JULY 15 She obtained U.S. Passport No.
017037793 on 19
1. Grace Poe vs. Comelec, GR. Nos. 221697,
221698-700, March 8, 2016
FACTS: Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares
(petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn infant in
the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo
Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental care
and custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to
his relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife.
Three days after, 6 September 1968, Emiliano reported
and registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office
of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her
Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the
petitioner was given the name “Mary Grace Natividad
Contreras Militar.” When petitioner was five (5) years
old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a.
Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan
Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May
1974, the trial court granted their petition and ordered
that petitioner’s name be changed from “Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar” to “Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe.”
Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in
1986, petitioner registered as a voter with the local
COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 4 April 1988,
petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine
Passport No. F9272876 by the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and 19 May
1998, she renewed her Philippine passport. Initially, the
petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in
Development Studies at the University of the
Philippines but she opted to continue her studies
abroad and left for the United States of America (U.S.).
On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael
Daniel V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a citizen of both
the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose
Parish in San Juan City.10 Desirous of being with her
husband who was then based in the U.S., the couple
flew back to the U.S. two days after the wedding
ceremony or on 29 July 1991. On 18 October 2001,
petitioner became a naturalized American citizen.14
December 2001. On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came
back to the Philippines together with Hanna to support
her father’s candidacy for President in the May 2004
elections. After a few months, specifically on 13
December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the
Philippines upon learning of her father’s deteriorating
medical condition. Her father slipped into a coma and
eventually expired. The petitioner stayed in the country
until 3 February 2005 to take care of her father’s
funeral arrangements as well as to assist in the
settlement of his estate.
Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines
on 24 May 200524 and without delay, secured a Tax
Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant
to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.36 Under the
same Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI)
a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship. On
12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice
Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an
“Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the
United States.” On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed
with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC)
for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she
answered “6 years and 6 months” to the question
“Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13,
2013.” Petitioner obtained the highest number of votes
and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013. On 15
October 2015, petitioner filed her CoC for the
Presidency for the May 2016 Elections.56 In her CoC,
the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born
citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to
the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005.57 The
petitioner attached to her CoC an “Affidavit Affirming
Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship” subscribed and
sworn to before a notary public in Quezon City on 14
October 2015. Petitioner’s filing of her CoC for
President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing
of several COMELEC cases against her which were the
subject of these consolidated cases.
Issue: Can the COMELEC, in the same cancellation of
COC case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the
candidate?
Ruling: No. The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same
cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack
thereof of the candidate. The opinion of Justice Vicente
V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on
Elections, which was affirmatively cited in the En Banc
decision in Fermin v. COMELEC is our guide, which ruled
that, “It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds
from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases
involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an
inquiry into qualifications based on age, residence and
citizenship of voters. “
The pronouncement of Romualdez leds to an
amendment done in 2012, which provides, “Grounds. -
Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a
party, is declared by final decision of a competent
court, guilty of, or found by the Commission to be
suffering from any disqualification provided by law or
the Constitution. A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate
invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or Cancel a
Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a
Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or a combination
thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.” Clearly, the
amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the
reality of absence of an authorized proceeding for
determining before election the qualifications of
candidate. Such that, as presently required, to
disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration by a
final judgment of a competent court that the candidate
sought to be disqualified "is guilty of or found by the
Commission to be suffering from any disqualification
provided by law or the Constitution."
Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is
concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides of one to
the other. Both do not allow, are not authorizations,
are not vestment of jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to
determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts of
qualification must beforehand be established in a prior
proceeding before an authority properly vested with
jurisdiction. The prior determination of qualification
may be by statute, by executive order or by a judgment
of a competent court or tribunal.
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a
prior finding that he or she is suffering from a
disqualification "provided by law or the Constitution,"
neither can the certificate of candidacy be cancelled or
denied due course on grounds of false representations
regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior
authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified,
such prior authority being the necessary measure by
which the falsity of the representation can be found.
The only exception that can be conceded are self-
evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable
veracity and judicial confessions. Such are, anyway,
bases equivalent to prior decisions against which the
falsity of representation can be determined.
2. Albania vs. Comelec, GR. No. 226792, June 6,
2017
FACTS: Petitioner, filed a petition for respondent's
disqualification from running as Governor based on Rule
25 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 on two grounds:
(1) he violated the three term limit rule under Section
43 of RA No 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991 (LGC); and (2) respondent's
suspension from office for one year without pay,
together with its accessory penalties, after he was
found guilty of oppression and grave abuse of authority
in the Ombudsman's Order dated October 2, 2015. The
COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition for
being filed out of time. It ruled that a violation of the
three-term limit rule and suspension from office as a
result of an administrative case are not grounds for
disqualification of a candidate under the law; that the
alleged violation of three-term limit rule is a ground for
ineligibility which constituted false material
representation under Section 78 of the OEC; and such
petition must be filed within 25 days from the time of
filing of the COC, which respondent failed to do.
ISSUE: Was petition for disqualification grounded on the
three-term limitation filed on time?
RULING: NO. As the petition filed is indeed a petition
under Section 78 of the OEC, the filing of the same must
comply with the period prescribed therein, i.e., the filing
of the same must be made not later than twenty-five
days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. In this case, respondent filed his COC for
Governor of Camarines Norte for the 2016 elections on
October 16, 2015, and he had 25 days therefrom to file
the petition for denial of due course or cancellation of
COC on the ground of violation of the three-term limit
rule, which fell on November 10, 2015. However, the
petition was filed only on November 13, 2015 which was
already beyond the period to file the same; thus, find no
grave abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC in
dismissing the petition for being filed out of time.
3. Santos vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 235058,
September 04, 2018
FACTS: On October 14, 2015, Jennifer Antiquera Roxas
(respondent) filed a certificate of candidacy for the
position of member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod for
the First District of Pasay City for the May 9, 2016
National and Local Elections.
On October 21, 2015, respondent filed a petition for
disqualification against Rosalie Isles Roxas (Rosalie)
before the COMELEC praying that the latter be declared
a nuisance candidate because her certificate of
candidacy (COC) was only filed for the sole purpose of
causing confusion among the voters by the similarity of
their names. She pointed out that Rosalie stated that her
nickname was "Jenn-Rose," to impersonate the former,
when Rosalie's real nickname was actually "Saleng."
Respondent also argued that Rosalie's intent to confuse
the voters was apparent because she chose the name
"Roxas Jenn-Rose" to appear in the official ballot even
though respondent, a re-electionist candidate, was
already using the name "Roxas Jenny" for election
purposes.
In its Resolution dated March 30, 2016, the COMELEC
Second Division granted the petition and declared
Rosalie a nuisance candidate. It found that Rosalie
suspiciously indicated her name in the ballot to be "Roxas
Jenn-Rose," which was strikingly similar with
respondent's name in the ballot as "Roxas Jenny." The
COMELEC also observed that the nickname "Jenn-Rose"
did not resemble the name of Rosalie as her real
nickname was actually "Saleng." It further opined that
Rosalie was not financially capable of sustaining the
rigors of waging a campaign. COMELEC concluded that
the candidacy of Rosalie was clearly meant to cause
confusion among the voters with respect to respondent's
name and that Rosalie had no bona fide intention to run
for office.
ISSUE: After one has been declared a nuisance
candidate, should there be a separate proceeding to
effect the transfer of votes to the bonafide candidate?
RULING: No. Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code
states that the COMELEC may declare a person as a
nuisance candidate motu proprio or through a verified
petition. In Dela Cruz, the Court discussed that the said
petition to declare a person as a nuisance candidate is
akin to a petition to cancel or deny due course a COC
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
A cancelled certificate cannot give rise to a valid
candidacy, much less to valid votes. Said votes cannot be
counted in favor of the candidate whose COC was
cancelled as he or she is not treated as a candidate at all,
as if he or she never filed a COC. Thus, a petition to
declare a person a nuisance candidate or a petition for
disqualification of a nuisance candidate is already
sufficient to cancel the COC of the said candidate and to
credit the garnered votes to the legitimate candidate
because it is as if the nuisance candidate was never a
candidate to be voted for.
To subscribe to petitioners' argument – that there should
be a separate proceeding solely for the purpose of
crediting the votes in favor of the legitimate candidate –
would be absurd. When a candidate is declared a
nuisance candidate, it certainly follows that he or she
cannot be voted for as he or she is not a candidate,
consequently, the votes shall be credited to the
legitimate candidate. Evidently, the crediting of the votes
is a logical consequence of the final decision in the
nuisance case because the vote for the nuisance
candidate is considered a vote for the legitimate
candidate. It would be the height of injustice to require
the legitimate candidate to initiate a separate
proceeding for the crediting of votes when it was already
declared that there was indeed a nuisance candidate,
which confused the electorate regarding their votes for
the legitimate candidate.
ISSUE: Shall the votes be credited to the legitimate
candidate if the decision in the nuisance case becomes
final and executory only after the elections?
RULING: Qualify. It does not distinguish whether the
decision in the nuisance case became final and executory
before or after the elections. In a nuisance petition, the
votes of the nuisance candidate shall be credited to the
legitimate candidate once the decision becomes final
and executory, whether before or after the elections.
Martinez III provides the basis for this rule: "final
judgments declaring a nuisance candidate should
effectively cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by
such candidate as of election day."
4. Zapanta vs. Zapanta, G.R. No. 233016, March
05, 2019
FACTS:
For the May 9, 2016 national and local elections,
Reynaldo, Alfred, and petitioner intervenor Edilberto U.
Lagasca (Lagasca) each filed a Certificate of Candidacy for
city councilor of the Second District of Antipolo City,
Rizal. The Second District of Antipolo City is entitled to
eight (8) seats in the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
Alfred filed before the Commission a Verified Petition To
Deny Due Course and/or To Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy of Reynaldo S. Zapanta as Nuisance Candidate
(Nuisance Petition). He alleged that Reynaldo indicated
the name "Alfred" both as his nickname in his Certificate
of Candidacy and as his name in the official ballots. He
claimed that Reynaldo never identified himself as
"Alfred."
Alfred averred that Reynaldo's use of the name "Alfred"
was "designed to mislead the voters" to steal the votes
intended for him. He contended that Reynaldo "has no
[bona fide] intention to run for the office [and only aims
to] cause confusion among the voters of Antipolo City
and thus prevent the faithful determination of the true
will of the electorate of Antipolo City." He prayed that
Reynaldo be declared as a nuisance candidate and that
Reynaldo's Certificate of Candidacy be canceled. He
further prayed that Reynaldo's name be excluded in the
official ballots and, should his Petition be decided after
the elections, that the votes Reynaldo would have
received be counted in his favor.
In its May 8, 2016 Resolution, the Commission's Second
Division granted Alfred's Petition. It found that
Reynaldo's name, as it would be indicated in the official
ballots, was "confusingly similar" to Alfred's name.
Meanwhile, the national and local elections took place
on May 9, 2016.
On June 1, 2016, Reynaldo moved for the
reconsideration of the May 8, 2016 Resolution of the
Commission's Second Division. He argued that his name's
likeness with Alfred's "does not necessarily make him a
nuisance candidate."
In its August 8, 2017 Resolution, the Commission En Banc
denied Reynaldo's Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit. It further ruled that the votes in favor of Reynaldo
should be credited to Alfred, pursuant to Dela Cruz. On
August 18, 2017, the Commission issued a Certificate of
Finality, declaring its August 8, 2017 Resolution final and
executory.
ISSUE: In a multi-slot office, shall all votes cast in favor of
the nuisance candidate whose name is confusingly
similar to a bona fide candidate be automatically
credited in the latter’s favor?
RULING: NO.
In a multi-slot office, all votes cast in favor of the
nuisance candidate whose name is confusingly similar to
a bona fide candidate shall NOT be automatically
credited in the latter's favor. If the ballot contains one (1)
vote for the nuisance candidate and no vote for the bona
fide candidate, that vote will be counted in the latter's
favor. However, if the nuisance candidate and the bona
fide candidate each gets a vote, only one (1) vote will be
counted in the latter's favor.
Discussion:
This Court further holds that public respondent's order
of adding petitioner's votes to private respondent's votes
is not tainted with grave abuse of discretion. However,
its ruling on this issue must be set aside.
With the recent promulgation of Santos, this Court
clarified how the votes of nuisance candidates in a multi-
slot office should be treated:
xxx
Therefore, in a multi-slot office, the COMELEC
must not merely apply a simple mathematical
formula of adding the votes of the nuisance
candidate to the legitimate candidate with the
similar name. To apply such simple arithmetic
might lead to the double counting of votes
because there may be ballots containing votes
for both nuisance and legitimate candidates.
xxx
Here, the Santos doctrine must be applied: the votes for
petitioner alone should be counted in favor of private
respondent; if there are votes for both petitioner and
private respondent in the same ballot, then only one (1)
vote should be counted in the latter's favor. This will not
only discourage nuisance candidates, but will also
prevent the disenfranchisement of voters.
JULY 17
1. Bagumbayan vs. Comelec, GR. No. 222731,
March 8, 2016 [MR]
FACTS: Bagumbayan-VNP and former Senator
Gordon filed before the SC a petition for
mandamus to compel COMELEC to implement
the Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT)
which is a security feature provided under RA
8346, as amended by RA 9369, to ensure the
sanctity of the ballot. The VVPAT functionality is
in the form of a printed receipt and a touch
screen reflecting the votes in the vote-counting
machine. For the 2016 elections, the COMELEC
opted to use vote-counting machines instead of
PCOS. The vote-counting machines are capable
of providing the VVPAT functionality, and for
that the COMELEC is now being petitioned to
have the vote-counting machines issue receipts
once the person has voted. The COMELEC,
however, refused to enable this feature for
reasons that the receipts might be used by
candidates in vote-buying and that it might
increase the voting time in election precincts.
ISSUES:
1. Did the Supreme Court ruled in Roque vs.
Comelec, that “the paper ballot satisfies the
VVPAT requirement?
2. Is a voter’s receipt requirement only necessary
when COMELEC uses a direct recording
electronic election system?
RULING:
1. NO. By setting the minimum system
capabilities of our automated election system,
the law intends to achieve the purposes set out
in this declaration. A mechanism that allows the
voter to verify his or her choice of candidates will
ensure a free, orderly, honest, peaceful,
credible, and informed election. The voter is not
left to wonder if the machine correctly
appreciated his or her ballot. The voter must
know that his or her sovereign will, with respect
to the national and local leadership, was
properly recorded by the vote-counting
machines. The minimum functional capabilities
enumerated under Section 6 of Republic Act
8436, as amended, are mandatory. These
functions constitute the most basic safeguards
to ensure the transparency, credibility, fairness
and accuracy of the upcoming elections.
The law is clear. A "voter verified paper audit
trail" requires the following: (a) individual voters
 can verify whether the machines have been able
to count their votes; and (b) that the verification
at minimum should be paper based.
There appears to be no room for further
interpretation of a "voter verified paper audit
trail." The paper audit trail cannot be considered
the physical ballot, because there may be
instances where the machine may translate the
ballot differently, or the voter inadvertently
spoils his or her ballot.
2. YES. PCOS, being a paper-based technology,
affords audit since the voter would be able, if
need be, to verify if the machine had scanned,
recorded and counted his vote properly.
Moreover, it should also be noted that the PCOS
machine contains an LCD screen, one that can be
programmed or configured to display to the
voter his votes as read by the machine.
Therefore, Court is fairly satisfied that the
Comelec has adopted a rigid technical evaluation
mechanism, a set of 26-item/check list criteria,
to ensure compliance with the above minimum
systems capabilities.
2. Chong vs. Senate, G.R. No. 217725, May 31,
2016
FACTS: The factual background of this case dates
back to the enactment of R.A. No. 8436 on
December 22, 1997 authorizing the adoption of
an automated election system (AES) in the May
11, 1998 national and local elections and
onwards. On January 23, 2007, R.A. No. 9369
was signed into law, amending R.A. No. 8436. Of
particular relevance in R.A. No. 9369 are Sections
8, 9, 10 and 11 which calls for the creation of the
AC and the TEC.
In Roque, Jr., et al. v. COMELEC, et al.,6 the Court
stated that the AC is to recommend, among
other functions, the most appropriate, secure,
applicable and cost-effective technology to be
applied to the AES; while the TEC is tasked to
certify, through an established international
certification committee, not later than three
months before the elections, by categorically
stating that the AES, inclusive of its hardware
and software components, is operating properly
and accurately based on defined and
documented standards.
Nevertheless, almost eight years after the
passage of R.A. No. 9369, and almost six years
after the conclusion of the 2010 elections, and
just several months before the 2016 elections,
Glenn Chong and Ang Kapatiran Party
(petitioners) came to this Court to assail the
constitutionality of the creation of the AC and
the TEC.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 8, 9, 10 and 11 of
R.A. No. 8436, as amended by Section 9 of R.A.
No. 9369, insofar as they provide for the creation
of the AC and the TEC, are unconstitutional for
allegedly being violative of Section 2(1), Article
IX-C of the 1987 Constitution?
RULING: No. A careful examination of the
assailed provisions would reveal that the AC and
the TEC's functions are merely advisory and
recommendatory in nature. The AC's primordial
task is to recommend the most appropriate
technology to the AES, while the TEC's sole
function is to certify that the AES, including its
hardware and software components, is
operating properly, securely and accurately, in
accordance with the provisions of law.
The functions of the AC are recommendatory, as
can be gleaned from the assailed provision itself
in Section 9 of R.A. No. 8436 which provides that
the functions of the AC are merely to
recommend, to provide advice and/or
assistance, and to participate as non-voting
members with respect to the COMELEC s
fulfillment of its mandate and authority to use
the AES, and which in all instances, is subject to
the approval and final decision of the COMELEC.
On the other hand, the TEC's exclusive function
 is to certify, through an established international
certification entity to be chosen by the COMELEC
from the recommendations of the AC that the
AES, including its hardware and software
components, is operating properly, securely, and
accurately, in accordance with the provisions of
law. Evidently, the AC and the TEC were created
to aid the COMELEC in fulfilling its mandate and
authority to use an effective AES for free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, credible and informed
elections. The actions of the AC and the TEC
neither bind nor prohibit the COMELEC from
enforcing and administering election laws.
3. Bungcaras vs. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 209415-17,
Nov. 15, 2016
FACTS: During the May 10, 2010 Automated
Elections, the petitioners and private
respondents vied for the local elective positions
in the municipality of Saint Bernard, Southern
Leyte. Respondent Rentuza was proclaimed the
winner for the mayoralty position over
petitioner Lim-Bungcaras; while for the position
of Vice Mayor, respondent Avendula was
proclaimed the winner over petitioner Castil. For
the members of the Sangguniang Bayan, private
respondents Calapre, Cinco, Salas, Dalugdugan,
Japon, Santiago, Malubay, and Bungcag were
declared winners as they received the eight
highest numbers of votes. Petitioners Pamaos,
Avendula, Domingo Ramada, Jr. and Victor
Ramada, were candidates for positions in the
Sangguniang Bayan who got the lower numbers
of votes. The petitioners contested the election
results before the RTC of San Juan, Southern
Leyte.
The Judgment of the RTC - the three (3) election
protests are all DISMISSED with costs against the
protestants. ACCORDINGLY, the counterclaims
of the protestees are GRANTED.
The Rulings of the COMELEC - On February 1,
2011, the COMELEC First Division issued three
separate but similarly worded Orders that
dismissed the petitioners’ appeals for failure to
pay the appeal fee payable to the COMELEC
within the reglementary period.
The motions were, however, denied by the
COMELEC En Banc in its assailed Resolution
dated September 6, 2013. The COMELEC En Banc
ruled that the motions had been rendered moot
given that the terms of the contested offices
already expired on June 30, 2013. As such, a
decision on the motions would no longer serve
any useful purpose.
ISSUE: Can moral damages and attorney’s fees
be awarded in election protests?
RULING: For moral damages – No. For attorney’s
fees – the same must be just and borne out by
the pleadings and evidence of the party
concerned.
With respect to moral damages, presently, the
award of damages in election contests is
provided under Section 259 of the Omnibus
Election Code. What is patently clear from
Section 259 of the Omnibus Election Code is that
only actual or compensatory damages may be
awarded in election contests. The above
provision is a stark contrast to the aforestated
provisions in the past election codes that
expressly permit the award of moral and
exemplary damages. As the Court concluded in
Atienza, the omission of the provisions allowing
for moral and exemplary damages in the current
Omnibus Election Code clearly underscores the
legislative intent to do away with the award of
damages other than those specified in Section
259 of the Omnibus Election Code, i.e., actual or
compensatory damages.
While on the other hand, for the trial court to
award attorney’s fees, the same must be just and
borne out by the pleadings and evidence of the
party concerned. Furthermore, Article 2208 of
the Civil Code enumerates the specific instances
when attorney’s fees may be awarded, among
which is when the defendant’s act or omission
has compelled the plaintiff to litigate or to incur
expenses to protect the latter’s interest.
In the case at bar, while the private respondents
did include their claim for attorney’s fees in their
memorandum before the trial court, the Court
finds that they did not adduce sufficient
evidence to substantiate their entitlement to
said claim. Moreover, the fact that the private
respondents were compelled to litigate does
not, by itself, merit the award of attorney’s fees.
Issue: How are appeals in election cases
involving elective municipal and barangay
officials, perfected?
Ruling: On July 15, 2008, the COMELEC
promulgated COMELEC Resolution No. 8486 in
order to clarify the implementation of the rules
on the required appeal fees for the perfection of
the appeals of election cases decided by the trial
courts.
“Section 8. Appeal. - An aggrieved party may
appeal the decision to the Commission on
Elections, within five days after promulgation, by
filing a notice of appeal with the court that
rendered the decision, with copy served on the
adverse counsel or party if not represented by
counsel.”
“Section 9. Appeal Fee. - The appellant in an
election contest shall pay to the court that
rendered the decision an appeal fee of One
Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), simultaneously
with the filing of the notice of appeal.”
WHEREAS, payment of appeal fees in appealed
election protest cases is also required in Section
3, Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
the amended amount of which was set at
P3,200.00 in COMELEC Minute Resolution No.
02-0130 made effective on September 18, 2002.
To recapitulate, if the appellant had already paid
the amount of P1,000.00 before the Regional
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court or lower courts within the five-day
period, pursuant to Section 9, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before
the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and
Barangay Officials (Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 07-4-15) and his
Appeal was given due course by the Court, said
appellant is required to pay the COMELEC appeal
fee of P 3,200. 00 at the Commission’s Cash
Division through the Electoral Contests
Adjudication Department (ECAD) or by postal
money order payable to the Commission on
Elections through ECAD, within a period of
fifteen days (15) from the time of the filing of the
Notice of Appeal with the lower court. If no
payment is made within the prescribed period,
the appeal shall be dismissed pursuant to
Section 9(a) of Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.
4. Legazpi vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 216572, April 19,
2016 [MR]
FACTS: Feliciano Legaspi sought for the
disqualification of Alfredo Germar, Rogelio
Santos Jr. and Roberto Esquivel on the ground of
rampant vote buying during the days leading to
the elections. Germar emerged as the highest
vote getter in the mayoralty race. Santos, for his
part, also appeared to have secured enough
votes to be the second councilor of the
municipality. Esquivel, though, failed in his bid to
become vice mayor of Norzagaray.
The Comelec's Special First Division has
disqualified Germar and Santos. Motions for
Reconsideration were filed which resulted in a
split vote. A rehearing was conducted insofar as
the electoral aspect of the case but the Comelec
en banc again failed to come up with a majority
consensus. The Comelec en banc dismissed the
disqualification case based on Section 6, Rule18
of the 1993 Comelec Rules of Procedures, which
states that When the Commission en banc is
equally divided in opinion, or the necessary
majority cannot be had, the case shall be
reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is
reached, the action or proceeding shall be
dismissed if originally commenced in the
Commission.
 Unconvinced, the petitioner filed the present
petition before the Supreme Court.
For the MR: From the September 1, 2015
Decision, petitioner Legaspi interposed the
instant motion for reconsideration. Hence, the
Court is faced once again with the issue on how
to treat the rulings of the COMELEC en banc
when less than four (4) votes were cast to either
grant or deny the motion for reconsideration
pending before it.
ISSUES:
1. Did the interpretation of Sec. 6, Rule 18
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure in Mendoza and
in the September 1, 2015 Decision render the rule
unconstitutional?
2. Is the motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC en banc an "incidental matter"?
RULING:
1. YES. The Mendoza doctrine, as
reiterated in the September 1, 2015 Decision,
deviated from the 1987 Constitution. Not only
does it circumvent the four-vote requirement
under Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution, it
likewise diminishes the adjudicatory powers of
the COMELEC Divisions under Sec. 3, Article IX-C.
Under Sec. 3, Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution, the COMELEC Divisions are granted
adjudicatory powers to decide election cases,
provided that the COMELEC en banc shall resolve
motions for reconsideration of the division
rulings. Further, under Sec. 7, Article IX-A of the
Constitution,four (4) votes are necessary for the
COMELEC en banc to decide a case. Naturally,
the party moving for reconsideration, as the
party seeking affirmative relief, carries the
burden of proving that the division committed
reversible error. The movant then shoulders the
obligation of convincing four (4) Commissioners
to grant his or her plea.
2. YES.In the adverted ruling, Senior
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice
Carpio) explained that a motion for
reconsideration is an incidental matter, and that
application of Sec. 7, Rule 56 thereto has been
clarified in A.M. No. 99- 1-09-SC28 wherein the
Court resolved as follows: A MOTION FOR THE
CONSIDERATION OF A DECISION OR
RESOLUTION OF THE COURT EN BANC OR OF A
DIVISION MAY BE GRANTED UPON A VOTE OF A
MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE EN BANC
OR OF A DIVISION, AS THE CASE MAY BE, WHO
ACTUALLY TOOK P ART IN THE DELIBERATION OF
THE MOTION IF THE VOTING RESULTS IN A TIE,
THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS
DEEMED DENIED. (emphasis added)
Free from ambiguity, the plain meaning of the
clarificatory resolution is that the motion for
reconsideration, being an incidental matter, is
deemed denied if no majority vote is reached.
Consequently, the Court's prior majority action
in such cases stands affirmed.
5. De la Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 209387, Jan. 11,
2016
FACTS:
• Dela Cruz was an on-the-job trainee of
an inter-island vessel. He frequently traveled,
coming back and forth taking a vessel. At around
12:00 noon of May 11, 2007, Dela Cruz was at a
pier of the Cebu Domestic Port to go home to
Iloilo.
• While buying a ticket, he allegedly left
his bag on the floor with a porter. It took him
around 15 minutes to purchase a ticket.
• Dela Cruz then proceeded to the
entrance of the terminal and placed his bag on
the x-ray scanning machine for inspection. The
operator of the x-ray machine saw firearms
inside Dela Cruz’s bag.
• Cutie Pie Flores (Flores) was the x-ray
machine operator-on-duty on May 11, 2007.18
She saw the impression of what appeared to be
three (3) firearms inside Dela Cruzs bag.
• Upon seeing the suspected firearms, she
called the attention of port personnel Igot who
was the baggage inspector then.
• Igot asked Dela Cruz whether he was the
owner of the bag. Dela Cruz answered Igot in the
affirmative and consented to Igot’s manual
inspection of the bag.
• Port Police Officer Abregana was on duty
at the terminal of the Cebu Domestic Port in Pier
1-G when his attention was called by . . . Igot.
• Igot told Officer Abregana that there
were firearms in a bag owned by a certain
person. Igot then pointed to the person. That
person was later identified as Dela Cruz.
• Dela Cruz admitted that he was owner of
the bag. The bag was then inspected and the
following items were found inside: three (3)
revolvers; NBI clearance; seaman’s book; other
personal items; and four (4) live ammunitions
placed inside the cylinder.
• When asked whether he had the proper
documents for the firearms, Dela Cruz answered
in the negative.
• Dela Cruz was then arrested and
informed of his violation of a crime punishable
by law. He was also informed of his
constitutional rights.
• RTC ruled that he Committed illegal
possession of possession of firearms.
• Dela Cruz, who had been charged with
illegal possession of firearms, was also charged
with violating the Gun Ban under Commission on
Elections Resolution No. 7764.
• On appeal, CA affirmed the trial court's
judgment. Hence this petition.
Issue: Was the court correct in dismissing the
charge for illegal possession of firearm and
convicting the accused for violation of the of the
Gun Ban?
Ruling: Yes.
The trial court was correct when it dismissed
Criminal Case No. CBU-80084 for violation of
Republic Act No. 8294, otherwise known as
illegal possession of firearms. Agote v. Judge
Lorenzo already settled the question of whether
there can be aseparate offense of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition if there
is another
crime committed. In that case, the petitioner
was charged with both illegal possession of
firearms an violation of the Gun Ban under
Commission on Elections
Resolution No. 2826. This court acquitted
petitioner in the case for illegal possession of
firearms since he simultaneously violated the
Gun Ban. This court also
held that the unlicensed firearm need not be
actually used in the course of committing the
other crime for the application of Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 8294.
Similarly, Madrigal v. People178 applied the
ruling in Agote and held that Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 8294 is express in its terms that
a person may not be convicted for illegal
possession of firearms if another crime was
committed.
Issue: Does the Indeterminate Sentence Law
apply to election offenses?
Ruling: Yes.
We note that the trial court imposed the penalty
of imprisonment for a period of one (1) year and
to suffer disqualification to hold public office and
deprivation of the right to suffrage.
Under Section 264 of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg.
881, persons found guilty of an election offense
shall be punished with imprisonment of not less
than one (1) year but not more than six (6) years
and shall not be subject to probation. The
Indeterminate Sentence Law applies to offenses
punished by both the Revised Penal Code and
special laws. The penalty to be imposed is a
matter of law that courts must follow. The trial
court should have provided minimum and
maximum terms for petitionerÊs penalty of
imprisonment as required by the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. Accordingly, we modify the
penalty imposed by the trial court. Based on the
 facts, we deem it reasonable that petitioner be
penalized with imprisonment of one (1) year as
minimum to two (2) years as maximum.

6. Sevilla vs. Gupit, G.R. No. 227797, November

13, 2018

FACTS: Petitioner and respondent were

candidates for Punong Barangay in Agusan Del
Norte. Petitioner was proclaimed the winner
with 466 votes, while respondent has 465 votes.
Hence, respondent contested his defeat via an
election protest. Notably, 4 ballots were subject
to the petition. One of which was a ballot with
the name Nanie G and another ballot contained
the words ALE on the space for Punong
Barangay.

ISSUE: Are the idem sonams, neighborhood rule and

intent rule applicable in this case?

RULING: Qualified. Idem sonams was applicable to the

ballot since the name "Nanie G" written on the space
allotted for Punong Barangay in the questioned ballot
was validly credited to private respondent. "Nanie"
undoubtedly sounds like the name of private
respondent, i.e., "Ranie". Moreover, the surname of
private respondent, i.e., Gupit, starts with a G.

However, the Neighborhood and Intent Rules find no

application in the present case, considering that there
was a name written in the space provided for Punong
Barangay and regardless of the fact that such name does
not belong to any candidate vying for the said position.