V.
WHO IMPLEMENTS THE LAW AND RUNS THE and vice-president for the entire nation must remain in
GOVERNMENT? (EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT)
Art. VII – Executive Department
PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT
Article VII, Sections. 2-13
[Section 4]
Macalintal v. COMELEC (2003)
Is Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 in relation to Section 4
of the same Act in contravention of Section 4, Article VII
of the Constitution?
Sec. 18.4 of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003
provides that:
“18.4. ...Immediately upon the completion of the
canvass, the chairman of the Special Board of
Canvassers shall transmit via facsimile, electronic mail,
or any other means of transmission equally safe and
reliable the Certificates of Canvass and the Statements
of Votes to the Commission..”
Indeed, the phrase, proclamation of winning
candidates, in Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too
sweeping that it necessarily includes the proclamation
of the winning candidates for the presidency and the
vice-presidency.
Court ruled that it appears to be repugnant to Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution only insofar as said
Section totally disregarded the authority given to
Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning
candidates for the positions of president and vice-
president.
Thus, it clashes with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII
of the Constitution which provides that the returns of
every election for President and Vice-President shall be
certified by the board of canvassers to Congress.
Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp
a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly
stated by petitioner, to encroach "on the power of
Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice-
president and the power to proclaim the winners for
the said positions." The provisions of the Constitution as
the fundamental law of the land should be read as part
of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and
hence, the canvassing of the votes and the
proclamation of the winning candidates for president
the hands of Congress.
Congressman Lopez v. Senate and House [G.R. No.
163556, June 4, 2004]
Petition for prohibition and mandamus seeking to
nullify Section 13, Rule VIII of the Rules of the Joint
Public Session of Congress, creating a Joint Committee
which shall preliminarily canvass the votes of the
candidates for President and Vice-President during the
May 10, 2004 elections.
Even if the court stated that it has jurisdiction over the
petition as it alleges violations on the Constitution, it
however dismissed the petition as it failed to show that
Congress gravely abused its discretion in creating the
Joint Committee.
Sec. 4 of Art. VII of the Constitution expressly empowers
the Congress to "to promulgate its rules for the
canvassing of the certificates.", citing Arroyo v. De
Venecia and Santiago v. Guingona wherein the Court
ruled that under the doctrine of separation of powers, it
had no power to review or interfere with internal
proceedings of the Congress, unless there is a clear
violation of the Constitution. Thus, the court has no
authority to restrict or limit the exercise of
congressional prerogative granted by the Constitution.
In the case at bar, the creation of the Joint Committee
does not constitute grave abuse and cannot be said to
have deprived petitioner and the other members of
Congress of their congressional prerogatives, because
under the very Rules under attack, the decisions and
final report of the said Committee shall be subject to
the approval of the joint session of both Houses of
Congress, voting separately.
Pimentel v. Joint Canvassing Committee [June 22,
2004]
Senator Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null
and void the continued existence of the Joint
Committee to determine the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminarily
canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-
Presidential candidates in the May 10, 2004 elections
following the adjournment of Congress sine die on June
11, 2004.
According to him, due to the adjournment of regular
sessions of the 12th Congress on 11 June 2004, it already
“passed out of legal existence”. Thus, “all pending
matters and proceedings terminate upon the expiration EDSA I EDSA II
of … Congress.” He relies on the rules of both Houses of involves the exercise of is an exercise of people
Congress. the people power of power of freedom of
revolution which speech and freedom of
The Court ruled that Sen. Pimentel’s argument is overthrew the whole assembly to petition the
contradicted by the very rules which he relies on which government government for redress
clearly provides that the “Senate shall convene in joint of grievances which only
session during any voluntary or compulsory recess to affected the office of the
canvass the votes for President and Vice-President not President
later than thirty days after the day of the elections in EDSA I is extra EDSA II is intra
accordance with Section 4, Article VII of the constitutional and the constitutional and the
Constitution.” legitimacy of the new resignation of the sitting
government that resulted President that it caused
Even though the legislative functions of the Twelfth from it cannot be the and the succession of the
Congress may have come to a close upon the final subject of judicial review Vice President as
adjournment of its regular sessions on June 11, 2004, it President are subject to
this does not affect its non-legislative functions, such as judicial review
that of being the National Board of Canvassers. In fact, presented a political involves legal questions
the joint public session of both Houses of Congress question
convened by express directive of Section 4, Article VII of
A brief discourse on freedom of speech and of the
the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to
freedom of assembly to petition the government for
proclaim the newly elected President and Vice-
redress of grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA
President has not, and cannot, adjourn sine die until it People Power II is not inappropriate.
has accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks.
For only when a board of canvassers has completed its Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not
functions is it rendered functus officio. Its membership political questions. The principal issues for resolution
may change, but it retains its authority as a board until require the proper interpretation of certain provisions
it has accomplished its purposes. in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II,
74 and section 8 75 of Article VII, and the allocation of
Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed its governmental powers under section 11 76 of Article VII.
non-legislative duty to canvass the votes and proclaim The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of
the duly elected President and Vice-President, its presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the
existence as the National Board of Canvassers, as well correct calibration of the right of petitioner against
as that of the Joint Committee to which it referred the prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of
preliminary tasks of authenticating and canvassing the Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine has been laid down
certificates of canvass, has not become functus officio. that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is . . ." Thus,
In sum, despite the adjournment sine die of Congress, respondent's invocation of the doctrine of political
there is no legal impediment to the Joint Committee question is but a foray in the dark.
completing the tasks assigned to it and transmitting its
report for the approval of the joint public session of Should Pres. Estrada be considered resigned as of Jan.
both Houses of Congress, which may reconvene without 20, 2001 when GMA took her oath as the 14 th President
need of call by the President to a special session. of the Republic?

Vacancy situations during the term [Section 8]
Estrada v. Desierto [02 Mar. 2001]
EDSA II cases involved are subject to judicial review.
Legal distinctions between EDSA I and EDSA II:
Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he
suffers from a permanent disability. Hence, he submits
that the office of the President was not vacant when
respondent Arroyo took her oath as President.
The court held that resignation has two elements:
(1) there must be an intent to resign
 (2) the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment.
The validity, according to the Court, is not governed by
any formal requirement. As long as it is clear, it must be
given legal effect.
Using the totality test, by the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on
the issues, the Court ruled that Estrada resigned as
president. His resignation cannot be disputed and he
cannot feign ignorance of this fact.
It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign
but only took a temporary leave of absence due to his
inability to govern.
To say the least, the letter is wrapped in mystery. Under
any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter
cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner.
Petitioner's resignation from the presidency cannot be
the subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will
especially if the resignation is the result of his
repudiation by the people.
WON Estrada is only temporarily unable to act as
president.
Petitioner argues that GMA as VP has no power to
adjudge the inability of the petitioner to discharge the
powers and duties of the presidency. His significant
submittal is that "Congress has the ultimate authority
under the Constitution to determine whether the
President is incapable of performing his functions in the
manner provided for in section 11 of Article VII." Thus,
he is a president on leave and GMA is an acting
president.
Court ruled that both houses of Congress have
recognized respondent Arroyo as the President.
Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that
the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer
temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's
claim of inability.
Moreover, the Court cannot pass upon petitioner's
claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of
the presidency. The question is political in nature and
addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is
a political issue which cannot be decided by this Court
without transgressing the principle of separation of
powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not
resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a
President on leave on the ground that he is merely
unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid
to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent
Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal
branch of government cannot be reviewed by this
Court.
WON Estrada enjoys immunity from suit, whether civil
and criminal.
The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in
character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and
corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these
crimes, especially plunder which carries the death
penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity
of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision of
this Court licensing the President to commit criminal
acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from
liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an
inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and
omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public
officials are not acts of the State and the officer who
acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same
footing as any other trespasser.
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to
appeals to stretch the scope of executive immunity in
our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987
Constitution is that a public office is a public trust. The
constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain
petitioner's claim that a non-sitting president enjoys
immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during
his incumbency.
Prohibitions [Section 13]
Doromal v. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354 (1989)
Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of PCGG,
for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(RA 3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection with his
shareholdings and position as president and director of
the Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC)
which submitted bids to supply P61 million worth of
electronic, electrical, automotive, mechanical and
airconditioning equipment to DECS and the NMYC.
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides
that "the President, Vice-President, the members of the
Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not . . .
during (their) tenure, . . . directly or indirectly . . .
participate in any business." The constitutional ban is
similar to the prohibition in the Civil Service Law (PD No.
807, Sec. 36, subpar. 24) that "pursuit of private
business . . . without the permission required by Civil
Service Rules and Regulations" shall be a ground for
disciplinary action against any officer or employee in the
civil service.
Thus, he "can rightfully be charged . . . with having
participated in a business which act is absolutely
prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the
Constitution" because "the DITC remained a family
corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect
interest."
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA
317 (1991)
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued
Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of the
Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries
to hold other government offices or positions in
addition to their primary positions subject to limitations
set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this
EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The
constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU
on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to
Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:
“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of
the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold
any other office or employment during their tenure.xxx
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution“, the only exceptions
against holding any other office or employment in
Government are those provided in the Constitution,
namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a
Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7;
and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member
of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1),
Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987
Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-
President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or
assistants from holding during their tenure multiple
offices or employment in the government, except in
those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as
above clarified with respect to posts held without
additional compensation in an ex-officio (by virtue of
one’s position or status) capacity as provided by law and
as required by the primary functions of their office, the
citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as
examples during the debate and deliberation on the
general rule laid down for all appointive officials should
be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot
override the constitution’s manifest intent and the
people’s understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in
relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly
restricting the number of positions that Cabinet
members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may
hold in addition to their primary position to not more
than 2 positions in the government and government
corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold
multiple offices or employment in direct contravention
of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless
otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
Bitonio Jr. v. COA, G.R. No. 147392, March 12, 2004
The issue in this case is whether or not the COA correctly
disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for
his attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors' meetings
as representative of the Secretary of Labor.
The Court ruled in the affirmative. Bitonio's presence in
the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of his
capacity as representative of the Secretary of Labor.
There was no separate or special appointment for such
position. Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited from
receiving compensation for his additional office or
employment, such prohibition likewise applies to the
petitioner who sat in the Board only in behalf of the
Secretary of Labor.
We cannot allow Bitonio who sat as representative of
the Secretary of Labor in the PEZA Board to have a
better right than his principal. As the representative of
the Secretary of Labor, the he sat in the Board in the
same capacity as his principal. Whatever laws and rules
the member in the Board is covered, so is the
representative; and whatever prohibitions or
restrictions the member is subjected, the representative
is, likewise, not exempted. Thus, his position as Director
IV of the DOLE which he claims is not covered by the
constitutional prohibition set by the Civil Liberties Union
case is of no moment. He attended the board meetings
by the authority given to him by the Secretary of Labor
to sit as his representative. If it were not for such
designation, the he would not have been in the Board at
all.
Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 (1988)
Beltran contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by
virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit,
she may subsequently have to be a witness for the
prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's
jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat her
privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the
witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible
contempt of court or perjury.
The court explained that the reason for the Presidential
immunity is to assure that his or her duties and
functions are free from any hindrance or distraction,
considering that being the Chief Executive of the
Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the
office-holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
However, only the President may invoke such privilege
and not by any other person in the President’s behalf.
As in the case at bar, Beltran cannot raise the
presidential immunity as a defense to prevent the case
from proceeding against him.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would
prevent the President from waiving such privilege. The
choice rests solely on the President’s prerogative. It is a
decision which cannot be assumed and imposed by any
other person.
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT [Article
VII, Sections 1, 13-23]
Executive Power (Section 1)
Carpio v. Executive Secretary [206 SCRA 290 (1992)]
In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 entitled “AN ACT
ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES” was passed. Antonio Carpio, as a member
of the bar and a defender of the Constitution, assailed
the constitutionality of the said law as he averred that it
only interferes with the control power of the president.
He advances the view that RA 6975 weakened the
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) by limiting its
power “to administrative control” over the PNP thus,
“control” remained with the Department Secretary
under whom both the NPC and the PNP were placed;
that the system of letting local executives choose local
police heads also undermine the power of the
president.
Whether or not the president abdicated its control
power over the PNP and NPC by virtue of RA 6975.
HELD: No. The President has control of all executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential
power of control over the executive branch of
government extends over all executive officers from
Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. Equally well
accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of
the President, is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency”. As the President cannot be expected to
exercise his control powers all at the same time and in
person, he will have to delegate some of them to his
Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment
of a single executive, “all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department,
the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except
in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or law to act in person on the exigencies of
the situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of
the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries
of such departments, performed and promulgated in
the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved
or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the
acts of the Chief Executive.”
Thus, and in short, “the President’s power of control is
directly exercised by him over the members of the
Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the
bureaus and other offices under their respective
jurisdictions in the executive department.”
Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and
the PNP are placed under the reorganized DILG is
merely an administrative realignment that would
bolster a system of coordination and cooperation
among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated
law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies
created under the assailed Act, the funding of the PNP
being in large part subsidized by the national
government.
Marcos v. Manglapus [177 SCRA 668 (1989)]
WON, in the exercise of the powers granted by the
Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses
from returning to the Philippines.
Powers of the President under Art. VII:
(1) the power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices,
(2) the power to execute the laws,
(3) the appointing power,
(4) the powers under the commander-in-chief
clause,
(5) the power to grant reprieves, commutations
and pardons,
(6) the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of Congress,
(7) the power to contract or guarantee foreign
loans,
(8) the power to enter into treaties or international
agreements,
(9) the power to submit the budget to Congress,
and
(10) the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Secs.
14-23]
Consideration of tradition and the development of
presidential power under the different constitutions are
essential for a complete understanding of the extent of
and limitations to the President's powers under the
1987 Constitution. Although the 1987 Constitution
imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of
the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally
considered as within the scope of "executive power."
Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said
to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in
the Constitution. In other words, executive power is
more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
The power involved is the President's residual power to
protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded
on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.
To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the
power of the President but also his duty to do anything
not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the
needs of the nation demand. The President is not only
clothed with extraordinary powers in times of
emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-
to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and
ensuring domestic tranquillity in times when no foreign
foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the
bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of
peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want
of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief
provision.
Thus, it must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
powers of the President which are implicit in and
correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office
to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that
context, such request or demand should submit to the
exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the
President to determine whether it must be granted or
denied.
Pichay Jr. v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary
for Legal Affairs [GR No. 196425, 24 July 2012]
The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize
the Executive Department under Admin Code of 1987.
It vests in the President the continuing authority to
reorganize the offices under him in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency. It sanctions the
following actions undertaken for such purpose:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of
the President Proper, by abolishing, consolidating, or
merging units thereof or transferring functions from
one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the
President to any other Department or Agency; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the
President to any other Department or Agency
Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its
functions to a division specially created within the
ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the
President under his continuing "delegated legislative
authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O.
292.
Moreover, the President's authority to issue E.O. 13 and Saguisag v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 212426, Jan.
constitute the IAD-ODESLA as his fact-finding 12, 2016
investigator cannot be doubted. After all, as Chief
I. BROAD CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT ON THE
Executive, he is granted full control over the Executive
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT: Defense, Foreign
Department to ensure the enforcement of the laws.
Relations, and EDCA
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution provides: A. Prime duty of the State and the
“The President shall have control of all the executive consolidation of executive power in the
departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that President
 Constitution vested vast
the laws be faithfully executed.”
executive powers in the
The obligation to see to it that laws are faithfully President
executed necessitates the corresponding power in the  With its prime duty to serve and
President to conduct investigations into the conduct of protect the people, the
officials and employees in the executive department. government may call upon
people to defend the State, and
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 citizens may be required, under
(1952) conditions provided by law, to
render military or civil service
In 1951, a labor dispute arose between the United B. The duty to protect the territory and
States steel companies and their employees. In 1952, the citizens, the power to call upon the
the employees union gave notice of a nationwide strike. people to defend the State, and the
Thereupon, fearful that such a work stoppage would President as Commander-in-Chief
jeopardize our national defense, President Truman  Power is limited by the
issued an order directing the Secretary of Commerce to Constitution: President may call
take possession of the nation’s steel mills. After obeying out the Armed Forces of the
the orders under protest, the steel companies brought Philippines (AFP) to
prevent/suppress lawless
suit in District Court. The District Court issued a
violence, invasion or rebellion,
temporary restraining order against the government,
but not suspend privilege of
which the Court of Appeals stayed.
writ of habeas corpus of place
Did President Truman have the authority to order the Philippines under martial law
seizure of the steel mills? for more than 60 days
C. The power and duty to conduct foreign
No. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. relations
Justice Hugo Black stated that there was no statute that  President carries the mandate
expressly conferred upon President Truman the power of being the sole organ in
to seize the mills. There are no provisions of the conduct of foreign relation, but
Constitution, or combination of provisions thereof, is qualified by the Constitution
o Sec. 2, Art. II on
which gave the President the authority to take
conduct of war; Sec. 20-
possession of property as he did.
21, Art VII on foreign
The President’s power, if any, to issue an order must loans; Sec. 4(2) & 5(2)
stem from an act of Congress or the United States (a) of Art VIII on judicial
Constitution. review of executive
acts; Sec. 4 & 25 of Art.
In his concurring opinion, J. Jackson said that when the XVIII on treaties and
President takes actions inconsistent with the will of international
Congress, his powers are at their lowest level. Then, he agreements and
can only rely on his own constitutional powers minus presence of foreign
any powers given to Congress on the same matter. military troops, bases or
facilities
 D. The relationship between the 2 major
presidential functions and the role of
the Senate
 Power to defend State and acts
as its representative in
international sphere does not
crystallize into absolute
discretion to craft whatever
instrument the Chief Executive
desires
 Senate has role in ensuring
treaties or international
agreements obtain approval of
⅔ of its members
 Petitioners claim that this
shared role of the President and
Senate is bypassed by EDCA
Whether the President may enter into an executive
agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
3. The President may enter into an executive
1. The role of the President as the executor of the
law includes the duty to defend the State, for
which purpose he may use that power in the
conduct of foreign relations
a. Most important self-executory
constitutional power of the President is
the President’s constitutional duty and
mandate to “ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed”
i. The President can execute the
law without any delegation of
power from the legislature
ii. Manner of the President’s
execution of the law, even if not
expressly granted by the law, is
justified by necessity and
limited only by law, since the
President must “take necessary
and proper steps to carry into
execution the law”
b. It is the President’s prerogative to do
whatever is legal and necessary for
Philippine defense interests
i. It would be repugnant to the
faithful-execution clause of the
Constitution to do nothing
when the call of the moment
requires increasing the
military’s defensive capabilities,
including forging alliances with
states that hold a common
interest with the Philippines
2. The plain meaning of the Constitution prohibits
the entry of foreign military bases, troops or
facilities, except by way of a treaty concurred in
by the Senate - a clear limitation on the
President’s dual role as defender of the State
and as sole authority in foreign relations
a. Despite President’s roles as defender of
the State and sole authority in foreign
relations, the 1987 Constitution
expressly limits his ability in instances
when it involves the entry of foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities
i. Sec. 21, Art. VII: “No treaty or
international agreement shall
be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least ⅔ of all
the Members of the Senate.”
b. Specific limitation is given by Sec. 25,
Art. XVIII Transitory Provisions
agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities, if (a) it is not the instrument that
allows the presence of foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to
implement an existing law or treaty
a. Sec. 25, Art. XVIII: After the expiration in
1991 of the Agreement between the
Republic of the Philippines and the
United States of America concerning
Military Bases, foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities shall not be allowed
in the Philippines except under a treaty
duly concurred in by the Senate and,
when the Congress so requires, ratified
by a majority of the votes cast by the
people in a national referendum held
for that purpose, and recognized as a
treaty by the other contracting State.”
b. The court ruled that the concept of
executive agreement is well-entrenched
in the Court’s pronouncements on the
power of the President. When the Court
validated the concept of “executive
agreement”, it did so with full
knowledge of the Senate’s role in
concurring in treaties.
c. MDT has not been rendered
obsolescent, considering that as late as
2009, the Court recognized its validity
d. A plain textual reading of Sec. 25, Art.
XVIII leads to the conclusion that the
constitutional restriction refers solely to
the initial entry of the foreign military
 bases, troops, or facilities. Once entry is
authorized, the subsequent acts are
therefore subject only to the limitations
provided by the rest of the Constitution
and Philippine law, and not to the Sec.
25 requirement of validity through a
treaty
4. The President may generally enter into
executive agreements subject to limitations
defined by the Constitution and may be in
furtherance of a treaty already concurred in by
the Senate.
 Section 5(2)(a), Article VIII of the
Constitution,
2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal
or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of
any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
 One of the distinguishing features of executive
agreements is that their validity and effectivity
are not affected by a lack of Senate
concurrence.
 The framers specifically deliberated on whether
the general term "international agreement"
included executive agreements, and whether it
was necessary to include an express proviso
that would exclude executive agreements from
the requirement of Senate concurrence.
o Decided that the term "international
agreements" as contemplated in
Section 21, Article VII, does not include
executive agreements, and that a
proviso is no longer needed.
Treaties Executive Agreements
Products of the acts of Solely executive actions
the Executive and the (between heads of
Senate states)
Both types of international agreement are
nevertheless subject to the supremacy of the
Constitution
“No treaty or Not subject to the same
international agreement requirement as that of
shall be valid and treaties. They become
effective unless binding through
concurred in by at least executive action without
two-thirds of all the need of a vote by the
members of the Senate.” Senate or Congress.
Required only when an When an agreement
agreement involves merely implements
changes in PH national already existing treaty
policy, and the obligations, laws or
agreement must policy, an executive
therefore be submitted agreement will suffice.
to the Senate for
ratification
5. The President had the choice to enter into
EDCA by way of an executive agreement or a
treaty.
 No court can tell the President to desist from
choosing an executive agreement over a treaty
to embody an international agreement, unless
the case falls squarely within Article VIII, Section
25.
 Section 9 of Executive Order No. 459, or the
Guidelines in the Negotiation of International
Agreements and its Ratification, thus, correctly
reflected the inherent powers of the President
when it stated that the DFA "shall determine
whether an agreement is an executive
agreement or a treaty."
 The task of the Court is to determine whether
the international agreement is consistent with
the applicable limitations.
6. Executive agreements may cover the matter of
foreign military forces if it merely involves
detail adjustments.
 Respondents carry the burden of proving that it
is a mere implementation of existing laws and
treaties concurred in by the Senate
 EDCA must thus be carefully dissected to
ascertain if it remains within the legal
parameters of a valid executive agreement.
7. EDCA is consistent with the content, purpose,
and framework of the MDT and the VFA
 VFA allowed construction for the benefit of U.S.
forces during their temporary visits.
 the VFA clearly allows the same kind of
equipment, vehicles, vessels, and aircraft to be
brought into the country. Articles VII and VIII of
the VFA contemplates that U.S. equipment,
materials, supplies, and other property are
imported into or acquired in the Philippines by
or on behalf of the U.S. Armed Forces;
 Even if EDCA was borne of military necessity, it
cannot be said to have strayed from the intent
of the VFA since EDCA's combat-related
components are allowed under the treaty.
  Terms and details used by an implementing
agreement need not be found in the mother
treaty. They must be sourced from the authority
derived from the treaty, but are not necessarily
expressed word-for-word in the mother treaty.
 Both the VFA and EDCA ensure Philippine
jurisdiction in all instances contemplated by
both agreements,
In brief, the Court ruled that EDCA is an executive
agreement that is consistent with existing laws and
treaties it purports to implement. The petition was
dismissed.
Power to Appoint and Prohibited Appointments
(Section 16)
Government v. Springer, 50 Phil. 259 (1927)
Does the power to appoint resides solely with the
Executive? YES.
While the Philippine Organic Act does not provide a
general distributing clause, it is clearly deducible that
there is a distribution of powers among the Executive,
Legislative and the Judiciary.
Thus, it is beyond the power of any branch to exercise
its functions in any way other than that provided under
the Organic Law.
The Organic Act vests the supreme executive power in
the GG:
(1) He is given general supervision and
control of all departments and bureaus
of the government
(2) He is also made responsible for the
faithful execution of laws
(3) This was also enunciated in the Admin
Code.
Because of the separation of powers, the legislature has
no authority to execute or construe the law, the
executive has no authority to make or construe the law,
and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the
law.
Can the Senate President as well as the House Speaker
can validly elect the Board Members of NCC? NO. E.O.
No 37 is valid.
In accordance with the doctrine of separation of
powers, the legislature creates the public office but it
has nothing to do with designating the persons to fill
the office. Appointing persons to a public office is
essentially executive. To extend the power of Congress
into allowing it, through the Senate President and the
House Speaker, to appoint members of the NCC is
already an invasion of executive powers.
However, the legislature may appoint persons to fill
public office if they relate to the selection of Secretaries
of Departments, of officers and employees for the
Legislature, and of Resident Commissioners, from which
it would naturally be inferred that no other officers and
employees may be chosen by it.
Bermudez v. Executive Secretary, 213 SCRA 733 (1999)
The validity and legality of the appointment of
respondent Conrado Quiaoit to the post of Provincial
Prosecutor of Tarlac by then President Fidel V. Ramos
was assailed in this petition for review on certiorari on a
pure question of law.
WON the absence of a recommendation of the
Secretary of Justice can be held fatal to the appointment
of respondent Conrado Quiaoit
Revised Administrative Code of 1987: "All provincial and
city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed
by the President upon the recommendation of the
Secretary."
Appointment - to a public office is the unequivocal act
of designating or selecting by one having the authority
therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the
duties and functions of an office or trust; it is deemed
complete once the last act required of the appointing
authority has been complied with and its acceptance
thereafter by the appointee in order to render it
effective; it necessarily calls for an exercise of discretion
on the part of the appointing authority
Therefore, the right of choice is the heart of the power
to appoint. In the exercise of the power of
appointment, discretion is an integral part thereof.
When Sec. 16 or the RAC of 1987 clothes the President
with the power to appoint a subordinate officer, such
conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying
with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. It
should be here pertinent to state that the President is
the head of government whose authority includes the
power of control over all "executive departments,
bureaus and offices.”
The Court ruled that "upon recommendation of the
Secretary”, should be interpreted should be interpreted
to be a mere advise, exhortation or endorsement, which
is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or
obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The
recommendation was nothing really more than advisory
in nature. The President, being the head of the
Executive Department, could very well disregard or do
away with the action of the departments, bureaus or
offices even in the exercise of discretionary authority,
and in so opting, he cannot be said as having acted
beyond the scope of his authority. In the instant case,
the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice and the
appointment of the President were acts of the Executive
Department itself, and there was no sharing of power to
speak of, the latter being merely an extension of the
personality of the President. The petition was denied.
Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, 2 April 2002.
Matibag was appointed by the COMELEC en banc as
“Acting Director IV” of the EID and was reappointed
twice for the same position in a temporary capacity.
Meanwhile, then PGMA also made appointments, ad
interim, of herein respondents Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners,
respectively. Their appointments were renewed thrice
by PGMA, the last one during the pendency of the case,
all due to the failure of the Commission of
Appointments to act upon the confirmation of their
appointments.
Respondent Benipayo, acting on his capacity as
COMELEC Chairman, issued a memorandum removing
petitioner as Acting Director IV and reassigning her to
the Law Department. Petitioner requested for
reconsideration but was denied. Thus, petitioner filed
the instant petition questioning the appointment and
the right to remain in office of herein respondents,
claiming that their ad interim appointments violate the
constitutional provisions on the independence of the
COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary
appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and
members.
Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA
were prohibited under the Constitution
NO. While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC
“shall be independent”, this provision should be
harmonized with the President’s power to extend ad
interim appointments. To hold that the independence
of the COMELEC requires the Commission on
Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees
before the appointees can assume office will negate the
President’s power to make ad interim appointments.
This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to
give meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It
will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of
the Constitution. The original draft of Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution – on the nomination of officers
subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments – did not provide for ad interim
appointments. The original intention of the framers of
the Constitution was to do away with ad interim
appointments because the plan was for Congress to
remain in session throughout the year except for a brief
30-day compulsory recess. However, because of the
need to avoid disruptions in essential government
services, the framers of the Constitution thought it wise
to reinstate the provisions of the 1935 Constitution on
ad interim appointments. Clearly, the reinstatement in
the present Constitution of the ad interim appointing
power of the President was for the purpose of avoiding
interruptions in vital government services that
otherwise would result from prolonged vacancies in
government offices, including the three constitutional
commissions.
Evidently, the exercise by the President in the instant
case of her constitutional power to make ad interim
appointments prevented the occurrence of the very evil
sought to be avoided by the second paragraph of
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. This power to
make ad interim appointments is lodged in the
President to be exercised by her in her sound judgment.
Under the second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of
the Constitution, the President can choose either of two
modes in appointing officials who are subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments:
1) First, while Congress is in session, the
President may nominate the
prospective appointee, and pending
consent of the Commission on
Appointments, the nominee cannot
qualify and assume office.
2) Second, during the recess of Congress,
the President may extend an ad interim
appointment which allows the
appointee to immediately qualify and
assume office.
Whether the President chooses to nominate the
prospective appointee or extend an ad interim
appointment is a matter within the prerogative of the
President because the Constitution grants her that
power. This Court cannot inquire into the propriety of
the choice made by the President in the exercise of her
constitutional power, absent grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on her part,
which has not been shown in the instant case.
In fine, we rule that the ad interim appointments
extended by the President to Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners,
respectively, do not constitute temporary or acting
appointments prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of
the Constitution.
Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA
were temporary in character
An ad interim appointment is a permanent
appointment because it takes effect immediately and
can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the
appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is
subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character.
The Constitution itself makes an ad interim
appointment permanent in character by making it
effective until disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of
Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution provides as follows:
“The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by
the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.”
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective
until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying
that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the
President.
Ad interim appointment Appointment/designation
in temporary or acting
capacity
Permanent and Can be withdrawn or
irrevocable except as revoked at the pleasure
provided by law of the appointing power
Appointee enjoys Appointee does not enjoy
security of tenure any security of tenure, no
matter how briefly
Allowed by virtue of Art. President is prohibited
16 of the Constitution from making under the
Constitution to the
Constitutional
Commissions, COMELEC
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint
permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the
COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason were extended permanent appointments during
the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity. The ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
are expressly allowed by the Constitution which
authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress,
to make appointments that take effect immediately.
De Castro v. JBC; GR No. 191002, March 17,2010
Notes:
Locus standi – As defined by Black is the “right the right
of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”;
it is required that the petitioner must have a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy
Direct injury test – “a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he sustained, or will sustain direct
injury as a result.
EXPN: when the case has transcendental importance
due to far-reaching implications even if the petitioner
does not have personality to file the suit (liberal
approach); enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in
his petition that he is entitled to the Court’s protection
or relief in vindication of a public right.
Taxpayer’s suit - the plaintiff is affected by the
expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but
the mere instrument of the public concern; It is at least
the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere
and see that a public offence be properly pursued and
punished, and that a public grievance be remedied.
Citizen’s suit - he is but the mere instrument of the
public concern; the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to
maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use
of public funds to his injury cannot be denied.
Petitioners in this case have locus standi since the issues
are of transcendental importance to the people as a
whole, regardless of one’s personal interest.
As to justiciability, the Court rules that there is a
justiciable controversy since the JBC already
commenced the proceedings for the selection of the
nominees for the next CJ. It thus makes the situation
ripe for determination.
First. The case of Valenzuela wherein the court ruled
that the prohibition under Sec. 15 of Art. VII (midnight
appointments) extends to Sec. 4(1) of Art. VIII (that the
vacancy should be filled within 90 days from the
occurrence thereof) was revisited by the Court. It ruled
that such interpretation should not be accepted and
that it defeats the intent of the framers to purposely
reflect the organization and arrangement of the
provisions of the Constitution (that is Art. VII is devoted
to the Executive Department and Art. VIII to the Judicial
Department).
Second. Sec. 15, Art. VII does not apply as well to all
other appointments in the Judiciary.
Two kinds of prohibited appointments under Sec. 15:
(1) Those made in two months preceding a
Presidential election;
(2) Midnight appointments
EXPN: making of temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety (thus, only
confined in the Executive Department).
The establishment of JBC and their process of
nomination and screening to candidates ensured that
there will no longer be midnight appointments in the
Judiciary.
Third. According to former Justice Regalado,
"constitutionality of . . . appointments" to the Court of
Appeals in light of the forthcoming presidential
elections. He assured that "on the basis of the
(Constitutional) Commission's records, the election ban
had no application to appointments to the Court of
Appeals.”
Fourth. 23 Secs. Of Art. VII concern the appointing
powers of the President.
Sec. 14 – cannot extend to the Judiciary as temporary or
acting appointments will undermine the independence
of the Judiciary due to their being revocable at will.
Sec. 16 - covers only the presidential appointments that
require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. By virtue of Sec. 9 of Art. VIII, however,
it did not include appointments to the Judiciary.
Funa v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 184740, February
11, 2010
Undersecretary Bautista’s designation as MARINA OIC
falls under the stricter prohibition under Sec. 13, Art. VII
of the Constitution
Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B – “Unless
otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other
office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.”
Sec. 13, Art. VII - prohibition imposed on the President
and his official family is all-embracing, the
disqualification was held to be absolute, as the holding
of "any other office" is not qualified by the phrase "in
the Government”
Sec. 13, Art. VI - prohibiting Senators and Members of
the House of Representatives from holding "any other
office or employment in the Government”
In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay
down the general rule applicable to all elective and
appointive public officials and employees, while Section
13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable
only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
Respondent Bautista being then the appointed
Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered by the
stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and
consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided
in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding
another office is allowed by law or the primary
functions of the position. Neither was she designated
OIC of MARINA in an ex-officio capacity, which is the
exception recognized in Civil Liberties Union.
Facts:
On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista
(Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC)
Bautista was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime
Transport of the department under Special Order No.
2006-171 dated October 23, 2006
On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then
MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista
was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the
Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC
Undersecretary
On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity
as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the
instant petition challenging the constitutionality of
Bautista's appointment/designation, which is proscribed
by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and
assistants to hold any other office or employment
Issues:
Petitioner argues that Bautista's concurrent positions as
DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in violation of
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
He points out that while it was clarified in Civil Liberties
Union that the prohibition does not apply to those...
positions held in ex-officio capacities, the position of
MARINA Administrator is not ex-officio to the post of
DOTC Undersecretary
The fact that Bautista was extended an appointment
naming her as OIC of MARINA shows that she does not
occupy it in an ex-officio capacity since an ex-officio
position does not require any "further warrant or
appoint.
Petitioner further contends that even if Bautista's
appointment or designation as OIC of MARINA was
intended to be merely temporary, still, such designation
must not violate a standing constitutional prohibition
Petitioner likewise asserts the incompatibility between
the posts of DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA
Administrator... respondents submit that the petition
should still be dismissed for being unmeritorious
considering that Bautista's concurrent designation as
MARINA OIC and DOTC Undersecretary was...
constitutional. There was no violation of Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution because respondent
Bautista was merely designated acting head of MARINA
on September 1, 2008. She was designated MARINA
OIC, not appointed MARINA Administrator.
The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not the
designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA,
concurrent with the position of DOTC Undersecretary
for Maritime Transport to which she had been
appointed, violated the constitutional proscription
against dual or multiple... offices for Cabinet Members
and their deputies and assistants.
Ruling: These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions
imposed on the President and his official family, which
prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public
officials or employees such as the Members of
Congress, members of the civil service in general and
members of... the armed forces, are proof of the intent
of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his
official family as a class by itself and to impose upon
said class stricter prohibitions.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil
service are allowed to hold other office or employment
in the government during their tenure when such is
allowed by law or by the primary functions of their
positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and...
assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by
the Constitution itself.
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987
Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants with respect to holding
multiple offices or employment in the government
during... their tenure, the exception to this prohibition
must be read with equal severity. On its face, the
language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that
it must be understood as intended to be a positive and
unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding
multiple... government offices or employment.
Respondent Bautista being then the appointed
Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered by the
stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and
consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided
in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding
another... office is allowed by law or the primary
functions of the position.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The designation
of respondent Ma. Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-
Charge, Office of the Administrator, Maritime Industry
Authority, in a concurrent capacity with her position as
DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is...
hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative
of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and
therefore, NULL and VOID.
Calderon v. Carale, G.R. No. 91636, 23 April 1992.

Citing various jurisprudence, the court deduced the
following doctrines:
1. Confirmation by the CA is required only for
presidential appointees mentioned in the first sentence
of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose
appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution
itself in the president (like sectoral representatives to
Congress and members of the constitutional
commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election).
2. Confirmation is not required when the President
appoints other government officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or
those officers whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the
Commission on Human Rights). Also, as observed in
Mison, when Congress creates inferior offices but omits
to provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an
unconstitutional manner for such appointments, the
officers are considered as among those whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law.
Whether or not Congress may, by law, require
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of
appointments extended by the President to government
officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the
first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution
whose appointments require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
Mison – four kinds of officers which the President may
appoint:
1) the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, officers of
the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested
in him in this Constitution
2) all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law
3) those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint
4) officers lower in rank whose
appointments the Congress may by law
vest in the President alone
As in the case at bar, the NLRC Chairman and
Commissioners fall within the second sentence of
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more
specifically under the "third groups" of appointees
referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom the President may
be authorized by law to appoint. Undeniably, the
Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the
officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16,
Article VII whose appointments requires confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments.
Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC
are not among the officers mentioned in the first
sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose appointments
require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. To the extent that RA 6715 requires
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of
the appointments of respondents Chairman and
Members of the National Labor Relations Commission,
it is unconstitutional because:
1) it amends by legislation, the first
sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution by adding thereto
appointments requiring confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments
2) it amends by legislation the second
sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution, by imposing the
confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments on appointments which
are otherwise entrusted only with the
President
Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. No. 139554, 21 July 2006.
Interpreting Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15
The clear and categorical language of Section 6(b) of PD
15 states that vacancies in the CCP Board shall be filled
by a majority vote of the remaining trustees. Should
only one trustee survive, the vacancies shall be filled by
the surviving trustee acting in consultation with the
ranking officers of the CCP. Should the Board become
entirely vacant, the vacancies shall be filled by the
President of the Philippines acting in consultation with
the same ranking officers of the CCP. Thus, the
remaining trustees, whether one or more, elect their
fellow trustees for a fixed four-year term. On the other
hand, Section 6(c) of PD 15 does not allow trustees to
reelect fellow trustees for more than two consecutive
terms.
Power of Appointment
Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,
the President appoints 3 groups of officers:
1) heads of the Executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in the
President by the Constitution (w/
consent of COA)
2) those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint (w/o
consent of COA)
3) all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise
provided by law (w/o consent of COA);
applied when the law is silent on who is
the appointing power or if the law
authorizing the head of a department,
agency, commission, or board to
appoint is declared unconstitutional.
Last sentence of first par of Sec. 16 provides a fourth
group: “xxxThe Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.xxx”
The present case involves the interpretation of Section
16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution with respect to
the appointment of this fourth group of officers (group
of lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress
may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards)
Thus, if Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is found
unconstitutional, the President shall appoint the
trustees of the CCP Board because the trustees fall
under the third group of officers.
The Scope of the Appointment Power of the Heads of
Departments, Agencies, Commissions, or Boards
The express language of the Constitution and the clear
intent of its framers point to only one conclusion — the
officers whom the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards may appoint must be of lower
rank than those vested by law with the power to
appoint.
In a department in the Executive branch, the head is the
Secretary. The law may not authorize the
Undersecretary, acting as such Undersecretary, to
appoint lower-ranked officers in the Executive
department. In an agency, the power is vested in the
head of the agency for it would be preposterous to vest
it in the agency itself. In a commission, the head is the
chairperson of the commission. In a board, the head is
also the chairperson of the board. In the last three
situations, the law may not also authorize officers other
than the heads of the agency, commission, or board to
appoint lower-ranked officers. Thus, the Constitution
authorizes Congress to vest the power to appoint lower-
ranked officers specifically in the "heads" of the
specified offices, and in no other person.
The head of the CCP is the Chairperson of its Board.
Thus, the Chairman of the CCP Board is the "head" of
the CCP who may be vested by law, under Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, with the power to
appoint lower-ranked officers of the CCP.
President’s Power of Control
Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution gives the presidential
power of control over the Executive branch of
government which extends to all executive employees
from the Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk.
This constitutional power of the President is self-
executing and does not require any implementing law.
Congress cannot limit or curtail the President's power of
control over the Executive branch.
In short, the President sits at the apex of the Executive
branch, and exercises "control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices.”
The CCP is part of the Executive branch. No law can cut
off the President's control over the CCP in the guise of
insulating the CCP from the President's influence. By
stating that the "President shall have control of all the
executive . . . offices," the 1987 Constitution empowers
the President not only to influence but even to control
all offices in the Executive branch, including the CCP.
Control is far greater than, and subsumes, influence.
Luego v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 69137, 5
August 1986.
Is the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove
a permanent appointment on the ground that another
person is better qualified than the appointee and, on
the basis of this finding, ordering his replacement by the
latter?
When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no
choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance
with the Civil Service Laws.

A full reading of the provision under the Civil Service

Decree, will make it clear that all the Commission is
actually allowed to do is check whether or not the
appointee possesses the appropriate civil service
eligibility or the required qualifications. If he does, his
appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved. No
other criterion is permitted by law to be employed by
the Commission when it acts on — or as the Decree
says, "approves" or "disapproves" — an appointment
made by the proper authorities.

In this case, the Commission on Civil Service

acknowledged that both the petitioner and the private
respondent were qualified for the position in
controversy. That recognition alone rendered it functus
officio in the case and prevented it from acting further
thereon except to affirm the validity of the petitioner's
appointment. To be sure, it had no authority to revoke
the said appointment simply because it believed that
the private respondent was better qualified for that
would have constituted an encroachment on the
discretion vested solely in the city mayor.

In preferring the private respondent to the petitioner,

the Commission was probably applying its own Rule V,
Section 9, of Civil Service Rules on Personnel Actions
and Policies, which provides that "whenever there are
two or more employees who are next-in-rank,
preference shall be given to the employee who is most
competent and qualified and who has the appropriate
civil service eligibility." This rule is inapplicable,
however, because neither of the claimants is next in
rank. Moreover, the next-in rank rule is not absolute as
the Civil Service Decree allows vacancies to be filled by
transfer of present employees, reinstatement,
reemployment, or appointment of outsiders who have
the appropriate eligibility.