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May 10, 2010 – BREAKFAST WITH DAVE
Whether this is all sustained will depend on the details of how these facilities will In the final analysis, if the
be operational and who makes the allocations and how they are made. Recall EU lends money to Greece
the initial reaction to the TARP program — shoot first, ask questions later, buy or to any other problem
some time. As the TARP initiation showed, it is one thing to announce a big and country in the zone, debt
bold rescue package, but it is quite another task to have its credibility built and ratios (including
actually initiate the plan with no wrinkles. Good luck. Back then, a huge contingent liabilities) in
immediate relief rally of 11% gave way to a 30% slide to the lows — the bottom the region will only rise
was only turned more than four months later once the kinks were worked out further
and the specifics of the stress tests were announced. Keep this in mind if
anyone decides to extrapolate today’s short-covering rally into the future.
In a sign of how euphoric this manic market has suddenly become today, as it
digests the bailout news, Greek 10-year bonds enjoyed their strongest session
on record, with yields falling 569 basis points, to 6.73%, and with spreads over
German bunds tightening around 350 basis points. Greek 2-year note yields
plunged 1,327bps (you read that correctly) to 4.9%.
Among other Eurozone periphery nations, yields on Spanish 10-year debt fell
48bps, to 3.96%, and Portuguese 10-year government bond yields slid 61bps, to
5.64%. Spreads on Greek CDS plummeted 444bps, to 561bps (CDS spreads on
all periphery sovereign debt receded sharply too).
While global equities are in the green, the Greece ASI 20 stock market index
climbed 11% — stock markets in Spain are up 12% (led by an 18.5% bounce in
financials). And look Ma, no fat fingers (that only happens on down days).
Beyond today’s knee-jerk reaction, there are issues left on the table. The
emergency measures just announced buys some time but should help take
some of the fear and illiquidity out of the market over the near-term. However,
what were not addressed are the intense structural fiscal problems plaguing
much of the Eurozone.
In the final analysis, if the EU lends money to Greece or to any other problem
country in the zone, debt ratios (including contingent liabilities) in the region will
only rise further. It will be interesting to see how the rating agencies end up
handling this. It cannot be lost on them, or the global investment community,
that while loans, guarantees and central bank provisioning can deal effectively
with liquidity issues, they are ineffective in addressing what’s really at stake
here, which are structural fiscal issues. So the deal over the weekend is only
going to be successful insofar as they are backed up by meaningful reforms (it
must be emphasized that the rescue package critically hinges on the Club Med
countries accepting deep budgetary retrenchment notwithstanding their weak
economic structures. Indeed, it will be interesting to see how Spain can manage
to meet EMU deficit requirements at a time when the unemployment rate is
currently at 20%, just as one example.)
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May 10, 2010 – BREAKFAST WITH DAVE
Since the ECB has come out and said that it will buy both government and The threat of default and
corporate bonds, then what is clear is that any rally in the Euro should be faded concerns over the future of
because the lines between fiscal and monetary policy has just become the Euro will not dissipate
blurred. The cost of the ECB helping drive long-term yields in the periphery lower entirely. The region,
is jeopardizing the sanctity of the central bank balance sheet. And, just as the especially the Club Med
Fed has ceased in expanding its balance sheet, the ECB is set to expand its partners, will be in for a
balance sheet, and this is a Euro-negative. Of all the knee-jerk bounces today, long period of extremely
the Euro is the one most vulnerable to reversal. weak economic growth
Although the measures will help mitigate the growing dangers of contagion in
the Euro area, the IMF/EU loans come with a “strong conditionality” with respect
to intense budgetary restraint and structural fiscal reforms. The massive
package of loans and guarantees buys time, but the issue of whether the
austerity package for Greece will be accepted by the public (almost half do not
approve) is still up in the air. Portugal and Spain are in need of credible
packages to cut their deficits. This will exert an enormous fiscal squeeze across
wide swaths of the Eurozone and require a weaker Euro as an antidote.
Against this backdrop, the threat of default and concerns over the future of the
Euro will not dissipate entirely. The region, especially the Club Med partners, will
be in for a long period of extremely weak economic growth. In fact, even with
the weaker currency and the underpinning this should give the Eurozone export
sector — at the expense of the U.S. — we are seeing EU real GDP estimates for
2010 come down right across the board today.
While the U.S. market has been hit by the heightened risk aversion, it has been
far worse overseas — Europe is now down 6.3% for the year. Japan is off 1.7%
for the year too as the Nikkei came off its sharpest weekly side since January
2009 (-6.3%). Asian stocks hit a 10-week low as the Greek problem went global
in terms of declining risk appetite. Canadian equities are highly correlated given
the commodity exposure and have fallen now for five days in a row. But no
market is down as much as Greece — plunging 12.8% last week and down
25.5% for the year.
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May 10, 2010 – BREAKFAST WITH DAVE
The VIX index is up 139% from its low (now at 37.16 versus the low of 15.58 Volatility has come back to
back on April 12, 2010). And on a 20-day percent basis, the VIX index is up the market place — the VIX
130%, not quite a high. The last time we saw such an increase, on a 20-day index is now up 139% from
basis, was back in early October 2008. Actually, in the entire history of the VIX its recent low
index, there were only 16 instances when the VIX surged 100% or more on a 20-
day basis. And, 12 happened after 2008 and prior to 2008, it only happened 4
times. In 2008, there were 10 times when the VIX index rose more than 100%
or more on a 20-day basis and it all happened in October. Now, we have seen
the VIX index surge 100% or more in two days (Thursday and Friday).
All the uncertainty has also cut into capital markets activity — four IPOs were
pulled last week due to the spreading impact of the Greek debt crisis, and only
$2.5 billion of investment-grade corporate bond paper made its way to the
market globally, which was the slowest week since May 1990. We should
probably add that U.S. regulators closed four more banks on Friday, bringing the
tally for the year to 68. A normal recovery indeed.
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May 10, 2010 – BREAKFAST WITH DAVE
WHAT TO BUY?
Thus far, the clear winner in this latest bout of financial turbulence has been
gold, which tacked on a further 1.1% on Friday, to close at $1,210/oz and is
now up over 9% for the year. And, the yellow metal has continued to hit new all-
time highs in Sterling and Euro terms.
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May 10, 2010 – BREAKFAST WITH DAVE
This is not a political backdrop that promises to be very effective at tackling the
U.K.’s deep fiscal challenges ahead — a balance sheet that does not look
altogether that much different than Greece. Remember, the credit rating agencies
made it very clear that for the U.K. to hang on to its AAA rating, any new
government would have to unveil a credible plan to improve its fiscal situation.
The bond market is starting to sniff out some problems here as Gilt-bund yield
spreads have widened out to 112 basis points — the highest since August 1998
when the LTCM fiasco froze up global credit markets. We see on page B6 of the
Saturday NYT that once the myriad of off-balance sheet debts are added to the
U.K. government balance sheet, debt is 150% of GDP (as opposed to the reported
53% figure) and the deficit is 18% (not 12%) — both much higher than Greece, by
the way. Then again, the U.K. has a currency it can devalue — and it too is a short.
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May 10, 2010 – BREAKFAST WITH DAVE
It’s amazing what the government has money for. First it was cash for clunkers.
Then the State governments, who are in fiscal disarray, offer up cash for
appliances, which helped underpin retail sales for the last couple of months.
And, now we see that Washington is set for a new method to spur spending —
cash for caulkers. We should just call it Rebate Nation.
The chart below shows this index of home prices, adjusted for inflation. Relative
to long-term trends, it shows just how overvalued the U.S. housing market was at
its peak in 2006 — prices were 3.5 standard deviations above the long-term
average. Currently, prices are nearly one standard deviation above historical
norms, which suggests in ordet to mean-revert to the long-term average, home
prices need to fall by another 20%.
180
160
120
100
80
-1 standard deviation
60
40
1890 1902 1914 1926 1938 1950 1962 1974 1986 1998 2008
Note: For details of series construction, see” Irrational Exuberance” by Robert Shiller (Page 13, note 3). Q1 2010
estimate by Gluskin Sheff, using latest Case-Shiller home prices index. Source: Robert Shiller, Gluskin Sheff
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May 10, 2010 – BREAKFAST WITH DAVE
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May 10, 2010 – BREAKFAST WITH DAVE
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