COQUILLA vs COMELEC [385 SCRA 607; GR
151914, September 17, 2002]
FACTS: Petitioner Coquilla was born of Filipino
parents in Oras, Eastern Samar, where he grew
up and resided. In 1965, he joined the US Navy
and subsequently naturalized as a US citizen.
On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the
Philippines and took out a residence certificate,
albeit continued making several trips to the US.
On November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a
citizen of the Philippines subsequently after his
application for repatriation was approved.
On November 21, 2000, he applied for
registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern
Samar.
On February 27, 2001, he filed his COC stating
therein that he has been a resident of Oras,
Eastern Samar for 2 years.
On March 5, 2001, respondent incumbent
mayor of Oras who was running for re-election,
sought the cancellation of petitioner’s COC on
the ground that the latter had resided in Oras
for only about 6 months since when he took his
oath as a citizen of the Philippines.
On May 14, 2001, petitioner garnered the
highest number of votes and was subsequently
proclaimed mayor of Oras.
ISSUE: WON petitioner satisfied the residency
requirement for the position of mayor.
HELD: NO. Par. 39, Chapter 1, Title 2 of the
Local Government Code (RA 7160) provides that
an elective official must be a “…resident therein
(barangay, municipality, city or province) for at
least 1 year immediately preceding the day of
the election…”
The term “residence” is to be understood not in
its common acceptation as referring to
“dwelling” or “habitation,” but rather to
“domicile” or legal residence, that is, “the place
where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where
he may be found at any given time, eventually
intends to return and remain (animus manendi).
A domicile of origin is acquired by every person
at birth. It is usually the place where the child’s
parents reside and continues until the same is
abandoned by acquisition of a new domicile
(domicile of choice).
In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of
origin in Oras by becoming a US citizen after
enlisting in the US Navy in 1965. From then on
and until November 10, 2000, when he
reacquired Philippine citizenship, he was an
alien.
DELA TORRE vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 121592; July
5, 1996)
FACTS: Petitioner Rolando dela Torre was
disqualified from running as mayor of Cavinti,
Laguna on the ground that he was convicted of
violation the Anti-Fencing Law.
He argues that he should not be disqualified
because he is serving probation of his sentence
and hence, the execution of his judgment was
suspended together with all its legal
consequences.
ISSUE: W/N Dela Torre is disqualified to run for
public office.
HELD: Sec.40 of LGC provides:
Disqualifications.
The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an
offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment within two (2) years after serving
sentence;
Moral turpitude is considered as an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man
and woman or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.
In this case of fencing, actual knowledge by the
"fence" of the fact that property received is
stolen displays the same degree of malicious
deprivation of one's rightful property as that
which animated the robbery or theft which, by
their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude.
Hence Dela Torre is disqualified from seeking
public office.
With regard to his argument that he is under
probation, the court ruled that the legal effect
of probation is only to suspend the execution of
the sentence.
Dela Torre's conviction subsists and remains
totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of
probation. In fact, a judgment of conviction in a
criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the
accused applies for probation, although it is not
executory pending resolution of the application
for probation.
MERCADO vs MANZANO [307 SCRA 631, May
26, 1999]
FACTS: In the case at bar, petitioner was
seeking the disqualification of respondent to
hold elective office on the ground that he is a
dual citizen, having been born in the United
States of Filipino parents. Pursuant to Local
Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160), those
with dual citizenship are disqualified from
running any elective local position.
ISSUE: Whether or not dual citizenship is a
ground for disqualification.
HELD: No, because dual citizenship is different
from dual allegiance. What is inimical is not dual
citizenship per se, but with naturalized citizens
who maintain their allegiance to their countries
of origin even after their naturalization. Hence,
the phrase “dual citizenship” in RA 7160 must
be understood as referring to “dual allegiance”.
Consequently, persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification.
RODRIGUEZ vs. COMELEC [259 SCRA 296, 1996]
FACTS: The petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez was
a candidate for Governor in the Province of
Quezon in the May 8, 1995 elections. His rival
candidate for the said position was Bienvenido
O. Marquez, Jr., herein private respondent.
Private respondent filed a petition for
disqualification before the COMELEC based
principally on the allegation that Rodriguez is a
“fugitive from justice.” Private respondent
revealed that a charge for fraudulent insurance
claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft
of personal property is pending against the
petitioner before the Los Angeles Municipal
Court. Rodriguez is therefore a “fugitive from
justice” which is a ground for his
disqualification/ ineligibility under Section 40
(e) of the Local Government Code according to
Marquez.
Rodriguez, however, submitted a certification
from the Commission of Immigration showing
that Rodriguez left the US on June 25, 1985-
roughly five (5) months prior to the institution
of the criminal complaint filed against him
before the Los Angeles Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rodriguez is a “fugitive
from justice.”
HELD: No. The Supreme Court reiterated that a
“fugitive from justice” includes not only those
who flee after conviction to avoid punishment
but likewise who, being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution. The definition thus indicates that
the intent to evade is the compelling factor that
animates one’s flight from a particular
jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be
intent to evade prosecution or punishment
when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject
of an already instituted indictment or of a
promulgated judgement of conviction.
GAMBOA vs AGUIRRE and ARANETA [GR No.
134213]
FACTS: In the 1995 elections, Rafael Coscolluela,
petitioner Romeo J. Gamboa, Jr. and
respondents Marcelo Aguirre, Jr., and Juan Y.
Araneta were elected Negros Occidental
Governor, Vice-Governor and SP members,
respectively. Sometime in August of 1995, the
governor designated petitioner as Acting
Governor for the duration of the former’s
official trip abroad until his return. When the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan held its regular
session, respondents questioned the authority
of petitioner to preside therein in view of his
designation as Acting Governor and asked him
to vacate the Chair. The latter, however,
refused to do so. In another session, 7 members
of the SP voted to allow petitioner to continue
presiding while 4 others voted against with 1
abstention. Respondents filed before the lower
court a petition for declaratory relief and
prohibition. In the meantime, the Governor re-
assumed his office.
Later, the trial court rendered a decision and
declared petitioner as “temporarily legally
incapacitated to preside over the sessions of
the SP during the period that he is the Acting
Governor.” Petitioner filed a petition for review
raising the issue earlier mentioned. Although
this case is dismissible for having become moot
and academic considering the expiration in
1998 of the terms of office of the local officials
involved herein, the Court nonetheless
proceeds to resolve this common controversy
but novel issue under the existing laws on local
government.
ISSUE: W/N Gamboa, while serving as the
Acting Governor, temporarily relinquished the
powers, functions, duties and responsibilities of
the Vice-Governor, including the power to
preside over the sessions of the SP
HELD: YES. The LGC provides that the Vice- vested in the SP,” which is “the legislative body
Governor shall be the presiding officer of the of the province,” and enumerates therein its
SP. In addition to such function, he becomes the membership consisting of the:
Governor and assumes the higher office for the
unexpired term of his predecessor, in case of 1) Vice Governor as presiding officer
“permanent vacancy” therein. When the 2) regular elective SP members
vacancy, however, is merely temporary, the
Vice-Governor “shall automatically exercise the 3) 3 elective sectoral representatives
powers (subject to certain limitations) and
4) ex-officio members namely:
perform the duties and functions” of the
Governor. But, no such contingency is provided a) President of the provincial chapter of
in case of temporary vacancy in the office of the the liga ng mga barangay
Vice-Governor.
b) President of the panlalawigang
When the Vice-Governor exercises the “powers pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan
and duties” of the Governor, he does not
assume the latter office. He only “acts” as the c) President of the provincial federation
Governor but does not “become” the Governor. of sanggunian members of municipalities and
His assumption of the powers, duties and component cities
functions of the provincial Chief Executive does
Not being included in the enumeration, the
not create a permanent vacuum or vacancy in
Governor is deemed excluded and thus, local
his position as the Vice-Governor. Necessarily,
executive power in the province is vested alone
he does not relinquish nor abandon his position
in the Governor. Consequently, the union of
and title as Vice-Governor by merely becoming
legislative-executive powers in the office of the
an Acting Governor or by merely exercising the
local chief executive under the former Code has
powers and duties of the higher office.
been disbanded.
A Vice-Governor who is concurrently an Acting
Being the Acting Governor, the Vice-Governor
Governor is actually a quasi-Governor. This
cannot continue to simultaneously exercise the
means, that for purposes of exercising his
duties of the latter office, since the nature of
legislative prerogatives and powers, he is
the duties of the provincial Governor call for a
deemed as a non-member of the SP for the
full-time occupant to discharge them.
time being. By tradition, the offices of the
provincial Governor and Vice-Governor are
essentially executive in nature, whereas plain
members of the provincial board perform
functions partaking of a legislative character.
This is because the authority vested by law in
the provincial boards involves primarily a
delegation of some legislative powers of
Congress. This is clear from the law, when it
provides that “local legislative power shall be