Election Law Cases

ABUNDIO BACATAN, LOVELY DELA TORRE, JED SALVIO PARACHA – ELECTION LAW CASE DIGEST
G.R. No. 207264 October 22, 2013

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN
FACTS: Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the lone district of
Marinduque. Respondent, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the
COMELEC a petition for the cancellation of petitioner’s COC. On October 31, 2012, the respondent filed the amended
petition on the ground that the petitioner’s COC contained material misrepresentations regarding the petitioner’s marital
status, residency, date of birth and citizenship. Respondent alleged that the petitioner is an American citizen and filed in
February 8, 2013 a manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered evidence and amended last exhibit.
On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling the petitioner’s COC on the basis
that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the requirements of Republic Act
(RA) No. 9225.
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013. But on May 14, 2013 the COMELEC en banc
promulgated a Resolution denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 elections and on June 5, 2013 took her
oath of office before the Speaker of House of Representatives. She has yet to assume office at noon of June 30, 2013.
On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the May 14, 2013 Resolution of
the COMELEC en banc final and executory.
Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status
Quo Ante Order.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the petitioner who is a duly proclaimed winner and
who has already taken her oath of office for the position of member of the House of Representative.
2. Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its ruling that the petitioner is illegible to run for office.
3. Whether or not there was denial of due process.
HELD: 1. YES. Petitioner, therefore, is in error when she posits that at present it is the HRET which has exclusive
jurisdiction over her qualifications as a Member of the House of Representatives. That the HRET is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives is a written
constitutional provision. It is, however unavailable to petitioner because she is NOT a Member of the House at present.
The COMELEC never ordered her proclamation as the rightful winner in the election for such membership. Indeed, the
action for cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy, the decision in which is the indispensable determinant of
the right of petitioner to proclamation, was correctly lodged in the COMELEC, was completely and fully litigated in the
COMELEC and was finally decided by the COMELEC. On and after 14 May 2013, there was nothing left for the COMELEC
to do to decide the case. The decision sealed the proceedings in the COMELEC regarding petitioner's ineligibility as a
candidate for Representative of Marinduque. The decision erected the bar to petitioner's proclamation. The bar remained
when no restraining order was obtained by petitioner from the Supreme Court within five days from 14 May 2013.
When petitioner finally went to the Supreme Court on 10 June 2013 questioning the COMELEC First Division
ruling and the 14 May 2013 COMELEC En Bane decision, her baseless proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not by that fact
of promulgation alone become valid and legal. A decision favorable to her by the Supreme Court regarding the decision of
the COMELEC En Bane on her certificate of candidacy was indispensably needed, not to legalize her proclamation on 18
May 2013 but to authorize a proclamation with the Supreme Court decision as basis.
2. NO. In R.A 9925, for a respondent to reacquire Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office, the law
requires that she must have accomplished the following 1) take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
before the consul-general of the Philippine Consulate in the USA, and 2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her
American citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. In the case at bar, there is no showing
that petitioner complied with the requirements.
Petitioner’s oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance in compliance
with RA 9225.
As to the issue of residency, the court approved the ruling if the COMELEC that a Filipino citizen who becomes
naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of origin. Upon reacquisition of Filipino citizenship, he must still
show that he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines through positive acts, and the period of his residency shall
be counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice. In this case, there is no showing that the petitioner reacquired
her Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that the petitioner renounced her American citizenship, it
follows that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA. Petitioner claim that she served as Provincial
Administrator of the province of Marinduque from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011 is not sufficient to prove her one-
year residency for she has never recognized her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No
amount of her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the
USA.
3. NO. Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given every opportunity to
argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan's petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the
First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did
not avail herself of the opportunity given her.
Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be given the opportunity or
right to be heard.
G.R. No. 199082 September 18, 2012
JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO vs. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS et, al.
FACTS: Acting on the discovery of alleged new evidence and the surfacing of new witnesses indicating the occurrence of
massive electoral fraud and manipulation of election results in the 2004 and 2007 National Elections, on August 2, 2011,
the Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a committee jointly with the Department of Justice
(DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses and anomalies committed during the
2004 and 2007 elections.
On August 4, 2011, the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 6406 naming three (3) of its prosecutors
to the Joint Committee.
On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases. The
Joint Committee and the Fact-Finding Team are composed of officials from the DOJ and the Comelec. Section 2 of the
Joint Order lays down the mandate of the Joint Committee.
The Fact-Finding Team,8 on the other hand, was created for the purpose of gathering real, documentary, and
testimonial evidence which can be utilized in the preliminary investigation to be conducted by the Joint Committee. Its
specific duties and functions as enumerated in Section 4 of the Joint Order are as follows:
a) Gather and document reports, intelligence information, and investigative leads from official as well as unofficial sources and
informants;
b) Conduct interviews, record testimonies, take affidavits of witnesses, and collate material and relevant documentary evidence, such as,
but not limited to, election documents used in the 2004 and 2007 national elections. For security reasons, or to protect the identities of informants, the
Fact-Finding Team may conduct interviews or document testimonies discreetly;
c) Assess and evaluate affidavits already executed and other documentary evidence submitted or may be submitted to the Fact-Finding
Team and/or Committee;
d) Identify the offenders, their offenses and the manner of their commission, individually or in conspiracy, and the provisions of election
and general criminal laws violated, establish evidence for individual criminal and administrative liability and prosecution, and prepare the necessary
documentation, such as complaints and charge sheets for the initiation of preliminary investigation proceedings against said individuals to be conducted by
the Committee;
e) Regularly submit to the Committee, the Secretary of Justice and the Chairman of the Comelec periodic reports and recommendations,
supported by real, testimonial and documentary evidence, which may then serve as the Committee’s basis for immediately commencing appropriate
preliminary investigation proceedings, as provided under Section 6 of this Joint Order; and
f) Upon the termination of its investigation, make a full and final report to the Committee, the Secretary of Justice, and the Chairman of
the Comelec.
The members of the Fact-Finding Team unanimously agreed that the subject of the Initial Report would be the
electoral fraud and manipulation of election results allegedly committed during the May 14, 2007 elections. Thus, in its
Initial Report11 dated October 20, 2011, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May
14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao were indeed perpetrated.
The Fact-Finding Team recommended that petitioner Abalos and ten (10) others be subjected to preliminary investigation
for electoral sabotage for conspiring to manipulate the election results in North and South Cotabato. Twenty-six (26)14
persons, including petitioners GMA and Abalos, were likewise recommended for preliminary investigation for electoral
sabotage for manipulating the election results in Maguindanao.
On November 14, 2011, petitioner Mike Arroyo filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings before the Joint Committee, in
view of the pendency of his petition before the Court. On the same day, petitioner GMA filed before the Joint Committee
an Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to require Senator Pimentel to furnish her with documents referred to in his complaint-
affidavit and for the production of election documents as basis for the charge of electoral sabotage. GMA contended that
for the crime of electoral sabotage to be established, there is a need to present election documents allegedly tampered
which resulted in the increase or decrease in the number of votes of local and national candidates. GMA prayed that she
be allowed to file her counter-affidavit within ten (10) days from receipt of the requested documents. Petitioner Abalos, for
his part, filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings (Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam), in view of the pendency of his petition
brought before the Court.
On November 18, 2011, petitioner GMA filed with the RTC an Urgent Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam with leave to
allow the Joint Committee to resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by GMA, to defer issuance of a warrant of arrest
and a Hold Departure Order, and to proceed to judicial determination of probable cause. She, likewise, filed with the
Comelec a Motion to Vacate Ad Cautelam praying that its Resolution be vacated for being null and void. The RTC
nonetheless issued a warrant for her arrest which was duly served. GMA thereafter filed a Motion for Bail which was
granted.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the creation of joint committee is violative of the constitutional right of due process and equal
protection clause.
2. Whether or not there was violation of separation of powers.
3. Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction under the law to conduct preliminary investigation jointly with
the DOJ (independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional body/Comelec has willingly surrendered its independence to the DOJ).
HELD: 1. (Equal Protection Clause) NO. The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is
intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences
among men, it does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons under like circumstances and
conditions shall be treated alike both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
Thus, as the constitutional body granted with the broad power of enforcing and administering all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall, and tasked to ensure free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections, the Comelec has the authority to determine how best to perform such
constitutional mandate. Pursuant to this authority, the Comelec issues various resolutions prior to every local or national
elections setting forth the guidelines to be observed in the conduct of the elections. This shows that every election is
distinct and requires different guidelines in order to ensure that the rules are updated to respond to existing
circumstances.
Moreover, as has been practiced in the past, complaints for violations of election laws may be filed either with the
Comelec or with the DOJ. The Comelec may even initiate, motu proprio, complaints for election offenses.
Pursuant to law and the Comelec’s own Rules, investigations may be conducted either by the Comelec itself through its
law department or through the prosecutors of the DOJ. These varying procedures and treatment do not, however, mean
that respondents are not treated alike. Thus, petitioners’ insistence of infringement of their constitutional right to equal
protection of the law is misplaced.
(Due Process Clause) NO. In this case, as correctly pointed out by respondents, there was no showing that the
statements claimed to have prejudged the case against petitioners were made by Secretary De Lima and Chairman
Brillantes or were in the prejudicial context in which petitioners claimed the statements were made. A reading of the
statements allegedly made by them reveals that they were just responding to hypothetical questions in the event that
probable cause would eventually be found by the Joint Committee.
More importantly, there was no proof or even an allegation that the Joint Committee itself, tasked to conduct the
requisite preliminary investigation against petitioners, made biased statements that would convey to the public that the
members were favoring a particular party. Neither did the petitioners show that the President of the Philippines, the
Secretary of Justice or the Chairman of the Comelec intervened in the conduct of the preliminary investigation or exerted
undue pressure on their subordinates to tailor their decision with their public declarations and adhere to a pre-
determined result.88 Moreover, insofar as the Comelec is concerned, it must be emphasized that the constitutional body
is collegial. The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the entire body itself.89 In equating the
alleged bias of the above-named officials with that of the Joint Committee, there would be no arm of the government
credible enough to conduct a preliminary investigation.
It must also be emphasized that Joint Order No. 001-2011 created two bodies, namely: (1) the Fact-Finding Team
tasked to gather real, documentary and testimonial evidence which can be utilized in the preliminary investigation to be
conducted by the Joint Committee; and (2) the Joint Committee mandated to conduct preliminary investigation. It is,
therefore, inaccurate to say that there is only one body which acted as evidence-gatherer, prosecutor and judge.
2. NO. As clearly explained above, the Comelec is granted the power to investigate, and where appropriate, prosecute
cases of election offenses. This is necessary in ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. On the other
hand, the DOJ is mandated to administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof
consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional system.91 It
is specifically empowered to "investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the probation and
correction system." Undoubtedly, it is the Constitution, statutes, and the Rules of Court and not the assailed Joint Order
which give the DOJ and the Comelec the power to conduct preliminary investigation. No new power is given to them by
virtue of the assailed order. As to the members of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team, they perform such
functions that they already perform by virtue of their current positions as prosecutors of the DOJ and legal officers of the
Comelec. Thus, in no way can we consider the Joint Committee as a new public office.
3.NO. Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as
independent. Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in
the discharge of their respective functions. The Constitution envisions a truly independent Comelec committed to ensure
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections and to serve as the guardian of the people’s sacred right of suffrage –
the citizenry’s vital weapon in effecting a peaceful change of government and in achieving and promoting political stability.
Moreover, during the past national and local elections, the Comelec issued Resolutions requesting the Secretary of
Justice to assign prosecutors as members of Special Task Forces to assist the Comelec in the investigation and
prosecution of election offenses. These Special Task Forces were created because of the need for additional lawyers to
handle the investigation and prosecution of election offenses.
Clearly, the Comelec recognizes the need to delegate to the prosecutors the power to conduct preliminary
investigation. Otherwise, the prompt resolution of alleged election offenses will not be attained. This delegation of power,
otherwise known as deputation, has long been recognized and, in fact, been utilized as an effective means of disposing of
various election offense cases. Apparently, as mere deputies, the prosecutors played a vital role in the conduct of
preliminary investigation, in the resolution of complaints filed before them, and in the filing of the informations with the
proper court.
In view of the foregoing disquisition, we find no impediment for the creation of a Joint Committee. While the composition of the
Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team is dominated by DOJ officials, it does not necessarily follow that the Comelec is inferior. Under
the Joint Order, resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable cause for election offenses shall still be approved by the Comelec in
accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure. This shows that the Comelec, though it acts jointly with the DOJ, remains in control of
the proceedings. In no way can we say that the Comelec has thereby abdicated its independence to the executive department.
The text and intent of the constitutional provision granting the Comelec the authority to investigate and prosecute
election offenses is to give the Comelec all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. The Comelec should be allowed considerable latitude in devising
means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created.102 We may not
agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this Court
should not interfere. Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 9266, approving the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding
Team, should be viewed not as an abdication of the constitutional body’s independence but as a means to fulfill its duty
of ensuring the prompt investigation and prosecution of election offenses as an adjunct of its mandate of ensuring a free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
G.R. No. 209185 October 25, 2013
MARC DOUGLAS IV C. CAGAS vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS: Cagas, while he was representative of the first legislative district of Davao del Sur, filed with Hon. Franklin
Bautista, then representative of the second legislative district of the same province, House Bill No. 4451 (H.B. No. 4451), a
bill creating the province of Davao Occidental. H.B. No. 4451 was signed into law as Republic Act No. 10360 (R.A. No.
10360), the Charter of the Province of Davao Occidental.
R.A. No. 10360 was passed by the House of Representatives on 28 November 2012, and by the Senate on 5
December 2012. President Benigno S. Aquino III approved R.A. No. 10360 on 14 January 2013.2 R.A. No. 10360 was
published in the Philippine Star and the Manila Bulletin only on 21 January 2013. Considering that R.A. No. 10360 shall
take effect 15 days after its publication in at least two newspapers of general and local circulation, COMELEC, therefore,
only had until 6 April 2013 to conduct the plebiscite.
As early as 27 November 2012, prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 10360, the COMELEC suspended the conduct of
all plebiscites as a matter of policy and in view of the preparations for the 13 May 2013 National and Local Elections. On
9 July 2013, the COMELEC extended the policy on suspension of the holding of plebiscites by resolving to defer action on
the holding of all plebiscites until after the 28 October 2013 Barangay Elections.6 During a meeting held on 31 July
2013, the COMELEC decided to hold the plebiscite for the creation of Davao Occidental simultaneously with the 28
October 2013 Barangay Elections to save on expenses . The COMELEC, in Minute Resolution No. 13-0926, approved the
conduct of the Concept of Execution for the conduct of the plebiscite on 6 August 2013.8 On 14 August 2013, Bartolome
J. Sinocruz, Jr., the Deputy Executive Director for Operations of the COMELEC, issued a memorandum furnishing a copy
of Minute Resolution No. 13-0926 to Atty. Remlane M. Tambuang, Regional Election Director of Region XI; Atty. Ma.
Febes M. Barlaan, Provincial Election Supervisor of Davao del Sur; and to all election officers of Davao del Sur.
On 9 October 2013, Cagas filed the present petition for prohibition. Cagas cites three causes of action:
1. COMELEC is without authority or legal basis to AMEND or MODIFY Section 46 of Republic Act No. 10360 by mere MINUTE
RESOLUTION because it is only CONGRESS who can validly amend, repel [sic] or modify existing laws, thus COMELEC [sic] act in suspending the holding of
a plebiscite is unconstitutional;13
2. COMELEC is without authority or legal basis to hold a plebiscite this coming October 28, 2013 for the creation of the Province of Davao
Occidental because Section 46 of Republic Act No. 10360 has already lapsed;14 and
3. Petitioner has no other adequate remedy to prevent the COMELEC from holding the Plebiscite on October 28, 2013 for the creation of
the Province of Davao Occidental except through the issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction because COMELEC had already
commenced the preparation for holding of the Plebiscite for the creation of the Province of Davao Occidental synchronizing it with that of the Barangay and
SK elections this coming October 28, 2013.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it resolved to hold the plebiscite for the creation of the Province of Davao
Occidental on 28 October 2013, simultaneous with the Barangay Elections.
HELD: NO. The COMELEC’s power to administer elections includes the power to conduct a plebiscite beyond the
schedule prescribed by law.
The conduct of a plebiscite is necessary for the creation of a province. Sections 10 and 11 of Article X of the
Constitution provided for.
The Constitution does not specify a date as to when plebiscites should be held. This is in contrast with its
provisions for the election of members of the legislature in Section 8, Article VI18 and of the President and Vice-President
in Section 4, Article VII. The Constitution recognizes that the power to fix the date of elections is legislative in nature,
which is shown by the exceptions in previously mentioned Constitutional provisions, as well as in the election of local
government officials.
Section 10 of R.A. No. 7160 furnishes the general rule as to when a plebiscite may be held:
Sec. 10. Plebiscite Requirement. – No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called
for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting
such action, unless said law or ordinance fixed another date.
Section 46 of R.A. No. 10360, however, specifically provides that the plebiscite for the creation of the province of
Davao Occidental be held within 60 days from the effectivity of R.A. No. 10360, or until 6 April 2013. Cagas claims that
R.A. No. 10360 "did not confer express or implied power to COMELEC to exercise discretion when the plebiscite for the
creation of the Province of Davao Occidental will be held. On the contrary, said law provides a specific period when the
COMELEC should conduct a plebiscite."22 Cagas views the period "60 days from the effectivity" in R.A. No. 10360 as
absolute and mandatory; thus, COMELEC has no legal basis to hold a plebiscite on 28 October 2013.
More importantly, it bears stressing that the COMELEC was not given a special budget to defray the cost of the
plebiscite. In fact, the COMELEC had to take ₱11 million from its savings and from the Barangay Elections budget to
finance the plebiscite to ratify R.A. No. 10360 on October 28, 2013.
The COMELEC’s questioned Resolution then directing the holding of the plebiscite for the ratification of R.A. No. 10360
simultaneously with the Barangay Elections was not an abuse of its discretion, as alleged, but simply an exercise of
prudence, because as the COMELEC itself noted, doing so "will entail less expense than holding it separately." [p. 9,
Resolution No. 13-0926, Annex B, Petition.]
The determination of the feasibility of holding a plebiscite on a given date is within the competence and discretion
of the COMELEC. Petitioner cannot therefore simply insist that the COMELEC should have complied with the period
specified in the law when doing so would be virtually impossible under the circumstances.
This Court has rejected a too literal interpretation of election laws in favor of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful
and credible elections.
G.R. No. 193314 June 25, 2013
SVETLANA P. JALOSJOS vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS: On 20 November 2009, petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for mayor of Baliangao,
MisamisOccidental for the 10 May 2010 elections. She indicated therein her place of birth and residence as
BarangayTugas, Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental (Brgy. Tugas).
Asserting otherwise, private respondents filed against petitioner a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy, in which they argued that she had falsely represented her place of birth and residence, because
she was in fact born in San Juan, Metro Manila, and had not totally abandoned her previous domicile, Dapitan City.
On the other hand, petitioner averred that she had established her residence in the said barangay since December
2008 when she purchased two parcels of land there, and that she had been staying in the house of a certain Mrs. Lourdes
Yap (Yap) while the former was overseeing the construction of her house. Furthermore, petitioner asserted that the error
in her place of birth was committed by her secretary. Nevertheless, in aCoC, an error in the declaration of the place of
birth is not a material misrepresentation that would lead to disqualification, because it is not one of the qualifications
provided by law.
The Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy remained pending as of the day of the
elections, in which petitioner garnered the highest number of votes. On 10 May 2010, the Municipal Board of Canvassers
of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, proclaimed her as the duly elected municipal mayor.
On 04 June 2010, the COMELEC Second Division ruled that respondent was DISQUALIFIED for the position of
mayor.
The COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution on 19 August 2010 denying the Motion for Reconsideration of
petitioner for lack of merit and affirming the Resolution of the Second Division denying due course to or cancelling her
CoC.
ISSUE: Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner had failed to prove compliance
with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials.
HELD:NO. Petitioner failed to comply with theone-year residency requirement forlocal elective officials.
Petitioner uncontroverted domicile of origin is Dapitan City. The question is whether she was able to establish, through
clear and positive proof, that she had acquired a domicile of choice in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, prior to the May
2010 elections.
When it comes to the qualifications for running for public office, residence is synonymous with domicile.
Accordingly, Nuval v. Gurayheld as follows:
The term esidenceas so used, is synonymous with omicilewhich imports not only intention to reside in a fixed
place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
There are three requisites for a person to acquire a new domicile by choice.
First, residence or bodily presence in the new locality.
Second, an intention to remain there.
Third, an intention to abandon the old domicile.
These circumstances must be established by clear and positive proof, as held in Romualdez-Marcos v.
COMELECand subsequently in Dumpit- Michelena v. Boado:
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to
continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or
residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have
two legal residences at the same time.
Moreover, even if these requisites are established by clear and positive proof, the date of acquisition of the domicile
of choice, or the critical date, must also be established to be within at least one year prior to the elections using the same
standard of evidence.
In the instant case, we find that petitioner failed to establish by clear and positive proof that she had resided in
Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, one year prior to the 10 May 2010 elections.
There were inconsistencies in the Affidavits of Acas-Yap, Yap III, Villanueva, Duhaylungsod, Estrellada, Jumawan,
Medija, Bagundol, Colaljo, Tenorio, Analasan, Bation, Maghilum and Javier.
First, they stated that they personally knew petitioner to be an actual and physical resident of Brgy. Tugassince
2008. However, they declared in the same Affidavits that she stayed in Brgy. Punta Miray while her house was being
constructed in Brgy. Tugas.
Second, construction workers Yap III, Villanueva, Duhay lungsod and Estrellada asserted that in December 2009,
construction was still ongoing. By their assertion, they were implying that six months before the 10 May 2010 elections,
petitioner had not yet moved into her house at Brgy. Tugas.
Third, the same construction workers admitted that petitioner only visited Baliangao occasionally when they stated
that "at times when she (petitioner) was in Baliangao, she used to stay at the house of Lourdes Yap while her residential
house was being constructed."
These discrepancies bolster the statement of the Brgy. Tugas officials that petitioner was not and never had been a
resident of their barangay. At most, the Affidavits of all the witnesses only show that petitioner was building and
developing a beach resort and a house in Brgy. Tugas, and that she only stayed in Brgy. Punta Miray whenever she
wanted to oversee the construction of the resort and the house.
Finally, the approval of the application for registration of petitioner as a voter only shows, at most, that she had
met the minimum residency requirement as a voter. This minimum requirement is different from that for acquiring a new
domicile of choice for the purpose of running for public office.
G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO
FACTS: Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent
naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation
of his foreign citizenship.
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify
Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection
with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a
foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the
nationality of Arnado as "USA-American." To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his
Memorandum a computer-generated travel record dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US
Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country on
14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24
November 2009.
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on misrepresentation5 the
COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. Balua’s contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States was
dismissed upon the finding that "Balua failed to present any evidence to support his contention," whereas the First Division still could
"not conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency requirement under the Local Government Code."
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino citizen.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC
As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which allows intervention in proceedings for
disqualification even after elections if no final judgment has been rendered, but went on further to say that Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be
prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the First Division allowing the order of succession under
Section 44 of the Local Government Code to take effect.
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as one for disqualification, and ruled that the petition was
filed well within the period prescribed by law, having been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later than 11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted Arnado’s qualifications to run for office.
ISSUE: Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a
renunciation earlier made.
HELD: YES. Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and
renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing these twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A.
No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public office.
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when he applied for repatriation
before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution of
his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the time,
however, he likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation,
thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation
under the laws of the foreign country.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used
his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign
passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both
countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United States of America.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next
day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights
granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship,
which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted
to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an
American citizen by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it
effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.
The popular vote does not cure the
ineligibility of a candidate.
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. When
the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as
elective public officials, those qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified is voted
for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in
the qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole determinant of who
should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic.
G.R. No. 206698, February 25, 2014
LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND MIGUEL R. VILLAFUERTE
FACTS: Petitioner and respondent were both candidates for the Gubernatorial position of the Province of Camarines Sur
in the May 13, 2013 local and national elections. On October 25, 2012, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Verified
Petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy (COC) of respondent, alleging that respondent
intentionally and materially misrepresented a false and deceptive name/nickname that would mislead the voters when he
declared under oath in his COC that “L–RAY JR.–MIGZ” was his nickname or stagename and that the name he intended
to appear on the official ballot was VILLAFUERTE, L–RAY JR.–MIGZ NP; that respondent deliberately omitted his first
name “MIGUEL” and inserted, instead “LRAY JR.,” which is the nickname of his father, the incumbent Governor of
Camarines Sur, “LRay Villafuerte, Jr.”
In his Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses, respondent denied the commission of any material
misrepresentation and asserted, among others, that he had been using the nickname “LRAY JR. MIGZ” and not only
“MIGZ”; that the choice of name/word to appear on the ballot was solely his choice or preference; and that the
presumption that the voters would be confused on the simple fact that his name would be placed first in the ballot was
misplaced.
The COMELEC found that its First Division did not err in denying the petition as existing law and jurisprudence
are clear in providing that a misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy is material when it refers to a qualification for
elective office and affects the candidate’s eligibility; and that a misrepresentation of a non–material fact is not a ground to
deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. It found that
petitioner’s allegations did not pertain to respondent’s qualifications or eligibility for the office to which he sought to be
elected. The candidate’s use of a name or nickname is a not a ground to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent committed a material misrepresentation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code so as to justify the cancellation of his COC.
HELD: NO. Clearly, Section 78 states that the false representation in the contents of the COC required under Section 74
must refer to material matters in order to justify the cancellation of the COC. What then constitutes a material
misrepresentation?
In Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections, petitioner Victorino Salcedo II filed with the COMELEC a petition seeking
cancellation of respondent Ermelita Salcedo’s (Ermelita) COC on the ground that she had made material
misrepresentation by stating her surname as Salcedo. Petitioner claimed that Ermelita had no right to use the surname
Salcedo, since her marriage to Neptali Salcedo was void. The COMELEC En Banc found that Ermelita did not commit any
misrepresentation nor usurp another’s name since she had the right to use her husband’s surname for being married to
him, and thus, validated her proclamation as Mayor of Sara, Iloilo. Salcedo appealed the COMELEC’s resolution, and we
held:
In case there is a material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy, the Comelec is authorized to deny due
course to or cancel such certificate upon the filing of a petition by any person pursuant to Section 78.
Clearly, from the foregoing, for the petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of one candidate to prosper, the
candidate must have made a material misrepresentation involving his eligibility or qualification for the office to which he
seeks election, such as the requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run for local
elective office as provided in the Local Government Code.15 Hence, petitioner’s allegation that respondent’s nickname
“LRAY JR. MIGZ” written in his COC is a material misrepresentation is devoid of merit. Respondent’s nickname written in
the COC cannot be considered a material fact which pertains to his eligibility and thus qualification to run for public
office.
Moreover, the false representation under Section 78 must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or
hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. As we said, respondent’s nickname is not considered a
material fact, and there is no substantial evidence showing that in writing the nickname “LRAY JR. MIGZ” in his COC,
respondent had the intention to deceive the voters as to his identity which has an effect on his eligibility or qualification
for the office he seeks to assume.
It bears stressing that Section 74 requires, among others, that a candidate shall use in a COC the name by which
he has been baptized, unless the candidate has changed his name through court–approved proceedings, and that he may
include one nickname or stagename by which he is generally or popularly known in the locality, which respondent did. As
we have discussed, the name which respondent wrote in his COC to appear in the ballot, is not considered a material
misrepresentation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, as it does not pertain to his qualification or eligibility
to run for an elective public office. By invoking the case of Villarosa which is in the nature of an election protest relating
to the proclamation of Villarosa, petitioner should have instead filed an election protest and prayed that the votes for
respondent be declared as stray votes, and not a petition to deny due course or cancel the COC.
G.R. No. 202202 March 19, 2013
SILVERIO R. TAGOLINO vs. HRET AND LUCY MARIE TORRES-GOMEZ
FACTS: On November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) with the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), seeking congressional office as Representative for the Fourth Legislative District of Leyte under the
ticket of the Liberal Party. Subsequently, on December 6, 2009, one of the opposing candidates, Buenaventura Juntilla
(Juntilla), filed a Verified Petition, alleging that Richard, who was actually a resident of College Street, East Greenhills,
San Juan City, Metro Manila, misrepresented in his CoC that he resided in 910 Carlota Hills, Can-adieng, Ormoc City. In
this regard, Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet the one (1) year residency requirement under Section 6, Article
VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) and thus should be declared disqualified/ineligible to run for the
said office. In addition, Juntilla prayed that Richard’s CoC be denied due course and/or cancelled.
On February 17, 2010, the COMELEC First Division rendered a Resolution6 granting Juntilla’s petition without
any qualification.
On May 5, 2010, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (private respondent) filed her CoC9 together with a Certificate of
Nomination and Acceptance from the Liberal Party endorsing her as the party’s official substitute candidate vice her
husband, Richard, for the same congressional post. In response to various letter-requests submitted to the COMELEC’s
Law Department (Law Department), the COMELEC En Banc, in the exercise of its administrative functions, issued
Resolution No. 8890 on May 8, 2010, approving, among others, the recommendation of the said department to allow the
substitution of private respondent.
The following day, or on May 9, 2010, Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration (May 9, 2010
Motion) of the above-mentioned COMELEC En Banc resolution
Pending resolution of Juntilla’s May 9, 2010 Motion, the national and local elections were conducted as scheduled
on May 10, 2010. During the elections, Richards, whose name remained on the ballots, garnered 101, 250 votes while his
opponents, namely, Eufrocino Codilla, Jr. and herein petitioner Silverio Tagolino, obtained 76,549 and 493 votes,
respectively. In view of the aforementioned substitution, Richard’s votes were credited in favor of private respondent and
as a result, she was proclaimed the duly-elected Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the substitution of respondent is valid.

2. Whether or not respondent is ineligible for the position of Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte for lack
of residency requirement.
HELD: 1. NO. Section 77 of the OEC provides that if an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies,
withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, a person belonging to and certified by the same political party may file a CoC
to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified.
Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. - If after the last day for the filing of certificates of
candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person
belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or
was disqualified.
Evidently, Section 77 requires that there be an "official candidate" before candidate substitution proceeds. Thus,
whether the ground for substitution is death, withdrawal or disqualification of a candidate, the said section unequivocally
states that only an official candidate of a registered or accredited party may be substituted.
Considering that Section 77 requires that there be a candidate in order for substitution to take place, as well as the
precept that a person without a valid CoC is not considered as a candidate at all, it necessarily follows that if a person’s
CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled, he or she cannot be validly substituted in the electoral process. The
existence of a valid CoC is therefore a condition sine qua non for a disqualified candidate to be validly substituted.
2. YES. Fundamental is the rule that grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. While it is well-recognized that the HRET has been empowered by the
Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the
House, the Court maintains jurisdiction over it to check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. In other words, when the HRET utterly disregards
the law and settled precedents on the matter before it, it commits a grave abuse of discretion.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that the HRET’s independence is not without limitation. As earlier mentioned,
the Court retains certiorari jurisdiction over the HRET if only to check whether or not it has gravely abused its discretion.
In this regard, the Court does not endeavor to denigrate nor undermine the HRET’s independence; rather, it merely fulfills
its duty to ensure that the Constitution and the laws are upheld through the exercise of its power of judicial review.
In fine, the Court observes that the HRET wantonly disregarded the law by deliberately adopting the COMELEC En Banc’s
flawed findings regarding private respondent’s eligibility to run for public office which essentially stemmed from her
substitution. In this light, it cannot be gainsaid that the HRET gravely abused its discretion.
Owing to the lack of proper substitution in its case, private respondent was therefore not a bona fide candidate for
the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Leyte when she ran for office, which means that she could not
have been elected. Considering this pronouncement, there exists no cogent reason to further dwell on the other issues
respecting private respondent’s own qualification to office.
G.R. No. 205033 June 18, 2013
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS et, al.
FACTS: On November 16, 2001, the Court promulgated its Decision in G.R. Nos. 132875-76, entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Romeo G. Jalosjos," convicting petitioner by final judgment of two (2) counts of statutory rape and six (6)
counts of acts of lasciviousness. Consequently, he was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua
and reclusion temporal for each count, respectively, which carried the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification pursuant to Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). On April 30, 2007, then President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo issued an order commuting his prison term to sixteen (16) years, three (3) months and three (3) days
(Order of Commutation). After serving the same, he was issued a Certificate of Discharge From Prison on March 18, 2009.
On April 26, 2012, petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City. However, because of his previous
conviction, his application was denied by the Acting City Election Officer of the Election Registration Board (ERB),
prompting him to file a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters (Petition for Inclusion) before the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities of Zamboanga City, Branch 1 (MTCC). Pending resolution of the same, he filed a CoC on October 5,
2012, seeking to run as mayor for Zamboanga City in the upcoming local elections scheduled on May 13, 2013 (May 2013
Elections). In his CoC, petitioner stated, inter alia, that he is eligible for the said office and that he is a registered voter of
Barangay Tetuan, Zamboanga City.
On October 18, 2012, the MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on account of his perpetual absolute
disqualification which in effect, deprived him of the right to vote in any election. Such denial was affirmed by the Regional
Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch 14 (RTC) in its October 31, 2012 Order which, pursuant to Section 138 of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 881, as amended, otherwise known as the "Omnibus Election Code" (OEC), was immediately final and
executory.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the COMELEC En Banc acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued motu proprio Resolution
No. 9613 and in so doing, violated petitioner’s right to due process.
2. whether or not petitioner’s perpetual absolute disqualification to run for elective office had already been removed
by Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC).
HELD: 1. NO. Petitioner claims that the COMELEC En Banc usurped the COMELEC Divisions’ jurisdiction by cancelling
motu proprio petitioner’s CoC through Resolution No. 9613, contrary to Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.
The above-cited constitutional provision requiring a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc may
take action is confined only to cases where the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial power. It finds no application,
however, in matters concerning the COMELEC’s exercise of administrative functions. The distinction between the two is
well-defined. As illumined in Villarosa v. COMELEC:
The term ‘administrative’ connotes, or pertains, to ‘administration, especially management, as by managing or conducting, directing or
superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of persons or things. It does not entail an opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of
evidence, and a decision or resolution thereon. While a ‘quasi-judicial function’ is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as
a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Crucial therefore to the present disquisition is the determination of the nature of the power exercised by the COMELEC En Banc when it promulgated
Resolution No. 9613.
Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the disqualification, it is
assumed that the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to run for elective public office is addressed to the
COMELEC because under the Constitution the COMELEC is duty bound to "enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election." The disqualification of a convict to run for public office under the
Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the enforcement and administration of
"all laws" relating to the conduct of elections.
2. NO. On the one hand, Section 40(a) of the LGC, applicable as it is to local elective candidates, provides:
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within
two (2) years after serving sentence;
And on the other hand, Article 30 of the RPC reads:
ART. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. - The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute
disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held, even if conferred by popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office or to be elected to such office.
3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the rights mentioned.
In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article shall last during the term of the sentence.
4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.
In the present case, petitioner was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal which,
pursuant to Article 41 of the RPC, carried with it the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification and in turn, pursuant to
Article 30 of the RPC, disqualified him to run for elective office. As discussed, Section 40(a) of the LGC would not apply to cases wherein
a penal provision – such as Article 41 in this case – directly and specifically prohibits the convict from running for elective office. Hence,
despite the lapse of two (2) years from petitioner’s service of his commuted prison term, he remains bound to suffer the accessory penalty
of perpetual absolute disqualification which consequently, disqualifies him to run as mayor for Zamboanga City.
Notably, Article 41 of the RPC expressly states that one who is previously convicted of a crime punishable by
reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal continues to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification
even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the said accessory penalty shall have been expressly remitted in
the pardon. In this case, the same accessory penalty had not been expressly remitted in the Order of Commutation or by
any subsequent pardon and as such, petitioner’s disqualification to run for elective office is deemed to subsist.
G.R. No. 204828 December 3, 2013
JAIME C. REGIO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONNIE C. CO
FACTS: Petitioner Jaime C. Regio (Regio) and private respondent Ronnie C. Co (Co), among other candidates, ran in the
October 25, 2010 barangay elections in Barangay 296, Zone 28, District III of the City of Manila for the position of punong
barangay. Immediately following the counting and canvassing of the votes from seven clustered precincts in the adverted
barangay, Regio, who garnered four hundred seventy-eight (478) votes, as against the three hundred thirty-six (336) votes
obtained by Co, was proclaimed winner for the contested post of punong barangay.
Candidate Clustered Precinct Number Total
1302A 1303A 1304A 1305A 1306A 1307A 1307B
Co, Ronnie C. 76 113 48 99 336

Regio, Jaime C. 171 151 73 83 478
On November 4, 2010, Co filed an election protest before the MeTC. He claimed, among other things, that the Board of Election
Tellers (BET) did not follow COMELEC Resolution No. 9030, as it: (1) did not permit his supporters to vote; (2) allowed "flying voters" to
cast votes; and (3) ignored the rules on appreciation of ballots, resulting in misreading, miscounting, and misappreciation of ballots.
Additionally, he alleged that Regio committed vote-buying, and engaged in distribution of sample ballots inside the polling centers during
the day of the elections.
Of the seven clustered precincts (CPs) initially protested, Co would later exclude CP Nos. 1304A and 1305A from the protest.
During the preliminary conference, the trial court allowed the revision of ballots. The revision of ballots occurred on January 13-14,
2011.
Candidate Clustered Precinct Number Total
1302A 1303A 1304A 1305A 1306A 1307A 1307B

Co, Ronnie C. 160 -- 63 98 321
Regio, Jaime C. 86 -- 62 84 232

During his turn to present evidence, Co limited his offer to the revision committee report, showing that he garnered the highest
number of votes. Regio, on the other hand, denied that the elections were tainted with irregularities. He claimed that the results of the
revision are products of post-elections operations, as the ballots were tampered with, switched, and altered drastically to change the
results of the elections.
The results of the revision notwithstanding, the trial court, in its Decision of May 4, 2011, dismissed Co’s protest and declared
Regio as the duly-elected punong barangay of Barangay 296. It disposed of the case, as follows:
According to the trial court, before it can accord credence to the results of the revision, it should first be ascertained that the
ballots found in the box during the revision are the same ballots deposited by the voters. In fine, the court "should first be convinced that
the ballots counted during the revision have not been tampered with before it can declare the ballots a) as superior evidence of how the
electorate voted, and b) as sufficient evidence to set aside the election returns. For the ballots to be considered the best evidence of how
the voters voted, their integrity should be satisfactorily established." Invoking Rosal v. COMELEC.
In a Resolution dated August 23, 2011, the COMELEC First Division12 dismissed the appeal, noting, as the MeTC did, that Co
failed to show that the integrity of the ballots in question was in fact preserved. Echoing the trial court, the COMELEC First Division
ruled that the absence of any report or record of tampering of the ballot boxes does not preclude the possibility of ballot tampering.
Co then filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In its assailed December 7, 2012 Resolution, the COMELEC En Banc17
reconsidered the August 23, 2011 Resolution of the First Division, and accordingly declared Co as the duly elected
punong barangay. Vital to the En Banc’s disposition is its finding that the ballots subjected to revision were genuine.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decision of COMELEC first
division.
HELD: YES. Private respondent Co has not proved that the integrity of the ballots has been preserved Applying Rosal,
viewed in conjunction with A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, this Court rules that the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of
discretion in ruling that private respondent had successfully discharged the burden of proving that the ballots counted
during the revision proceedings are the same ballots cast and counted during the day of the elections. That is the essence
of the second paragraph in the Rosal doctrine. It is well to note that the respondent Co did not present any testimonial
evidence to prove that the election paraphernalia inside the protested ballot boxes had been preserved. He mainly relied
on the report of the revision committee. There was no independent, direct or indirect, evidence to prove the preservation of
the ballots and other election paraphernalia. This leads Us to no other conclusion but that respondent Co failed to
discharge his burden under the Rosal doctrine. With no independent evidence to speak of, respondent Co cannot simply
rely on the report of the revision committee, and from there conclude that the report itself is proof of the preservation of
the ballots. What he needs to provide is evidence independent of the revision proceedings. Without any such evidence, the
Court or the COMELEC, as the case may be, will be constrained to honor the presumption established in A.M. No. 07-4-
15-SC, that the data and information supplied by the members of the Boards of Election Inspectors in the accountable
forms are true and correct.
Respondent Co admits having, under the Rosal doctrine, the burden of proving the preservation of the ballots, and
corollarily, that their integrity have not been compromised before the revision proceedings. He, however, argues that he
had successfully discharged that burden. And how? First, he pointed out that from the moment the various BETs placed
the counted official ballots inside the ballot boxes until they were transported for canvassing, and until they were
transmitted to the Election Officer/City Treasurer of Manila for storage and custody, no irregularities or ballot-box
snatching were reported; neither was there any news or record of ballot box tampering in the protested precincts. Second,
no untoward incident or irregularity which may taint or affect the integrity of the ballot boxes was ever reported when
they were transported to the storage area of the trial court. Third, the storage place of the ballot boxes was at all times
tightly secured, properly protected, and well safeguarded. Fourth, all the protested ballot boxes were properly locked and
sealed. Fifth, the petitioner never questioned or raised any issue on the preservation of the integrity of the protested ballot
boxes. And sixth, the Technical Examination Report signed by the COMELEC representative confirmed the genuineness,
authenticity, and integrity of all the ballots found during the revision.
NOTE: The petition in this case has become moot but was still decided by the Supreme Court!
At the outset, it must be noted that the protest case is dismissible for being moot and academic. A case becomes moot
when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the
merits. Generally, courts will not determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted.
In Malaluan v. COMELEC,21 this Court settled the matter on when an election protest case becomes moot and
academic:
When the appeal from a decision in an election case has already become moot, the case being an election protest involving the office
of mayor the term of which had expired, the appeal is dismissible on that ground, unless the rendering of a decision on the merits would be
of practical value.
In the case now before the Court, the position involved is that of a punong barangay. The governing law, therefore, is
Republic Act No. (RA) 9164, as amended by RA 9340. Sec. 4 of the law states:
Sec. 4. Assumption of Office. - The term of office of the barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials elected under this Act shall
commence on August 15, 2002, next following their elections. The term of office of the barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials elected
in the October 2007 election and subsequent elections shall commence at noon of November 30 next following their election.
The court takes judicial notice of the holding of barangay elections last October 28, 2013. Following the elections, the
new set of barangay officials already assumed office as of noon of November 30, 2013. It goes without saying, then, that the
term of office of those who were elected during the October 2010 barangay elections also expired by noon on November 30,
2013. In fine, with the election of a new punong barangay during the October 28, 2013 elections, the issue of who the
rightful winner of the 2010 barangay elections has already been rendered moot and academic.
G.R. No. 204637 April 16, 2013

LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO vs. HRET and ELMER E. PANOTES
FACTS: In the May 10, 2010 elections, Chato and Panotes both ran for the congressional seat to represent the Second
District of Camarines Norte. On May 12, 2010, Panotes was proclaimed as the winner for having garnered 51,704 votes.
The votes cast for Chato totalled 47,822.
On May 24, 2010, Chato filed an electoral protest claiming that in four of the seven municipalities4 comprising the
Second District of Camarines Norte.
On March 21, 2011, the HRET started the initial revision of ballots in 25% of the pilot protested CPs. The revision
ended on March 24, 2011. Per physical count, Chato’s votes increased by 518, while those cast for Panotes decreased by
2,875 votes.
On March 22, 2012, the HRET issued Resolution No. 12-079 directing the continuance of the revision of ballots in
75% of the contested CPs. The proceeding commenced on May 2, 2012 and ended on May 9, 2012, the continuance
resulted to Chato’s votes increased by 1,213, while those cast for Panotes decreased by 5,476 votes.
Chato filed before the HRET an Urgent Motion to Prohibit the Use by Protestee of the Decrypted and Copied Ballot
Images. The HRET denied Chato’s motion through Resolution No. 11-321 issued on June 8, 2011. Thereafter, the HRET
issued Resolution No. 11-208 directing the decryption and copying of the picture image files of ballots (PIBs). The
proceeding was conducted within the COMELEC premises. However, Chato alleged that the back-up CF card for CP No.
44 of the Municipality of Daet and the CF card for CP No. 29 of the Municipality of Mercedes did not contain the PIBs.
Going back to HRET Case No. 10-040 (EP), in the 160 protested CPs, there were substantial variances in the
figures per machine count as indicated in the ERs, on one hand, and per physical count, on the other, in a total of 69
CPs, 23 of which were in Basud and 46 in Daet.
The votes of the parties per physical count in all the 120 [sic] protested CPs in the concerned district are 40,209 for
protestant Chato and 33,459 for protestee Panotes.
Considering that 69 CPs have substantial variances, the Tribunal decided to disregard the ballots therein, i.e.,
18,535 for protestant and 10,858 for protestee, and to consider, instead, the results in the election returns, i.e., 16,802
for protestant and 19,202 for protestee.
Hence, only the ballots in the 91 CPs without substantial variances, i.e., 21,674 for protestant and 22,601 for
protestee, had undergone appreciation of ballots. Of the ballots appreciated, the Tribunal rejected two (2) ballots for
protestant and two (2) ballots for protestee, while it admitted 176 ballots claimed by the protestant and 183 claimed by
the protestee.
The votes of the parties in the uncontested municipalities are 9,338 for protestant and 9,894 for protestee.
Accordingly, the parties’ votes, after recount and appreciation and examination of the evidence presented in the
160 protested CPs.
The foregoing results of revision and appreciation of ballots in the protested CPs, and the evidence of the parties
indicate that protestee’s proclamation margin of 3,882 votes increased by eight (8). (Citations omitted)
On December 3, 2012, the HRET denied Chato’s motion for reconsideration to the Decision dated October 15,
2012.
ISSUE: 1. whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion when it disregarded the results of the physical
count in the 69 CPs when the HRET had previously held that the integrity of the ballot boxes was preserved and that the
results of the revision proceedings can be the bases to overturn those reflected in the election returns.
2. whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion when it held that Chato had failed to prove by
substantial evidence that the CF cards used in the May 10, 2010 elections were not preserved.
HELD: 1. NO. It bears stressing that the HRET’s Order dated April 10, 2012 was issued to resolve Panotes’ motion to
suspend the continuance of the revision proceedings in 75% of the contested CPs. The HRET’s findings then anent the
integrity of the ballot boxes were at the most, preliminary in nature. The HRET was in no way estopped from
subsequently holding otherwise after it had the opportunity to exhaustively observe and examine in the course of the
entire revision proceedings the conditions of all the ballot boxes and their contents, including the ballots themselves, the
MOV, SOVs and ERs.
2.NO. The HRET found Chato’s evidence insufficient. The testimonies of the witnesses she presented were declared
irrelevant and immaterial as they did not refer to the CF cards used in the 20 precincts in the Municipalities of Basud
and Daet with substantial variances x x x.
To substitute our own judgment to the findings of the HRET will doubtless constitute an intrusion into its domain
and a curtailment of its power to act of its own accord on its evaluation of the evidentiary weight of testimonies presented
before it. Thus, for failure of Chato to discharge her burden of proving that the integrity of the questioned cards had not
been preserved, no further protestations to the use of the picture images of the ballots as stored in the CF cards should
be entertained.
Chato attempts to convince us that the integrity of the physical ballots was preserved, while that of the CF cards
was not. As mentioned above, the integrity of the CF cards is already a settled matter. Anent that of the physical ballots,
this is a factual issue which calls for a re-calibration of evidence. Generally, we do not resolve factual questions unless
the decision, resolution or order brought to us for review can be shown to have been rendered or issued with grave abuse
of discretion.
In the case at bar, the HRET disposed of Chato’s electoral protest without grave abuse of discretion. The herein
assailed decision and resolution were rendered on the bases of existing evidence and records presented before the HRET.
G.R. No. 203833 March 19, 2013

MAMERTO T. SEVILLA, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RENATO R. SO
FACTS: Sevilla and So were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Sucat, Muntinlupa City during
the October 25, 2010 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. On October 26, 2010, the Board of Election Tellers
proclaimed Sevilla as the winner with a total of 7,354 votes or a winning margin of 628 votes over So’s 6,726 total votes.
On November 4, 2010, So filed an election protest with the MeTC on the ground that Sevilla committed electoral fraud,
anomalies and irregularities in all the protested precincts. So pinpointed twenty percent (20%) of the total number of the
protested precincts. He also prayed for a manual revision of the ballots.
Following the recount of the ballots in the pilot protested precincts, the MeTC issued an Order dated May 4, 2011
dismissing the election protest. On May 9, 2011, So filed a motion for reconsideration from the dismissal order instead of
a notice of appeal; he also failed to pay the appeal fee within the reglementary period. On May 17, 2011, the MeTC denied
the motion for reconsideration on the ground that it was a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 1, Rule 6 of A.M. No.
07-04-15-SC.
In response, So filed a petition for certiorari on May 31, 2011 with the Comelec, alleging grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the MeTC Judge. So faults the MeTC for its non-observance of the rule that in the appreciation of ballots,
there should be a clear and distinct presentation of the specific details of how and why a certain group of ballots should
be considered as having been written by one or two persons.
The Comelec Second Division Ruling
In its May 14, 2012 Resolution, the Comelec Second Division granted So’s petition. The Comelec Second Division
held that certiorari can be granted despite the availability of appeals when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive
exercise of judicial authority, as in the case before it.
The Comelec En Banc Ruling
The Comelec en banc, by a vote of 3-3,8 affirmed the Comelec Second Division’s ruling in its October 6, 2012
Resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be dismissed, for being premature.
HELD: YES. In the present case, while the October 6, 2012 Resolution of the Comelec en banc appears to have affirmed
the Comelec Second Division’s Resolution and, in effect, denied Sevilla’s motion for reconsideration, the equally divided
voting between three Commissioners concurring and three Commissioners dissenting is not the majority vote that the
Constitution and the Comelec Rules of Procedure require for a valid pronouncement of the assailed October 6, 2012
Resolution of the Comelec en banc.
In essence, based on the 3-3 voting, the Comelec en banc did not sustain the Comelec Second Division’s findings
on the basis of the three concurring votes by Commissioners Tagle, Velasco and Yusoph; conversely, it also did not
overturn the Comelec Second Division on the basis of the three dissenting votes by Chairman Brillantes, Commissioner
Sarmiento and Commissioner Lim, as either side was short of one (1) vote to obtain a majority decision. Recall that under
Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution, a majority vote of all the members of the Commission en banc is necessary to
arrive at a ruling. In other words, the vote of four (4) members must always be attained in order to decide, irrespective of
the number of Commissioners in attendance. Thus, for all intents and purposes, the assailed October 6, 2012 Resolution
of the Comelec en banc had no legal effect whatsoever except to convey that the Comelec failed to reach a decision and
that further action is required.
The October 6, 2012 Comelec en banc’s Resolution must be reheard pursuant to the Comelec Rules of Procedure
To break the legal stalemate in case the opinion is equally divided among the members of the Comelec en banc, Section 6,
Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure mandates a rehearing where parties are given the opportunity anew to
strengthen their respective positions or arguments and convince the members of the Comelec en banc of the merit of their
case.19 Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure reads:
Section 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. - When the Commission en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the
necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action or
proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment or order
appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.
In the present case, it appears from the records that the Comelec en banc did not issue an Order for a rehearing of
the case in view of the filing in the interim of the present petition for certiorari by Sevilla. In both the cases of Juliano and
Marcoleta, cited above, we remanded the cases to the Comelec en banc for the conduct of the required rehearing pursuant
to the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Based on these considerations, we thus find that a remand of this case is necessary
for the Comelec en banc to comply with the rehearing requirement of Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure.
G.R. No. 206952 October 22, 2013

ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST ABANG LINGKOD vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS: ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of peasant fanners and fisherfolks, and
was registered under the party-list system on December 22, 2009. It participated in the May 2010 elections, but failed to
obtain the number of votes needed for a seat in the House of Representatives.
On May 31, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD manifested before the COMELEC its intent to participate in the May 2013
elections. On August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513, which, inter alia required previously registered
party-list groups that have filed their respective Manifestations of Intent to undergo summary evidentiary hearing for
purposes of determining their continuing compliance with the requirements under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 79413 and the
guidelines set forth in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC.
On August 16, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD, in compliance with the COMELEC's August 9, 2012 Resolution, filed with
the COMELEC pertinent documents to prove its continuing compliance with the requirements under R.A. No. 7941.
After due proceedings, the COMELEC En Bane in a Resolution dated November 7 2012, cancelled ABANG
LINGKOD's registration as a party list group. The COMELEC En Bane pointed out that ABANG LINGKOD failed to
establish its track record in uplifting the cause of the marginalized and underrepresented; that it merely offered
photographs of some alleged activities it conducted after the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Bane further opined
that ABANG LINGKOD failed to show that its nominees are themselves marginalized and underrepresented or that they
have been involved in activities aimed at improving the plight of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors it claims
to represent.
On April 2, 2013, the Court, in Atong Paglaum Inc. v. Commission on Elections, laid down new parameters to
be observed by the COMELEC in screening parties, organizations or associations seeking registration and/or
accreditation under the party-list system, viz:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or
organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not
need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector. 3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they
register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not,
that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can
separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political
party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in "well-defined political
constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of their sector. The sectors that
are marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women,
and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of the sectoral parties or organizations that represent the ''marginalized and underrepresented must
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties
or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" or that represent those who lack "well-defined political
constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record or advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified,
provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not ABANG LINGKOD was denied due process when the COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of its
registration under the party-list system sans any summary evidentiary hearing.
2. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling ABANG LINGKOD’s registration under
the party-list system.
HELD: 1. NO. In the instant case, while the petitioner laments that it was denied due process, the Court finds that the
COMELEC had afforded ABANG LINGKOD sufficient opportunity to present evidence establishing its qualification as a
party-list group. It was notified through Resolution No. 9513 that its registration was to be reviewed by the COMELEC.
That ABANG LINGKOD was able to file its Manifestation of Intent and other pertinent documents to prove its continuing
compliance with the requirements under R.A. No. 7941, which the COMELEC set for summary hearing on three separate
dates, belies its claim that it was denied due process.
There was no necessity for the COMELEC to conduct further summary evidentiary hearing to assess the
qualification of ABANG LINGKOD pursuant to Atong Paglaum. ABANG LINGKOD’s Manifestation of Intent and all the
evidence adduced by it to establish its qualification as a party-list group are already in the possession of the COMELEC.
Thus, conducting further summary evidentiary hearing for the sole purpose of determining ABANG LINGKOD s
qualification under the party-list system pursuant to Atong Paglaum would just be a superfluity.
Contrary to ABANG LINGKOD’s claim, the Court, in Atong Paglaum, did not categorically require the COMELEC to
conduct a summary evidentiary hearing for the purpose of determining the qualifications of the petitioners therein
pursuant to the new parameters for screening party-list groups.
2.YES. The COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration on the ground that it declared
untruthful statement in its bid for accreditation as a party-list group in the May 2013 elections, pointing out that it
deliberately submitted digitally altered photographs of activities to make it appear that it had a track record in
representing the marginalized and underrepresented. Essentially, ABANG LINGKOD's registration was cancelled on the
ground that it failed to adduce evidence showing its track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented.
The flaw in the COMELEC's disposition lies in the fact that it insists on requiring party-list groups to present
evidence showing that they have a track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented.
R.A. No. 7941 did not require groups intending to register under the party-list system to submit proof of their track
record as a group. The track record requirement was only imposed in Ang Bagong Bayani where the Court held that
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations seeking registration under the party-list system must prove
through their, inter alia track record that they truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented.
There is no logic in treating sectoral organizations differently from national and regional parties or organizations as
regards their bid for registration under the party-list system. The varying track record requirement suggested by the
dissent would unnecessarily put a premium on groups intending to register as national and regional parties or
organizations as against those intending to register as sectoral organizations The imposition of an additional burden on
sectoral organizations, i.e. submission of their track record, would be plainly unjust as it effectively deters the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors from organizing themselves under the party-list system.
Likewise, that there was no explicit reversal of the guidelines in ng Bagong Bayani in tong Paglaum does not mean
that groups intending to register under the party-list system are still required to submit a track record. The track record
of groups intending to register under the party-list system was required under the first guideline of Ang Bagong Bayani
for a very specific purpose to show that the national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations that would be allowed
to participate in the party-list elections are truly representative of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors It was
necessary-then to require groups seeking registration under the party-list system since representation of the marginalized
and underrepresented, as understood in the context of Ang Bagong Bayani is easy to claim and feign.
There exists no reason to further require groups seeking registration under the party-list system to submit evidence
showing their track record. Pursuant to Atong Paglaum not all groups are required to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and, accordingly, there is no longer any incentive in merely feigning representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
In the case of sectoral organizations, although they are still required to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented, they are likewise not required to show a track record since there would be no reason for them to feign
representation of the marginalized and underrepresented as they can just register as a national or regional party or
organization. Thus, the Court, in Atong Paglaum stated that, for purposes of registration under the party-list system, it is
enough that the principal advocacy of sectoral organizations pertains to the sector/s they represent.
There is thus no basis in law and established jurisprudence to insist that groups seeking registration under the
party-list system still comply with the track record requirement. Indeed, nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is it mandated that
groups seeking registration thereunder must submit evidence to show their track record as a group.
To stress, in Atong Paglaum the Court pointed out that [t]he nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the 'marginalized and underrepresented,' or that represent those who lack 'well-defined political constituencies,'
either must belong to their respective sectors or must have a track record o advocacy for their respective sectors. Stated
otherwise, the nominee of a party-list groups may either be: first one who actually belongs to the sector which the party-
list group represents, in which case the track record requirement does not apply; or second one who does not actually
belong to the sector which the party-list group represents but has a track record showing the nominee's active
participation in activities aimed at uplifting the cause of the sector which the group represents."
In the case under consideration, three of the five nominees of ABANG LINGKOD are farmers and, thus, are not
required to present a track record showing their active participation in activities aimed to promote the sector which
ABANG LINGKOD represents, i.e. peasant farmers and fisherfolk. That two of ABANG LINGKOD's nominees do not
actually belong to the sector it represents is immaterial and would not result in the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's
registration as a party-list group. This is clear from the sixth parameter laid down by the Court in tong Paglaum which
states that "national, regional and sectoral organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified." At the very least, ABANG LINGKOD has
three (3) qualified nominees, being farmers by occupation.
Indeed, the disqualification of one or some of the nominees of a party-list group should not automatically result in
the disqualification of the group.1avvphi1 Otherwise it would accord the nominees the same significance, which the law
holds for the party-list groups; it is still the fact that the party-list group satisfied the qualifications of the law that is
material to consider. The disqualification of the nominees must simply be regarded as failure to qualify for an office or
position. It should not, in any way, blemish the qualifications of the party-list group itself with defect. The party-list group
must be treated as separate and distinct from its nominees such that qualifications of the latter must not be considered
part and parcel of the qualifications of the former.
G.R. No. 192803 December 10, 2013

ARARO PARTY-LIST vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS: Petitioner, Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc.,(ARARO) was a duly accredited party-list under
Republic Act No. 7941. It garnered a total of one hundred forty-seven thousand two hundred four (147,204) votes in the
May 10, 2010 elections and ranked fiftieth (50th). The Commission on Elections En Banc sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers initially proclaimed twenty-eight (28) party-list organizations as winners involving a total of thirty-five (35)
seats guaranteed and additional seats. The result was based on the Commission on Elections’ count of one hundred
twenty-one (121) Certificates of Canvass or a total of twenty-nine million seven hundred fifty thousand and forty-one
(29,750,041) votes for the Party-List System.
Petitioner then filed an election protest before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal questioning the
Resolution of the Commission on Elections that proclaimed the 28 party-list groups listed above.
Without waiting for the resolution of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, the petitioner filed the present
Petition for Review on Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.
The petitioner suggests that the formula used by the Commission on Elections is flawed because votes that were
spoiled or that were not made for any party-lists were not counted. According to the petitioner, around seven million
(7,000,000) votes were disregarded as a result of the Commission on Elections’ erroneous interpretation. The figure
presented by petitioner resulted from the following computations:1
37,377,371 (Number of voters who actually voted LESS votes
for disqualified party lists)
less 30,264,579 (Number of votes for party-list candidates LESS
number of votes for disqualified party-list candidates)
7,112,792 (Total number of disregarded votes
according to petitioner ARARO)
First, the total number of votes for disqualified party-lists is deducted from the total number of voters that actually voted. The
total number of votes for disqualified party-list groups is three hundred eight thousand three hundred thirty-five (308,335). 15 The total
number of voters that actually voted is thirty-seven million six hundred eighty-five thousand seven hundred six (37,685,706).16 After
subtracting the amounts, the result is thirty-seven million three hundred seventy-seven thousand three hundred seventy-one
(37,377,371)votes.
Second, the number of votes for disqualified party-list groups is again deducted from the number of votes for party-list candidates
which the petitioner pegged at thirty million five hundred seventy-two thousand nine hundred fourteen votes (30,572,914).17 The
difference then is thirty million two hundred sixty-four thousand five hundred seventy-nine (30,264,579) votes.
Lastly, to get the total number of votes disregarded by the Commission on Elections’ interpretation, 30,264,579 is subtracted from
37,377,371.The computation then results to seven million one hundred twelve thousand seven hundred ninety-two (7,112,792) votes
disregarded using the Commission on Elections’ interpretation.
On the other hand, the formula used by the Commission on Elections En Banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers is the
following:
Number of seats available to Number of seats
legislative districts available to party-list
x .20 =
.08 representatives
Thus, the total number of party-list seats available for the May 2010 elections is 57 as shown below:
229
x .20 = 57
.80
The National Board of Canvassers’ Resolution No. 10-009 applies the formula used in Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC 18 to arrive at the winning party-
list groups and their guaranteed seats, where:
Number of votes of party-list
Proportion or
= Percentage of votes
Total number of votes for garnered by party-list
party-list candidates
The Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by party-list should be greater than or equal to 2% or 0.02
to entitle a party-list candidate to one (1) seat in the first round. There will be a second round if the total
number of guaranteed seats awarded in the first round is less than the total number of party-list seats
available. Thus:
Proportion or
Total number of Number of seats
Percentage of Additional seats
party-list seats - allocated in first x =
votes garnered by awarded
available round
party-list
If the total seats available for party-lists are not yet awarded after the second round (this is computed by
getting the sum of the seats awarded in the first round and the additional seats awarded in the second round),
the next in the party-list ranking will be given one (1) seat each until all seats are fully distributed. A three-seat
cap per party-list, however, is imposed on winning groups. Fractional seats are not rounded off and are
disregarded.
ISSUE: Determination of the computation of the correct divisor to be used. The options are:
A. All votes cast for the party-list system less the votes cast for subsequently disqualified party-list groups
and votes declared spoiled
B. The total votes cast
C. The total number of valid votes cast for the party-list system including votes cast for party-list groups
listed in the ballot even if subsequently declared disqualified. The divisor should not include votes that
are declared spoiled or invalid.
HELD: Sections 11 and 12 of Republic Act No. 7941,thus, provide:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the
party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be
entitled to participate in the party-list system.
The most recent Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC does not in any way modify the formula set in Veterans. It
only corrects the definition of valid party-list groups. We affirmed that party-list groups maybe national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. We abandoned the requirement introduced in Ang Bagong
Bayani that all party-list groups should prove that they represent a "marginalized" or "under-represented"
sector.
Proportional representation is provided in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7941. BANAT overturned
Veterans’ interpretation of the phrase in proportion to their total number of votes. We clarified that the
interpretation that only those that obtained at least 2% of the votes may get additional seats will not result in
proportional representation because it will make it impossible for the party-list seats to be filled completely. As
demonstrated in BANAT, the 20% share may never be filled if the 2% threshold is maintained.
The divisor, thus, helps to determine the correct percentage of representation of party-list groups as
intended by the law. This is part of the index of proportionality of the representation of a party-list to the House
of Representatives.46 It measures the relation between the share of the total seats and the share of the total
votes of the party-list. In Veterans, where the 20% requirement in the Constitution was treated only as a ceiling,
the mandate for proportional representation was not achieved, and thus, was held void by this Court.
Not all votes cast in the elections should be included in the divisor. Contrary to the argument of the
petitioner, Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 7941 is clear that only those votes cast for the party-list system
shall be considered in the computation of the percentage of representation:
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
the party-list systemshall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent
(2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided,
finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
(Emphasisprovided)
The total votes cast do not include invalid votes. The invalid votes, for the determination of the
denominator, may be votes that were spoiled or votes that resulted from the following: improper shading or
having no shade at all;51 existence of stray or ambiguous marks;52 tears in the ballot; and/or ballots rejected
by the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines under the paper-based53automated election system. All
these are causes that nullify the count for that vote that can be attributable to the voter’s action.
Votes cast for the party-list system should, however, include all votes cast for party-list groups contained
in the ballot even if subsequently they are disqualified by the Commission on Elections or by our courts. Thus,
the content of the divisor in the formula to determine the seat allocation for the party-list component of the
House of Representatives should be amended accordingly.
Therefore, the divisor should now include all votes cast for party-list groups that are subsequently disqualified for
so long as they were presented as a choice to the electorate.
If his or her vote is not counted as part of the divisor, then this would amount to a disenfranchisement of a basic
constitutional right to be able to choose representatives of the House of Representatives in two ways. First, his or her vote
will be nullified. Second, he or she will be deprived of choosing another party-list group to represent his or her interest
should the party listed in the ballot be declared disqualified.
However, there are instances when the Commission on Elections include the name of the party-list group in the
ballot but such group is disqualified with finality prior to the elections. In applying and interpreting the provisions of
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646,we said in Cayat v. Commission on Elections62 that votes cast in favor of a candidate
"disqualified with finality" should be considered stray and not be counted. To be consistent, the party-list group in the
ballot that has been disqualified with finality and whose final disqualification was made known to the electorate by the
Commission on Elections should also not be included in the divisor. This is to accord weight to the disqualification as well
as accord respect to the inherent right of suffrage of the voters.
Thus, the formula to determine the proportion garnered by the party-list group would now henceforth be:
Number of votes of party-list
Proportion or Percentage of
=
votes garnered by party-list
Total number of valid votes for party-list candidates
G.R. No. 203766 April 2, 2013

ATONG PAGLAUM vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS: 52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the Supreme Court (SC) in an
effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) disqualifying them from the May 2013
party-list race. The Comelec, in its assailed resolutions issued in October, November and December of 2012, ruled, among
others, that these party-list groups and organizations failed to represent a “marginalized and underrepresented sector,”
their nominees do not come from a “marginalized and underrepresented sector,” and/or some of the organizations or
groups are not truly representative of the sector they intend to represent in Congress.
Petitioners argued that the poll body committed grave abuse of discretion in denying some of the petitioners’
application for accreditation and cancelling the existing accreditation of the rest. They also lamented the poll body’s
“denial” to accord them due process in the evaluation proceedings.
The high court consolidated these cases; Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio was tasked as the Member-in-
charge of the case.
Status quo ante orders (SQAO) were issued in all 54 petitions which restored the status quo prior to the
disqualification of petitioners. However, only 39 of the 52 petitioners or only 41 petitions were able to secure a mandatory
injunction, directing the Comelec to include their names in the printing of official ballots.
ISSUES: 1 Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new
petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as
party-list organizations.
2. Whether or not the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections (BANAT) should be
applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
HELD: 1. NO. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However,
the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines
which abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties
or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and
do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field
candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative
district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under
the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party
through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political
constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political
constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented”
must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent.
The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that
represent those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must
have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from participating in the
party-list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political
parties can now participate in the party-list system provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see
parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage them to work
assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-
defined political constituencies.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when they were drafting
the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include
all parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the
BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the
intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for the
marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the “marginalized and
underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. It is also for national or regional parties.
It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The common
denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike major political parties, to field or
sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the
party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly excludes other
cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include only labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that
by their nature are economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941
includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals, which are not per se
economically marginalized but are still qualified as “marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined
political constituencies” as they are ideologically marginalized.
2. YES. In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling further. In BANAT, the
majority officially excluded major political parties from participating in party-list elections,60 abandoning even the lip-
service that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to the 1987 Constitution and R.A.No. 7941 that major political parties can
participate in party-list elections.
The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can participate in the party-list system
through their sectoral wings. The minority expressed that "[e]xcluding the major political parties in party-list elections is
manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot
engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list
elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law."61 The experimentations in socio-political engineering have
only resulted in confusion and absurdity in the party-list system. Such experimentations, in clear contravention of the
1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, must now come to an end.
We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying petitioners. In
following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed grave abuse of discretion. However, for the
coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, we must now impose and mandate the party-list system actually envisioned and
authorized under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. In BANAT, this Court devised a new formula in the allocation
of party-list seats, reversing the COMELEC's allocation which followed the then prevailing formula in Ang Bagong Bayani.
In BANAT, however, the Court did not declare that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. Similarly, even as
we acknowledge here that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion, we declare that it would not be in
accord with the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT in
determining who are qualified to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. For this purpose, we suspend
our rule that a party may appeal to this Court from decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion.
G.R. No. 204591 April 16, 2013

A-IPRA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS: Petitioner Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance (A-IPRA) is a sectoral political party whose primordial
objectives are the recognition, protection and promotion of the rights of the indigenous people. It was allowed registration
and accreditation by the COMELEC Second Division in its Resolution dated January 13, 2010 in SPP Case No. 09-214
(PL).
Petitioner committed itself to protect and work for the betterment of the underrepresented and marginalized sector
of indigenous peoples by ensuring that their rights, cultural communities and ancestral domains are accorded priority
and recognition. Petitioner likewise committed itself to promote the culture of the indigenous people through education
and the delivery of basic services to the indigenous cultural communities. Its track record is manifested by its active
advocacy for the passage of the IPRA Law (Republic Act No. 8371) by conducting a series of campaigns and seminars to
educate and inform the indigenous people of their rights. When the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8371 or the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act was challenged before the Courts, petitioner A-IPRA gave valuable inputs to the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples, resulting in the dismissal of the petition to declare said law unconstitutional.
A-IPRA participated in the May 2010 elections with three nominees.
On May 31, 2012, A-IPRA filed a Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the May 2013 Elections with the
COMELEC. Appended in the manifestation is a new list of nominees and officers (Lota Group), consisting of five nominees.
On August 9, 2012, the COMELEC en banc issued an Order, requiring A-IPRA to appear before them to present
documentary evidence which will establish its continuing compliance with the requirements set forth under Republic Act
No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC.
On November 7, 2012, the COMELEC en banc issued the assailed Resolution, cancelling the registration and
accreditation of A-IPRA.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse when it issued Comelec Resolution dated November 7, 2012.
HELD:NO. In Atong Paglaum, the Court specifically ruled that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion, thus:
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of this Court in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since the Court
adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list
system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand
to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the partylist
system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this
Decision.
With a definite ruling of this Court on the absence of grave abuse of discretion in the consolidated cases of Atong
Paglaum, the instant petition had become moot and academic and must therefore be dismissed.
As regards the legitimacy of the nomination of the Lota Group raised by the Insigne group in their petition for intervention
and opposition, the same is more aptly addressed to the COMELEC. The determination of who is the rightful
representative of a political party or the legitimate nominee of a party-list group lies with the COMELEC, as part and
parcel of its constitutional task of registering political parties, organizations and coalitions under Section 2(5), Article
IX(C) of the 1987 Constitution.
In Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino v. COMELEC, this Court held that the COMELEC correctly ruled that "the
ascertainment of the identity of a political party and its legitimate officers is a matter that is well within its authority. The
source of this authority is no other than the fundamental law itself, which vests upon the COMELEC the power and
function to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election."
Apparently, the COMELEC failed to resolve the issue of the legitimacy of the nomination of the Lota Group in its
Resolution dated November 7, 2012 and this was raised as an issue by the Insigne Group in the instant petition.
However, with the remand of all the petitions to the COMELEC and the directive for it to redetermine the qualifications of
the petitioning party-list groups, it is only appropriate that the Insigne Group present their challenge to the legitimacy of
the Lota Group’s nomination before the Commission to give it the opportunity to rule on the matter at the same time that
it reevaluates A-IPRA’s qualifications to run in the May 2013 elections based on the new set of guidelines in Atong
Paglaum.

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ABUNDIO BACATAN, LOVELY DELA TORRE, JED SALVIO PARACHA – ELECTION LAW CASE DIGEST

G.R. No. 207264 October 22, 2013

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the substitution of respondent is valid.

Co, Ronnie C. 76 113 48 99 336

1302A 1303A 1304A 1305A 1306A 1307A 1307B

Regio, Jaime C. 86 -- 62 84 232

G.R. No. 204637 April 16, 2013

G.R. No. 203833 March 19, 2013

G.R. No. 206952 October 22, 2013

G.R. No. 192803 December 10, 2013

HELD: Sections 11 and 12 of Republic Act No. 7941,thus, provide:

G.R. No. 203766 April 2, 2013

G.R. No. 204591 April 16, 2013

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