1

Jerett Chunn
HIS 400
Dr. Esposito
30 November 2015
United States and China: Mutually Beneficial
The Cold War was a troubling time for every country in the world, but it was especially
unsettling for the three superpowers that controlled the fate of the world. The United States,
China, and the Soviet Union were engaged in a standoff that was tenuous at best and many
people believed that if something did not intervene it would eventually lead to the destruction of
humankind. The world stared on as the United States, Soviet Union, and China tried to alleviate
the tension, but it seemed like nothing was capable of causing any of the big three to back away
from the conflict until a chain of events concerning the relationship between the United States
and China led to a meeting between Mao Zedong and Richard Nixon. These events were a ray of
hope that people believed could alleviate some of the tension that had been brewing in the Cold
War and potentially revise longstanding rhetoric concerning the United States relationship with
China.
Many researchers in this field focus on the relationship between the United States and the
Soviet Union, but the interactions between the United States and China were just as important in
shaping the politics of the Cold War. The potential for a positive relationship between the United
States and China helped to put pressure on the Soviet Union which caused them to be more
agreeable in their dealings with the United States and China. This was important because a

positive relationship between the United States and China threatened the dominance of the
Soviet Union in Asia.1
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the interactions between Henry Kissinger and Zhou Enlai
and to determine how the two countries moved towards normalizing relations. Several questions
must be answered concerning the interactions between the United States and China. Why was
Communist China open to negotiating a more positive relationship with the United States after
having experienced such a rocky relationship previously? What were the roles of Henry
Kissinger and Zhou Enlai in facilitating the progress of normalizing relations between the United
States and China? How did the attitudes about each country change after the efforts of Zhou
Enlai and Henry Kissinger? What benefits did each country receive by advancing the cause of
positive U.S.-Sino relations? Why was it important for the early stages of contact between the
two countries be kept secret in the United States? How did these efforts between the United
States and China affect the Soviet Union? These questions serve as a basis for analyzing why the
United States and China both favored attempting to create a relationship that was less hostile and
potentially more likely to prevent the escalation of a nuclear incident.
The relationship between the Peoples Republic of China and the United States had been
problematic since the end of the Communist Revolution when the Nationalist government fled
mainland China and was replaced by the Peoples Republic of China. Relations between the two
countries were frigid because the United States refused to recognize the legitimacy of the PRC
and continued to support the displaced Nationalist government in Taiwan. This policy, coupled

1 William Burr, Sino-American Relations, 1969: The Sino-Soviet Border War and
Steps Toward Rapprochement, Cold War History Vol. 1, No. 1 (Apr., 2001), 74-75

with isolationist views from both countries, continued to plague the political relationship of the
United States and China into the later stages of the 1960s.2
The Peoples Republic of China started out as a very isolationist nation and stayed that way for
much of its formative years. During the Cultural Revolution, China attempted to avoid the
influence and interaction with other nations. It believed that avoiding the influence of nations
with other philosophies and ideologies would allow the nation to flourish in the communist
system of Mao Zedong. After the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese leadership changed its
viewpoint concerning interaction with other nations. China directed its policy towards one of
peaceful coexistence with other nations. It did not want different ideologies to necessarily mean
they had to be in conflict.3 This change in attitude was important for the forming of relations
with the United States. According to the new Chinese stance, it would not be terrible for China
to attempt to secure relations with the United States because it now lined up with their viewpoint.
Peaceful coexistence was their goal, and working with the United States would contribute to that
immensely.
Neither country was confident in creating a direct line of communication concerning
relations with each other. They worked in an alternate manner concerning the organization of
communication. They would each systematically send messages to each other with the help of
nations that were friendly with both countries. The United States was frequently fond of using

2 William Overholt "President Nixon's Trip to China and Its Consequences," Asian Survey, Vol. 13, No. 7 (Jul.,
1973), 707

3 "Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of Political Affairs, Asia-Oceania, Note, 'State of the Chinese
Question after Canada and Italys Recognition of Beijing and After the UN Discussion'," December 30,
1970, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
France. Obtained by Enrico Fardella and translated by Garret Martin.
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116461

Pakistan as a reliable way to make sure that China was aware of the United States position on
matters and to hint at potential opportunities for better relations.

The United States used

Pakistani leadership to relay their desire for the normalizing of relations to China and also to
communicate that the United States would be enacting gestures of good will such as removing
battleships that were placed in the Taiwan Straits. This was a strong gesture because of how
much friction the presence of American military vessels in the area caused between the two
nations, and by removing this small obstacle, they were hoping to create an opening for
diplomacy.

Although the action was a genuine attempt by the United States to open up

communication, the Chinese leaders thought that it was just going to be an empty gesture from
the United States. The Peoples Republic of China Ambassador argued that the gesture meant
nothing because the United States was still interfering in the area by sending in reconnaissance
missions that were extremely close to Chinese land, and that proved that the United States
gesture of removing battleships from the area was an empty claim.4
One of the main reasons the United States wanted to keep communications with China
secret was because of the effect that it could potentially have on the Soviet Union. Nixon and
Kissingers goal was to make sure that everything they did would cause the Soviets to question
what was going on in the United States. The Nixon administration hoped that the Soviets were
only able to discover that messages were being sent. They wanted the Soviets to wonder what
was being discussed with the Chinese, and that this enigma would cause the Soviet Union to be
more likely to negotiate with the United States. 5 This was an attempt to gain a small edge in
4 Burr, Sino-American Relations, 97.
5 Bill Lattanzi, David G. McCullough, and David Ogden Stiers. Nixon's China game.
[videorecording]. n.p.: [Arlington, VA] : PBS Home Video [distributor], c2000.,
2000. University of Mississippi Libraries Catalog, January 31, 2000.

diplomatic discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union. It shows the fact that
each country was desperate to improve relations between the United States, Soviet Union, and
China.

Anything that could potentially create a better stance for the United States was

considered, and small efforts such as keeping communications between the United States and
China secret were implemented in the hopes that the Soviet Union would react favorably towards
the United States.
One of the largest factors concerning rapprochement was the Sino-Soviet border
conflicts. The relationship between the Peoples Republic of China and the Soviet Union had
been deteriorating for years, and it finally came to a head on March 2, 1969. A unit of the
Peoples Liberation Army encountered a Soviet unit and confronted them directly. This was
based on border conflicts that China and the Soviet Union had been experiencing. The Soviets
had been expanding its position in conflicted border regions for some time, and Mao decided to
cut off the expansion of the Soviets by preventing them from expanding further towards the
Chinese. Both nations were vying for control of the border, and China decided to take action
into its own hands and defend its border on Zhenbao Island.6 This incident led to sporadic
fighting between the two nations deep into the summer of 1969. The world was concerned that
this could lead to a serious response from the Soviet Union. The Chinese considered the fact that
these skirmishes could escalate to the Soviets destroying the nuclear capability of the Chinese
and lead to an all out war with the Soviet Union. It was a very tense time for the Chinese and
Soviet Union alike.7

6 Kuisong Yang "The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to SinoAmerican Rapprochement," Cold War History, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Aug. 2000), pp. 3-28
7 Burr, Sino-American Relations, 80-81

The United States did not know how to respond to the Sino-Soviet border conflict. They
were not sure which country had initially caused the altercations, and reports from the Chinese
stated that it could have been either side. Initially the Nixon Administration believed that the
Soviet Union was the aggressor because of several visits from Anatoly Dobrynin. He was
insistent that Henry Kissinger and the Nixon Administration know the Soviet side of the incident,
which caused the United States to think that they were responsible and trying to sway the United
States opinion. This belief caused the United States to launch an investigation on the incident,
which proved initial assumptions false. 8 The CIA was eventually able to ascertain that it was
most likely the Chinese that had initiated the conflict, and that Beijing wanted it to occur in a
place where they believed that they had the strongest border claim. The United States did not
believe that either side wanted the incident to escalate into a large-scale war, and it believed that
the Chinese were simply trying to stymie the progression of the Soviets into important but
contested border areas such as the Xinjiang Province. The Soviets attempted to contact the
Chinese during this time, but the Chinese that controlled the communication lines refused to
connect the Soviet leaders with the Chinese leaders. This action by the Soviets shows that they
had no intention of escalating the Sino-Soviet border conflicts into a large conflict with China.
They were most likely defending the expansion that they had made into the contested border
region. Although neither side really wanted to escalate the conflict, it was a very tense situation
and both sides prepared for the worse. Troop placements on the border locations were heavily
increased by both sides.9 The Soviets began communicating with other nations about how their

8 Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: The Penguin Press, 2011), 217
9 Burr, Sino-American Relations, 82-83

governments would react to a Soviet preemptive strike on Chinese nuclear installations, which
the Chinese were hinting towards the United States in the hopes of improving relations.
The Sino-Soviet border conflict was responsible for some of the first signals by the United States
and China of the desire for relations. The Chinese did small things such as letting detained
Americans leave China, while the United States lifted small trade restrictions centered on China.
These actions were easy to deny by either government, but both parties were clearly sending
signals to one another that the long-standing diplomatic policies were in need of change because
of the threat of the Soviet Union. 10
The first potential opportunity for the advancement of the political relationship between the
United States and China was during a ping-pong tournament that was located in Nagoya, Japan.
This event would be dubbed as Ping Pong Diplomacy. On April 10, 1971, the United States table
tennis team was competing in a tournament that Japan was hosting. The Chinese table tennis
team was also in attendance, but it was not by accident. Many officials had debated whether or
not the Chinese table tennis team should compete. Zhou Enlai was a staunch supporter of the
Chinese table tennis team attending the tournament in Nagoya, Japan, but the Foreign Ministry
and State Physical Culture and Sports Commission were against the proposal because they did
not feel that it would positively advance the Chinese position with the United States. Zhou Enlai
appealed the recommendation to Mao Zedong, and he agreed with Zhou. They believed that the
Chinese team would be in a favorable position to potentially open up relations with the United
States in an event that portrayed the Chinese in a favorable light. The Chinese were adept in the
sport of table tennis, so they believed that by initiating contact with the United States team they
would appear in a superior situation on a national scale. They would be able to communicate
10 Kissinger, On China, 217

with the United States through a medium in which both countries were equal. On this particular
trip, the main goal of the Chinese table tennis team was to be charming and friendly, and that
they should put winning the event on the backburner in favor of potentially convincing the
United States team that they were personable and people just like the players on the American
team.11 Zhou believed that this sporting event could spark a chain of events that could gain
China valuable ground concerning their position with the Soviets.
Positive interactions between the United States and Chinese table tennis teams led to the Chinese
government officially inviting the United States team to China. Zhou also strongly supported
this move, but he again met resistance from the Foreign Ministry and State Physical Culture and
Sports Commission. He followed the same route and appealed to Mao Zedong and was greeted
with success. Mao approved the United States teams visit on April 7, 1971 in spite of the
disagreements of the Foreign Ministry. Mao and Zhou truly believed that this was a positive
path that would benefit China in diplomacy talks with the United States. Xia quoted Zhou in his
paper stating, This [visit] offers a very good opportunity to open relations between China and
the United States. In our handling of this matter, we must treat it as an important event and
understand that its significance is much greater in politics than in sports. 12 After the United
States team visited China and competed with the Chinese, Zhou made a speech to the teams
praising the work that they had done concerning global politics. He said that they had changed
the political course of the United States and China in a drastically positive way.13

11 Yafeng Xia "Chinas Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement, January 1969February 1972," Journal
of Cold War Studies, Vol. 8, No. 4 (2006), pp. 13

12 Xia "Chinas Elite Politics, 14

13 Xia,"Chinas Elite Politics, 16

The actions that Zhou Enlai took in preparation for the Nagoya, Japan tournament proves that he
was dedicated to improving Chinas stance in the world through repeated attempts at improving
relations with the United States. He believed the future of China depended on normalizing
relations with the United States, so he put great emphasis on the diplomatic importance of the
trip that the Chinese team was taking. It seems like he was planning far ahead in preparation to
make a move that would solidify Chinas position in the triangular relations between the United
States and Soviet Union.
The momentous impact of ping-pong diplomacy created an opening that China and the
United States used to expedite the planning of meetings between the two countries. Within two
weeks of the United States table tennis teams visit to China, Zhou Enlai had sent notification to
the United States leadership formally inviting President Richard Nixon to visit China. Both
countries thought that it would be best if a representative was sent to China first to discuss the
potential meeting between Richard Nixon and Mao Zedong. By setting up this preliminary
meeting, the United States kept both sides from expecting a certain outcome from a formal visit
by President Nixon. This discussion allowed the United States and China to both know what to
expect from a presidential visit so that neither country would expect something that was not
going to happen.14
The quickness that was applied to communication between the United States and China shows a
mutual interest in the progression of normalizing relations that both sides had been hinting at
indirectly over the course of the previous few years. They were both eager to jump at the chance
of better relations, and the advent of ping-pong diplomacy allowed both sides to promote
discussions without it seeming like either side was being soft on the policies of the other country.
14 Xia "Chinas Elite Politics, 17

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It was the perfect storm of indirect cooperation that allowed both nations to get what they
wanted without losing face in global politics. It took courage from the leadership of both sides to
be that quick with action, but both sides believed that it was worth the risk to improve relations
and move into a better position concerning the Soviets. By moving closer to one another, it put
the Soviets in a precarious position and put pressure on them to be a little more flexible
concerning policies towards the United States and China.15
Ping-pong diplomacy was not the only reason that the United States was more confident in
pursuing Sino-American rapprochement. Many of the leaders in the State Department in the
United States believed that years of repression and bad policies had left the Peoples Republic of
China in such disarray that it would not be able to threaten the United States. The Chinese were
viewed as irrational and the leaders believed that they were incapable of predicting what the
Chinese would do with their nuclear power. In previous years the Chinese had informed other
countries that they were not afraid to use the nuclear weapons that they had acquired. They were
willing to do what they felt was necessary regardless of the consequences to their own nation.
This was something that the United States was concerned about because if they could not predict
what the Chinese would do, it could lead to a disastrous event for the United States. These
opinions about China led to the Nixon Administration believing that it was important to forge
relations with the Chinese because they were so unpredictable and therefore dangerous. They
were not very strong in terms of nuclear power, but their unpredictable nature left the United
States uneasy having the Chinese as enemies. It would be better for both parties if they were
able to come to some sort of diplomatic agreement.16
15 Burr, Sino-American Relations, 103
16 Burr, Sino-American Relations, 77

11

The Chinese viewed the United States as a much smaller threat than the Soviet Union. Many of
the leaders in the Chinese government believed that the United States would never allow for a
direct war between the Soviet Union and China because it might allow the Soviets to gain so
much ground and territory that the United States would never be able to compete with an even
larger Soviet power. This assumption influenced the opinions of many of the leaders in the
Chinese government.

They believed that the conflict with the United States was not as

threatening as the problems that the Chinese were facing from the Soviet Union. The Chinese
believed that they were facing a direct war with the Soviet Union so it made sense for them to
seek to increase the likelihood of the United States leaning towards supporting Beijing in any
large-scale conflict that could arise.17 Warner quoted Nixon by writing, It was against our
interest to let China be smashed in a Sino-Soviet war. 18 This statement by Nixon corroborates
the opinions of the Chinese government and proves that both the United States and China were
on the same page when it came to the possibility of a Sino-Soviet conflict escalating to a largescale war.
Secrecy was very important for the United States concerning Henry Kissingers first visit to
China. If Richard Nixon had attempted make a planned public trip then there would have been a
lot of political complications. They would have had to consider all possible ramifications
concerning all of the foreign interests of the United States such as the government in Taiwan,
which was still the Chinese government that the United States officially supported. By sending
Kissinger in secret, Nixon was able to skirt all of these official requirements so that he could feel

17 Burr, Sino-American Relations, 95.

18 Geoffrey Warner, Nixon, Kissinger, and the Rapprochement with China 19691972, International Affairs Vol. 83, No. 4 (Jul., 2007), 764.

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out the intentions of the Chinese before he brought any official policy change to the rest of the
political leaders in the United States.19
For Kissinger to make it to China without the rest of the world knowing about Nixons plans, it
was important that a scheme was in place to throw off suspicion among the people traveling with
him. Kissinger was officially sent on a fact finding mission throughout several countries in Asia.
Kissinger stated, The dramatic denouement required us to go through tiring stops at each city
designed to be so boringly matter-of-fact that the media would stop tracking our movements. 20
When Kissinger finally broke away from the main trip by pretending to be ill, the only people
that knew his actual destination were Nixon and Colonel Alexander Haig. He snuck away from
the rest of the group so that he could meet with the Chinese in secrecy.
Nixon firmly believed in the necessity to exclude the State Department in the infant stages of
diplomacy with China.

He thought that they would bog down the progress and make it

impossible for communication and decisions about China to be made in a timely manner. The
trip that Kissinger was making would have had to go through multiple channels. It would not
have gone as smoothly as it did if Nixon and Kissinger had been open with the rest of the
government about their actions. This decision allowed the United States to plan for Nixon
visiting China without directly risking the integrity of the United States in international politics.
If things did not go the way that Nixon and Kissinger wanted them to go at the meeting they
could walk away from the talks without losing credibility elsewhere.21

19 Kissinger, On China , 236.

20 Kissinger, On China, 236.
21 Lattanzi, Nixons China Game, January 31, 2000

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When he arrived in China, Kissinger was met with a nonchalant attitude that was not expected.
The diplomats from the Peoples Republic of China were far too relaxed for the momentous
occasion that was unfolding around them. Kissingers Memoirs state that the Chinese were in no
hurry to discuss the finer details of a presidential visit, and in fact had several scheduled events
that directly conflicted with the entire reason that he was visiting China. He was only able to
visit Beijing for forty-eight hours and these distractions were very unsettling for Kissinger.22
Although Kissinger and his team were unsettled by the aloofness of the Chinese ambassadorial
team, they were impressed by the amount of respect that they were given. Kissinger, in a world
viewpoint, was not a very high ranking diplomatic agent. At this time, Kissinger was still
National Security Advisor. This rank did not equal that of Premier Zhou Enlai, which many
would consider much higher than Kissinger. Custom dictated that a diplomat from one country
would be received by a diplomat that could be considered of equal rank. This custom was not
followed in Kissingers first visit to Beijing. Kissinger and his team were to wait on the arrival
of Zhou Enlai, and that was a great honor when it came to international politics. Zhou was
approximately three ranks higher than Kissinger, but he still was the first diplomat to officially
greet Kissinger.23
This type of engagement can be interpreted as a sign that China was very eager to improve its
relationship with the United States. It does not seem wise for Zhou Enlai to greet a foreign
diplomat that was so much lower in status than him personally unless it was vitally important for
the meeting to go as Zhou had been planning all along. This direct overreach of diplomatic rank
is a strong sign that the Chinese, especially Zhou Enlai himself, felt that this meeting would hold
22 Kissinger, On China, 238.
23 Kissinger, On China, 239.

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strong influence on the future of diplomatic relations between the two world superpowers. If
Zhou had sent anyone else it is possible that the meeting could have gone awry and the
painstaking work that Zhou had put into organizing the meeting would have been wasted and
China would not have benefited in any way.
Both Kissinger and Zhou realized the importance of the meeting that they had both
worked tirelessly to make a possibility. Neither of the wanted to leave this first encounter
without improving relations, but they both realized that they were confronting a difficult
situation. Kissinger stated, Confrontation made no sense for either side; that is why we were in
BeijingNeither side could afford failure. Each side knew the stakes. 24

Both parties knew

what they were attempting to accomplish, and failure by either side would set back a
rapprochement for years. This was an outcome that was to be avoided by both sides if at all
possible.
The first meeting between Henry Kissinger and Zhou Enlai came on July 9, 1971. According to
Warner one of the most important distinctions made during this first meeting between Kissinger
and Zhou was the change in the United States attitude toward Communist states and their place
in the world. Warner quoted Kissinger stating:
Secretary Dulles believed that it was Americas mission to fight communism all around
the world and for the US to be the principal force, to engage itself in every struggle at
every point of the world at any time . We do not deal with communism in the abstract,
but with specific communist states on the basis of their specific action toward us, and not
as an abstract crusade.25
This is an important statement in the meetings between the two nations. Essentially Kissinger is
acknowledging the fact that the Peoples Republic of China is not going to collapse and the
24 Kissinger, On China, 240.
25 Warner, Nixon, Kissinger, and the Rapprochement, 769.

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United States no longer feels like it is their responsibility to go and fight for the extinction of the
communist nations that are currently dominating their sectors of the world. Kissinger is stating
that the United States can peacefully coexist with China and that there is no reason for the two
countries to experience conflict just because of a difference in ideology. The change from the
persecution of a nation based on ideology to one where each nation is judged by its actions is a
definitive turning point for Sino-American relations and this is evidence of Kissinger relaying
these issues to Zhou Enlai.
Kissinger was concerned about his first visit to Beijing because it was so different from other
diplomatic meetings that he had experienced. Most of the time there are small issues that can be
used to begin negotiation procedures and discussions. Since the two nations had virtually cut ties
for two decades the only issues that were open to begin discussion were the status of Taiwan and
the Vietnam War. This left Kissinger in a tough position because he had to remain strong in the
United States convictions about both issues without cutting off the possibility of an agreement
being made with China. Kissinger felt as if it was a tight rope that they would have to walk so
that if they faltered to either side the entire meeting would collapse and success would elude both
nations.26 Zhou was the first to make headway in making a discussion possible. Normally the
Chinese insisted on resolving the Taiwan issue before anything else could be discussed, but this
time Zhou Enlai allowed for Kissinger to bring up other topics concerning Indochina. Zhou did
this because the United States believed that the two large issues that needed to be resolved were
linked and needed to be discussed together. According to Kissinger, It would be impossible to
approach the topic of Taiwan without taking into consideration the Vietnam War. Kissinger fully
believed that for the United States to discuss one of the two issues it had to discuss the Vietnam
26 Kissinger, On China , 248.

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War first. This decision by the Chinese to allow another topic to be discussed before the Taiwan
issue was momentous.

Previously the two nations would have immediately butted heads

concerning Taiwan, but the flexibility of the Chinese allowed the talks to progress without either
side giving up too much ground on such an important topic. Kissinger was concerned whether
the meeting would end without beginning because of this issue, but both nations were capable of
putting Taiwan on the backburner long enough to begin the discussions concerning Nixons visit
to China and the normalization of relations. This allowed the meeting to progress further than
previous attempts that ended before they began. The United States was allowed to approach the
topic without coming to a decision about Taiwan first.27
One area that Kissinger and Zhou disagreed about was the position of United States troops in
Asia. The war in Vietnam was continuing and Kissinger made it clear that any withdrawal of
troops in Vietnam would be determined by the outcome of the war. These troops were needed in
the Indochina war, and without resolution to that the United States would not remove them. This
statement was important to Kissinger because it established that the United States would not
consider resolving troop placement issues without first having the Indochina War come to a
close.28
The withdrawal of any troops not involved in the Vietnam War would depend on the
resolution of a One China policy. Kissinger stated that the United States position was that it
would be fine with any peaceful solution as long as both Political entities, the PRC and Taiwan,
came to the decision on their own. Officially it did not matter to the United States which
government was in charge as long as the resolution was peaceful and no one was forced into any
27 Kissinger, On China, 248.
28 Kissinger, On China, 249.

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agreement against their will. Zhous response was one of reassurance that the Peoples Republic
of China would do everything that it could to make sure that any resolution with Taiwan would
be peaceful if possible.29 The admonition that the United States had no problem with the ideology
of China was one of the key advancements made in this first encounter between Kissinger and
Zhou. The interactions between Kissinger and Zhou concerning Taiwan were less fruitful than
the United States had hoped for. They essentially both stated that they would not easily give up
on the situation in Taiwan, and it remained the looming issue that would be a hindrance to
possible relations between the two nations. The discussion on Taiwan was one topic on the
forefront of Kissinger and Nixons minds while planning the Presidential visit to China.
The Peoples Republic of China took an interesting stance concerning the Vietnam War.
The statements and actions by Zhou concerning the Vietnam War were very similar to the way
that Kissinger approached the topic of Taiwan. Zhou stated that the Chinese had deep concerns
for Vietnam, but that they did not owe the country anything. They were no longer the entity that
was so heavily involved in Vietnam. Zhou said, The debt we owe them was incurred by our
ancestors. We have since liberation no responsibility because we overthrew the olds system. Yet
we still feel a deep and full sympathy for them. 30 On the first day of discussions during
Kissingers presentation, Zhou and the other Chinese officials did not pressure or condemn the
things that Kissinger was introducing about the Vietnam War. They knew that this was an
important subject for the United States, and by not condemning the actions of the United States
there was a higher chance that the meeting would end with success. They did not condemn the
actions of the United States morally or in any aggressive fashion. The Chinese left the issue of
29Warner, Nixon, Kissinger, and the Rapprochement, 770
30 Kissinger, On China, 250.

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Vietnam in a similar state as the United States left the Taiwan issue. They were not in a hurry to
resolve anything concerning the Vietnam issue, and they avoided any hard decisions. These
hints were the Chinese leaders attempt at conveying the fact that they would not become
involved militarily or interfere with the United States position diplomatically.
The initiation of a visit from President Nixon in China was such a daunting task that Zhou and
Kissinger debated on how the formal invitation should be extended. Neither side wanted it to
seem like they were the ones initiating the visit, and this caused quite a problem on drafting an
official document. After spending the entire time meeting with one another, Zhou and Kissinger
avoided bringing the subject up outright. Each had both alluded to the possibility, but neither
one said anything directly for fear of being portrayed as the party that asked the other for a visit.
They danced around the topic for the entire meeting until Zhou finally approached the topic
directly. He asked Kissinger how he thought that the announcement of the visit should be
handled, and Kissinger responded by pretending that he did not know what visit the Premier was
talking about. Zhou continued to discuss the procedure for announcing the visit without delay,
and once Zhou continued to plan for the visit Kissinger finally began making suggestions on how
it should be handled for the Americans.31
Both parties feared that if they were the group that was seen as more eager to initiate a visit by
President Nixon, then they would appear beneath the other group. Zhou and Kissinger were
finally able to decide on a wording for the invitation that satisfied both nations. The wording
that was chosen was in which Zhou, knowing of President Nixons expressed desire to visit the

31 Kissinger, On China, 254.

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Peoples Republic of China extended an invitation which Nixon had then accepted with
pleasure.32
After several days in Beijing navigating through very tense topic with Zhou and other Chinese
officials, Kissinger was able to head back towards the United States with the knowledge that his
secret mission had been successful, and the course of relations between the United States and
China had forever been altered. Whether or not his actions led to an improvement in relations,
he was satisfied in knowing that he had done what he could to put the United States in a better
position concerning China and the Soviet Union. The discussions and decisions made in Beijing
on July 9-11, 1971 by Henry Kissinger and Zhou Enlai changed the face of the relationship
between the two countries. The rest of the world was shocked at the possibility that two longstanding adversaries were working closely together to thaw a relationship that had been wrought
with problems since the communist government came to power.

The announcement of

Kissingers activity in China and the announcement of a presidential visit caused a sensation in
the United States.

33

One could argue that the work that Kissinger and Zhou did during this secret meeting was more
important than the actual Presidential visit itself. Without the compromise that both individuals
were willing to consider, it is highly likely that China and the United States would not have been
able to come to an agreement on the terms of a visit from Richard Nixon. It was beneficial for
both nations, but it was possible for the distrust between the two countries to keep them from
improving relations and each ones standing concerning the Soviet Union. This meeting was also

32 Kissinger, On China, 255.

33 Lattanzi, Nixons China Game, January 31, 2000

20

a problem for the Soviet Union. On February 7, 1972 Tolstikov gave a speech to friendly
diplomats concerning Nixons visit to Beijing. He said,
Existing ideological and political differences prove that currently there can be no
negotiations between the U.S. and the PRC which would consist of a positive
contribution towards peace and dtente. This means, that the forthcoming dialogue
between Nixon and Beijing desires to achieve goals representing the interests of one or
the other side. Taking into account that one side is an imperialist power, the enemy of
peoples fighting for their freedom and independence, and the other side holds antisocialist and dividing positions. Therefore the plot China-USA will mainly be at the
expense of the Soviet Union, the socialist countries, and the countries of Indochina and
whole Southeast Asia.34
This quote represents the viewpoint of the Soviet Union. They believed that the two
countries would not normalize relations, but this action would be bad for all socialist countries in
the world. The Soviets did not believe that the United States and China could overcome the
fundamental differences in ideological viewpoint and form a realistic relationship.

They

believed that one side would come out on top in the discussions and the rest of the socialist world
would suffer because of what was happening in Beijing. Tolstikovs speech represents the
nervousness of the Soviet Union that the United States and China were expecting from their
discussions. If the Soviet Union believes that the whole socialist world will suffer because of
what is happening in Beijing, then they would most likely be more open to discussion and
flexible in their foreign policy decisions. This was one of the main goals of normalizing
relations between China and the United States and predominantly why the two countries were
working together at all. The United States and China no longer viewed each other as the most

34 "Lecture by Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov for Friendly Diplomats on Forthcoming

Nixon Visit," February 07, 1972, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive,
Obtained for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer and translated for CWIHP by Karen Riechert.
Included in the document reader for the international conference "China and the
Warsaw Pact in the 1970-1980s" held by CWHIP and the Parallel History Project
March 2004 in Beijing. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114829

21

dangerous foe in the world. That honor had been shifted to the Soviet Union for both the United
States and China.35
President Nixons visit to China was a tense but exciting event for citizens from the
United States and China alike. For several years the Chinese government had been softening the
Chinese people on the general view of American society. When Nixon arrived in China, he was
not met with the kind of reception that he was expecting from the Chinese. It was a simple
gathering and he was greeted by Zhou Enlai while a Chinese band played the star spangled
banner. No Chinese were on the streets and his entrance did not gain the attention that was
expected as his motorcade made its way to meet with Mao Zedong. This issue was actually
addressed by the Chinese. They were cautious about what would happen if the biggest enemy of
Vietnam was cheered as he entered China. They did not want to offend the Vietnamese leaders
so they kept the celebration to a minimum on Nixons arrival. They attempted to make up for
this slight by introducing Nixon to Mao within the first few hours after his arrival. This was an
attempt by the Chinese to show respect to Nixon while still trying to prevent the alienation of the
Vietnam leaders.
Even though a lot of headway had been made with Kissingers secret visit to Beijing, some
details of the communiqu that Zhou and Kissinger had worked on had not been finalized, so
there was still time for things to go south in the discussions between the United States and China.
The main topic that was still in the air was the Taiwan predicament. Neither side had agreed on a
solution to the topic, so Kissinger was concerned about what would happen during the
presidents visit. During the first meeting between Nixon and Mao, they were able to discuss
issues while still disagreeing in some areas. The atmosphere that was created during this
35 Burr, Sino-American Relations, 96.

22

meeting was one of a relaxed nature with serious overtones. It was an important meeting, but
neither side was very persistent in pursuing their goals. Nixon said:
It also should be saidlooking at the two great powers, the United States and Chinawe
know China doesn't threaten the territory of the United States; I think you know the
United States has no territorial designs on China. We know China doesn't want to
dominate the United States. We believe you too realize the United States doesn't want to
dominate the world. Alsomaybe you don't believe this, but I doneither China nor the
United States, both great nations, want to dominate the world. Because our attitudes are
the same on these two issues, we dont threaten each others territories.36
This quote is an excellent example of the attitudes of both sides of the discussion during
Nixon and Maos first conversation. They were just getting to know one another and feel each
other out. They were talking like two people who had just been introduced by a mutual friend. It
was not at all the serious and tense discussion that one would assume takes place between two
leaders of powerful nations that had been in direct disagreement for decades. Nixon and Mao
realized that a discussion between the United States and China would be mutually beneficial, and
petty squabbling would not get the job done. Mao was very receptive of Nixon and the idea that
they should be discussing the issues, whether a solution was found or not. Mao stated, But
perhaps you as an individual may not be among those to be overthrown. They say that he (Dr.
Kissinger) is also among those not to be overthrown personally. And if all of you are overthrown
we wouldn't have any more friends left. 37 This quote refers to President Nixon has worked hard
in building up and improving relations with the Peoples Republic of China and should not be
removed from power in the United States. Mao recognized the fact that Nixon was trying to
work with him to better the United States and China. This was important because all of the
36 "Memorandum of Conversation between Chairman Mao Zedong and President Richard
Nixon," February 21, 1972, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Gerald R. Ford
Presidential Library, National Security Adviser Trip Briefing Books and Cables for President
Ford, 1974-1976 (Box 19). http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118064

37 Memorandum of Conversation, February 21, 1972.

23

rhetoric coming from Mao before this was against previous presidents of the United States. Mao
even condemned Truman and Johnson in this particular conversation, but acknowledged that
Nixon was different.
The meetings between Nixon and Mao continued during the week that he was visiting in
China. They were able to come to an agreement on policy and issued the Shanghai Communiqu
detailing the United States and Chinas position concerning each other. The first part of the
communiqu reaffirms Chinas stance on Taiwan. China believed that Taiwan was a province of
China and that it was an internal affair that China should handle on its own. It denounced any
policy of other nations that advocated a One China, One Taiwan, Two Chinas, or an
independent Taiwan.38
The United States was vaguer on their policy towards Taiwan in the Shanghai
Communiqu. They reaffirmed that the United States also prescribed to the One China policy,
and that all they wanted was a peaceful resolution of the situation. The United States also
claimed that it would gradually reduce its military presence in Taiwan.

This is the most

important section of the communiqu because of how the United States worded their policy.
They left themselves with plenty of room to wiggle and avoid complying with the agreement set
forth in the communiqu. Without a definitive timetable for withdrawal the United States would
essentially be able to continue to have a military presence in Taiwan, which is not what the
Chinese wanted from the United States.

This particular policy is what hindered the full

normalization of relations between the United States and China for years. If the United States

38 "Joint Communiqu between the United States and China," February 27, 1972,
History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Nixon Presidential Library and
Museum, Staff Member Office Files (SMOF), President's Personal Files (PPF), Box 73.
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121325

24

had a definitive timetable for the withdrawal of military presence in Taiwan, it is possible that
relations between both countries would have been normalized much sooner than they actually
were.39
Many events led to the possibility of the United States and China creating a better
relationship with one another. The results of Nixons visit to China changed the course of SinoAmerican relations for the better. The Joint Communiqu of 1972 in Shanghai outlined the
benefits that the United States and China would experience because of the efforts of Zhou Enlai
and Henry Kissinger. The United States and China were going to have concrete communication
from this point on. This was a huge step towards improving relations because they no longer had
to communicate through slow channels. They could now send diplomats back and forth and
communicate like nations normally do. This was a huge step for the United States and China
considering just one year before it would have been unthinkable for the two countries to have
diplomats be able to travel between the two countries so easily. Relations between the United
States and China had a long way to go, but open communication was a large step in the right
direction.
The purpose of this paper was to analyze the events that led up to Nixons first visit to
China. Henry Kissinger and Zhou Enlai put forth a lot of effort to make sure that the two nations
were capable of meeting and discussing the things that divided them. Several factors contributed
to the fact that China was willing to participate in discussion with the United States such as a
fundamental change in foreign policy, the Sino-Soviet Border conflicts, and a general belief that
the United States was no longer the largest enemy to China. The United States seized an

39 Joint Communiqu, February 27, 1972.

25

opportunity to undermine the Soviet Union by instructing Henry Kissinger to work so closely
with the Chinese in improving relations.
This paper clearly cites evidence that the organization of Nixons visit and relations as a
whole were not mutually beneficial to the United States. China had just as much to gain from
working with the United States. Working together, Zhou and Kissinger organized a political visit
that made the Soviet Union genuinely concerned about the fate of the socialist world, and this
was beneficial to China and the United States. Considering the fact that the Soviet Union was
the largest problem for the United States and China, Nixons visit to China was important
because it made the Soviets question what China and the United States were really planning.
The Soviets may not have believed that a Sino-American alliance was forming, but they did
believe that whatever happened in Beijing between Richard Nixon and Mao Zedong would
fundamentally be bad for the Soviet Union.40
Zhou Enlai and Henry Kissinger worked together to forge a bridge between the United
States and China because they both realized it would be good for their respective nations. They
both probably believed they were getting the better deal in the negotiations, but they both agreed
that it was mutually beneficial to normalize relations because of the threat that the Soviet Union
posed. The foreign policy of the United States and China was changing, and Kissing and Zhou
took advantage of the opening and created a situation in which Richard Nixon and Mao Zedong
could sit down together and discuss issues without fear of offending each other. They knew
exactly what to expect and that is the reason the visit was so successful. Henry Kissinger and
Zhou Enlai were not the only individuals that worked on creating a possibility for Richard Nixon
to visit China, but without their personal efforts there is a legitimate chance that the visit would
40 Lecture by Soviet Ambassador, February 7, 1972.

26

not have been organized as swiftly and successful. The two men were leaders from different
world, but they both wanted to advance the cause of their country so they put their differences
aside and had meaningful discussions on topics that their predecessors had only been able to
argue and disagree about. The shrewdness of Kissinger and Zhou allowed China and the United
States to navigate through a very dangerous time and prevented conflicts that could have
changed the course of the Cold War.

27

Bibliography
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"Joint Communiqu between the United States and China," February 27, 1972, History and
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Kissinger, Henry, On China (New York: The Penguin Press, 2011), 236-274.
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http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114829
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Presidential Library, National Security Adviser Trip Briefing Books and Cables for
President Ford, 1974-1976 (Box 19).
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118064

28

"Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of Political Affairs, Asia-Oceania, Note, 'State of the
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