FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

G.R. No. 132922 April 21, 1998

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and GMA NETWORK, INC. vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS: In Osmeña v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 132231, decided March 31, 1998, we upheld the validity of § 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 which
prohibits the sale or donation of print space or air time for political ads, except to the Commission on Elections under §90, of B.P.
No. 881, the Omnibus Election Code, with respect to print media, and §92, with respect to broadcast media. In the present case, we
consider the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. No. 881 against claims that the requirement that radio and television time be given free takes
property without due process of law; that it violates the eminent domain clause of the Constitution which provides for the payment
of just compensation; that it denies broadcast media the equal protection of the laws; and that, in any event, it violates the terms of
the franchise of petitioner GMA Network, Inc.
Section 92 of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 881, as amended, reads as follows:
Sec. 92. Comelec time. — The commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as
“Comelec Time” which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage
of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations
are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of the campaign.
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. is an organization of lawyers of radio and
television broadcasting companies. They are suing as citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters. The other petitioner, GMA Network,
Inc., operates radio and television broadcasting stations throughout the Philippines under a franchise granted by Congress.
Petitioners challenge the validity of §92 on the ground (1) that it takes property without due process of law and without just
compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in
excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during
the period of election.

ISSUE: Is Section 92 of BP. Blg. 881 violative of the due process clause and unlawful taking of private property for public use without
just compensation?

HELD:NO. Petitioners' argument is without merit, All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the
government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are
frequencies to assign. 9 A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amended by Congress in accordance with the
constitutional provision that "any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the
Congress when the common good so requires."
Indeed, provisions for COMELEC Time have been made by amendment of the franchises of radio and television broadcast
stations and, until the present case was brought, such provisions had not been thought of as taking property without just
compensation. Art. XII, §11 of the Constitution authorizes the amendment of franchises for "the common good." What better
measure can be conceived for the common good than one for free air time for the benefit not only of candidates but even more of
the public, particularly the voters, so that they will be fully informed of the issues in an election? "[I]t is the right of the viewers and
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."
Nor indeed can there be any constitutional objection to the requirement that broadcast stations give free air time. Even in
the United States, there are responsible scholars who believe that government controls on broadcast media can constitutionally be
instituted to ensure diversity of views and attention to public affairs to further the system of free expression. For this purpose,
broadcast stations may be required to give free air time to candidates in an election.
In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies
through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a
franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some
form of public service
G.R. No. 133486 January 28, 2000
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS: The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from [a] reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group)
has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections x x x and to make [an] exit survey of the x x x
vote during the elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be [broadcast]
immediately." The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial
quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized Petitioner
ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.
On May 9, 1998, this Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner. We directed the Comelec to
cease and desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if
any. In fact, the exit polls were actually conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or problem.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conduct of exit survey is valid.

HELD:YES. Doctrinally, the Court has always ruled in favor of the freedom of expression, and any restriction is treated an exemption.
The power to exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed; rather the presumption is against its validity. And it is respondent's
burden to overthrow such presumption. Any act that restrains speech should be greeted with furrowed brows, so it has been said.
To justify a restriction, the promotion of a substantial government interest must be clearly shown. Thus:
"A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the government, if it
furthers an important or substantial government interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest."
Hence, even though the government's purposes are legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursued by means that
broadly, stifle fundamental personal liberties, when the end can be more narrowly achieved.
The freedoms of speech and of the press should all the more be upheld when what is sought to be curtailed is the
dissemination of information meant to add meaning to the equally vital right of suffrage.We cannot support any ruling or order "the
effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech."When faced with borderline situations in which the
freedom of a candidate or a party to speak or the freedom of the electorate to know is invoked against actions allegedly made to
assure clean and free elections, this Court shall lean in favor of freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen and
the State's power to regulate should not be antagonistic. There can be no free and honest elections if, in the efforts to maintain
them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly curtailed.
True, the government has a stake in protecting the fundamental right to vote by providing voting places that are safe and
accessible. It has the duty to secure the secrecy of the ballot and to preserve the sanctity and the integrity of the electoral process.
However, in order to justify a restriction of the people's freedoms of speech and of the press, the state's responsibility of ensuring
orderly voting must far outweigh them.
These freedoms have additional importance, because exit polls generate important research data which may be used to
study influencing factors and trends in voting behavior. An absolute prohibition would thus be unreasonably restrictive, because it
effectively prevents the use of exit poll data not only for election-day projections, but also for long-term research.

Clear and present danger of destroying the integrity of electoral processes.

Speculative and Untenable. First, by the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or participants are selected at random, so
that the results will as much as possible be representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the community or group
polled. Second, the survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official Comelec count. It consists merely of
the opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in general has probably voted for, based on the limited data gathered from
polled individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are
separate and independent from the exit polls. The holding and the reporting of the results of exit polls cannot undermine those of
the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. If at all, the outcome of one can only be indicative of the other.
G.R. No. 147571 May 5, 2001
SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING CORPORATION, doing business as MANILA
STANDARD vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTION

FACTS: Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 (Fair
Election Act), which provides:Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and
surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election.
The term election surveys is defined in 5.1 of the law as follows:
Election surveys refer to the measurement of opinions and perceptions of the voters as regards a candidates popularity, qualifications,
platforms or a matter of public discussion in relation to the election, including voters preference for candidates or publicly discussed issues during
the campaign period (hereafter referred to as Survey).
To implement 5.4, Resolution 3636, 24(h), dated March 1, 2001, of the COMELEC enjoins
Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates
shall not be published seven (7) days before an election.
Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections both at the national and
local levels and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioner Kamahalan Publishing
Corporation, on the other hand, states that it intends to publish election survey results up to the last day of the elections on May 14,
2001.
Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom
of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. They claim that SWS and other pollsters conducted and published the
results of surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to as close as two days before the election day without causing confusion among
the voters and that there is neither empirical nor historical evidence to support the conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to
the voting process posed by election surveys. They point out that no similar restriction is imposed on politicians from explaining their opinion or on
newspapers or broadcast media from writing and publishing articles concerning political issues up to the day of the election. Consequently, they
contend that there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied access to the results of election surveys which are relatively objective.
Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 as necessary to prevent the manipulation and
corruption of the electoral process by unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before the election. It contends that (1) the prohibition on the
publication of election survey results during the period proscribed by law bears a rational connection to the objective of the law, i.e., the
prevention of the debasement of the electoral process resulting from manipulated surveys, bandwagon effect, and absence of reply; (2) it is
narrowly tailored to meet the evils sought to be prevented; and (3) the impairment of freedom of expression is minimal, the restriction being
limited both in duration, i.e., the last 15 days before the national election and the last 7 days before a local election, and in scope as it does not
prohibit election survey results but only require timeliness. Respondent claims that in National Press Club v. COMELEC, a total ban on political
advertisements, with candidates being merely allocated broadcast time during the so-called COMELEC space or COMELEC hour, was upheld by this
Court. In contrast, according to respondent, it states that the prohibition in 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 is much more limited.

ISSUE: Whether or not 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression, and the
press.

HELD: YES. First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the OBrien test because the causal connection of expression to the asserted governmental
interest makes such interest not unrelated to the suppression of free expression. By prohibiting the publication of election survey results because
of the possibility that such publication might undermine the integrity of the election, 5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while
allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists,
and other opinion makers. In effect, 5.4 shows a bias for a particular subject matter, if not viewpoint, by preferring personal opinion to statistical
results. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression means that the government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. The inhibition of speech should be upheld only if the expression falls within one of the few
unprotected categories dealt with in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, thus:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or fighting words those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. [S]uch utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
Second. Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the suppression of speech and the resulting restriction
of free expression is only incidental, 5.4 nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4] of the OBrien test, namely, that the restriction be not greater than is
necessary to further the governmental interest. As already stated, 5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of
bandwagon effect, junking of weak or losing candidates, and resort to the form of election cheating called dagdag-bawas. Praiseworthy as these
aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when such aim can be more
narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils.
This is surely a less restrictive means than the prohibition contained in 5.4. Pursuant to this power of the COMELEC, it can confiscate
bogus survey results calculated to mislead voters. Candidates can have their own surveys conducted. No right of reply can be invoked by others. No
principle of equality is involved. It is a free market to which each candidate brings his ideas. As for the purpose of the law to prevent bandwagon
effects, it is doubtful whether the Government can deal with this natural-enough tendency of some voters. Some voters want to be identified with
the winners. Some are susceptible to the herd mentality. Can these be legitimately prohibited by suppressing the publication of survey results
which are a form of expression? It has been held that [mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well
support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the
maintenance of democratic institutions.
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC June 29, 2001
RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE FORMER
PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS,
CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO and ATTY. RICARDO ROMULO vs. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES

FACTS: On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association representing duly franchised and
authorized television and radio networks throughout the country, sent a letter requesting this Court to allow live media coverage of
the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history."The
request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 05 April 2001 to the Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato
Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo.
On 17 April 2001, the Honorable Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the instant petition, submitting the
following exegesis:
"3. The foregoing criminal cases involve the previous acts of the former highest official of the land, members of his family,
his cohorts and, therefore, it cannot be over emphasized that the prosecution thereof, definitely involves a matter of public concern
and interest, or a matter over which the entire citizenry has the right to know, be informed and made aware of.
" 4. There is no gainsaying that the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern, as in the
instant cases, can best be recognized, served and satisfied by allowing the live radio and television coverage of the concomitant
court proceedings.
"5. Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of the proceedings will also serve the dual purpose of ensuring the
desired transparency in the administration of justice in order to disabuse the minds of the supporters of the past regime of any and
all unfounded notions, or ill-perceived attempts on the part of the present dispensation, to 'railroad' the instant criminal cases
against the Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada."

ISSUE: Whether the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and right to information of public concern be given more
weight  than the fundamental rights of the accused.

HELD:NO. The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public information.  It also
approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the
public and in acquainting the public with the judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding
consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due process which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its
constitutional proportions.  
Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted
above its individual settings nor made an object of public's attention and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any
outside force or influencebut only by evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is
demanded."Television can work profound changes in the behavior of the people it focuses on."The conscious or unconscious effect
that such coverage may have on the testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be
said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it.
Although an accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or
liberty can be held critically in balance.  A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned
and that his rights are not compromised. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors
must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial
process.  In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the
proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their
proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings.
G.R. No. 170270 April 2, 2009
Newsounds Broadcasting vs. Dy

FACTS: Petitioners operate and run Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC), an AM radio broadcast station, and Star FM DWIT
Cauayan, an FM radio broadcast station, in Cauayan Citry, Isabela. Back in 1996, Newsounds commenced relocation of its
broadcasting station, management office, and transmitters on propery located in Minante 2, Cauayan City, Isabela.
On July 1996, the Housing & Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and Office of the Municipal Planning and Development
Coordinator (OMPDC) affirmed and certified that the commercial structure to be constructed conformed to local zoning regulations,
noting as well that the location is classified as a “commercial area”. The radio station was able to fully operate smoothly thereafter.
In 2002 however, when petitioners applied for a renewal of mayor’s permit, City Zoning Administratior-Designate Bagnos
Maximo refused to issue zoning clearance on the grounds that petitioners were not able to submit conversion papers showing that
the agricultural land was converted to commercial land. Petitioners asked the court to compel the issuance of mayor’s permit but
the court denied the action. In the meantime, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Region II office issued to petitioners a
formal recognition of conversion of the property from agricultural to commercial.
In 2003, petitioners again filed their application for renewal of mayor’s permit, attaching the DAR Order. Respondent
Felicisimo Meer, acting City Administrator of Cauayan City denied the same, claiming that it was void on the grounds that they did
not have record of the DAR Order.
The deadline lapsed on Febuary 15, 2004, and respondents Meer and Racma Fernandez-Garcia, City Legal Officer of
Cauayan City, closed the radio station. Due to the prvosion of Omnibus Election Code which prohibits the closure of radio station
during the pendency of election period, COMELEC issued an order allowing the petitioners to operate before Febuary 17, 2004, but
was barred again by respondent Mayor Ceasar Dy on the grounds that the radio station had no permit. Nonetheless, COMELEC
allowed them to run again until June 10, 2004 after elections. Petitioners filed the case to the RTC and CA for the issuance of mayor’s
permit but both courts denied the petition.
A municipal or city mayor is likewise authorized under the LGC to issue licenses and permits, and suspend or revoke the
same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. In case
of Cauayan City, the authority to require a mayor’s permit was enacted through Ordinance No. 92-004, enacted in 1993. However,
nothing in the ordinance requires an application for a mayor’s permit to submit “either an approved land conversion papers from
DAR, showing that its property was converted from prime agricultural land or an approved resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan
or Sangguniang Panglungsod authorizing the reclassification of property from agricultural to commercial land.
In 1996, the HLURB issued a zoning decision that classified the property as commercial. Petitioners are also armed with
several certifications stating that the property is indeed a commercial area. Also, petitioners paid real property taxes based on the
classification of property as commercial without objections raised by the respondents.
Petitioners argued that this consistent recognition by the local government of Cauayan of the commercial character of the
property constitutes estoppels against respondents from denying the fact before the courts. The lower courts had ruled that “the
government of Cauayan City is not bound by estoppels, but petitioners classified that this concept is understood to only refer to acts
and mistakes of its official especially to those which are irregular.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is prior restraint against DZNC.

HELD: YES. Without taking into account any extenuating circumstances that may favor the respondents, we can identify the bare
acts of closing the radio stations or preventing their operations as an act of prior restraint against speech, expression or of the press.
Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication
or dissemination. While any system of prior restraint comes to court bearing a heavy burden against its constitutionality, not all prior
restraints on speech are invalid.
That the acts imputed against respondents constitute a prior restraint on the freedom of expression of respondents who
happen to be members of the press is clear enough. There is a long-standing tradition of special judicial solicitude for free speech,
meaning that governmental action directed at expression must satisfy a greater burden of justification than governmental action
directed at most other forms of behavior. We had said in SWS v. COMELEC: Because of the preferred status of the constitutional
rights of speech, expression, and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity. Indeed, any system of
prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. . . . The
Government 'thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such restraint. There is thus a reversal of
the normal presumption of validity that inheres in every legislation.
At the same time, jurisprudence distinguishes between  a content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the
incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined standards; and a content-
based  restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. Content-based laws are
generally treated as more suspect than content-neutral laws because of judicial concern with discrimination in the regulation of
expression. Content-neutral regulations of speech or of conduct that may amount to speech, are subject to lesser but still
heightened scrutiny.
G.R. No. 164437 May 15, 2009
HECTOR C. VILLANUEVA vs. PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC.

FACTS: Petitioner was one of the mayoralty candidates in Bais, Negros Oriental during the May 11, 1992 elections.
On March 30, 1990, Ricardo Nolan, another mayoralty candidate, petitioned for the disqualification of petitioner from running in the
elections. Said petition, however, was denied by the COMELEC.
Two days before the elections, or on May 9, 1992, respondent Manila Daily Bulletin Publishing Corporation (Manila Bulletin)
published the following story:
The Comelec has disqualified Hector G. Villanueva as Lakas-NUCD candidate for mayor of Bais City for having been
convicted in three administrative cases for grave abuse of authority and harassment in 1987, while he was officer-in-charge of the
mayors office of Bais City.
A day before the elections or on May 10, 1992, respondent Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. (PDI) also came out with a similar
story, to wit:
The Commission on Elections disqualified Hector G. Villanueva as Lakas-NUCD candidate for mayor of Bais City for having been convicted
in three administrative cases for grave abuse of authority and harassment in 1987, while he was the officer-in-charge of the mayors office in the
city.
In the same month, Francisco G. Villanueva was appointed OIC Mayor to replace Hector Villanueva who had been removed from office.
The poll body also stated that insofar as the penalty of the removal is concerned, this cannot be reversed anymore, and
consequently cannot be the subject matter of an appeal.
The indefinite term as OIC to which respondent was appointed in 1986 already lapsed, with the holding of the 1988 local
elections and the assumption of office of those elected therein. On May 11, 1992, the national and local elections were held as
scheduled. When results came out, it turned out that petitioner failed in his mayoralty bid. Believing that his defeat was caused by
the publication of the above-quoted stories, petitioner sued respondents PDI and Manila Bulletin as well as their publishers and
editors for damages before the RTC of Bais City. He alleged that the articles were maliciously timed to defeat him. He claimed he
should have won by landslide, but his supporters reportedly believed the news items distributed by his rivals and voted for other
candidates. He asked for actual damages of P270,000 for the amount he spent for the campaign, moral damages of P10,000,000, an
unspecified amount of exemplary damages, attorneys fees of P300,000 and costs of suit.
Respondents disclaimed liability. They asserted that no malice can be attributed to them as they did not know petitioner
and had no interest in the outcome of the election, stressing that the stories were privileged in nature.
According to Manila Bulletin reporter Edgardo T. Suarez, he got the story during a COMELEC commissioners press briefing.
He, however, came in late and only a fellow reporter told him that the disqualification case against petitioner was granted. He did
not bother to get a confirmation from anyone as he had a deadline to beat. PDI political section editor Carlos Hidalgo, on the other
hand, said that he got the story from a press release. He claimed that he found the press release on his desk the day Manila Bulletin
published the same story. The press release bore COMELECs letterhead and was signed by one Sonia Dimasupil, a former Malaya
newspaper editor who was in-charge of COMELEC press releases. He tried to contact her but she was out of the office. Since the
news item was also published in the Manila Bulletin, he felt confident the press release was authentic. He however failed to produce
the press release in court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the article is privilege in nature.

HELD:NO. Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural person or juridical
person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. Any of these imputations is defamatory and under the general rule stated in
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious. The presumption of malice,
however, does not exist in the following instances:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty;
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other
official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of
any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
We note that the publications or articles in question are neither private communications nor true reports of official
proceedings without any comments or remarks. However, this does not necessarily mean that the questioned articles are not
privileged. The enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualified privileged communications since fair commentaries on
matters of public interest are likewise privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander.The rule on privileged
communication had its genesis not in the nations penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of
speech and of the press. As early as 1918, in United States v. Caete, this Court ruled that publications which are privileged for
reasons of public policy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech.
In the instant case, there is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of public interest. These are matters
about which the public has the right to be informed, taking into account the very public character of the election itself. For this
reason, they attracted media mileage and drew public attention not only to the election itself.
G.R. No. 180291 July 27, 2010
GSIS vs. DINNAH VILLAVIZA et. Al

FACTS: Petitioner Winston Garcia (PGM Garcia), as President and General Manager of the GSIS, filed separate formal charges against
respondents Dinnah Villaviza, Elizabeth Duque, Adronico A. Echavez, Rodel Rubio, Rowena Therese B. Gracia, Pilar Layco, and
Antonio Jose Legarda for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service pursuant to the Rules of
Procedure in Administrative Investigation (RPAI) of GSIS Employees and Officials, III, D, (1, c, f) in relation to Section 52A (3), (20),
Rule IV, of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS), in accordance with Book V of the Administrative
Code of 1987, committed as follows:
  That on 27 May 2005, respondent, wearing red shirt together with some employees, marched to or appeared
simultaneously at or just outside the office of the Investigation Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of protest and support for Messrs.
Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, the latter having surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises;
  That some of these employees badmouthed the security guards and the GSIS management and defiantly raised
clenched fists led by Atty. Velasco who was barred by Hearing Officer Marvin R. Gatpayat in an Order dated 24 May 2005 from
appearing as counsel for Atty. Molina pursuant to Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees;
  That respondent, together with other employees in utter contempt of CSC Resolution No. 021316, dated 11 October 2002,
otherwise known as Omnibus Rules on Prohibited Concerted Mass Actions in the Public Sector caused alarm and heightened some
employees and disrupted the work at the Investigation Unit during office hours.
This episode was earlier reported to PGM Garcia, through an office memorandum dated May 31, 2005, by the Manager of
the GSIS Security Department (GSIS-SD), Dennis Nagtalon. On the same day, the Manager of the GSIS Investigation Unit (GSIS-IU),
Atty. Lutgardo Barbo, issued a memorandum to each of the seven (7) respondents requiring them to explain in writing and under
oath within three (3) days why they should not be administratively dealt with.
  Respondents Duque, Echavez, Rubio, Gracia, Layco, and Legarda, together with two others, submitted a letter-explanation to Atty. Barbo
dated June 6, 2005. Denying that there was a planned mass action, the respondents explained that their act of going to the office of the GSIS-IU
was a spontaneous reaction after learning that their former union president was there. Aside from some of them wanting to show their support,
they were interested in that hearing as it might also affect them. For her part, respondent Villaviza submitted a separate letter explaining that she
had a scheduled pre-hearing at the GSIS-IU that day and that she had informed her immediate supervisor about it, attaching a copy of the order of
pre-hearing. These letters were not under oath.
PGM Garcia then filed the above-mentioned formal charges for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service
against each of the respondents, all dated June 4, 2005. Respondents were again directed to submit their written answers under oath within three
(3) days from receipt thereof. None was filed.
On June 29, 2005, PGM Garcia issued separate but similarly worded decisions finding all seven (7) respondents guilty of the
charges and meting out the penalty of one (1) year suspension plus the accessory penalties appurtenant thereto.
On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) found the respondents guilty of the lesser offense of Violation of Reasonable
Office Rules and Regulations and reduced the penalty to reprimand. The CSC ruled that respondents were not denied their right to
due process but there was no substantial evidence to hold them guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.

ISSUE: Whether or not GSIS employees rightfully exercised their freedom of expression by wearing red shirts.
HELD:YES. In the recent case of GSIS v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS, the Court upheld the position of petitioner GSIS
because its employees, numbering between 300 and 800 each day, staged a walkout and participated in a mass protest or
demonstration outside the GSIS for four straight days. We cannot say the same for the 20 or so employees in this case. To equate
their wearing of red shirts and going to the GSIS-IU office for just over an hour with that four-day mass action in Kapisanan ng mga
Manggagawa sa GSIS case and to punish them in the same manner would most certainly be unfair and unjust.
Recent analogous decisions in the United States, while recognizing the governments right as an employer to lay down certain standards
of conduct, tend to lean towards a broad definition of public concern speech which is protected by their First Amendment. One such case is that of
Scott v. Meters.[ In said case, the New York Transit Authority (NYTA), responsible for operation of New York Citys mass transit service, issued a rule
prohibiting employees from wearing badges or buttons on their uniforms. A number of union members wore union buttons promoting their
opposition to a collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, the NYTA tried to enforce its rule and threatened to subject these union members
to discipline. The court, though recognizing the governments right to impose reasonable restrictions, held that the NYTAs rule was
unconstitutionally overboard.  
In another case, Communication Workers of America v. Ector County Hospital District, it was held that,
  A county hospital employees wearing of a Union Yes lapel pin during a union organization drive constituted speech
on a matter of public concern, and the countys proffered interest in enforcing the anti-adornment provision of its dress code was
outweighed by the employees interest in exercising his First Amendment speech and associational rights by wearing a pro-union lapel
button.
  Thus, respondents freedom of speech and of expression remains intact, and CSCs Resolution No. 02-1316 defining what a
prohibited concerted activity or mass action has only tempered or regulated these rights. Measured against that definition,
respondents actuations did not amount to a prohibited concerted activity or mass action. The CSC and the CA were both correct in
arriving at said conclusion.
G.R. No. 164785               March 15, 2010
ELISEO F. SORIANO vs. MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD (MTRCB)

FACTS: Petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano, a television evangelist, hosted the Ang Dating Daan, a popular television ministry aired
nationwide everyday from 10:00 p.m. to midnight over public television. The program carried a "general patronage" rating from the
Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).
The Ang Dating Daan’s rivalry with another religious television program, the Iglesia ni Cristo’s Ang Tamang Daan, is well
known. The hosts of the two shows have regularly engaged in verbal sparring on air, hurling accusations and counter-accusations
with respect to their opposing religious beliefs and practices.
It appears that in his program Ang Tamang Daan, Michael M. Sandoval (Michael) of the Iglesia ni Cristo attacked petitioner
Soriano of the Ang Dating Daan for alleged inconsistencies in his Bible teachings. Michael compared spliced recordings of Soriano’s
statements, matched with subtitles of his utterances, to demonstrate those inconsistencies. On August 10, 2004, in an apparent
reaction to what he perceived as a malicious attack against him by the rival television program, Soriano accused Michael of
prostituting himself with his fabricated presentations. Thus:
"….gago ka talaga Michael. Masahol ka pa sa putang babae. O di ba? Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, kay
Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan.
Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng demonyong ito…"
Michael and seven other ministers of the Iglesia ni Cristo lodged a complaint against petitioner Soriano before the MTRCB.
Acting swiftly, the latter preventively suspended the airing of Soriano’s Ang Dating Daan television program for 20 days, pursuant to
its powers under Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree 1986 1 and its related rules.
Petitioner Soriano challenged the validity of that preventive suspension before this Court in G.R. 164785. Meanwhile, after
hearing the main case or on September 27, 2004, the MTRCB found Soriano guilty as charged and imposed on him a penalty of three
months suspension from appearing on the Ang Dating Daan program. Soriano thus filed a second petition in G.R. 165636 to question
that decision. The Court consolidated the two cases.
On April 29, 2009 the Court rendered a decision, upholding MTRCB’s power to impose preventive suspension and affirming
its decision against petitioner Soriano with the modification of applying the three-month suspension to the program And Dating
Daan, rather than to Soriano.

ISSUE: Whether or not statements uttered by Soriano was covered by his freedom of expression

HELD:NO. Contrary to petitioner’s impression, the Court has, in fact, considered the factual antecedents of and his motive in making
his utterances, and has found those circumstances wanting as defense for violating the program’s "G" rating. Consider the following
excerpts from the Court’s Decision:
There is nothing in petitioner’s statements subject of the complaints expressing any particular religious belief, nothing
furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he came out with his statements in a televised bible exposition program
does not automatically accord them the character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot
be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioner’s attempts to place his words in context show that he was moved by
anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction. His claim, assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers
distorted his statements respecting amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV station does not convert the foul language used in
retaliation as religious speech. We cannot accept that petitioner made his statements in defense of his reputation and religion, as
they constitute no intelligible defense or refutation of the alleged lies being spread by a rival religious group. They simply illustrate
that petitioner had descended to the level of name-calling and foul-language discourse. Petitioner could have chosen to contradict
and disprove his detractors, but opted for the low road.
Petitioner’s invocation of Iglesia ni Cristo to support his hands-off thesis is erroneous. Obviously, he fails to appreciate what
the Court stated in that particular case when it rejected the argument that a religious program is beyond MTRCB’s review and
regulatory authority. We reproduce what the Court pertinently wrote in Iglesia ni Cristo:
We thus reject petitioner’s postulate that its religious program is per se beyond review by the respondent [MTRCB]. Its
public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even
the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when
it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e. serious
detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of
religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as religion is and continues to be
a volatile area of concern in our country today. Across the sea and in our shore, the bloodiest and bitterest wars fought by men were
caused by irreconcilable religious differences. Our country is still not safe from the recurrence of this stultifying strife considering our
warring religious beliefs and the fanaticism with which some of us cling and claw to these beliefs. x x x For when religion divides and
its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still.
G.R. No. 178552
OUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC. vs. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, et. At.

FACTS: Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), An Act to Secure the
State and Protect our People from Terrorism, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007,signed into law on March 6, 2007.
Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007, petitioner Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., a non-
government organization, and Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr., a concerned citizen, taxpayer and lawyer, filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition on July 16, 2007 docketed as G.R. No. 178552. On even date, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), National Federation
of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), and Center for Trade Union and Human Rights (CTUHR), represented by their
respective officers who are also bringing the action in their capacity as citizens, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed
as G.R. No. 178554.
  The following day, July 17, 2007, organizations Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), General Alliance Binding Women for
Reforms, Integrity, Equality, Leadership and Action (GABRIELA), Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), Movement of Concerned
Citizens for Civil Liberties (MCCCL), Confederation for Unity, Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees (COURAGE),
Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap (KADAMAY), Solidarity of Cavite Workers (SCW), League of Filipino Students (LFS), Anakbayan,
Pambansang Lakas ng Kilusang Mamamalakaya (PAMALAKAYA), Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT), Migrante, Health Alliance for
Democracy (HEAD), and Agham, represented by their respective officers,and joined by concerned citizens and taxpayers Teofisto
Guingona, Jr., Dr. Bienvenido Lumbera, Renato Constantino, Jr., Sister Mary John Manansan, OSB, Dean Consuelo Paz, Atty. Josefina
Lichauco, Retired Col. Gerry Cunanan, Carlitos Siguion-Reyna, Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Danilo Ramos,
Emerenciana de Jesus, Rita Baua and Rey Claro Casambre filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178581.
On August 6, 2007, Karapatan and its alliance member organizations Hustisya, Desaparecidos, Samahan ng mga Ex-Detainees Laban
sa Detensyon at para sa Amnestiya (SELDA), Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace (EMJP), and Promotion of Church Peoples
Response (PCPR), which were represented by their respective officers who are also bringing action on their own behalf, filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178890.
  On August 29, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Counsels for the Defense of Liberty (CODAL), Senator Ma.
Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal, Sergio Osmea III, and Wigberto E. Taada filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R.
No. 179157.
  Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog (BAYAN-ST), other regional chapters and organizations mostly based in the
Southern Tagalog Region, and individuals followed suit by filing on September 19, 2007 a petition for certiorari and prohibition
docketed as G.R. No. 179461 that replicates the allegations raised in the BAYAN petition in G.R. No. 178581.
Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 (the
Human Security Act of 2007) in that terms like “widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace” and “coerce the
government to give in to an unlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the
prohibited acts.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Human Security Act of 2007 be facially challenged on the grounds of vagueness and overbreadth
doctrine.

HELD:NO. It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and,
owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases.
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of
protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially
overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines
itself only to facts as applied to the litigants.
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of
constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant
prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case
basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In
overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the
entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized
court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with
the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that
an overbroad laws "very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.( 
In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least two cases, observed that the US Supreme
Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment, and that claims of facial
overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words. In Virginia
v. Hicks, it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically
addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the transcendent value to all
society of constitutionally protected expression.
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY

G.R. No. 169838             April 25, 2006

BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP) v. DUARDO ERMITA et, al.

FACTS: KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police
blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. They
further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along España
Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta
Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. 4 Three
other rallyists were arrested.
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as
well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR policy
recently announced.
CPR, on the other hand, is a policy set forth in a press release by Malacañang dated September 21, 2005, shown in Annex
"A" to the Petition in G.R. No. 169848, thus:
Malacañang Official
Manila, Philippines NEWS
Release No. 2 September 21, 2005
STATEMENT OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA
On Unlawful Mass Actions
In view of intelligence reports pointing to credible plans of anti-government groups to inflame the political situation, sow
disorder and incite people against the duly constituted authorities, we have instructed the PNP as well as the local government units
to strictly enforce a "no permit, no rally" policy, disperse groups that run afoul of this standard and arrest all persons violating the
laws of the land as well as ordinances on the proper conduct of mass actions and demonstrations.
The rule of calibrated preemptive response is now in force, in lieu of maximum tolerance. The authorities will not stand
aside while those with ill intent are herding a witting or unwitting mass of people and inciting them into actions that are inimical to
public order, and the peace of mind of the national community.
Unlawful mass actions will be dispersed. The majority of law-abiding citizens have the right to be protected by a vigilant and
proactive government.
We appeal to the detractors of the government to engage in lawful and peaceful conduct befitting of a democratic society.
The President’s call for unity and reconciliation stands, based on the rule of law.
Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. 5
They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or
absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause
as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not
content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words "lawful cause," "opinion," "protesting
or influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase "maximum tolerance"
shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it
cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.
Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the right to
peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also
characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not
mere regulations but are actually prohibitions.
Furthermore, the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear standards. The two standards stated in the
laws (clear and present danger and imminent and grave danger) are inconsistent.
Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in
B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for being vague and for lack of publication.
Finally, petitioners KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B.P. No.
880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right, the
limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and
present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require
instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane.
As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action even before the rallyists can
perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order supports the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum
tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to
peaceably assemble.
ISSUE: Whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.

HELD:YES. Petitioners’ standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise
the right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880 which requires a permit for all who would
publicly assemble in the nation’s streets and parks. They have, in fact, purposely engaged in public assemblies without the required
permits to press their claim that no such permit can be validly required without violating the Constitutional guarantee. Respondents,
on the other hand, have challenged such action as contrary to law and dispersed the public assemblies held without the permit.
Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances is, together with freedom of
speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights
constitute the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected.
As stated in Jacinto v. CA,15 the Court, as early as the onset of this century, in U.S. v. Apurado,16 already upheld the right to assembly
and petition, as follows:
There is no question as to the petitioners’ rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances and, for
that matter, to organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities.
These rights are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution, particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of Article
IX, and Section 3 of Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed pronouncements defending and promoting the people’s
exercise of these rights. As early as the onset of this century, this Court in U.S. vs. Apurado, already upheld the right to assembly and
petition and even went as far as to acknowledge:
"It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances
whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater, the
grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their
irresponsible followers. But if the prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by individual
members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities, then the
right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would become a delusion and a snare and the attempt to exercise it on
the most righteous occasion and in the most peaceable manner would expose all those who took part therein to the severest and
most unmerited punishment, if the purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting
authorities. If instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished
therefor, but the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly and seditious conduct and between an
essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising."
Again, in Primicias v. Fugoso, the Court likewise sustained the primacy of freedom of speech and to assembly and petition over
comfort and convenience in the use of streets and parks.
The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the
time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is
required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may
be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such
refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there
is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision,
whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to
the proper judicial authority. Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in
our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary, -- even more so than on the other
departments – rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal
formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so felicitiously termed by Justice Holmes "as the
sovereign prerogative of judgment." Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side
of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy. x x x
G.R. No. 175241 February 24, 2010
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE LITO ATIENZA

FACTS: Petitioners Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and lawyers H. Harry L. Roque and Joel R. Butuyan appeal the June 28, 2006
Decision and the October 26, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals that found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Jose Lito Atienza, the then mayor of Manila, in granting a permit to rally in a venue other than the one applied for by the
IBP.  
On June 15, 2006, the IBP, through its then National President Jose Anselmo Cadiz (Cadiz), filed with the Office of the City
Mayor of Manila a letter application for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.
to be participated in by IBP officers and members, law students and multi-sectoral organizations.
Respondent issued a permit dated June 16, 2006 allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given date but indicated therein Plaza
Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge, which permit the IBP received on June 19, 2006.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed on June 21, 2006 before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
94949.The petition having been unresolved within 24 hours from its filing, petitioners filed before this Court on June 22, 2006 a
petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 172951 which assailed the appellate courts inaction or refusal to resolve the petition
within the period provided under the Public Assembly Act of 1985.
The Court, by Resolutions of July 26, 2006, August 30, 2006 and November 20, 2006, respectively, denied the petition for
being moot and academic, denied the relief that the petition be heard on the merits in view of the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No.
94949, and denied the motion for reconsideration.
The rally pushed through on June 22, 2006 at Mendiola Bridge, after Cadiz discussed with P/Supt. Arturo Paglinawan whose
contingent from the Manila Police District (MPD) earlier barred petitioners from proceeding thereto. Petitioners allege that the
participants voluntarily dispersed after the peaceful conduct of the program.
The MPD thereupon instituted on June 26, 2006 a criminal action, docketed as I.S. No. 06I-12501, against Cadiz for violating
the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not indicated in the permit, to which charge Cadiz filed a Counter-Affidavit of
August 3, 2006.
In the meantime, the appellate court ruled, in CA-G.R. SP No. 94949, by the first assailed issuance, that the petition became
moot and lacked merit. The appellate court also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration by the second assailed issuance.

ISSUE: Whether the appellate court erred in holding that the modification of the venue in IBPs rally permit does not constitute grave
abuse of discretion’

HELD:YES. In Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) v. Ermita, the Court reiterated:
Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of
matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that the state has a right to prevent. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it
is a necessary consequence of our republican institutions and complements the right of free speech. To paraphrase the
opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority of the American Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins, it was not by
accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the
rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. All these rights, while
not identical, are inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there is a limitation placed on the exercise of this right, the
judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged governmental actuation. The sole justification for a
limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a
character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate
public interest.
The Court in Bayan stated that the provisions of the Public Assembly Act of 1985 practically codified the 1983 ruling in
Reyes v. Bagatsing. In juxtaposing Sections 4 to 6 of the Public Assembly Act with the pertinent portion of the Reyes case, the Court
elucidated as follows:
The public official concerned shall] appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to
its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and
present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or
adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper
judicial authority.
 
It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a permit would be granted. It
is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may
probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place is
that the permit must be for the assembly being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice Roberts, speaking for the
American Supreme Court, is not to be "abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 880
AN ACT ENSURING THE FREE EXERCISE BY THE PEOPLE OF THEIR RIGHT PEACEABLY TO ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE GOVERNMENT
FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Section 1. Title - This Act shall be known as "The Public Assembly Act of 1985."
Section 2. Declaration of policy - The constitutional right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances is essential and vital to the strength and stability of the State. To this end, the State shall ensure the free exercise of such right without
prejudice to the rights of others to life, liberty and equal protection of the law.
Section 3. Definition of terms - For purposes of this Act:
(a) "Public assembly" means any rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public
place for the purpose of presenting a lawful cause; or expressing an opinion to the general public on any particular issue; or protesting or
influencing any state of affairs whether political, economic or social; or petitioning the government for redress of grievances.
The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings and assemblages for religious purposes shall be governed by local ordinances:
Provided, however, That the declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be faithfully observed.
The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other concerted action in strike areas by workers and employees resulting from a
labor dispute as defined by the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and by the Batas Pambansa Bilang 227.
(b) "Public place" shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road, street, bridge or other thoroughfare, park, plaza, square, and/or any open
space of public ownership where the people are allowed access.
(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a
public assembly or in the dispersal of the same.
(d) "Modification of permit" shall include the change of the place and time of the public assembly, rerouting of the parade or street march, the
volume of loud-speakers or sound system and similar changes.
Section 4. Permit when required and when not required - A written permit shall be required for any person or persons to organize and
hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly
established by law or ordinance or in private property, in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is
required, or in the campus of a government-owned and operated educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said
educational institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by this Act.
Section 5. Application requirements - All applications for a permit shall comply with the following guidelines:
(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the date, time
and duration thereof, and place or streets to be used for the intended activity; and the probable number of persons participating, the transport and
the public address systems to be used.
(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant under Section 8 hereof.
(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at
least five (5) working days before the scheduled public assembly.
(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to
immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building.
Section 6. Action to be taken on the application -
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that
the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days from the date the application was filed,
failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the
application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have
been filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he
shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the application within twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the
decision in an appropriate court of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court,
or the Intermediate Appellate Court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same.
No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall,
be immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be
immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.
Section 7. Use of public thoroughfare - Should the proposed public assembly involve the use, for an appreciable length of time, of any
public highway, boulevard, avenue, road or street, the mayor or any official acting in his behalf may, to prevent grave public inconvenience,
designate the route thereof which is convenient to the participants or reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction so that there will be no
serious or undue interference with the free flow of commerce and trade.
Section 8. Responsibility of applicant - It shall be the duty and responsibility of the leaders and organizers of a public assembly to take all
reasonable measures and steps to the end that the intended public assembly shall be conducted peacefully in accordance with the terms of the
permit. These shall include but not be limited to the following:
(a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under the permit;
(b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to prevent non-demonstrators from disrupting the lawful activities of the public assembly;
(c) To confer with local government officials concerned and law enforcers to the end that the public assembly may be held peacefully;
(d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not go beyond the time stated in the permit; and
(e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest any person or do any act unduly interfering with the rights of other persons not
participating in the public assembly.
Section 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities - Law enforcement agencies shall not interfere with the holding of a public
assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety, a law enforcement contingent under the command of a responsible police officer may be
detailed and stationed in a place at least one hundred (100) meter away from the area of activity ready to maintain peace and order at all times.
Section 10. Police assistance when requested - It shall be imperative for law enforcement agencies, when their assistance is requested by
the leaders or organizers, to perform their duties always mindful that their responsibility to provide proper protection to those exercising their
right peaceably to assemble and the freedom of expression is primordial. Towards this end, law enforcement agencies shall observe the following
guidelines:
(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall be in complete uniform with their nameplates and units to
which they belong displayed prominently on the front and dorsal parts of their uniform and must observe the policy of "maximum tolerance" as
herein defined;
(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms but may be equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields,
crash helmets with visor, gas masks, boots or ankle high shoes with shin guards;
(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall not be used unless the public assembly is attended by actual
violence or serious threats of violence, or deliberate destruction of property.
Section 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit - No public assembly with a permit shall be dispersed. However, when an assembly
becomes violent, the police may disperse such public assembly as follows:
(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall call the attention of the leaders of the public
assembly and ask the latter to prevent any possible disturbance;
(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the participants are thrown at the police or at the non-
participants, or at any property causing damage to such property, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly warn the
participants that if the disturbance persists, the public assembly will be dispersed;
(c) If the violence or disturbances prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph should not stop or abate, the ranking officer of the law
enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a warning to the participants of the public assembly, and after allowing a reasonable period of time to
lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith disperse;
(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the public assembly unless he violates during the assembly a law,
statute, ordinance or any provision of this Act. Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended:
(e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or branch of the peace during the public assembly shall not constitute a group for dispersal.
Section 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit - When the public assembly is held without a permit where a permit is required,
the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed.
Section 13. Prohibited acts - The following shall constitute violations of this Act:
(a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by any leader or organizer without having first secured that written permit where a
permit is required from the office concerned, or the use of such permit for such purposes in any place other than those set out in said permit:
Provided, however, That no person can be punished or held criminally liable for participating in or attending an otherwise peaceful assembly;
(b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in violation of the provisions of this Act by the mayor or any other official acting in
his behalf.
(c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt of the application for a permit by the mayor or any official acting in his
behalf;
(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly;
(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or any person to disperse the public assembly;
(f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;
(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the area of activity of the public assembly or on the occasion
thereof;
1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as firearm, pillbox, bomb, and the like;
2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;
3 the malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares;
4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;
5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly by the use of a motor vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems.
Section 14. Penalties - Any person found guilty and convicted of any of the prohibited acts defined in the immediately preceding Section
shall be punished as follows:
(a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment of one month and one day to six months;
(b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item 4, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six
years;
(c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years without prejudice to prosecution
under Presidential Decree No. 1866;
(d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of one day to thirty days.
Section 15. Freedom parks - Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after the effectivity of this Act establish or
designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be centrally located within
the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need of any prior permit.
In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks within the period of six months
from the effectivity of this Act
FREEDOM OF RELIGION

A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003

ALEJANDRO ESTRADA v. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR

FACTS: In a sworn letter-complaint dated July 27, 2000, complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., presiding
judge of Branch 253, Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor,
court interpreter in said court, is living with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old.
Estrada is not personally related either to Escritor or her partner and is a resident not of Las Pias City but of Bacoor, Cavite.
Nevertheless, he filed the charge against Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of
the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.
Judge Caoibes referred the letter to Escritor who stated that there is no truth as to the veracity of the allegation and
challenged Estrada to appear in the open and prove his allegation in the proper forum. Judge Caoibes set a preliminary conference
on October 12, 2000. Escritor moved for the inhibition of Judge Caoibes from hearing her case to avoid suspicion and bias as she
previously filed an administrative complaint against him and said case was still pending in the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA). Escritors motion was denied. The preliminary conference proceeded with both Estrada and Escritor in attendance. Estrada
confirmed that he filed the letter-complaint for immorality against Escritor because in his frequent visits to the Hall of Justice of Las
Pias City, he learned from conversations therein that Escritor was living with a man not her husband and that she had an eighteen to
twenty-year old son by this man. This prompted him to write to Judge Caoibes as he believed that employees of the judiciary should
be respectable and Escritors live-in arrangement did not command respect.
Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband having
died in 1998. She admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage for twenty years and
that they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract
Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living together, she
executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness
Escritors partner, Quilapio, executed a similar pledge on the same day.Both pledges were executed in Atimonan, Quezon and signed
by three witnesses. At the time Escritor executed her pledge, her husband was still alive but living with another woman. Quilapio
was likewise married at that time, but had been separated in fact from his wife. During her testimony, Escritor volunteered to
present members of her congregation to confirm the truthfulness of their Declarations of Pledging Faithfulness, but Judge Caoibes
deemed it unnecessary and considered her identification of her signature and the signature of Quilapio sufficient authentication of
the documents.
Judge Caoibes endorsed the complaint to Executive Judge Manuel B. Fernandez, Jr., who, in turn, endorsed the same to Court
Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo. On July 17, 2001, the Court, upon recommendation of Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N.
Elepao, directed Escritor to comment on the charge against her. In her comment, Escritor reiterated her religious congregations
approval of her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio, viz:
Herein respondent does not ignore alleged accusation but she reiterates to state with candor that there is no truth as to the veracity
of same allegation. Included herewith are documents denominated as Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness (Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2)
duly signed by both respondent and her mate in marital relationship with the witnesses concurring their acceptance to the
arrangement as approved by the WATCH TOWER BIBLE and TRACT SOCIETY, Philippine Branch.
Escritor and Quilapio transferred to Salazars Congregation, the Almanza Congregation in Las Pias, in May 2001. The declarations
having been executed in Atimonan, Quezon in 1991, Salazar had no personal knowledge of the personal circumstances of Escritor
and Quilapio when they executed their declarations. However, when the two transferred to Almanza, Salazar inquired about their
status from the Atimonan Congregation, gathered comments of the elders therein, and requested a copy of their declarations. The
Almanza Congregation assumed that the personal circumstances of the couple had been considered by the Atimonan Congregation
when they executed their declarations.
Escritor and Quilapios declarations are recorded in the Watch Tower Central office. They were executed in the usual and
approved form prescribed by the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society which was lifted from the article, Maintaining Marriage in
Honor Before God and Men, in the March 15, 1977 issue of the Watch Tower magazine, entitled The Watchtower.
The declaration requires the approval of the elders of the Jehovahs Witnesses congregation and is binding within the congregation all over
the world except in countries where divorce is allowed. The Jehovahs congregation requires that at the time the declarations are executed, the
couple cannot secure the civil authorities approval of the marital relationship because of legal impediments. It is thus standard practice of the
congregation to check the couples marital status before giving imprimatur to the conjugal arrangement. The execution of the declaration finds
scriptural basis in Matthew 5:32 that when the spouse commits adultery, the offended spouse can remarry. The marital status of the declarants and
their respective spouses commission of adultery are investigated before the declarations are executed. Thus, in the case of Escritor, it is presumed
that the Atimonan Congregation conducted an investigation on her marital status before the declaration was approved and the declaration is valid
everywhere, including the Almanza Congregation. That Escritors and Quilapios declarations were approved are shown by the signatures of three
witnesses, the elders in the Atimonan Congregation. Salazar confirmed from the congregations branch office that these three witnesses are elders in
the Atimonan Congregation. Although in 1998 Escritor was widowed, thereby lifting the legal impediment to marry on her part, her mate is still not
capacitated to remarry. Thus, their declarations remain valid. Once all legal impediments for both are lifted, the couple can already register their
marriage with the civil authorities and the validity of the declarations ceases. The elders in the congregations can then solemnize their marriage as
authorized by Philippine law. In sum, therefore, insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement
between Escritor and Quilapio and they remain members in good standing in the congregation.
Salvador Reyes, a minister at the General de Leon, Valenzuela City Congregation of the Jehovahs Witnesses since 1974 and
member of the headquarters of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of the Philippines, Inc., presented the original copy of the
magazine article entitled, Maintaining Marriage Before God and Men to which Escritor and Minister Salazar referred in their
testimonies. The article appeared in the March 15, 1977 issue of the Watchtower magazine published in Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Felix S.
Fajardo, President of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of the Philippines, Inc., authorized Reyes to represent him in
authenticating the article. The article is distributed to the Jehovahs Witnesses congregations which also distribute them to the
public.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents right to religious freedom should carve out an exception from the prevailing jurisprudence on
illicit relations for which government employees are held administratively liable.

HELD:YES. The two streams of jurisprudence - separationist or accommodationist - are anchored on a different reading of the "wall
of separation." Separationist - This approach erects an absolute barrier to formal interdependence of religion and state. Religious
institutions could not receive aid, whether direct or indirect, from the state. Nor could the state adjust its secular programs to
alleviate burdens the programs placed on believers. the strict neutrality or separationist view is largely used by the Court, showing
the Court’s tendency to press relentlessly towards a more secular society Accommodationist - Benevolent neutrality thus recognizes
that religion plays an important role in the public life of the United States as shown by many traditional government practices which
An accommodationist holds that it is good public policy, and sometimes constitutionally required, for the state to make conscious
and deliberate efforts to avoid interference with religious freedom. On the other hand, the strict neutrality adherent believes that it
is good public policy, and also constitutionally required, for the government to avoid religion-specific policy even at the cost of
inhibiting religious exercise First, the accommodationist interpretation is most consistent with the language of the First Amendment.
Second, the accommodationist position best achieves the purposes of the First Amendment. Third, the accommodationist
interpretation is particularly necessary to protect adherents of minority religions from the inevitable effects of majoritarianism,
which include ignorance and indifference and overt hostility to the minority Fourth, the accommodationist position is practical as it is
a commonsensical way to deal with the various needs and beliefs of different faiths in a pluralistic nation. The "compelling state
interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state’s
interests: some effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the
interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary In applying the test, the
first inquiry is whether respondent’s right to religious freedom has been burdened. There is no doubt that choosing between
keeping her employment and abandoning her religious belief and practice and family on the one hand, and giving up her
employment and keeping her religious practice and family on the other hand, puts a burden on her free exercise of religion The
second step is to ascertain respondent’s sincerity in her religious belief. Respondent appears to be sincere in her religious belief and
practice and is not merely using the "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness" to avoid punishment for immorality. She did not secure
the Declaration only after entering the judiciary where the moral standards are strict and defined, much less only after an
administrative case for immorality was filed against herIndeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present
evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the
government which is the Office of the Solicitor General. To properly settle the issue in the case at bar, the government should be
given the opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondent’s stance that her
conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection.
G.R. No. 164785 April 29, 2009
ELISEO F. SORIANO v. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA et, al.

FACTS: On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made the
following remarks:
Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling;
Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang
doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi
ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.x x x
Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and
seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC),against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast.
Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioners remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of
the TV program Ang Tamang Daan. Forthwith, the MTRCB sent petitioner a notice of the hearing on August 16, 2004 in relation to
the alleged use of some cuss words in the August 10, 2004 episode of Ang Dating Daan.
After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB, by Order of August 16, 2004, preventively
suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days, in accordance with Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree No. (PD)
1986, creating the MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and
Sec. 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure. The same order also set the case for preliminary investigation.
The following day, petitioner sought reconsideration of the preventive suspension order, praying that Chairperson Consoliza
P. Laguardia and two other members of the adjudication board recuse themselves from hearing the case. Two days after, however,
petitioner sought to withdraw his motion for reconsideration, followed by the filing with this Court of a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 164785, to nullify the preventive suspension order thus issued.
On September 27, 2004, in Adm. Case No. 01-04, the MTRCB issued a decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, a Decision is hereby rendered, finding respondent Soriano liable for his
utterances and thereby imposing on him a penalty of three (3) months suspension from his program, Ang Dating Daan.
Co-respondents Joselito Mallari, Luzviminda Cruz and UNTV Channel 37 and its owner, PBC, are hereby exonerated for lack
of evidence.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION PROMULGATED BY RESPONDENT [MTRCB] DATED 16 AUGUST 2004
AGAINST THE TELEVISION PROGRAM ANG DATING DAAN x x x IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION.

HELD:NO. The Court is at a loss to understand how petitioners utterances in question can come within the pale of Sec. 5, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution on religious freedom. The section reads as follows:
No law shall be made respecting the establishment of a religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test
shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
There is nothing in petitioners statements subject of the complaints expressing any particular religious belief, nothing
furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he came out with his statements in a televised bible exposition program
does not automatically accord them the character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot
be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioners attempts to place his words in context show that he was moved by
anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction. His claim, assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers
distorted his statements respecting amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV station does not convert the foul language used in
retaliation as religious speech. We cannot accept that petitioner made his statements in defense of his reputation and religion, as
they constitute no intelligible defense or refutation of the alleged lies being spread by a rival religious group. They simply illustrate
that petitioner had descended to the level of name-calling and foul-language discourse. Petitioner could have chosen to contradict
and disprove his detractors, but opted for the low road.
G.R. No. 124382 August 16, 1999
PASTOR DIONISIO V. AUSTRIA v. HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

FACTS: The records show that petitioner Pastor Dionisio V. Austria worked with the SDA for twenty eight (28) years from 1963 to
1991.He began his work with the SDA on 15 July 1963 as a literature evangelist, selling literature of the SDA over the island of
Negros. From then on, petitioner worked his way up the ladder and got promoted several times. In January, 1968, petitioner became
the Assistant Publishing Director in the West Visayan Mission of the SDA. In July, 1972, he was elevated to the position of Pastor in
the West Visayan Mission covering the island of Panay, and the provinces of Romblon and Guimaras. Petitioner held the same
position up to 1988. Finally, in 1989, petitioner was promoted as District Pastor of the Negros Mission of the SDA and was assigned
at Sagay, Balintawak and Toboso, Negros Occidental, with twelve (12) churches under his jurisdiction. In January, 1991, petitioner
was transferred to Bacolod City. He held the position of district pastor until his services were terminated on 31 October 1991.
On various occasions from August up to October, 1991, petitioner received several communications from Mr. Eufronio Ibesate, the
treasurer of the Negros Mission asking him to admit accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by
his wife, Mrs. Thelma Austria, in his district which amounted to P15,078.10, and to remit the same to the Negros Mission.
In his written explanation dated 11 October 1991, petitioner reasoned out that he should not be made accountable for the
unremitted collections since it was private respondents Pastor Gideon Buhat and Mr. Eufronio Ibesate who authorized his wife to
collect the tithes and offerings since he was very sick to do the collecting at that time.
Thereafter, on 16 October 1991, at around 7:30 a.m., petitioner went to the office of Pastor Buhat, the president of the
Negros Mission. During said call, petitioner tried to persuade Pastor Buhat to convene the Executive Committee for the purpose of
settling the dispute between him and the private respondent, Pastor David Rodrigo. The dispute between Pastor Rodrigo and
petitioner arose from an incident in which petitioner assisted his friend, Danny Diamada, to collect from Pastor Rodrigo the unpaid
balance for the repair of the latters motor vehicle which he failed to pay to Diamada. Due to the assistance of petitioner in collecting
Pastor Rodrigos debt, the latter harbored ill-feelings against petitioner. When news reached petitioner that Pastor Rodrigo was
about to file a complaint against him with the Negros Mission, he immediately proceeded to the office of Pastor Buhat on the date
abovementioned and asked the latter to convene the Executive Committee. Pastor Buhat denied the request of petitioner since
some committee members were out of town and there was no quorum. Thereafter, the two exchanged heated arguments.
Petitioner then left the office of Pastor Buhat. While on his way out, petitioner overheard Pastor Buhat saying, Pastor daw inisog na
ina iya (Pastor you are talking tough). Irked by such remark, petitioner returned to the office of Pastor Buhat, and tried to overturn
the latters table, though unsuccessfully, since it was heavy. Thereafter, petitioner banged the attache case of Pastor Buhat on the
table, scattered the books in his office, and threw the phone. Fortunately, private respondents Pastors Yonilo Leopoldo and Claudio
Montao were around and they pacified both Pastor Buhat and petitioner.
On 17 October 1991, petitioner received a letter inviting him and his wife to attend the Executive Committee meeting at the
Negros Mission Conference Room on 21 October 1991, at nine in the morning. To be discussed in the meeting were the non-
remittance of church collection and the events that transpired on 16 October 1991. A fact-finding committee was created to
investigate petitioner. For two (2) days, from October 21 and 22, the fact-finding committee conducted an investigation of
petitioner. Sensing that the result of the investigation might be one-sided, petitioner immediately wrote Pastor Rueben Moralde,
president of the SDA and chairman of the fact-finding committee, requesting that certain members of the fact-finding committee be
excluded in the investigation and resolution of the case.Out of the six (6) members requested to inhibit themselves from the
investigation and decision-making, only two (2) were actually excluded, namely: Pastor Buhat and Pastor Rodrigo. Subsequently, on
29 October 1991, petitioner received a letter of dismissal citing misappropriation of denominational funds, willful breach of trust,
serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties, and commission of an offense against the person of employers duly
authorized representative, as grounds for the termination of his services.
Reacting against the adverse decision of the SDA, petitioner filed a complaint [on 14 November 1991, before the Labor
Arbiter for illegal dismissal against the SDA and its officers and prayed for reinstatement with backwages and benefits, moral and
exemplary damages and other labor law benefits.
On 15 February 1993, Labor Arbiter Cesar D. Sideo rendered a decision in favor of petitioner

ISSUE: Whether or not the termination of the services of petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair, and, as such, involves the separation of
church and state.

HELD:NO. The case at bar does not concern an ecclesiastical or purely religious affair as to bar the State from taking cognizance of
the same. An ecclesiastical affair is one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form or worship of the church, or the adoption and
enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the government of the membership, and the power of
excluding from such associations those deemed unworthy of membership. Based on this definition, an ecclesiastical affair involves
the relationship between the church and its members and relate to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of
the congregation. To be concrete, examples of this so-called ecclesiastical affairs to which the State cannot meddle are proceedings
for excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities with which attached
religious significance. The case at bar does not even remotely concern any of the abovecited examples. While the matter at hand
relates to the church and its religious minister it does not ipso facto give the case a religious significance. Simply stated, what is
involved here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee. It is purely secular and has no
relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the church. In this case, petitioner was not excommunicated
or expelled from the membership of the SDA but was terminated from employment. Indeed, the matter of terminating an employee,
which is purely secular in nature, is different from the ecclesiastical act of expelling a member from the religious congregation.
As pointed out by the OSG in its memorandum, the grounds invoked for petitioners dismissal, namely: misappropriation of
denominational funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties and commission of an offense
against the person of his employers duly authorize representative, are all based on Article 282 of the Labor Code which enumerates
the just causes for termination of employment. By this alone, it is palpable that the reason for petitioners dismissal from the service
is not religious in nature. Coupled with this is the act of the SDA in furnishing NLRC with a copy of petitioners letter of termination.
As aptly stated by the OSG, this again is an eloquent admission by private respondents that NLRC has jurisdiction over the case.
Aside from these, SDA admitted in a certification issued by its officer, Mr. Ibesate, that petitioner has been its employee for twenty-
eight (28) years. SDA even registered petitioner with the Social Security System (SSS) as its employee. As a matter of fact, the
workers records of petitioner have been submitted by private respondents as part of their exhibits. From all of these it is clear that
when the SDA terminated the services of petitioner, it was merely exercising its management prerogative to fire an employee which
it believes to be unfit for the job. As such, the State, through the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, has the right to take cognizance of the
case and to determine whether the SDA, as employer, rightfully exercised its management prerogative to dismiss an employee. This
is in consonance with the mandate of the Constitution to afford full protection to labor.

G.R. No. 153888 July 9, 2003

ISLAMIC DAWAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC v. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS: Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates under Department of Social Welfare and Development License No. SB-01-085, is
a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. It claims
to be a federation of national Islamic organizations and an active member of international organizations such as the Regional Islamic
Dawah Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP) and The World Assembly of Muslim Youth. The RISEAP accredited
petitioner to issue halal certifications in the Philippines. Thus, among the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars,
orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers.
Petitioner alleges that, on account of the actual need to certify food products as halal and also due to halal food producers
request, petitioner formulated in 1995 internal rules and procedures based on the Quran and the Sunnah for the analysis of food,
inspection thereof and issuance of halal certifications. In that same year, petitioner began to issue, for a fee, certifications to
qualified products and food manufacturers. Petitioner even adopted for use on its halal certificates a distinct sign or logo registered
in the Philippine Patent Office under Patent No. 4-2000-03664.
On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 creating the Philippine Halal Certification
Scheme and designating respondent OMA to oversee its implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive
authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities.
On May 8, 2002, a news article entitled OMA Warns NGOs Issuing Illegal Halal Certification was published in the Manila
Bulletin, a newspaper of general circulation. In said article, OMA warned Muslim consumers to buy only products with its official
halal certification since those without said certification had not been subjected to careful analysis and therefore could contain pork
or its derivatives. Respondent OMA also sent letters to food manufacturers asking them to secure the halal certification only from
OMA lest they violate EO 46 and RA 4109.As a result, petitioner lost revenues after food manufacturers stopped securing
certifications from it.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.

HELD: YES. Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has
consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to
allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with
the liberty of others and with the common good.
Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the
Quran and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious
freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim
consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its
own interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah on halal food.
nly the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the
infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is
constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference with the
affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity.
In the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein
petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be
effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the
Muslim Filipinos right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with
ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these
laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims.

G.R. No. 159357 April 28, 2004

Brother MARIANO MIKE Z. VELARDE v. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY

FACTS:On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief (SJS Petition) before the RTC-Manila against Velarde and his
aforesaid co-respondents. SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional provisions, specifically
on the separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing
a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.
The subsequent proceedings were recounted in the challenged Decision in these words:
x x x. Bro. Eddie Villanueva submitted, within the original period [to file an Answer], a Motion to Dismiss. Subsequently, Executive
Minister Erao Manalo and Bro. Mike Velarde, filed their Motions to Dismiss. While His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, filed a
Comment and Bro. Eli Soriano, filed an Answer within the extended period and similarly prayed for the dismissal of the Petition. All
sought the dismissal of the Petition on the common grounds that it does not state a cause of action and that there is no justiciable
controversy. They were ordered to submit a pleading by way of advisement, which was closely followed by another Order denying
all the Motions to Dismiss. Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister Erao Manalo moved to reconsider the
denial. His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, asked for extension to file memorandum. Only Bro. Eli Soriano complied with the first
Order by submitting his Memorandum. x x x.
x x x the Court denied the Motions to Dismiss, and the Motions for Reconsideration filed by Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva
and Executive Minister Erao Manalo, which raised no new arguments other than those already considered in the motions to dismiss
x x x.
After narrating the above incidents, the trial court said that it had jurisdiction over the Petition, because in praying for a
determination as to whether the actions imputed to the respondents are violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law,
[the Petition] has raised only a question of law. It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition the
separation of church and state even tracing, to some extent, the historical background of the principle. Through its discourse, the
court a quo opined at some point that the [e]ndorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation
of the separation clause.
After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial court failed to include a dispositive portion in its assailed Decision. Thus,
Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration which, as mentioned earlier, were denied by the lower court.

ISSUE: Whether or not religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be prohibited from endorsing candidates for public
office? Corollarily, may they be banned from campaigning against said candidates?

HELD:YES. The basic question posed in the SJS Petition -- WHETHER ENDORSEMENTS OF CANDIDACIES BY RELIGIOUS LEADERS IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL -- undoubtedly deserves serious consideration. As stated earlier, the Court deems this constitutional issue to be
of paramount interest to the Filipino citizenry, for it concerns the governance of our country and its people. Thus, despite the
obvious procedural transgressions by both SJS and the trial court, this Court still called for Oral Argument, so as not to leave any
doubt that there might be room to entertain and dispose of the SJS Petition on the merits.
Counsel for SJS has utterly failed, however, to convince the Court that there are enough factual and legal bases to resolve the
paramount issue. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General has sided with petitioner insofar as there are no facts
supporting the SJS Petition and the assailed Decision.
We reiterate that the said Petition failed to state directly the ultimate facts that it relied upon for its claim. During the Oral
Argument, counsel for SJS candidly admitted that there were no factual allegations in its Petition for Declaratory Relief. Neither were
there factual findings in the assailed Decision. At best, SJS merely asked the trial court to answer a hypothetical question. In effect, it
merely sought an advisory opinion, the rendition of which was beyond the courts constitutional mandate and jurisdiction.
Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in clear violation of the Constitution, because it made no findings of facts and
final disposition. Hence, it is void and deemed legally inexistent. Consequently, there is nothing for this Court to review, affirm,
reverse or even just modify.
Regrettably, it is not legally possible for the Court to take up, on the merits, the paramount question involving a
constitutional principle. It is a time-honored rule that the constitutionality of a statute [or act] will be passed upon only if, and to the
extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the
parties concerned.

G.R. No. 144801 March 10, 2005

DOMINADOR L. TARUC et, al. v. BISHOP PORFIRIO B. DE LA CRUZ et, al.

FACTS: The antecedents show that petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC) in Socorro, Surigao del
Norte. Respondents Porfirio de la Cruz and Rustom Florano were the bishop and parish priest, respectively, of the same church in
that locality. Petitioners, led by Dominador Taruc, clamored for the transfer of Fr. Florano to another parish but Bishop de la Cruz
denied their request. It appears from the records that the family of Fr. Floranos wife belonged to a political party opposed to
petitioner Tarucs, thus the animosity between the two factions with Fr. Florano being identified with his wifes political camp. Bishop
de la Cruz, however, found this too flimsy a reason for transferring Fr. Florano to another parish.
Meanwhile, hostility among the members of the PIC in Socorro, Surigao del Norte worsened when petitioner Taruc tried to
organize an open mass to be celebrated by a certain Fr. Renato Z. Ambong during the town fiesta of Socorro. When Taruc informed
Bishop de la Cruz of his plan, the Bishop tried to dissuade him from pushing through with it because Fr. Ambong was not a member
of the clergy of the diocese of Surigao and his credentials as a parish priest were in doubt. The Bishop also appealed to petitioner
Taruc to refrain from committing acts inimical and prejudicial to the best interests of the PIC. He likewise advised petitioners to air
their complaints before the higher authorities of PIC if they believed they had valid grievances against him, the parish priest, the
laws and canons of the PIC.
Bishop de la Cruz, however, failed to stop Taruc from carrying out his plans. On June 19, 1993, at around 3:00 p.m., Taruc and his
sympathizers proceeded to hold the open mass with Fr. Ambong as the celebrant.
On June 28, 1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine Independent
Church for reasons of:
(1) disobedience to duly constituted authority in the Church;
(2) inciting dissension, resulting in division in the Parish of Our Mother of Perpetual Help, Iglesia Filipina Independiente,
Socorro, Surigao del Norte when they celebrated an open Mass at the Plaza on June 19, 1996; and
(3) for threatening to forcibly occupy the Parish Church causing anxiety and fear among the general membership.
Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction
against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 32. They impleaded Fr. Florano and one Delfin T.
Bordas on the theory that they conspired with the Bishop to have petitioners expelled and excommunicated from the PIC. They
contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done without trial thus violating their right to due process of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to hear a case involving the expulsion/excommunication of members of a
religious institution.

HELD:NO. Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No
religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
In our jurisdiction, we hold the Church and the State to be separate and distinct from each other. Give to Ceasar what is
Ceasars and to God what is Gods. We have, however, observed as early as 1928 that:
upon the examination of the decisions it will be readily apparent that cases involving questions relative to ecclesiastical rights have
always received the profoundest attention from the courts, not only because of their inherent interest, but because of the far
reaching effects of the decisions in human society. [However,] courts have learned the lesson of conservatism in dealing with such
matters, it having been found that, in a form of government where the complete separation of civil and ecclesiastical authority is
insisted upon, the civil courts must not allow themselves to intrude unduly in matters of an ecclesiastical nature.)
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization
is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for the courts
to exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the
members of religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations. In the words of Justice Samuel F. Miller.

RIGHT TO INFORMATION
G.R. No. 130716. December 9, 1998
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG)

FACTS: Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as taxpayer, citizen and former government official who initiated the prosecution of the
Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the
countrys economy, alleges that what impelled him to bring this action were several news reports bannered in a number of
broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos
assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the
government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.
Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions
involving the national interest, demands that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to
PCGGs task of recovering the Marcoses ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth
involves an issue of paramount public interest, since it has a debilitating effect on the countrys economy that would be greatly
prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have a right to know the transactions or deals
being contrived and effected by the government.
Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs. They claim, though,
that petitioners action is premature, because there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the
Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions
of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.
Respondents further aver that the Marcos heirs have submitted the subject Agreements to the Sandiganbayan for its
approval in Civil Case No. 141, entitled Republic v. Heirs of Ferdinand E. Marcos, and that the Republic opposed such move on the
principal grounds that (1) said Agreements have not been ratified by or even submitted to the President for approval, pursuant to
Item No. 8 of the General Agreement; and (2) the Marcos heirs have failed to comply with their undertakings therein, particularly
the collation and submission of an inventory of their assets. The Republic also cited an April 11, 1995 Resolution in Civil Case No.
0165, in which the Sandiganbayan dismissed a similar petition filed by the Marcoses attorney-in-fact.
Furthermore, then President Fidel V. Ramos, in his May 4, 1998 Memorandum to then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol
Gunigundo, categorically stated:
This is to reiterate my previous position embodied in the Palace Press Release of 6 April 1995 that I have not authorized you
to approve the Compromise Agreements of December 28, 1993 or any agreement at all with the Marcoses, and would have
disapproved them had they been submitted to me.
The Full Powers of Attorney of March 1994 and July 4, 1994, did not authorize you to approve said Agreements, which I
reserve for myself as President of the Republic of the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not this Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of any agreement, perfected or not,
with the Marcoses.

HELD: YES. Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.
Sec. 28 [Article II]. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Respondents opposite view is that the above constitutional provisions refer to completed and operative official acts, not to those still
being considered. As regards the assailed Agreements entered into by the PCGG with the Marcoses, there is yet no right of action that has accrued,
because said Agreements have not been approved by the President, and the Marcos heirs have failed to fulfill their express undertaking therein.
Thus, the Agreements have not become effective. Respondents add that they are not aware of any ongoing negotiation for another compromise
with the Marcoses regarding their alleged ill-gotten assets.
The information and the transactions referred to in the subject provisions of the Constitution have as yet no defined scope and extent.
There are no specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be obliged.
However, the following are some of the recognized restrictions: (1) national security matters and intelligence information, (2) trade secrets and
banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential information.
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers,
as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have
decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite
propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communicationsduring the
stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the exploratory stage. There is a need, of course,
to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed earlier -- such as on matters involving national
security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information.
G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
FACTS: On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP for brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also
included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of
fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA to
reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, and to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands. [1] On the
same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the
Manila Bay[2] under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP, so that [A]ll future
works in MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and owned by PEA. Accordingly, PEA and CDCP executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated December 29,
1981, which stated:
(i) CDCP shall undertake all reclamation, construction, and such other works in the MCCRRP as may be agreed upon by the parties, to be
paid according to progress of works on a unit price/lump sum basis for items of work to be agreed upon, subject to price escalation, retention and
other terms and conditions provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1594. All the financing required for such works shall be provided by PEA.
(iii) x x x CDCP shall give up all its development rights and hereby agrees to cede and transfer in favor of PEA, all of the rights, title,
interest and participation of CDCP in and to all the areas of land reclaimed by CDCP in the MCCRRP as of December 30, 1981 which have not yet
been sold, transferred or otherwise disposed of by CDCP as of said date, which areas consist of approximately Ninety-Nine Thousand Four Hundred
Seventy Three (99,473) square meters in the Financial Center Area covered by land pledge No. 5 and approximately Three Million Three Hundred
Eighty Two Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (3,382,888) square meters of reclaimed areas at varying elevations above Mean Low Water Level
located outside the Financial Center Area and the First Neighborhood Unit.
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA the parcels of land so
reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen
thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters. Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of
Paraaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the
Freedom Islands located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Paraaque City. The Freedom Islands have a total land area of
One Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred and Forty One (1,578,441) square meters or 157.841 hectares.
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA for brevity) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the
Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to complete
the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through
negotiation without public bidding. On April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. On June 8,
1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the
grandmother of all scams. As a result, the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The Senate Committees reported the results of their
investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16, 1997. Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands
PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and
therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to
conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The members of the Legal Task Force were the Secretary of
Justice, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, and the Government Corporate Counsel.The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary
to the conclusions reached by the Senate Committees.
On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports that there were on-going renegotiations between PEA
and AMARI under an order issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos. According to these reports, PEA Director Nestor Kalaw, PEA Chairman Arsenio
Yulo and retired Navy Officer Sergio Cruz composed the negotiating panel of PEA.
On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed before the Court a Petition for Prohibition with Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 132994 seeking to nullify the JVA. The Court dismissed the petition for unwarranted
disregard of judicial hierarchy, without prejudice to the refiling of the case before the proper court.
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez (Petitioner for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for
the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of
pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA,
invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations. Finally, petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of
billions of pesos in properties of the State that are of public dominion.
After several motions for extension of time, PEA and AMARI filed their Comments on October 19, 1998 and June 25, 1998, respectively.
Meanwhile, on December 28, 1998, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion: (a) to require PEA to submit the terms of the renegotiated PEA-AMARI
contract; (b) for issuance of a temporary restraining order; and (c) to set the case for hearing on oral argument. Petitioner filed a Reiterative
Motion for Issuance of a TRO dated May 26, 1999, which the Court denied in a Resolution dated June 22, 1999.
In a Resolution dated March 23, 1999, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective
memoranda.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement (Amended JVA, for brevity). On May 28, 1999, the
Office of the President under the administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the Amended JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on constitutional and statutory grounds the
renegotiated contract be declared null and void.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION INCLUDES OFFICIAL INFORMATION ON ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE A
FINAL AGREEMENT.

HELD:YES. Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the peoples right to information on matters of public
concern. This State policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, thus:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest. (Emphasis supplied)
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the government, as
well as provide the people sufficient information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights. These twin provisions are essential to the
exercise of freedom of expression. If the government does not disclose its official acts, transactions and decisions to citizens, whatever citizens say,
even if expressed without any restraint, will be speculative and amount to nothing. These twin provisions are also essential to hold public officials
at all times x x x accountable to the people,for unless citizens have the proper information, they cannot hold public officials accountable for
anything. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and
their effective implementation. An informed citizenry is essential to the existence and proper functioning of any democracy. As explained by the
Court in Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.
An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and
the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may
perceive and be responsive to the peoples will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus
able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating
thereto can such bear fruit.
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information rooted in the separation of powers. The
information does not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal
deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of Congress, are recognized as confidential.
This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free
from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to
exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. This is not the situation in the instant case.
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final
contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like
privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order. Congress has also prescribed
other limitations on the right to information in several legislations.

G.R. No. 180643             September 4, 2008

ROMULO L. NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS
FACTS: On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified for about eleven (11) hours on matters
concerning the National Broadband Project (the "NBN Project"), a project awarded by the Department of Transportation and Communications
("DOTC") to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment ("ZTE"). Petitioner disclosed that then Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") Chairman
Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo ("President Arroyo") of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further
on President Arroyo and petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive privilege." To be
specific, petitioner refused to answer questions on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,(b) whether or not she
directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve it.
Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioner’s answers to these three questions by requiring him to appear and testify once
more on November 20, 2007. On November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to respondent Committees and requested them
to dispense with petitioner’s testimony on the ground of executive privilege. The letter of Executive Secretary Ermita pertinently stated:
Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, the foregoing questions fall under conversations and correspondence between the President and
public officials which are considered executive privilege (Almonte v. Vasquez, G.R. 95637, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. PEA, G.R. 133250, July 9, 2002).
Maintaining the confidentiality of conversations of the President is necessary in the exercise of her executive and policy decision making process.
The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of her conversations and correspondences, like the value which we accord deference for the
privacy of all citizens, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential
decision-making. Disclosure of conversations of the President will have a chilling effect on the President, and will hamper her in the effective
discharge of her duties and responsibilities, if she is not protected by the confidentiality of her conversations.
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as
well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the
President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to
protect.
In light of the above considerations, this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v.
Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly.
Considering that Sec. Neri has been lengthily interrogated on the subject in an unprecedented 11-hour hearing, wherein he has answered
all questions propounded to him except the foregoing questions involving executive privilege, we therefore request that his testimony on 20
November 2007 on the ZTE / NBN project be dispensed with.
On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees upon orders of the President invoking executive
privilege. On November 22, 2007, the respondent Committees issued the show-cause letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in
contempt. On November 29, 2007, in petitioner’s reply to respondent Committees, he manifested that it was not his intention to ignore the Senate
hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be covered by executive privilege. He also manifested his
willingness to appear and testify should there be new matters to be taken up. He just requested that he be furnished "in advance as to what else"
he "needs to clarify."
Respondent Committees found petitioner’s explanations unsatisfactory. Without responding to his request for advance notice of the
matters that he should still clarify, they issued the Order dated January 30, 2008; In Re: P.S. Res. Nos. 127,129,136 & 144; and privilege speeches of
Senator Lacson and Santiago (all on the ZTE-NBN Project), citing petitioner in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and
detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
On the same date, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the above Order. 8 He insisted that he had not shown "any contemptible conduct
worthy of contempt and arrest." He emphasized his willingness to testify on new matters, but respondent Committees did not respond to his
request for advance notice of questions. He also mentioned the petition for certiorari he previously filed with this Court on December 7, 2007.
According to him, this should restrain respondent Committees from enforcing the order dated January 30, 2008 which declared him in contempt
and directed his arrest and detention.
Petitioner then filed his Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (with Urgent Application for TRO/Preliminary Injunction) on February 1,
2008. In the Court’s Resolution dated February 4, 2008, the parties were required to observe the status quo prevailing prior to the Order dated
January 30, 2008.
On March 25, 2008, the Court granted his petition for certiorari on two grounds: first, the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions were covered by executive privilege; and second, respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt
order. Anent the first ground, we considered the subject communications as falling under the presidential communications privilege because (a)
they related to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, (b) they were received by a close advisor of the President, and (c)
respondent Committees failed to adequately show a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. As to the second ground, we found that respondent Committees committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order because (a) there was a valid claim of executive privilege, (b) their invitations to petitioner did not
contain the questions relevant to the inquiry, (c) there was a cloud of doubt as to the regularity of the proceeding that led to their issuance of the
contempt order, (d) they violated Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution because their inquiry was not in accordance with the "duly published
rules of procedure," and (e) they issued the contempt order arbitrarily and precipitately.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not there is a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege in our legal system.
2. Whether or not there is factual or legal basis to hold that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by executive
privilege.

HELD: 1. YES. Senate v. Ermita expounds on the premise of the foregoing ruling in this wise:
Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines that a certain information is privileged, such
determination is presumed to bear the President’s authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, subject
only to the express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the appearance of such official. These provisions thus allow the President to
authorize claims of privilege by mere silence.
 Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege. Executive privilege, as already discussed,
is recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the
executive branch, or in those instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive
responsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept
confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this
case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege. She
may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the
authority is "By order of the President", which means that he personally consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be
wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such
power. There is even less reason to uphold such authorization in the instant case where the authorization is not explicit but by mere silence.
Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), is further invalid on this score.
Thus, if what is involved is the presumptive privilege of presidential communications when invoked by the President on a matter clearly within the
domain of the Executive, the said presumption dictates that the same be recognized and be given preference or priority, in the absence of proof of
a compelling or critical need for disclosure by the one assailing such presumption. Any construction to the contrary will render meaningless the
presumption accorded by settled jurisprudence in favor of executive privilege. In fact, Senate v. Ermita reiterates jurisprudence citing "the
considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications."

2. This Court did not rule that the Senate has no power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. There is nothing in the assailed Decision
that prohibits respondent Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. They could continue the investigation and even call petitioner Neri to
testify again. He himself has repeatedly expressed his willingness to do so. Our Decision merely excludes from the scope of respondents’
investigation the three (3) questions that elicit answers covered by executive privilege and rules that petitioner cannot be compelled to appear
before respondents to answer the said questions. We have discussed the reasons why these answers are covered by executive privilege. That there
is a recognized public interest in the confidentiality of such information is a recognized principle in other democratic States. To put it simply, the
right to information is not an absolute right.
Indeed, the constitutional provisions cited by respondent Committees do not espouse an absolute right to information. By their wording,
the intention of the Framers to subject such right to the regulation of the law is unmistakable. The highlighted portions of the following provisions
show the obvious limitations on the right to information, thus:
Article III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as
to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.
Article II, Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
In Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, it was stated that there are no specific laws prescribing the exact limitations
within which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be obliged. Nonetheless, it enumerated the recognized restrictions to
such rights, among them: (1) national security matters, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential
information. National security matters include state secrets regarding military and diplomatic matters, as well as information on inter-government
exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements. It was further held that even where there is no need to protect such state
secrets, they must be "examined in strict confidence and given scrupulous protection."
Incidentally, the right primarily involved here is the right of respondent Committees to obtain information allegedly in aid of legislation,
not the people’s right to public information. This is the reason why we stressed in the assailed Decision the distinction between these two rights. As
laid down in Senate v. Ermita, "the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the
same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress" and "neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact
testimony from government officials." As pointed out, these rights belong to Congress, not to the individual citizen. It is worth mentioning at this
juncture that the parties here are respondent Committees and petitioner Neri and that there was no prior request for information on the part of
any individual citizen. This Court will not be swayed by attempts to blur the distinctions between the Legislature's right to information in a
legitimate legislative inquiry and the public's right to information.

G.R. No. 189546 September 21, 2010

CENTER FOR PEOPLE EMPOWERMENT IN GOVERNANCE v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS: On May 26, 2009 petitioner Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG), a non-government organization, [1] wrote respondent
COMELEC, requesting a copy of the source code of the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) programs, the Board of Canvassers
Consolidation/Canvassing System (BOC CCS) programs for the municipal, provincial, national, and congressional canvass, the COMELEC server
programs, and the source code of the in-house COMELEC programs called the Data Capturing System (DCS) utilities.
CenPEG invoked the following pertinent portion of Section 12 of Republic Act (R.A.) 9369, which provides:
Once an AES technology is selected for implementation, the Commission shall promptly make the source code of that technology
available and open to any interested political party or groups which may conduct their own review thereof.
Section 2(12) of R.A. 9369 describes the source code as the human readable instructions that define what the computer equipment will
do. This has been explained in an article:
Source code is the human readable representation of the instructions that control the operation of a computer. Computers are composed
of hardware (the physical devices themselves) and software (which controls the operation of the hardware). The software instructs the computer
how to operate; without software, the computer is useless. Source code is the human readable form in which software is written by computer
programmers. Source code is usually written in a programming language that is arcane and incomprehensible to non-specialists but, to a computer
programmer, the source code is the master blueprint that reveals and determines how the machine will behave.
Source code could be compared to a recipe: just as a cook follows the instructions in a recipe step-by-step, so a computer executes the
sequence of instructions found in the software source code. This is a reasonable analogy, but it is also imperfect. While a good cook will use her
discretion and common sense in following a recipe, a computer follows the instructions in the source code in a mechanical and unfailingly literal
way; thus, while errors in a recipe might be noticed and corrected by the cook, errors in source code can be disastrous, because the code is
executed by the computer exactly as written, whether that was what the programmer intended or not x x x.
The source code in voting machines is in some ways analogous to the procedures provided to election workers. Procedures are
instructions that are provided to people; for instance, the procedures provided to poll workers list a sequence of steps that poll workers should
follow to open the polls on election morning. Source code contains instructions, not for people, but for the computers running the election; for
instance, the source code for a voting machine determines the steps the machine will take when the polls are opened on election morning. [2]
On June 24, 2009 the COMELEC granted the request [3] for the source code of the PCOS and the CCS, but denied that for the DCS, since the
DCS was a system used in processing the Lists of Voters which is not part of the voting, counting and canvassing systems contemplated by R.A.
9369. According to COMELEC, if the source code for the DCS were to be divulged, unscrupulous individuals might change the program and pass off
an illicit one that could benefit certain candidates or parties.
Still, the COMELEC apparently did not release even the kinds of source code that it said it was approving for release. Consequently, on
July 13, 2009, CenPEG once more asked COMELEC for the source code of the PCOS, together with other documents, programs, and diagrams
related to the AES. CenPEG sent follow-up letters on July 17 and 20 and on August 24, 2009.
On August 26, 2009 COMELEC replied that the source code CenPEG wanted did not yet exist for the reasons: 1) that it had not yet
received the baseline source code of the provider, Smartmatic, since payment to it had been withheld as a result of a pending suit; 2) its
customization of the baseline source code was targeted for completion in November 2009 yet; 3) under Section 11 of R.A. 9369, the customized
source code still had to be reviewed by an established international certification entity, which review was expected to be completed by the end of
February 2010; and 4) only then would the AES be made available for review under a controlled environment.

ISSUE: Whether or not Commission on Elections (COMELEC) may be compelled to disclose the source code for the Automated Election System
(AES) technologies it used in the 2010 national and local elections.

HELD:YES. Rejecting COMELECs excuse, on October 5, 2009 CenPEG filed the present petition for mandamus, seeking to compel COMELEC to
immediately make its source codes available to CenPEG and other interested parties.
COMELEC claimed in its comment that CenPEG did not have a clear, certain, and well-defined right that was enforceable by mandamus
because COMELECs duty to make the source code available presupposed that it already had the same. COMELEC restated the explanation it gave in
its August 26, 2009 letter to CenPEG.
In its manifestation and omnibus motion, CenPEG did not believe that the source code was still unavailable considering that COMELEC
had already awarded to an international certification entity the review of the same and that COMELEC had already been field testing its PCOS and
CCS machines.
On February 10, 2010 COMELEC filed a manifestation, stating that it had already deposited on February 9, 2010 the source code to be
used in the May 10, 2010 elections with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. Required to comment on this, CenPEG said on February 22, 2010 that the
manifestation did not constitute compliance with Section 12 of R.A. 9369 but only with Section 11 of R.A. 8436.
In its earlier comment, COMELEC claimed, reiterating what it said in its August 26, 2009 letter to CenPEG, that it would make the source
code available for review by the end of February 2010 under a controlled environment. Apparently, this review had not taken place and was
overtaken by the May 10, 2010 elections.
On June 21, 2010 CenPEG filed a manifestation and omnibus motion, reiterating its prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in this
case notwithstanding the fact that the elections for which the subject source code was to be used had already been held. It claimed that the source
code remained important and relevant not only for compliance with the law, and the purpose thereof, but especially in the backdrop of numerous
admissions of errors and claims of fraud.
The Court finds the petition and this last manifestation meritorious.
The pertinent portion of Section 12 of R.A. 9369 is clear in that once an AES technology is selected for implementation, the Commission
shall promptly make the source code of that technology available and open to any interested political party or groups which may conduct their own
review thereof. The COMELEC has offered no reason not to comply with this requirement of the law. Indeed, its only excuse for not disclosing the
source code was that it was not yet available when CenPEG asked for it and, subsequently, that the review had to be done, apparently for security
reason, under a controlled environment. The elections had passed and that reason is already stale.
RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATION
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION

FACTS: On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted
Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A.
Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to
pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for
consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of
the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court
for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered
mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda
in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity of the integration
of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A
(hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated — and to the
provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's
name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the
Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues
for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the
Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme
Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of
Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the
sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the
IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to
which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no
legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending
that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an
administrative body."

ISSUE:Whether or not the court is without power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to
associate)

HELD:NO. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of
the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for
the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and
beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.

G.R. No. L-62270 May 21, 1984

CRISPIN MALABANAN et, al. v. NASTACIO D. RAMENTO, Araneta University Foundation et, al.
FACTS: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They sought and were granted by tile
school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with
other students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the place
indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the second floor lobby. At such gathering they
manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the
Institute of Agriculture. At 10:30 A.M., the same day, they marched toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally. It was
outside the area covered by their permit. They continued their demonstration, giving utterance to language severely critical of the
University authorities and using megaphones in the process. There was, as a result, disturbance of the classes being held. Also, the
non-academic employees, within hearing distance, stopped their work because of the noise created. They were asked to explain on
the same day why they should not be held liable for holding an illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were formed
through a memorandum that they were under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly in
front of the Life Science Building. The validity thereof was challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in
a petition for mandamus with damages against private respondents and before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports. On
October 20, 1982, respondent Ramento, as Director of the National Capital Region, found petitioners guilty of the charge of having
violated par. 146(c) of the Manual for Private Schools more specifically their holding of an illegal assembly which was characterized
by the violation of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for
one academic year. Hence this petition.
On November 16, 1982, this Court issued the following resolution: "Acting on the urgent ex-parte motion for the immediate
issuance of a temporary mandatory order filed by counsel for petitioners, dated November 12, 1982, the Court Resolved to ISSUE A
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER enjoining all respondents or any person or persons acting in their place or stead from enforcing
the order of the Ministry of' Education and Culture dated October 20, 1982 finding the petitioners guilty of the charges against them
and suspending them for one (1) academic year with a stern warning that a commission of the same or another offense will be dealt
with utmost severity, effective as of this date and continuing until otherwise ordered by this Court, thus allowing them to enroll, if so
minded.

ISSUE: Whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action and the penalty imposed, there was an infringement of
the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech.

HELD: YES. Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. They are entitled to do so. They enjoy like the rest of the citizens
the freedom to express their views and communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this case. They do
not, to borrow from the opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." While, therefore, the authority of educational institutions over the conduct of students must be
recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional safeguards. On a more specific level there is persuasive force to this formulation in
the Fortas opinion: "The principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students during prescribed hours for the purpose of
certain types of activities. Among those activities is personal intercommunication among the students. This is not only an inevitable part of the
process of attending school; it is also an important part of the educational process. A student's rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the
classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions,
even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without 'materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school' and without colliding with the rights of others. ... But conduct by the student, in class or out of
it, which for any reason — whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior — materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder
or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech."
As tested by such a standard, what is the verdict on the complaint of petitioners that there was a disregard of their constitutional
rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. It must be in their favor, but subject to qualification in view of their continuing their
demonstration in a place other than that specified in the permit for a longer period and their making use of megaphones therein,
resulting in the disruption of classes and the stoppage of work by the non-academic personnel in the vicinity of such assembly.
Admittedly, there was a violation of the terms of the permit. The rally was held at a place other than that specified, in the second
floor lobby, rather than the basketball court, of the VMAS building of the University. Moreover, it was continued longer than the
period allowed. According to the decision of respondent Ramento, the "concerted activity [referring to such assembly] went on until
5:30 p. m. Private respondents could thus, take disciplinary action. On those facts, however, an admonition, even a censure-certainly
not a suspension-could be the appropriate penalty. Private respondents could and did take umbrage at the fact that in view of such
infraction considering the places where and the time when the demonstration took place-there was a disruption of the classes and
stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. They would not be unjustified then if they did take a much more serious view of
the matter. Even then a one-year period of suspension is much too severe. While the discretion of both respondent University and
respondent Ramento is recognized, the rule of reason, the dictate of fairness calls for a much lesser penalty. If the concept of
proportionality between the offense connoted and the sanction imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes. That
would give rise to a due process question. To avoid this constitutional objection, it is the holding of this Court that a one-week
suspension would be punishment enough.
G.R. No. 122226 March 25, 1998
UNITED PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY UNION (UPSU) v. HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA and PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS, PHILIPPINES
FACTS: Petitioner is a union of supervisory employees. It appears that on March 20, 1995 the union filed a petition for certification
election on behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. However, its petition was denied by the med-arbiter
and, on appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, on the ground that the route managers are managerial employees and,
therefore, ineligible for union membership under the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, which provides:
Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory employees. Managerial employees are not
eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor
organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.
Petitioner brought this suit challenging the validity of the order dated August 31, 1995, as reiterated in the order dated
September 22, 1995, of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Its petition was dismissed by the Third Division for lack of showing
that respondent committed grave abuse of discretion. But petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, pressing for resolution its
contention that the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, so far as it declares managerial employees to be ineligible to form,
assist or join unions, contravenes Art. III 8 of the Constitution which provides:
The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for the
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

ISSUE: Whether Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits managerial employees from forming, joining or assisting labor unions, violates Art. III,
8 of the Constitution.

HELD:NO. ART. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory employees. - Managerial
employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership
in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.
This provision is the result of the amendment of the Labor Code in 1989 by R.A. No. 6715, otherwise known as the Herrera-Veloso
Law. Unlike the Industrial Peace Act or the provisions of the Labor Code which it superseded, R.A. No. 6715 provides separate
definitions of the terms "managerial" and "supervisory employees," as follows:
ART. 212. Definitions. . . .
(m) "managerial employee" is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute
management policies and/or to hire transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees.
Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial
actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of
independent judgment. All employees not falling within any of the above definitions are considered rank-and-file
employees for purposes of this Book.
Although the definition of "supervisory employees" seems to have been unduly restricted to the last phrase of the
definition in the Industrial Peace Act, the legal significance given to the phrase "effectively recommends" remains the same. In fact,
the distinction between top and middle managers, who set management policy, and front-line supervisors, who are merely
responsible for ensuring that such policies are carried out by the rank and file, is articulated in the present definition. When read in
relation to this definition in Art. 212(m), it will be seen that Art. 245 faithfully carries out the intent of the Constitutional Commission
in framing Art. III, 8 of the fundamental law.
Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, 8 infringed by a ban against managerial employees forming a union.
The right guaranteed in Art. III, 8 is subject to the condition that its exercise should be for purposes "not contrary to law." In the case
of Art. 245, there is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming or joining labor organizations. As Justice
Davide, Jr., himself a constitutional commissioner, said in his ponencia in Philips Industrial Development, Inc. v. NLRC:
In the first place, all these employees, with the exception of the service engineers and the sales force personnel, are
confidential employees. Their classification as such is not seriously disputed by PEO-FFW; the five (5) previous CBAs between PIDI
and PEO-FFW explicitly considered them as confidential employees. By the very nature of their functions, they assist and act in a
confidential capacity to, or have access to confidential matters of, persons who exercise managerial functions in the field of labor
relations. As such, the rationale behind the ineligibility of managerial employees to form, assist or joint a labor union equally applies
to them.
In Bulletin Publishing Co., Inc. v. Hon. Augusto Sanchez, this Court elaborated on this rationale, thus:
". . . The rationale for this inhibition has been stated to be, because if these managerial employees would belong to or be
affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of interests. The Union
can also become company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union membership."
To be sure, the Court in Philips Industrial was dealing with the right of confidential employees to organize. But the same
reason for denying them the right to organize justifies even more the ban on managerial employees from forming unions. After all,
those who qualify as top or middle managers are executives who receive from their employers information that not only is
confidential but also is not generally available to the public, or to their competitors, or to other employees. It is hardly necessary to
point out that to say that the first sentence of Art. 245 is unconstitutional would be to contradict the decision in that case.

G.R. No. 132088 June 28, 2000

EVERDINA ACOSTA v. CA, CSC and DepED
FACTS: Petitioners are teachers from different public schools in Metro Manila. On various dates in September and October 1990,
petitioners did not report for work and instead, participated in mass actions by public school teachers at the Liwasang Bonifacio for
the purpose of petitioning the government for redress of their grievances.
On the basis of reports submitted by their respective school principals that petitioners participated in said mass actions and
refused to comply with the return-to-work order issued on September 17, 1990 by then Secretary Isidro D. Cario of the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), petitioners were administratively charged with such offenses as grave misconduct, gross
neglect of duty, gross violation of civil service law, rules and regulations and reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official
duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and absence without official leave. Petitioners
failed to answer these charges. Following the investigations conducted by the DECS Investigating Committees, Secretary Cario found
petitioners guilty as charged and ordered their immediate dismissal from the service.
Petitioners appealed the orders of Secretary Cario to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and later to the CSC. In
1995, the CSC modified the said orders of Secretary Cario as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby finds Everdina Acosta guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service. She is hereby meted out the penalty of six (6) months suspension without pay. Considering
the period of time she was out of service, she is automatically reinstated to her former positions (sic).
Following the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners questioned the matter before the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court denied their petition for certiorari and subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION WRONGLY PENALIZED PETITIONERS WHOSE ONLY "OFFENSE" WAS TO
EXERCISE THEIR CONSITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PEACEABLY ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES.

HELD:NO. Petitioners' contentions are without merit. The character and legality of the mass actions which they participated in have
been passed upon by this Court as early as 1990 in Manila Public School Teachers' Association (MPSTA) v. Laguio, Jr. wherein we
ruled that "these 'mass actions' were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage
of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers' sworn duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons." In
Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, we added that:
It is an undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that petitioners' purpose was to realize their demands by
withholding their services. The fact that the conventional term "strike" was not used by the striking employees to describe their
common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be
controlling.
The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. In the absence of statute, public employees do not have the right to
engage in concerted work stoppages for any purpose.
Further, herein petitioners, except Mariano, are being penalized not because they exercised their right of peaceable
assembly and petition for redress of grievances but because of their successive unauthorized and unilateral absences which
produced adverse effects upon their students for whose education they are responsible. The actuations of petitioners definitely
constituted conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, punishable under the Civil Service law, rules and regulations.
As aptly stated by the Solicitor General, "It is not the exercise by the petitioners of their constitutional right to peaceably
assemble that was punished, but the manner in which they exercised such right which resulted in the temporary stoppage or
disruption of public service and classes in various public schools in Metro Manila. For, indeed, there are efficient and non-disruptive
avenues, other than the mass actions in question, whereby petitioners could petition the government for redress of grievances."
It bears stressing that suspension of public services, however temporary, will inevitably derail services to the public, which is one of
the reasons why the right to strike is denied government employees. It may be conceded that the petitioners had valid grievances
and noble intentions in staging the "mass actions," but that will not justify their absences to the prejudice of innocent school
children. Their righteous indignation does not legalize an illegal work stoppage.

NON IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE

G.R. No. 178768 November 25, 2009

PACIFIC WIDE REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. PUERTO AZUL LAND, INC.

FACTS: Puerto Azul Land, Inc. (PALI) is the owner and developer of the Puerto Azul Complex situated in Ternate, Cavite. Its business
involves the development of Puerto Azul into a satellite city with residential areas, resort, tourism and retail commercial centers
with recreational areas.In order to finance its operations, it obtained loans from various banks, the principal amount of which
amounted to Six Hundred Forty Million Two Hundred Twenty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Twenty-Four Pesos (P640,225,324.00).
PALI and its accommodation mortgagors, i.e., Ternate Development Corporation (TDC), Ternate Utilities, Inc. (TUI), and Mrs. Trinidad
Diaz-Enriquez, secured the loans.
In the beginning, PALIs business did very well. However, it started encountering problems when the Philippine Stock
Exchange rejected the listing of its shares in its initial public offering which sent a bad signal to the real estate market. This resulted
in potential investors and real estate buyers shying away from the business venture. The situation was aggravated by the 1997 Asian
financial crisis and the decline of the real estate market. Consequently, PALI was unable to keep up with the payment of its
obligations, both current and those that were about to fall due. One of its creditors, the Export and Industry Bank (EIB), later
substituted by Pacific Wide Realty and Development Corporation (PWRDC), filed foreclosure proceedings on PALIs mortgaged
properties. Thrust to a corner, PALI filed a petition for suspension of payments and rehabilitation, accompanied by a proposed
rehabilitation plan and three (3) nominees for the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver.
On September 17, 2004, after finding that the petition was sufficient in form and substance, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
issued a Stay Order and appointed Patrick V. Caoile as rehabilitation receiver. Dissatisfied, EIB filed a motion to replace the
appointed rehabilitation receiver. On January 25, 2005, the RTC denied the motion.
On April, 20, 2005, the rehabilitation receiver filed his rehabilitation report and recommendation, wherein he proposed that
PALI should be rehabilitated rather than be dissolved and liquidated. On June 9, 2005, PALI filed a revised rehabilitation
plan.
EIB and the other creditors of PALI filed their respective comments/opposition to the report/recommendations of the
rehabilitation receiver. On November 2, 2005, EIB, together with another creditor of PALI, Tranche I (SPV-MC), Inc., filed an urgent
motion to disqualify the appointed rehabilitation receiver. The RTC denied the motion in an Order dated December 9, 2005.
On December 13, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision [approving PALIs petition for suspension of payments and
rehabilitation.
On September 21, 2004, EIB entered its appearance before the rehabilitation court and moved for the clarification of the
stay order dated September 17, 2004 and/or leave to continue the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estates owned by PALIs
accommodation mortgagors. In opposition, PALI argued that the foreclosure sought would preempt the rehabilitation proceedings
and would give EIB undue preference over PALIs other creditors. On November 10, 2004, the RTC issued an Order, denying EIBs
motion. 
On March 3, 2005, EIB filed an urgent motion to order PALI and/or the mortgagor TUI/rehabilitation receiver to pay all the
taxes due on Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 133164. EIB claimed that the property covered by TCT No. 133164, registered in
the name of TUI, was one of the properties used to secure PALIs loan from EIB. The said property was subject to a public auction by
the Treasurers Office of Pasay City for non-payment of realty taxes. Hence, EIB prayed that PALI or TUI be ordered to pay the realty
taxes due on TCT No. 133164. 
PALI opposed the motion, arguing that the rehabilitation courts stay order stopped the enforcement of all claims, whether
for money or otherwise, against a debtor, its guarantors, and its sureties not solidarily liable to the debtor; thus, TCT No. 133164 was
covered by the stay order.

ISSUE: Whether the terms of the rehabilitation plan are unreasonable and in violation of the non-impairment clause.

HELD:NO. Rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the
corporation to its former position of successful operation and solvency. The purpose of rehabilitation proceedings is to enable the
company to gain a new lease on life and thereby allow creditors to be paid their claims from its earnings. The rehabilitation of a
financially distressed corporation benefits its employees, creditors, stockholders and, in a larger sense, the general public. 
Under the Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, rehabilitation is defined as the restoration of the debtor to a
position of successful operation and solvency, if it is shown that its continuance of operation is economically feasible and its
creditors can recover by way of the present value of payments projected in the plan, more if the corporation continues as a going
concern than if it is immediately liquidated. 
An indispensable requirement in the rehabilitation of a distressed corporation is the rehabilitation plan, and Section 5 of the
Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation provides the requisites thereof:
SEC. 5. Rehabilitation Plan. The rehabilitation plan shall include (a) the desired business targets or goals and the duration
and coverage of the rehabilitation; (b) the terms and conditions of such rehabilitation which shall include the manner of its
implementation, giving due regard to the interests of secured creditors; (c) the material financial commitments to support the
rehabilitation plan; (d) the means for the execution of the rehabilitation plan, which may include conversion of the debts or any
portion thereof to equity, restructuring of the debts, dacion en pago, or sale of assets or of the controlling interest; (e) a liquidation
analysis that estimates the proportion of the claims that the  creditors and shareholders would receive if the debtors properties
were liquidated; and (f) such other relevant information to enable a reasonable investor to make an informed decision on the
feasibility of the rehabilitation plan.
In G.R. No. 180893, the rehabilitation plan is contested on the ground that the same is unreasonable and results in the
impairment of the obligations of contract. PWRDC contests the following stipulations in PALIs rehabilitation plan: fifty percent (50%)
reduction of the principal obligation; condonation of the accrued and substantial interests and penalty charges; repayment over a
period of ten years, with minimal interest of two percent (2%) for the first five years and five percent (5%) for the next five years
until fully paid, and only upon availability of cash flow for debt service.
We find nothing onerous in the terms of PALIs rehabilitation plan. The Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation provides
for means of execution of the rehabilitation plan, which may include, among others, the conversion of the debts or any portion
thereof to equity, restructuring of the debts, dacion en pago, or sale of assets or of the controlling interest.
The restructuring of the debts of PALI is part and parcel of its rehabilitation. Moreover, per findings of fact of the RTC and as
affirmed by the CA, the restructuring of the debts of PALI would not be prejudicial to the interest of PWRDC as a secured creditor.
Enlightening is the observation of the CA in this regard, viz.:
There is nothing unreasonable or onerous about the 50% reduction of the principal amount when, as found by the court a
quo, a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) acquired the credits of PALI from its creditors at deep discounts of as much as 85%. Meaning,
PALIs creditors accepted only 15% of their credits value. Stated otherwise, if PALIs creditors are in a position to accept 15% of their
credits value, with more reason that they should be able to accept 50% thereof as full settlement by their debtor. x x x.
We also find no merit in PWRDCs contention that there is a violation of the impairment clause. Section 10, Article III of the
Constitution mandates that no law impairing the obligations of contract shall be passed. This case does not involve a law or an
executive issuance declaring the modification of the contract among debtor PALI, its creditors and its accommodation mortgagors.
Thus, the non-impairment clause may not be invoked. Furthermore, as held in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. even assuming that the same
may be invoked, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State. Property rights and contractual rights are
not absolute. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State
for the common good of the general public.
Successful rehabilitation of a distressed corporation will benefit its debtors, creditors, employees, and the economy in
general. The court may approve a rehabilitation plan even over the opposition of creditors holding a majority of the total liabilities of
the debtor if, in its judgment, the rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and the opposition of the creditors is manifestly
unreasonable. The rehabilitation plan, once approved, is binding upon the debtor and all persons who may be affected by it,
including the creditors, whether or not such persons have participated in the proceedings or have opposed the plan or whether or
not their claims have been scheduled.
 

G.R. No. 162243               December 3, 2009

HON. HEHERSON ALVAREZ v. PICOP RESOURCES, INC
FACTS: To recall, PICOP filed with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) an application to have its Timber
License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted into an IFMA. In the middle of the processing of PICOP’s application, however, PICOP
refused to attend further meetings with the DENR. Instead, on 2 September 2002, PICOP filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City a Petition for Mandamus1 against then DENR Secretary Heherson T. Alvarez. PICOP seeks the issuance of a privileged
writ of mandamus to compel the DENR Secretary to sign, execute and deliver an IFMA to PICOP, as well as to –
[I]ssue the corresponding IFMA assignment number on the area covered by the IFMA, formerly TLA No. 43, as amended; b) to issue
the necessary permit allowing petitioner to act and harvest timber from the said area of TLA No. 43, sufficient to meet the raw
material requirements of petitioner’s pulp and paper mills in accordance with the warranty and agreement of July 29, 1969 between
the government and PICOP’s predecessor-in-interest; and c) to honor and respect the Government Warranties and contractual
obligations to PICOP strictly in accordance with the warranty and agreement dated July 29, [1969] between the government and
PICOP’s predecessor-in-interest. x x x.
On 11 October 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision granting PICOP’s Petition for Mandamus, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Mandamus is hereby GRANTED.
The Respondent DENR Secretary Hon. Heherson Alvarez is hereby ordered:
1. to sign, execute and deliver the IFMA contract and/or documents to PICOP and issue the corresponding IFMA assignment number
on the area covered by the IFMA, formerly TLA No. 43, as amended;
2. to issue the necessary permit allowing petitioner to act and harvest timber from the said area of TLA No. 43, sufficient to meet the
raw material requirements of petitioner’s pulp and paper mills in accordance with the warranty and agreement of July 29, 1969
between the government and PICOP’s predecessor-in-interest; and
3. to honor and respect the Government Warranties and contractual obligations to PICOP strictly in accordance with the warranty
and agreement dated July 29, 1999 (sic) between the government and PICOP’s predecessor-in-interest (Exhibits "H", "H-1" to "H-5",
particularly the following:
a) the area coverage of TLA No. 43, which forms part and parcel of the government warranties;
b) PICOP tenure over the said area of TLA No. 43 and exclusive right to cut, collect and remove sawtimber and pulpwood for the
period ending on April 26, 1977; and said period to be renewable for [an]other 25 years subject to compliance with constitutional
and statutory requirements as well as with existing policy on timber concessions; and
c) The peaceful and adequate enjoyment by PICOP of the area as described and specified in the aforesaid amended Timber License
Agreement No. 43.
The Respondent Secretary Alvarez is likewise ordered to pay petitioner the sum of ₱10 million a month beginning May 2002
until the conversion of TLA No. 43, as amended, to IFMA is formally effected and the harvesting from the said area is granted.
On 25 October 2002, the DENR Secretary filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In a 10 February 2003 Order, the RTC denied
the DENR Secretary’s Motion for Reconsideration and granted PICOP’s Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of
Mandatory Injunction. The fallo of the 11 October 2002 Decision was practically copied in the 10 February 2003 Order, although
there was no mention of the damages imposed against then DENR Secretary Alvarez. The DENR Secretary filed a Notice of Appeal
from the 11 October 2002 Decision and the 10 February 2003 Order.
On 19 February 2004, the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is in violation of the Constitution and has impaired the obligation of contract by his refusal to
respect: a) the tenurial rights of PICOP over the forest area covered by TLA No. 43, as amended and its renewal for another twenty
five (25) years.

HELD:NO. PICOP was not able to prove either of the two things it needed to prove to be entitled to a Writ of Mandamus against the
DENR Secretary. The 1969 Document is not a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause and, even if we assume for the
sake of argument that it is, it did not enjoin the government to issue an IFMA in 2002 either. These are the essential elements in
PICOP’s cause of action, and the failure to prove the same warrants a dismissal of PICOP’s Petition for Mandamus, as not even
PICOP’s compliance with all the administrative and statutory requirements can save its Petition now.

G.R. No. 193007 July 19, 2011

RENATO V. DIAZ v. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE
FACTS: Petitioners claim that, since the VAT would result in increased toll fees, they have an interest as regular users of tollways in
stopping the BIR action. Additionally, Diaz claims that he sponsored the approval of Republic Act 7716 (the 1994 Expanded VAT Law
or EVAT Law) and Republic Act 8424 (the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code or the NIRC) at the House of Representatives. Timbol,
on the other hand, claims that she served as Assistant Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry and consultant of the Toll
Regulatory Board (TRB) in the past administration.
Petitioners allege that the BIR attempted during the administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to impose VAT on
toll fees. The imposition was deferred, however, in view of the consistent opposition of Diaz and other sectors to such move. But,
upon President Benigno C. Aquino IIIs assumption of office in 2010, the BIR revived the idea and would impose the challenged tax on
toll fees beginning August 16, 2010 unless judicially enjoined.
Petitioners hold the view that Congress did not, when it enacted the NIRC, intend to include toll fees within the meaning of
sale of services that are subject to VAT; that a toll fee is a users tax, not a sale of services; that to impose VAT on toll fees would
amount to a tax on public service; and that, since VAT was never factored into the formula for computing toll fees, its imposition
would violate the non-impairment clause of the constitution.
On August 13, 2010 the Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO), enjoining the implementation of the VAT. The
Court required the government, represented by respondents Cesar V. Purisima, Secretary of the Department of Finance, and Kim S.
Jacinto-Henares, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, to comment on the petition within 10 days from notice. Later, the Court issued
another resolution treating the petition as one for prohibition.
On August 23, 2010 the Office of the Solicitor General filed the governments comment.The government avers that the NIRC
imposes VAT on all kinds of services of franchise grantees, including tollway operations, except where the law provides otherwise;
that the Court should seek the meaning and intent of the law from the words used in the statute; and that the imposition of VAT on
tollway operations has been the subject as early as 2003 of several BIR rulings and circulars.
The government also argues that petitioners have no right to invoke the non-impairment of contracts clause since they
clearly have no personal interest in existing toll operating agreements (TOAs) between the government and tollway operators. At
any rate, the non-impairment clause cannot limit the States sovereign taxing power which is generally read into contracts.
Finally, the government contends that the non-inclusion of VAT in the parametric formula for computing toll rates cannot exempt
tollway operators from VAT. In any event, it cannot be claimed that the rights of tollway operators to a reasonable rate of return will
be impaired by the VAT since this is imposed on top of the toll rate. Further, the imposition of VAT on toll fees would have very
minimal effect on motorists using the tollways.

ISSUE: Whether or not the imposition of VAT on tollway operators will impair the tollway operators right to a reasonable return of
investment under their TOAs.

HELD:NO. Fees paid by the public to tollway operators for use of the tollways, are not taxes in any sense. A tax is imposed under the
taxing power of the government principally for the purpose of raising revenues to fund public expenditures.Toll fees, on the other
hand, are collected by private tollway operators as reimbursement for the costs and expenses incurred in the construction,
maintenance and operation of the tollways, as well as to assure them a reasonable margin of income. Although toll fees are charged
for the use of public facilities, therefore, they are not government exactions that can be properly treated as a tax. Taxes may be
imposed only by the government under its sovereign authority, toll fees may be demanded by either the government or private
individuals or entities, as an attribute of ownership.
Parenthetically, VAT on tollway operations cannot be deemed a tax on tax due to the nature of VAT as an indirect tax. In
indirect taxation, a distinction is made between the liability for the tax and burden of the tax. The seller who is liable for the VAT
may shift or pass on the amount of VAT it paid on goods, properties or services to the buyer. In such a case, what is transferred is not
the sellers liability but merely the burden of the VAT.
Thus, the seller remains directly and legally liable for payment of the VAT, but the buyer bears its burden since the amount
of VAT paid by the former is added to the selling price. Once shifted, the VAT ceases to be a tax and simply becomes part of the cost
that the buyer must pay in order to purchase the good, property or service.
Consequently, VAT on tollway operations is not really a tax on the tollway user, but on the tollway operator. Under Section
105 of the Code, VAT is imposed on any person who, in the course of trade or business, sells or renders services for a fee. In other
words, the seller of services, who in this case is the tollway operator, is the person liable for VAT. The latter merely shifts the burden
of VAT to the tollway user as part of the toll fees.
For this reason, VAT on tollway operations cannot be a tax on tax even if toll fees were deemed as a users tax. VAT is
assessed against the tollway operators gross receipts and not necessarily on the toll fees. Although the tollway operator may shift
the VAT burden to the tollway user, it will not make the latter directly liable for the VAT. The shifted VAT burden simply becomes
part of the toll fees that one has to pay in order to use the tollways.

FREE ACCESS TO COURTS

A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC
IN RE: EQUEST OF NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID TO EXEMPT LEGAL AID CLIENTS FROM PAYING FILING,
DOCKET AND OTHER FEES

FACTS: On September 23, 2008 the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) promulgated
Resolution No. 24, series of 2008.[2] The resolution requested the IBPs National Committee on Legal Aid [3] (NCLA) to ask
for the exemption from the payment of filing, docket and other fees of clients of the legal aid offices in the various IBP
chapters. Resolution No. 24, series of 2008 provided:
RESOLUTION NO. 24, SERIES OF 2008
 
RESOLUTION OF THE IBPMISAMIS ORIENTAL CHAPTER FOR THE IBP NATIONAL LEGAL AID OFFICE TO REQUEST THE
COURTS AND OTHER QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES, THE PHILIPPINE MEDIATION CENTER AND PROSECUTORS OFFICES TO
EXEMPT LEGAL AID CLIENTS FROM PAYING FILING, DOCKET AND OTHER FEES INCIDENTAL TO THE FILING AND
LITIGATION OF ACTIONS, AS ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS OR ON APPEAL.
 
WHEREAS, Section 1, Article I of the Guidelines Governing the Establishment and Operation of Legal Aid Offices
in All Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (otherwise known as []Guideline[s] on Legal Aid[]) provides: Legal
aid is not a matter of charity. It is a means for the correction of social imbalances that may often lead to injustice, for
which reason, it is a public responsibility of the Bar. The spirit of public service should therefore unde[r]ly all legal aid
offices. The same should be so administered as to give maximum possible assistance to indigent and deserving members
of the community in all cases, matters and situations in which legal aid may be necessary to forestall injustice.
WHEREAS, Section 2 of the same provides: In order to attain the objectives of legal aid, legal aid office should be
as close as possible to those who are in need thereof the masses. Hence, every chapter of the IBP must establish and
operate an adequate legal aid office.
WHEREAS, the Legal Aid Office of the IBPMisamis Oriental Chapter has long been operational, providing free
legal services to numerous indigent clients, through the chapters members who render volunteer services in the spirit of
public service;
WHEREAS, the courts, quasi-judicial bodies, the various mediation centers and prosecutors offices are collecting
fees, be they filing, docket, motion, mediation or other fees in cases, be they original proceedings or on appeal;
WHEREAS, IBP Legal Aid clients are qualified under the same indigency and merit tests used by the Public
Attorneys Office (PAO), and would have qualified for PAO assistance, but for reasons other than indigency, are
disqualified from availing of the services of the PAO, like the existence of a conflict of interests or conflicting defenses,
and other similar causes;
WHEREAS, PAO clients are automatically exempt from the payment of docket and other fees for cases, be they
original proceedings or on appeal, by virtue of the provisions of Section 16D of R.A. 9406 (PAO Law), without the need
for the filing of any petition or motion to declare them as pauper litigants;
WHEREAS, there is no similar provision in any substantive law or procedural law giving IBP Legal Aid clients the
same benefits or privileges enjoyed by PAO clients with respect to the payment of docket and other fees before the
courts, quasi-judicial bodies and prosecutors offices;
WHEREAS, the collection of docket and other fees from the IBP Legal Aid clients poses an additional strain to
their next to non-existent finances;
WHEREAS, the quarterly allowance given by the National Legal Aid Office to the IBP Misamis Oriental Chapter is
insufficient to even cover the incidental expenses of volunteer legal aid lawyers, much less answer for the payment of
docket and other fees collected by the courts, quasi-judicial bodies and prosecutors offices and mediation fees collected
by the Philippine Mediation Center;
NOW THEREFORE, on motion of the Board of Officers of the IBPMisamis Oriental Chapter, be it resolved as it is
hereby resolved, to move the IBP National Legal Aid Office to make the necessary requests or representations with the
Supreme Court, the Philippine Mediation Center, the Department of Justice and the National Prosecution Service and
other quasi-judicial agencies to effect the grant of a like exemption from the payment of filing, docket and other fees to
the IBP Legal Aid clients as that enjoyed by PAO clients, towards the end that IBP Legal Aid clients be automatically
exempted from the filing of the abovementioned fees;
 
 RESOLVED FURTHER, that copies of this Resolution be furnished to Supreme Court Chief Justice Honorable
Reynato S. Puno, IBP National President Feliciano M. Bautista, the IBP Board of Governors, Secretary of Justice Hon. Raul
M. Gonzalez, the National Supervisor of the Philippine Mediation Center, the National Labor Relations Commission, the
Civil Service Commission and other quasi-judicial bodies and their local offices;
RESOLVED FINALLY to move the IBP Board of Governors and National Officers to make the necessary
representations with the National Legislature and its members to effect the filing of a bill before the House of
Representatives and the Senate granting exemption to IBP Legal Aid clients from the payment of docket, filing and or
other fees in cases before the courts, quasi-judicial agencies and prosecutors offices and the mediation centers.
Done this 23rd day of September 2008, Cagayan De Oro City.

HELD: Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium. Where there is a right, there must be
a remedy. The remedy must not only be effective and efficient, but also readily accessible. For a remedy that is
inaccessible is no remedy at all.
The Constitution guarantees the rights of the poor to free access to the courts and to adequate legal assistance.
The legal aid service rendered by the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters nationwide addresses only the right to
adequate legal assistance. Recipients of the service of the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters may enjoy free
access to courts by exempting them from the payment of fees assessed in connection with the filing of a complaint or
action in court. With these twin initiatives, the guarantee of Section 11, Article III of Constitution is advanced and access
to justice is increased by bridging a significant gap and removing a major roadblock.
WHEREFORE, the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is hereby COMMENDED for
helping increase the access to justice by the poor. The request of the Misamis Oriental Chapter for the exemption from
the payment of filing, docket and other fees of the clients of the legal aid offices of the various IBP chapters is GRANTED.
The Rule on the Exemption From the Payment of Legal Fees of the Clients of the National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA)
and of the Legal Aid Offices in the Local Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) (which shall be assigned
the docket number A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC [IRR] provided in this resolution is hereby APPROVED. In this connection, the
Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to cause the publication of the said rule in a newspaper of general circulation within five days
from the promulgation of this resolution.
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984
entry into force 26 June 1987, in accordance with article 27 (1)
The States Parties to this Convention,
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
Recognizing that those rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person,
Considering the obligation of States under the Charter, in particular Article 55, to promote universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms,
Having regard to article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, both of which provide that no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment,
Having regard also to the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December 1975,
Desiring to make more effective the struggle against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
throughout the world,
Have agreed as follows:
PART I
Article 1
1. For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
2. This article is without prejudice to any international instrument or national legislation which does or may contain provisions of
wider application.
Article 2
1. Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory
under its jurisdiction.
2. No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public
emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.
3. An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked as a justification of torture.
Article 3
1. No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.
2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the competent authorities shall take into account all relevant
considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass
violations of human rights.
Article 4
1. Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law. The same shall apply to an attempt to
commit torture and to an act by any person which constitutes complicity or participation in torture. 2. Each State Party shall make
these offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature.
Article 5
1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences referred to in article 4
in the following cases:
(a) When the offences are committed in any territory under its jurisdiction or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State;
(b) When the alleged offender is a national of that State;
(c) When the victim is a national of that State if that State considers it appropriate.
2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over such offences in cases
where the alleged offender is present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him pursuant to article 8 to any of
the States mentioned in paragraph I of this article.
3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with internal law.
Article 6
1. Upon being satisfied, after an examination of information available to it, that the circumstances so warrant, any State Party in whose
territory a person alleged to have committed any offence referred to in article 4 is present shall take him into custody or take other
legal measures to ensure his presence. The custody and other legal measures shall be as provided in the law of that State but may be
continued only for such time as is necessary to enable any criminal or extradition proceedings to be instituted.
2. Such State shall immediately make a preliminary inquiry into the facts.
3. Any person in custody pursuant to paragraph I of this article shall be assisted in communicating immediately with the nearest
appropriate representative of the State of which he is a national, or, if he is a stateless person, with the representative of the State
where he usually resides.
4. When a State, pursuant to this article, has taken a person into custody, it shall immediately notify the States referred to in article 5,
paragraph 1, of the fact that such person is in custody and of the circumstances which warrant his detention. The State which makes
the preliminary inquiry contemplated in paragraph 2 of this article shall promptly report its findings to the said States and shall
indicate whether it intends to exercise jurisdiction.
Article 7
1. The State Party in the territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to have committed any offence referred to in article 4 is
found shall in the cases contemplated in article 5, if it does not extradite him, submit the case to its competent authorities for the
purpose of prosecution.
2. These authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the
law of that State. In the cases referred to in article 5, paragraph 2, the standards of evidence required for prosecution and conviction
shall in no way be less stringent than those which apply in the cases referred to in article 5, paragraph 1.
3. Any person regarding whom proceedings are brought in connection with any of the offences referred to in article 4 shall be
guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings.
Article 8
1. The offences referred to in article 4 shall be deemed to be included as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing
between States Parties. States Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable offences in every extradition treaty to be
concluded between them.
2. If a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another State
Party with which it has no extradition treaty, it may consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition in respect of such
offences. Extradition shall be subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the requested State.
3. States Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognize such offences as extraditable
offences between themselves subject to the conditions provided by the law of the requested State.
4. Such offences shall be treated, for the purpose of extradition between States Parties, as if they had been committed not only in the
place in which they occurred but also in the territories of the States required to establish their jurisdiction in accordance with article 5,
paragraph 1.
Article 9
1. States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect
of any of the offences referred to in article 4, including the supply of all evidence at their disposal necessary for the proceedings.
2. States Parties shall carry out their obligations under paragraph I of this article in conformity with any treaties on mutual judicial
assistance that may exist between them.
Article 10
1. Each State Party shall ensure that education and information regarding the prohibition against torture are fully included in the
training of law enforcement personnel, civil or military, medical personnel, public officials and other persons who may be involved in
the custody, interrogation or treatment of any individual subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment.
2. Each State Party shall include this prohibition in the rules or instructions issued in regard to the duties and functions of any such
person.
Article 11
Each State Party shall keep under systematic review interrogation rules, instructions, methods and practices as well as arrangements
for the custody and treatment of persons subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment in any territory under its
jurisdiction, with a view to preventing any cases of torture.
Article 12
Each State Party shall ensure that its competent authorities proceed to a prompt and impartial investigation, wherever there is
reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture has been committed in any territory under its jurisdiction.
Article 13
Each State Party shall ensure that any individual who alleges he has been subjected to torture in any territory under its jurisdiction has
the right to complain to, and to have his case promptly and impartially examined by, its competent authorities. Steps shall be taken to
ensure that the complainant and witnesses are protected against all ill-treatment or intimidation as a consequence of his complaint or
any evidence given.
Article 14
1. Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to
fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as full rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a
result of an act of torture, his dependants shall be entitled to compensation.
2. Nothing in this article shall affect any right of the victim or other persons to compensation which may exist under national law.
Article 15
Each State Party shall ensure that any statement which is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as
evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made.
Article 16
1. Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article I, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. In particular, the obligations contained in
articles 10, 11, 12 and 13 shall apply with the substitution for references to torture of references to other forms of cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.
2. The provisions of this Convention are without prejudice to the provisions of any other international instrument or national law
which prohibits cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or which relates to extradition or expulsion.
PART II
Article 17
1. There shall be established a Committee against Torture (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) which shall carry out the
functions hereinafter provided. The Committee shall consist of ten experts of high moral standing and recognized competence in the
field of human rights, who shall serve in their personal capacity. The experts shall be elected by the States Parties, consideration being
given to equitable geographical distribution and to the usefulness of the participation of some persons having legal experience.
2. The members of the Committee shall be elected by secret ballot from a list of persons nominated by States Parties. Each State Party
may nominate one person from among its own nationals. States Parties shall bear in mind the usefulness of nominating persons who
are also members of the Human Rights Committee established under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and who
are willing to serve on the Committee against Torture.
3. Elections of the members of the Committee shall be held at biennial meetings of States Parties convened by the Secretary-General
of the United Nations. At those meetings, for which two thirds of the States Parties shall constitute a quorum, the persons elected to
the Committee shall be those who obtain the largest number of votes and an absolute majority of the votes of the representatives of
States Parties present and voting.
4. The initial election shall be held no later than six months after the date of the entry into force of this Convention. At. Ieast four
months before the date of each election, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall address a letter to the States Parties inviting
them to submit their nominations within three months. The Secretary-General shall prepare a list in alphabetical order of all persons
thus nominated, indicating the States Parties which have nominated them, and shall submit it to the States Parties.
5. The members of the Committee shall be elected for a term of four years. They shall be eligible for re-election if renominated.
However, the term of five of the members elected at the first election shall expire at the end of two years; immediately after the first
election the names of these five members shall be chosen by lot by the chairman of the meeting referred to in paragraph 3 of this
article.
6. If a member of the Committee dies or resigns or for any other cause can no longer perform his Committee duties, the State Party
which nominated him shall appoint another expert from among its nationals to serve for the remainder of his term, subject to the
approval of the majority of the States Parties. The approval shall be considered given unless half or more of the States Parties respond
negatively within six weeks after having been informed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the proposed appointment.
7. States Parties shall be responsible for the expenses of the members of the Committee while they are in performance of Committee
duties.
Article 18
1. The Committee shall elect its officers for a term of two years. They may be re-elected.
2. The Committee shall establish its own rules of procedure, but these rules shall provide, inter alia, that:
(a) Six members shall constitute a quorum;
(b) Decisions of the Committee shall be made by a majority vote of the members present.
3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall provide the necessary staff and facilities for the effective performance of the
functions of the Committee under this Convention.
4. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene the initial meeting of the Committee. After its initial meeting, the
Committee shall meet at such times as shall be provided in its rules of procedure.
5. The States Parties shall be responsible for expenses incurred in connection with the holding of meetings of the States Parties and of
the Committee, including reimbursement to the United Nations for any expenses, such as the cost of staff and facilities, incurred by
the United Nations pursuant to paragraph 3 of this article.
Article 19
1. The States Parties shall submit to the Committee, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, reports on the measures they
have taken to give effect to their undertakings under this Convention, within one year after the entry into force of the Convention for
the State Party concerned. Thereafter the States Parties shall submit supplementary reports every four years on any new measures
taken and such other reports as the Committee may request.
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the reports to all States Parties.
3. Each report shall be considered by the Committee which may make such general comments on the report as it may consider
appropriate and shall forward these to the State Party concerned. That State Party may respond with any observations it chooses to the
Committee.
4. The Committee may, at its discretion, decide to include any comments made by it in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article,
together with the observations thereon received from the State Party concerned, in its annual report made in accordance with article
24. If so requested by the State Party concerned, the Committee may also include a copy of the report submitted under paragraph I of
this article.
Article 20
1. If the Committee receives reliable information which appears to it to contain well-founded indications that torture is being
systematically practised in the territory of a State Party, the Committee shall invite that State Party to co-operate in the examination of
the information and to this end to submit observations with regard to the information concerned.
2. Taking into account any observations which may have been submitted by the State Party concerned, as well as any other relevant
information available to it, the Committee may, if it decides that this is warranted, designate one or more of its members to make a
confidential inquiry and to report to the Committee urgently.
3. If an inquiry is made in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article, the Committee shall seek the co-operation of the State Party
concerned. In agreement with that State Party, such an inquiry may include a visit to its territory.
4. After examining the findings of its member or members submitted in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article, the Commission
shall transmit these findings to the State Party concerned together with any comments or suggestions which seem appropriate in view
of the situation.
5. All the proceedings of the Committee referred to in paragraphs I to 4 of th is article s hall be con fidential , and at all stages of the
proceedings the co-operation of the State Party shall be sought. After such proceedings have been completed with regard to an inquiry
made in accordance with paragraph 2, the Committee may, after consultations with the State Party concerned, decide to include a
summary account of the results of the proceedings in its annual report made in accordance with article 24.
Article 21
1. A State Party to this Convention may at any time declare under this article that it recognizes the competence of the Committee to
receive and consider communications to the effect that a State Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations
under this Convention. Such communications may be received and considered according to the procedures laid down in this article
only if submitted by a State Party which has made a declaration recognizing in regard to itself the competence of the Committee. No
communication shall be dealt with by the Committee under this article if it concerns a State Party which has not made such a
declaration. Communications received under this article shall be dealt with in accordance with the following procedure;
(a) If a State Party considers that another State Party is not giving effect to the provisions ofthis Convention, it may, by written
communication, bring the matter to the attention of that State Party. Within three months after the receipt of the communication the
receiving State shall afford the State which sent the communication an explanation or any other statement in writing clarifying the
matter, which should include, to the extent possible and pertinent, reference to domestic procedures and remedies taken, pending or
available in the matter;
(b) If the matter is not adjusted to the satisfaction of both States Parties concerned within six months after the receipt by the receiving
State of the initial communication, either State shall have the right to refer the matter to the Committee, by notice given to the
Committee and to the other State;
(c) The Committee shall deal with a matter referred to it under this article only after it has ascertained that all domestic remedies have
been invoked and exhausted in the matter, in conformity with the generally recognized principles of international law. This shall not
be the rule where the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged or is unlikely to bring effective relief to the person who is
the victim of the violation of this Convention;
(d) The Committee shall hold closed meetings when examining communications under this article; (e) Subject to the provisions of
subparagraph
(e), the Committee shall make available its good offices to the States Parties concerned with a view to a friendly solution of the matter
on the basis of respect for the obligations provided for in this Convention. For this purpose, the Committee may, when appropriate, set
up an ad hoc conciliation commission;
(f) In any matter referred to it under this article, the Committee may call upon the States Parties concerned, referred to in subparagraph
(b), to supply any relevant information;
(g) The States Parties concerned, referred to in subparagraph (b), shall have the right to be represented when the matter is being
considered by the Committee and to make submissions orally and/or in writing;
(h) The Committee shall, within twelve months after the date of receipt of notice under subparagraph (b), submit a report:
(i) If a solution within the terms of subparagraph (e) is reached, the Committee shall confine its report to a brief statement of the facts
and of the solution reached;
(ii) If a solution within the terms of subparagraph (e) is not reached, the Committee shall confine its report to a brief statement of the
facts; the written submissions and record of the oral submissions made by the States Parties concerned shall be attached to the report.
In every matter, the report shall be communicated to the States Parties concerned.
2. The provisions of this article shall come into force when five States Parties to this Convention have made declarations under
paragraph 1 of this article. Such declarations shall be deposited by the States Parties with the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
who shall transmit copies thereof to the other States Parties. A declaration may be withdrawn at any time by notification to the
Secretary-General. Such a withdrawal shall not prejudice the consideration of any matter which is the subject of a communication
already transmitted under this article; no further communication by any State Party shall be received under this article after the
notification of withdrawal of the declaration has been received by the Secretary-General, unless the State Party concerned has made a
new declaration.
Article 22
1. A State Party to this Convention may at any time declare under this article that it recognizes the competence of the Committee to
receive and consider communications from or on behalf of individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation
by a State Party of the provisions of the Convention. No communication shall be received by the Committee if it concerns a State
Party which has not made such a declaration.
2. The Committee shall consider inadmissible any communication under this article which is anonymous or which it considers to be an
abuse of the right of submission of such communications or to be incompatible with the provisions of this Convention.
3. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2, the Committee shall bring any communications submitted to it under this article to the
attention of the State Party to this Convention which has made a declaration under paragraph I and is alleged to be violating any
provisions of the Convention. Within six months, the receiving State shall submit to the Committee written explanations or statements
clarifying the matter and the remedy, if any, that may have been taken by that State.
4. The Committee shall consider communications received under this article in the light of all information made available to it by or
on behalf of the individual and by the State Party concerned.
5. The Committee shall not consider any communications from an individual under this article unless it has ascertained that:
(a) The same matter has not been, and is not being, examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement;
(b) The individual has exhausted all available domestic remedies; this shall not be the rule where the application of the remedies is
unreasonably prolonged or is unlikely to bring effective reliefto the person who is the victim of the violation of this Convention.
6. The Committee shall hold closed meetings when examining communications under this article.
7. The Committee shall forward its views to the State Party concerned and to the individual.
8. The provisions of this article shall come into force when five States Parties to this Convention have made declarations under
paragraph 1 of this article. Such declarations shall be deposited by the States Parties with the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
who shall transmit copies thereof to the other States Parties. A declaration may be withdrawn at any time by notification to the
Secretary-General. Such a withdrawal shall not prejudice the consideration of any matter which is the subject of a communication
already transmitted under this article; no further communication by or on behalf of an individual shall be received under this article
after the notification of withdrawal of the declaration has been received by the SecretaryGeneral, unless the State Party has made a
new declaration.
Article 23
The members of the Committee and of the ad hoc conciliation commissions which may be appointed under article 21, paragraph I (e),
shall be entitled to the facilities, privileges and immunities of experts on mission for the United Nations as laid down in the relevant
sections of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.
Article 24
The Committee shall submit an annual report on its activities under this Convention to the States Parties and to the General Assembly
of the United Nations.
PART III
Article 25
1. This Convention is open for signature by all States. 2. This Convention is subject to ratification. Instruments of ratification shall be
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 26
This Convention is open to accession by all States. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of accession with the
SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations.
Article 27
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession.
2. For each State ratifying this Convention or acceding to it after the deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession,
the Convention shall enter into force onthe thirtieth day after the date of the deposit of its own instrument of ratification or accession.
Article 28
1. Each State may, at the time of signature or ratification of this Convention or accession thereto, declare that it does not recognize the
competence of the Committee provided for in article 20.
2. Any State Party having made a reservation in accordance with paragraph I of this article may, at any time, withdraw this reservation
by notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 29
1 . Any State Party to this Convention may propose an amendment and file it with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The
SecretaryGeneral shall thereupon communicate the proposed amendment to the States Parties with a request that they notify him
whether they favour a conference of States Parties for the purpose of considering an d voting upon the proposal. In the event that
within four months from the date of such communication at least one third of the States Parties favours such a conference, the
SecretaryGeneral shall convene the conference under the auspices of the United Nations. Any amendment adopted by a majority of the
States Parties present and voting at the conference shall be submitted by the Secretary-General to all the States Parties for acceptance.
2. An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph I of this article shall enter into force when two thirds of the States Parties to
this Convention have notified the Secretary-General of the United Nations that they have accepted it in accordance with their
respective constitutional processes.
3. When amendments enter into force, they shall be binding on those States Parties which have accepted them, other States Parties still
being bound by the provisions of this Convention and any earlier amendments which they have accepted.
Article 30
1. Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be
settled through negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six months from thc date of the
request for arbitration the Parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer the
dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court.
2. Each State may, at the time of signature or ratification of this Con vention or accession thereto, declare that it does not consider
itself bound by paragraph I of this article. The other States Parties shall not be bound by paragraph I of this article with respect to any
State Party having made such a reservation.
3. Any State Party having made a reservation in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article may at any time withdraw this reservation
by notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
 Article 31
1. A State Party may denounce this Convention by written notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Denunciation
becomes effective one year after the date of receipt of- the notification by the Secretary-General .
2. Such a denunciation shall not have the effect of releasing the State Party from its obligations under this Convention in regard to any
act or omission which occurs prior to the date at which the denunciation becomes effective, nor shall denunciation prejudice in any
way the continued consideration of any matter which is already under consideration by the Committee prior to the date at which the
denunciation becomes effective.
3. Following the date at which the denunciation of a State Party becomes effective, the Committee shall not commence consideration
of any new matter regarding that State.
Article 32
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all States Members of the United Nations and all States which have signed
this Convention or acceded to it of the following:
(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions under articles 25 and 26;
(b) The date of entry into force of this Convention under article 27 and the date of the entry into force of any amendments under
article 29;
(c) Denunciations under article 31.
Article 33
1. This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit certified copies of this Convention to all States.
 REPUBLIC ACT N0. 9745
AN ACT PENALIZING TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN AND DEGRADING TREATMENT OR
PUNISHMENT AND PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Short Title. - This Ad shall be known as the "Anti-Torture Act of 2009".
Section 2. Statement of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State:
(a) To value the dignity of every human person and guarantee full respect for human rights;
(b) To ensure that the human rights of all persons, including suspects, detainees and prisoners are respected at all times; and that no
person placed under investigation or held in custody of any person in authority or, agent of a person authority shall be subjected to
physical, psychological or mental harm, force, violence, threat or intimidation or any act that impairs his/her free wi11 or in any
manner demeans or degrades human dignity;
(c) To ensure that secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention, where torture may be carried
out with impunity, are prohibited; and
(d) To fully adhere to the principles and standards on the absolute condemnation and prohibition of torture as provided for in the 1987
Philippine Constitution; various international instruments to which the Philippines is a State party such as, but not limited to, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDA W) and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); and all other relevant international human rights instruments to which the
Philippines is a signatory.
Section 3. Definitions. - For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:
(a) "Torture" refers to an act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for
such purposes as obtaining from him/her or a third person information or a confession; punishing him/her for an act he/she or a third
person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or intimidating or coercing him/her or a third person; or for any reason
based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a person in authority or agent of a person in authority. It does not include pain or Buffering arising only from,
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
(b) "Other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment" refers to a deliberate and aggravated treatment or punishment not
enumerated under Section 4 of this Act, inflicted by a person in authority or agent of a person in authority against a person under
his/her custody, which attains a level of severity causing suffering, gross humiliation or debasement to the latter.
(c) "Victim" refers to the person subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment as defined above
and any individual who has suffered harm as a result of any act(s) of torture, or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment.
(d) "Order of Battle" refers to any document or determination made by the military, police or any law enforcement agency of the
government, listing the names of persons and organizations that it perceives to be enemies of the State and that it considers as
legitimate targets as combatants that it could deal with, through the use of means allowed by domestic and international law.
Section 4. Acts of Torture. - For purposes of this Act, torture shall include, but not be limited to, the following:
(a) Physical torture is a form of treatment or punishment inflicted by a person in authority or agent of a person in authority upon
another in his/her custody that causes severe pain, exhaustion, disability or dysfunction of one or more parts of the body, such as:
(1) Systematic beating, headbanging, punching, kicking, striking with truncheon or rifle butt or other similar objects, and jumping on
the stomach;
(2) Food deprivation or forcible feeding with spoiled food, animal or human excreta and other stuff or substances not normally eaten;
(3) Electric shock;
(4) Cigarette burning; burning by electrically heated rods, hot oil, acid; by the rubbing of pepper or other chemical substances on
mucous membranes, or acids or spices directly on the wound(s);
(5) The submersion of the head in water or water polluted with excrement, urine, vomit and/or blood until the brink of suffocation;
(6) Being tied or forced to assume fixed and stressful bodily position;
(7) Rape and sexual abuse, including the insertion of foreign objects into the sex organ or rectum, or electrical torture of the genitals;
(8) Mutilation or amputation of the essential parts of the body such as the genitalia, ear, tongue, etc.;
(9) Dental torture or the forced extraction of the teeth;
(10) Pulling out of fingernails;
(11) Harmful exposure to the elements such as sunlight and extreme cold;
(12) The use of plastic bag and other materials placed over the head to the point of asphyxiation;
(13) The use of psychoactive drugs to change the perception, memory. alertness or will of a person, such as:
(i) The administration or drugs to induce confession and/or reduce mental competency; or
(ii) The use of drugs to induce extreme pain or certain symptoms of a disease; and
(14) Other analogous acts of physical torture; and
(b) "Mental/Psychological Torture" refers to acts committed by a person in authority or agent of a person in authority which are
calculated to affect or confuse the mind and/or undermine a person's dignity and morale, such as:
(1) Blindfolding;
(2) Threatening a person(s) or his/fher relative(s) with bodily harm, execution or other wrongful acts;
(3) Confinement in solitary cells or secret detention places;
(4) Prolonged interrogation;
(5) Preparing a prisoner for a "show trial", public display or public humiliation of a detainee or prisoner;
(6) Causing unscheduled transfer of a person deprived of liberty from one place to another, creating the belief that he/she shall be
summarily executed;
(7) Maltreating a member/s of a person's family;
(8) Causing the torture sessions to be witnessed by the person's family, relatives or any third party;
(9) Denial of sleep/rest;
(10) Shame infliction such as stripping the person naked, parading him/her in public places, shaving the victim's head or putting marks
on his/her body against his/her will;
(11) Deliberately prohibiting the victim to communicate with any member of his/her family; and
(12) Other analogous acts of mental/psychological torture.
Section 5. Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment. - Other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment refers to a deliberate and aggravated treatment or punishment not enumerated under Section 4 of this Act, inflicted by a
person in authority or agent of a person in authority against another person in custody, which attains a level of severity sufficient to
cause suffering, gross humiliation or debasement to the latter. The assessment of the level of severity shall depend on all the
circumstances of the case, including the duration of the treatment or punishment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases,
the sex, religion, age and state of health of the victim.
Section 6. Freedom from Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, An Absolute Bight. - Torture
and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment as criminal acts shall apply to all circumstances. A state of war or a
threat of war, internal political instability, or any other public emergency, or a document or any determination comprising an "order of
battle" shall not and can never be invoked as a justification for torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment.
Section 7. Prohibited Detention. - Secret detention places, solitary confinement, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention,
where torture may be carried out with impunity. Are hereby prohibited.
In which case, the Philippine National Police (PNP), the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and other law enforcement. agencies
concerned shall make an updated list of all detention centers and facilities under their respective jurisdictions with the corresponding
data on the prisoners or detainees incarcerated or detained therein such as, among others, names, date of arrest and incarceration, and
the crime or offense committed. This list shall be made available to the public at all times, with a copy of the complete list available at
the respective national headquarters of the PNP and AFP. A copy of the complete list shall likewise be submitted by the PNP, AFP
and all other law enforcement agencies to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), such list to be periodically updated, by the same
agencies, within the first five (5) days of every month at the minimum. Every regional office of the PNP, AFP and other law
enforcement agencies shall also maintain a similar list far all detainees and detention facilities within their respective areas, and shall
make the same available to the public at all times at their respective regional headquarters, and submit a copy. updated in the same
manner provided above, to the respective regional offices of the CHR.
Section 8. Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule; Exception. - Any confession, admission or statement obtained as a result of torture
shall be inadmissible in evidence in any proceedings, except if the same is used as evidence against a person or persons accused of
committing torture.
Section 9. Institutional Protection of Torture Victims and Other Persons Involved. - A victim of torture shall have the following rights
in the institution of a criminal complaint for torture:
(a) To have a prompt and an impartial investigation by the CHR and by agencies of government concerned such as the Department of
Justice (DOJ), the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), the PNP, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and the AFP. A prompt
investigation shall mean a maximum period of sixty (60) working days from the time a complaint for torture is filed within which an
investigation report and/or resolution shall be completed and made available. An appeal whenever available shall be resolved within
the same period prescribed herein,
(b) To have sufficient government protection against all forms of harassment; threat and/or intimidation as a consequence of the filing
of said complaint or the presentation of evidence therefor. In which case, the State through its appropriate agencies shall afford
security in order to ensure his/her safety and all other persons involved in the investigation and prosecution such as, but not limited to,
his/her lawyer, witnesses and relatives; and
(c) To be accorded sufficient protection in the manner by which he/she testifies and presents evidence in any fora in order to avoid
further trauma.
Section 10. Disposition of Writs of Habeas Corpus, Amparo and Habeas Data Proceedings and Compliance with a Judicial 07'der. -
A writ of habeas corpus or writ of amparo or writ of habeas data proceeding, if any, filed on behalf of the victim of torture or other
cruel, degrading and inhuman treatment or punishment shall be disposed of expeditiously and any order of release by virtue thereof, or
other appropriate order of a court relative thereto, shall be executed or complied with immediately.
Section 11. Assistance in Filing a Complaint. - The CHR and the PAO shall render legal assistance in the investigation and monitoring
and/or filing of the complaint for a person who suffers torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, or for
any interested party thereto.
The victim or interested party may also seek legal assistance from the Barangay Human Rights Action Center (BRRAC) nearest
him/her as well as from human rights nongovernment organizations (NGOs).
Section 12. Right to' Physical, Medical and Psychological Examination. - Before and after interrogation, every person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation shall have the right to he informed of his/her right to demand physical examination by an
independent and competent doctor of his/her own choice. If such person cannot afford the services of his/her own doctor, he/she shall
he provided by the State with a competent and independent doctor to conduct physical examination. The State shall endeavor to
provide the victim with psychological evaluation if available under the circumstances. If the person arrested is a female, she shall be
attended to preferably by a female doctor. Furthermore, any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, including
his/her immediate family, shall have the right to immediate access to proper and adequate medical treatment. The physical
examination and/or psychological evaluation of the victim shall be contained in a medical report, duly signed by the attending
physician, which shall include in detail his/her medical history and findings, and which shall he attached to the custodial investigation
report. Such report shall be considered a public document.
Following applicable protocol agreed upon by agencies tasked to conduct physical, psychological and mental examinations, the
medical reports shall, among others, include:
(a) The name, age and address of the patient or victim;
(b) The name and address of the nearest kin of the patient or victim;
(c) The name and address of the person who brought the patient or victim for physical, psychological and mental examination, and/or
medical treatment;
(d) The nature and probable cause of the patient or victim's injury, pain and disease and/or trauma;
(e) The approximate time and date when the injury, pain, disease and/or trauma was/were sustained;
(f) The place where the injury, pain, disease and/or trauma was/were sustained;
(g) The time, date and nature of treatment necessary; and
(h) The diagnosis, the prognosis and/or disposition of the patient.
Any person who does not wish to avail of the rights under this pr<;lvision may knowingly and voluntarily waive such rights in
writing, executed in the presence and assistance of his/her counsel.
Section 13. Who are Criminally Liable. - Any person who actually participated Or induced another in the commission of torture or
other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment or who cooperated in the execution of the act of torture or other cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment by previous or simultaneous acts shall be liable as principal
Any superior military, police or law enforcement officer or senior government official who issued an order to any lower ranking
personnel to commit torture for whatever purpose shall be held equally liable as principals.
The immediate commanding officer of the unit concerned of the AFP or the immediate senior public official of the PNP and other law
enforcement agencies shall be held liable as a principal to the crime of torture or other cruel or inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment for any act or omission, or negligence committed by him/her that shall have led, assisted, abetted or allowed, whether
directly or indirectly, the commission thereof by his/her subordinates. If he/she has knowledge of or, owing to the circumstances at the
time, should have known that acts of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment shall be committed, is
being committed, or has been committed by his/her subordinates or by others within his/her area of responsibility and, despite such
knowledge, did not take preventive or corrective action either before, during or immediately after its commission, when he/she has the
authority to prevent or investigate allegations of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment but failed to
prevent or investigate allegations of such act, whether deliberately or due to negligence shall also be liable as principals.
Any public officer or employee shall be liable as an accessory if he/she has knowledge that torture or other cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment is being committed and without having participated therein, either as principal or accomplice,
takes part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manner:
(a) By themselves profiting from or assisting the offender to profit from the effects of the act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment;
(b) By concealing the act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment and/or destroying the effects or
instruments thereof in order to prevent its discovery; or(c) By harboring, concealing or assisting m the escape of the principal/s in the
act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment: Provided, That the accessory acts are done with the
abuse of the official's public functions.
Section 14. Penalties. - (a) The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the perpetrators of the following acts:
(1) Torture resulting in the death of any person;
(2) Torture resulting in mutilation;
(3) Torture with rape;
(4) Torture with other forms of sexual abuse and, in consequence of torture, the victim shall have become insane, imbecile, impotent,
blind or maimed for life; and
(5) Torture committed against children.
(b) The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed on those who commit any act of mental/psychological torture resulting in
insanity, complete or partial amnesia, fear of becoming insane or suicidal tendencies of the victim due to guilt, worthlessness or
shame.
(c) The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed on those who commit any act of torture resulting in psychological, mental and
emotional harm other than those described 1n paragraph (b) of this section. '
(d) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed if, in consequence of torture, the victim shall
have lost the power of speech or the power to hear or to smell; or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm or a leg; or shall have
lost the use of any such member; Or shall have become permanently incapacitated for labor.
(e) The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed if, in consequence of torture, the victim shall
have become deformed or shall have lost any part of his/her body other than those aforecited, or shall have lost the use thereof, or shall
have been ill or incapacitated for labor for a period of more than ninety (90) days.
(f) The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed if, in
consequence of torture, the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for labor for mare than thirty (30) days but not more than ninety
(90) days.
(g) The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium period shall be imposed if, in consequence of torture, the victim
shall have been ill or incapacitated for labor for thirty (30) days or less.
(h) The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed for acts constituting cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment as
defined in Section 5 of this Act.
(i) The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon those who establish, operate and maintain secret detention places and/or
effect or cause to effect solitary confinement, incommunicado or other similar forms of prohibited detention as provided in Section 7
of this Act where torture may be carried out with impunity.
(j) The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon the responsible officers or personnel of the AFP, the PNP and other law
enforcement agencies for failure to perform his/her duty to maintain, submit or make available to the public an updated list of
detention centers and facilities with the corresponding data on the prisoners or detainees incarcerated or detained therein, pursuant to
Section 7 of this Act.
Section 15. Torture as a Separate and Independent Crime. - Torture as a crime shall not absorb or shall not be absorbed by any other
crime or felony committed as a consequence, or as a means in the conduct or commission thereof. In which case, torture shall be
treated as a separate and independent criminal act whose penalties shall be imposable without prejudice to any other criminal liability
provided for by domestic and international laws.
Section 16. Exclusion from the Coverage of Special Amnesty Law. - In order not to depreciate the crime of torture, persons who have
committed any act of torture shall not benefit from any special amnesty law or similar measures that will have the effect of exempting
them from any criminal proceedings and sanctions.
Section 17. Applicability of Refouler. - No person shall be expelled, returned or extradited to another State where there are substantial
grounds to believe that such person shall be in danger of being subjected to torture. For the purposes of determining whether such
grounds exist, the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the Secretary of the DOJ, in coordination with the
Chairperson of the CHR, shall take into account all relevant considerations including, where applicable and not limited to, the
existence in the requesting State of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.
Section 18. Compensation to Victims of Torture. - Any person who has suffered torture shall have the right to claim for compensation
as provided for under Republic Act No. 7309: Provided, That in no case shall compensation be any lower than Ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00). Victims of torture shall also have the right to claim for compensation from such other financial relief programs that may
be made available to him/her under existing law and rules and regulations.
Section 19. Formulation of a Rehabilitation Program. - Within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD), the DOJ and the Department of Health (DOH) and such other concerned government agencies,
and human rights organizations shall formulate a comprehensive rehabilitation program for victims of torture and their families. The
DSWD, the DOJ and thc DOH shall also call on human rights nongovernment organizations duly recognized by the government to
actively participate in the formulation of such program that shall provide for the physical, mental, social, psychological healing and
development of victims of torture and their families. Toward the attainment of restorative justice, a parallel rehabilitation program for
persons who have committed torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment shall likewise be formulated by the same
agencies.
Section 20. Monitoring of Compliance with this Act. - An Oversight Committee is hereby created to periodically oversee the
implementation of this Act. The Committee shall be headed by a Commissioner of the CRR, with the following as members: the
Chairperson of the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights, the respective Chairpersons of the House of Representatives'
Committees on Justice and Human Rights, and the Minority Leaders of both houses or their respective representatives in the minority.
Section 21. Education and Information Campaign. - The CHR, the DOJ, the Department of National Defense (DND), the Department
of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) and such other concerned parties in both the public and private sectors shall ensure that
education and information regarding prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment shall
be fully included in the training of law enforcement personnel, civil or military, medical personnel, public officials and other persons
who may be involved in the custody, interrogation or treatment of any individual subjected to any form of arrest, detention or
imprisonment. The Department of Education (DepED) and the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) shall also ensure the
integration of human rights education courses in all primary, secondary and tertiary level academic institutions nationwide.
Section 22. Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. - The provisions of the Revised Penal Code insofar as they are applicable shall be
suppletory to this Act. Moreover, if the commission of any crime punishable under Title Eight (Crimes Against Persons) and Title
Nine (Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security) of the Revised Penal Code is attended by any of the acts constituting torture and
other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment as defined herein, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum
period.
Section 23. Appropriations. - The amount of Five million pesos (Php5,000,000.00) is hereby appropriated to the CHR for the initial
implementation of tills Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the continued implementation of this Act shall be included
in the annual General Appropriations Act.
Section 24. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The DOJ and the CHR, with the active participation of human rights
nongovernmental organizations, shall promulgate the rules and regulations for the effective implementation of tills Act. They shall
also ensure the full dissemination of such rules and regulations to all officers and members of various law enforcement agencies.
Section 25. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the other provisions not affected
thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.
Section 26. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, executive orders or rules and regulations contrary to or inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 27. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.
 Republic Act No. 7438             April 27, 1992
AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE
DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. Statement of Policy. – It is the policy of the Senate to value the dignity of every human being and guarantee full respect
for human rights.
Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation; Duties of Public Officers. –
(a) Any person arrested detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel.
(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his place, who arrests, detains or investigates any person for
the commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known to and understood by him, of his rights to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer privately
with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he
must be provided with a competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer.lawphi1Ÿ
(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating officer, provided that before such report is
signed, or thumbmarked if the person arrested or detained does not know how to read and write, it shall be read and adequately
explained to him by his counsel or by the assisting counsel provided by the investigating officer in the language or dialect known to
such arrested or detained person, otherwise, such investigation report shall be null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed
by such person in the presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the
parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or
minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.
(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, or under custodial
investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise the waiver shall be null and void
and of no effect.
(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed visits by or conferences with any member of his
immediate family, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or
by his counsel, or by any national non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Commission on Human Rights of by any
international non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Office of the President. The person's "immediate family" shall
include his or her spouse, fiancé or fiancée, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or
niece, and guardian or ward.
As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in
connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any
violation of law.
Section 3. Assisting Counsel. – Assisting counsel is any lawyer, except those directly affected by the case, those charged with
conducting preliminary investigation or those charged with the prosecution of crimes.
The assisting counsel other than the government lawyers shall be entitled to the following fees;
(a) The amount of One hundred fifty pesos (P150.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with light felonies;lawphi1©alf
(b) The amount of Two hundred fifty pesos (P250.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with less grave or grave felonies;
(c) The amount of Three hundred fifty pesos (P350.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with a capital offense.
The fee for the assisting counsel shall be paid by the city or municipality where the custodial investigation is conducted, provided
that if the municipality of city cannot pay such fee, the province comprising such municipality or city shall pay the fee: Provided, That
the Municipal or City Treasurer must certify that no funds are available to pay the fees of assisting counsel before the province pays
said fees.
In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted and the suspected person can only be detained by the
investigating officer in accordance with the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
Section 4. Penalty Clause. – (a) Any arresting public officer or employee, or any investigating officer, who fails to inform any person
arrested, detained or under custodial investigation of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice, shall suffer a fine of Six thousand pesos (P6,000.00) or a penalty of imprisonment of not less than eight
(8) years but not more than ten (10) years, or both. The penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification shall also be imposed upon the
investigating officer who has been previously convicted of a similar offense.
The same penalties shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee, or anyone acting upon orders of such investigating officer or
in his place, who fails to provide a competent and independent counsel to a person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation for the commission of an offense if the latter cannot afford the services of his own counsel.
(b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the immediate family of a person arrested, detained
or under custodial investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his
immediate family or by his counsel, from visiting and conferring privately with him, or from examining and treating him, or from
ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
not less than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years, and a fine of four thousand pesos (P4,000.00).
The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with custodial responsibility over any detainee or prisoner
may undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure his safety and prevent his escape.
Section 5. Repealing Clause. – Republic Act No. No. 857, as amended, is hereby repealed. Other laws, presidential decrees, executive
orders or rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 6. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in any daily
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
Approved: April 27, 1992.

Inquest Procedures (DOJ Circular No. 61, 1993)

Evidence Needed for an Inquest Proceedings
 SECTION 1.Concept .—Inquest is an informal and summary investigation con-ducted by a public prosecutor in criminal cases
involving persons arrested and detained without the benefit of a warrant of arrest issued by the court for the purpose of deter-
mining whether or not said persons should remain under custody and correspondingly be charged in court.
SEC. 2.Designationof Inquest Officers.—The City or Provincial Prosecutor shall designate the Prosecutors assigned to inquest
duties and shall furnish the Philippine National Police (PNP) a list of their names and their schedule of assignments. If, however,
there is only one Prosecutor in the area, all inquest cases shall be referred to him for appropriate action. Unless otherwise directed
by the City or Provincial Prosecutor, those assigned to inquest duties shall discharge their functions during the hours of their
designated assignments and only at the police stations/headquarters of the PNP in order to expedite and facilitate the disposition of
inquest cases.
SEC. 3.Commencement and Termination of Inquest.—The inquest proceedings shall be considered commenced upon
receipt by the Inquest Officer from the law enforcement authorities of the complaint/referral documents which should include:
a. the affidavit of arrest;
b. the investigation report;
c. the statement of the complainant and witnesses; and
d. other supporting evidence gathered by the police in the course of the latter’s investigation of the criminal incident involving the
arrested or detained person. The inquest Officer shall, as far as practicable, cause the affidavit of arrest and statements/affidavits of
the complainant and the witnesses to be subscribed and sworn to before him by the arresting officer and the affiants. The inquest
proceedings must be terminated within the period prescribed under the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. *
SEC. 4.Particular Documents Required in Specific Cases.—The submission, presentation of the documents listed herein
below should as far as practicable, be required in the following cases by the Inquest Officer.
Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law (PD 1612)
a. a list/inventory of the articles and items subject of the offense; and
b. statement of their respective value
Illegal Possession of Explosives (PD 1866)
a. chemistry report duly signed by the forensic chemist and
b. photograph of the explosives, if readily available.
Violation of the Fisheries Law (PD 704)(now RA 8550)
a. photograph of the confiscated fish, if readily available; and
b. certification of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources;
Violation of the Forestry Law (PD 705)
a. scale sheets containing the volume and species of the forest products confiscated, number of pieces and other important details
such as estimated value of the products confiscated;
b. certification of Department of Environment and Natural Resources/Bureau of Forest Management; and
c. seizure receipt. The submission of the foregoing documents shall no absolutely be required if there are other forms of evidence
submitted which will sufficiently establish the facts sought to be proved by the foregoing documents.
SEC. 5.Incomplete documents.—When the documents presented are not complete to establish probable cause, the Inquest Officer shall
direct the law enforcement agency to submit the required evidence within the period prescribed under the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended; otherwise, the Inquest Officer shall order the release of the detained person and, where the inquest is conducted outside
of office hours, direct the law enforcement agency concerned to file the case with the City or Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.
SEC. 6.Presence of the detained person.—The presence of the detained person who is under custody shall be ensured during the
proceedings. However, the production of the detained person before the Inquest Officer may be dispensed with in the following cases:
a. if he is confined in a hospital;
b. if he is detained in a place under maximum security;
c. if production of the detained person involve security risks; or
d. if the presence of the detained person is not feasible by reason of age, health, sex and other similar factors.
The absence of the detained person by reason of any of the foregoing factors must be noted by the Inquest Officer and reflected in the
record of the case.
SEC. 7.Charges and counter-charges.—All charges and counter-charges arising from the same incident shall, as far as
practicable, be consolidated and inquested jointly to avoid contradictory or inconsistent dispositions.
SEC. 8.Initial duty of the inquest officer .—The Inquest Officer must first deter-mine if the arrest of the detained person was
made in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, which provide that arrests without a warrant may be effected:

a. when, in the presence of the arresting officer, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense; or
b. when an offense has in fact just been committed, and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it. For this purpose, the Inquest Officer may summarily examine the arresting officers on the
circumstances surrounding the arrest or apprehension of the detained per-son.
 SEC. 9.Where arrest not properly effected.—Should the Inquest Officer find that the arrest was not made in accordance with the Rules,
he shall:
a. recommend the release of the person arrested or detained;
b. note down the disposition of the referral document;
c. prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the action taken; and
d. forward the same, together with the record of the case, to the City or Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.
Where the recommendation for the release of the detained person is approved by the City or Provincial Prosecutor but the evidence on
hand warrant the conduct of a regular preliminary investigation, the order of release shall be served on the officer having custody of said detainee
and shall direct the said officer to serve upon the detainee the subpoena or notice of preliminary investigation, together with the copies of the
charge sheet or complaint, affidavits or sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses and other supporting evidence.
SEC. 10.Where the arrest property effected.—Should the Inquest Officer find that the arrest was properly effected, the
detained person should be asked if he desires to avail himself of a preliminary investigation, if he does, he shall be made to execute
a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and, in case of non-
availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. The preliminary investigation may be conducted by the Inquest Officer
himself or by any other Assistant Prosecutor to whom the case may be assigned by the City or Provincial Prosecutor, which
investigation shall be terminated within fifteen(15) days from its inception.
SEC. 11.Inquest proper .—Where the detained person does not opt for a preliminary investigation or otherwise refuses to execute the
required waiver, the Inquest Officer shall proceed with the inquest by examining the sworn statements/affidavits of the complainant and the
witnesses and other supporting evidence submitted to him. If necessary, the Inquest Officer may require the presence of the complainant and
witnesses and subject them to an informal and summary investigation or examination for purposes of determining the existence of probable cause.
SEC. 12.Meaning of probable cause.—Probable cause exists when the evidence submitted to the Inquest Officer engenders
a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the arrested or detained person is probably guilty thereof.
SEC. 13.Presence of probable cause.—If the Inquest Officer finds that probable cause exists, he shall forthwith prepare the corresponding
complaint/information with the recommendation that the same be filed in court. The complaint/information shall indicate the offense committed
and the amount of bail recommended, if bailable. Thereafter, the record of the case, together with the prepared com-plaint/information, shall be
forwarded to the City or Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action. The complaint/information may be filed by the Inquest Officer himself or by
any other Assistant Prosecutor to whom the case may be assigned by the City or Provincial Prosecutor.
SEC. 14.Contents of information.—The information shall, among others, contain:
a. a certification by the filing Prosecutor that he is filing the same in accordance with the provisions of Section 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, in cases cognizable by the Regional Trial Court;
b. the full name and alias, if any, and address of the accused;
c. the place where the accused is actually detained;
d. the full names and addresses of the complainant and witnesses;
e. a detailed description of the recovered item, if any;
f. the full name and address of the evidence custodian;
g. the age and date of birth of the complainant or the accused, if eighteen (19)years of age or below; and
h. the full names and addresses of the parents, custodians or guardians of the minor complainant or accused, as the case may be.
SEC. 15.Absence of probable cause.—If the Inquest Officer finds no probable cause, he shall:
a. recommend the release of the arrested or detained person;
b. note down his disposition on the referral document;
c. prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the action taken; and
d. forthwith forward the record of the case to the City or Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.
If the recommendation of the Inquest Officer for the release of the arrested or detained person is approved, the order of
release shall be served on the officer having custody of the said detainee. Should the City or Provincial Prosecutor disapprove the
recommendation of release, the arrested or detained person shall remain under custody, and the correspond-ing
complaint/information shall be filed by the City or Provincial Prosecutor or by any Assistant Prosecutor to whom the case may be
assigned.
SEC. 16.Presence at the crime scene.—Whenever a dead body is found and there is reason to believe that the death resulted from foul
play, or from the unlawful acts or omissions of other persons and such fact has been brought to his attention, the Inquest Officer shall:
a. forthwith proceed to the crime scene or place of discovery of the dead person;
b. cause an immediate autopsy to be conducted by the appropriate medico-legal officer in the locality or the PNP medico-legal division or the NBI
medico-legal office, as the case may be;
c. direct the police investigator to cause the taking of photographs of the crime scene or place of discovery of the dead body;
d. supervise the investigation to be conducted by the police authorities as well as the recovery of all articles and pieces of evidence found thereat
and see to it that the same are safeguarded and the chain of the custody thereof properly recorded; and
e. submit a written report of his finding to the City or Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.
SEC. 17.Sandiganbayan cases.—Should any complaint cognizable by the Sandiganbayan be referred to an Inquest Officer for
investigation, the latter shall, after conducting the corresponding inquest proceeding, forthwith forward the complete record to the
City or Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.

G.R. No. L-51770 March 20, 1985

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FRANCISCO GALIT
FACTS: The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a robbery. He had been detained and interrogated almost
continuously for five days, to no avail. He consistently maintained his innocence. There was no evidence to link him to the crime.
Obviously, something drastic had to be done. A confession was absolutely necessary. So the investigating officers began to maul him
and to torture him physically. Still the prisoner insisted on his innocence. His will had to be broken. A confession must be obtained.
So they continued to maltreat and beat him. 'They covered his face with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet bowl full of human
waste. The prisoner could not take any more. His body could no longer endure the pain inflicted on him and the indignities he had to
suffer. His will had been broken. He admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed the confession they
prepared. Later, against his will, he posed for pictures as directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a reenactment.
The record shows that in the morning of August 23, 1977, Mrs. Natividad Fernando, a widow, was found dead in the bedroom of her
house located at Barrio Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal, as a result of seven (7) wounds inflicted upon different parts of her body by a
blunt instrument. More than two weeks thereafter, police authorities of Montalban picked up the herein accused, Francisco Galit,
an ordinary construction worker (pion) living in Marikina, Rizal, on suspicion of the murder. On the following day, however,
September 8, 1977, the case was referred to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further investigation in view of the
alleged limited facilities of the Montalban police station. Accordingly, the herein accused was brought to the NBI where he was
investigated by a team headed by NBI Agent Carlos Flores. NBI Agent Flores conducted a preliminary interview of the suspect who
allegedly gave evasive answers to his questions. But the following day, September 9, 1977, Francisco Galit voluntarily executed a
Salaysay admitting participation in the commission of the crime. He implicated Juling Dulay and Pabling Dulay as his companions in
the crime. As a result, he was charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide.

ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional rights of the accused was violated

HELD:YES. Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be
informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be several short and clear questions and every right
explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no
showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate with his
lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for
investigation and it was only about two weeks after he had executed the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His
statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the
supposed reenactment, again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations of his rights.
The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as evidence because they were
obtained in a manner contrary to law.
Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the circumstances surrounding the taking of any confession, especially
where the prisoner claims having been maltreated into giving one. Where there is any doubt as to its voluntariness, the same must
be rejected in toto.
This Court, in the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, laid down the correct procedure for peace officers to follow when making
an arrest and in conducting a custodial investigation, and which We reiterate:
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he
must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that
any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a
relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in
the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either
of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made
with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

G.R. No. 132154 June 29, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PACITO ORDOO
FACTS: The records show that on 5 August 1994 the decomposing body of a young girl was found among the bushes near a bridge in
Barangay Poblacion, Santol, La Union. The girl was later identified as Shirley Victore, fifteen (15) years old, a resident of Barangay
Guesset, Poblacion, Santol, La Union, who three (3) days before was reported missing. Post-mortem examination conducted by Dr.
Arturo Llavore, a medico-legal officer of the NBI, revealed that the victim was raped and strangled to death.
Unidentified sources pointed to Pacito Ordoo and Apolonio Medina as the authors of the crime. Acting on this lead, the police
thereupon invited the two (2) suspects and brought them to the police station for questioning. However, for lack of evidence then
directly linking them to the crime, they were allowed to go home.
On 10 August 1994 the accused Pacito Ordoo and Apolonio Medina returned to the police station one after another and
acknowledged that they had indeed committed the crime. Acting on their admission, the police immediately conducted an
investigation and put their confessions in writing. The investigators however could not at once get the services of a lawyer to assist
the two (2) accused in the course of the investigation because there were no practicing lawyers in the Municipality of Santol, a
remote town of the Province of La Union. Be that as it may, the statements of the two (2) accused where nevertheless taken. But
before doing so, both accused were apprised in their own dialect of their constitutional right to remain silent and to be assisted by a
competent counsel of their choice. Upon their acquiescence and assurance that they understood their rights and did not require the
services of counsel, the investigation was conducted with the Parish Priest, the Municipal Mayor, the Chief of Police and other police
officers of Santol, La Union, in attendance to listen to and witness the giving of the voluntary statements of the two (2) suspects who
admitted their participation in the crime.
The first to confess was Apolonio Medina who in addition to the Parish Priest, the Mayor, the Chief of Police and the other
police officers was also accompanied by his wife and mother. Apolonio Medina narrated that in the morning of 2 August 1994 while
he was walking towards the house of Pacito Ordoo in Sitio Buacao, Poblacion, Santol, La Union, he noticed a young woman walking
towards the school at the Poblacion. Upon reaching Sitio Buacao, he saw Pacito Ordoo standing along the road. When the woman
reached him he suddenly grabbed her, held her tightly and covered her mouth with his right hand. As Medina neared them, Ordoo
turned to him and said, "Come and help me, I am feeling uneasy."
Although Medina claimed he was surprised at the request, he nonetheless went to Ordoo, helped him hold the legs of the young
woman including her bag and umbrella and together they carried her to the bushes where they laid her down. Medina held her legs
as requested while Ordoo continued to cover her mouth with his hand and boxing her many times on the head. When she was
already weak and weary Ordoo knelt near her, raised her skirt and lowered her panty down to her knees. Medina continued to
remove her panty as Ordoo removed his short pants, then his briefs. Ordoo then raped her, boxed her head continuously, with
Medina continuously pinning her legs down and boxing those legs every time she struggled.
After Ordoo had satiated himself Medina took his turn in raping the same victim with Ordoo holding her legs. After they were
through, Medina left to watch out for intruders while Ordoo tied a vine around the girl's neck, hanged her on a tree that ended her
life. Then, they went back to the road and parted ways.
After Medina said his piece, his wife and mother suddenly burst into tears. He then affixed his signature on his statement
and so did his wife, followed by all the other witnesses who listened to his confession.
Pacito Ordoo narrated his story in the afternoon. According to him, in the morning of 2 August 1994 he was on his way to Sitio
Guesset, Barangay Manggaan, Santol, La Union, when he saw a girl followed by Apolonio Medina. When the girl was near him he
immediately grabbed her and covered her mouth. Medina drew near, held her two legs, bag and umbrella and together they carried
her into the thicket. After laying her down Ordoo boxed her breasts and face while Medina boxed her legs. When she became weak
Ordoo raised her skirt and lowered her panty while Medina completely, removed it. Ordoo then removed his pants and walker
briefs, went on top of Shirley and as Medina spread her legs Ordoo immediately inserted his penis into her vagina. After ejaculating
Ordoo turned to Medina for him to take his turn in raping the girl. Ordoo was now holding her legs. At the end of his narration
Ordoo affixed his thumbmark on his statement in lieu of his signature as he did not know how to write.
Thereafter, Apolonio Medina and Pacito Ordoo were detained at the Santol police station. News about the apprehension
and detention of the culprits of the rape-slay of Shirley Victore soon spread that Roland Almoite, leading radio announcer of radio
station DZNL, visited and interviewed them. In the interview which was duly tape-recorded both accused admitted again their
complicity in the crime and narrated individually the events surrounding their commission thereof. According to Medina, his remorse
in having committed the crime was so great but his repentance came too late. He and Ordoo hoped that the parents of Shirley
Victore would forgive them. Upon conclusion of the interview, Roland Almoite immediately went to radio station DZNL and played
the taped interview on the air. The same interview was played again on the air the following morning and was heard by thousands of
listeners.
A couple of days later, the police brought the two (2) accused to the office of the PAO lawyer in Balaoan, La Union, for
assistance and counseling. In a closed-door session, PAO lawyer Oscar B. Corpuz apprised each of the accused of his constitutional
rights and, even though their confessions were already written in their dialect, explained to them each of the questions and answers
taken during the investigation. He likewise advised them to ponder the consequences of their confessions, leading them to defer the
affixing of their second signature/ thumbmark thereon.
After a week or so, the two (2) separately went back to Atty. Corpuz and informed him of their willingness to affix their
signatures and thumbmarks for the second time in their respective confessions. Once again Atty. Corpuz apprised the two (2)
accused of their constitutional rights, explained the contents of their respective statements, and finally, accompanied them to Judge
Fabian M. Bautista, MTC judge of Balaoan, La Union, who further apprised the two (2) accused of their constitutional rights and
asked them if they had been coerced into signing their confessions. They assured Judge Bautista that their statements had been
given freely and voluntarily. Upon such assurance that they had not been coerced into giving and signing their confessions, Judge
Bautista finally asked the accused Pacito Ordoo and Apolonio Medina to affix their signatures/ thumbmarks on their respective
confessions, and to subscribe the same before him. Atty. Corpuz then signed their statements as their assisting counsel, followed by
a few members of the MTC staff who witnessed the signing.
On arraignment, in a complete turnabout, the two (2) accused pleaded not guilty.

ISSUE: Whether or not the extra judicial confession made by two accused are admissible as evidence.

HELD: YES. Under the Constitution and the rules laid down pursuant to law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible in evidence must
satisfy four (4) fundamental requirements: (a) the confession must be voluntary; (b) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent
and independent counsel; (c) the confession must be express; and, (d) the confession must be in writing. Among all these requirements none is
accorded the greatest respect than an accused's right to counsel to adequately protect him in his ignorance and shield him from the otherwise
condemning nature of a custodial investigation. The person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of
extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of the offense. Hence,
if there is no counsel at the start of the custodial investigation any statement elicited from the accused is inadmissible in evidence against him. This
exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police
interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent.
In the instant case, custodial investigation began when the accused Ordoo and Medina voluntarily went to the Santol Police Station to confess and
the investigating officer started asking questions to elicit information and/or confession from them. At such point, the right of the accused to
counsel automatically attached to them. Concededly, after informing the accused of their rights the police sought to provide them with counsel.
However, none could be furnished them due to the non-availability of practicing lawyers in Santol, La Union, and the remoteness of the town to the
next adjoining town of Balaoan, La Union, where practicing lawyers could be found. At that stage, the police should have already desisted from
continuing with the interrogation but they persisted and gained the consent of the accused to proceed with the investigation. To the credit of the
police, they requested the presence of the Parish Priest and the Municipal Mayor of Santol as well as the relatives of the accused to obviate the
possibility of coercion, and to witness the voluntary execution by the accused of their statements before the police. Nonetheless, this did not cure
in any way the absence of a lawyer during the investigation.
In providing that during the taking of an extrajudicial confession the accused's parents, older brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor,
municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by the accused may be present, RA 7438 does not propose
that they appear in the alternative or as a substitute for counsel without any condition or clause. It is explicitly stated therein that before the
above-mentioned persons can appear two (2) conditions must be met: (a) counsel of the accused must be absent, and, (b) a valid waiver must be
executed. RA 7438 does not therefore unconditionally and unreservedly eliminate the necessity of counsel but underscores its importance by
requiring that a substitution of counsel with the above-mentioned persons be made with caution and with the essential safeguards.
Hence, in the absence of such valid waiver, the Parish Priest of Santol, the Municipal Mayor, the relatives of the accused, the Chief of
Police and other police officers of the municipality could not stand in lieu of counsel's presence. The apparent consent of the two (2) accused in
continuing with the investigation was of no moment as a waiver to be effective must be made in writing and with the assistance of counsel.
Consequently, any admission obtained from the two (2) accused emanating from such uncounselled interrogation would be inadmissible in
evidence in any proceeding.
Securing the assistance of the PAO lawyer five (5) to eight (8) days later does not remedy this omission either. Although there was a
showing that the PAO lawyer made a thorough explanation of the rights of the accused, enlightened them on the possible repercussions of their
admissions, and even gave them time to deliberate upon them, this aid and valuable advice given by counsel still came several days too late. It
could have no palliative effect. It could not cure the absence of counsel during the custodial investigation when the extrajudicial statements were
being taken.
Sections 12, pars. (1) and (3), Art. III, of the Constitution do not cover the verbal confessions of the two (2) accused to the
radio announcer. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights
enumerated under Sec. 12, Art. III, are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to
admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the
relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents. They
confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without need of any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by
government, rights that government has the duty to protect. Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down
these limitations to protect the individual against aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of government and
its agencies.
The admissions of the accused before the radio announcer and duly tape-recorded are further bolstered and substantiated
by the findings of the NBI Medico-Legal Officer as reflected in the Autopsy Report/Post Mortem Findings. The narration of the
accused Apolonio Medina that Asing boxed the victim, who was struggling as she was being raped, was proved by the Autopsy
Report stating that the victim suffered contusions on the leg, right, lateral aspect, middle third, etc.; that accused Pacito Ordoo boxed
the face of the victim to make her weak was proved by the testimony of the NBI Medico-Legal Officer that there was blackening on
the face of the victim due to hematoma caused by violence or boxing on her face; and, that accused Pacito Ordoo hanged the victim
on a tree by tying a vine around her neck, was proved by the finding of a depressed mark involving the anterior and lateral portions
of the neck.
G.R. No. 136253 February 21, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CLEMENTE JOHN LUGOD
FACTS: EDILBERTO CASTILLO, the medico-legal officer who examined the cadaver of Nairube on September 19, 1997, testified that
during the course of his examination of the cadaver, he discovered an 8 cm. wound penetration in her vagina which was probably
caused by the insertion of a penis; that the cadaver was in an advanced state of decomposition; that more or less, the approximate
time of death of the victim was three (3) days prior to his examination; and that the cause of death of the victim was hypovolenic
shock secondary to the laceration.
RICARDO VIDA, the Task Force Chief of Cavinti, testified that on September 18, 1997, at around 4:35 p.m., the accused
pointed out where the body of the victim was; that the accused pointed to a place inside Villa Anastacia which was two hundred
(250) meters from the road; that at the time the accused pointed to the place, he was handcuffed to the accused; that the accused
used his left hand in pointing towards the direction; and that the father of the victim cried upon identifying the victim.
VIOLETA CABUHAT testified that on September 15, 1997, at around 10:00 p.m., she was weaving hats at her house. At that
time, she was together with her three children, Joey, Jessica and Jovelin and Loreto Veloria. The accused suddenly entered her house
and asked her if he could sleep there but she declined. After she declined, he suddenly forced her to move to one side of the place
where she was seated by forcing his body against hers and held her chin. She noticed that he was drunk at that time because she
smelt liquor on his breath. After he held her chin, she went upstairs and slept. She claims that the accused left her house at 10:20
p.m. since she looked at her watch when she went upstairs. She does not remember what happened next. In court, she identified
that accused as the person who entered her house that night.
LORETO VELORIA testified that on September 15, 1997, at around 10:10 p.m., he was at the house of Violeta Cabuhat.
While he was there, the accused, whom he identified in court, suddenly arrived. He noticed that the accused was wearing a pair of
muddy rubber slippers the bottom of which was color red while the top was color yellow. Since the slippers of the accused were
muddy, he asked him to remove them but the accused did not comply with his request. Veloria also noticed that the accused was
wearing a black collared T-shirt. In court, he identified a pair of slippers (Exhibit D) as the one he saw the accused wearing that night
and on several other occasions. He also identified a black collared T-shirt in court (Exhibit E) as the one he saw the accused wearing
that night and on two other occasions. Veloria stated that the accused sat beside Violeta and tried to catch her chin; that he
conversed with Violeta but did not hear the accuseds request if he could stay overnight. After the accused left, he also left the house
of Violeta.
PEDRO DELA TORRE testified that on September 15, 1997, at 10:30 p.m., the accused arrived at his house and joined the
drinking session of his son. He noticed that the accused was wearing a black T-shirt and appeared to be drunk. Dela Torre claims that
the accused left at around 11:45 p.m.
ROMUALDO RAMOS testified that at around 8:30 on the morning of September 16, 1997, he was driving his tricycle towards
the poblacion of Cavinti. While driving towards the poblacion, he noticed the accused coming out of the gate of Villa Anastacia.
Upon seeing the accused, he stopped his tricycle thinking that the accused would board the same but the accused did not mind him.
He noticed that the accused was wearing only a pair of white short pants with a red waistline and was not wearing a T-shirt or any
slippers. The accused also appeared to be drunk. Thereafter, he proceeded to the poblacion terminal where he discovered that
Nairube was missing. He also learned that the accused was the suspect behind her disappearance. Upon learning this, he told
Ricardo Vida, the Chief of the barangay tanod who was searching for the victim, to look for her at Villa Anastacia because it was the
place where he saw the accused come out from. Ramos further testified that the house of the victim is about five hundred (500)
meters away from the place where he saw the accused but if one passes through the coconut plantation, it is only two hundred
(200) meters away.
ALMA DIAZ testified that around 2:00 to 3:00 p.m. of September 16, 1997, she went with the search party to look for
Nairube. The search party was composed of around ten (10) persons including Violeta and Helen Ramos, the mother of the victim.
They first searched the back portion of the victims house. During the course of their search, she found a panty around three hundred
(300) meters away from the house of the victim. Helen identified the panty as belonging to her daughter and cried upon seeing the
same. The panty was laid behind a barb wire fence (the boundary of Villa Anastacia) and had a spot of blood and some mud on it. In
court, she identified Exhibit F as the panty she saw but stated that it was already clean. Thereafter, they continued the search and
found a black collared T-shirt with buttons in front and piping at the end of the sleeve hanging on a guava twig. The T-shirt appeared
clean at the time. She picked up the T-shirt and brought it along with her to the house of the victim. Upon reaching the house, the T-
shirt fell in mud and got dirty. Diaz further stated that the panty was found less than a hundred (100) meters away while the black T-
shirt was fifty (50) meters away from the place where the body of the victim was found inside Villa Anastacia and that the panty and
T-shirt were around thirty (30) meters away from each other. Diaz also claims that eight days after the death of the child, the mother
of the accused, Irene Lugod, came to her house to ask her for help in seeking an amicable settlement of the case with the Ramos
spouses. On cross-examination Diaz stated that she found the panty closer than the black T-shirt to the body of the victim.
HELEN RAMOS, the mother of the victim, testified that on September 15, 1997 at around 7:00 p.m., she was asleep in her
house together with her husband and children, Nimrod, Neres and Nairube, the victim. Nairube slept close to her on the upper part
of her body. At around 12:30 a.m., her husband woke her up because he sensed someone going down the stairs of their house. She
noticed that Nairube was no longer in the place where she was sleeping but she assumed that Nairube merely answered the call of
nature. After three minutes of waiting for Nariubes return, she stood up and began calling out for Nairube but there was no answer.
Thereafter, she went downstairs and saw that the backdoor of their house was open. She went outside through the backdoor to see
if Nairube was there but she was not. Helen also testified that Nairubes blanket was also no longer at the place she slept but that her
slippers were still there. She further stated that she found a pair of rubber slippers on top of a wooden bench outside of her
backdoor. The sole of the slippers was red while the strap was a combination of yellow and white. She assured the court that the
slippers did not belong to any member of her family. In court, she identified Exhibit D as the slippers she found that night.
Thereafter, she proceeded to the house of Alma Diaz to ask her for help. Then, in the morning of September 16, 1997, she went to
the police station to report the loss of her child. She also reported the discovery of the pair of slippers. She then went home while
the police began their search for Nairube. At around 12:30 p.m., Alma Diaz requested her to go with the searching team. During the
search, Alma Diaz found a panty which she recognized as that of her daughter. After seeing the panty, she cried. She was thereafter
ordered to go home while the others continued the search. On September 18, 1997, they found the dead body of her daughter in
Villa Anastacia. Helen also testified on the amounts she spent in connection with the funeral of her daughter and produced a list
which totaled P37,200.00. During cross-examination, Helen stated that the pair of slippers she found on top of the bench was
muddy.
LORO ESGUERRA, the Vice-Mayor of Cavinti, testified that on September 19, 1997 at around 3:30 p.m., he attended the
funeral of Nairube. After the funeral, he visited the accused in his cell. In the course of his conversation with the accused, the
accused confessed to the commission of the offense

ISSUE: Whether or not the confession of the accused to the vice-mayor is admissible in evidence.

HELD: NO. As can be seen from the testimony of the Vice-Mayor, accused-appellant merely responded to the ambiguous questions
that the Vice-Mayor propounded to him. He did not state in certain and categorical terms that he raped and killed Nairube. In fact,
the Vice-Mayor admitted that the accused-appellant did not tell him that he raped and killed Nairube. In addition, we note the
contradiction between the testimony of the Vice-Mayor who stated that he was alone when he spoke to the accused-appellant and
that of SPO2 Gallardo who claimed that he was present when accused-appellant confessed to the Mayor and Vice-Mayor.
Considering that the confession of accused-appellant cannot be used against him, the only remaining evidence which was
established by the prosecution is the fact that several persons testified having seen accused-appellant the night before the murder
of Nairube and on several other occasions wearing the rubber slippers and black T-shirt found at the house of the victim and Villa
Anastacia respectively as well as the testimony of Romualdo Ramos, the tricycle driver who stated that he saw accused-appellant in
the early morning of September 16, 1997 leaving Villa Anastacia without a T-shirt and without slippers. These pieces of evidence are
circumstantial in nature. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue
may be established by inference.Under Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which lead to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
In the present case, much emphasis was placed by the trial court on the discovery of the pair of rubber slippers at the victims house
and the black T-shirt hanging on a guava twig near the cadaver of Nairube which were allegedly worn by accused-appellant the day
before Nariubes disappearance. The trial court also relied on the fact that there was an eyewitness who saw accused-appellant
leaving Villa Anastacia, the place where the body of the victim was found, in the morning after the disappearance of the victim.
However, the combination of the above-mentioned circumstances does not lead to the irrefutably logical conclusion that accused-
appellant raped and murdered Nairube. At most, these circumstances, taken with the testimonies of the other prosecution
witnesses, merely establish the accused-appellants whereabouts on that fateful evening and places accused-appellant at the scene
of the crime and nothing more. The evidence of the prosecution does not provide a link which would enable this Court to conclude
that he in fact killed and raped Nairube. It must be stressed that although not decisive for the determination of the guilt of the
accused-appellant, the prosecution did not present any evidence to establish that he was at any time seen with the victim at or
about the time of the incident. Neither was there any other evidence which could single him out to the exclusion of any other as
being responsible for the crime.

ACQUITTED!

G.R. Nos. 144086-87 February 6, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDRALIN TABOGA
FACTS: For the commission of the above felonies, Edralin Taboga was charged in Criminal Case No. 1818-K with Robbery with
Homicide. Upon arraignment, accused-appellant entered separate pleas of Not Guilty to the crimes charged. [3] The cases were
thereafter tried jointly.
It appears that at 2:00 in the early morning of April 1, 1998, at Magsingal, Ilocos Sur, Barangay Councilman Cirilo Urayani
woke up to the sound of loud explosions. He thought people were lighting firecrackers in the neighboring barangay to celebrate their
fiesta. He went out of the house to fetch water, and he saw the house of Francisca Tubon on fire.
Marites Ceria, a niece of Francisca Tubon, was also awakened by the explosions. She rushed to her aunts house and, seeing
it on fire, shouted for help. She called out the name of her aunt but there was no response.
Barangay Captain William Pagao heard Marites shouts for help. He and other barangay officials and residents helped in
dousing out the fire using a water pump. When they entered the burned house, they discovered the charred remains of Francisca
Tubon. They examined the body and found stab wounds on the chest of the deceased.
Later that morning, Pagao reported the incident to the police authorities of Magsingal, Ilocos Sur. SPO1 Tiburcio Panod
went to the scene of the crime to investigate and gather physical evidence. He saw the charred remains of Francisca Tubon inside
what used to be her bedroom. He also found stab wounds on her chest. Meanwhile, Hilaria Migo, a niece of the deceased, took
pictures of the charred remains.
A sack of about four (4) gantas of rice was found some thirty to forty meters away from the burned house. Also found were
two crumpled five peso bills, twenty peso and fifty peso bills, and a five dollar bill underneath a big stone along the barangay road.
The investigators likewise found a necklace with pendant, three rings, a certificate of ownership of large cattle and a vial of perfume
near the scene.
The deceaseds former farm workers were rounded up, namely, Mario Ceria, Edwin Ceria, Tante Dumadag and Edralin Taboga. Brgy.
Capt. Pagao noticed fresh blood stains on the short pants of Taboga. He confronted Taboga, and the latter readily admitted that he
killed Francisca Tubon and set the flue-cured tobacco stored inside her house on fire, causing the whole house, including the dead
body of the old woman, to be burned.
Taboga was brought to the police station for further investigation. During the investigation, SPO1 Panod asked Taboga, Apay, sica ti
akinaramid wenno saan? (Why, were you the one who did it or not?) Taboga answered, Wen, Sir, ngem tulungannac cadi. (Yes, sir,
but please help me.) SPO1 Panod prepared a written extra-judicial confession for Taboga. During the inquest, however, Taboga
refused to sign the confession upon the advice of his lawyer.
The following day, April 2, 1998, Mr. Mario Contaoi, a radio announcer of DZNS, went to the Magsingal Municipal Police Station to
interview the suspect, Edralin Taboga. Again, Taboga admitted killing the deceased and setting her and her house on fire.
In the meantime, the Forensic Biologist of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), who examined the bloodstains on Tabogas
shorts and on the kitchen knife, found that the said specimens contained human blood Type O, the blood type of the deceased.
On the other hand, the Municipal Health Officer of Magsingal, Ilocos Sur who performed an autopsy on the victims charred remains,
found several stab wounds on the chest. According to him, the victim may have been stabbed to death before she and her house
were burned.
The daughter of the deceased, Dr. Marcelina T. Salvador, testified that the family spent the total amount of P115,960.00 for
the wake and interment of her mother, and that the house, including the pieces of furniture, fixtures and valuables therein, was
easily worth P1,000,000.00.
Accused-appellant further claimed that he was maltreated by the policemen and forced to admit the crime. Regarding his
admission to radio announcer Mario Contaoi, he narrated that the interview was held inside the investigation room of the police
station where policemen were present. Thus, he had to admit the crimes because he was afraid of the policemen. Moreover,
relatives of the deceased beat him up by kicking him, hitting him with a chair, slapping him and punching him on the head and face.
Accused-appellants live-in partner corroborated his testimony. She stated that she got up to relieve herself at about 1:00 at dawn of
April 1, 1998 when she heard shouts of a fire. She woke up accused-appellant and, together, they went to help put out the fire. After
an hour, they returned home and went back to sleep.

ISSUE: Whether or not the admission made by the accused to the radio reporter is admissible in evidence.

HELD: YES. There is nothing in the record to show that the radio announcer colluded with the police authorities to elicit inculpatory
evidence against accused-appellant. Neither is there anything on record which even remotely suggests that the radio announcer was
instructed by the police to extract information from him on the details of the crimes. Indeed, the reporter even asked permission
from the officer-in-charge to interview accused-appellant. Nor was the information obtained under duress. In fact, accused-
appellant was very much aware of what was going On. Furthermore, accused-appellants confession is replete with details on the
manner in which the crimes were committed, thereby ruling out the probability that it was involuntarily made. The voluntariness of
a confession may be inferred from its language such that if, upon its face the confession exhibits no sign of suspicious circumstances
tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details which could be supplied only by the accused reflecting
spontaneity and coherence which, psychologically, cannot be associated with a mind to which violence and torture have been
applied, it may be considered voluntary.
In the early case of U.S. v. De los Santos,we stated:
If a confession be free and voluntary the deliberate act of the accused with a full comprehension of its significance, there is no
impediment to its admission as evidence, and it becomes evidence of a high order; since it is supported by the presumption a very
strong presumption that no person of normal mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be a perpetrator of a crime,
especially if it be a serious crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience.
Under Rule 133, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, an extrajudicial confession made by an accused shall not be a sufficient ground for
conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. As defined, it means the body of the crime and, in its primary sense,
means a crime has actually been committed.Applied to a particular offense, it is the actual commission by someone of the particular
crime charged.In the case at bar, the confession made by accused-appellant was corroborated by several items found by the
authorities, to wit: the knife which was used to kill the victim and the charred body of the victim.

G.R. No. 140740 April 12, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUANITO BALOLOY
FACTS: An information charging JUANITO with the crime of rape with homicide. Upon arraignment on 10 December 1996, JUANITO
entered a plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
Jose Camacho, father of GENELYN and resident of Inasagan, Purok Mabia, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, testified that at
about 5:00 p.m. of 3 August 1996, he asked GENELYN to borrow some rice from their neighbor Wilfredo Balogbog whose house was
about 200 meters away. GENELYN forthwith left, but never returned. Thus, Jose went to the house of Wilfredo, who informed him
that GENELYN had already left with one ganta of rice. Jose then started to look for GENELYN. Speculating that GENELYN might have
taken shelter at the house of their neighbor Olipio Juregue while it was raining, Jose proceeded to Olipios house. Unfortunately, Jose
did not find GENELYN there. Not losing hope, Jose proceeded to the house of Ernesto Derio. On his way, he met Wilfredo, who
accompanied him to the house of Ernesto. GENELYN was not there either. They continued their search for GENELYN, but when it
proved to be in vain, the two decided to go home.
A few minutes after Jose reached his house, Ernesto and JUANITO arrived. JUANITO informed Jose that he saw a dead body
at the waterfalls, whose foot was showing. When asked whose body it was, JUANITO answered that it was GENELYNs. Immediately,
the three went to the waterfalls where JUANITO pointed the spot where he saw GENELYNs body. With the aid of his flashlight, Jose
went to the spot, and there he saw the dead body floating face down in the knee-high water. True enough, it was GENELYNs. Jose
reported the incident to Barangay Captain Luzviminda Ceniza. Upon Cenizas order, the Bantay Bayan members and some policemen
retrieved and brought GENELYNs dead body to Joses house.
Wilfredo Balogbog corroborated the testimony of Jose that GENELYN came to his house in the afternoon of 3 August 1996 to borrow
some rice. GENELYN had with her an umbrella that afternoon, as it was raining. He learned that GENELYN failed to reach her home
when Jose came to look for her.
Ernesto Derio, JUANITOs uncle-in-law, testified that at about 6:30 p.m. of 3 August 1996, Jose, together with Wilfredo Balogbog,
arrived at his house to look for GENELYN, but they immediately left when they did not find her. At about 7:30 p.m., JUANITO arrived
at Ernestos house, trembling and apparently weak. JUANITO was then bringing a sack and a kerosene lamp. When Ernesto asked
JUANITO where he was going, the latter said that he would catch frogs; and then he left. After thirty minutes, JUANITO returned and
told Ernesto that he saw a foot of a dead child at the waterfalls. With the disappearance of GENELYN in mind, Ernesto lost no time to
go the house of Jose. JUANITO followed him. There, JUANITO told Jose that he saw a foot of a dead child at the waterfalls. When
Jose asked whether it was GENELYNs, JUANITO answered in the affirmative. The three then proceeded to the waterfalls, where
JUANITO pointed the place where he saw the body of GENELYN. Jose immediately approached the body, and having confirmed that
it was GENELYNs, he brought it to a dry area.
Ernesto also testified that on 4 August 1996, he saw Antonio Camacho hand over a black rope to Barangay Captain Ceniza.
The latter asked those present as to who owned the rope. When JUANITO admitted ownership of the rope, Ceniza brought him away
from the crowd to a secluded place and talked to him.
Finally, Ernesto testified that JUANITO previously attempted to molest his (Ernestos) child, an incident that caused a fight between
him (JUANITO) and his (Ernestos) wife.
Antonio Camacho, a cousin of Jose, testified that on 3 August 1996, he was informed by Joses brother that GENELYN was
drowned. He and the Bantay Bayan members proceeded to the place of the incident and retrieved the body of GENELYN. At 8:00
a.m. of the following day he, together with Edgar Sumalpong and Andres Dolero, went to the waterfalls to trace the path up to
where GENELYN was found. There, they found a black rope and an umbrella. They gave the umbrella to Joses wife, and the black
rope to Barangay Captain Ceniza, who was then attending the wake of GENELYN. Ceniza asked those who were at the wake whether
anyone of them owned the rope. JUANITO answered that he owned it. Thereafter Ceniza talked to JUANITO.
Andres Dolero corroborated the testimony of Antonio on the recovery of the black rope and umbrella at the waterfalls where
GENELYNs body was found.
Barangay Captain Ceniza of Inasagan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, testified that at about 8:30 p.m. of 3 August 1996, Jose
Camacho, Ernesto Derio, Porferio Camacho, and JUANITO arrived at her house to inform her that JUANITO found GENELYNs dead
body at the waterfalls. Ceniza forthwith ordered the members of the Bantay Bayan to retrieve the body of GENELYN, and reported
the incident to the police headquarters of Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur. She specifically named JUANITO as her suspect. She then
went home and proceeded to Joses house for GENELYNs wake. She saw JUANITO at the wake and noticed that he was very uneasy.
Ceniza further revealed that on 4 August 1996, while she was on her way to Joses house, Antonio gave her a black rope,
which he reportedly found at the spot where the dead body of GENELYN was retrieved. Ceniza then asked the people at the wake
about the rope. JUANITO, who was among those present, claimed the rope as his. She brought JUANITO away from the others and
asked him why his rope was found at the place where GENELYNs body was discovered. JUANITO answered: I have to claim this as my
rope because I can commit sin to God if I will not claim this as mine because this is mine. Ceniza further asked JUANITO to tell her
everything. JUANITO told Ceniza that his intention was only to frighten GENELYN, not to molest and kill her. When GENELYN ran
away, he chased her. As to how he raped her, JUANITO told Ceniza that he first inserted his fingers into GENELYNs vagina and then
raped her. Thereafter, he threw her body into the ravine.After such confession, Ceniza examined his body and found a wound on his
right shoulder, as well as abrasions and scratches on other parts of his body. Upon further inquiry, JUANITO told her that the wound
on his shoulder was caused by the bite of GENELYN. Ceniza then turned over JUANITO to a policeman for his own protection, as the
crowd became unruly when she announced to them that JUANITO was the culprit. JUANITO was forthwith brought to the police
headquarters.
Victor Mosqueda, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed at the Aurora Police Station, testified that at
about 10:00 p.m. of 4 August 1996 he was at Joses house. Ceniza informed him that JUANITO was the suspect in the killing of
GENELYN, and she turned over to him a black rope which belonged to JUANITO. He wanted to interrogate JUANITO, but Ceniza
cautioned him not to proceed with his inquiry because the people around were getting unruly and might hurt JUANITO. Mosqueda
immediately brought JUANITO to the police station, and on that same day, he took the affidavits of the witnesses. The following day,
a complaint was filed against JUANITO.
Presiding Judge Celestino V. Dicon of the Municipal Trial Court of Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, testified that when he arrived
in his office at around 8:30 a.m. of 4 August 1996 several people, including Barangay Captain Ceniza, were already in his courtroom.
He learned that they came to swear to their affidavits before him. After reading the affidavit of Ceniza, he asked Ceniza whether her
statements were true. Ceniza answered in the affirmative and pointed to JUANITO as the culprit. Judge Dicon turned to JUANITO and
asked him whether the charge against him was true. JUANITO replied in the dialect: [N]apanuwayan ko, sir (I was demonized). While
Judge Dicon realized that he should not have asked JUANITO as to the truthfulness of the allegations against him, he felt justified in
doing so because the latter was not under custodial investigation. Judge Dicon thus proceeded to ask JUANITO whether he had a
daughter as old as the victim and whether he was aware of what he had done to GENELYN. Again, JUANITO responded that he was
demonized, and he spontaneously narrated that after he struck GENELYNs head with a stone he dropped her body into the
precipice.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED CONFESSION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO WITNESSES LUZVIMINDA CENIZA AND
JUDGE CELESTINO DICON IS ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE.

HELD:YES. It has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not apply to a spontaneous statement,
not elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits having
committed the crime. Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions made by a suspect in the commission of a crime before he is
placed under investigation. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights
under Section 12 of the Constitution are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused
to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
In the instant case, after he admitted ownership of the black rope and was asked by Ceniza to tell her everything, JUANITO
voluntarily narrated to Ceniza that he raped GENELYN and thereafter threw her body into the ravine. This narration was a
spontaneous answer, freely and voluntarily given in an ordinary manner. It was given before he was arrested or placed under
custody for investigation in connection with the commission of the offense.
It may be stressed further that Cenizas testimony on the facts disclosed to her by JUANITO was confirmed by the findings of Dr.
Lumacad. GENELYNs physical resistance and biting of the right shoulder of JUANITO were proved by the wound on JUANITOs right
shoulder and scratches on different parts of his body. His admission that he raped GENELYN was likewise corroborated by the fresh
lacerations found in GENELYNs vagina.
Moreover, JUANITO did not offer any evidence of improper or ulterior motive on the part of Ceniza, which could have
compelled her to testify falsely against him. Where there is no evidence to show a doubtful reason or improper motive why a
prosecution witness should testify against the accused or falsely implicate him in a crime, the said testimony is trustworthy.
However, there is merit in JUANITOs claim that his constitutional rights during custodial investigation were violated by
Judge Dicon when the latter propounded to him incriminating questions without informing him of his constitutional rights. It is
settled that at the moment the accused voluntarily surrenders to, or is arrested by, the police officers, the custodial investigation is
deemed to have started. So, he could not thenceforth be asked about his complicity in the offense without the assistance of counsel.
Judge Dicons claim that no complaint has yet been filed and that neither was he conducting a preliminary investigation deserves
scant consideration. The fact remains that at that time JUANITO was already under the custody of the police authorities, who had
already taken the statement of the witnesses who were then before Judge Dicon for the administration of their oaths on their
statements.

Confession to Ceniza only!