ARTICLE IV On October 6, 2010, President Aquino appointed

Senator Poe as Chairperson of the Movie and

Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).
1. David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. On October 20, 2010, Senator Poe executed an
221538. September 20, 2016 Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United
States of America and Renunciation of American
Citizenship. Senator Poe executed an
FACTS: Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a
Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of
foundling whose biological parents are unknown. As
the United States on July 12, 2011. Senator Poe
an infant, she was abandoned at the Parish Church
decided to run as Senator in the 2013 Elections and
of Jaro, Iloilo. She was later adopted and raised by
eventually won. David, a losing candidate in the
spouses FPJ and Susan Roces. She took her college
2013 Senatorial Elections, filed before the Senate
degree in the USA. She returns to the Philippines
Electoral Tribunal a Petition for Quo Warranto on
frequently. On July 29, 1991, Senator Poe decided
August 6, 2015. He contested the election of
to settle in the US with her husband and children
Senator Poe for failing to "comply with the
and lived there for some time. She was naturalized
citizenship and residency requirements mandated
and granted American citizenship on October 18,
by the Constitution. On November 17, 2015, the
2001. She was subsequently given a United States
Senate Electoral Tribunal promulgated its assailed
passport.
Decision finding Senator Poe to be a natural-born
When FPJ ran for President in 2004, she returned to citizen and, therefore, qualified to hold office as
support her father's candidacy. After the Elections, Senator. Hence, this petition.
she returned to the United States on July 8, 2004.
On December 14, 2004, FPJ died. She stayed in the
country until February 3, 2005 to attend her father's
funeral and to attend to the settling of his estate. In ISSUE: Is there a presumption that all foundlings
2004, Senator Poe resigned from work in the United found in the Philippines are born to at least either a
States and decided to return home in 2005. She Filipino father or a Filipino mother?
came back on May 24, 2005. On July 7, 2006, she
took the Oath of Allegiance to Republic of the
Philippines RULING: Yes. Apart from how private respondent is
a natural-born Filipino citizen consistent with a
In July 2006, her Petition for Retention and or Re-
reading that harmonizes Article IV, Section 2's
acquisition of Philippine Citizenship and derivative
definition of natural-born citizens and Section 1(2)'s
citizenship on behalf of her three children were
reference to parentage, the Constitution sustains a
granted. Senator Poe became a registered voter of
presumption that all foundlings found in the
Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on August 31,
Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino
2006. Senator Poe made several trips to the United
father or a Filipino mother and are thus natural-
States of America between 2006 and 2009 using her
born, unless there is substantial proof otherwise.
United States Passport. She used her passport "after
Consistent with Article IV, Section 1(2), any such
having taken her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
countervailing proof must show that both—not just
on 07 July 2006, but not after she has formally
one—of a foundling's biological parents are not
renounced her American citizenship on 20 October
Filipino citizens.
2010.
The presumption arises when one reads the
Constitution as a whole, so as to effectuate its whole
purpose. It must not be read in isolation but in light
of the constitutional mandate to defend the well-
being of children, to guarantee equal protection of
the law and equal access to opportunities for public
service, and to respect human rights. They must also
be read in conjunction with the Constitution's
reasons for requiring natural-born status for select
public offices. Further, this presumption is validated
by contemporaneous construction that considers
related legislative enactments, executive and
administrative actions, and international
instruments.
ISSUE: (for Article V) Did Senator Poe fail to comply
with the citizenship and residency requirement?
RULING: No. Private respondent was a Filipino
citizen at birth. This status' commencement from
birth means that private respondent never had to
do anything to consummate this status. By
definition, she is natural-born. Though subsequently
naturalized, she reacquired her natural-born status
upon satisfying the requirement of Republic Act No.
9225. Accordingly, she is qualified to hold office as a
Senator of the Republic. On the issue of residency,
during the Preliminary Conference with the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, the parties agreed to drop the
issue of residency on the ground of prescription.
2. REPUBLIC vs KARBASI, G.R. 210412, July 29, 2015
FACTS: Kamran F. Karbasi filed a petition for
naturalization with the RTC. After finding the
petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC
issued an order setting the petition for hearing and
ordering the publication thereof, once a week for
three consecutive weeks, in the Official Gazette and
in a newspaper of general circulation in Zamboanga
del Norte and in Dipolog and Dapitan. Karbasi and
his counsel appeared and presented proof of
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.
Nobody appeared to interpose an objection to the
petition. During the hearing on Alton C. Ratificar and
Dominador Natividad Tagulo testified as character
witnesses. The RTC found Karbasi’s evidence
sufficient to support his petition and found Karbasi
as possessing all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen. Not in
conformity, the Republic of the Philippines, through
the OSG, interposed an appeal to the CA, based
mainly on the ground that the RTC erred in granting
Karbasi’s petition as he failed to comply with the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 473
(Naturalization Law) on character, income and
reciprocity. The CA ruled that the alleged under
declaration in Karbasi’s ITRs was prepared in good
faith because he was of the belief that he no longer
needed to include the income he received as
payment of his services to Daewoo Electronics
Electronics Services, Inc. (Daewoo) and Kolins
Philippines International, Inc. (Kolins), because the
same were already withheld at source. The CA
likewise affirmed the RTC finding that Karbasi, as a
refugee, need not prove reciprocity between
Philippine and Iranian laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA had correctly affirmed
the RTC decision granting application for
naturalization of Karbasi, an Iranian refugee, despite
the opposition posed by the OSG?
RULING: Yes. First, there was neither a showing that
Karbasi was dependent on another person for
support nor proof that his family’s extraordinary
expenses that would render his income as
inadequate. As in any other business venture, the
risk of losses is a possibility for his repair shop but,
still, this risk was not clearly established to render
his livelihood as unstable and volatile. In fact, the
OSG does not belie the fact that Karbasi has been
engaged by reputable companies for his services.
Conversely, the findings of the RTC would indicate
that Karbasi had indeed exhibited industry and hard
work in putting up his repair shop business and that
his wife considered him as a good provider, not to
mention a vocational and college degree holder.
Admittedly, testimonies in favor of an applicant for
naturalization are expected to be self-serving.
Nevertheless, the Court finds it difficult to agree with
the OSG’s meager use of government data to prove
that Karbasi would become a burden to the
Philippine society in the future. Except for its own
citation of government data, nothing else was
presented to establish that Karbasi had indeed no
lucrative income or trade to support himself and his
family. (No need to write)
Second, as to the issue of Karbasi’s alleged
underdeclaration of income in his ITRs, the Court
ruled that Karbasi did not deny the charge of the
OSG and instead admitted a procedural lapse on his
part. There is no showing that the income earned by
Karbasi was undeclared in order to benefit from
statutory tax exemptions. The Court did not
consider this as an outright reflection of one’s
immoral inclinations. With due consideration to his
character as established by witnesses, and as
observed by the RTC during the hearings, Karbasi
should be deemed to have sufficiently explained his
mistake.
Third, A perusal of Karbasi’s petition, both with the
RTC and the CA, together with his supplemental
pleadings filed with the Court, however, reveals that
he has successfully established his refugee status
upon arrival in the Philippines. In effect, the
country’s obligations under its various international
commitments come into operation.
3. Tan v Crisologo
FACTS: Tan was a natural-born citizen having been
born to Filipino parents on 1 April 1968. Although
she became a naturalized American citizen on 19
January 1993. On 26 October 2009, Tan applied to
be registered as a voter in Quezon City. She
indicated that she was a Filipino .Citizen by birth. On
1 December 2009, she filed a petition before the
Bureau of Immigration (BI) for the reacquisition of
her Philippine citizenship. She stated in her petition
that she lost her Philippine citizenship when she
became a naturalized American citizen. However,
Tan executed a sworn declaration renouncing her
allegiance to the U.S.A. Thereafter, the BI confirmed
her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. On
December 1, 2009, Tan filed here COC for the 2010
National Elections to run as congresswoman for the
First District of Quezon City. On 28 December 2009,
respondent Vincent "Bing bong" Crisologo
(Crisologo) filed a petition before the MeTC,
docketed as Civil Case No. 37- 09-1292, seeking the
exclusion of Tan from the voter's list because (1) she
was not a Filipino citizen when she registered as a
voter; and (2) she failed to meet the residency
requirement of the law.
ISSUE: Does the reacquisition of citizenship through
R.A No. 9225 have a retroactive effect?
RULING: No. it is a well-settled rule that statutes are
to be construed as having only a prospective
operation, unless the legislature intended to give
them a retroactive effect. To consider that the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship retroacts to
the date it was lost would result in an absurd
scenario where a Filipino would still be considered a
Philippine citizen when in fact he had already
renounced his citizenship. We are not about to give
a statute a meaning that would lead to absurdity as
it is our duty to construe statutes in such a way to
avoid such consequences.
ISSUE: Can Tan be considered a Philippine Citizen at
the time she registered as voter?
RULING: No. Only Filipino citizens are qualified to
vote and may be included in the permanent list of
voters. Thus, to be registered a voter in the
Philippines, the registrant must be a citizen at the
time he or she filed the application.
In the present case, it is undisputed that Tan
filed her voter's registration application on 26
October 2009, and that she only took her Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 30
November 2009, or more than a month after the
ERB approved her application.
4. Republic of the Philippines vs Go Pei Hung, G.R.
No. 212785, April 4, 2018
FACTS: On December 3, 2007, respondent Go Pei
Hung - a British subject and Hong Kong resident -
filed a Petition for Naturalization5 seeking
Philippine citizenship. The case was lodged before
the RTC of Manila. After trial, the RTC issued its July
21, 2010 Decision granting the respondent's
petition for naturalization.
Under Republic Act 530, this decision granting the
application for naturalization shall not become final
and executory until after two (2) years from the
promulgation of the decision and after another
hearing is conducted to determine whether or not
the applicant has complied with the requirements of
Section 1 of said law with the attendance of the
Solicitor General or his authorized representative.
Petitioner interposed an appeal with the CA, which
was docketed as CAG.R. CV No. 97542. On February
28, 2014, the CA issued the assailed Decision.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but in its June
5, 2014 Resolution, the appellate court held its
ground.
ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals commit a reversible
error in granting the naturalization?
RULING: Yes. Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization
Law or CA 473 requires, among others, that an
applicant for naturalization must attach a Certificate
of Arrival to the Petition for Naturalization.
Respondent came to the country sometime in 1973;
thus, he should have attached a Certificate of Arrival
to his Petition for Naturalization. This is mandatory
as respondent must prove that he entered the
country legally and not by unlawful means or any
other manner that is not sanctioned by law. Because
if he entered the country illegally, this would render
his stay in the country unwarranted from the start,
and no number of years' stay here will validate his
unlawful entry. The spring cannot rise higher than
its source, so to speak.
In Republic v. Judge De la Rosa, this Court held that
the failure to attach a copy of the applicant's
certificate of arrival to the petition as required by
Section 7 of CA 473 is fatal to an applicant's petition
for naturalization.
The Certificate of Arrival should prove that
respondent's entry to the country is lawful. Without
it, his Petition for Naturalization is incomplete and
must be denied outright. Even if respondent
acquired permanent resident status, this does not
do away with the requirement of said certificate of
arrival. An application to become a naturalized
Philippine citizen involves requirements different
and separate from that for permanent residency
here.
Respondent likewise argues that the required
certificate of arrival is a "mere component part in
the filing of the Declaration of Intention" and thus
unnecessary since he is exempt from submitting the
latter document. This is not correct. The Declaration
of intention is entirely different from the Certificate
of Arrival; the latter is just as important because it
proves that the applicant's entry to the country was
not illegal - that he was a documented alien whose
arrival and presence in the country is in good faith
and with evident intention to submit to and abide
by the laws of the Republic. Certainly, an illegal and
surreptitious entry into the country by aliens whose
undocumented arrival constitutes a threat to
national security and the safety of its citizens may
not be rewarded later on with citizenship by
naturalization or otherwise; to repeat, a spring will
not rise higher than its Source.
To repeat, strict compliance with all statutory
requirements is necessary before an applicant may
acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization. The
absence of even a single requirement is fatal to an
application for naturalization.
ARTICLE V
1.Juliet B. Dano v. COMELEC & Digal, G.R. NO.
210200, Sept. 13, 2016
Facts: Petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen,
hailing from the municipality of Sevilla, Bohol. She
emigrated to the US to work as a nurse, and
eventually acquired American citizenship. She
obtained a Community Tax Certificate in Sevilla, and
took her oath of allegiance at the Philippine
Consulate in Los Angeles. She registered as a voter
in Sevilla, following which she returned to the US,
purportedly to wind up her affairs and sell her
properties abroad. She returned to the Philippines
and executed a sworn statement renouncing any
and all foreign citizenship. She filed her CoC for the
mayoralty race of Sevilla, representing herself as
having been a resident of Sevilla for 1 year, 11 days
prior to the 13 March 2013 elections (or, 2 May
2012). Private respondent Mary Karen Joy Digal filed
a petition to cancel Dano’s CoC. Digal alleged that
Dano’s CoC was void for material
misrepresentations of fact, as Digal claimed that
Dano failed to meet the one (1) year residency
requirement under Section 39 of the LGC. Five days
before the elections in May of 2013, the COMELEC
issued a ruling cancelling Dano’s CoC, for failure to
establish domicile under the one-year residence
requirement of the LGC. While Dano’s MR was
before the COMELEC en banc, she assumed office as
the elected mayor of Sevilla, Bohol. In December of
2013, the COMELEC en banc rejected her MR, hence
she filed the instant petition for certiorari seeking
the reversal of the decision rendered against her by
the COMELEC.
Issue: Must physical presence be unbroken to
establish a domicile by choice?
Ruling: No. Physical presence, along with animus
manendi et revertendi, is an essential requirement
for the acquisition of a domicile of choice. However,
the law does not require that physical presence be
unbroken. In Japzon v. Comelec, this Court ruled
that to be considered a resident of a municipality,
the candidate is not required to stay and never leave
the place for a full one-year period prior to the date
of the election. In Sabili v. Comelec, his Court
reiterated that the law does not require a candidate
to be at home 24 hours a day 7 days a week to fulfill
the residency requirement.
Issue: Did petitioner had fail to prove compliance
with the one (1) year residency requirement?
Ruling: Yes. The general rule is that actual physical
presence, in addition to animus manendi and
animus revertendi, is required to establish domicile.
While this is true, the law does not require that such
presence be unbroken. The law does not require
that the prospective candidate stay and never leave
the place for the period required under the LGC. It
should be noted that at no point is it controverted
that petitioner’s citizenship did not arise at the
required time; All that is claimed is that Dano’s
absence from Sevilla for a period of roughly four
months disqualifies her under the residence rule.
Dano’s acts of filing for candidacy and residence in
the Dano ancestral home beginning early in 2012, in
addition to her return to the US for the purpose of
disposing of her properties there, evince her intent
to reside and remain in Sevilla. COMELEC’s ruling
that Dano’s absence of 4 months disqualifies her
under the residency requirement of the LGC is
erroneous. Therefore, Dano’s petition is granted.

3. Cardino vs. Jalosjos, G.R. No. 216637, March 7,
2017
FACTS: Cardino and Jalosjos both ran for the
position of Mayor of Dapitan City. Jalosjos was
proclaimed the winner. Cardino immediately filed a
petition for quo warranto before the COMELEC.
According to Cardino, Jalosjos is a dual citizen
because when the latter filed her COC, the Affidavit
of Renunciation of her American citizenship was
subscribed and sworn to on July 16, 2012 before
Judge De Guzman-Laput. Cardino, further alleges
that this was physically impossible for Jalosjos to
execute since based on the certification of the
Bureau of Immigration, Jalosjos left the Philippines
on May 30, 2012 and arrived back in the Philippines
on July 17, 2012. Hence, the Affidavit is falsified and
has no legal effect. Jalosjos, on the other hand,
claims that such was a mere clerical error and it was
supposed to say July 19, 2012, and hence no physical
impossibility.
ISSUE: Was Jalosjos able to fully divest herself of her
American citizenship, thus making her eligible to run
for the mayorship of Dapitan City?
RULING: Yes. A Filipino American or any dual citizen
cannot run for any elective public position in the
Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a
renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of
filing the certificate of candidacy. To be valid, the
renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly
executed before an officer of the law who is
authorized to administer an oath stating in clear and
unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all
foreign citizenship. In this case, the COMELEC En
Banc did not err in affirming the ruling of the Second
Division that the date of July 16, 2012 in the Affidavit
of Renunciation was indeed a clerical error.
The COMELEC Second Division gave greater weight
to the evidence offered by Jalosjos, particularly the
testimony of Judge De Guzman-Laput, who
unequivocally stated that Jalosjos personally
appeared before her sala on July 19, 2012 to
subscribe to the Affidavit of Renunciation. The
COMELEC Second Division found that Cardino failed
to disprove Judge De Guzman-Laput’s testimony.
Article V
7. Palacios vs. People, G.R. No. 240676, March 18,
2019
FACTS: Maria Ramirez filed an economic abuse case
under 9262 against her, husband, the petitioner in
the case. In her Sinumpaang-Reklamong Salaysay
filed before the Quezon City Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) she alleged that petitioner resided
in Block 3 Lot 24 Turquoise St., Las Piñas Royale
Estate, Naga Road, Brgy. Pulang Lupa Dos, Las Piñas
City, where he may be served with summons. In
2015 OCP-QC recommended that petitioner be
indicted for the crime charged. In resolving the case
based on the evidence proffered solely by Ramirez,
the investigating prosecutor held that petitioner
failed to appear during the preliminary investigation
and submit his counter-affidavit despite being
ample opportunity to do so. In 2016, Petitioner
avers that his right to due process was violated
because Ramirez had knowingly concealed his true
and correct address. His real address was actually
Block 9 Lot 6 Pag-Ibig Homes, Talon IV, Las Piñas
City. As a result he only learned of the case against
him on 2016 when he was also in the process of
filing a case against her.
ISSUE: Was failure to notify petitioner of his
preliminary investigation violative of procedural
due process?
RULING: Yes, there is no showing that petitioner
was notified of the charges filed against him or
served with a subpoena relative to the preliminary
investigation. It was the burden of respondents to
prove the fact of service. The right to preliminary
investigation is substantive and should not be
deprived on purely procedural grounds otherwise it
would deprive the petitioner the full measure of his
right to due process.
OMITTED CASES
10. PERALTA VS. PHIL. POSTAL CORPORATION, G.R.
NO. 223395, DECEMBER 04, 2018
FACTS: (PhilPost) issued a stamp commemorating
Iglesia ni Cristo's (INC's) Centennial Celebration. The
design of the stamp showed a photo of INC founder,
the late Felix Y. Manalo (Manalo) with the
designation on the left side containing the words
"Felix Y Afunalo, 1886-196 3 First Executive Minister
of Iglesia ni Cristo", with the Central Temple of the
religious group at the background. At the right side
of Manalo's photo is the INC's centennial logo which
contained a torch enclosed by a two concentric
circles containing the words "IGLESIA NJ CRISTO
CENTENNIAL 1914-2014".
On June 16, 2014, petitioner Renato V.
Peralta (petitioner) filed a complaint for injunction
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Br. 33 of Manila,
assailing the constitutionality of the printing,
issuance and distribution of the INC
commemorative centennial stamps, allegedly paid
for by respondent PhilPost using public funds.
ISSUE: Was the printing of the INC centennial
commemorative stamps violative of the non-
establishment of religion clause of the 1987
Constitution?
RULING: NO. There is no quibbling that as to the
50,000 stamps ordered, printed and issued to INC,
the same did not violate the Constitutional
prohibitions separating State matters from religion.
It is plain, that the costs for the printing and issuance
of the aforesaid 50,000 stamps were all paid for by
INC. Any perceived use of government property,
machines or otherwise, is de minimis and certainly
do not amount to a sponsorship of a specific
religion. Also, We see no violation of the
Constitutional prohibition on establishment of
religion, insofar as the remaining 1, 150,000 pieces
of stamps printed and distributed by PhilPost.
First, there is no law mandating anyone to avail of
the INC commemorative stamps, nor is there any
law purporting to require anyone to adopt the INC's
teachings. Arguably, while then President Aquino
issued Proclamation No. 815, s. 2014, authorizing
the issuance of the INC commemorative stamp, the
same did not contain any legal mandate endorsing
or requiring people to conform to the INC's
teachings. The secular purpose behind the printing
of the INC
Commemorative stamp is obvious from the MOA
between INC and Philpost:
xxxx
INC has requested PPC to issue, circulate and
sell commemorative stamps and other philatelic
products to promote the Centennial of the Iglesia Ni
Cristo, and in honor of its First Executive Minister,
Bro. Felix Y. Manalo;
The centennial celebration of the Iglesia ni
Cristo, though arguably involves a religious
institution, has a secular aspect. The printing of the
INC commemorative stamp is no different. It
Is simply an acknowledgment of INC's existence for
a hundred years. It does not necessarily equate to
the State sponsoring the INC. As to the use of the
government's machinery in printing and distribution
of the 1.2 million stamps, this Court does not find
that the same amounted to sponsorship of INC as a
religion considering that the same is no different
from other stamps issued by PhilPost
acknowledging persons and events of significance to
the country, such as those printed celebrating
National Artists, past Philippine Presidents, and
events of organizations, religious or not. We note
that PhilPost has also issued stamps for the Catholic
Church such as those featuring Heritage Churches,
15th International Eucharistic Congress,and Pope
Francis. In the past, the Bureau of Posts also printed
stamps celebrating 300 years of
Islam in the 1980s. Likewise, our review of the
records does not disclose that PhilPost has
exclusively or primarily used its resources to benefit
INC, to the prejudice of other religions.
Finally, other than this single transaction
with INC, this Court did not find PhilPost to have
been unneccesarily involved in INC's affairs.
Thus, there is no violation of the non-
establishment clause in this case.
12. Zabal v. Duterte, G.R. No. 238467 February
12, 2019
FACTS: Claiming that Boracay has become a
cesspool, President Duterte first made public his
plan to shut it down during a business forum held in
Davao sometime February 2018.This was followed
by several speeches and news releases stating that
he would place Boracay under a state of calamity.
True to his words, President Duterte ordered the
shutting down of the island in a cabinet meeting
held on April 4, 2018.
Justifying their resort to prohibition and
mandamus, petitioners assert that this case
presents constitutional issues, i.e., whether
President Duterte acted within the scope of the
powers granted him by the Constitution in ordering
the closure of Boracay and, whether the measures
implemented infringe upon the constitutional rights
to travel and to due process of petitioners as well as
of tourists and non-residents of the island.
ISSUE: Did Proclamation No. 475, which temporarily
closed Boracay impair the constitutional right to
travel?
RULING: No. The activities proposed to be
undertaken to rehabilitate Boracay involved
inspection, testing, demolition, relocation, and
construction. These could not have been
implemented freely and smoothly with tourists
coming in and out of the island not only because of
the possible disruption that they may cause to the
works being undertaken, but primarily because their
safety and convenience might be compromised. In
fine, this case does not actually involve the right to
travel in its essential sense contrary to what
petitioners want to portray. Any bearing that
Proclamation No. 475 may have on the right to
travel is merely corollary to the closure of Boracay
and the ban of tourists and non-residents therefrom
which were necessary incidents of the island's
rehabilitation. There is certainly no showing that
Proclamation No. 475 deliberately meant to impair
the right to travel. The questioned proclamation is
clearly focused on its purpose of rehabilitating
Boracay and any intention to directly restrict the
right cannot, in any manner, be deduced from its
import.