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Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008-2015) : Civil Law
Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008-2015) : Civil Law
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a)
b)
c)
When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks,
garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways and other public places such as
sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds;
When government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be
implemented; or
When there is a court order for eviction and demolition.
Magkalas asserts that this afore-quoted provision is inconsistent with Section 1 of P.D. No.
1315 and Section 2 of P.D. No. 1472, which state as follows:
Sec. 1 (P.D. No. 1315) xxx. The National Housing Authority hereinafter referred to as the
Authority is designated administrator for the national government and is authorized to immediately
take possession, control and disposition of the expropriated properties with the power of demolition of
their improvements. xxx
Sec. 2 (P.D. No. 1315) xxx. The National Housing Authority shall have the power to
summarily eject, without the necessity of judicial order, any and all squatters colonies on government
resettlement projects, as well as any illegal occupants in any homelot, apartment or dwelling unit
owned or administered by it. xxx.
From a careful reading of the foregoing provisions, the Court holds that R.A. No. 7279 does
not necessarily repeal P.D. No. 1315 and P.D. No. 1472 as it does not contain any provision which
categorically and expressly repeals the provisions of P.D. No. 1315 and P.D. No. 1472. Neither could
there be an implied repeal. It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals by
implication are not favored. The rationale behind the rule is explained as follows:
Repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed. Repeals by implication are not favoured
as laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all laws existing on the
subject. Such repeals are not favored for a law cannot be deemed repealed unless it is clearly manifest
that the legislature so intended it. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the
intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist
in the terms of the new and old laws.
The Court finds that there is no irreconcilable conflict or repugnancy between Section 28 of
R.A. No. 7279 and P.D. No. 1315 and No. 1472, rather, they can be read together and harmonized to
give effect to their provision. It should be stressed that Section 28 of R.A. No. 7279 does not totally
and absolutely prohibit eviction and demolition without a judicial order as in fact it provides for
exceptions. Pursuant to established doctrine, the three (3) statutes should be construed in the light
of the objective to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed by the said laws, and they
should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief and secure the
benefits intended. It is worthy to note that the three laws (P.D. No. 1315, P.D. No. 1472 and R.A. No.
7279) have a common objective to address the housing problems of the country by establishing a
comprehensive urban development and housing program for the homeless. For this reason, the
need to harmonize these laws all the more becomes imperative.
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OWNERSHIP
SPS. AMBROSIO DECALENG (substituted by his heirs) and JULIA "WANAY" DECALENG vs.
BISHOP OF THE MISSIONARY DISTRICT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS OF PROTESTANT
EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, otherwise known as THE
PHILIPPINE EPISCOPAL CHURCH
G.R. No. 171209, June 27, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro
A Torrens title cannot be attacked collaterally, and the issue on its validity can be raised only
in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. A collateral attack is made when, in another action
to obtain a different relief, the certificate of title is assailed as an incident in said action. Spouses
Decaleng only sought the dismissal of the complaint of PEC-EDNP plus the grant of their counterclaim
for the payment of moral damages, exemplary damages, litigation expenses, and attorneys fees. They
conspicuously did not pray for the annulment or cancellation of Certificate of Title No. 1. Evidently, the
Spouses Decalengs attack on the validity, as well as the existence of Certificate of Title No. 1 is only
incidental to their defense against the accion publiciana and accion reinvindicatoria instituted by
PEC-EDNP, hence, merely collateral.
Facts:
The Bishop of the Missionary District of the Philippine Islands of the Protestant Episcopal
Church in the United States of America, otherwise known as the Philippine Episcopal Church (PEC),
is a religious corporation duly organized and registered under the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines. One of its dioceses is the Episcopal Diocese of Northern Philippines (EDNP).
On, PEC-EDNP filed before the Regional Trial Court a Complaint for Accion Reinvindicatoria
and Accion Publiciana against Ambrosio Decaleng and Fabian Lopez (Lopez). PEC-EDNP alleged
that it is the owner of two parcels of land in the Municipality of Sagada, located in areas of as Kengeka and Ken-gedeng. According to PEC-EDNP, the Ken-geka property is covered by Certificate of
Title No. 1 of the Register of Deeds of Mountain Province, issued on 1915, in the name of U.S.
Episcopal Church. PEC-EDNP asserted that the U.S. Episcopal Church donated the Ken-geka
property, among other real properties, to the PEC by virtue of a Deed of Donation executed on 1974.
Around the second quarter of 1989, Ambrosio Decaleng entered and cultivated a portion of about
1,635 square meters of the Ken-geka property despite the protestations of PEC-EDNP
representatives.
When it comes to the Ken-gedeng property, PEC-EDNP averred that it and its predecessorsin-interest occupied the Ken-gedeng property openly, adversely, continuously, and notoriously in
en concepto de dueo since the American Missionaries arrived in the Mountain Province in 1901.
PEC-EDNP and its predecessors-in-interest have introduced valuable improvements on the Kengedeng property through the years. During the first quarter of 1987, Ambrosio Decaleng illegally
and forcibly entered two portions of the Ken-gedeng property. Ambrosio Decaleng made matters
worse by selling Portion 2 of the Ken-gedeng property to Fabian Lopez.
Ambrosio Decaleng and Lopez filed their Answer alleging that Certificate of Title No. 1 was
inaccurate and depicted a parcel of land much bigger than that generally believed to be owned by
PEC-EDNP and that the properties occupied by Ambrosio Decaleng were outside the properties of
PEC-EDNP. They then moved for the dismissal of the complaint against them.
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Issue:
Whether or not PEC- EDNP is the rightful owner of the subject lands.
Ruling:
Yes.
An accion reinvindicatoria is an action to recover ownership over real property. Article 434
of the New Civil Code provides that to successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a
real property, the person who claims a better right to it must prove two things: first, the identity of
the land claimed by describing the location, area, and boundaries thereof; and second, his title
thereto. The Court finds that PEC-EDNP was able to successfully prove both requisites by
preponderance of evidence, both documentary and testimonial. The identity of the properties over
which PEC-EDNP asserts ownership is well-established. The Ken-geka property is covered by
Certificate of Title No. 1, while the Ken-gedeng property is identified as Lot 3 of Survey Plan PSU118424.
PEC-EDNP likewise proved its title to the Ken-geka and Ken-gedeng properties. The Kengeka property was registered in the name of the U.S. Episcopal Church under Certificate of Title No.
1. It was conveyed by the U.S. Episcopal Church to PEC through a Deed of Donation dated April 24,
1974. It was also declared by the U.S. Episcopal Church and PEC-EDNP for real property tax
purposes. Although not yet covered by any certificate of title, the Ken-gedeng property had been
occupied under claim of title (en concepto de dueo) by PEC-EDNP and its predecessor-in-interest,
the U.S. Episcopal Church, since the latters arrival in 1901. It was also declared by the U.S.
Episcopal Church and PEC-EDNP for real property tax purposes. PEC-EDNPs officers, priests, and
employees, as well as the Sagada residents testified as to actual possession by PEC-EDNP of the
Ken-geka and Ken-gedeng properties by the introduction of improvements such as permanent
buildings, pine trees, fruit trees, and vegetable gardens thereon.
Finally, Spouses Decalengs contention that Certificate of Title No. 1 does not exist
constitutes a collateral attack of Certificate of Title No. 1. It must be noted that a Torrens title
cannot be attacked collaterally, and the issue on its validity can be raised only in an action expressly
instituted for that purpose. A collateral attack is made when, in another action to obtain a different
relief, the certificate of title is assailed as an incident in said action. In this case, the original
complaint filed by PEC-EDNP before the RTC is for accion publiciana and accion reinvindicatoria
(for recovery of possession and ownership) of the Ken-geka and Ken-gedeng properties. In said
complaint, PEC-EDNP alleged ownership of the Ken-geka property as evidenced by Certificate of
Title No. 1. In their defense, the spouses Decaleng raised issues as to the validity of Certificate of
Title No. 1 (by asserting in their Answer that Certificate of Title No. 1 covered an area much larger
than that actually owned by PEC-EDNP), and as to the existence of Certificate of Title No. 1 (by
presenting Mountain Province Register of Deeds Dailay-Papas certification that Certificate of Title
No. 1 does not appear in the record of registered titles). Nevertheless, the spouses Decaleng only
sought the dismissal of the complaint of PEC-EDNP, plus the grant of their counterclaim for the
payment of moral damages, exemplary damages, litigation expenses, and attorneys fees; and they
conspicuously did not pray for the annulment or cancellation of Certificate of Title No. 1. Evidently,
the spouses Decalengs attack on the validity, as well as the existence of Certificate of Title No. 1 is
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Issue:
Should the Torbela siblings submit an accounting of the rents of the improvements on Lot
No. 356-A which they had received and to turn over any balance thereof to Dr. Rosario?
Ruling:
Yes, the rules on accession shall govern the improvements on Lot No. 356-A and the rents
thereof.
The accessory follows the principal. The right of accession is recognized under Article 440
of the Civil Code which states that the ownership of property gives the right by accession to
everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either
naturally or artificially.
There is no question that Dr. Rosario is the builder of the improvements on Lot No. 356-A.
The Torbela siblings themselves alleged that they allowed Dr. Rosario to register Lot No.
356-A in his name so he could obtain a loan from DBP, using said parcel of land as security; and
with the proceeds of the loan, Dr. Rosario had a building constructed on Lot No. 356-A, initially used
as a hospital, and then later for other commercial purposes. Dr. Rosario supervised the construction
of the building, which began in 1965; fully liquidated the loan from DBP; and maintained and
administered the building, as well as collected the rental income therefrom, until the Torbela
siblings instituted Civil Case No. U-4359 before the RTC on February 13, 1986.
When it comes to the improvements on Lot No. 356-A, both the Torbela siblings (as
landowners) and Dr. Rosario (as builder) are deemed in bad faith. The Torbela siblings were aware
of the construction of a building by Dr. Rosario on Lot No. 356-A, while Dr. Rosario proceeded with
the said construction despite his knowledge that Lot No. 356-A belonged to the Torbela siblings.
This is the case contemplated under Article 453 of the Civil Code, which reads:
ART. 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, planted or sowed
on the land of another, but also on the part of the owner of such land, the rights of one and the other
shall be the same as though both had acted in good faith.
It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner whenever the act was done
with his knowledge and without opposition on his part.
When both the landowner and the builder are in good faith, the following rules govern:
Whatever is built, planted, or sown on the land of another, and the improvements or repairs
made thereon, belong to the owner of the land. Where, however, the planter, builder, or sower has
acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners and it becomes necessary to
protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view
of the impracticability of creating what Manresa calls a state of "forced co-ownership," the law has
provided a just and equitable solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the
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The instituted action in this case is clearly a direct attack on a certificate of title to real
property. The relief sought by petitioners is certainly feasible since the objective of an action to
quiet title, as provided under Article 476 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, is precisely to quiet,
remove, invalidate, annul, and/or nullify a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein by
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De Guzman was able to establish that the LBP check was not received by her or by her
authorized personnel. The PNPs own records show that it was claimed and signed for by Cruz, who
is openly known as being connected to Highland Enterprises, another contractor. Hence, absent any
showing that the respondent agreed to the payment of the contract price to another person, or that
she authorized Cruz to claim the check on her behalf, the payment, to be effective must be made to
her.
The respondent has explained her inaction towards Cruz and Highland Enterprises. Since it
was the PNP who owed her money, her actions should be directed towards the PNP and not Cruz or
Highland Enterprises, against whom she has no adequate proof.80 Respondent has also adequately
explained her delay in filing an action against the petitioner, particularly that she did not want to
prejudice her other pending transactions with the PNP.
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES RODOLFO T. TIU AND VICTORIA N. TIU
G.R. Nos. 173090-91, September 7, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro
It is important to note at this point that in the determination of the nullity of a contract based
on the lack of consideration, the debtor has the burden to prove the same. Article 1354 of the Civil
Code provides that "although the cause is not stated in the contract, it is presumed that it exists and is
lawful, unless the debtor proves the contrary."
Facts:
Petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank) and respondent spouses Rodolfo T.
Tiu and Victoria N. Tiu (the spouses Tiu) entered into a Credit Line Agreement (CLA) whereby
Union Bank agreed to make available to the spouses Tiu credit facilities in such amounts as may be
approved. The spouses Tiu took out various loans in the total amount of US$3,632,000.00.
Union Bank advised the spouses Tiu through a letter that, in view of the existing currency
risks, the loans shall be redenominated to their equivalent Philippine peso amount. Union Bank and
the spouses Tiu entered into a Restructuring Agreement. The Restructuring Agreement contains a
clause wherein the spouses Tiu confirmed their debt and waived any action on account thereof.
The restructured amount (P155,364,800.00) is the sum of the following figures: (1)
P150,364,800.00, which is the value of the US$3,632,000.00 loan as redenominated under the
above-mentioned exchange rate of US$1=P41.40; and (2) P5,000,000.00, an additional loan given to
the spouses Tiu to update their interest payments.
As likewise provided in the Restructuring Agreement, the spouses Tiu executed a Real
Estate Mortgage in favor of Union Bank over their "residential property inclusive of lot and
improvements" located at P. Burgos St., Mandaue City.
The spouses Tiu claim to have made the following payments: (1) P15,000,000.00 on August
3, 1999; and (2) another P13,197,546.79 as of May 8, 2001. Adding the amounts paid under the
Deeds of Dation in Payment, the spouses Tiu postulate that their payments added up to
P89,407,546.79.15
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Ruling:
Yes, the court a quo erred when it ruled that the said Restructuring Agreement is void
without taking into considerations the surrounding circumstances.
Validity of the Restructuring Agreement
The Court of Appeals declared that the Restructuring Agreement is void on account of its
being a failed novation of the original loan agreements.
Union Bank does not dispute that the spouses Tiu received the loaned amount of
US$3,632,000.00 in Philippine pesos, not dollars, at the prevailing exchange rate of US$1=P26.53
However, Union Bank claims that this does not change the true nature of the loan as a foreign
currency loan, and proceeded to illustrate in its Memorandum that the spouses Tiu obtained
favorable interest rates by opting to borrow in dollars (but receiving the equivalent peso amount)
as opposed to borrowing in pesos.
We agree with Union Bank on this point. Although the spouses Tiu received peso
equivalents of the borrowed amounts, the loan documents presented as evidence, i.e., the
promissory notes, expressed the amount of the loans in US dollars and not in any other currency.
This clearly indicates that the spouses Tiu were bound to pay Union Bank in dollars, the amount
stipulated in said loan documents. Thus, before the Restructuring Agreement, the spouses Tiu were
bound to pay Union Bank the amount of US$3,632,000.00 plus the interest stipulated in the
promissory notes, without converting the same to pesos.
Such stipulation of payment in dollars is not prohibited by any prevailing law or
jurisprudence at the time the loans were taken. In this regard, Article 1249 of the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 1249. The payment of debts in money shall be made in the currency stipulated, and if it is not
possible to deliver such currency, then in the currency which is legal tender in the Philippines.
Having established that Union Bank and the spouses Tiu validly entered into dollar loans,
the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that there were no dollar loans to novate into peso loans
must necessarily fail.
The Court of Appeals pronouncement that the novation was not supported by any cause or
consideration is likewise incorrect. This conclusion suggests that when the parties signed the
Restructuring Agreement, Union Bank got something out of nothing or that the spouses Tiu
received no benefit from the restructuring of their existing loan and was merely taken advantage of
by the bank. It is important to note at this point that in the determination of the nullity of a contract
based on the lack of consideration, the debtor has the burden to prove the same. Article 1354 of the
Civil Code provides that "although the cause is not stated in the contract, it is presumed that it
exists and is lawful, unless the debtor proves the contrary."
In the case at bar, the Restructuring Agreement was signed at the height of the financial
crisis when the Philippine peso was rapidly depreciating. Since the spouses Tiu were bound to pay
their debt in dollars, the cost of purchasing the required currency was likewise swiftly increasing. If
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We, however, agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that despite the failure of the
Memorandum of Agreement to push through, the certificates and titles mentioned therein do
appear to be in the possession of Union Bank.
As regards Union Banks argument that it has the right to retain said documents pursuant to
the Restructuring Agreement.
Assuming arguendo that the Restructuring Agreement indeed allows the retention of the
certificates as security for spouses Tius debt, Union Banks position still cannot be upheld. Insofar
as said provision permits Union Bank to apply properties of the spouses Tiu in its possession to the
full or partial payment of the latters obligations, the same appears to impliedly allow Union Bank to
appropriate these properties for such purpose. However, said provision cannot be validly applied to
the subject certificates and titles without violating the prohibition against pactum commissorium
contained in Article 2088 of the Civil Code, to the effect that "the creditor cannot appropriate the
things given by way of pledge or mortgage, or dispose of them; any stipulation to the contrary is
null and void."
This Court affirms the order of the Court of Appeals for Union Bank to return to the spouses
Tiu all the certificates of shares of stock and titles to real properties that were submitted to it or, in
lieu thereof, to pay the cost for the replacement and issuance of new certificates and new titles over
the said properties.
Validity of the Award of Damages
The Court of Appeals awarded damages in favor of the spouses Tiu based on its taking
judicial notice of the alleged exploitation by many banks of the Asian financial crisis, as well as the
foreclosure of the mortgage of the home of the spouses Tiu despite the alleged full payment by the
latter.
Article 1339 of the New Civil Code provides that the failure to disclose facts, when there is a
duty to reveal them, as when the parties are bound by confidential relations, constitutes fraud.
Undoubtedly, the banks and their clients are bound by confidential relations.
We have already held that the foreclosure of the mortgage was warranted under the
circumstances. As regards the alleged exploitation by many banks of the Asian financial crisis, this
Court rules that the generalization made by the appellate court is unfounded and cannot be the
subject of judicial notice. "It is axiomatic that good faith is always presumed unless convincing
evidence to the contrary is adduced. It is incumbent upon the party alleging bad faith to sufficiently
prove such allegation. Absent enough proof thereof, the presumption of good faith prevails." The
alleged insidious design of many banks to betray their clients during the Asian financial crisis is
certainly not of public knowledge. The deletion of the award of moral and exemplary damages in
favor of the spouses Tiu is therefore in order.
SPOUSES RENATO and FLORINDA DELA CRUZ vs. SPOUSES GIL and LEONILA SEGOVIA
G.R. No. 149801, June 26, 2008, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Article 1391 of the Civil Code, which pertinently reads: The action for annulment shall be
brought within four years. In case of mistake or fraud, this period shall begin from the time of the
discovery of the same.
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Facts:
Sometime in July 1985, Florinda wanted to purchase two (2) parcels of land located at Sta.
Mesa, Manila, Lot 503 and Lot 505. The two lots were being sold together for P180,000.00.
Inasmuch as Florinda had only P144,000.00 at hand, she asked her sister, Leonila, to contribute
P36,000.00 to complete the purchase price. The sisters agreed that Lot 503 and the apartment unit
thereat would belong to Leonila upon full payment of its purchase price of P80,000.00, while Lot
505 with a residential house would belong to Florinda. The properties were then registered in the
name of Renato dela Cruz married to Florinda. The parties, however, verbally agreed that Leonila
and her family would stay at Lot 505 until she had fully paid for Lot 503.
On September 9, 1991, Florinda and Leonila signed an Agreement embodying the detailed
scheme of payment for the lot covered by the sisters agreement. Leonila continued paying the
balance she owed Florinda. Leonila attempted to pay the remaining balance of P26,444.56 in full
satisfaction of her obligation but Florinda refused to accept the same on the ground that, the ten
year period for the payment of the balance, reckoned from July 1985, the alleged date of the verbal
agreement between them, had already expired. Thereafter Florinda demanded that Leonila and her
family vacate the house at 505.
On March 8, 1996, Renato and Florinda filed with the RTC of Manila, a complaint for Nullity
of Contract/Agreement with Damages on the ground that the Agreement executed on September 9,
1991 did not contain the true intention of the parties because Florindas consent thereto was
vitiated by mistake. Allegedly, Florinda did not know that the agreement provided that the ten year
period for payment of the balance commenced from September 1991 and not from July 1985 which
was her true intention. On May 5, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for
Nullity of Contract/Agreement with Damages and declaring the subject Agreement valid and
subsisting.
RTC ruled that the action for annulment had already lapsed when the Complaint was filed
on March 8, 1996. The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC in its decision.
Issue:
Whether the four (4) year period for filing an action for annulment of the September 9,
1991 Agreement, on ground of vitiated consent, had already lapsed
Ruling:
This is in accordance with Article 1391 of the Civil Code, which pertinently reads: Art.
1391. The action for annulment shall be brought within four years. This period shall begin: x x x In
case of mistake or fraud, from the time of the discovery of the same. x x x.
The complaint for Nullity of Contract/Agreement with Damages was filed on March 7, 1996,
while the agreement subject thereof was entered into on September 9, 1991. The Agreement was
read to the parties before they affixed their signatures thereon. Petitioners were thereafter
furnished a copy of the subject Agreement. Petitioners are presumed to have discovered the alleged
mistake on September 9, 1991. Hence, the action for annulment which was filed four years and six
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First, Tan Sri had no authority to bind MBf Card in the alleged oral agreement considering
the admission of Aguiluz that he neither knew nor inquired whether Tan Sri was an officer or
director of the MBf Card.
Second, the remittance of the money given by MBf Card will only be applied to its proposed
shareholdings upon the execution and approval of the Joint Venture Licensing Agreements. Further,
the advice and suggestion of MBf Card for the sale, promotion and marketing discounts are merely
preparatory acts and does not necessarily indicate the existence of a perfected contract.
Lastly, MBf`Card are neither incorporators nor stockholders of MCA-MBF, the company that
was supposedly intended to be converted into the Joint Venture Company. It must be stressed that
MCA-MBF has not yet been converted into the Joint Venture Company as no shares of stock have
been delivered to MBf Card.
KINDS OF CONTRACTS
SALVADOR A. FERNANDEZ vs. CRISTINA D. AMAGNA
G.R. No. 152614, September 30, 2009, J. Leonardo-De Castro
When the contract of lease does not provide for a definite period for its duration, the lease
shall be considered month to month if the rentals are paid on a monthly basis and when the lessee
fails to pay the monthly rental, the contract of lease shall be considered terminated.
Facts:
Cristina was a co-owner and administratrix of the property in question and a portion of the
property was leased by Salvador Fernandez on a month-to-month basis at the rate of P1,300.00. In
July 1995, Fernandez failed to pay the monthly rentals, prompting Amagna to send a demand letter
to pay and vacate but the former refused. Amagna then filed an action for unlawful detainer against
Fernandez.
Fernandez averred that he had been renting the premises for over fifty years and that the
monthly rental was only P420.00 and not P1,300.00 and that there was no agreement with
respondent regarding the period for the lease. Lastly, he asseverated that he was surprised to
receive a demand letter as on May 15, 1997, he filed a Petition for Consignation and deposited his
arrears in rent computed at the rate of P420.00 per month.
The MeTC ruled in favor of Amagna which was affirmed by the RTC and CA holding that:
When petitioner-appellant filed a consignation case, a fact was established that
there was really an unpaid rental commencing from July 1995. A closer examination
of the records reveals that the complaint for ejectment was filed on September 23,
1996, while the consignation case was commenced on May 15, 1997. Hence, when
the petitioner-appellant paid the back rentals, the respondent-appellee had already
filed the ejectment case. Case law is to the effect that the acceptance by the lessor of
the payment by lessee of rentals in arrears does not constitute a waiver of the
default of the payment of rentals as a valid cause of action for ejectment. xxx.
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The Court found that the CA committed no reversible error when it ruled that the
construction projects solicited by Zamora for Multiwood were outside the coverage of the
Marketing Agreement so as preclude the former from claiming a 10% commission. The plain import
of the text of the Marketing Agreement leaves no doubt as to the true intention of the parties in
executing the Marketing Agreement. The pertinent provisions of the said Marketing Agreement are
as follows:
WHEREAS, the principal is engaged in the manufacture and export of
furniture and such other related products using various types of suitable raw
materials;
WHEREAS, the principal needs the services of the agent in soliciting
and finding buyers, customers, or dealers, whether individuals or entities,
for the products of the principal and agent has represented that she has the
capability and competence to provide the said services;
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing and of
the covenants hereinafter specified, the parties hereto have agreed as follows:
1. That principal hereby grants the agent the non-exclusive right to
identify, solicit, find or introduce for negotiation, prospective local and foreign
buyers, dealers, or customers for the products of the principal.
xxx xxx xxx
4. That for the services of the agent under this agreement, the principal
agrees to pay her Ten Percent (10%) of the face value of the invoice price,
covering the letter of credit, or such similar instrument representing the actual
purchase price for the products sold or shipped by the principal. x x x.
(emphasis ours)
The trial courts reliance various vouchers which were not offered in evidence by either
party and marked for exhibit only during the testimony of defense witness is misplaced. It has no
evidentiary value in this case because it was not offered in evidence before the trial court. The rule
is that the court shall not consider any evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose
for which the evidence is offered must be specified. The offer of evidence is necessary because it is
the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence
offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or
purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of
probative weight. Mere identification of documents and the markings thereof as exhibits do not
confer any evidentiary weight on documents unless formally offered.
Plainly, the trial court should not have read terms into the Marketing Agreement that were
not expressly in the agreement itself. The agreement is clear, plain and simple that it leaves no
room for interpretation. It explicitly provides that for the services of Zamora, as agent under the
agreement, Multiwood agreed to pay her in the amount equivalent to 10% of the face value of the
invoice price, covering the letter of credit or such other instrument representing the actual
purchase price for the products sold or shipped by Multiwood. In other words, Zamoras
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The proper basis for the nullity of the forged pacto de retro sale is not Article 1409 (which
enumerates examples of void contracts) in relation to Article 1505 (which refers to an
unenforceable contract and is applicable only to goods) of the Civil Code as stated by the Court of
Appeals, but Article 1318 of the Civil Code, which enumerates the essential requisites of a valid
contract.
Article 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:
(1)
Consent of the contracting parties;
(2)
Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
(3)
Cause of the obligation which is established.
There are two types of void contracts:
(1) those where one of the essential requisites of a valid contract as provided for by Article
1318 of the Civil Code is totally wanting; and
(2) those declared to be so under Article 1409 of the Civil Code. Conveyances by virtue of a
forged signature are void ab initio.
The absence of the essential requisites of consent and cause or consideration in these cases
rendered the contract inexistent.
PHILNICO INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION vs. PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OFFICE
G.R. No. 199420, August 27, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Article 1305 of the Civil Code allows contracting parties to establish such stipulation, clauses,
terms, and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided, however, that they are not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
Pactum commissorium is among the contractual stipulations that are deemed contrary to
law. It is defined as "a stipulation empowering the creditor to appropriate the thing given as guaranty
for the fulfillment of the obligation in the event the obligor fails to live up to his undertakings, without
further formality, such as foreclosure proceedings, and a public sale." It is explicitly prohibited under
Article 2088 of the Civil Code.
Facts:
This case involves the consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court filed by Philnico Industrial Corporation (PIC) and Privatization and Management
Office (PMO).
In 1987, the shares of stock owned by DPB and PNB of Philnico Processing Corporation
(PPC), a corporation engaged in nickel mining and refining business, were transferred to
respondent PMO. Thereafter, PMO, PIC and PPC executed a contract, denominated as the Amended
and Restated Definitive Agreement (ARDA). The contract laid down the terms and conditions of the
purchase and acquisition by PIC from PMO of 22,500,000 shares of stock of PPC (representing 90%
of ownership of PPC), as well as receivables of PMO from PPC. Under the ARDA, PIC agreed to pay
PMO the peso equivalent of US$333,762,000.00 as purchase price, payable in instalments and in
accordance with the schedule also set out in the ARDA.
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Whether or not CBIC is bound by the acts of its agent Quinain in entering into a surety
agreement with Unimarine.
Ruling:
No.
Our law mandates an agent to act within the scope of his authority. The scope of an agents
authority is what appears in the written terms of the power of attorney granted upon him. Under
Article 1878(11) of the Civil Code, a special power of attorney is necessary to obligate the principal
as a guarantor or surety.
In the case at bar, CBIC could be held liable even if Quinain exceeded the scope of his
authority only if Quinains act of issuing the Surety Bond is deemed to have been performed within
the written terms of the power of attorney he was granted. However, the Special Power of Attorney
accorded to Quinain clearly states the limits of his authority and particularly provides that in case
of surety bonds, it can only be issued in favor of the Department of Public Works and Highways, the
National Power Corporation, and other government agencies.
Under Articles 1898 and 1910 of the New Civil Code, an agents act, even if done beyond the
scope of his authority, may bind the principal if he ratifies them, whether expressly or tacitly. It
must be stressed though that only the principal, and not the agent, can ratify the unauthorized acts,
which the principal must have knowledge of. Neither Unimarine nor Cebu Shipyard was able to
repudiate CBICs testimony that it was unaware of the existence of Surety Bond. There were no
allegations either that CBIC should have been put on alert with regard to Quinains business
transactions done on its behalf. It is clear, and undisputed therefore, that there can be no
ratification in this case, whether express or implied.
Article 1911 of NCC, on the other hand, is based on the principle of estoppel, which is
necessary for the protection of third persons. It states that the principal is solidarily liable with the
agent even when the latter has exceeded his authority, if the principal allowed him to act as though
he had full powers. This Court cannot agree with the lower courts pronouncement of negligence on
CBICs part. CBIC not only clearly stated the limits of its agents powers in their contracts, it even
stamped its surety bonds with the restrictions, in order to alert the concerned parties. CBIC cannot
be faulted for Quinains deliberate failure to notify it of his transactions with Unimarine.
Furthermore, nowhere in the decisions of the lower courts was it stated that CBIC let the
public, or specifically Unimarine, believe that Quinain had the authority to issue a surety bond in
favor of companies other than the Department of Public Works and Highways, the National Power
Corporation, and other government agencies. Neither was it shown that CBIC knew of the existence
of the surety bond before the endorsement extending the life of the bond, was issued to
Unimarine. For one to successfully claim the benefit of estoppel on the ground that he has been
misled by the representations of another, he must show that he was not misled through his own
want of reasonable care and circumspection.
TRUST
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Yes, Dr. Rosario is merely the trustee of Lot No. 356-A and the Torbela siblings are the true
owners.
Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in
another. It is a fiduciary relationship that obliges the trustee to deal with the property for the
benefit of the beneficiary. Trust relations between parties may either be express or implied. An
express trust is created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties, while an implied trust
comes into being by operation of law.
Express trusts are created by direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or
deed, or will, or by words either expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust.
Under Article 1444 of the Civil Code, no particular words are required for the creation of an express
trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended. It is possible to create a trust without using
the word trust or trustee. Conversely, the mere fact that these words are used does not necessarily
indicate an intention to create a trust. The question in each case is whether the trustor manifested
an intention to create the kind of relationship which to lawyers is known as trust.
In Tamayo v. Callejo, the Court recognized that a trust may have a constructive or implied
nature in the beginning, but the registered owners subsequent express acknowledgement in a
public document of a previous sale of the property to another party, had the effect of imparting to
the aforementioned trust the nature of an express trust. The same situation exists in this case.
When Dr. Rosario was able to register Lot No. 356-A in his name under TCT No. 52751 on
December 16, 1964, an implied trust was initially established between him and the Torbela siblings
under Article 1451 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 1451. When land passes by succession to any person and he causes the legal title to be put
in the name of another, a trust is established by implication of law for the benefit of the true
owner.
Dr. Rosarios execution of the Deed of Absolute Quitclaim on December 28, 1964, containing
his express admission that he only borrowed Lot No. 356-A from the Torbela siblings, eventually
transformed the nature of the trust to an express one. The express trust continued despite Dr.
Rosario stating in his Deed of Absolute Quitclaim that he was already returning Lot No. 356-A to the
Torbela siblings as Lot No. 356-A remained registered in Dr. Rosarios name under TCT No. 52751
and Dr. Rosario kept possession of said property, together with the improvements thereon.
Therefore, Banco Filipino was ordered to reconvey Lot No. 356-A to the Torbela siblings.
Furthermore, the right of the Torbela siblings to recover Lot No. 356-A has not yet
prescribed. To apply the 10-year prescriptive period, which would bar a beneficiarys action to
recover in an express trust, the repudiation of the trust must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence and made known to the beneficiary.
A trustee who obtains a Torrens title over a property held in trust for him by another
cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the registration.
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After the purchase of the above lots, titles were issued in the name of RISCO. The amount
contributed by plaintiffs constituted as liens and encumbrances on the aforementioned properties
as annotated in the titles of said lots. Such annotation was made pursuant to the Minutes of the
Special Meeting of the Board of Directors of RISCO stating that;
And that the respective contributions above-mentioned shall constitute as their lien or interest on the
property described above, if and when said property are titled in the name of RURAL INSURANCE &
SURETY CO., INC., subject to registration as their adverse claim in pursuance of the Provisions of Land
Registration Act, (Act No. 496, as amended) until such time their respective contributions are refunded
to them completely.
Thereafter, various subsequent annotations were made on the same titles in favor of PNB.
As a result, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB, being the lone and highest bidder of the
three (3) parcels of land and was also issued Transfer Certificate of Title over the said parcels of
land.
This prompted Aznar et. al to file a complaint seeking the quieting of their supposed title to
the subject properties. They alleged that the subsequent annotations on the titles are subject to the
prior annotation of their liens and encumbrances. PNB, on the other hand, countered that plaintiffs
have no right of action for quieting of title since the order of the court directing the issuance of titles
to PNB had already become final and executory and their validity cannot be attacked except in a
direct proceeding for their annulment.
Aznar, et al., filed a Manifestation and Motion for Judgment on the Thus, the trial court
rendered a decision, which ruled against PNB on the basis that there was an express trust created
over the subject properties. On appeal, the CA set aside the ruling of the trial court and ruled that
there was no trust created. The lien is merely an evidence of the loan. Thus, it directed PNB to pay
Aznar, et al., the amount of their contributions plus legal interest from the time of acquisition of the
property until finality of judgment.
Issue:
trust
Whether or not the annotation in the 3 parcels of land was made in pursuance of a loan or a
Ruling:
The annotation was made in pursuance of a loan.
At the outset, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the agreement contained in
the Minutes of the Special Meeting of the RISCO Board of Directors held on March 14, 1961 was a
loan by the therein named stockholders to RISCO.
Careful perusal of the Minutes relied upon by plaintiffs-appellees in their claim, showed that
their contributions shall constitute as "lien or interest on the property" if and when said properties
are titled in the name of RISCO, subject to registration of their adverse claim under the Land
Registration Act, until such time their respective contributions are refunded to them completely.
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The public auction sale took place as scheduled on December 9, 1999, with CSB as the
winning and highest bidder. Notary Public Magpantay subsequently issued a Certificate of Sale,
covering the subject properties, in favor of CSB. This Certificate of Sale mentioned, among other
things, that the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the mortgaged properties was only a partial
satisfaction of Sps. Samonte total outstanding financial obligations to CSB. Consequently, CSB filed a
complaint against Sps. Samonte for the collection of the deficiency of their loans.
Sometime in 2001, the parties executed a Contract of Lease whereby CSB leased one of the
foreclosed properties to Sps. Samonte for a period of one year. It was acknowledged in said contract
that CSB acquired the real property subject of the lease as the highest and winning bidder in an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale, conducted pursuant to Act No. 3135, as amended. CSB eventually
consolidated its titles to the foreclosed properties. As a result, new certificates of title were issued
in the name of petitioner.
A few months later, Sps. Samonte filed a complaint, seeking the annulment of the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale of their real properties contending that the extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings initiated by CSB failed to comply with the posting requirements under Section 3 of Act
No. 3135, as amended. On the other hand, CSB insisted that the extrajudicial foreclosure sale was
duly conducted in accordance with law.
The Makati RTC-Branch 58, after trial, dismissed Sps. Samontes complaint. The trial court
found that the Notice of Sale appears to have been posted for 20 days before the scheduled public
auction, as stated in the Notary Publics Certificate of Posting; and that even if the posting
requirement was not complied with, the publication of the Notice of Sale in a newspaper of general
circulation already satisfied the notice requirement under Act No. 3135.
Sps. Samonte appealed before the Court of Appeals.
CA granted the appeal and annulled the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the said properties
by adjudging that the said foreclosure proceedings were fatally defective because the Certificate of
Posting failed to state that the Notice of Sale was posted for 20 days before the sale in at least 3
public places of the city where the properties sought to be foreclosed were situated.
Hence, CSB filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the CAs Decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of Sps. Samontes mortgaged properties
was valid.
Ruling:
The Court finds the instant Petition meritorious.
The resolution of said issue, however, is dependent on the answer to the question of
whether the legal requirements on the notice of sale were complied with. Necessarily, the Court
must review the evidence on record, most especially, Notary Public Magpantays Certificate of
Posting, to determine the weight and probative value to accord the same. Non-compliance with the
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Whether or not petitioners Ramos were entitled to the release of the real estate mortgage
that secured their said obligations
Ruling:
No, PNB cannot be compelled to release the real estate mortgage and the titles involved
since the issue of whether the sugar quedan financing loan will be fully paid through the pledged
sugar receipts remains the subject of pending litigation.
Here, it cannot be denied that the real estate mortgage executed by the parties provided
that it shall stand as security for any subsequent promissory note or notes either as a renewal of
the former note, as an extension thereof, or as a new loan, or is given any other kind of
accommodations such as overdrafts, letters of credit, acceptances and bills of exchange, releases of
import shipments on Trust Receipts, etc.
The same real estate mortgage likewise expressly covered any and all other obligations of
the Mortgagor to the Mortgagee of whatever kind and nature whether such obligations have been
contracted before, during or after the constitution of this mortgage. Thus, from the clear and
unambiguous terms of the mortgage contract, the same has application even to future loans and
obligations of the mortgagor of any kind, not only agricultural crop loans.
Such a blanket clause or dragnet clause in mortgage contracts has long been recognized in
our jurisprudence.
Thus, in another case, we held:
As a general rule, a mortgage liability is usually limited to the amount mentioned in
the contract. However, the amounts named as consideration in a contract of mortgage do not
limit the amount for which the mortgage may stand as security if, from the four corners of the
instrument, the intent to secure future and other indebtedness can be gathered. This
stipulation is valid and binding between the parties and is known as the "blanket mortgage
clause" (also known as the "dragnet clause)."
In the present case, the mortgage contract indisputably provides that the subject
properties serve as security, not only for the payment of the subject loan, but also for "such
other loans or advances already obtained, or still to be obtained." The cross-collateral
stipulation in the mortgage contract between the parties is thus simply a variety of a dragnet
clause. After agreeing to such stipulation, the petitioners cannot insist that the subject
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Petitioners filed Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
without seeking a reconsideration of the CAs decision.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a contract of lease between the petitioners and DBP.
Ruling:
DBP.
The Court rules that no new contract of lease was ever perfected between petitioners and
In the instant case, the lease contract between petitioners and Rudy Robles was not
registered. During trial, DBP denied having any knowledge of the said lease contract. It asserted
that the lease was merely presumed in view of the existence of tenants in the subject property.
Nevertheless, DBP recognized and acknowledged this lease contract, which was addressed to
Bonifacio Sia, then President of Cebu Bionic. DBP even required Sia to pay the monthly rental for
the month of June 1987, thereby exercising the right of the previous lessor, Rudy Robles, to collect
the rental payments from the lessee. In the same letter, DBP extended an offer to Cebu Bionic to
continue the lease on the subject property, outlining the provisions of the proposed contract and
specifically instructing the latter to come to the bank for the execution of the same. DBP likewise
gave Cebu Bionic a 30-day period within which to act on the said contract execution. Should Cebu
Bionic fail to do so, it would be deemed uninterested in continuing with the lease. In that
eventuality, the letter states that Cebu Bionic should vacate the premises within the said period.
Instead of acceding to the terms of the aforementioned letter, the counsel of Cebu Bionic sent a
counter-offer to DBP suggesting a different mode of payment for the rentals and requesting for a
60-day period within which time the parties will execute a new contract of lease.
The parties, however, failed to execute a written contract of lease. Petitioners put the blame
on DBP, asserting that no contract was signed because DBP did not prepare it for them. DBP, on the
other hand, counters that it was petitioners who did not positively act on the conditions for the
execution of the lease contract. In view of the counter-offer of petitioners, DBP and respondents To
Chip, Yap and Balila argue that there was no meeting of minds between DBP and petitioners, which
would have given rise to a new contract of lease.
In the case at bar, there was no concurrence of offer and acceptance vis-a-vis the terms of
the proposed lease agreement. In fact, after the reply of petitioners counsel, there was no indication
that the parties undertook any other action to pursue the execution of the intended lease
contract. Petitioners even admitted that they merely waited for DBP to present the contract to
them, despite being instructed to come to the bank for the execution of the same. The contention
that the lease contract between petitioners and Rudy Robles did not expire, given that it did not
have a definite term and the parties thereto failed to terminate the same, deserves scant
consideration.
The lease is on a month-to-month basis. Relevantly, the well-entrenched principle is that
a lease from month-to-month is with a definite period and expires at the end of each month upon
the demand to vacate by the lessor. As held by the CA, the above-mentioned lease contract was
duly terminated by DBP. We reiterate that the letter explicitly directed the petitioners to come to
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In its Decision dated October 29, 1999, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent ordering MIAA
to grant renewal of the lease contract for the same term as stipulated in the old contract and the
rental to be based on the applicable rate of the time or renewal. The CA affirmed the RTC.
MIAA argues that the renewal of the Contract of Lease cannot be made to depend on the
sole will of Ding Velayo Sports Center, Inc. for the same would then be void for being a potestative
condition.
Issue:
Whether or not MIAA could deny Ding Velayo Sports Center, Inc of the exclusive right to
choose whether or not to renew the lease after having previously agreed to the grant of the same
Ruling:
No, SC cannot now allow MIAA to arbitrarily deny Ding Velayo Sports Center, Inc of said
right after having previously agreed to the grant of the same.
The SC affirmed the decision of RTC and CA.
Paragraph 17 of the Contract of Lease dated May 14, 1976 between MIAA and Ding Velayo
Sports Center, Inc solely granted to Ding Velayo Sports Center, Inc the option of renewing the lease
of the subject property, the only express requirement was for respondent to notify MIAA of its
decision to renew the lease within 60 days prior to the expiration of the original lease term.
It has not been disputed that said Contract of Lease was willingly and knowingly entered
into by MIAA and Ding Velayo Sports Center, Inc. Thus, MIAA freely consented to giving Ding Velayo
Sports Center, Inc the exclusive right to choose whether or not to renew the lease.
As we stated in Allied Banking, the right of renewal constitutes a part of the interest of
respondent, as lessee, in the subject property, and forms a substantial and integral part of the lease
agreement with petitioner.
Records show that Ding Velayo Sports Center, Inc had duly complied with the only condition
for renewal under Section 17 of the Contract of Lease by notifying petitioner 60 days prior to the
expiration of said Contract that it chooses to renew the lease. We cannot now allow MIAA to
arbitrarily deny Ding Velayo Sports Center, Inc of said right after having previously agreed to the
grant of the same.
In case the lessee chooses to renew the lease but there are no specified terms and
conditions for the new contract of lease, the same terms and conditions as the original contract of
lease shall continue to govern.
In sum, the renewed contract of lease of the subject property between petitioner and
respondent shall be based on the same terms and conditions as the original contract of lease. The
original contract of lease does not pertain to the Contract of Lease dated May 14, 1976 between
petitioner and respondent alone, but also to the Contract of Lease dated February 15, 1967 between
petitioner (then still called CAA) and Salem, as well as the Contract of Lease dated November 26,
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Issue:
Is cancellation of certificates of title civil in nature, not agrarian, therefore conferring
jurisdiction over the same with the regular courts?
Ruling:
Procedural infirmities aside, the contention of petitioners that cancellation of certify-cates
of title is civil in nature, not agrarian, hardly deserves thorough contemplation.
It is well-settled that the DAR, through its adjudication arm, i.e., the DARAB and its regional
and provincial adjudication boards, exercises quasi-judicial functions and jurisdiction on all matters
pertaining to an agrarian dispute or controversy and the implementation of agrarian reform laws.
Pertinently, it is provided in the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure that the DARAB has primary
and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian
disputes involving the implementation of the CARP and related agrarian reform laws. Such
jurisdiction shall extend to cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of Certificates
of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents which are registered with the Land
Registration Authority.
This Court has had the occasion to rule that the mere issuance of an emancipation patent
does not put the ownership of the agrarian reform beneficiary beyond attack and scrutiny.
Emancipation patents may be cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and regulations.
Section 12(g) of P.D. No. 946 issued on June 17, 1976 vested the then Court of Agrarian Relations
with jurisdiction over cases involving the cancellation of emancipation patents issued under P.D.
No. 266. Exclusive jurisdiction over such cases was later lodged with the DARAB under Section 1 of
Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure.
For sure, the jurisdiction of the DARAB cannot be deemed to disappear the moment a
certificate of title is issued, for, such certificates are not modes of transfer of property but merely
evidence of such transfer, and there can be no valid transfer of title should the CLOA, on which it
was grounded, be void. The same holds true in the case of a certificate of title issued by virtue of a
void emancipation patent.
BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM
OFFICER OF PAMPANGA, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ANGELES CITY, BENJAMIN POY LORENZO,
LAVERNIE POY LORENZO, DIOSDADO DE GUZMAN, ROSEMARY ENG TAY TAN, LEANDRO DE
GUZMAN, BENJAMIN G. LORENZO, ANTONIO MANALO, AND SOCORRO DE GUZMAN
G.R. Nos. 155322-29, June 27, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro
It is a basic rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint. The
peitioners complaints did not contain any allegation that would, even in the slightest, imply that the
issue to be resolved in this case involved an agrarian dispute which would transfer the jurisdiction to
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). In the action filed by the petitioner, the
issue to be resolved was who between the petitioner and the private respondents and their purported
predecessors-in-interest, have a valid title over the subject properties in light of the relevant facts and
applicable laws. The case thus involves a controversy relating to the ownership of the subject
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Whether or not the Department of Agrarian reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) has
jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling:
None. This case properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC .
This Court agrees with the BCDA that for this case to fall within the ambit of DARABs
jurisdiction, the issue must be one that involves an agrarian dispute, which is not attendant in the
instant case.
Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes
concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It
includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms
and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other
agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm
operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
It is a basic rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint. The
BCDAs complaints did not contain any allegation that would, even in the slightest, imply that the
issue to be resolved in this case involved an agrarian dispute. In the action filed by the BCDA, the
issue to be resolved was who between the BCDA and the private respondents and their purported
predecessors-in-interest, have a valid title over the subject properties in light of the relevant facts
and applicable laws. The case thus involves a controversy relating to the ownership of the subject
properties, which is beyond the scope of the phrase "agrarian dispute."
TORRENS SYSTEM
PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY (also known as Philtrust Bank) vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
and FORFOM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 150318, November 22, 2010, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Banks, their business being impressed with public interest, are expected to exercise more care
and prudence than private individuals in their dealings, even those involving registered lands. The rule
that persons dealing with registered lands can rely solely on the certificate of title does not apply to
banks.
Facts:
Forfom Development Corporation (Forfom) is engaged in agricultural business and real
estate development and owns several parcels of land in Pampanga. It is the registered owner of two
(2) parcels of land subject of the present controversy, situated in Angeles City, Pampanga, under
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 10896 and 64884 consisting of 1,126,530 and 571,014 square
meters, respectively. Sometime in 1989, plaintiff received a letter from the Department of Agrarian
Reform with the names Ma. Teresa Limcauco and Ellenora Limcauco as addressees. Upon
verification with the DAR and the Register of Deeds made by Forfom Vice-President at that time,
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It is a well-settled rule that a purchaser or mortgagee cannot close his eyes to facts which
should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith under the
belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor or mortgagor.
While the defective cancellation of Entry Nos. 274471-274472 by Entry No. 520469 might
not be evident to a private individual, the same should have been apparent to Banco Filipino. Banco
Filipino is not an ordinary mortgagee, but is a mortgagee-bank, whose business is impressed with
public interest. A banking institution is expected to exercise due diligence before entering into a
mortgage contract. The ascertainment of the status or condition of a property offered to it as
security for a loan must be a standard and indispensable part of its operations.
Banco Filipino cannot be deemed a mortgagee in good faith, much less a purchaser in good
faith at the foreclosure sale of Lot No. 356-A. Hence, the right of the Torbela siblings over Lot No.
356-A is superior over that of Banco Filipino; and as the true owners of Lot No. 356-A, the Torbela
siblings are entitled to a reconveyance of said property even from Banco Filipino.
REPUBLIC PHILIPPINES vs. GLORIA JARALVE substituted ALAN .JESS JARALVE DOCUMENTO,
JR., EDGARDO JARALVE, SERAFIN UY, JR., SHELLA UY, LAGNADA, SAY A-ANG, INTERNATIONAL
NIMFA PANTALEON STARG LAD AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ANNIE TAN, TEOTIMO
CABARRUBIAS, JESSICA DACLAN, MA. EMMA RAMAS, DANILO DEEN, and ERIC ANTHONY
DEEN.
G.R. No. 175177, October 24, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Under the Regalian doctrine embodied in our Constitution, land that has not been acquired
from the government, either by purchase, grant, or any other mode recognized by law, belongs to the
State as part of the public domain. Thus, it is indispensable for a person claiming title to a public land
to show that his title was acquired through such means
It is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The
applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land
subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through
survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of
the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.
Facts:
On October 22, 1996, Repondents Gloria Jaralve,5 Edgardo Jaralve, Serafin Uy, Jr., Shella Uy,
Nimfa Lagnada, Pantaleon Saya-Ang, Starglad International and Development Corporation, Annie
Tan, Teotimo Cabarrubias, Jessica Daclan, and Ma. Emma Ramas filed an Application with Branch
20 of the RTC of Cebu City, for the registration in their names of Lot Sgs-07-000307 (subject
property), under Presidential Decree No. 1529. Respondents declared that they were the co-owners
in fee simple of the subject property, a parcel of land with an area of 731,380 square meters,
belonging to Cadastral Lot 18590, and situated in Barangay Quiot, City of Cebu, and all the
improvements thereon. They alleged that they occupied the subject property and to the best of
their knowledge, there was no mortgage or encumbrance affecting it, and no one was in possession
Page 95 of 159
Page 96 of 159
Page 97 of 159
Page 98 of 159
2. Yes. Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, explicitly provides that [a] certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. In
Decaleng v. Bishop of the Missionary District of the Philippine Islands of Protestant Episcopal Church
in the United States of America, the Court declared that a Torrens title cannot be attacked
collaterally, and the issue on its validity can be raised only in an action expressly instituted for that
purpose.
A collateral attack is made when, in another action to obtain a different relief, the certificate
of title is assailed as an incident in said action. Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 was an application for
registration of the subject property instituted by Landicho before the CFI, which was granted by the
CFI in its Decision dated November 16, 1965. Rodriguez, asserting that he was Landichos lawful
successor-in-interest, filed an Omnibus Motion before the RTC in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098
seeking the issuance of a decree of registration and an OCT in his name for the subject property
pursuant to the said CFI judgment. Rodriguez acknowledged the existence of TCT No. 482970 of
PCCAI for the same property, but he simply brushed aside said certificate of title for allegedly being
spurious. Still, Rodriguez did not pray that TCT No. 482970 be declared void and/or cancelled and
even if he did, the RTC had no jurisdiction to grant such relief in a land registration case.
Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion in Land Reg. Case No. N5098, under the circumstances, is a
collateral attack on said certificate, which is proscribed under Section 48 of the Property
Registration Decree. If Rodriguez wants to have a decree of registration and OCT issued in his (or
even in Landichos name) for the subject property, he should have directly challenged the validity of
the extant TCT No. 482970 of PCCAI for the very same property in an action specifically instituted
for such purpose (i.e., petition for annulment and/or cancellation of title, petition for quieting of
title) and pray the said certificate of title be annulled or canceled. The proper court in an
appropriate action can try the factual and legal issues involving the alleged fatal defects in
Landichos TCT No. 167681 and/or its derivative TCTs, including TCT No. 482970 of PCCAI the
legal effects of Landichos sale of the subject property to BCPI (the predecessorininterest of
PCCAI) in 1971 and also to Rodriguez in 1996 and the good faith or bad faith of PCCAI, as well as
Rodriguez, in purchasing the subject property. The resolution of these issues will ultimately be
determinative of who between Rodriguez and PCCAI is the rightful owner of the subject property.
3. Yes. The LRA exists for the sole purpose of implementing and protecting the Torrens system of
land titling and registration. In particular, it is tasked with the following functions: (1) Issue decrees
of registration pursuant to final judgments of the courts in land registration proceedings and cause
the issuance by the Registrars of Land Titles and Deeds of the corresponding certificates of title (2)
Be the central repository of records relative to original registration of lands titled under the
Torrens system, including subdivision and consolidation plans of titled lands and (3) Extend
assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings and to the other
agencies of the government in the implementation of the land reform program.
The LRA, in this case, filed the Manifestation dated February 4, 2008 to inform the RTC that
the subject property is already covered by two TCTs, both uncancelled and extant[] and for this
reason, the LRA cannot comply with the RTC Order dated April 10, 2007, directing the issuance of a
decree of registration and an OCT for the same property in Landichos name, as it would further
aggravate the already existing problem of double titling[.] In filing said Manifestation, the LRA was
Page 99 of 159
Since there was still no compliance of "all that is required x x x for purposes of entry and
annotation" of the Deed of Sale as of June 25, 2004, we are constrained to rule that the registration
of the Notice of Levy on Attachment on June 17, 2004 should take precedence over the former.
Considering that the Notice of Levy on Attachment was deemed registered earlier than the Deed of
Sale, the TCT issued pursuant to the latter should contain the annotation of the Attachment.
In view of the foregoing, we find that the RTC was, in fact, acting properly when it ordered
the reinstatement of the Notice of Levy on Attachment in TCT No. R-22522. Since the RTC cannot be
considered as to have acted in grave abuse of its discretion in issuing such Order, the Petition for
Certiorari assailing the same should have been dismissed.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LYDIA CAPCO DE TENSUAN, represented by CLAUDIA C.
ARUELO
G.R. No. 171136, October 23, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro
The Supreme Court had allowed substantial compliance with the requirement that an
applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land as alienable and disposable and was lenient with the application of
the rule that a CENRO Certification, by itself does not prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
However, such substantial compliance and leniency will not be allowed where the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) or the DENR oppose the application on the ground that the land subject thereof is
inalienable.
Facts:
Respondent Lydia Capco de Tensuan filed with the MeTC an application for registration of
two parcels of land located in Taguig which she inherited from her father, claiming that her
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property even before the Second World
War. The Republic opposed the application, arguing among others that neither Tensuan nor her
predecessors in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject property since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. The Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA) also opposed the registration, arguing that their findings indicate
that the parcels of land are below the Laguna lake elevation which means that the parcels of land
are part of the bed of the Laguna Lake, and is thus considered public land.
Among the evidence Tensuan presented during trial was Certification from the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office of the DENR (CENRO-DENR) which states that said land
falls within alienable and disposable land.
The MeTC granted Tensuans application for registration, and the CA affirmed the decision.
Issue:
Should the application for registration of Tensuan be denied?
Ruling:
The petition is granted.
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the
State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of
such patrimony. The same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Consequently, the burden of proof to
overcome the presumption of ownership of lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified and alienated by the State to a
private person, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a
positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public
land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits
alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been officially delimited and
classified.
As proof that the subject property is alienable and disposable, Tensuan presented a
Certification dated July 29, 1999 issued by the CENRO-DENR which verified that said land falls
within alienable and disposable land under Project No. 27-B L.C. Map No. 2623 under Forestry
Administrative Order No. 4-1141 dated January 3, 1968. However, we have declared unequivocally
[in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.] that a CENRO Certification, by itself, is insufficient proof that a
parcel of land is alienable and disposable. The CENRO is not the official repository or legal
custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and disposable.
The CENRO should have attached an official publication of the DENR Secretarys issuance declaring
the land alienable and disposable.
While we may have been lenient in some cases and accepted substantial compliance with
the evidentiary requirements set forth in T.A.N. Properties, Inc., we cannot do the same for Tensuan
in the case at bar. We cannot afford to be lenient in cases where the Land Registration Authority
(LRA) or the DENR oppose the application for registration on the ground that the land subject
thereof is inalienable. In the present case, the DENR recognized the right of the LLDA to oppose
Tensuans Application for Registration; and the LLDA, in its Opposition, precisely argued that the
subject property is part of the Laguna Lake bed and, therefore, inalienable public land. We do not
even have to evaluate the evidence presented by the LLDA given the Regalian Doctrine. Since
Tensuan failed to present satisfactory proof that the subject property is alienable and disposable,
the burden of evidence did not even shift to the LLDA to prove that the subject property is part of
the Laguna Lake bed.
CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. PHIL-VILLE DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING
CORPORATION, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (through the OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL), and the REGISTEROF DEEDS OF METRO MANILA DISTRICT III, CALOOCAN
G .R. No. 160728, March 11, 2015, J. Leonardo-De Castro
A party claiming ownership over a parcel of land cannot bank on the weakness and defects of
the title of the adverse party but rely on the strength of his claim.
Facts:
Facts:
Alfonso Sandoval and Roman Ozaeta filed an Application for Registration of Title for two
parcels of land situated in Municipality of Antipolo. On May 31, 1966, the then Court of First
NCIP Regional Hearing Officer Brain S. Masweng issued a TRO and writ of injunction which
was affirmed by CA since it involves the protection of private respondents rights to their ancestral
domains in accordance with Section 7(b), (c) and (g)7 of the IPRA, the NCIP clearly has jurisdiction
over the dispute pursuant to Section 66.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Baguio City is beyond the ambit of the IPRA
2. Whether or not issuance of TRO and writ of injunction was proper.
Ruling:
1. No. The issue concerning the validity of the deed of sale between the Rufloes and Delos Reyes had
already been resolved with finality in the civil case by the RTC which declared that the signatures of
the alleged vendors, Angel and Adoracion Rufloe, had been forged. It is undisputed that the forged
deed of sale was null and void and conveyed no title. It is a well-settled principle that no one can
give what one does not have, nemo dat quod non habet. One can sell only what one owns or is
authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more right than what the seller can transfer
legally. Due to the forged deed of sale, Delos Reyes acquired no right over the subject property
which she could convey to the Burgos siblings. All the transactions subsequent to the falsified sale
between the spouses Rufloe and Delos Reyes are likewise void, including the sale made by the
Burgos siblings to their aunt, Leonarda.
2. No. An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that
some other person has a right to or interest in it, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the
purchase or before receiving any notice of another persons claim. The burden of proving the status
of a purchaser in good faith and for value lies upon one who asserts that status. This onus
probandi cannot be discharged by mere invocation of the ordinary presumption of good faith.
As a general rule, every person dealing with registered land, as in this case, may safely rely
on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and will in no way oblige him to go
beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property. However, this rule admits of an
unchallenged exception:
a person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the Torrens certificate of
title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further except when the party has
actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious
man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack
of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to
inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation.
The circumstances surrounding this case point to the absolute lack of good faith on the part
of respondents. The evidence shows that the Rufloes caused a notice of adverse claim to be
annotated on the title of Delos Reyes as early as November 5, 1979. The annotation of an adverse
claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property, and
serves as a notice and warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming
an interest on the same or may have a better right than the registered owner thereof. Despite the
notice of adverse claim, the Burgos siblings still purchased the property in question.Too, at the time
the Burgos siblings bought the subject property, an action for damages, and criminal case for estafa,
filed by the Rufloes against Delos Reyes, were both pending before the RTC of Pasay City. This
circumstance should have alerted the Burgos siblings as to the validity of Delos Reyes title and her
authority and legal right to sell the property.
In the same vein, Leonarda cannot be categorized as a purchaser in good faith. Since it was
the Rufloes who continued to have actual possession of the property, Leonarda should have
investigated the nature of their possession.
Settled is the rule that a buyer of real property that is in the possession of a person other
than the seller must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in possession. Otherwise,
without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded as a buyer in good faith.
THE HEIRS OF ROMANA SAVES, et al. vs. THE HEIRS OF ESCOLASTICO SAVES, et al.
G.R. No. 152866, October 6, 2010, J. Leonardo-De Castro
It is a well-settled doctrine that one who deals with property registered under the Torrens
system need not go beyond the same, but only has to rely on the certificates of title, he is charged with
notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the certificates. But, a buyer of real
property in possession of persons other than the seller must be wary and should investigate the rights
of those in possession, for without such inquiry the buyer can hardly be regarded as a buyer in good
faith and cannot have any right over the property.
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property without notice that some other person has
a right to or interest in such property and pays its fair price before he has notice of the adverse claims
and interest of another person in the same property.
Laches is defined as the failure to assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to
assert it.
Facts:
Sometime on January 1921, several persons filed their respective claims before the then,
Court of First Instance of the province of Oriental Negros for the titling of the respective lots they
occupy, among them were Severo Chaves and Benedicta Chaves, who filed their claim for Lot No.
382, to be titled in their names, together with Escolastico Saves, Maximo Saves, Romana Saves,
Rafaela Saves, and Januaria Saves.
A Decision was rendered by the court, adjudicating several parcels of land to different
claimants. Decree No. 177831 was issued by the United States of America for the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Negros ordering the registration of Lot No. 382 in the names of
Benedicta Saves, Escolastica Saves, the sons of Romana Saves, deceased, Rafaela Saves, Januaria
Saves, and the sons of Maximo Saves, deceased.
Thereafter, Severo Saves died intestate, leaving his wife, Teresa Ramirez, his four (4)
surviving children, and the heirs of his two children who predeceased him. Adelaida Martinez and
Felicidad Martinez, who were the heirs of Januaria Saves, who predeceased them, sold their 1/6
share in Lot No. 382 to a certain Gaudencia Valencia in a Motion for the Issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title, filed by Gaudencia Valencia.
A Deed of Sale was executed by the heirs of Romana Saves, namely: Sinforosa Alimayda,
Juan Alimayda, Vicente Alimayda, Felimon Alimayda and Porferia Alimayda; the sole heir of Rafaela
Saves, Pablo Saves Dizon; and the sole heir of Escolastico Saves, Teodoro Saves, their respective 1/6
share in Lot No. 382, or 3/6 of the property, to Gaudencia Valencia.
Benedicta Saves and Marcela Saves, the sole heir of Maximo Saves, sold their respective 1/6
share in Lot No. 382, also to Gaudencia Valencia, or 2/6 of the property. Considering that all the 1/6
share, rights, and participation of each co-owner in Lot No. 382 were already sold to Gaudencia
Valencia, she initiated the titling of the said property under her name in a Motion for Issuance of
However, in Civil Cases Nos. 17347 and 17364, both of the then CFI of Rizal, the
compromise agreement was declared null and void for being a forgery, and the partial decision
rendered in accordance therewith was likewise declared null and void and of no force and effect. On
appeal to the CA sustained the nullity of the Kasunduan. Thus, on motion by the heirs of Gregorio
Bajamonde, the lower court in Civil Case No. C-760 issued the order dated August 29, 1986,
declaring that any transfer of Lots 75 and 54 to Araneta Institute of Agriculture or Gregorio Araneta
University Foundation as rescinded and ordering the Register of Deeds to issue a new Transfer
Certificate of Title over lots 75 and 54 in the name of Gregorio Bajamonde or heirs. An order for the
execution of the aforesaid joint order was issued.
GAUF filed with the CA a petition for annulment of the aforementioned Joint Order alleging
that the twin orders were issued by the trial court without jurisdiction as the same constituted a
collateral attack on its certificate of title in violation of Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529
(P.D. 1529), otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. The CA denied such petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the joint orders constituted a collateral attack on Aranetas title
Ruling:
No. An action or proceeding is deemed an attack on a title when the object of the action is to
nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The
attack is direct when the object of the action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its
enforcement. On the other hand, it is indirect or collateral when, in an action or proceeding to
obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.
Here, while it may be true that Civil Case No. C-760 was originally an action for specific
performance and damages, nonetheless the case cannot constitute a collateral attack on the
petitioner's title which, to begin with, was irregularly and illegally issued. It bears stressing that the
source of GAUF's title was the Compromise Agreement purportedly executed by Gregorio
Bajamonde, et al. on November 28, 1961. This Compromise Agreement was approved by the trial
court in Civil Case No. C-760 in its Partial Decision dated December 23, 1961. As petitioners own
evidence shows, the subject property was conveyed to it in compliance with and in satisfaction of
the said Partial Decision in Civil Case No. C-760 and the writ of execution issued in connection
therewith. The same Compromise Agreement and Partial Decision, however, were declared null and
void in Civil Cases Nos. 17347 and 17364 and likewise effectively invalidated in CA-G.R. No. 45330R. The rule that a title issued under the Torrens System is presumed valid and, hence, is the best
proof of ownership does not apply where the very certificate itself is faulty as to its purported
origin, as in the present case.
With the reality that the presumption of authenticity and regularity enjoyed by the
petitioners title has been overcome and overturned by the aforementioned decisions nullifying the
aforesaid Compromise Agreement from whence the petitioner's title sprung, that title can never be
indefeasible as its issuance was replete with badges of fraud and irregularities that rendered the
same nugatory. Well-settled is the rule that the indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles
secured by fraud and misrepresentation. In view of these circumstances, it was as if no title at all
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "the general rule is that in the case of two certificates of
title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails. Applying the principle
Primus Tempore, Portior Jure (First in Time, Stronger in Right) in this case, it was found that ALIs
title was the valid title having been derived from the earlier OCT.
Further, Carpos action is barred by prescription and laches. OCT No. 242 had become
incontrovertible after the lapse of one year from the time a decree of registration was issued, any
action for reconveyance that the Carpos could have availed of is also barred. Although the
complaint was for quieting of title, it is in essence an action for reconveyance based on an implied
or constructive trust, considering that the Carpos were alleging in said complaint that there was a
serious mistake, if not fraud, in the issuance of OCT No. 242 in favor of ALIs predecessor-ininterest. It is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance, which is a legal remedy granted to a
landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in anothers name, must
be filed within ten years from the issuance of the title, since such issuance operates as a
constructive notice. Since ALIs title is traced to an OCT issued in 1950, the ten-year prescriptive
period expired in 1960.
Laches is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. It
does not involve mere lapse or passage of time, but is principally an impediment to the assertion or
enforcement of a right, which has become under the circumstances inequitable or unfair to permit.
In the instant case, the Carpos, as well as their predecessor-in-interest, have not shown that they
have taken judicial steps to nullify OCT No. 242, from which ALIs title was derived, for 45 years. To
allow them to do so now, and if successful, would be clearly unjust and inequitable to those who
relied on the validity of said OCT, the innocent purchasers for value.
EMERITA MUOZ vs. ATTY. VICTORIANO R. YABUT, JR. and SAMUEL GO CHAN
G.R. No. 142676, June 6, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro
An action for declaration of nullity of title and recovery of ownership of real property, or reconveyance, is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only
although it concerns the right to a tangible thing. Any judgment therein is binding only upon the
parties properly impleaded. The effect of the said judgment cannot be extended to BPI Family and the
spouses Chan by simply issuing an alias writ of execution against them. No man shall be affected by
any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment
rendered by the court. In the same manner, a writ of execution can be issued only against a party and
not against one who did not have his day in court.
Facts:
The subject property is a house and lot at No. 48 Scout Madrian St., Diliman, Quezon City,
formerly owned by Yee L. Ching. Yee L. Ching is married to Emilia M. Ching (spouses Ching),
Muozs sister. As consideration for the valuable services rendered by Muoz to the spouses
Chings family, Yee L. Ching agreed to have the subject property transferred to Muoz. By virtue of a
Deed of Absolute Sale, seemingly executed by Yee L. Ching in favor of Muoz, the latter acquired a
Transfer Certificate of Title covering the subject property in her name.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision in Civil Case No. Q-28580 may be implemented against Spouses
Go and BPI Family Savings Bank
Ruling:
No, the decision in Civil Case No. Q-28580 cannot be implemented against the Spouses Go
and BPI Family Savings Bank.
Since they were not impleaded as parties and given the opportunity to participate in Civil
Case No. Q-28580, the final judgment in said case cannot bind BPI Family and the spouses Chan. The
effect of the said judgment cannot be extended to BPI Family and the spouses Chan by simply
issuing an alias writ of execution against them. No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which
he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court. In
the same manner, a writ of execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did
not have his day in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are bound by the judgment
therein and by writs of execution issued pursuant thereto.
We further stress that Section 48 of Property Registration Decree, clearly provides that "[a]
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law." Herein, several Torrens titles were already
issued after the cancellation of Muozs. Certificates of title had been successively issued to Emilia
M. Ching, spouses Go, BPI Family, and spouses Chan. Civil Case No. Q-28580, in which a final
judgment had already been rendered, specifically challenged the validity of the certificates of title of
Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go only. To have the present certificate of title of the spouses Chan
cancelled, Muoz must institute another case directly attacking the validity of the same.
Although the RTC-Branch 95 had declared with finality in Civil Case No. Q-28580 that the
titles of Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go were null and void, there is yet no similar
determination on the titles of BPI Family and the spouses Chan. As we have previously discussed
herein, Muoz cannot have the spouses Chans TCT No. 53297 cancelled by a mere motion for the
issuance of an alias writ of execution in Civil Case No. Q-28580, when the spouses Chan were not
parties to the case. Civil Case No. Q-28580 was a proceeding in personam, and the final judgment
rendered therein declaring null and void the titles to the subject property of Emilia M. Ching and
the spouses Go should bind only the parties thereto. Furthermore, despite the void titles of Emilia
M. Ching and the spouses Go, the derivative titles of BPI Family and the spouses Chan may still be
valid provided that they had acquired the same in good faith and for value.
JOSE FERNANDO, JR., ZOILO FERNANDO, NORMA FERNANDO BANARES, ROSARIO FERNANDO
TANGKENCGO, HEIRS OF TOMAS FERNANDO, represented by ALFREDO V. FERNANDO, HEIRS
OF GUILLERMO FERNANDO, represented by Ronnie H. Fernando, HEIRS OF ILUMINADA
FERNANDO, represented by Benjamin Estrella and HEIRS OF GERMOGENA FERNANDO vs.
LEON ACUNA, HERMOGENES FERNANDO, HEIRS OF SPOUSES ANTONIO FERNANDO AND
FELISA CAMACHO, represented by HERMOGENES FERNANDO
G.R. No. 161030, September 14, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Whether or not prescription or laches has already set in to bar the filing of Civil Case No. 98-
Ruling:
Civil Case No. 98-021 was filed more than 28 years from the issuance of TCT No. T5,427. This period is unreasonably long for a party seeking to enforce its right to file the
appropriate case. Thus, petitioners claim that they had not slept on their rights is patently
unconvincing.
Petitioners claim that although the complaint was captioned for CANCELLATION OF
TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-5,427, RECONVEYANCE, WITH ACCOUNTING,
RECEIVERSHIP, AND APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY PROHIBITORY INJUNCTION
PLUS DAMAGES, the complaint is substantially in the nature of an action to quiet title which
allegedly does not prescribe. Petitioners also allege that the cases cited by the Court of Appeals in
ruling that prescription has set in, particularly that of Declaro v. Court of Appeals, which in turn
cites Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, are inapplicable to the case at bar since neither fraud nor
forgery was attendant in said cases.
As regards petitioners claim that the complaint in Civil Case No. 98-021 is really one of
quieting of title which does not prescribe, it appears that petitioners are referring to the doctrine
laid down in the often-cited case of Heirs of Jose Olviga v. Court of Appeals.
The cause of action of petitioners in Civil Case No. 98-021, wherein they claim that Minors
predecessor-in-interest acquired the subject property by forgery, can indeed be considered as that
of enforcing an implied trust.
However, the Court made a clear distinction in Olviga: when the plaintiff in such action is
not in possession of the subject property, the action prescribes in ten years from the date of
registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property. When
the plaintiff is in possession of the subject property, the action, being in effect that of quieting of
title to the property, does not prescribe. In the case at bar, petitioners (who are the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 98-021) are not in possession of the subject property. Civil Case No. 98-021, if it were to be
considered as that of enforcing an implied trust, should have therefore been filed within ten years
from the issuance of TCT No. T-5,427 on December 22, 1969. Civil Case No. 98-021 was, however,
filed on August 20, 1998, which was way beyond the prescriptive period.
PUBLIC LAND ACT
BARCELIZA P. CAPISTRANO vs. DARRYL LIMCUANDO and FE S. SUMIRAN
G.R. No. 152413, February 13, 2009, J. Leonardo-De Castro
The ultimate objective of the law is "to promote public policy, that is, to provide home and
decent living for destitutes, aimed at providing a class of independent small landholders which is the
bulwark of peace and order.
Facts:
Petitioner Barceliza Capistrano owned a parcel of land located at Barangay Talaga, Rizal,
Laguna, covered by Original Certificate of Title pursuant to a Free Patent issued on August 23, 1977.
She sold this parcel of land with a right of repurchase in favor of spouses Felimon Zuasola and Anita
Subida on December 31, 1985.
On February 1, 1989, petitioner sold half of the same parcel of land to respondents Darryl
Limcuando and Fe Sumiran for the price of P75,000.00 on the understanding that respondents shall
pay the amount of P10,000.00 as partial payment and the balance to be paid by monthly
installments. Petitioner Capistrano received the partial payment of P10,000.00 but signed a deed of
absolute sale. Subsequently, respondents defaulted on their monthly instalments despite repeated
demands. Respondents learned afterwards that the disputed land had been previously sold by
petitioner Capistrano to the spouses Zuasola and Subida which led respondents to file a criminal
complaint for estafa against petitioner. Petitioner was eventually convicted.
On August 19, 1991, petitioner repurchased the parcel of land from the spouses Zuasola and
Subida. She also offered to repurchase from respondents the portion of the disputed land which she
sold to them but the latter refused. A Transfer Certificate of Title over the disputed land was issued
in the names of respondents.
Petitioner Capistrano filed a complaint for the annulment of the subject deed of sale alleging
that the sale was a nullity from the beginning. As an alternative cause of action, petitioner
Capistrano sought to repurchase the disputed land from respondents based on Section 119 of CA
No. 141 (Public Land Act). The RTC sustained the validity of the subject deed of sale and denied the
right of the petitioner to repurchase the disputed land from the respondents. CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner Capistrano should be allowed to repurchase the land from
respondent
Ruling:
No. It is true that Section 118 of the Public Land Act pertains to the prohibition of the sale or
encumbrance of a land acquired through free patent and homestead provision within a period of
five years from the date of the issuance of the patent or grant. On the other hand, Section 119 of the
said law subjects said lands alienation, impliedly after the expiration of the prohibitive period,
upon a right of repurchase by the homesteader, his widow, or heirs, within a period of five years
from the date of its conveyance. Indeed, these provisions complement the intent and purpose of the
law "to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the
State had gratuitously given to him."
Issue:
Whether or not Vallacar Transit is liable for damages
Ruling:
No. Vallacar Transit is not liable for damages.
The Court agrees with petitioner, nonetheless, that respondent was unable to prove
imputable negligence on the part of petitioner.
There is merit in the argument of the petitioner that Article 2180 of the Civil Code
imputing fault or negligence on the part of the employer for the fault or negligence of its employee
does not apply to petitioner since the fault or negligence of its employee driver, Cabanilla, which
would have made the latter liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, has never
been established by respondent. To the contrary, the totality of the evidence presented during trial
shows that the proximate cause of the collision of the bus and motorcycle is attributable solely to
the negligence of the driver of the motorcycle, Catubig.
The RTC concisely articulated and aptly concluded that Catubigs overtaking of a slowmoving truck ahead of him, while approaching a curve on the highway, was the immediate and
proximate cause of the collision which led to his own death, to wit:
Based on the evidence on record, it is crystal clear that the immediate and proximate cause of the
collision is the reckless and negligent act of Quintin Catubig, Jr. and not because the Ceres Bus was
running very fast. Even if the Ceres Bus is running very fast on its lane, it could not have caused the
collision if not for the fact that Quintin Catubig, Jr. tried to overtake a cargo truck and encroached
on the lane traversed by the Ceres Bus while approaching a curve. As the driver of the motorcycle,
Quintin Catubig, Jr. has not observed reasonable care and caution in driving his motorcycle which
an ordinary prudent driver would have done under the circumstances. Recklessness on the part of
Quintin Catubig, Jr. is evident when he tried to overtake a cargo truck while approaching a curve.
The evidence shows that the driver of the bus, Cabanilla, was driving his vehicle along the
proper lane, while the driver of the motorcycle, Catubig, had overtaken a vehicle ahead of him as he
was approaching a curvature on the road, in disregard of the provision of the law on reckless
driving, at the risk of his life and that of his employee, Emperado.
The presumption that employers are negligent under Article 2180 of the Civil Code flows
from the negligence of their employees. Having adjudged that the immediate and proximate cause
of the collision resulting in Catubigs death was his own negligence, and there was no fault or
negligence on Cabanillas part, then such presumption of fault or negligence on the part of
petitioner, as Cabanillas employer, does not even arise. Thus, it is not even necessary to delve into
the defense of petitioner that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of Cabanilla
as its employee driver.
MORAL DAMAGES
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGER TEJERO
ATTORNEYS FEES
THE LAW FIRM OF RAYMUNDO A. ARMOVIT vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BENGSON
COMMERCIAL BUILDING, INC.
G.R. No. 154559, October 5, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro
While the body of the Decision quoted the agreement of the parties stating the compensation
as 20% contingent fee computed on the value to be recovered by favorable judgment on the cases. It is
basic that when there is a conflict between the dispositive portion or fallo of a Decision and the
opinion of the court contained in the text or body of the judgment, the former prevails over the latter.
This rule rests on the theory that the fallo is the final order while the opinion in the body is merely a
statement ordering nothing.
Facts:
Bengson Commercial Building, Inc. obtained loans from the Government Service Insurance
System in the total amount of P4,250,000.00, secured by real estate and chattel mortgages. When
BCBI defaulted in the payment of the amortizations, GSIS extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged
properties and sold them at public auction where it emerged as the highest bidder.
BCBI, with the Armovit Law Firm as its counsel filed an action to annul the extrajudicial
foreclosure on with the then Court of First Instance of La Union. After trial, the CFI rendered a
Decision: (1) nullifying the foreclosure of BCBIs mortgaged properties; (2) ordering the cancellation
of the titles issued to GSIS and the issuance of new ones in the name of BCBI; (3) ordering BCBI to
pay GSIS P900,000.00 for the debenture bonds; and (4) directing GSIS to (a) restore to BCBI full
possession of the foreclosed properties, (b) restructure the P4.25 Million worth of loans at the legal
rate of interest from the finality of the judgment, (c) pay BCBI P1.9 Million representing accrued
monthly rentals and P20,000.00 rental monthly until the properties are restored to BCBIs
possession, and (d) pay the costs.
GSIS appealed to the Court of Appeals. It appears that the Armovit Law Firm ceased to be
the counsel of BCBI sometime before the appeal of GSIS. The said law firm and BCBI dispute the
legality of the replacement, with BCBI claiming that the Armovit Law Firm had been remiss in its
duties as BCBIs counsel. On January 19, 1988, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision with
modification. The GSIS did not file a Motion for Reconsideration or an appeal therefrom.
It appears that when Atty. Armovit sought execution with the court a quo, he was informed
by Romualdo Bengzon, president of the respondent corporation, that the firm had retained the
services of Atty. Pacifico Yadao. He was also informed that the company would pay him the agreed
compensation and that Atty. Yadao's fees were covered by a separate agreement. The private
respondent, however, later ignored his billings and over the phone, directed him allegedly not to
take part in the execution proceedings. Forthwith, he sought the entry of an attorney's lien in the
records of the case.
This Court rendered its Decision in the foregoing case on September 27, 1991 that the
private respondent is ORDERED to pay the petitioner the sum of P252,000.00. Neither party filed a
Motion for Reconsideration from the Decision of this Court. Thus, the Decision became final and
executory. On February 24, 1993, the RTC issued the first assailed Order denying the Armovit Law
There is a contractual stipulation in the Promissory Note that in case of petitioners default
on the terms and conditions of the said Promissory Note by failing to pay any installment due, then
this will render the entire balance of the obligation immediately due and payable. The total
obligation of petitioners amounted to P1,321,313.00 (P1,336,313.00 less P15,000.00) plus the 12%
interest per annum of the said balance, as well as attorneys fees equivalent to 5% of the total
outstanding indebtedness. The Promissory Note was signed by both parties voluntarily, thus the
stipulation therein has the force of law between the parties and should be complied with by them in
good faith. The RTC and CA, in awarding attorneys fees equivalent to 20% of petitioners total
obligation, disregarded the stipulation expressly agreed upon in the Promissory Note and instead
increased the award of attorneys fees. It is undeniable from the evidence submitted by respondent
herself to the trial court that the agreement of the parties with respect to attorneys fees is only 5%
of the total obligation and the trial court granted the 20% rate based on the testimony of
respondents counsel who opined that the same is the reasonable amount of attorneys fees, despite
the unequivocal agreement of the parties.
2. On the matter of interest, the Court affirms the amount of interest awarded by the two
courts, there being a written stipulation as to its rate. The stipulated interest in this case is
12% per annum. As of July 1994, the total indebtedness of petitioners amounted
to P1,321,313.00. From then on, theP1,321,313.00 should have earned the stipulated
interest of 12% per annum plus attorneys fees equivalent to 5% of the total outstanding
indebtedness. However, once the judgment becomes final and executory and the amount
adjudged is still not satisfied, legal interest at the rate of 12% applies until full payment. The
rate of 12% per annum is proper because the interim period from the finality of judgment,
awarding a monetary claim and until payment thereof, is deemed to be equivalent to a
forbearance of credit. The actual base for the computation of this 12% interest is the
amount due upon finality of this decision.
GRADUATION OF DAMAGES
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNOLD GARCHITORENA Y CAMBA A.KA. JUNIOR; JOEY
PAMPLONA A.K.A. NATO AND JESSIE GARCIA Y ADORINO
G. R. No. 175605, August 28, 2009, J. Leonardo-De Castro
The increase in the award of damages is predicated on the qualifying circumstances present in
the case and not on the penalty imposed. In case of moral damages, it need not be alleged and proved
as the emotional suffering of the heirs from the vicious killing of the victim cannot be denied. As to the
loss of earning capacity, the same need not be proved, as an exception, when the victim is selfemployed and earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws or when employed as a
daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.
Facts:
Arnold Garchitorena, Joey Pamplona and Jessie Garcia were charged of the crime of murder
for the killing of Mauro Biay. During the trial, the prosecution presented Dulce Borero, the sister of
the accused, the forensic expert who conducted the autopsy over the victim and the victims widow,
Amelia Biay.
Ruling:
Yes. While the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty provided
for by law for a heinous offense is still death and the offense is still heinous. Consequently, the civil
indemnity for the victim is still P75,000.00. In People v. Quiachon, we explained that even if the
penalty of death was not to be imposed on appellant because of the prohibition in Republic Act No.
9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 was still proper. Following the ratiocination in People v.
Victor, the said award is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty, but on the fact
that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the
commission of the crime.
Hence, we modify the award of civil indemnity by the trial court from P50,000.00
to P75,000.00. Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of
proof other than the commission of the crime. Likewise the award of P50,000.00 for moral damages
is modified and increased to P75,000.00, consistent with recent jurisprudence on heinous crimes
where the imposable penalty is death, it is reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to R.A. 9346. The
award of moral damages does not require allegation and proof of the emotional suffering of the
heirs, since the emotional wounds from the vicious killing of the victim cannot be denied. The trial
courts award of exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00 shall, however, be reduced
to P30,000.00, also pursuant to the latest jurisprudence on the matter.
As to the award of actual damages amounting to P16,700.00, we modify the same. In People
v. Villanueva, this Court declared that when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial
amount to less than P25,000.00, as in this case, the award of temperate damages for P25,000.00 is
justified in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount. In the light of such ruling, the victims heirs in
the present case should, therefore, be awarded temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00.
The award of P408,000.00 for loss of earning capacity is justified. As a rule, documentary
evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By
way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of
documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-employed and earning less than the minimum
wage under current labor laws, in which case judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the
deceaseds line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a
daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. It cannot be
disputed that the victim, at the time of his death, was self-employed and earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws. The computation arrived at by the trial court was in
accordance with the formula for computing the award for loss of earning capacity. Thus,
Award for = 2/3 [80-age at time of death] x [gross annual income 50% (GAI)]
lost earnings
= 2/3 [80-29] x P24,000.00 P12,000.00
= (34) x (P12,000.00)
= P408,000.00
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICHARD O. SARCIA
G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Whether or not the damages awarded should be reduced on the ground of minority of
Ruling:
No. A review of the nature and purpose of the damages imposed on the convicted offender
is in order. Article 107 of the Revised Penal Code defines the term indemnification, which is
included in the civil liability prescribed by Article 104 of the same Code, as follows:
Art. 107. Indemnification-What is included. Indemnification for consequential
damages shall include not only those caused the injured party, but also those
suffered by his family or by a third person by reason of the crime.