Buckleyv.

Valeo

U.S.SupremeCourt

BUCKLEYv.VALEO,424U.S.1(1976)
424U.S.1
BUCKLEYETAL.v.VALEO,SECRETARYOFTHEUNITED
STATESSENATE,ETAL.
APPEALFROMTHEUNITEDSTATESCOURTOFAPPEALSFOR
THE
DISTRICTOFCOLUMBIACIRCUIT.
No.75436.
ArguedNovember10,1975.
DecidedJanuary30,1976.*
[Footnote*]TogetherwithNo.75437,Buckleyetal.v.Valeo,SecretaryoftheUnited
StatesSenate,etal.,onappealfromtheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheDistrictof
Columbia.
TheFederalElectionCampaignActof1971(Act),asamendedin1974,(a)limits
politicalcontributionstocandidatesforfederalelectiveofficebyanindividualoragroup
to$1,000andbyapoliticalcommitteeto$5,000toanysinglecandidateperelection,
withanoverallannuallimitationof$25,000byanindividualcontributor(b)limits
expendituresbyindividualsorgroups"relativetoaclearlyidentifiedcandidate"to
$1,000percandidateperelection,andbyacandidatefromhispersonalorfamilyfundsto
variousspecifiedannualamountsdependinguponthefederalofficesought,andrestricts
overallgeneralelectionandprimarycampaignexpendituresbycandidatestovarious
specifiedamounts,againdependinguponthefederalofficesought(c)requirespolitical
committeestokeepdetailedrecordsofcontributionsandexpenditures,includingthe
nameandaddressofeachindividualcontributinginexcessof$10,andhisoccupation
and

Page424U.S.1,2
principalplaceofbusinessifhiscontributionexceeds$100,andtofilequarterlyreports
withtheFederalElectionCommissiondisclosingthesourceofeverycontribution
exceeding$100andtherecipientandpurposeofeveryexpenditureover$100,andalso
requireseveryindividualorgroup,otherthanacandidateorpoliticalcommittee,making
contributionsorexpendituresexceeding$100"otherthanbycontributiontoapolitical
committeeorcandidate"tofileastatementwiththeCommissionand(d)createsthe
eightmemberCommissionastheadministeringagencywithrecordkeeping,disclosure,
andinvestigatoryfunctionsandextensiverulemaking,adjudicatory,andenforcement
powers,andconsistingoftwomembersappointedbythePresidentprotemporeofthe
Senate,twobytheSpeakeroftheHouse,andtwobythePresident(allsubjectto
confirmationbybothHousesofCongress),andtheSecretaryoftheSenateandtheClerk

Buckleyv.Valeo
oftheHouseasexofficiononvotingmembers.SubtitleHoftheInternalRevenueCode
of1954(IRC),asamendedin1974,providesforpublicfinancingofPresidential
nominatingconventionsandgeneralelectionandprimarycampaignsfromgeneral
revenuesandallocatessuchfundingtoconventionsandgeneralelectioncampaignsby
establishingthreecategories:(1)"major"parties(thosewhosecandidatereceived25%or
moreofthevoteinthemostrecentelection),whichreceivefullfunding,(2)"minor"
parties(thosewhosecandidatereceivedatleast5%butlessthan25%ofthevotesatthe
lastelection),whichreceiveonlyapercentageofthefundstowhichthemajorpartiesare
entitledand(3)"new"parties(allotherparties),whicharelimitedtoreceiptofpost
electionfundsorarenotentitledtoanyfundsiftheircandidatereceiveslessthan5%of
thevote.AprimarycandidateforthePresidentialnominationbyapoliticalpartywho
receivesmorethan$5,000fromprivatesources(countingonlythefirst$250 ofeach
contribution)ineachofatleast20Statesiseligibleformatchingpublicfunds.Appellants
(variousfederalofficeholdersandcandidates,supportingpoliticalorganizations,and
others)broughtsuitagainstappellees(theSecretaryoftheSenate,ClerkoftheHouse,
ComptrollerGeneral,AttorneyGeneral,andtheCommission)seekingdeclaratoryand
injectivereliefagainsttheabovestatutoryprovisionsonvariousconstitutionalgrounds.
TheCourtofAppeals,oncertifiedquestionsfromtheDistrictCourt,upheldallbutone
ofthestatutoryprovisions.AthreejudgeDistrictCourtupheldtheconstitutionalityof
SubtitleH.Held:

Page424U.S.1,3
1.ThislitigationpresentsanArt.III"caseorcontroversy,"sincethecomplaintdiscloses
thatatleastsomeoftheappellantshaveasufficient"personalstake"inadeterminationof
theconstitutionalvalidityofeachofthechallengedprovisionstopresent"arealand
substantialcontroversyadmittingofspecificreliefthroughadecreeofaconclusive
character,asdistinguishedfromanopinionadvisingwhatthelawwouldbeupona
hypotheticalstateoffacts."AetnaLifeIns.Co.v.Haworth, 300U.S.227,241.Pp.11
12.
2.TheAct'scontributionprovisionsareconstitutional,buttheexpenditureprovisions
violatetheFirstAmendment.Pp.1259.
(a)Thecontributionprovisions,alongwiththosecoveringdisclosure,areappropriate
legislativeweaponsagainsttherealityorappearanceofimproperinfluencestemming
fromthedependenceofcandidatesonlargecampaigncontributions,andtheceilings
imposedaccordinglyservethebasicgovernmentalinterestinsafeguardingtheintegrity
oftheelectoralprocesswithoutdirectly impingingupontherightsofindividualcitizens
andcandidatestoengageinpoliticaldebateanddiscussion.Pp.2338.
(b)TheFirstAmendmentrequirestheinvalidationoftheAct'sindependentexpenditure
ceiling,itslimitationonacandidate'sexpendituresfromhisownpersonalfunds,andits
ceilingsonoverallcampaignexpenditures,sincethoseprovisionsplacesubstantialand
directrestrictionsontheabilityofcandidates,citizens,andassociationstoengagein
protectedpoliticalexpression,restrictionsthattheFirstAmendmentcannottolerate.Pp.
3959.

Buckleyv.Valeo

3.TheAct'sdisclosureandrecordkeepingprovisionsareconstitutional.Pp.6084.
(a)Thegeneraldisclosureprovisions,whichservesubstantialgovernmentalinterestsin
informingtheelectorateandpreventingthecorruptionofthepoliticalprocess,arenot
overbroadinsofarastheyapplytocontributionstominorpartiesandindependent
candidates.Noblanketexemptionforminorpartiesiswarrantedsincesuchpartiesin
ordertoproveinjuryasaresultofapplicationtothemofthedisclosureprovisionsneed
showonlyareasonableprobabilitythatthecompelleddisclosureofaparty'scontributors'
nameswillsubjectthemtothreats,harassment,orreprisalsinviolationoftheirFirst
Amendmentassociationalrights.Pp.6474.
(b)Theprovisionfordisclosurebythosewhomakeindependent

Page424U.S.1,4
contributionsandexpenditures,asnarrowlyconstruedtoapplyonly(1)whentheymake
contributionsearmarkedforpolitical purposesorauthorizedorrequestedbyacandidate
orhisagenttosomepersonotherthanacandidateorpoliticalcommitteeand(2)when
theymakeanexpenditureforacommunicationthatexpresslyadvocatestheelectionor
defeatofaclearlyidentifiedcandidateisnotunconstitutionallyvagueanddoesnot
constituteapriorrestraintbutisareasonableandminimallyrestrictivemethodof
furtheringFirstAmendmentvaluesbypublicexposureofthefederalelectionsystem.Pp.
7482.
(c)Theextensionoftherecordkeepingprovisionstocontributionsassmallasthosejust
above$10andthedisclosureprovisionstocontributionsabove$100isnotonthisrecord
overbroadsinceitcannotbesaidtobeunrelatedtotheinformationalandenforcement
goalsof thelegislation.Pp.8284.
4.SubtitleHoftheIRCisconstitutional.Pp.85109.
(a)SubtitleHisnotinvalidundertheGeneralWelfareClausebut,asameanstoreform
theelectoralprocess,wasclearlyachoicewithinthepowergrantedtoCongressbythe
Clausetodecidewhichexpenditureswillpromotethegeneralwelfare.Pp.9092.
(b)NordoesSubtitleHviolatetheFirstAmendment.Ratherthanabridging,restricting,
orcensoringspeech,itrepresentsanefforttousepublicmoneytofacilitateandenlarge
publicdiscussionandparticipationintheelectoralprocess.Pp.9293.
(c)SubtitleH,beinglessburdensomethanballotaccessregulationsandhavingbeen
enactedinfurtheranceofvitalgovernmentalinterestsinrelievingmajorpartycandidates
fromtherigorsofsolicitingprivatecontributions,innotfundingcandidateswholack
significantpublicsupport,andineliminatingrelianceonlargeprivatecontributionsfor
fundingofconventionsandcampaigns,doesnotinvidiouslydiscriminateagainstminor
andnewpartiesinviolationoftheDueProcessClauseoftheFifthAmendment.Pp.93
108.
(d)InvalidationofthespendinglimitprovisionsoftheActdoesnotrenderSubtitleH
unconstitutional,buttheSubtitleisseverablefromsuch provisionsandisnotdependent
upontheexistenceofagenerallyapplicableexpenditurelimit.Pp.108109.

Buckleyv.Valeo
5.TheCommission'scompositionastoallbutitsinvestigativeandinformativepowers
violatesArt.II,2,cl.2.WithrespecttotheCommission'spowers,allofwhichareripe
forreview,

Page424U.S.1,5
toenforcetheAct,includingprimaryresponsibilityforbringingcivilactionsagainst
violators,tomakerulesforcarryingouttheAct,totemporarilydisqualifyfederal
candidatesforfailingtofilerequiredreports,andtoauthorizeconventionexpendituresin
excessofthespecifiedlimits,theprovisionsoftheActvestingsuchpowersinthe
CommissionandtheprescribedmethodofappointmentofmembersoftheCommission
totheextentthatamajorityofthevotingmembersareappointedbythePresidentpro
temporeoftheSenateandtheSpeakeroftheHouse,violatetheAppointmentsClause,
whichprovidesinpertinentpartthatthePresidentshallnominate,andwiththeSenate's
adviceandconsentappoint,all"OfficersoftheUnitedStates,"whoseappointmentsare
nototherwiseprovidedfor,butthatCongressmayvesttheappointmentofsuchinferior
officers,asitdeemsproper,inthePresidentalone,inthecourts,orintheheadsof
departments.Hence(thoughtheCommission'spastactsareaccordeddefactovalidity
andastayisgrantedpermittingittofunctionundertheActfornotmorethan30days),
theCommission,aspresentlyconstituted,maynotbecauseofthatClauseexercisesuch
powers,whichcanbeexercisedonlyby"OfficersoftheUnitedStates"appointedin
conformitywiththeAppointmentsClause,althoughitmayexercisesuchinvestigative
andinformativepowersasareinthesamecategoryasthosepowersthatCongressmight
delegatetooneofitsowncommittees.Pp.109143.
No.75436,171U.S.App.D.C.172,519F.2d821,affirmedinpartandreversedinpart
No.75437,401F.Supp.1235,affirmed.
Percuriamopinion,inthe"caseorcontroversy"partofwhich (post,pp.1112)all
participatingMembersjoinedandastoallotherPartsofwhichBRENNAN,
STEWART,andPOWELL,JJ.,joinedMARSHALL,J.,joinedinallbutPartIC2
BLACKMUN,J.,joinedinallbutPartIBREHNQUIST,J.,joinedinallbutPartIIIB
1BURGER,C.J.,joinedinPartsICandIV(exceptinsofarasitaccordsdefacto
validityfortheCommission'spastacts)andWHITE,J.,joinedinPartIII.BURGER,C.
J.,post,p.235,WHITE,J.,post,p.257,MARSHALL,J.,post,p.286,BLACKMUN,J.,
post,p.290,andREHNQUIST,J.,post,p.290,filedopinionsconcurringinpartand
dissentinginpart.STEVENS,J.,tooknopartintheconsiderationordecisionofthe
cases.
RalphK.Winter,Jr.,prohacvice,JoelM.Gora,and

Page424U.S.1,6
BriceM.Clagettarguedthecauseforappellants.WiththemonthebriefswasMelvinL.
Wulf.

Buckleyv.Valeo
DeputySolicitorGeneralFriedman,ArchibaldCox,LloydN.Cutler,andRalphS.
Spritzerarguedthecauseforappellees.WithMr.Friedmanonthebriefforappellees
LeviandtheFederalElectionCommissionwereAttorneyGeneralLevi,prose,Solicitor
GeneralBork,andLouisF.Claiborne.WithMr.CutleronthebriefforappelleesCenter
forPublicFinancingofElectionsetal.werePaulJ.Mode,Jr.,WilliamT.Lake,Kenneth
J.Guido,Jr.,andFredWertheimer.WithMr.SpritzeronthebriefforappelleeFederal
ElectionCommissionwasPaulBender.AttorneyGeneralLevi,prose,SolicitorGeneral
Bork,andDeputySolicitorGeneralRandolphfiledabriefforappelleeLeviandforthe
UnitedStatesasamicuscuriae.Fn
Fn

Page424U.S.1,6
ThomasF.MonaghanfiledabriefforJamesB.Longleyasamicuscuriaeurgingreversal.
Mr.CoxfiledabriefforHughScottetal.asamicicuriaeurgingaffirmance.
BriefsofamicicuriaewerefiledbyJeromeB.Falk,Jr.,DanielH.Lowenstein,Howard
F.Sachs,andGuyL.HeinemannfortheCaliforniaFairPoliticalPracticesCommission
etal.byLeeMetcalf,prose,andG.RogerKingforMr.MetcalfbyVincentHallinan
fortheSocialistLaborPartybyMargueriteM.BuckleyfortheLosAngelesCounty
CentralCommitteeofthePeaceandFreedomPartyandbytheCommitteefor
DemocraticElectionLaws.

PERCURIAM.
TheseappealspresentconstitutionalchallengestothekeyprovisionsoftheFederal
ElectionCampaignActof1971(Act),andrelatedprovisionsoftheInternalRevenue
Codeof1954,allasamendedin1974.[Footnote1]

Page424U.S.1,7
TheCourtofAppeals,insustainingthelegislationinlargepartagainstvarious
constitutionalchallenges,[Footnote2]vieweditas"byfarthemostcomprehensive
reformlegislation [ever]passedbyCongressconcerningtheelectionofthePresident,
VicePresident,andmembersofCongress."171U.S.App.D.C.172,182,519F.2d821,
831(1975).Thestatutesatissuesummarizedinbroadterms,containthefollowing
provisions:(a)individualpoliticalcontributionsarelimitedto$1,000toanysingle
candidateperelection,withanoverallannuallimitationof$25,000byanycontributor
independentexpendituresbyindividualsandgroups"relativetoaclearlyidentified
candidate"arelimitedto$1,000ayearcampaignspendingbycandidatesforvarious
federalofficesandspendingfornationalconventionsbypoliticalpartiesaresubjectto
prescribedlimits(b)contributionsandexpendituresabovecertainthresholdlevelsmust
bereportedandpubliclydisclosed(c)asystemforpublicfundingofPresidential
campaignactivitiesisestablishedbySubtitleHoftheInternalRevenueCode[Footnote

Buckleyv.Valeo
3]and(d)aFederalElectionCommissionisestablishedtoadministerandenforcethe
legislation.
ThissuitwasoriginallyfiledbyappellantsintheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtforthe
DistrictofColumbia.PlaintiffsincludedacandidateforthePresidencyoftheUnited
States,aUnitedStatesSenatorwhoisacandidateforreelection,apotentialcontributor,
the

Page424U.S.1,8
CommitteeforaConstitutionalPresidency McCarthy'76,theConservativePartyofthe
StateofNewYork,theMississippiRepublicanParty,theLibertarianParty,theNew
YorkCivilLibertiesUnion,Inc.,theAmericanConservativeUnion,theConservative
VictoryFund,andHumanEvents,Inc.ThedefendantsincludedtheSecretaryofthe
UnitedStatesSenateandtheClerkoftheUnitedStatesHouseofRepresentatives,bothin
theirofficialcapacitiesandasexofficiomembersoftheFederalElectionCommission.
TheCommissionitselfwasnamedasadefendant.AlsonamedweretheAttorneyGeneral
oftheUnitedStatesandtheComptrollerGeneral oftheUnitedStates.
Jurisdictionwasassertedunder28U.S.C.1331,2201,and2202,and315(a)oftheAct,2
U.S.C.437h(a)(1970ed.,Supp.IV).[Footnote4]Thecomplaintsoughtbotha

Page424U.S.1,9
declaratoryjudgmentthatthemajorprovisionsoftheActwereunconstitutionalandan
injunctionagainstenforcementofthoseprovisions.Appellantsrequestedtheconvocation
ofathreejudgeDistrictCourtastoallmattersandalsorequestedcertificationof
constitutionalquestionstotheCourtofAppeals,pursuanttothetermsof315(a).The
DistrictJudgedeniedtheapplicationforathreejudgecourtanddirectedthatthecasebe
transmittedtotheCourtofAppeals.Thatcourtenteredanorderstatingthatthecasewas
"preliminarilydeemed"tobeproperlycertifiedunder315(a).Leavetointervenewas
grantedtovariousgroupsandindividuals.[Footnote5]Afterconsideringmatters
regardingfactfindingprocedures,theCourtofAppealsenteredanorderenbanc
remandingthecasetotheDistrictCourtto(1)identifytheconstitutionalissuesinthe
complaint(2)takewhateverevidencewasfoundnecessaryinadditiontothe
submissionssuitablydealtwithbywayofjudicialnotice(3)makefindingsoffactwith
referencetothoseissuesand(4)certifytheconstitutionalquestionsarisingfromthe
foregoingstepstotheCourtofAppeals.[Footnote6]Onremand,theDistrict

Page424U.S.1,10
Judgeenteredamemorandumorderadoptingextensivefindingsoffactandtransmitting
theaugmentedrecordbacktotheCourtofAppeals.

Buckleyv.Valeo
Onplenaryreview,amajorityoftheCourtofAppealsrejected,forthemostpart,
appellants'constitutionalattacks.Thecourtfound"aclearandcompellinginterest,"171
U.S.App.D.C.,at192,519F.2d,at841,inpreservingtheintegrityoftheelectoral
process.Onthatbasis,thecourtupheld,withoneexception,[Footnote7]thesubstantive
provisionsoftheActwithrespecttocontributions,expenditures,anddisclosure.Italso
sustainedtheconstitutionalityofthenewlyestablishedFederalElectionCommission.
Thecourtconcludedthat,notwithstandingthemannerofselectionofitsmembersandthe
breadthofitspowers,whichincludednonlegislativefunctions,theCommissionisa
constitutionallyauthorizedagencycreatedtoperformprimarilylegislativefunctions.[
Footnote8]

Page424U.S.1,11
TheprovisionsforpublicfundingofthethreestagesofthePresidential selectionprocess
wereupheldasavalidexerciseofcongressionalpowerundertheGeneralWelfareClause
oftheConstitution,Art.I,8.
InthisCourt,appellantsarguethattheCourtofAppealsfailedtogivethislegislationthe
criticalscrutinydemandedunderacceptedFirstAmendmentandequalprotection
principles.Inappellants'view,limitingtheuseofmoneyforpoliticalpurposes
constitutesarestrictiononcommunicationviolativeoftheFirstAmendment,since
virtuallyallmeaningfulpoliticalcommunicationsinthemodernsettinginvolvethe
expenditureofmoney.Further,theyarguethatthereportinganddisclosureprovisionsof
theActunconstitutionallyimpingeontheirrighttofreedomofassociation.Appellants
alsoviewthefederalsubsidyprovisionsofSubtitleHasviolativeoftheGeneralWelfare
Clause,andasinconsistentwiththeFirstandFifthAmendments.Finally,appellants
renewtheirattackontheCommission'scompositionandpowers.
Attheoutsetwemustdeterminewhetherthecasebeforeuspresentsa"caseor
controversy"withinthemeaningofArt.IIIoftheConstitution.Congressmaynot,of
course,requirethisCourttorenderopinionsinmatterswhicharenot"casesor
controversies."AetnaLifeIns.Co.v.Haworth, 300U.S.227,240241(1937).Wemust
thereforedecidewhetherappellantshavethe"personalstakeintheoutcomeofthe
controversy"necessarytomeettherequirementsofArt.III.Bakerv.Carr, 369U.S.186,
204(1962).ItisclearthatCongress,inenacting

Page424U.S.1,12
2U.S.C.437h(1970ed.,Supp.IV),[Footnote9]intendedtoprovidejudicialreviewto
theextentpermittedbyArt.III.Inourview,thecomplaintinthiscasedemonstratesthat
atleastsomeoftheappellantshaveasufficient"personalstake"[Footnote10]ina
determinationoftheconstitutionalvalidityofeachofthechallengedprovisionstopresent
"arealandsubstantialcontroversyadmittingofspecificreliefthroughadecreeofa
conclusivecharacter,asdistinguishedfromanopinionadvisingwhatthelawwouldbe

Buckleyv.Valeo
uponahypotheticalstateoffacts."AetnaLifeIns.Co.v.Haworth,supra,at241.[
Footnote11]
I.CONTRIBUTIONANDEXPENDITURELIMITATIONS
TheintricatestatutoryschemeadoptedbyCongresstoregulatefederalelection
campaignsincludesrestrictions

Page424U.S.1,13
onpoliticalcontributionsandexpendituresthatapplybroadlytoallphasesofandall
participantsintheelectionprocess.Themajorcontributionandexpenditurelimitationsin
theActprohibitindividualsfromcontributingmorethan$25,000inasingleyearormore
than$1,000toanysinglecandidateforanelectioncampaign[Footnote12]andfrom
spendingmorethan$1,000ayear"relativetoaclearlyidentifiedcandidate."[Footnote13
]Otherprovisionsrestrictacandidate'suseofpersonalandfamilyresourcesinhis
campaign[Footnote14]andlimittheoverallamountthatcanbespentbyacandidatein
campaigningforfederaloffice.[Footnote15]
TheconstitutionalpowerofCongresstoregulatefederalelectionsiswellestablishedand
isnotquestionedbyanyofthepartiesinthiscase.[Footnote16]Thus,thecritical
constitutional

Page424U.S.1,14
questionspresentedheregonottothebasicpowerofCongresstolegislateinthisarea,
buttowhetherthespecificlegislationthatCongresshasenactedinterfereswithFirst
Amendmentfreedomsorinvidiouslydiscriminatesagainstnonincumbentcandidatesand
minorpartiesincontraventionoftheFifthAmendment.

A.GeneralPrinciples
TheAct'scontributionandexpenditurelimitationsoperateinanareaofthemost
fundamentalFirstAmendmentactivities.Discussionofpublicissuesanddebateonthe
qualificationsofcandidatesareintegraltotheoperationofthesystemofgovernment
establishedbyourConstitution.TheFirstAmendmentaffordsthebroadestprotectionto
suchpoliticalexpressioninorder"toassure[the]unfetteredinterchangeofideasforthe
bringingaboutofpoliticalandsocialchangesdesiredbythepeople."Rothv.United
States, 354U.S.476,484 (1957).AlthoughFirstAmendmentprotectionsarenot
confinedto"theexpositionofideas,"Wintersv.NewYork, 333U.S.507,510 (1948),
"thereispracticallyuniversalagreementthatamajorpurposeofthatAmendmentwasto
protectthefreediscussionofgovernmentalaffairs,...ofcourseinclud[ing]discussions
ofcandidates...."Millsv.Alabama,384U.S.214,218 (1966).Thisnomorethan

Buckleyv.Valeo
reflectsour"profoundnationalcommitmenttotheprinciplethatdebateonpublicissues
shouldbeuninhibited,robust,andwideopen,"NewYorkTimesCo.v.Sullivan,376
U.S.254,270 (1964).Inarepublicwherethepeoplearesovereign,theabilityofthe
citizenrytomakeinformedchoicesamongcandidates

Page424U.S.1,15
forofficeisessential,fortheidentitiesofthosewhoareelectedwillinevitablyshapethe
coursethatwefollowasanation.AstheCourtobservedinMonitorPatriotCo.v.Roy,
401U.S.265,272 (1971),"itcanhardlybedoubtedthattheconstitutionalguaranteehas
itsfullestandmosturgentapplicationpreciselytotheconductofcampaignsforpolitical
office."
TheFirstAmendmentprotectspoliticalassociationaswellaspoliticalexpression.The
constitutionalrightofassociationexplicatedinNAACPv.Alabama,357U.S.449,460
(1958),stemmedfromtheCourt'srecognitionthat"[e]ffectiveadvocacyofbothpublic
andprivatepointsofview,particularlycontroversialones,isundeniablyenhancedby
groupassociation."SubsequentdecisionshavemadeclearthattheFirstandFourteenth
Amendmentsguarantee"`freedomtoassociatewithothersforthecommonadvancement
ofpoliticalbeliefsandideas,'"afreedomthatencompasses"`[t]herighttoassociatewith
thepoliticalpartyofone'schoice.'"Kusperv.Pontikes,414U.S.51,56,57(1973),
quotedinCousinsv.Wigoda, 419U.S.477,487 (1975).
Itiswiththeseprinciplesinmindthatweconsidertheprimarycontentionsoftheparties
withrespecttotheAct'slimitationsuponthegivingandspendingofmoneyinpolitical
campaigns.Thoseconflictingcontentionscouldnotmoresharplydefinethebasicissues
beforeus.AppelleescontendthatwhattheActregulatesisconduct,andthatitseffecton
speechandassociationisincidentalatmost.Appellantsrespondthatcontributionsand
expendituresareattheverycoreofpoliticalspeech,andthattheAct'slimitationsthus
constituterestraintsonFirstAmendmentlibertythatarebothgrossanddirect.
InupholdingtheconstitutionalvalidityoftheAct'scontributionandexpenditure
provisionsontheground

Page424U.S.1,16
thatthoseprovisionsshouldbeviewedasregulatingconduct,notspeech,theCourtof
AppealsrelieduponUnitedStatesv.O'Brien,391U.S.367 (1968).See171U.S.App.
D.C.,at191,519F.2d,at840.TheO'Briencaseinvolvedadefendant'sclaimthatthe
FirstAmendmentprohibitedhisprosecutionforburninghisdraftcardbecausehisact
was"`symbolicspeech'"engagedinasa"`demonstrationagainstthewarandagainstthe
draft.'"391U.S.,at376.Ontheassumptionthat"theallegedcommunicativeelementin
O'Brien'sconduct[was]sufficienttobringintoplaytheFirstAmendment,"theCourt
sustainedtheconvictionbecauseitfound"asufficientlyimportantgovernmentalinterest

Buckleyv.Valeo
inregulatingthenonspeechelement"thatwas"unrelatedtothesuppressionoffree
expression"andthathadan"incidentalrestrictiononallegedFirstAmendmentfreedoms
...nogreaterthan[was]essentialtothefurtheranceofthatinterest."Id.,at376377.The
CourtexpresslyemphasizedthatO'Brienwasnotacase"wheretheallegedgovernmental
interestinregulatingconductarisesinsomemeasurebecausethecommunication
allegedlyintegraltotheconductisitselfthoughttobeharmful."Id.,at382.
WecannotsharetheviewthatthepresentAct'scontributionandexpenditurelimitations
arecomparabletotherestrictionsonconductupheldinO'Brien.Theexpenditureof
moneysimplycannotbeequatedwithsuchconductasdestructionofadraftcard.Some
formsofcommunicationmadepossiblebythegivingandspendingofmoneyinvolve
speechalone,someinvolveconductprimarily,andsomeinvolveacombinationofthe
two.YetthisCourthasneversuggestedthatthedependenceofacommunicationonthe
expenditureofmoneyoperatesitselftointroduceanonspeechelementortoreducethe
exactingscrutinyrequiredbytheFirstAmendment.SeeBigelowv.Virginia,421U.S.
809,

Page424U.S.1,17
820(1975)NewYorkTimesCo.v.Sullivan,supra,at266.Forexample,inCoxv.
Louisiana,379U.S.559 (1965),theCourtcontrastedpicketingandparadingwitha
newspapercommentandatelegrambyacitizentoapublicofficial.Theparadingand
picketingactivitiesweresaidtoconstituteconduct"intertwinedwithexpressionand
association,"whereasthenewspapercommentandthetelegramweredescribedasa"pure
formofexpression"involving"freespeechalone"ratherthan"expressionmixedwith
particularconduct."Id.,at563564.
Evenifthecategorizationoftheexpenditureofmoneyasconductwereaccepted,the
limitationschallengedherewouldnotmeettheO'Brientestbecausethegovernmental
interestsadvancedinsupportoftheActinvolve"suppressingcommunication."The
interestsservedbytheActincluderestrictingthevoicesofpeopleandinterestgroups
whohavemoneytospendandreducingtheoverallscopeoffederalelectioncampaigns.
AlthoughtheActdoesnotfocusontheideasexpressedbypersonsorgroupssubjectto
itsregulations,itisaimedinpartatequalizingtherelativeabilityofallvoterstoaffect
electoral outcomesbyplacingaceilingonexpendituresforpoliticalexpressionby
citizensandgroups.UnlikeO'Brien,wheretheSelectiveServiceSystem'sadministrative
interestinthepreservationofdraftcardswaswhollyunrelatedtotheiruseasameansof
communication,itisbeyonddisputethattheinterestinregulatingthealleged"conduct"
ofgivingorspendingmoney"arisesinsomemeasurebecausethecommunication
allegedlyintegraltotheconductisitselfthoughttobeharmful."391U.S.,at382.
NorcantheAct'scontributionandexpenditurelimitationsbesustained,assomeofthe
partiessuggest,byreferencetotheconstitutionalprinciplesreflectedinsuch

Buckleyv.Valeo
Page424U.S.1,18
decisionsasCoxv.Louisiana,supraAdderleyv.Florida,385U.S.39 (1966)and
Kovacsv.Cooper, 336U.S.77 (1949).Thosecasesstandforthepropositionthatthe
governmentmayadoptreasonabletime,place,andmannerregulations,whichdonot
discriminateamongspeakersorideas,inordertofurtheranimportantgovernmental
interestunrelatedtotherestrictionofcommunication.SeeErznoznikv.Cityof
Jacksonville,422U.S.205,209 (1975).IncontrasttoO'Brien,wherethemethodof
expressionwasheldtobesubjecttoprohibition,Cox,Adderley,andKovacsinvolved
placeormannerrestrictionsonlegitimatemodesofexpression picketing,parading,
demonstrating,andusingasoundtruck.Thecriticaldifferencebetweenthiscaseand
thosetime,place,andmannercasesisthatthepresentAct'scontributionandexpenditure
limitationsimposedirectquantityrestrictionsonpolitical communicationandassociation
bypersons,groups,candidates,andpoliticalpartiesinadditiontoanyreasonabletime,
place,andmannerregulationsotherwiseimposed.[Footnote17]

Page424U.S.1,19
Arestrictionontheamountofmoneyapersonorgroupcanspendonpolitical
communicationduringacampaignnecessarilyreducesthequantityofexpressionby
restrictingthenumberofissuesdiscussed,thedepthoftheirexploration,andthesizeof
theaudiencereached.[Footnote18]Thisisbecausevirtuallyeverymeansof
communicatingideasintoday'smasssocietyrequirestheexpenditureofmoney.The
distribution ofthehumblesthandbillorleafletentailsprinting,paper,andcirculation
costs.Speechesandralliesgenerallynecessitatehiringahallandpublicizingtheevent.
Theelectorate'sincreasingdependenceontelevision,radio,andothermassmediafor
newsandinformationhasmadetheseexpensivemodesofcommunicationindispensable
instrumentsofeffectivepoliticalspeech.
TheexpenditurelimitationscontainedintheActrepresentsubstantialratherthanmerely
theoreticalrestraintsonthequantity anddiversityofpoliticalspeech.The$1,000ceiling
onspending"relativetoaclearlyidentifiedcandidate,"18U.S.C.608(e)(1)(1970ed.,
Supp.IV),wouldappeartoexcludeallcitizensandgroupsexceptcandidates,political
parties,andtheinstitutionalpress[Footnote19]fromanysignificantuseofthemost

Page424U.S.1,20
effectivemodesofcommunication.[Footnote20]AlthoughtheAct'slimitationson
expendituresbycampaignorganizationsandpoliticalpartiesprovidesubstantiallygreater
roomfordiscussionanddebate,theywouldhaverequiredrestrictionsinthescopeofa
numberofpastcongressionalandPresidentialcampaigns[Footnote21]andwould
operatetoconstraincampaigningbycandidateswhoraisesumsin excessofthespending
ceiling.

Buckleyv.Valeo
Bycontrastwithalimitationupon expendituresforpoliticalexpression,alimitationupon
theamountthatanyonepersonorgroupmaycontributetoacandidateorpolitical
committeeentailsonlyamarginalrestrictionuponthecontributor'sabilitytoengagein
freecommunication.

Page424U.S.1,21
Acontributionservesasageneralexpressionofsupportforthecandidateandhisviews,
butdoesnotcommunicatetheunderlyingbasisforthesupport.Thequantityof
communicationbythecontributordoesnotincreaseperceptiblywith thesizeofhis
contribution,sincetheexpressionrestssolelyontheundifferentiated,symbolicactof
contributing.Atmost,thesizeofthecontributionprovidesaveryroughindexofthe
intensityofthecontributor'ssupportforthecandidate.[Footnote22]Alimitationonthe
amountofmoneyapersonmaygivetoacandidateorcampaignorganizationthus
involveslittledirectrestraintonhispoliticalcommunication,foritpermitsthesymbolic
expressionofsupportevidencedbyacontributionbutdoesnotinanywayinfringethe
contributor'sfreedomtodiscusscandidatesandissues.Whilecontributionsmayresultin
politicalexpressionifspentbyacandidateoranassociationtopresentviewstothe
voters,thetransformationofcontributionsintopoliticaldebateinvolvesspeechby
someoneotherthanthecontributor.
Giventheimportantroleofcontributionsinfinancingpoliticalcampaigns,contribution
restrictionscouldhaveasevereimpactonpoliticaldialogueifthelimitationsprevented
candidatesandpoliticalcommitteesfromamassingtheresourcesnecessaryforeffective
advocacy.Thereisnoindication,however,thatthecontributionlimitationsimposedby
theActwouldhaveanydramaticadverseeffectonthefundingofcampaignsandpolitical
associations.[Footnote23]TheoveralleffectoftheAct'scontribution

Page424U.S.1,22
ceilingsismerelytorequirecandidatesandpoliticalcommitteestoraisefundsfroma
greaternumberofpersonsandtocompelpeoplewhowouldotherwisecontribute
amountsgreaterthanthestatutorylimitstoexpendsuchfundsondirectpolitical
expression,ratherthantoreducethetotalamountofmoneypotentiallyavailableto
promotepoliticalexpression.
TheAct'scontributionandexpenditurelimitationsalsoimpingeonprotected
associationalfreedoms.Makingacontribution,likejoiningapoliticalparty,servesto
affiliateapersonwithacandidate.Inaddition,itenableslikemindedpersonstopool
theirresourcesinfurtheranceofcommonpoliticalgoals.TheAct'scontributionceilings
thuslimitoneimportantmeansofassociatingwithacandidateorcommittee,butleave
thecontributorfreetobecomeamemberofanypoliticalassociationandtoassist
personallyintheassociation'seffortsonbehalfofcandidates.AndtheAct'scontribution
limitationspermitassociationsandcandidatestoaggregatelargesumsofmoneyto

Buckleyv.Valeo
promoteeffectiveadvocacy.Bycontrast,theAct's$1,000limitationonindependent
expenditures"relativetoaclearlyidentifiedcandidate"precludesmostassociationsfrom
effectivelyamplifyingthevoiceoftheiradherents,theoriginalbasisfortherecognition
ofFirstAmendmentprotectionofthefreedomofassociation.SeeNAACPv.Alabama,
357U.S.,at460.TheAct'sconstraintsontheabilityofindependentassociationsand
candidatecampaignorganizationstoexpendresourcesonpoliticalexpression"is
simultaneouslyaninterferencewiththefreedomof[their]adherents,"Sweezyv.New
Hampshire,354U.S.234,250 (1957)(pluralityopinion).SeeCousinsv.

Page424U.S.1,23
Wigoda,419U.S.,at487488NAACPv.Button, 371U.S.415,431 (1963).
Insum,althoughtheAct'scontributionandexpenditurelimitationsbothimplicate
fundamentalFirstAmendmentinterests,itsexpenditureceilingsimposesignificantly
moresevererestrictionsonprotectedfreedomsofpoliticalexpressionandassociation
thandoitslimitationsonfinancialcontributions.

B.ContributionLimitations
1.The$1,000LimitationonContributionsbyIndividualsandGroupstoCandidates
andAuthorizedCampaignCommittees
Section608(b)provides,withcertainlimitedexceptions,that"nopersonshallmake
contributionstoanycandidatewithrespecttoanyelectionforFederalofficewhich,in
theaggregate,exceed$1,000."Thestatutedefines"person"broadlytoinclude"an
individual,partnership,committee,association,corporationoranyotherorganizationor
groupofpersons."591(g).Thelimitationreachesagift,subscription,loan,advance,
depositofanythingofvalue,orpromisetogiveacontribution,madeforthepurposeof
influencingaprimaryelection,aPresidentialpreferenceprimary,orageneralelectionfor
anyfederaloffice.[Footnote24]591(e)(1),(2).The

Page424U.S.1,24
$1,000ceilingappliesregardlessofwhetherthecontributionisgiventothecandidate,to
acommitteeauthorizedinwritingbythecandidatetoacceptcontributionsonhisbehalf,
orindirectlyviaearmarkedgiftspassedthroughanintermediarytothecandidate.608(b)
(4),(6).[Footnote25]Therestrictionappliestoaggregateamountscontributedtothe
candidateforeachelection withprimaries,runoffelections,andgeneralelections
countedseparately,andallPresidentialprimariesheldinanycalendaryeartreated
togetherasasingleelectioncampaign.608(b)(5).
Appellantscontendthatthe$1,000contributionceilingunjustifiablyburdensFirst
Amendmentfreedoms,employsoverbroaddollarlimits,anddiscriminatesagainst

Buckleyv.Valeo
candidatesopposingincumbentofficeholdersandagainstminorpartycandidatesin
violationoftheFifthAmendment.Weaddresseachoftheseclaimsofinvalidityinturn.
(a)
AsthegeneraldiscussioninPartIA,supra,indicated,theprimaryFirstAmendment
problemraisedbytheAct'scontributionlimitationsistheirrestrictionofoneaspectof
thecontributor'sfreedomofpoliticalassociation.

Page424U.S.1,25
TheCourt'sdecisionsinvolvingassociationalfreedomsestablishthattherightof
associationisa"basicconstitutionalfreedom,"Kusperv.Pontikes,414U.S.,at57,thatis
"closelyalliedtofreedomofspeechandarightwhich,likefreespeech,liesatthe
foundationofafreesociety."Sheltonv.Tucker, 364U.S.479,486 (1960).See,e.g.,
Batesv.LittleRock, 361U.S.516,522523(1960)NAACPv.Alabama,supra,at460
461NAACPv.Button,supra,at452(Harlan,J.,dissenting).Inviewofthefundamental
natureoftherighttoassociate,governmental"actionwhichmayhavetheeffectof
curtailingthefreedomtoassociateissubjecttotheclosestscrutiny."NAACPv.
Alabama,supra,at460461.Yet,itisclearthat"[n]eithertherighttoassociatenorthe
righttoparticipateinpoliticalactivitiesisabsolute."CSCv.LetterCarriers,413U.S.
548,567 (1973).Evena"`significantinterference'withprotectedrightsofpolitical
association"maybesustainediftheStatedemonstratesasufficientlyimportantinterest
andemploysmeanscloselydrawntoavoidunnecessaryabridgmentofassociational
freedoms.Cousinsv.Wigoda,supra,at488NAACPv.Button,supra,at438Sheltonv.
Tucker,supra,at488.
AppelleesarguethattheAct'srestrictionsonlargecampaigncontributionsarejustified
bythreegovernmentalinterests.Accordingtothepartiesandamici,theprimaryinterest
servedbythelimitationsand,indeed,bytheActasawhole,isthepreventionof
corruptionandtheappearanceofcorruptionspawnedbytherealorimaginedcoercive
influenceoflargefinancialcontributionsoncandidates'positionsandontheiractionsif
electedtooffice.Two"ancillary"interestsunderlyingtheActarealsoallegedlyfurthered
bythe$1,000limitsoncontributions.First,thelimitsservetomutethevoicesofaffluent
personsandgroupsintheelection

Page424U.S.1,26
processandtherebytoequalizetherelativeabilityofallcitizenstoaffecttheoutcomeof
elections.[Footnote26]Second,itisargued,theceilingsmaytosomeextentactasa
brakeontheskyrocketingcostofpoliticalcampaignsandtherebyservetoopenthe
politicalsystemmorewidelytocandidateswithoutaccesstosourcesoflargeamountsof
money.[Footnote27]

Buckleyv.Valeo
ItisunnecessarytolookbeyondtheAct'sprimarypurpose tolimittheactualityand
appearanceofcorruptionresultingfromlargeindividualfinancialcontributionsinorder
tofindaconstitutionallysufficientjustificationforthe$1,000contributionlimitation.
Underasystemofprivatefinancingofelections,acandidatelackingimmensepersonal
orfamilywealthmustdependonfinancialcontributionsfromotherstoprovidethe
resourcesnecessarytoconductasuccessfulcampaign.Theincreasingimportanceofthe
communicationsmediaandsophisticatedmassmailingandpollingoperationsto
effectivecampaigningmaketheraisingoflargesumsofmoneyanevermoreessential
ingredientofaneffectivecandidacy.Totheextentthatlargecontributionsaregivento
secureapoliticalquidproquofromcurrentandpotentialofficeholders,theintegrityof
oursystemof

Page424U.S.1,27
representativedemocracyisundermined.Althoughthescopeofsuchperniciouspractices
canneverbereliablyascertained,thedeeplydisturbingexamplessurfacingafterthe1972
electiondemonstratethattheproblemisnotanillusoryone.[Footnote28]
Ofalmostequalconcernasthedangerofactualquidproquoarrangementsistheimpact
oftheappearanceofcorruptionstemmingfrompublicawarenessoftheopportunitiesfor
abuseinherentinaregimeoflargeindividualfinancialcontributions.InCSCv.Letter
Carriers,supra,theCourtfoundthatthedangerto"fairandeffectivegovernment"posed
bypartisanpoliticalconductonthepartoffederalemployeeschargedwithadministering
thelawwasasufficientlyimportantconcerntojustifybroadrestrictionsonthe
employees'rightofpartisanpoliticalassociation.Here,asthere,Congresscould
legitimatelyconcludethattheavoidanceoftheappearanceofimproperinfluence"isalso
critical...ifconfidenceinthesystemofrepresentativeGovernmentisnottobeeroded
toadisastrousextent."413U.S.,at565.[Footnote29]
Appellantscontendthatthecontributionlimitationsmustbeinvalidatedbecausebribery
lawsandnarrowlydrawndisclosurerequirementsconstitutealessrestrictivemeansof
dealingwith"provenandsuspectedquidproquoarrangements."Butlawsmaking
criminal

Page424U.S.1,28
thegivingandtakingofbribesdealwithonlythemostblatantandspecificattemptsof
thosewithmoneytoinfluencegovernmentalaction.Andwhiledisclosurerequirements
servethemanysalutarypurposesdiscussedelsewhereinthisopinion,[Footnote30]
Congresswassurelyentitledtoconcludethatdisclosurewasonlyapartialmeasure,and
thatcontributionceilingswereanecessarylegislativeconcomitanttodealwiththereality
orappearanceofcorruptioninherentinasystempermittingunlimitedfinancial
contributions,evenwhentheidentitiesofthecontributorsandtheamountsoftheir
contributionsarefullydisclosed.

Buckleyv.Valeo
TheAct's$1,000contributionlimitationfocusespreciselyontheproblemoflarge
campaigncontributions thenarrowaspectofpoliticalassociationwheretheactuality
andpotentialforcorruptionhavebeenidentifiedwhileleavingpersonsfreetoengagein
independentpoliticalexpression,toassociateactivelythroughvolunteeringtheirservices,
andtoassisttoalimitedbutnonethelesssubstantialextentinsupportingcandidatesand
committeeswithfinancialresources.[Footnote31]Significantly,the

Page424U.S.1,29
Act'scontributionlimitationsinthemselvesdonotunderminetoanymaterialdegreethe
potentialforrobustandeffectivediscussionofcandidatesandcampaignissuesby
individualcitizens,associations,theinstitutionalpress,candidates,andpoliticalparties.
Wefindthat,undertherigorousstandardofreviewestablishedbyourpriordecisions,the
weightyinterestsservedbyrestrictingthesizeoffinancialcontributionstopolitical
candidatesaresufficienttojustifythelimitedeffectuponFirstAmendmentfreedoms
causedbythe$1,000contributionceiling.
(b)
Appellants'firstoverbreadthchallengetothecontributionceilingsrestsonthe
propositionthatmostlargecontributorsdonotseekimproperinfluenceoveracandidate's
positionoranofficeholder'saction.Althoughthetruthofthatpropositionmaybe
assumed,itdoesnot

Page424U.S.1,30
undercutthevalidityofthe$1,000contributionlimitation.Notonlyisitdifficultto
isolatesuspectcontributionsbut,moreimportantly,Congresswasjustifiedinconcluding
thattheinterestinsafeguardingagainsttheappearanceofimproprietyrequiresthatthe
opportunityforabuseinherentintheprocessofraisinglargemonetarycontributionsbe
eliminated.
Asecond,relatedoverbreadthclaimisthatthe$1,000restrictionisunrealisticallylow
becausemuchmorethanthatamountwouldstillnotbeenoughtoenableanunscrupulous
contributortoexerciseimproperinfluenceoveracandidateorofficeholder,especiallyin
campaignsforstatewideornationaloffice.Whilethecontributionlimitationprovisions
mightwellhavebeenstructuredtotakeaccountofthegraduatedexpenditurelimitations
forcongressionalandPresidentialcampaigns,[Footnote32]Congress'failuretoengagein
suchfinetuningdoesnotinvalidatethelegislation.AstheCourtofAppealsobserved,
"[i]fitissatisfiedthatsomelimitoncontributionsisnecessary,acourthasnoscalpelto
probe,whether,say,a$2,000ceilingmightnotserveaswellas$1,000."171U.S.App.
D.C.,at193,519F.2d,at842.Suchdistinctionsindegreebecomesignificantonly when
theycanbesaidtoamounttodifferencesinkind.CompareKusperv.Pontikes,414U.S.
51(1973),withRosariov.Rockefeller,410U.S. 752(1973).

Buckleyv.Valeo
(c)
ApartfromtheseFirstAmendmentconcerns,appellantsarguethatthecontribution
limitationsworksuchaninvidiousdiscriminationbetweenincumbents

Page424U.S.1,31
andchallengersthatthestatutoryprovisionsmustbedeclaredunconstitutionalontheir
face.[Footnote33]Inconsideringthiscontention,itisimportantattheoutsettonotethat
theActappliesthesamelimitationsoncontributionstoallcandidatesregardlessoftheir
presentoccupations,ideologicalviews,orpartyaffiliations.Absentrecordevidenceof
invidiousdiscriminationagainstchallengersasaclass,acourtshouldgenerallybe
hesitanttoinvalidatelegislationwhichonitsfaceimposesevenhandedrestrictions.Cf.
Jamesv.Valtierra, 402U.S.137 (1971).

Page424U.S.1,32
Thereisnosuchevidencetosupporttheclaimthatthecontributionlimitationsin
themselvesdiscriminateagainstmajorpartychallengerstoincumbents.Challengerscan
andoftendodefeatincumbentsinfederalelections.[Footnote34]Majorparty
challengersinfederalelectionsareusuallymenandwomenwhoarewellknownand
influentialintheircommunityorState.Oftensuchchallengersarethemselves
incumbentsinimportantlocal,state,orfederaloffices.Statisticsintherecordindicate
thatmajorpartychallengersaswellasincumbentsarecapableofraisinglargesumsfor
campaigning.[Footnote35]Indeed,asmallbutnonethelesssignificantnumberof
challengershaveinrecentelectionsoutspenttheirincumbentrivals.[Footnote36]And,to
theextentthatincumbentsgenerallyaremorelikelythanchallengerstoattractverylarge
contributions,theAct's$1,000ceilinghasthepracticaleffectofbenefitingchallengersas
aclass.[Footnote37]Contrarytothebroadgeneralization

Page424U.S.1,33
drawnbytheappellants,thepracticalimpactofthecontributionceilingsinanygiven
electionwillclearlydependupontheamountsinexcessoftheceilingsthat,forvarious
reasons,thecandidatesinthatelectionwouldotherwisehavereceivedandtheutilityof
theseadditionalamountstothecandidates.Tobesure,thelimitationsmayhavea
significanteffectonparticularchallengersorincumbents,buttherecordprovidesno
basisforpredictingthatsuchadventitiousfactorswillinvariablyandinvidiouslybenefit
incumbentsasaclass.[Footnote38]Sincethedangerofcorruptionandtheappearanceof
corruptionapplywithequalforcetochallengersandtoincumbents,Congresshadample
justificationforimposingthesamefundraisingconstraintsuponboth.
Thechargeofdiscriminationagainstminorpartyandindependentcandidatesismore
troubling,buttherecordprovidesnobasisforconcludingthattheActinvidiously

Buckleyv.Valeo
disadvantagessuchcandidates.Asnotedabove,theActonitsfacetreatsall candidates
equallywithregardtocontributionlimitations.Andtherestrictionwouldappearto
benefitminorpartyandindependentcandidatesrelativetotheirmajorpartyopponents
becausemajorpartycandidatesreceivefarmoremoneyinlargecontributions.[Footnote
39]Althoughthereissome

Page424U.S.1,34
forcetoappellants'responsethatminorpartycandidatesareprimarilyconcernedwith
theirabilitytoamasstheresourcesnecessarytoreachtheelectorateratherthanwiththeir
fundingpositionrelativetotheirmajorpartyopponents,therecordisvirtuallydevoidof
supportfortheclaimthatthe$1,000contributionlimitationwillhaveaseriouseffecton
theinitiationandscopeofminorpartyandindependentcandidacies.[Footnote40]
Moreover,anyattempt

Page424U.S.1,35
toexcludeminorpartiesandindependentsenmassefromtheAct'scontribution
limitationsoverlooksthefactthatminorpartycandidatesmaywinelectiveofficeorhave
asubstantialimpactontheoutcomeofanelection.[Footnote41]
Inviewoftheseconsiderations,weconcludethattheimpactoftheAct's$1,000
contributionlimitationonmajorpartychallengersandonminorpartycandidatesdoes
notrendertheprovisionunconstitutionalonitsface.
2.The$5,000LimitationonContributionsbyPoliticalCommittees
Section608(b)(2)permitscertaincommittees,designatedas"politicalcommittees,"to
contributeupto$5,000toanycandidatewithrespecttoanyelectionforfederaloffice.In
ordertoqualifyforthehighercontributionceiling,agroupmusthavebeenregistered
withtheCommissionasapoliticalcommitteeunder2U.S.C.433(1970ed.,Supp.IV)
fornotlessthansixmonths,havereceivedcontributionsfrommorethan50persons,and,
exceptforstatepoliticalpartyorganizations,havecontributedtofiveormorecandidates
forfederaloffice.Appellantsarguethatthesequalificationsunconstitutionally
discriminateagainstadhocorganizationsinfavorofestablishedinterestgroupsand
impermissiblyburdenfreeassociation.Theargumentiswithoutmerit.Ratherthan
underminingfreedomofassociation,thebasicprovisionenhancestheopportunityof
bonafidegroupstoparticipateintheelectionprocess,andtheregistration,contribution,
andcandidateconditionsservethepermissiblepurposeofpreventingindividuals

Page424U.S.1,36
fromevadingtheapplicablecontributionlimitationsbylabelingthemselvescommittees.

Buckleyv.Valeo
3.LimitationsonVolunteers'IncidentalExpenses
TheActexcludesfromthedefinitionofcontribution "thevalueofservicesprovided
withoutcompensationbyindividualswhovolunteeraportionoralloftheirtimeon
behalfofacandidateorpoliticalcommittee."591(e)(5)(A).Certainexpensesincurred
bypersonsinprovidingvolunteerservicestoacandidateareexemptfromthe$1,000
ceilingonlytotheextentthattheydonotexceed$500.Theseexpensesareexpressly
limitedto(1)"theuseofrealorpersonalpropertyandthecostofinvitations,food,and
beverages,voluntarilyprovidedbyanindividualtoacandidateinrenderingvoluntary
personalservicesontheindividual'sresidentialpremisesforcandidaterelatedactivities."
591(e)(5)(B)(2)"thesaleofanyfoodorbeveragebyavendorforuseinacandidate's
campaignatacharge[atleastequaltocostbut]lessthanthenormalcomparablecharge,"
591(e)(5)(C)and(3)"anyunreimbursedpaymentfortravelexpensesmadebyan
individualwhoonhisownbehalfvolunteershispersonalservicestoacandidate,"591(e)
(5)(D).
If,aswehaveheld,thebasiccontributionlimitationsareconstitutionallyvalid,then
surelytheseprovisionsareaconstitutionallyacceptableaccommodationofCongress'
validinterestinencouragingcitizenparticipationinpoliticalcampaignswhilecontinuing
toguardagainstthecorruptingpotentialoflargefinancialcontributionstocandidates.
Theexpenditureofresourcesatthecandidate'sdirectionforafundraisingeventata
volunteer'sresidenceortheprovisionofinkindassistanceintheformof foodor
beveragestoberesoldtoraisefundsorconsumedbytheparticipantsinsuchanevent
providesmaterialfinancialassistancetoacandidate.Theultimate

Page424U.S.1,37
effectisthesameasifthepersonhadcontributedthedollaramounttothecandidateand
thecandidatehadthenusedthecontributiontopayforthefundraisingeventorthefood.
Similarly,travelundertakenasavolunteeratthedirectionofthecandidateorhisstaffis
anexpenseofthecampaignandmayproperlybeviewedasacontributionifthe
volunteerabsorbsthefare.Treatingtheseexpensesascontributionswhenmadetothe
candidate'scampaignoratthedirectionofthecandidateorhisstaffforeclosesanavenue
ofabuse[Footnote42]withoutlimitingactionsvoluntarilyundertakenbycitizens
independentlyofacandidate'scampaign.[Footnote43]

Page424U.S.1,38
4.The$25,000LimitationonTotalContributionsDuringanyCalendarYear
Inadditiontothe$1,000limitationonthenonexemptcontributionsthatanindividual
maymaketoaparticularcandidateforanysingleelection,theActcontainsanoverall
$25,000limitationontotalcontributionsbyanindividualduringanycalendaryear.608
(b)(3).Acontributionmadeinconnectionwithanelectionisconsidered,forpurposesof

Buckleyv.Valeo
thissubsection,tobemadeintheyeartheelectionisheld.Althoughtheconstitutionality
ofthisprovisionwasdrawnintoquestionbyappellants,ithasnotbeenseparately
addressedatlengthbytheparties.Theoverall$25,000ceilingdoesimposeanultimate
restrictionuponthenumberofcandidatesandcommitteeswithwhichanindividualmay
associatehimselfbymeansoffinancialsupport.Butthisquitemodestrestraintupon
protectedpoliticalactivityservestopreventevasionofthe$1,000contributionlimitation
byapersonwhomightotherwisecontributemassiveamountsofmoneytoaparticular
candidatethroughtheuseofunearmarkedcontributionstopoliticalcommitteeslikelyto
contributetothatcandidate,orhugecontributionstothecandidate'spoliticalparty.The
limited,additionalrestrictiononassociationalfreedom imposedbytheoverallceilingis
thusnomorethanacorollaryofthebasicindividualcontributionlimitationthatwehave
foundtobeconstitutionallyvalid.

Page424U.S.1,39
C.ExpenditureLimitations
TheAct'sexpenditureceilingsimposedirectandsubstantialrestraintsonthequantityof
politicalspeech.Themostdrasticofthelimitationsrestrictsindividualsandgroups,
includingpoliticalpartiesthatfailtoplaceacandidateontheballot,[Footnote44]toan
expenditureof$1,000"relativetoaclearlyidentifiedcandidateduringacalendaryear."
608(e)(1).Otherexpenditureceilingslimitspendingbycandidates,608(a),their
campaigns,608(c),andpoliticalpartiesinconnectionwithelectioncampaigns,608(f).
Itisclearthataprimaryeffectoftheseexpenditurelimitationsistorestrictthequantity
ofcampaignspeechbyindividuals,groups,andcandidates.Therestrictions,while
neutralastotheideasexpressed,limitpoliticalexpression"atthecoreofourelectoral
processandoftheFirstAmendmentfreedoms."Williamsv.Rhodes,393U.S.23,32
(1968).
1.The$1,000LimitationonExpenditures"RelativetoaClearlyIdentified
Candidate"
Section608(e)(1)providesthat"[n]opersonmaymakeanyexpenditure...relativetoa
clearlyidentifiedcandidateduringacalendaryearwhich,whenaddedtoallother
expendituresmadebysuchpersonduringtheyearadvocatingtheelectionordefeatof
suchcandidate,exceeds$1,000."[Footnote45]Theplaineffectof608(e)(1)isto

Page424U.S.1,40
prohibitallindividuals,whoareneithercandidatesnorownersofinstitutionalpress
facilities,andallgroups,exceptpoliticalpartiesandcampaignorganizations,from
voicingtheirviews"relativetoaclearlyidentifiedcandidate"throughmeansthatentail
aggregateexpendituresofmorethan$1,000duringacalendaryear.Theprovision,for

Buckleyv.Valeo
example,wouldmakeitafederalcriminaloffenseforapersonorassociationtoplacea
singleonequarterpageadvertisement"relativetoaclearlyidentifiedcandidate"ina
majormetropolitannewspaper.[Footnote46]
Beforeexaminingtheinterestsadvancedinsupportof608(e)(1)'sexpenditureceiling,
considerationmustbegiventoappellants'contention thattheprovisionis
unconstitutionallyvague.[Footnote47]Closeexaminationofthe

Page424U.S.1,41
specificityofthestatutorylimitationisrequiredwhere,ashere,thelegislationimposes
criminalpenaltiesinanareapermeatedbyFirstAmendmentinterests.SeeSmithv.
Goguen, 415U.S.566,573 (1974)Crampv.BoardofPublicInstruction, 368U.S.278,
287288(1961)Smithv.California,361U.S.147,151 (1959).[Footnote48]Thetestis
whetherthelanguageof608(e)(1)affordsthe"[p]recisionofregulation[that]mustbe
thetouchstoneinanareasocloselytouchingourmostpreciousfreedoms."NAACPv.
Button,371U.S.,at438.
Thekeyoperativelanguageoftheprovisionlimits"anyexpenditure...relativetoa
clearlyidentifiedcandidate."Although"expenditure,""clearlyidentified,"and
"candidate"aredefinedintheAct,thereisnodefinitionclarifyingwhatexpendituresare
"relativeto"acandidate.Theuseofsoindefiniteaphraseas"relativeto"acandidate
failstoclearlymarktheboundarybetweenpermissibleandimpermissiblespeech,unless
otherportionsof608(e)(1)makesufficientlyexplicittherangeofexpenditures

Page424U.S.1,42
coveredbythelimitation.Thesectionprohibits"anyexpenditure...relativetoaclearly
identifiedcandidateduringacalendaryearwhich,whenaddedtoallotherexpenditures.
..advocatingtheelectionordefeatofsuchcandidate,exceeds$1,000."(Emphasis
added.)Thiscontextclearlypermits,ifindeeditdoesnotrequire,thephrase"relativeto"
acandidatetobereadtomean"advocatingtheelectionordefeatof"acandidate.[
Footnote49]
Butwhilesuchaconstructionof608(e)(1)refocusesthevaguenessquestion,theCourt
ofAppealswasmistakeninthinkingthatthisconstructioneliminatestheproblemof
unconstitutionalvaguenessaltogether.171U.S.App.D.C.,at204,519F.2d,at853.For
thedistinctionbetweendiscussionofissuesandcandidatesandadvocacyofelectionor
defeatofcandidatesmayoftendissolveinpracticalapplication.Candidates,especially
incumbents,areintimatelytiedtopublicissuesinvolvinglegislativeproposalsand
governmentalactions.Notonlydocandidatescampaignonthebasisoftheirpositionson
variouspublicissues,butcampaignsthemselvesgenerateissuesofpublicinterest.[
Footnote50]Inananalogous

Buckleyv.Valeo
Page424U.S.1,43
context,thisCourtinThomasv.Collins,323U.S.516(1945),observed:
"[W]hetherwordsintendedanddesignedtofallshortofinvitationwouldmissthatmark
isaquestionbothofintentandofeffect.Nospeaker,insuchcircumstances,safelycould
assumethatanythinghemightsayuponthegeneralsubjectwouldnotbeunderstoodby
someasaninvitation.Inshort, thesupposedlyclearcutdistinctionbetweendiscussion,
laudation,generaladvocacy,andsolicitationputsthespeakerinthesecircumstances
whollyatthemercyofthevariedunderstandingofhishearersandconsequentlyof
whateverinferencemaybedrawnastohisintentandmeaning.
"Suchadistinctionoffersnosecurityforfreediscussion.Intheseconditionsitblankets
withuncertaintywhatevermaybesaid.Itcompelsthespeakertohedgeandtrim."Id.,at
535.
SeealsoUnitedStatesv.Auto.Workers, 352U.S.567,595596(1957)(Douglas,J.,
dissenting)Gitlowv.NewYork, 268U.S.652,673(1925)(Holmes,J.,dissenting).
TheconstitutionaldeficienciesdescribedinThomasv.Collinscanbeavoidedonlyby
reading608(e)(1)aslimitedtocommunicationsthatincludeexplicitwordsofadvocacy
ofelectionordefeatofacandidate,muchasthedefinitionof"clearlyidentified"in608
(e)(2)requiresthatanexplicitandunambiguousreferencetothecandidateappearaspart
ofthecommunication.[Footnote51]This

Page424U.S.1,44
isthereadingoftheprovisionsuggestedbythenongovernmentalappelleesinarguing
that"[f]undsspenttopropagateone'sviewsonissueswithoutexpresslycallingfora
candidate'selectionordefeatarethusnotcovered."Weagreethatinordertopreservethe
provisionagainstinvalidationonvaguenessgrounds,608(e)(1)mustbeconstruedto
applyonlytoexpendituresforcommunicationsthatinexpresstermsadvocatethe
electionordefeatofaclearlyidentifiedcandidateforfederaloffice.[Footnote52]
WeturnthentothebasicFirstAmendmentquestion whether608(e)(1),evenasthus
narrowlyandexplicitlyconstrued,impermissiblyburdenstheconstitutionalrightoffree
expression.TheCourtofAppealssummarilyheldtheprovisionconstitutionallyvalidon
thegroundthat"section608(e)isaloopholeclosingprovisiononly"thatisnecessaryto
preventcircumventionofthecontributionlimitations.171U.S.App.D.C.,at204,519
F.2d,at853.Wecannotagree.
ThediscussioninPartIA,supra,explainswhytheAct'sexpenditurelimitationsimpose
fargreaterrestraintsonthefreedomofspeechandassociationthandoitscontribution
limitations.Themarkedlygreaterburdenonbasicfreedomscausedby608(e)(1)thus
cannotbesustainedsimplybyinvokingtheinterestinmaximizingtheeffectivenessof
thelessintrusivecontributionlimitations.Rather,theconstitutionalityof608(e)(1)turns

Buckleyv.Valeo
onwhetherthegovernmentalinterestsadvancedinitssupportsatisfytheexacting
scrutinyapplicabletolimitations

Page424U.S.1,45
oncoreFirstAmendmentrightsofpoliticalexpression.
Wefindthatthegovernmentalinterestinpreventingcorruptionandtheappearanceof
corruptionisinadequatetojustify608(e)(1)'sceilingonindependentexpenditures.First,
assuming,arguendo,thatlargeindependentexpendituresposethesamedangersofactual
orapparentquidproquoarrangementsasdolargecontributions,608(e)(1)doesnot
provideananswerthatsufficientlyrelatestotheeliminationofthosedangers.Unlikethe
contributionlimitations'totalbanonthegivingoflargeamountsofmoneytocandidates,
608(e)(1)preventsonlysomelargeexpenditures.Solongaspersonsandgroupseschew
expendituresthatinexpresstermsadvocatetheelectionordefeatofaclearlyidentified
candidate,theyarefreetospendasmuchastheywanttopromotethecandidateandhis
views.Theexactinginterpretationofthestatutorylanguagenecessarytoavoid
unconstitutionalvaguenessthusunderminesthelimitation'seffectivenessasaloophole
closingprovisionbyfacilitatingcircumventionbythoseseekingtoexertimproper
influenceuponacandidateorofficeholder.Itwouldnaivelyunderestimatetheingenuity
andresourcefulnessofpersonsandgroupsdesiringtobuyinfluencetobelievethatthey
wouldhavemuchdifficultydevisingexpendituresthatskirtedtherestrictiononexpress
advocacyofelectionordefeatbutneverthelessbenefitedthecandidate'scampaign.Yet
nosubstantialsocietalinterestwouldbeservedbyaloopholeclosingprovisiondesigned
tocheckcorruptionthatpermittedunscrupulouspersonsandorganizationstoexpend
unlimitedsumsofmoneyinordertoobtainimproperinfluenceovercandidatesfor
electiveoffice.Cf.Millsv.Alabama,384U.S.,at220.
Second,quiteapartfromtheshortcomingsof608(e)

Page424U.S.1,46
(1)inpreventinganyabusesgeneratedbylargeindependentexpenditures,the
independentadvocacyrestrictedbytheprovisiondoesnotpresentlyappeartopose
dangersofrealorapparentcorruptioncomparabletothoseidentifiedwithlargecampaign
contributions.Thepartiesdefending608(e)(1)contendthatitisnecessarytoprevent
wouldbecontributorsfromavoidingthecontributionlimitationsbythesimpleexpedient
ofpayingdirectlyformediaadvertisementsorforotherportionsofthecandidate's
campaignactivities.Theyarguethatexpenditurescontrolledbyorcoordinatedwiththe
candidateandhiscampaignmightwellhavevirtuallythesamevaluetothecandidateasa
contributionandwouldposesimilardangersofabuse.Yetsuchcontrolledorcoordinated
expendituresaretreatedascontributionsratherthanexpendituresundertheAct.[Footnote
53]Section608(b)'s

Buckleyv.Valeo
Page424U.S.1,47
contributionceilingsratherthan608(e)(1)'sindependentexpenditurelimitationprevent
attemptstocircumventtheActthroughprearrangedorcoordinatedexpenditures
amountingtodisguisedcontributions.Bycontrast,608(e)(1)limitsexpendituresfor
expressadvocacyofcandidatesmadetotallyindependentlyofthecandidateandhis
campaign.Unlikecontributions,suchindependentexpendituresmaywellprovidelittle
assistancetothecandidate'scampaignandindeedmayprovecounterproductive.The
absenceofprearrangementandcoordinationofanexpenditurewiththecandidateorhis
agentnotonlyunderminesthevalueoftheexpendituretothecandidate,butalso
alleviatesthedangerthatexpenditureswillbegivenasaquidproquoforimproper
commitmentsfromthecandidate.Ratherthanpreventingcircumventionofthe
contributionlimitations,608(e)(1)severelyrestrictsallindependentadvocacydespiteits
substantiallydiminishedpotentialforabuse.
Whiletheindependentexpenditureceilingthusfailstoserveanysubstantial
governmentalinterestinstemming

Page424U.S.1,48
thereality orappearanceofcorruptionintheelectoralprocess,itheavilyburdenscore
FirstAmendmentexpression.FortheFirstAmendmentrightto"`speakone'smind...on
allpublicinstitutions'"includestherighttoengagein"`vigorousadvocacy'nolessthan
`abstractdiscussion.'"NewYorkTimesCo.v.Sullivan,376U.S.,at269,quoting
Bridgesv.California,314U.S.252,270 (1941),andNAACPv.Button,371U.S.,at429.
Advocacyoftheelectionordefeatofcandidatesforfederalofficeisnolessentitledto
protectionundertheFirstAmendmentthanthediscussionofpoliticalpolicygenerallyor
advocacyofthepassageordefeatoflegislation.[Footnote54]
Itisargued,however,thattheancillarygovernmentalinterestinequalizingtherelative
abilityofindividualsandgroupstoinfluencetheoutcomeofelectionsservestojustify
thelimitationonexpressadvocacyoftheelectionordefeatofcandidatesimposedby608
(e)(1)'sexpenditureceiling.Buttheconceptthatgovernmentmayrestrictthespeechof
someelementsofoursocietyin

Page424U.S.1,49
ordertoenhancetherelativevoiceofothersiswhollyforeigntotheFirstAmendment,
whichwasdesigned"tosecure`thewidestpossibledisseminationofinformationfrom
diverseandantagonisticsources,'"and"`toassureunfetteredinterchangeofideasforthe
bringingaboutofpoliticalandsocialchangesdesiredbythepeople.'"NewYorkTimes
Co.v.Sullivan,supra,at266,269,quotingAssociatedPressv.UnitedStates, 326U.S.1,
20(1945),andRothv.UnitedStates,354U.S.,at484.TheFirstAmendment'sprotection
againstgovernmentalabridgmentoffreeexpressioncannotproperlybemadetodepend

Buckleyv.Valeo
onaperson'sfinancialabilitytoengageinpublicdiscussion.Cf.EasternR.Conf.v.
NoerrMotors, 365U.S.127,139 (1961).[Footnote55]

Page424U.S.1,50
TheCourt'sdecisionsinMillsv.Alabama,384U.S.214 (1966),andMiamiHerald
PublishingCo.v.Tornillo,418U.S.241 (1974),heldthatlegislativerestrictionson
advocacyoftheelectionordefeatofpoliticalcandidatesarewhollyatoddswiththe
guaranteesoftheFirstAmendment.InMills,theCourtaddressedthequestionwhether"a
State,consistentlywiththeUnitedStatesConstitution,canmakeitacrimefortheeditor
ofadailynewspapertowriteandpublishaneditorialonelectiondayurgingpeopleto
voteacertainwayonissuessubmittedtothem."384U.S.,at215(emphasisinoriginal).
Weheldthat"notestofreasonablenesscansave[such]astatelawfrominvalidationasa
violationoftheFirstAmendment."Id.,at220.Yettheprohibitionofelectionday
editorialsinvalidatedinMillsisclearlyalesserintrusiononconstitutionalfreedomthana
$1,000limitationontheamountofmoneyanypersonorassociationcanspendduringan
entireelectionyearinadvocatingtheelectionordefeatofacandidateforpublicoffice.
MorerecentlyinTornillo,theCourtheldthatFloridacouldnotconstitutionallyrequirea
newspaper

Page424U.S.1,51
tomakespaceavailableforapoliticalcandidatetoreplytoitscriticism.Yetunderthe
Floridastatute,everynewspaperwasfreetocriticizeanycandidateasmuchasitpleased
solongasitundertookthemodestburdenofprintinghisreply.See418U.S.,at256257.
ThelegislativerestraintinvolvedinTornillothusalsopalesincomparisontothe
limitationsimposedby608(e)(1).[Footnote56]
Forthereasonsstated,weconcludethat608(e)(1)'sindependentexpenditurelimitation
isunconstitutionalundertheFirstAmendment.
2.LimitationonExpendituresbyCandidatesfromPersonalorFamilyResources
TheActalsosetslimitsonexpendituresbyacandidate"fromhispersonalfunds,orthe
personalfundsofhisimmediatefamily,inconnectionwithhiscampaignsduringany
calendaryear."608(a)(1).Theseceilingsvaryfrom$50,000forPresidentialorVice
Presidentialcandidatesto$35,000forsenatorialcandidates,and$25,000formost
candidatesfortheHouseofRepresentatives.[Footnote57]

Page424U.S.1,52
Theceilingonpersonalexpendituresbycandidatesontheirownbehalf,likethe
limitationsonindependentexpenditurescontainedin608(e)(1),imposesasubstantial

Buckleyv.Valeo
restraintontheabilityofpersonstoengageinprotectedFirstAmendmentexpression.[
Footnote58]Thecandidate,nolessthananyotherperson,hasaFirstAmendmentright
toengageinthediscussionofpublicissuesandvigorouslyandtirelesslytoadvocatehis
ownelectionandtheelectionofothercandidates.Indeed,itisofparticularimportance
thatcandidateshavetheunfettered

Page424U.S.1,53
opportunity tomaketheirviewsknownsothattheelectoratemayintelligentlyevaluate
thecandidates'personalqualitiesandtheirpositionsonvitalpublicissuesbefore
choosingamongthemonelectionday.Mr.JusticeBrandeis'observationthatinour
country"publicdiscussionisapoliticalduty,"Whitneyv.California,274U.S.357,375
(1927)(concurringopinion),applieswithspecialforcetocandidatesforpublicoffice.
Section608(a)'sceilingonpersonalexpendituresbyacandidateinfurtheranceofhis
owncandidacythusclearlyanddirectlyinterfereswithconstitutionallyprotected
freedoms.
TheprimarygovernmentalinterestservedbytheAct thepreventionofactualand
apparentcorruptionofthepoliticalprocessdoesnotsupportthelimitationonthe
candidate'sexpenditureofhisownpersonalfunds.AstheCourtofAppealsconcluded:
"Manifestly,thecoreproblemofavoidingundisclosedandundueinfluenceoncandidates
fromoutsideinterestshaslesserapplicationwhenthemoniesinvolvedcomefromthe
candidatehimselforfromhisimmediatefamily."171U.S.App.D.C.,at206,519F.2d,
at855.Indeed,theuseofpersonalfundsreducesthecandidate'sdependenceonoutside
contributionsandtherebycounteractsthecoercivepressuresandattendantrisksofabuse
towhichtheAct'scontributionlimitationsaredirected.[Footnote59]

Page424U.S.1,54
Theancillaryinterestinequalizingtherelativefinancialresourcesofcandidates
competingforelectiveoffice,therefore,providesthesolerelevantrationalefor608(a)'s
expenditureceiling.Thatinterestisclearlynotsufficienttojustifytheprovision's
infringementoffundamentalFirstAmendmentrights.First,thelimitationmayfailto
promotefinancialequalityamongcandidates.Acandidatewhospendslessofhis
personalresourcesonhiscampaignmaynonethelessoutspendhisrivalasaresultof
moresuccessfulfundraisingefforts.Indeed,acandidate'spersonalwealthmayimpede
hiseffortstopersuadeothersthatheneedstheirfinancialcontributionsorvolunteer
effortstoconductaneffectivecampaign.Second,andmorefundamentally,theFirst
Amendmentsimplycannottolerate608(a)'srestrictionuponthefreedomofacandidate
tospeakwithoutlegislativelimitonbehalfofhisowncandidacy.Wethereforeholdthat
608(a)'srestrictiononacandidate'spersonalexpendituresisunconstitutional.

Buckleyv.Valeo
3.LimitationsonCampaignExpenditures
Section608(c)placeslimitationsonoverallcampaignexpendituresbycandidates
seekingnominationforelectionandelectiontofederaloffice.[Footnote60]Presidential
candidatesmayspend$10,000,000inseekingnominationforofficeandanadditional
$20,000,000inthegeneralelectioncampaign.608(c)(1)(A),(B).[Footnote61]

Page424U.S.1,55
Theceilingonsenatorialcampaignsispeggedtothesizeofthevotingagepopulationof
theStatewithminimumdollaramountsapplicabletocampaignsinStateswithsmall
populations.Insenatorialprimaryelections,thelimitisthegreaterofeightcents
multipliedbythevotingagepopulationor$100,000,andinthegeneralelectionthelimit
isincreasedto12centsmultipliedbythevotingagepopulationor$150,000.608(c)(1)
(C),(D).TheActimposesblanket$70,000limitationsonbothprimarycampaignsand
generalelectioncampaignsfortheHouseofRepresentativeswiththeexceptionthatthe
senatorialceilingappliestocampaignsinStatesentitledtoonlyoneRepresentative.608
(c)(1)(C)(E).Theseceilingsaretobeadjustedupwardsatthebeginningofeach
calendaryearbytheaveragepercentageriseintheconsumerpriceindexforthe12
precedingmonths.608(d).[Footnote62]
Nogovernmentalinterestthathasbeensuggestedissufficienttojustifytherestrictionon
thequantityofpoliticalexpressionimposedby608(c)'scampaignexpenditure
limitations.Themajorevilassociatedwithrapidlyincreasingcampaignexpendituresis
thedangerofcandidatedependenceonlargecontributions.Theinterestinalleviatingthe
corruptinginfluenceoflargecontributionsisservedbytheAct'scontributionlimitations
anddisclosureprovisionsratherthanby608(c)'scampaignexpenditureceilings.The
CourtofAppeals'assertionthattheexpenditurerestrictionsarenecessarytoreducethe
incentivetocircumventdirectcontributionlimitsisnotpersuasive.See171U.S.

Page424U.S.1,56
App.D.C.,at210,519F.2d,at859.Thereisnoindicationthatthesubstantialcriminal
penaltiesforviolatingthecontributionceilingscombinedwiththepoliticalrepercussion
ofsuchviolationswillbeinsufficienttopolicethecontributionprovisions.Extensive
reporting,auditing,anddisclosurerequirementsapplicabletobothcontributionsand
expendituresbypoliticalcampaignsaredesignedtofacilitatethedetectionofillegal
contributions.Moreover,astheCourtofAppealsnoted,theActpermitsanofficeholder
orsuccessfulcandidatetoretaincontributionsinexcessoftheexpenditureceilingandto
usethesefundsfor"anyotherlawfulpurpose."2U.S.C.439a(1970ed.,Supp.IV).This
provisionundercutswhatevermarginalroletheexpenditurelimitationsmightotherwise
playinenforcingthecontributionceilings.

Buckleyv.Valeo
Theinterestinequalizingthefinancialresourcesofcandidatescompetingforfederal
officeisnomoreconvincingajustificationforrestrictingthescopeoffederalelection
campaigns.Giventhelimitationonthesizeofoutsidecontributions,thefinancial
resourcesavailabletoacandidate'scampaign,likethenumberofvolunteersrecruited,
willnormallyvarywiththesizeandintensityofthecandidate'ssupport.[Footnote63]
Thereisnothinginvidious,improper,orunhealthyinpermittingsuchfundstobespentto
carrythecandidate'smessagetotheelectorate.[Footnote64]Moreover,theequalization
ofpermissiblecampaignexpenditures

Page424U.S.1,57
mightservenottoequalizetheopportunitiesofallcandidates,buttohandicapa
candidatewholackedsubstantialnamerecognitionorexposureofhisviewsbeforethe
startofthecampaign.
Thecampaignexpenditureceilingsappeartobedesignedprimarilytoservethe
governmentalinterestsinreducingtheallegedlyskyrocketingcostsofpolitical
campaigns.AppelleesandtheCourtofAppealsstressedstatisticsindicatingthat
spendingforfederalelectioncampaignsincreasedalmost300%between1952and1972
incomparisonwitha57.6%riseintheconsumerpriceindexduringthesameperiod.
Appellantsrespondthatduringtheseyearstheriseincampaignspendinglaggedbehind
thepercentageincreaseintotalexpendituresforcommercialadvertisingandthesizeof
thegrossnationalproduct.Inanyevent,themeregrowthinthecostoffederalelection
campaignsinandofitselfprovidesnobasisforgovernmentalrestrictionsonthequantity
ofcampaignspendingandtheresultinglimitationonthescopeoffederalcampaigns.The
FirstAmendmentdeniesgovernmentthepowertodeterminethatspendingtopromote
one'spoliticalviewsiswasteful,excessive,orunwise.Inthefreesocietyordainedbyour
Constitutionitisnotthegovernment,butthepeopleindividuallyascitizensand
candidatesandcollectivelyasassociationsandpoliticalcommitteeswhomustretain
controloverthequantityandrangeofdebateonpublicissuesinapoliticalcampaign.[
Footnote65]

Page424U.S.1,58
Forthesereasonsweholdthat608(c)isconstitutionallyinvalid.[Footnote66]
Insum,theprovisionsoftheActthatimposea$1,000limitationoncontributionstoa
singlecandidate,608(b)(1),a$5,000limitationoncontributionsbyapolitical
committeetoasinglecandidate,608(b)(2),anda$25,000limitationontotal
contributionsbyanindividualduringanycalendaryear,608(b)(3),areconstitutionally
valid.Theselimitations,alongwiththedisclosureprovisions,constitutetheAct'sprimary
weaponsagainsttherealityorappearanceofimproperinfluencestemmingfromthe
dependenceofcandidatesonlargecampaigncontributions.Thecontributionceilingsthus
servethebasicgovernmentalinterestinsafeguardingtheintegrityoftheelectoralprocess

Buckleyv.Valeo
withoutdirectlyimpingingupontherightsofindividualcitizensandcandidatestoengage
inpoliticaldebateanddiscussion.Bycontrast,theFirstAmendmentrequiresthe
invalidationoftheAct'sindependentexpenditureceiling,608(e)(1),itslimitationona
candidate'sexpendituresfromhisownpersonalfunds,608(a),anditsceilingsonoverall
campaignexpenditures,608(c).Theseprovisionsplacesubstantialanddirectrestrictions

Page424U.S.1,59
ontheabilityofcandidates,citizens,andassociationstoengageinprotectedpolitical
expression,restrictionsthattheFirstAmendmentcannottolerate.[Footnote67]

Page424U.S.1,60

II.REPORTINGANDDISCLOSUREREQUIREMENTS
Unlikethelimitationsoncontributionsandexpendituresimposedby18U.S.C.608(1970
ed.,Supp.IV),thedisclosurerequirementsoftheAct,2U.S.C.431etseq.(1970ed.,
Supp.IV),[Footnote68]arenotchallengedbyappellantsasperseunconstitutional
restrictionsontheexerciseofFirstAmendmentfreedomsofspeechandassociation.[
Footnote69]Indeed,appellantsarguethat"narrowlydrawndisclosurerequirementsare
thepropersolutiontovirtuallyalloftheevilsCongresssoughttoremedy."Brieffor
Appellants171.Theparticularrequirements

Page424U.S.1,61
embodiedintheActareattackedasoverbroad bothintheirapplicationtominorparty
andindependentcandidatesandintheirextensiontocontributionsassmallas$11or
$101.Appellantsalsochallengetheprovisionfordisclosurebythosewhomake
independentcontributionsandexpenditures,434(e).TheCourtofAppealsfoundno
constitutionalinfirmitiesintheprovisionschallengedhere.[Footnote70]Weaffirmthe
determinationonoverbreadthandholdthat434(e),ifnarrowlyconstrued,alsoiswithin
constitutionalbounds.
Thefirstfederaldisclosurelawwasenactedin1910.ActofJune25,1910,c.392,36
Stat.822.Itrequiredpoliticalcommittees,definedasnationalcommitteesandnational
congressionalcampaigncommitteesofparties,andorganizationsoperatingtoinfluence
congressionalelectionsintwoormoreStates,todisclosenamesofallcontributorsof
$100ormoreidentificationofrecipientsofexpendituresof$10ormorewasalso
required.1,56,36Stat.822824.Annual expendituresof$50ormore"forthepurpose
ofinfluencingorcontrolling,intwoormoreStates,theresultof"acongressionalelection
hadtobereportedindependentlyiftheywerenotmadethroughapoliticalcommittee.7,

Buckleyv.Valeo
36Stat.824.In1911theActwasrevisedtoincludeprenominationtransactionssuchas
thoseinvolvedinconventionsandprimarycampaigns.ActofAug.19,1911,2,37Stat.
26.SeeUnitedStatesv.Auto.Workers,352U.S.,at575576.
DisclosurerequirementswerebroadenedintheFederalCorruptPracticesActof1925
(TitleIIIoftheActofFeb.28,1925),43Stat.1070.ThatActrequiredpolitical
committees,definedasorganizationsthatacceptcontributionsormakeexpenditures"for
thepurposeof

Page424U.S.1,62
influencingorattemptingtoinfluence"thePresidentialorVicePresidentialelections(a)
intwoormoreStatesor(b)asasubsidiaryofanationalcommittee,302(c),43Stat.
1070,toreporttotalcontributionsandexpenditures,includingthenamesandaddressesof
contributorsof$100ormoreandrecipientsof$10ormoreinacalendaryear.305(a),43
Stat.1071.TheActwasupheldagainstachallengethatitinfringedupontheprerogatives
oftheStatesinBurroughsv.UnitedStates, 290U.S.534 (1934).TheCourtheldthatit
waswithinthepowerofCongress"topassappropriatelegislationtosafeguard[a
Presidential]electionfromtheimproperuseofmoneytoinfluencetheresult."Id.,at545.
Althoughthedisclosurerequirementswerewidelycircumvented,[Footnote71]nofurther
attemptsweremadetotightenthemuntil1960,whentheSenatepassedabillthatwould
haveclosedsomeexistingloopholes.S.2436,106Cong.Rec.1193.Theattemptaborted
becausenosimilareffortwasmadeintheHouse.
TheActpresentlyunderreviewreplacedallpriordisclosurelaws.Itsprimarydisclosure
provisionsimposereportingobligationson"politicalcommittees"andcandidates.
"Politicalcommittee"isdefinedin431(d)asagroupofpersonsthatreceives
"contributions"ormakes"expenditures"ofover$1,000inacalendaryear.
"Contributions"and"expenditures"aredefinedinlengthyparallelprovisionssimilarto
thoseinTitle18,discussed

Page424U.S.1,63
above.[Footnote72]Bothdefinitionsfocusontheuseofmoneyorotherobjectsofvalue
"forthepurposeof...influencing"thenominationorelectionofanypersontofederal
office.431(e)(1),(f)(1).
EachpoliticalcommitteeisrequiredtoregisterwiththeCommission,433,andtokeep
detailedrecordsofbothcontributionsandexpenditures,432(c),(d).Theserecordsmust
includethenameandaddressofeveryonemakingacontributioninexcessof$10,along
withthedateandamountofthecontribution.Ifaperson'scontributionsaggregatemore
than$100,hisoccupationandprincipalplaceofbusinessarealsotobeincluded.432(c)
(2).ThesefilesaresubjecttoperiodicauditsandfieldinvestigationsbytheCommission.
438(a)(8).

Buckleyv.Valeo
Eachcommitteeandeachcandidatealsoisrequiredtofilequarterlyreports.434(a).The
reportsaretocontaindetailedfinancialinformation,includingthefullname,mailing
address,occupation,andprincipalplaceofbusinessofeachpersonwhohascontributed
over$100inacalendaryear,aswellastheamountanddateofthecontributions.434(b).
TheyaretobemadeavailablebytheCommission"forpublicinspectionandcopying."
438(a)(4).Everycandidateforfederalofficeisrequiredtodesignatea"principal
campaigncommittee,"whichistoreceivereportsofcontributionsandexpendituresmade
onthecandidate'sbehalffromotherpoliticalcommitteesandtocompileandfilethese
reports,togetherwithitsownstatements,withtheCommission.432(f).
Everyindividualorgroup,otherthanapoliticalcommitteeorcandidate,whomakes
"contributions"or"expenditures"ofover$100inacalendaryear"otherthan

Page424U.S.1,64
bycontributiontoapoliticalcommitteeorcandidate"isrequiredtofileastatementwith
theCommission.434(e).Anyviolationoftheserecordkeepingandreportingprovisions
ispunishablebyafineofnotmorethan$1,000oraprisontermofnotmorethanayear,
orboth.441(a).

A.GeneralPrinciples
Unliketheoveralllimitationsoncontributionsandexpenditures,thedisclosure
requirementsimposenoceilingoncampaignrelatedactivities.Butwehaverepeatedly
foundthatcompelleddisclosure,initself,canseriouslyinfringeonprivacyofassociation
andbeliefguaranteedbytheFirstAmendment.E.g.,Gibsonv.FloridaLegislative
Comm.,372U.S.539 (1963)NAACPv.Button, 371U.S.415 (1963)Sheltonv.
Tucker, 364U.S.479 (1960)Batesv.LittleRock, 361U.S.516 (1960)NAACPv.
Alabama,357U.S.449 (1958).
WelonghaverecognizedthatsignificantencroachmentsonFirstAmendmentrightsof
thesortthatcompelleddisclosureimposescannotbejustifiedbyamereshowingofsome
legitimategovernmentalinterest.SinceNAACPv.Alabamawehaverequiredthatthe
subordinatinginterestsoftheStatemustsurviveexactingscrutiny.[Footnote73]Wealso
haveinsistedthattherebea"relevantcorrelation"[Footnote74]or"substantialrelation"[
Footnote75]betweenthegovernmentalinterestandtheinformationrequiredtobe
disclosed.SeePollardv.Roberts,283F.Supp.248,257(EDArk.)(threejudgecourt),
aff'd,393U.S.14 (1968)

Page424U.S.1,65
(percuriam).Thistypeofscrutinyisnecessaryevenifanydeterrenteffectonthe
exerciseofFirstAmendmentrightsarises,notthroughdirectgovernmentaction,but

Buckleyv.Valeo
indirectlyasanunintendedbutinevitableresultofthegovernment'sconductinrequiring
disclosure.NAACPv.Alabama,supra,at461.Cf.Kusperv.Pontikes,414U.S.,at57
58.
Appelleesarguethatthedisclosurerequirementsof theActdiffersignificantlyfromthose
atissueinNAACPv.AlabamaanditsprogenybecausetheActonlyrequiresdisclosure
ofthenamesofcontributorsanddoesnotcompelpoliticalorganizationstosubmitthe
namesoftheirmembers.[Footnote76]
Aswehaveseen,groupassociationisprotectedbecauseitenhances"[e]ffective
advocacy."NAACPv.Alabama,supra,at460.Therighttojointogether"forthe
advancementofbeliefsandideas,"ibid.,isdilutedifitdoesnotincludetherighttopool
moneythroughcontributions,forfundsareoftenessentialif"advocacy"is

Page424U.S.1,66
tobetrulyoroptimally"effective."Moreover,theinvasionofprivacyofbeliefmaybeas
greatwhentheinformationsoughtconcernsthegivingandspendingofmoneyaswhenit
concernsthejoiningoforganizations,for"[f]inancialtransactionscanrevealmuchabout
aperson'sactivities,associations,andbeliefs."CaliforniaBankersAssn.v.Shultz,416
U.S.21,7879(1974)(POWELL,J.,concurring).Ourpastdecisionshavenotdrawnfine
linesbetweencontributorsandmembersbuthavetreatedtheminterchangeably.InBates,
forexample,weappliedtheprinciplesofNAACPv.Alabamaandreversedconvictions
forfailuretocomplywithacityordinancethatrequiredthedisclosureof"dues,
assessments,andcontributionspaid,bywhomandwhenpaid."361U.S.,at518.Seealso
UnitedStatesv.Rumely,345U.S.41 (1953)(settingasideacontemptconvictionofan
organizationofficialwhorefusedtodisclosenamesofthosewhomadebulkpurchasesof
bookssoldbytheorganization).
ThestricttestestablishedbyNAACPv.Alabamaisnecessarybecausecompelled
disclosurehasthepotentialforsubstantiallyinfringingtheexerciseofFirstAmendment
rights.Butwehaveacknowledgedthattherearegovernmentalinterestssufficiently
importanttooutweighthepossibilityofinfringement,particularlywhenthe"free
functioningofournationalinstitutions"isinvolved.CommunistPartyv.Subversive
ActivitiesControlBd., 367U.S.1,97 (1961).
Thegovernmentalinterestssoughttobevindicatedbythedisclosurerequirementsareof
thismagnitude.Theyfallintothreecategories.First,disclosureprovidestheelectorate
withinformation"astowherepoliticalcampaignmoneycomesfromandhowitisspent
bythecandidate"[Footnote77]inordertoaidthevotersinevaluatingthose

Buckleyv.Valeo
Page424U.S.1,67
whoseekfederaloffice.Itallowsvoterstoplaceeachcandidateinthepoliticalspectrum
morepreciselythanisoftenpossiblesolelyonthebasisofpartylabelsandcampaign
speeches.Thesourcesofacandidate'sfinancialsupportalsoalertthevotertothe
intereststowhichacandidateismostlikelytoberesponsiveandthusfacilitate
predictionsoffutureperformanceinoffice.
Second,disclosurerequirementsdeteractualcorruptionandavoidtheappearanceof
corruptionbyexposinglargecontributionsandexpenditurestothelightofpublicity.[
Footnote78]Thisexposuremaydiscouragethosewhowouldusemoneyforimproper
purposeseitherbeforeoraftertheelection.Apublicarmedwithinformationabouta
candidate'smostgeneroussupportersisbetterabletodetectanypostelectionspecial
favorsthatmaybegiveninreturn.[Footnote79]And,aswerecognizedinBurroughsv.
UnitedStates,290U.S., at548,Congresscouldreasonablyconcludethatfulldisclosure
duringanelectioncampaigntends"topreventthecorruptuseofmoneytoaffect
elections."InenactingtheserequirementsitmayhavebeenmindfulofMr.Justice
Brandeis'advice:
"Publicityisjustlycommendedasaremedyforsocialandindustrialdiseases.Sunlightis
saidtobethebestofdisinfectantselectriclightthemostefficientpoliceman."[Footnote
80]
Third,andnotleastsignificant,recordkeeping,reporting,

Page424U.S.1,68
anddisclosurerequirementsareanessentialmeansofgatheringthedatanecessaryto
detectviolationsofthecontributionlimitationsdescribedabove.
Thedisclosurerequirements,asageneralmatter,directlyservesubstantialgovernmental
interests.Indeterminingwhethertheseinterestsaresufficienttojustifytherequirements
wemustlooktotheextentoftheburdenthattheyplaceonindividualrights.
Itisundoubtedlytruethatpublicdisclosureofcontributionstocandidatesandpolitical
partieswilldetersomeindividualswhootherwisemightcontribute.Insomeinstances,
disclosuremayevenexposecontributorstoharassmentorretaliation.Thesearenot
insignificantburdensonindividualrights,andtheymustbeweighedcarefullyagainstthe
interestswhichCongresshassoughttopromotebythislegislation.Inthisprocess,we
noteandagreewithappellants'concession[Footnote81]thatdisclosurerequirements
certainlyinmostapplicationsappeartobetheleastrestrictivemeansofcurbingthe
evilsofcampaignignoranceandcorruptionthatCongressfoundtoexist.[Footnote82]
Appellantsargue,however,thatthebalancetipsagainstdisclosurewhenitisrequiredof
contributorstocertainpartiesandcandidates.Weturnnowtothiscontention.

Buckleyv.Valeo
B.ApplicationtoMinorPartiesandIndependents
AppellantscontendthattheAct'srequirementsareoverbroadinsofarastheyapplyto
contributionstominor

Page424U.S.1,69
partiesandindependentcandidatesbecausethegovernmentalinterestinthisinformation
isminimalandthedangerofsignificantinfringementonFirstAmendmentrightsis
greatlyincreased.
1.RequisiteFactualShowing
InNAACPv.Alabamatheorganizationhad"madeanuncontrovertedshowingthaton
pastoccasionsrevelationoftheidentityof itsrankandfilemembers[had]exposedthese
memberstoeconomicreprisal,lossofemployment,threatofphysicalcoercion,andother
manifestationsofpublichostility,"357U.S.,at462,andtheStatewasunabletoshow
thatthedisclosureitsoughthada"substantialbearing"ontheissuesitsoughttoclarify,
id.,at464.Underthosecircumstances,theCourtheldthat"whateverinteresttheState
mayhavein[disclosure]hasnotbeenshowntobesufficienttoovercomepetitioner's
constitutionalobjections."Id.,at465.
TheCourtofAppealsrejectedappellants'suggestionthatthiscasefitsintotheNAACPv.
Alabamamold.Itconcludedthatsubstantialgovernmentalinterestsin"informingthe
electorateandpreventingthecorruptionofthepoliticalprocess"werefurtheredby
requiringdisclosureofminorpartiesandindependentcandidates,171U.S.App.D.C.,at
218,519F.2d,at867,andthereforefoundno"tenablerationaleforassumingthatthe
publicinterestinminoritypartydisclosureofcontributionsaboveareasonablecutoff
pointisuniformlyoutweighedbypotentialcontributors'associationalrights,"id.,at219,
519F.2d,at868.Thecourtleftopenthequestionoftheapplicationofthedisclosure
requirementstocandidates(andparties)whocoulddemonstrateinjuryofthesortatstake
inNAACPv.Alabama.Norecordofharassmentonasimilarscalewasfoundinthis
case.[Footnote83]Weagreewith

Page424U.S.1,70
theCourtofAppeals'conclusionthatNAACPv.Alabamaisinappositewhere,ashere,
anyseriousinfringementonFirstAmendmentrightsbroughtaboutbythecompelled
disclosureofcontributorsishighlyspeculative.
Itistruethatthegovernmentalinterestindisclosureisdiminishedwhenthecontribution
inquestionismadetoaminorpartywithlittlechanceofwinninganelection.Asminor
partiesusuallyrepresentdefiniteandpublicizedviewpoints,theremaybelessneedto
informthevoters oftheintereststhatspecificcandidatesrepresent.Majorparties

Buckleyv.Valeo
encompasscandidatesofgreaterdiversity.Inmanysituationsthelabel"Republican"or
"Democrat"tellsavoterlittle.Thecandidatewhobearsitmaybesupportedbyfunds
fromthefarright,thefarleft,oranyplaceinbetweenonthepoliticalspectrum.Itisless
likelythatacandidateof,say,theSocialistLaborPartywillrepresentintereststhat
cannotbediscernedfromtheparty'sideologicalposition.
TheGovernment'sinterestindeterringthe"buying"ofelectionsandtheundueinfluence
oflargecontributorsonofficeholdersalsomaybereducedwherecontributionstoaminor
partyoranindependentcandidateareconcerned,foritislesslikelythatthecandidate
willbevictorious.Butaminorpartysometimescanplayasignificantroleinanelection.
Evenwhenaminorpartycandidatehaslittleornochanceofwinning,hemaybe
encouragedbymajorpartyinterestsinordertodivertvotesfromothermajorparty
contenders.[Footnote84]

Page424U.S.1,71
Wearenotunmindfulthatthedamagedonebydisclosuretotheassociationalinterestsof
theminorpartiesandtheirmembersandtosupportersofindependentscouldbe
significant.Thesemovementsarelesslikelytohaveasoundfinancialbaseandthusare
morevulnerabletofalloffsincontributions.Insomeinstancesfearsofreprisalmaydeter
contributionstothepointwherethemovementcannotsurvive.Thepublicinterestalso
suffersifthatresultcomestopass,forthereisaconsequentreductioninthefree
circulationofideasbothwithin[Footnote85]andwithout[Footnote86]thepolitical
arena.
Therecouldwellbeacase,similartothosebeforetheCourtinNAACPv.Alabamaand
Bates,wherethethreattotheexerciseofFirstAmendmentrightsissoseriousandthe
stateinterestfurtheredbydisclosuresoinsubstantialthattheAct'srequirementscannot
beconstitutionallyapplied.[Footnote87]Butnoappellantinthiscasehastenderedrecord
evidenceofthesortprofferedinNAACPv.Alabama.Instead,appellantsprimarilyrely
on"theclearlyarticulatedfearsofindividuals,wellexperiencedinthepoliticalprocess."
BriefforAppellants173.At

Page424U.S.1,72
besttheyofferthetestimonyofseveralminorpartyofficialsthatoneortwopersons
refusedtomakecontributionsbecauseofthepossibilityofdisclosure.[Footnote88]On
thisrecord,thesubstantialpublicinterestindisclosureidentifiedbythelegislativehistory
ofthisActoutweighstheharmgenerallyalleged.
2. BlanketExemption
Appellantsagreethat"therecordheredoesnotreflectthekindoffocusedandinsistent
harassmentofcontributorsandmembersthatexistedintheNAACPcases."Ibid.They

Buckleyv.Valeo
argue,however,thatablanketexemptionforminorpartiesisnecessarylestirreparable
injurybedonebeforetherequiredevidencecanbegathered.
Thosepartiesthatwouldbesufficiently"minor"tobeexemptedfromtherequirementsof
434couldbedefined,appellantssuggest,alongthelinesusedforpublicfinancing
purposes,seePartIIIA,infra,asthosewhoreceivedlessthan25%ofthevoteinpast
elections.Appellantsdonotarguethatthislineisconstitutionallyrequired.Theysuggest
asanalternativedefining"minorparties"asthosethatdonotqualifyforautomaticballot
accessunderstatelaw.Presumably,othercriteria,suchascurrentpoliticalstrength
(measuredbypollsorpetition),age,ordegreeoforganization,couldalsobeused.[
Footnote89]
Thedifficultywiththesesuggestionsisthattheyreflectonlyaparty'spastorpresent
politicalstrengthand

Page424U.S.1,73
thatisonlyoneofthefactorsthatmustbeconsidered.Someofthecriteriaarenot
preciselyindicativeofeventhatfactor.Age,[Footnote90]orpastpoliticalsuccess,for
instance,maytypicallybeassociatedwithpartiesthathaveahighprobabilityofsuccess.
Butnotalllongestablishedpartiesarewinnerssomeareconsistentlosersandanew
partymaygarneragreatdealofsupportifitcanassociateitselfwithanissuethathas
capturedthepublic'simagination.Noneofthecriteriasuggestedispreciselyrelatedto
theothercriticalfactorthatmustbeconsidered,thepossibilitythatdisclosurewill
impingeuponprotectedassociational activity.
AnopiniondissentinginpartfromtheCourtofAppeals'decisionconcedesthatnoone
lineis"constitutionallyrequired."[Footnote91]Itargues,however,thataflatexemption
forminorpartiesmustbecarvedout,evenalongarbitrarylines,ifgroupsthatwould
sufferimpermissiblyfromdisclosurearetobegivenanyrealprotection.Anapproach
thatrequiresminorpartiestosubmitevidencethatthedisclosurerequirementscannot
constitutionallybeappliedtothemoffersonlyanillusorysafeguard,theargumentgoes,
becausethe"evils"of"chillandharassment...arelargelyincapableofformalproof."[
Footnote92]Thisdissentexpresseditsconcernthataminorparty,particularlya

Page424U.S.1,74
newparty,mayneverbeabletoproveasubstantialthreatofharassment,howeverreal
thatthreatmaybe,becauseitwouldberequiredtocomeforwardwithwitnesseswhoare
toofearfultocontributebutnottoofearfultotestifyabouttheirfear.Astrictrequirement
thatchillandharassmentbedirectlyattributabletothespecificdisclosurefromwhichthe
exemptionissoughtwouldmakethetaskevenmoredifficult.

Buckleyv.Valeo
Werecognizethatundulystrictrequirementsofproofcouldimposeaheavyburden,but
itdoesnotfollowthatablanketexemptionforminorpartiesisnecessary.Minorparties
mustbeallowedsufficientflexibilityintheproof ofinjurytoassureafairconsideration
oftheirclaim.Theevidenceofferedneedshowonlyareasonableprobabilitythatthe
compelleddisclosureofaparty'scontributors'nameswillsubjectthemtothreats,
harassment,orreprisalsfromeitherGovernmentofficialsorprivateparties.Theproof
mayinclude,forexample,specificevidenceofpastorpresentharassmentofmembers
duetotheirassociationalties,orofharassmentdirectedagainsttheorganizationitself.A
patternofthreatsorspecificmanifestationsofpublichostilitymaybesufficient.New
partiesthathavenohistoryuponwhichtodrawmaybeabletoofferevidenceofreprisals
andthreatsdirectedagainstindividualsororganizationsholdingsimilarviews.
Whereitexiststhetypeof chillandharassmentidentifiedinNAACPv.Alabamacanbe
shown.Wecannotassumethatcourtswillbeinsensitivetosimilarshowingswhenmade
infuturecases.Wethereforeconcludethatablanketexemptionisnotrequired.

C.Section434(e)
Section434(e)requires"[e]veryperson(otherthanapoliticalcommitteeorcandidate)
whomakescontributions

Page424U.S.1,75
orexpenditures"aggregatingover$100inacalendaryear"otherthanbycontributiontoa
politicalcommitteeorcandidate"tofileastatementwiththeCommission.[Footnote93]
Unliketheotherdisclosureprovisions,thissectiondoesnotseekthecontributionlistof
anyassociation.Instead,itrequiresdirectdisclosureofwhatanindividualorgroup
contributesorspends.
Inconsideringthisprovisionwemustapplythesamestrictstandardofscrutiny,forthe
rightofassociationalprivacydevelopedinNAACPv.Alabamaderivesfromtherightsof
theorganization'smemberstoadvocatetheirpersonalpointsofviewinthemosteffective
way.357U.S.,at458,460.SeealsoNAACPv.Button,371U.S.,at429431Sweezyv.
NewHampshire,354U.S.,at250.
Appellantsattack434(e)asadirectintrusiononprivacyofbelief,inviolationofTalley
v.California,362U.S.60 (1960),andasimposing"veryreal,practicalburdens...
certaintodeterindividualsfrommakingexpendituresfortheirindependentpolitical
speech"analogoustothoseheldtobeimpermissibleinThomasv.Collins,323U.S.516
(1945).

Buckleyv.Valeo
1.TheRoleof434(e)
TheCourtofAppealsupheld434(e)asnecessarytoenforcetheindependentexpenditure
ceilingimposedby18U.S.C.608(e)(1)(1970ed.,Supp.IV).Itsaid:
"If...Congresshasboththeauthorityandacompellinginteresttoregulateindependent
expendituresundersection608(e),surelyitcanrequirethattherebedisclosureto
preventmisuseofthespendingchannel."171U.S.App.D.C.,at220519F.2d,at869.
Wehavefoundthat608(e)(1)unconstitutionallyinfringes

Page424U.S.1,76
uponFirstAmendmentrights.[Footnote94]Ifthesolefunctionof434(e)weretoaidin
theenforcementofthatprovision,itwouldnolongerserveanygovernmentalpurpose.
Butthetwoprovisionsarenotsointimatelytied.Thelegislativehistoryonthefunction
of434(e)isbare,butitwasclearlyintendedtostandindependentlyof608(e)(1).Itwas
enactedwiththegeneraldisclosureprovisionsin1971aspartoftheoriginalAct,[
Footnote95]while608(e)(1)waspartofthe1974amendments.[Footnote96]Likethe
otherdisclosureprovisions,434(e)couldplayaroleintheenforcementoftheexpanded
contributionandexpenditurelimitationsincludedinthe1974amendments,butitalsohas
independentfunctions.Section434(e)ispartofCongress'efforttoachieve"total
disclosure"byreaching"everykindofpoliticalactivity"[Footnote97]inordertoinsure
thatthevotersarefullyinformedandtoachievethroughpublicitythemaximum
deterrencetocorruptionandundueinfluencepossible.Theprovisionisresponsivetothe
legitimatefearthateffortswouldbemade,astheyhadbeeninthepast,[Footnote98]to
avoidthedisclosurerequirementsbyroutingfinancialsupportofcandidatesthrough
avenuesnotexplicitlycoveredbythegeneralprovisionsoftheAct.
2.VaguenessProblems
Initsefforttobeallinclusive,however,theprovisionraisesseriousproblemsof
vagueness,particularlytreacherouswhere,ashere,theviolationofitstermscarries
criminalpenalties[Footnote99]andfearofincurringthesesanctions

Page424U.S.1,77
maydeterthosewhoseektoexerciseprotectedFirstAmendmentrights.
Section434(e)appliesto"[e]veryperson...whomakescontributionsorexpenditures."
"Contributions"and"expenditures"aredefinedinparallelprovisionsintermsoftheuse
ofmoneyorothervaluableassets"forthepurposeof...influencing"thenominationor

Buckleyv.Valeo
electionofcandidatesforfederaloffice.[Footnote100]Itistheambiguityofthisphrase
thatposesconstitutionalproblems.
Dueprocessrequiresthatacriminalstatuteprovideadequatenoticetoapersonof
ordinaryintelligencethathiscontemplatedconductisillegal,for"nomanshallbeheld
criminallyresponsibleforconductwhichhecouldnotreasonablyunderstandtobe
proscribed."UnitedStatesv.Harriss,347U.S.612,617 (1954).SeealsoPapachristouv.
CityofJacksonville,405U.S.156 (1972).WhereFirstAmendmentrightsareinvolved,
aneven"greaterdegreeofspecificity"isrequired.Smithv.Goguen,415U.S.,at573.
SeeGraynedv.CityofRockford, 408U.S.104,109(1972)Kunzv.NewYork, 340
U.S.290 (1951).
Thereisnolegislativehistorytoguideusindeterminingthescopeofthecriticalphrase
"forthepurposeof...influencing."Itappearstohavebeenadoptedwithoutcomment
fromearlierdisclosureActs.[Footnote101]Congress"hasvoiceditswishesin[most]
mutedstrains,"leavingustodrawupon"thosecommonsenseassumptionsthatmustbe
madeindeterminingdirectionwithoutacompass."Rosadov.Wyman,397U.S.397,412
(1970).Wheretheconstitutionalrequirementofdefinitenessisatstake,wehavethe
furtherobligationtoconstruethestatute,

Page424U.S.1,78
ifthatcanbedoneconsistentwiththelegislature'spurpose,toavoidtheshoalsof
vagueness.UnitedStatesv.Harriss,supra,at618UnitedStatesv.Rumely,345U.S.,at
45.
InenactingthelegislationunderreviewCongressaddressedbroadlytheproblemof
politicalcampaignfinancing.Itwishedtopromotefulldisclosureofcampaignoriented
spendingtoinsureboththerealityandtheappearanceofthepurityandopennessofthe
federalelectionprocess.[Footnote102]Ourtaskistoconstrue"forthepurposeof...
influencing,"incorporatedin434(e)throughthedefinitionsof"contributions"and
"expenditures,"inamannerthatpreciselyfurthersthisgoal.
InPartIwediscussedwhatconstituteda"contribution"forpurposesofthecontribution
limitationssetforthin18U.S.C.608(b)(1970ed.,Supp.IV).[Footnote103]We
construedthattermtoincludenotonlycontributionsmadedirectlyorindirectlytoa
candidate,politicalparty,orcampaigncommittee,andcontributionsmadetoother
organizationsorindividualsbutearmarkedforpoliticalpurposes,butalsoall
expendituresplacedincooperationwithorwiththeconsentofacandidate,hisagents,or
anauthorizedcommitteeofthecandidate.Thedefinitionof"contribution"in431(e)for
disclosurepurposesparallelsthedefinitioninTitle18almostwordforword,andwe
construetheformerprovisionaswehavethelatter.Sodefined,"contributions"havea
sufficientlycloserelationshiptothegoalsoftheAct,fortheyareconnectedwitha
candidateorhiscampaign.

Buckleyv.Valeo
Whenweattempttodefine"expenditure"inasimilarlynarrowwayweencounterline
drawingproblems

Page424U.S.1,79
ofthesortwefacedin18U.S.C.608(e)(1)(1970ed.,Supp.IV).Althoughthephrase,
"forthepurposeof...influencing"anelectionornomination,differsfromthelanguage
usedin608(e)(1), itsharesthesamepotentialforencompassingbothissuediscussion
andadvocacyofapoliticalresult.[Footnote104]Thegeneralrequirementthat"political
committees"andcandidatesdisclosetheirexpenditurescouldraisesimilarvagueness
problems,for"politicalcommittee"isdefinedonlyintermsofamountofannual
"contributions"and"expenditures,"[Footnote105]andcouldbeinterpretedtoreach
groupsengagedpurelyinissuediscussion.Thelowercourtshaveconstruedthewords
"politicalcommittee"morenarrowly.[Footnote106]Tofulfill thepurposesoftheAct
theyneedonlyencompassorganizationsthatareunderthecontrolofacandidateorthe
majorpurposeofwhichisthenominationorelectionofacandidate.Expendituresof
candidatesandof"politicalcommittees"soconstruedcanbeassumedtofallwithinthe
coreareasoughttobeaddressedbyCongress.Theyare,bydefinition,campaignrelated.
Butwhenthemakeroftheexpenditureisnotwithinthesecategorieswhenitisan
individualotherthanacandidateoragroupother thana"politicalcommittee"[Footnote
107]

Page424U.S.1,80
therelationoftheinformationsoughttothepurposesoftheActmaybetooremote.To
insurethatthereachof434(e)isnotimpermissiblybroad,weconstrue"expenditure"for
purposesofthatsectioninthesamewayweconstruedthetermsof608(e) toreachonly
fundsusedforcommunicationsthatexpresslyadvocate[Footnote108]theelectionor
defeatofaclearlyidentifiedcandidate.Thisreadingisdirectedpreciselytothatspending
thatisunambiguouslyrelatedtothecampaignofaparticularfederalcandidate.
Insummary,434(e),asconstrued,imposesindependentreportingrequirementson
individualsandgroupsthatarenotcandidatesorpoliticalcommitteesonlyinthe
followingcircumstances:(1)whentheymakecontributionsearmarkedforpolitical
purposesorauthorizedorrequestedbyacandidateorhisagent,tosomepersonother
thanacandidateorpoliticalcommittee,and(2)whentheymakeexpendituresfor
communicationsthatexpresslyadvocatetheelectionordefeatofaclearlyidentified
candidate.
Unlike18U.S.C.608(e) (1)(1970ed.,Supp.IV),434(e),asconstrued,bearsa
sufficientrelationshiptoasubstantialgovernmentalinterest.Asnarrowed,434(e),like
608(e)(1),doesnotreachallpartisandiscussionforitonlyrequiresdisclosureofthose

Buckleyv.Valeo
expendituresthatexpresslyadvocateaparticularelectionresult.Thismighthavebeen
fataliftheonlypurposeof434(e)

Page424U.S.1,81
weretostemcorruptionoritsappearancebyclosingaloopholeinthegeneraldisclosure
requirements.Butthedisclosureprovisions,including434(e),serveanother,
informationalinterest,andevenasconstrued434(e)increasesthefundofinformation
concerningthosewhosupportthecandidates.Itgoesbeyondthegeneraldisclosure
requirementstoshedthelightofpublicityonspendingthatisunambiguouslycampaign
relatedbutwouldnototherwisebereportedbecauseittakestheformofindependent
expendituresorofcontributionstoanindividualorgroupnotitselfrequiredtoreportthe
namesofitscontributors.Bythesametoken,itisnotfatalthat434(e)encompasses
purelyindependentexpendituresuncoordinatedwithaparticularcandidateorhisagent.
Thecorruptionpotentialoftheseexpendituresmaybesignificantlydifferent,butthe
informationalinterestcanbeasstrongasitisincoordinatedspending,fordisclosure
helpsvoterstodefinemoreofthecandidates'constituencies.
Section434(e),aswehaveconstruedit,doesnotcontaintheinfirmitiesoftheprovisions
beforetheCourtinTalleyv.California,362U.S.60(1960),andThomasv.Collins,323
U.S.516 (1945).TheordinancefoundwantinginTalleyforbadealldistributionof
handbillsthatdidnotcontainthenameoftheprinter,author,ormanufacturer,andthe
nameofthedistributor.Thecityurgedthattheordinancewasaimedatidentifyingthose
responsibleforfraud,falseadvertising,andlibel,buttheCourtfoundthatitwas"inno
mannersolimited."362U.S.,at64.Here,aswehaveseen,thedisclosurerequirementis
narrowlylimitedtothosesituationswheretheinformationsoughthasasubstantial
connectionwiththegovernmentalinterestssoughttobeadvanced.Thomasheld
unconstitutionalapriorrestraintintheformofaregistrationrequirementforlabor
organizers.

Page424U.S.1,82
TheCourtfoundtheState'sinterestinsufficienttojustifytherestrictiveeffectofthe
statute.Theburdenimposedby 434(e)isnopriorrestraint,butareasonableand
minimallyrestrictivemethodoffurtheringFirstAmendmentvaluesbyopeningthebasic
processesofourfederalelectionsystemtopublicview.[Footnote109]

D.Thresholds
Appellants'thirdcontention,basedonallegedoverbreadth,isthatthemonetary
thresholdsintherecordkeepingandreportingprovisionslackasubstantialnexuswiththe
claimedgovernmentalinterests,fortheamountsinvolvedaretooloweventoattractthe
attentionofthecandidate,muchlesshaveacorruptinginfluence.

Buckleyv.Valeo
Theprovisionscontaintwothresholds.Recordsaretobekeptbypoliticalcommitteesof
thenamesandaddressesofthosewhomakecontributionsinexcessof$10,432(c)(2),
andtheserecordsaresubjecttoCommissionaudit,438(a)(8).Ifaperson'scontributions
toacommitteeorcandidateaggregatemorethan$100,hisnameandaddress,aswellas
hisoccupationandprincipalplaceof business,aretobeincludedinreportsfiledby
committeesandcandidateswiththeCommission,434(b)(2),andmadeavailablefor
publicinspection,438(a)(4).
TheCourtofAppealsrejectedappellants'contentionthatthesethresholdsare
unconstitutional.ItfoundthechallengeonFirstAmendmentgroundstothe$10threshold
tobepremature,foritcould"discernnobasisinthestatuteforauthorizingdisclosure
outsidetheCommission

Page424U.S.1,83
...,andhencenosubstantial`inhibitoryeffect'operatingupon"appellants.171U.S.
App.D.C.,at216,519F.2d,at865.The$100thresholdwasfoundtobewithinthe
"reasonablelatitude"giventhelegislature"astowheretodrawtheline."Ibid.Weagree.
The$10and$100thresholdsareindeedlow.Contributorsofrelativelysmallamountsare
likelytobeespeciallysensitivetorecordingordisclosureoftheirpoliticalpreferences.
Thesestrictrequirementsmaywelldiscourageparticipationbysomecitizensinthe
politicalprocess,aresultthatCongresshardlycouldhaveintended.Indeed,thereislittle
inthelegislativehistorytoindicatethatCongressfocusedcarefullyontheappropriate
levelatwhichtorequirerecordinganddisclosure.Rather,itseemsmerelytohave
adopted thethresholdsexistinginsimilardisclosurelawssince1910.[Footnote110]But
wecannotrequireCongresstoestablishthatithaschosenthehighestreasonable
threshold.Thelineisnecessarilyajudgmentaldecision,bestleftinthecontextofthis
complexlegislationtocongressionaldiscretion.Wecannotsay,onthisbarerecord,that
thelimitsdesignatedarewhollywithoutrationality.[Footnote111]
Wearemindfulthatdisclosureservesinformationalfunctions,aswellastheprevention
ofcorruptionandtheenforcementofthecontributionlimitations.Congressisnot
requiredtosetathresholdthatistailoredonlytothelattergoals.Inaddition,the
enforcement

Page424U.S.1,84
goalcanneverbewellservedifthethresholdissohighthatdisclosurebecomes
equivalenttoadmittingviolationofthecontributionlimitations.
The$10recordkeepingthreshold,inasomewhatsimilarfashion,facilitatesthe
enforcementofthedisclosureprovisionsbymakingitrelativelydifficulttoaggregate
secretcontributionsinamountsthatsurpassthe$100limit.WeagreewiththeCourtof

Buckleyv.Valeo
Appealsthatthereisnowarrantforassumingthatpublicdisclosureofcontributions
between$10and$100isauthorizedbytheAct.Accordingly,wedonotreachthe
questionwhetherinformationconcerninggiftsofthissizecanbemadeavailabletothe
publicwithouttrespassingimpermissiblyonFirstAmendmentrights.Cf.California
BankersAssn.v.Shultz,416U.S.,at5657.[Footnote112]
Insummary,wefindnoconstitutionalinfirmitiesintherecordkeeping,reporting,and
disclosureprovisionsoftheAct.[Footnote113]

Page424U.S.1,85
III.PUBLICFINANCINGOFPRESIDENTIALELECTIONCAMPAIGNS
Aseriesofstatutes[Footnote114]forthepublicfinancingofPresidentialelection
campaignsproducedtheschemenowfoundin6096andSubtitleHoftheInternal
Revenue

Page424U.S.1,86
Codeof1954,26U.S.C.6096,90019012,90319042(1970ed.,Supp.IV).[Footnote
115]BoththeDistrictCourt,401F.Supp.1235,andtheCourtofAppeals,171U.S.App.
D.C.,at229238,519F.2d,at878887,sustainedSubtitleHagainstaconstitutional
attack.[Footnote116]Appellantsrenewtheirchallengehere,contendingthatthe
legislationviolatestheFirstandFifthAmendments.Wefindnomeritintheirclaimsand
affirm.

A.SummaryofSubtitleH
Section9006establishesaPresidentialElectionCampaignFund(Fund),financedfrom
generalrevenuesintheaggregateamountdesignatedbyindividualtaxpayers,under
6096,whoontheirincometaxreturnsmayauthorizepaymenttotheFundofonedollar
oftheirtaxliabilityinthecaseofanindividualreturnortwodollarsinthecaseofajoint
return.TheFundconsistsofthreeseparateaccountstofinance(1)partynominating
conventions,9008(a),(2)generalelectioncampaigns,9006(a),and(3)primary
campaigns,9037(a).[Footnote117]

Page424U.S.1,87
Chapter95ofTitle26,whichconcernsfinancingofpartynominatingconventionsand
generalelectioncampaigns,distinguishesamong"major,""minor,"and"new"parties.A
majorpartyisdefinedasapartywhosecandidateforPresidentinthemostrecentelection

Buckleyv.Valeo
received25%ormoreofthepopularvote.9002(6).Aminorpartyisdefinedasaparty
whosecandidatereceivedatleast5%butlessthan25%ofthevoteatthemostrecent
election.9002(7).Allotherpartiesarenewparties,9002(8),includingbothnewly
createdpartiesandthosereceivinglessthan5%ofthevoteinthelastelection.[Footnote
118]
Majorpartiesareentitledto$2,000,000todefraytheirnationalcommitteePresidential
nominatingconventionexpenses,mustlimittotalexpenditurestothatamount,9008(d),[
Footnote119]andmaynotuseanyofthismoneytobenefitaparticularcandidateor
delegate,9008(c).

Page424U.S.1,88
Aminorpartyreceivesaportionofthemajorpartyentitlementdeterminedbytheratioof
thevotesreceivedbytheparty'scandidateinthelastelectiontotheaverageofthevotes
receivedbythemajorparties'candidates.9008(b)(2).Theamountsgiventotheparties
andtheexpenditurelimitareadjustedforinflation,using1974asthebaseyear.9008(b)
(5).Nofinancingisprovidedfornewparties,noristhereanyexpressprovisionfor
financingindependentcandidatesorpartiesnotholdingaconvention.
Forexpensesinthegeneralelectioncampaign,9004(a)(1)entitleseachmajorparty
candidateto$20,000,000.[Footnote120]Thisamountisalsoadjustedforinflation.See
9004(a)(1).Tobeeligibleforfundsthecandidate[Footnote121]mustpledgenotto
incurexpensesinexcessoftheentitlementunder9004(a)(1)andnottoacceptprivate
contributionsexcepttotheextentthatthefundisinsufficienttoprovidethefull
entitlement.9003(b)Minorpartycandidatesarealsoentitledtofunding,againbasedon
theratioofthevotereceivedbytheparty'scandidateintheprecedingelection tothe
averageofthemajorpartycandidates.9004(a)(2)(A).Minorpartycandidatesmust
certifythattheywillnotincurcampaignexpensesinexcessofthemajorparty
entitlementand

Page424U.S.1,89
thattheywillacceptprivatecontributionsonlytotheextentneededtomakeupthe
differencebetweenthatamountandthepublicfundinggrant.9003(c).Newparty
candidatesreceivenomoneypriortothegeneralelection,butanycandidatereceiving5%
ormoreofthepopularvoteintheelectionisentitledtopostelectionpaymentsaccording
totheformulaapplicabletominorpartycandidates.9004(a)(3).Similarly,minorparty
candidatesareentitledtopostelectionfundsiftheyreceiveagreaterpercentageofthe
averagemajorpartyvotethantheirparty'scandidatedidintheprecedingelectionthe
amountofsuchpaymentsisthedifferencebetweentheentitlementbasedonthe
precedingelectionandthatbasedontheactualvoteinthecurrentelection.9004(a)(3).
Afurthereligibility requirementforminorandnewpartycandidatesisthatthe

Buckleyv.Valeo
candidate'snamemustappearontheballot,orelectorspledgedtothecandidatemustbe
ontheballot,inatleast10States.9002(2)(B).
Chapter96establishesathirdaccountintheFund,thePresidentialPrimaryMatching
PaymentAccount.9037(a).Thisfundingisintendedtoaidcampaignsbycandidates
seekingPresidentialnomination"byapoliticalparty,"9033(b)(2),in"primary
elections,"9032(7).[Footnote122]Thethresholdeligibilityrequirementisthatthe
candidateraiseatleast$5,000ineachof20States,countingonlythefirst$250fromeach
personcontributingtothecandidate.9033(b)(3),(4).Inaddition,thecandidatemust
agreetoabidebythespendinglimitsin9035.See9033(b)(1).[Footnote123]Fundingis

Page424U.S.1,90
providedaccordingtoamatchingformula:eachqualifiedcandidateisentitledtoasum
equaltothetotalprivatecontributionsreceived,disregardingcontributionsfromany
persontotheextentthattotalcontributionstothecandidatebythatpersonexceed$250.
9034(a).PaymentstoanycandidateunderChapter96maynotexceed50%oftheoverall
expenditureceilingacceptedbythecandidate.9034(b).

B.ConstitutionalityofSubtitleH
AppellantsarguethatSubtitleHisinvalid(1)as"contrarytothe`generalwelfare,'"Art.
I,8,(2)becauseanyschemeofpublicfinancingofelectioncampaignsisinconsistent
withtheFirstAmendment,and(3)becauseSubtitleHinvidiouslydiscriminatesagainst
certaininterestsinviolationoftheDueProcessClauseoftheFifthAmendment.Wefind
nomeritinthesecontentions.
Appellants'"generalwelfare"contentionerroneouslytreatstheGeneralWelfareClauseas
alimitationuponcongressionalpower.Itisratheragrantofpower,thescopeofwhichis
quiteexpansive,particularlyinviewoftheenlargementofpowerbytheNecessaryand
ProperClause.M`Cullochv.Maryland,4Wheat.316,420(1819).Congresshaspower
toregulatePresidentialelectionsandprimaries,UnitedStatesv.Classic,313U.S.299
(1941)Burroughsv.UnitedStates, 290U.S.534 (1934)andpublicfinancingof
Presidentialelectionsasameanstoreformtheelectoralprocesswasclearlyachoice
withinthegrantedpower.ItisforCongresstodecidewhichexpenditureswillpromote
thegeneralwelfare:"[T]hepowerofCongresstoauthorizeexpenditureofpublicmoneys
forpublicpurposesisnot

Page424U.S.1,91
limitedbythedirectgrantsoflegislativepowerfoundintheConstitution."UnitedStates
v.Butler,297U.S.1,66 (1936).SeeHelveringv.Davis,301U.S.619,640641(1937).
Anylimitationsupontheexerciseofthatgrantedpowermustbefoundelsewhereinthe

Buckleyv.Valeo
Constitution.Inthiscase,Congresswaslegislatingforthe"generalwelfare"toreduce
thedeleteriousinfluenceoflargecontributionsonourpoliticalprocess,tofacilitate
communicationbycandidateswiththeelectorate,andtofreecandidatesfromtherigors
offundraising.SeeS.Rep.No.93689,Pp.110(1974).Whetherthechosenmeans
appear"bad,""unwise,"or"unworkable"tousisirrelevantCongresshasconcludedthat
themeansare"necessaryandproper"topromotethegeneralwelfare,andwethusdecline
tofindthislegislationwithoutthegrantofpowerinArt.I,8.
Appellants'challengetothedollarcheckoffprovision(6096)failsforthesamereason.
TheymaintainthatCongressisrequiredtopermittaxpayerstodesignateparticular
candidatesorpartiesasrecipientsoftheirmoney.ButtheappropriationtotheFundin
9006islikeanyotherappropriationfromthegeneralrevenueexceptthatitsamountis
determinedbyreferencetotheaggregateoftheoneandtwodollarauthorizationon
taxpayers'incometaxreturns.Thisdetaildoesnotconstitutetheappropriationanylessan
appropriationbyCongress.[Footnote124]Thefallacyofappellants'argumentistherefore
apparent

Page424U.S.1,92
everyappropriationmadebyCongressusespublicmoneyinamannertowhichsome
taxpayersobject.[Footnote125]
Appellantsnextarguethat"byanalogy"totheReligionClausesoftheFirstAmendment
publicfinancingofelectioncampaigns,howevermeritorious,violatestheFirst
Amendment.Wehave,of course,heldthattheReligionClauses"Congressshallmake
nolawrespectinganestablishmentofreligion,orprohibitingthefreeexercisethereof"
requireCongress,andtheStatesthroughtheFourteenthAmendment,toremainneutralin
mattersofreligion.E.g.,AbingtonSchoolDist.v.Schempp,374U.S.203,222226
(1963).Thegovernmentmaynotaidonereligiontothedetrimentofothersorimposea
burdenononereligionthatisnotimposedonothers,andmaynotevenaidallreligions.
E.g.,Eversonv.BoardofEducation,330U.S.1,1516(1947).SeeKurland,OfChurch
andStateandtheSupremeCourt,29U.Chi.L.Rev.1,96(1961).Buttheanalogyis
patentlyinapplicabletoourissuehere.Although"Congressshallmakenolaw...
abridgingthefreedomofspeech,orthepress,"SubtitleHisacongressionaleffort,notto
abridge,restrict,orcensorspeech,butrathertousepublicmoneytofacilitateandenlarge
public

Page424U.S.1,93
discussionandparticipationintheelectoralprocess,goalsvitaltoaselfgoverning
people.[Footnote126]Thus,SubtitleHfurthers,notabridges,pertinentFirstAmendment
values.[Footnote127]Appellantsargue,however,thatasconstructedpublicfinancing
invidiouslydiscriminatesinviolationoftheFifthAmendment.Weturnthereforetothat
argument.

Buckleyv.Valeo
EqualprotectionanalysisintheFifthAmendmentareaisthesameasthatunderthe
FourteenthAmendment.Weinbergerv.Wiesenfeld, 420U.S.636,638 n.2(1975),and
casescited.Inseveralsituationsconcerningtheelectoralprocess,theprinciplehasbeen

Page424U.S.1,94
developedthatrestrictionsonaccesstotheelectoralprocessmustsurviveexacting
scrutiny.Therestrictioncanbesustainedonlyifitfurthersa"vital"governmental
interest,AmericanPartyofTexasv.White,415U.S.767,780781(1974),thatis
"achievedbyameansthatdoesnotunfairlyorunnecessarilyburdeneitheraminority
party'soranindividualcandidate'sequallyimportantinterestinthecontinuedavailability
ofpoliticalopportunity."Lubinv.Panish,415U.S.709,716 (1974).SeeAmericanParty
ofTexasv.White,supra,at780Storerv.Brown, 415U.S.724,729730(1974).These
cases,however,dealtprimarilywithstatelawsrequiringacandidatetosatisfycertain
requirementsinordertohavehisnameappearontheballot.Thesewere,ofcourse,direct
burdensnotonlyonthecandidate'sabilitytorunforofficebutalsoonthevoter'sability
tovoicepreferencesregardingrepresentativegovernmentandcontemporaryissues.In
contrast,thedenialofpublicfinancingtosomePresidentialcandidatesisnotrestrictive
ofvoters'rightsandlessrestrictiveofcandidates'.[Footnote128]SubtitleHdoesnot
preventanycandidatefromgettingontheballotoranyvoterfromcastingavoteforthe
candidateofhischoicetheinability,ifany,ofminorpartycandidatestowageeffective
campaignswillderivenotfromlackofpublicfundingbutfromtheirinabilityto

Page424U.S.1,95
raiseprivatecontributions.Anydisadvantagesufferedbyoperationoftheeligibility
formulaeunderSubtitleHisthuslimitedtotheclaimeddenialoftheenhancementof
opportunitytocommunicatewiththeelectoratethattheformulaeaffordeligible
candidates.Buteligiblecandidatessufferacountervailingdenial.Aswemorefully
developlater,acceptanceofpublicfinancingentailsvoluntaryacceptanceofan
expenditureceiling.Noneligiblecandidatesarenotsubjecttothatlimitation.[Footnote
129]Accordingly,weconcludethatpublicfinancingisgenerallylessrestrictiveofaccess
totheelectoralprocessthantheballotaccessregulationsdealtwithinpriorcases.[
Footnote130]Inanyevent,CongressenactedSubtitleHinfurtheranceofsufficiently
importantgovernmentalinterestsandhas

Page424U.S.1,96
notunfairlyorunnecessarilyburdenedthepoliticalopportunityofanypartyorcandidate.
Itcannotbegainsaidthatpublicfinancingasameansofeliminatingtheimproper
influenceoflargeprivatecontributionsfurthersasignificantgovernmentalinterest.S.
Rep.No.93689,pp.45(1974).Inaddition,thelimitsoncontributionsnecessarily

Buckleyv.Valeo
increasetheburdenoffundraising,andCongressproperlyregardedpublicfinancingas
anappropriatemeansofrelievingmajorpartyPresidentialcandidatesfromtherigorsof
solicitingprivatecontributions.Seeid.,at5.TheStateshavealsobeenheldtohave
importantinterestsinlimitingplacesontheballottothosecandidateswhodemonstrate
substantial popularsupport.E.g.,Storerv.Brown,supra,at736Lubinv.Panish,supra,
at718719Jennessv.Fortson, 403U.S.431,442 (1971)Williamsv.Rhodes,393U.S.,
at3133.Congress'interestinnotfundinghopelesscandidacieswithlargesumsofpublic
money,S.Rep.No.93689,supra,at7,necessarilyjustifiesthewithholdingofpublic
assistancefromcandidateswithoutsignificantpublicsupport.Thus,Congressmay
legitimatelyrequire"somepreliminaryshowingofasignificantmodicumofsupport,"
Jennessv.Fortson,supra,at442,asaneligibilityrequirementforpublicfunds.This
requirementalsoservestheimportantpublicinterestagainstprovidingartificial
incentivesto"splinteredpartiesandunrestrainedfactionalism."Storerv.Brown,supra,at
736S.Rep.No.93689,supra,at8H.R.Rep.No.931239,p.13(1974).Cf.Bullock
v.Carter, 405U.S.134,145 (1972).
AtthesametimeCongressrecognizedtheconstitutionalrestraintsagainstinhibitionof
thepresentopportunityofminorpartiestobecomemajorpoliticalentitiesiftheyobtain
widespreadsupport.S.Rep.No.93689,supra,at810H.R.Rep.No.931239,supra,at
13.As

Page424U.S.1,97
theCourtofAppealssaid,"provisionsforpublicfundingofPresidentialcampaigns...
couldoperatetogiveanunfairadvantagetoestablishedparties,thusreducing,tothe
nation'sdetriment....the`potentialfluidityofAmericanpoliticallife.'"171U.S.App.
D.C.,at231,519F.2d,at880,quotingfromJennessv.Fortson,supra,at439.
1.GeneralElectionCampaignFinancing
AppellantsinsistthatChapter95fallsshortoftheconstitutionalrequirementinthatits
provisionssupplylarger,andequal,sumstocandidatesofmajorparties,usepriorvote
levelsasthesolecriterionforpreelectionfunding,limitnewpartycandidatestopost
electionfunds,anddenyanyfundstocandidatesofpartiesreceivinglessthan5%ofthe
vote.Theseprovisions,itisargued,arefataltothevalidityofthescheme,becausethey
workinvidiousdiscriminationagainstminorandnewpartiesinviolationoftheFifth
Amendment.Wedisagree.[Footnote131]
Asconcededbyappellants,theConstitutiondoesnotrequireCongresstotreatall
declaredcandidatesthesameforpublicfinancingpurposes.AswesaidinJennessv.
Fortson,"thereareobviousdifferencesinkindbetweentheneedsandpotentialsofa
politicalpartywithhistoricallyestablishedbroadsupport,ontheonehand,andanewor
smallpoliticalorganizationontheother....Sometimesthegrossestdiscriminationcan
lieintreating

Buckleyv.Valeo
Page424U.S.1,98
thingsthataredifferentasthoughtheywereexactlyalike,atruismwellillustratedin
Williamsv.Rhodes,supra."403U.S.,at441442.SincethePresidentialelectionsof
1856and1860,whentheWhigswerereplacedasamajorpartybytheRepublicans,no
thirdpartyhasposedacrediblethreattothetwomajorpartiesinPresidentialelections.[
Footnote132]Thirdpartieshavebeencompletelyincapableofmatchingthemajor
parties'abilitytoraisemoneyandwinelections.Congresswas,ofcourse,awareofthis
factofAmericanlife,andthuswasjustifiedinprovidingbothmajorpartiesfullfunding
andallotherpartiesonlyapercentageofthemajorpartyentitlement.[Footnote133]
Identicaltreatmentofallparties,ontheotherhand,"wouldnotonlymakeiteasytoraid
theUnitedStatesTreasury,itwouldalsoartificiallyfostertheproliferationofsplinter
parties."171U.S.App.D.C.,at231,519F.2d,at881.TheConstitutiondoesnotrequire
theGovernmentto"financetheeffortsofeverynascentpoliticalgroup,"AmericanParty
ofTexasv.White,415U.S.,at794,merelybecauseCongresschosetofinancetheefforts
ofthemajorparties.
Furthermore,appellantshavemadenoshowingthat

Page424U.S.1,99
theelectionfundingplandisadvantagesnonmajorpartiesbyoperatingtoreducetheir
strengthbelowthatattainedwithoutanypublicfinancing.First,suchpartiesarefreeto
raisemoneyfromprivatesources,[Footnote134]andbyourholdingtodaynewparties
arefreedfromany expenditurelimits,althoughadmittedlythoselimitsmaybealargely
academicmattertothem.Butsinceanymajorpartycandidateacceptingpublicfinancing
ofacampaignvoluntarilyassentstoaspendingceiling,othercandidateswillbeableto
spendmoreinrelationtothemajorpartycandidates.Therelativepositionofminor
partiesthatdoqualifytoreceivesomepublicfundsbecausetheyreceived5%ofthevote
inthepreviousPresidentialelectionisalsoenhanced.Publicfundingforcandidatesof
majorpartiesisintendedasasubstituteforprivatecontributionsbutforminorparty
candidates[Footnote135]suchassistancemaybeviewedasasupplementtoprivate
contributionssincethesecandidatesmaycontinuetosolicitprivatefundsuptothe
applicablespendinglimit.Thus,weconcludethatthegeneralelectionfundingsystem
doesnotworkaninvidiousdiscriminationagainstcandidatesofnonmajorparties.
Appellantschallengerelianceonthevoteinpastelectionsasthebasisfordetermining
eligibility.Thatchallengeisforeclosed,however,byourholdinginJennessv.Fortson,
403U.S.,at439440,thatpopularvotetotalsinthelastelectionareapropermeasureof
publicsupport.

Page424U.S.1,100
AndCongresswasnotobligedtoselectinsteadfromamongappellants'suggested
alternatives.Congresscouldproperlyregardthemeanschosenaspreferable,sincethe

Buckleyv.Valeo
alternativeofpetitiondrivespresentscostandadministrativeproblemsinvalidating
signatures,andthealternativeofopinionpollsmightbethoughtinappropriatesinceit
wouldinvolveaGovernmentagencyinthebusinessofcertifyingpollsorconductingits
owninvestigationofsupportforvariouscandidates,inadditiontoseriousproblemswith
reliability.[Footnote136]
Appellantsnextargue,relyingontheballotaccessdecisionsofthisCourt,thatthe
absenceofanyalternativemeansofobtainingpreelectionfundingrendersthescheme
unjustifiablyrestrictiveofminoritypoliticalinterests.Appellants'relianceontheballot
accessdecisionsismisplaced.Tobesure,theregulationsustainedinJennessv.Fortson,
forexample,incorporatedalternativemeansofqualifyingfortheballot,403U.S.,at440,
andthelackofanalternativewasadefectintheschemestruckdowninLubinv.Panish,
415U.S.,at718.To

Page424U.S.1,101
suggest,however,thattheconstitutionalityofSubtitleHthereforehingessolelyon
whethersomealternativeisaffordedoverlookstherationaleoftheoperative
constitutionalprinciples.Ourdecisionsfindinganeedforanalternativemeansturnon
thenatureandextentoftheburdenimposedintheabsenceofavailablealternatives.We
haveearlierstatedourviewthatChapter95isfarlessburdensomeuponandrestrictiveof
constitutionalrightsthantheregulationsinvolvedintheballotaccesscases.Seesupra,at
9495.Moreover,expenditurelimitsformajorpartiesandcandidatesmaywellimprove
thechancesofnonmajorpartiesandtheircandidatestoreceivefundsandincreasetheir
spending.Anyriskofharmtominorityinterestsisspeculativeduetoourpresentlackof
knowledgeofthepracticaleffectsofpublicfinancingandcannotovercometheforceof
thegovernmentalinterestsagainstuseofpublicmoneytofosterfrivolouscandidacies,
createasystemofsplinteredparties,andencourageunrestrainedfactionalism.
Appellants'relianceonthealternativemeansanalysesoftheballotaccesscasesgenerally
failstorecognizeasignificantdistinctionfromtheinstantcase.Theprimarygoalofall
candidatesistocarryonasuccessfulcampaignbycommunicatingtothevoters
persuasivereasonsforelectingthem.InsomeoftheballotaccesscasestheStates
affordedcandidatesalternativemeansforqualifyingfortheballot,astepinanycampaign
that,withrareexceptions,isessentialtosuccessfuleffort.Chapter95concededly
providesonlyonemethodofobtainingpreelectionfinancingsuchfundingis,however,
notasnecessaryasbeingontheballot.Seen.128,supra.Plainly,campaignscanbe
successfullycarriedoutbymeansotherthanpublicfinancingtheyhavebeenuptothis
date,andthisavenueisstillopentoallcandidates.And,afterall,theimportant
achievementsofminority

Buckleyv.Valeo
Page424U.S.1,102
politicalgroupsinfurtheringthedevelopmentofAmericandemocracy[Footnote137]
wereaccomplishedwithoutthehelpofpublicfunds.Thus,thelimitedparticipationor
nonparticipationofnonmajorpartiesorcandidatesinpublicfundingdoesnot
unconstitutionallydisadvantagethem.
Of course,nonmajorpartiesandtheircandidatesmayqualifyforpostelection
participationinpublicfundingandinthatsensetheclaimeddiscriminationisnottotal.
Appellantscontend,however,thatthebenefitofanysuchparticipationisillusorydueto
9004(c),whichbarstheuseofthemoneyforanypurposeotherthanpayingcampaign
expensesorrepayingloansthathadbeenusedtodefraysuchexpenses.Theonly
meaningfuluseforpostelectionfundsisthustorepayloansbutloans,exceptfrom
nationalbanks,are"contributions"subjecttothegenerallimitationsoncontributions,18
U.S.C.591(e)(1970ed.,Supp.IV).Further,theyargue,loansarenotreadilyavailableto
nonmajorpartiesorcandidatesbeforeelectionstofinancetheircampaigns.Availability
ofpostelectionfundsthereforeassertedlygivesthemnothing.Butinthenatureofthings
thewillingnessoflenderstomakeloanswilldependuponthepreelectionprobability
thatthecandidateandhispartywillattract5%ormoreofthevoters.Whenareasonable
prospectofsuchsupportappears,thepartyandcandidatemaybeanacceptableloanrisk
sincetheprospectofpostelectionparticipationinpublicfundingwillbegood.[Footnote
138]

Page424U.S.1,103
Finally,appellantschallengethevalidityofthe5%thresholdrequirementforgeneral
electionfunding.Theyarguethat,sincemoststateregulationsgoverningballotaccess
havethresholdrequirementswellbelow5%,andbecauseintheirviewthe5%
requirementhereisactuallystricterthanthatupheldinJennessv.Fortson, 403U.S.431
(1971),[Footnote139]therequirementisunreasonable.Wehavealreadyconcludedthat
therestrictionunderChapter95isgenerallylessburdensomethanballotaccess
regulations.Supra,at9495.Further,theGeorgiaprovisionsustainedinJennessrequired
thecandidatetoobtainthesignaturesof5%ofalleligiblevoters,withoutregardtoparty.
Tobesure,thepublicfundingformuladoesnotpermitanyonewhovotedforanother
partyinthelastelectiontobepartofacandidate's5%.ButunderChapter95a
Presidentialcandidateneedsonly5%ormoreoftheactualvote,notthelargeruniverse
ofeligiblevoters.Asaresult,wecannotsaythatChapter95isnumericallymore,orless,
restrictivethantheregulationinJenness.Inanyevent,thechoiceofthepercentage
requirementthatbestaccommodatesthecompetinginterestsinvolvedwasforCongress
tomake.SeeLouisvilleGasCo.v.Coleman,277U.S.32,41 (1928)(Holmes,J.,
dissenting)n.111,supra.Withoutanydoubtarangeofformulationswouldsufficiently
protectthepublicfiscandnotfosterfactionalism,andwouldalsorecognizethepublic
interestinthefluidityofourpolitical

Buckleyv.Valeo
Page424U.S.1,104
affairs.WecannotsaythatCongress'choicefallswithoutthepermissiblerange.[Footnote
140]
2.NominatingConventionFinancing
Theforegoinganalysisandreasoningsustaininggeneral electionfundingapplyinlarge
parttoconventionfundingunderChapter95andsufficetosupportourrejectionof
appellants'challengetotheseprovisions.Fundingofpartyconventionshasincreasingly
beenderivedfromlargeprivatecontributions,seeH.R.Rep.No.931239,p.14(1974),
andthegovernmentalinterestineliminatingthisrelianceisasvitalasinthecaseof
privatecontributionstoindividualcandidates.Theexpenditurelimitationsonmajor
partiesparticipatinginpublicfinancingenhancetheabilityofnonmajorpartiesto
increasetheirspendingrelativetothemajorpartiesfurther,insolicitingprivate
contributionstofinanceconventions,partiesarenotsubjecttothe$1,000contribution
limitpertainingtocandidates.[Footnote141]Wethereforeconcludethatappellants'
constitutionalchallengetothe

Page424U.S.1,105
provisionsforfundingnominatingconventionsmustalsoberejected.
3.PrimaryElectionCampaignFinancing
Appellants'finalchallengeistotheconstitutionalityofChapter96,whichprovides
fundingofprimarycampaigns.Theycontendthattheseprovisionsareconstitutionally
invalid(1)becausetheydonotprovidefundsforcandidatesnotrunninginparty
primaries[Footnote142]and(2)becausetheeligibilityformulaactuallyincreasesthe
influenceofmoneyontheelectoralprocess.Innotprovidingassistancetocandidates
whodonotenterpartyprimaries,Congresshasmerelychosentolimitatthistimethe
reachofthereformsencompassedinChapter96.ThisCongresscoulddowithout
constitutingthereformsaconstitutionallyinvidiousdiscrimination.Thegoverning
principlewasstatedinKatzenbachv.Morgan,384U.S.641,657 (1966):
"[I]ndecidingtheconstitutionalproprietyofthelimitationsinsuchareformmeasurewe
areguidedby thefamiliarprinciplesthata`statuteisnotinvalidundertheConstitution
becauseitmighthavegonefartherthanitdid,'Roschenv.Ward,279U.S.337,339,that
alegislatureneednot`strikeatallevilsatthesametime,'Semlerv.DentalExaminers,
294U.S.608,610,andthat`reformmaytakeonestepatatime,addressingitselftothe
phaseoftheproblemwhichseemsmostacutetothelegislativemind,'Williamsonv.Lee
OpticalCo., 348U.S.483,489."[Footnote143]

Buckleyv.Valeo
Page424U.S.1,106
Thechoicetolimitmatchingfundstocandidatesrunninginprimariesmayreflectthat
concernaboutlargeprivatecontributionstocandidatescenteredonprimaryracesandthat
thereisnohistoricalevidenceofsimilarabusesinvolvingcontributionstocandidates
whoengageinpetitiondrivestoqualifyforstateballots.Moreover,assistanceto
candidatesandnonmajorpartiesforcedtoresorttopetitiondrivestogainballotaccess
implicatesthepoliciesagainstfosteringfrivolouscandidacies,creatingasystemof
splinteredparties,andencouragingunrestrainedfactionalism.
TheeligibilityrequirementsinChapter96aresurelynotanunreasonablewaytomeasure
popularsupportforacandidate,accomplishingtheobjectiveoflimitingsubsidizationto
thosecandidateswithasubstantialchanceofbeingnominated.Countingonlythefirst
$250ofeachcontributionforeligibilitypurposesrequirescandidatestosolicitsmaller
contributionsfromnumerouspeople.Requiringthemoneytocomefromcitizensofa
minimumnumberofStateseliminatescandidateswhoseappealislimitedgeographically
aPresidentiselectednotbypopularvote,butbywinningthepopularvoteinenough
StatestohaveamajorityintheElectoralCollege.[Footnote144]

Page424U.S.1,107
Wealsorejectaswithoutmeritappellants'argumentthatthematchingformulafavors
wealthyvotersandcandidates.Thethrustofthelegislationistoreducefinancialbarriers[
Footnote145]andtoenhancetheimportanceofsmallercontributions.[Footnote146]
Somecandidatesundoubtedlycouldraiselargesumsofmoneyandthushavelittleneed
forpublicfunds,butcandidateswithlesserfundraisingcapabilitieswillgainsubstantial
benefitsfrommatchingfunds.Inaddition,oneeligibilityrequirementfor

Page424U.S.1,108
matchingfundsisacceptanceofanexpenditureceiling,andcandidateswithlittle
fundraisingabilitywillbeabletoincreasetheirspendingrelativetocandidatescapableof
raisinglargeamountsinprivatefunds.
Forthereasonsstated,werejectappellants'claimsthatSubtitleHisfacially
unconstitutional.[Footnote147]

C.Severability
Theonlyremainingissueiswhetherourholdingsinvalidating18U.S.C.608(a),(c),and
(e)(1)(1970ed.,Supp.IV)requiretheconclusionthatSubtitleHisunconstitutional.
Thereis,ofcourse,arelationshipbetweenthespendinglimitsin608(c)andthepublic
financingprovisionstheexpenditurelimitsacceptedbyacandidatetobeeligiblefor
publicfundingareidenticaltothelimitsin608(c).Butwehavenodifficultyin

Buckleyv.Valeo
concludingthatSubtitleHisseverable."UnlessitisevidentthattheLegislaturewould
nothaveenactedthoseprovisionswhicharewithinitspower,independentlyofthat
whichisnot,theinvalidpartmaybedroppedifwhatisleftisfullyoperativeasalaw."
Champlin

Page424U.S.1,109
RefiningCo.v.CorporationCommission,286U.S.210,234 (1932).Ourdiscussionof
"whatisleft"leavesnodoubtthatthevalueofpublicfinancingisnotdependentonthe
existenceofagenerallyapplicableexpenditurelimit.WethereforeholdSubtitleH
severablefromthoseportionsofthelegislation todayheldconstitutionallyinfirm.

IV.THEFEDERALELECTIONCOMMISSION
The1974amendmentstotheActcreateaneightmemberFederalElectionCommission
(Commission)andvestinitprimaryandsubstantialresponsibilityforadministeringand
enforcingtheAct.Thequestionthatweaddressinthisportionoftheopinioniswhether,
inviewofthemannerinwhichamajorityofitsmembersareappointed,theCommission
mayundertheConstitutionexercisethepowersconferreduponit.Wefinditunnecessary
toparsethecomplexstatutoryprovisionsinordertosketchthefullsweepofthe
Commission'sauthority.Itwillsufficeforpresentpurposestodescribewhatappeartobe
representativeexamplesofitsvariouspowers.
Chapter14ofTitle2[Footnote148]makestheCommissiontheprincipalrepositoryof
thenumerousreportsandstatementswhicharerequiredbythatchaptertobefiledby
thoseengagingintheregulatedpoliticalactivities.Itsdutiesunder438(a)withrespectto
thesereportsandstatementsincludefilingandindexing,makingthemavailablefor
publicinspection,preservation,andauditingandfieldinvestigations.Itisdirectedto
"serveasanationalclearinghouseforinformationinrespecttotheadministrationof
elections."438(b).

Page424U.S.1,110
Beyondtheserecordkeeping,disclosure,andinvestigativefunctions,however,the
Commissionisgivenextensiverulemakingandadjudicativepowers.Itsdutyunder438
(a)(10)is"toprescribesuitablerulesandregulationstocarryouttheprovisionsof...
chapter14.."Under437d(a)(8)theCommissionisempoweredtomakesuchrules"as
arenecessarytocarryouttheprovisionsofthisAct."[Footnote149]Section437d(a)(9)
authorizesitto"formulategeneralpolicywithrespecttotheadministrationofthisAct"
andenumeratedsectionsofTitle18'sCriminalCode,[Footnote150]astoallofwhich
provisionstheCommission"hasprimaryjurisdictionwithrespectto[their]civil
enforcement."437c(b).[Footnote151]TheCommissionisauthorizedunder437f(a)to
renderadvisoryopinionswithrespecttoactivitiespossiblyviolatingtheAct,theTitle18

Buckleyv.Valeo
sections,orthecampaignfundingprovisionsofTitle26,[Footnote152]theeffectof
whichisthat"[n]otwithstanding

Page424U.S.1,111
anyotherprovisionoflaw,anypersonwithrespecttowhomanadvisoryopinionis
rendered...whoactsingoodfaithinaccordancewiththeprovisionsandfindings
[thereof]shallbepresumedtobeincompliancewiththe[statutoryprovision]with
respecttowhichsuchadvisoryopinionisrendered."437f(b).Inthecourseof
administeringtheprovisionsforPresidentialcampaignfinancing,theCommissionmay
authorizeconventionexpenditureswhichexceedthestatutorylimits.26U.S.C.9008(d)
(3)(1970ed.,Supp.IV).
TheCommission'senforcementpowerisbothdirectandwideranging.Itmayinstitutea
civilactionfor(i)injunctiveorotherreliefagainst"anyactsorpracticeswhichconstitute
orwillconstituteaviolationofthisAct,"437g(a)(5)(ii)declaratoryorinjunctiverelief
"asmaybeappropriatetoimplementorcon[s]trueanyprovisions"ofChapter95ofTitle
26,governingadministrationoffundsforPresidentialelectioncampaignsandnational
partyconventions,26U.S.C.9011(b)(1)(1970ed.,Supp.IV)and(iii)"suchinjunctive
reliefasisappropriatetoimplementanyprovision"ofChapter96ofTitle26,governing
thepaymentofmatchingfundsforPresidentialprimarycampaigns,26U.S.C.9040(c)
(1970ed.,Supp.IV).IfaftertheCommission'spostdisbursementauditofcandidates
receivingpaymentsunderChapter95or96itfindsanoverpayment,itisempoweredto
seekrepaymentofallfundsduetheSecretaryoftheTreasury.26U.S.C.9010(b),9040
(b)(1970ed.,Supp.IV).Innorespectdotheforegoingcivilactionsrequirethe
concurrenceoforparticipationbytheAttorneyGeneralconversely,thedecisionnotto
seekjudicialreliefintheaboverespectswouldappeartorestsolelywiththe
Commission.[Footnote153]Withrespecttothe

Page424U.S.1,112
referencedTitle18sections,437g(a)(7)providesthatif,afternoticeandopportunityfor
ahearingbeforeit,theCommissionfindsanactualorthreatenedcriminalviolation,the
AttorneyGeneral"uponrequestbytheCommission...shallinstituteacivilactionfor
relief."Finally,as"[a]dditionalenforcementauthority,"456(a)authorizesthe
Commission,afternoticeandopportunityforhearing,tomake"afindingthataperson..
.whileacandidateforFederaloffice,failedtofile"arequiredreportof contributionsor
expenditures.Ifthatfindingismadewithintheapplicablelimitationsperiod

Page424U.S.1,113
forprosecutions,thecandidateisthereby"disqualifiedfrombecomingacandidateinany
futureelectionforFederalofficeforaperiodoftimebeginningonthedateofsuch

Buckleyv.Valeo
findingandendingoneyearaftertheexpirationofthetermoftheFederalofficefor
whichsuchpersonwasacandidate."[Footnote154]
Thebodyinwhichthisauthorityisreposedconsistsofeightmembers.[Footnote155]
TheSecretaryoftheSenateandtheClerkoftheHouseofRepresentativesareexofficio
membersoftheCommissionwithouttherighttovote.Twomembersareappointedby
thePresidentprotemporeoftheSenate"upontherecommendationsofthemajority
leaderoftheSenateandtheminorityleaderoftheSenate."[Footnote156]Twomoreare
tobeappointedbytheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives,likewiseuponthe
recommendationsofitsrespectivemajorityandminorityleaders.Theremainingtwo
membersareappointedbythePresident.Eachofthesixvotingmembersofthe
CommissionmustbeconfirmedbythemajorityofbothHousesofCongress,andeachof
thethreeappointingauthoritiesisforbiddentochoosebothoftheirappointeesfromthe
samepoliticalparty.
A.Ripeness
AppellantsarguethatgiventheCommission'sextensivepowersthemethodofchoosing
itsmembersunder437c(a)(1)runsafouloftheseparationofpowersembeddedinthe
Constitution,andurgethataspresentlyconstitutedtheCommission's"existencebeheld
unconstitutionalbythisCourt."Beforeembarkingonthisorany

Page424U.S.1,114
relatedinquiry,however,wemustdecidewhethertheseissuesareproperlybeforeus.
BecauseoftheCourtofAppeals'emphasisonlackof"ripeness"oftheissuerelatingto
themethodofappointmentofthemembersoftheCommission,wefinditnecessaryto
focusparticularlyonthatconsiderationinthissectionofouropinion.
Wehaverecentlyrecognizedthedistinctionbetweenjurisdictionallimitationsimposed
byArt.IIIand"[p]roblemsofprematurityandabstractness"thatmayprevent
adjudicationinallbuttheexceptionalcase.SocialistLaborPartyv.Gilligan,406U.S.
583,588 (1972).InRegionalRailReorganizationActCases,419U.S.102,140 (1974),
westatedthat"ripenessispeculiarlyaquestionoftiming,"andthereforethepassageof
monthsbetweenthetimeofthedecisionoftheCourtofAppealsandourpresentrulingis
ofitselfsignificant.WelikewiseobservedintheReorganizationActCases:
"Thus,occurrenceoftheconveyanceallegedlyviolativeofFifthAmendmentrightsisin
nowayhypotheticalorspeculative.Wheretheinevitabilityoftheoperationofastatute
againstcertainindividualsispatent,itisirrelevanttotheexistenceofajusticiable
controversythattherewillbeatimedelaybeforethedisputedprovisionswillcomeinto
effect."Id.,at143.
TheCourtofAppealsheldthatofthefivespecificcertifiedquestionsdirectedatthe
Commission'sauthority,onlyitspowerstorenderadvisoryopinionsandtoauthorize

Buckleyv.Valeo
excessiveconventionexpenditureswereripeforadjudication.Thecourtheldthatthe
remainingaspectsoftheCommission'sauthoritycouldnotbeadjudicatedbecause"[in]
itspresentstance,thislitigationdoesnotpresentthecourtwiththeconcretefactsthatare
necessary

Page424U.S.1,115
toaninformeddecision."[Footnote157]171U.S.App.D.C.,at244,519F.2d,at893.
SincetheentryofjudgmentbytheCourtofAppeals,

Page424U.S.1,116
theCommissionhasundertakentoissuerulesandregulationsundertheauthorityof438
(a)(10).Whilemanyofitsotherfunctionsremainasyetunexercised,thedateoftheirall
butcertainexerciseisnowcloser

Page424U.S.1,117
byseveralmonthsthanitwasatthetimetheCourtofAppealsruled.Congresswas
understandablymostconcernedwithobtainingafinaladjudicationofasmanyissuesas
possiblelitigatedpursuanttotheprovisionsof437h.Thus,inordertodecidethebasic
questionwhethertheAct'sprovisionforappointmentof themembersoftheCommission
violatestheConstitution,webelievewearewarrantedinconsideringallofthoseaspects
oftheCommission'sauthoritywhichhavebeenpresentedbythecertifiedquestions.[
Footnote158]
Partylitigantswithsufficientconcreteinterestsatstakemayhavestandingtoraise
constitutionalquestionsofseparationofpowerswithrespecttoanagencydesignatedto
adjudicatetheirrights.Palmorev.UnitedStates, 411U.S.389 (1973)GliddenCo.v.
Zdanok, 370U.S.530 (1962)Colemanv.Miller,307U.S.433 (1939).InGlidden,of
course,thechallengedadjudicationhadalreadytakenplace,whereasinthiscase
appellants'claimisofimpendingfuturerulingsanddeterminationsbytheCommission.
Butthisisaquestionofripeness,rather thanlackofcaseorcontroversyunderArt.III,
andforthereasonstowhichwehavepreviously

Page424U.S.1,118
advertedweholdthatappellants'claimsastheybearuponthemethodofappointmentof
theCommission'smembersmaybepresentlyadjudicated.

Buckleyv.Valeo
B.TheMerits
AppellantsurgethatsinceCongresshasgiventheCommissionwiderangingrulemaking
andenforcementpowerswithrespecttothesubstantiveprovisionsoftheAct,Congressis
precludedundertheprincipleofseparationofpowersfromvestinginitselftheauthority
toappointthosewhowillexercisesuchauthority.Theirargumentisbasedonthe
languageofArt.II,2,cl.2,oftheConstitution,whichprovidesinpertinentpartas
follows:
"[ThePresident]shallnominate,andbyandwiththeAdviceandConsentoftheSenate,
shallappoint...allotherOfficersoftheUnitedStates,whoseAppointmentsarenot
hereinotherwiseprovidedfor,andwhichshallbeestablishedbyLaw:buttheCongress
maybyLawvesttheAppointmentofsuchinferiorOfficers,astheythinkproper,inthe
Presidentalone,intheCourtsofLaw,orintheHeadsofDepartments."
Appellants'argumentisthatthisprovisionistheexclusivemethodbywhichthose
chargedwithexecutingthelawsoftheUnitedStatesmaybechosen.Congress,they
assert,cannothaveitbothways.IftheLegislaturewishestheCommissiontoexerciseall
oftheconferredpowers,thenitsmembersareinfact"OfficersoftheUnitedStates"and
mustbeappointedundertheAppointmentsClause.ButifCongressinsistsuponretaining
thepowertoappoint,thenthemembersoftheCommissionmaynotdischargethose
manyfunctionsoftheCommissionwhichcanbeperformedonlyby"Officersof

Page424U.S.1,119
theUnitedStates,"asthattermmustbeconstruedwithinthedoctrineofseparationof
powers.
AppelleeCommissionandamiciinsupportoftheCommissionurgethattheFramersof
theConstitution,whilemindfuloftheneedforchecksandbalancesamongthethree
branchesoftheNationalGovernment,hadnointentionofdenyingtotheLegislative
Branchauthoritytoappointitsownofficers.Congress,eitherundertheAppointments
ClauseorunderitsgrantsofsubstantivelegislativeauthorityandtheNecessaryand
ProperClauseinArt.I,isintheirviewempoweredtoprovidefortheappointmenttothe
CommissioninthemannerwhichitdidbecausetheCommissionisperforming
"appropriatelegislativefunctions."
ThemajorityoftheCourtofAppealsrecognizedtheimportanceofthedoctrineof
separationofpowerswhichisattheheartofourConstitution,andalsorecognizedthe
principleenunciatedinSpringerv.PhilippineIslands, 277U.S.189 (1928),thatthe
LegislativeBranchmaynotexerciseexecutiveauthoritybyretainingthepowerto
appointthosewhowillexecuteitslaws.Butitdescribedappellants'argumentbasedupon
Art.II,2,cl.2,as"strikinglysyllogistic,"andconcludedthatCongresshadsufficient
authorityundertheNecessaryandProperClauseofArt.IoftheConstitutionnotonlyto
establishtheCommissionbuttoappointtheCommission'smembers.Aswehaveearlier
noted,itupheldtheconstitutionalvalidityofcongressionalvestingofcertainauthorityin

Buckleyv.Valeo
theCommission,andconcludedthatthequestionoftheconstitutionalvalidityofthe
vestingofitsremainingfunctionswasnotyetripeforreview.Thethreedissentingjudges
intheCourtofAppealsconcludedthatthemethodofappointmentfortheCommission
didviolatethedoctrineofseparationofpowers.

Page424U.S.1,120
1.SeparationofPowers
Wedonotthinkappellants'argumentsbaseduponArt.II,2,cl.2,oftheConstitution
maybesoeasilydismissedasdidthemajorityoftheCourtofAppeals.Ourinquiryof
necessitytouchesuponthefundamentalprinciplesoftheGovernmentestablishedbythe
FramersoftheConstitution,andalllitigantsandallofthecourtswhichhaveaddressed
themselvestothematterstartoncommongroundintherecognitionoftheintentofthe
FramersthatthepowersofthethreegreatbranchesoftheNationalGovernmentbe
largelyseparatefromoneanother.
JamesMadison,writingintheFederalistNo.47,[Footnote159]defendedtheworkofthe
Framersagainstthechargethatthesethreegovernmentalpowerswerenotentirely
separatefromoneanotherintheproposedConstitution.Heassertedthatwhiletherewas
someadmixture,theConstitutionwasnonethelesstruetoMontesquieu'swellknown
maximthatthelegislative,executive,andjudicialdepartmentsoughttobeseparateand
distinct:
"ThereasonsonwhichMontesquieugroundshismaximareafurtherdemonstration of
hismeaning.`Whenthelegislativeandexecutivepowersareunitedinthesamepersonor
body,'sayshe,`therecanbenoliberty,becauseapprehensionsmayariselestthesame
monarchorsenateshouldenacttyrannicallawstoexecutetheminatyrannicalmanner.'
Again:`Werethepowerofjudgingjoinedwiththelegislative,thelifeandlibertyofthe
subjectwouldbeexposedtoarbitrarycontrol,forthejudgewouldthenbethelegislator.
Wereitjoinedtotheexecutivepower,thejudgemightbehavewithalltheviolenceofan
oppressor.'Someofthesereasons

Page424U.S.1,121
aremorefullyexplainedinotherpassagesbutbrieflystatedastheyarehere,they
sufficientlyestablishthemeaningwhichwehaveputonthiscelebratedmaximofthis
celebratedauthor."[Footnote160]
YetitisalsoclearfromtheprovisionsoftheConstitutionitself,andfromtheFederalist
Papers,thattheConstitutionbynomeanscontemplatestotalseparationofeachofthese
threeessentialbranchesofGovernment.ThePresidentisaparticipantinthelawmaking
processbyvirtueofhisauthoritytovetobillsenactedbyCongress.TheSenateisa

Buckleyv.Valeo
participantintheappointiveprocessbyvirtueofitsauthoritytorefusetoconfirmpersons
nominatedtoofficebythePresident.ThemenwhometinPhiladelphiainthesummerof
1787werepracticalstatesmen,experiencedinpolitics,whoviewedtheprincipleof
separationofpowersasavitalcheckagainsttyranny.Buttheylikewisesawthata
hermeticsealingoffofthethreebranchesofGovernmentfromoneanotherwould
precludetheestablishmentofaNationcapableofgoverningitselfeffectively.
Mr.ChiefJusticeTaft,writingfortheCourtinHampton&Co.v.UnitedStates, 276U.S.
394(1928),afterstatingthegeneralprincipleofseparationofpowersfoundintheUnited
StatesConstitution,wentontoobserve:
"[T]heruleisthatintheactualadministrationofthegovernmentCongressorthe
Legislatureshouldexercisethelegislativepower,thePresidentortheStateexecutive,the
Governor,theexecutivepower,andtheCourtsorthejudiciarythejudicialpower,andin
carryingoutthatconstitutionaldivisionintothreebranchesitisabreachoftheNational
fundamentallawifCongressgivesupitslegislativepower

Page424U.S.1,122
andtransfersittothePresident,ortotheJudicialbranch,orifbylawitattempts toinvest
itselforitsmemberswitheitherexecutivepowerorjudicialpower.Thisisnottosaythat
thethreebranchesarenotcoordinatepartsofonegovernmentandthateachinthefield
ofitsdutiesmaynotinvoketheactionofthetwootherbranchesinsofarastheaction
invokedshallnotbeanassumptionoftheconstitutionalfieldofactionofanotherbranch.
Indeterminingwhatitmaydoinseekingassistancefromanotherbranch,theextentand
characterofthatassistancemustbefixedaccordingtocommonsenseandtheinherent
necessitiesofthegovernmentalcoordination."Id.,at406.
Morerecently,Mr.JusticeJackson,concurringintheopinionandthejudgmentofthe
CourtinYoungstownSheet&TubeCo.v.Sawyer, 343U.S.579,635 (1952),succinctly
characterizedthisunderstanding:
"WhiletheConstitutiondiffusespowerthebettertosecureliberty,italsocontemplates
thatpracticewillintegratethedispersedpowersintoaworkablegovernment.Itenjoins
uponitsbranchesseparatenessbutinterdependence,autonomybutreciprocity."
TheFramersregardedthechecksandbalancesthattheyhadbuiltintothetripartite
FederalGovernmentasaselfexecutingsafeguardagainsttheencroachmentor
aggrandizementofonebranchattheexpenseoftheother.AsMadisonputitinFederalist
No.51:
"Thispolicyofsupplying,byoppositeandrivalinterests,thedefectofbettermotives,
mightbetracedthroughthewholesystemofhumanaffairs,privateaswellaspublic.We
seeitparticularlydisplayedinallthesubordinatedistributionsofpower,wherethe
constantaimistodivideandarrangethe

Buckleyv.Valeo
Page424U.S.1,123
severalofficesinsuchamannerasthateachmaybeacheckontheother thatthe
privateinterestofeveryindividualmaybeasentineloverthepublicrights.These
inventionsofprudencecannotbelessrequisiteinthedistributionofthesupremepowers
oftheState."[Footnote161]
ThisCourthasnothesitatedtoenforcetheprincipleofseparationofpowersembodiedin
theConstitutionwhenitsapplicationhasprovednecessaryforthedecisionsofcasesor
controversiesproperly beforeit.TheCourthasheldthatexecutiveoradministrative
dutiesofanonjudicialnaturemaynotbeimposedonjudgesholdingofficeunderArt.III
oftheConstitution.UnitedStatesv.Ferreira,13How.40(1852)Hayburn'sCase,2Dall.
409(1792). TheCourthasheldthatthePresidentmaynotexecuteandexercise
legislativeauthoritybelongingonlytoCongress.YoungstownSheet&TubeCo.v.
Sawyer,supra.Inthecourseofitsopinioninthatcase,theCourtsaid:
"IntheframeworkofourConstitution,thePresident'spowertoseethatthelawsare
faithfullyexecutedrefutestheideathatheistobealawmaker.TheConstitutionlimits
hisfunctionsinthelawmakingprocesstotherecommendingoflawshethinkswiseand
thevetoingoflawshethinksbad.AndtheConstitutionisneithersilentnorequivocal
aboutwhoshallmakelawswhichthePresidentistoexecute.Thefirstsectionofthefirst
articlesaysthat`AlllegislativePowershereingrantedshallbevestedinaCongressof
theUnitedStates....'"343U.S.,at587588.

Page424U.S.1,124
MorecloselyinpointtothefactsofthepresentcaseisthisCourt'sdecisioninSpringerv.
PhilippineIslands,277U.S.189 (1928),wheretheCourtheldthatthelegislatureofthe
PhilippineIslandscouldnotprovideforlegislativeappointmenttoexecutiveagencies.
2.TheAppointmentsClause
Theprincipleofseparationofpowerswasnotsimplyanabstractgeneralizationinthe
mindsoftheFramers:itwaswovenintothedocumentthattheydraftedinPhiladelphiain
thesummerof1787.ArticleI,1,declares:"AlllegislativePowershereingrantedshallbe
vestedinaCongressoftheUnitedStates."ArticleII,1,veststheexecutivepower"ina
PresidentoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,"andArt.III,1,declaresthat"Thejudicial
PoweroftheUnitedStates,shallbevestedinonesupremeCourt,andinsuchinferior
CourtsastheCongressmayfromtimetotimeordainandestablish."Thefurtherconcern
oftheFramersoftheConstitutionwithmaintenanceoftheseparationofpowersisfound
inthesocalled"Ineligibility"and"Incompatibility"ClausescontainedinArt.I,6:
"NoSenatororRepresentativeshall,duringtheTimeforwhichhewaselected,be
appointedtoanycivilOfficeundertheAuthorityoftheUnitedStates,whichshallhave
beencreated,ortheEmolumentswhereofshallhavebeenencreasedduringsuchtime

Buckleyv.Valeo
andnoPersonholdinganyOfficeundertheUnitedStates,shallbeaMemberofeither
HouseduringhisContinuanceinOffice."
Itisinthecontextofthesecognateprovisionsofthedocumentthatwemustexaminethe
languageofArt.II.2,cl.2,whichappellantscontendprovidestheonlyauthorizationfor
appointmentofthosetowhomsubstantialexecutiveoradministrativeauthorityisgiven

Page424U.S.1,125
bystatute.Becauseoftheimportanceofitslanguage,weagainsetouttheprovision:
"[ThePresident]shallnominate,andbyandwiththeAdviceandConsentoftheSenate,
shallappointAmbassadors,otherpublicMinistersandConsuls,Judgesofthesupreme
Court,andallotherOfficersoftheUnitedStates,whoseAppointmentsarenotherein
otherwiseprovidedfor,andwhichshallbeestablishedbyLaw:buttheCongressmayby
LawvesttheAppointmentofsuchinferiorOfficers,astheythinkproper,inthePresident
alone,intheCourtsofLaw,orintheHeadsofDepartments."
TheAppointmentsClausecould,ofcourse,bereadasmerelydealingwithetiquetteor
protocolindescribing"OfficersoftheUnitedStates,"butthedraftershadalessfrivolous
purposeinmind.ThisconclusionissupportedbylanguagefromUnitedStatesv.
Germaine,99U.S.508,509510(1879):
"TheConstitutionforpurposesofappointmentveryclearlydividesallitsofficersinto
twoclasses.TheprimaryclassrequiresanominationbythePresidentandconfirmation
bytheSenate.Butforeseeingthatwhenofficesbecamenumerous,andsuddenremovals
necessary,thismodemightbeinconvenient,itwasprovidedthat,inregardtoofficers
inferiortothosespeciallymentioned,Congressmightbylawvesttheirappointmentin
thePresidentalone,inthecourtsoflaw,orintheheadsofdepartments.Thatallpersons
whocanbesaidtoholdanofficeunderthegovernmentabouttobeestablishedunderthe
Constitutionwereintendedtobeincludedwithinoneortheotherofthesemodesof
appointmenttherecanbebutlittledoubt."(Emphasissupplied.)
Wethinkthattheterm"OfficersoftheUnitedStates"

Page424U.S.1,126
asusedinArt.II,definedtoinclude"allpersonswhocanbesaidtoholdanofficeunder
thegovernment"inUnitedStatesv.Germaine,supra,isatermintendedtohave
substantivemeaning.Wethinkitsfairimportisthatanyappointeeexercisingsignificant
authoritypursuanttothelawsoftheUnitedStatesisan"OfficeroftheUnitedStates,"
andmust,therefore,beappointedinthemannerprescribedby2,cl.2,ofthatArticle.

Buckleyv.Valeo
If"allpersonswhocanbesaidtoholdanofficeunderthegovernmentabouttobe
establishedundertheConstitutionwereintendedtobeincludedwithinoneortheotherof
thesemodesofappointment,"UnitedStatesv.Germaine,supra,itisdifficulttoseehow
themembersoftheCommissionmayescapeinclusion.Ifapostmasterfirstclass,Myers
v.UnitedStates, 272U.S.52 (1926),and theclerkofadistrictcourt,ExparteHennen,
13Pet.230(1839),areinferiorofficersoftheUnitedStateswithinthemeaningofthe
AppointmentsClause,astheyare,surelytheCommissionersbeforeusareatthevery
leastsuch"inferiorOfficers"withinthemeaningofthatClause.[Footnote162]
AlthoughtwomembersoftheCommissionareinitiallyselectedbythePresident,his
nominationsaresubjecttoconfirmationnotmerelyby theSenate,butbytheHouseof
Representativesaswell.TheremainingfourvotingmembersoftheCommissionare
appointedbythePresidentprotemporeoftheSenateandbytheSpeakeroftheHouse.
WhilethesecondpartoftheClause

Page424U.S.1,127
authorizesCongresstovesttheappointmentoftheofficersdescribedinthatpartin"the
CourtsofLaw,orintheHeadsofDepartments,"neithertheSpeakeroftheHousenorthe
PresidentprotemporeoftheSenatecomeswithinthislanguage.
Thephrase"HeadsofDepartments,"usedasitisinconjunctionwiththephrase"Courts
ofLaw,"suggeststhattheDepartmentsreferredtoarethemselvesintheExecutive
Branchoratleasthavesomeconnectionwiththatbranch.WhiletheClauseexpressly
authorizesCongresstovesttheappointmentofcertainofficersinthe"CourtsofLaw,"
theabsenceofsimilarlanguagetoincludeCongressmustmeanthatneitherCongressnor
itsofficerswereincludedwithinthelanguage"HeadsofDepartments"inthispartofcl.
2.
ThuswithrespecttofourofthesixvotingmembersoftheCommission,neitherthe
President,theheadofanydepartment,northeJudiciaryhasanyvoiceintheirselection.
TheAppointmentsClausespecifiesthemethodofappointmentonlyfor"Officersofthe
UnitedStates"whoseappointmentisnot"otherwiseprovidedfor"intheConstitution.
ButthereisnoprovisionoftheConstitutionremotelyprovidinganyalternativemeansfor
theselectionofthemembersoftheCommissionorforanybody likethem.Appellee
Commissionhasargued,andtheCourtofAppealsagreed,thattheAppointmentsClause
ofArt.IIshouldnotbereadtoexcludethe"inherentpowerofCongress"toappointits
ownofficerstoperformfunctionsnecessarytothatbodyasaninstitution.Butthereisno
needtoreadtheAppointmentsClausecontrarytoitsplainlanguageinordertoreachthe
resultsoughtbytheCourtofAppeals.ArticleI,3,cl.5,expresslyauthorizestheselection
ofthePresidentprotemporeoftheSenate,and2,cl.5,ofthatArticleprovides

Buckleyv.Valeo
Page424U.S.1,128
fortheselectionoftheSpeakeroftheHouse.Rankingnonmembers,suchastheClerkof
theHouseofRepresentatives,areelectedundertheinternalrulesofeachHouse[Footnote
163]andaredesignatedbystatuteas"officersoftheCongress."[Footnote164]Thereis
nooccasionforustodecidewhetheranyofthesememberofficersare"Officersofthe
UnitedStates"whose"appointment"isotherwiseprovidedforwithinthemeaningofthe
AppointmentsClause,sinceeveniftheyweresuchofficerstheirappointeeswouldnot
be.ContrarytothefearsexpressedbythemajorityoftheCourtofAppeals,nothingin
ourholdingwithrespecttoArt.II,2,cl.2,willdenytoCongress"allpowertoappointits
owninferiorofficerstocarryoutappropriatelegislativefunctions."[Footnote165]
AppelleeCommissionandamicicontendsomewhatobliquelythatbecausetheFramers
hadnointentionofrelegatingCongresstoapositionbelowthatofthecoequalJudicial
andExecutiveBranchesoftheNationalGovernment,theAppointmentsClausemust
somehowbereadtoincludeCongressoritsofficersasamongthose

Page424U.S.1,129
inwhomtheappointmentpowermaybevested.ButthedebatesoftheConstitutional
Convention,andtheFederalistPapers,arerepletewithexpressionsoffearthatthe
LegislativeBranchoftheNationalGovernmentwillaggrandizeitselfattheexpenseof
theothertwobranches.[Footnote166]ThedebatesduringtheConvention,andthe
evolutionofthedraftversionoftheConstitution,seemtoustolendconsiderablesupport
toourreadingofthelanguageoftheAppointmentsClauseitself.
AninterimversionofthedraftConstitutionhadvestedintheSenatetheauthorityto
appointAmbassadors,publicMinisters,andJudgesoftheSupremeCourt,andthe
languageofArt.IIasfinallyadoptedisadistinctchangeinthisregard.Webelievethatit
wasadeliberatechangemadebytheFramerswiththeintenttodenyCongressany
authorityitselftoappointthosewhowere"OfficersoftheUnitedStates."Thedebateson
theflooroftheConventionreflectatleastinpartthewaythechangecameabout.
OnMonday,August6,1787,theCommitteeonDetailtowhichhadbeenreferredthe
entiredraftoftheConstitutionreporteditsdrafttotheConvention,includingthe
followingtwoarticlesthatbearonthequestionbeforeus:[Footnote167]
ArticleIX,1:"TheSenateoftheUnitedStatesshallhavepower...toappoint
Ambassadors,andJudgesoftheSupremeCourt."
ArticleX,2:"[ThePresident]shallcommissionall

Buckleyv.Valeo
Page424U.S.1,130
theofficersoftheUnitedStatesandshallappointofficersinallcasesnototherwise
providedforbythisConstitution."
Itwillbeseenfromacomparisonofthesetwoarticlesthattheappointmentof
AmbassadorsandJudgesoftheSupremeCourtwasconfidedtotheSenate,andthatthe
authoritytoappointnotmerelynominate,buttoactuallyappoint allotherofficerswas
reposedinthePresident.
DuringadiscussionofaprovisioninthesamedraftfromtheCommitteeonDetailwhich
providedthatthe"Treasurer"oftheUnitedStatesshouldbechosenbybothHousesof
Congress,Mr.Readmovedtostrikeoutthatclause,"leavingtheappointmentofthe
TreasurerasofotherofficerstotheExecutive."[Footnote168]OppositiontoRead's
motionwasbased,notonobjectiontotheprincipleofexecutiveappointment,butonthe
particularnatureoftheofficeofthe"Treasurer."[Footnote169]
OnThursday,August23,theConventionvotedtoinsertaftertheword"Ambassadors"in
thetextofdraftArt.IXthewords"andotherpublicMinisters."Immediatelyafterwards,
thesectionasamendedwasreferredtothe"CommitteeofFive."[Footnote170]The
followingdaytheConventiontookupArt.X.RogerShermanobjectedtothedraft
languageof2becauseitconferredtoomuchpoweronthePresident,andproposedto
insertafterthewords"nototherwiseprovidedforbythisConstitution"thewords"orby
law."ThismotionwasdefeatedbyavoteofnineStatestoone.[Footnote171]On
September

Page424U.S.1,131
3theConventiondebatedtheIneligibilityandIncompatibilityClauseswhichnowappear
inArt.I,andmadetheIneligibilityClausesomewhatlessstringent.[Footnote172]
Meanwhile,onFriday,August31,amotionhadbeencarriedwithoutoppositiontorefer
suchpartsoftheConstitutionashadbeenpostponedornotactedupontoaCommitteeof
Eleven.SuchreferencecarriedwithitbothArts.IXandX.Thefollowingweekthe
CommitteeofElevenmadeitsreporttotheConvention,inwhichthepresentlanguageof
Art.II,2,cl.2,dealingwiththeauthorityofthePresidenttonominateisfound,virtually
wordforword,as4ofArt.X.[Footnote173]ThesameCommitteealsoreporteda
revisedarticleconcerningtheLegislativeBranchtotheConvention.Thechangesare
obvious.Inthefinalversion,theSenateisshornofitspowertoappointAmbassadorsand
JudgesoftheSupremeCourt.ThePresidentisgiven,notthepowertoappointpublic
officersoftheUnitedStates,butonlytherighttonominatethem,andaprovisionis
insertedbyvirtueofwhichCongressmayrequireSenateconfirmationofhisnominees.
Itwouldseem afairsurmisethatacompromisehadbeenmade.Butnochangewasmade
intheconceptoftheterm"OfficersoftheUnitedStates,"whichsinceithadfirst

Buckleyv.Valeo
appearedinArt.Xhadbeentakenbyallconcernedtoembraceallappointedofficials
exercisingresponsibilityunderthepubliclawsoftheNation.
AppelleeCommissionandamiciurgethatbecauseofwhattheyconceivetobethe
extraordinaryauthorityreposedinCongresstoregulateelections,thiscasestandsona
differentfootingthanifCongresshadexerciseditslegislativeauthorityinanotherfield.
Thereis,ofcourse,nodoubtthatCongresshasexpressauthoritytoregulate

Page424U.S.1,132
congressionalelections,byvirtueofthepowerconferredinArt.I,4.[Footnote174]This
Courthasalsoheldthatithasverybroadauthoritytopreventcorruptioninnational
Presidentialelections.Burroughsv.UnitedStates, 290U.S.534 (1934).ButCongress
hasplenaryauthorityinallareasinwhichithassubstantivelegislativejurisdiction,
M`Cullochv.Maryland,4Wheat.316(1819),solongastheexerciseofthatauthority
doesnotoffendsomeotherconstitutionalrestriction.Weseenoreasontobelievethatthe
authorityofCongressoverfederalelectionpracticesisofsuchawhollydifferentnature
fromtheothergrantsofauthoritytoCongressthatitmaybeemployedinsuchamanner
astooffendwellestablishedconstitutionalrestrictionsstemmingfromtheseparationof
powers.
ThepositionthatbecauseCongresshasbeengivenexplicitandplenaryauthorityto
regulateafieldofactivity,itmustthereforehavethepowertoappointthosewhoareto
administertheregulatorystatuteisbothnovelandcontrarytothelanguageofthe
AppointmentsClause.Unlesstheirselectioniselsewhereprovidedfor,allofficersofthe
UnitedStatesaretobeappointedinaccordancewiththeClause.Principalofficersare
selectedbythePresidentwiththeadviceandconsentoftheSenate.Inferiorofficers
CongressmayallowtobeappointedbythePresidentalone,bytheheadsofdepartments,
orbytheJudiciary.Noclassortypeofofficerisexcludedbecauseofitsspecial
functions.ThePresidentappointsjudicialaswellasexecutiveofficers.Neitherhasit
beendisputedandapparently

Page424U.S.1,133
itisnotnowdisputed thattheClausecontrolstheappointmentofthemembersofa
typicaladministrativeagencyeventhoughitsfunctions,asthisCourtrecognizedin
Humphrey'sExecutorv.UnitedStates, 295U.S.602,624 (1935),maybe"predominantly
quasijudicialandquasilegislative"ratherthanexecutive.TheCourtinthatcase
carefullyemphasizedthatalthoughthemembersofsuchagenciesweretobeindependent
oftheExecutiveintheirdaytodayoperations,theExecutivewasnotexcludedfrom
selectingthem.Id.,at625626.
AppelleesarguethatthelegislativeauthorityconferredupontheCongressinArt.I,4,to
regulate"theTimes,placesandMannerofholdingElectionsforSenatorsand

Buckleyv.Valeo
Representatives"isaugmentedbytheprovisionin5that"EachHouseshallbetheJudge
oftheElections,ReturnsandQualificationsofitsownMembers."Section5confers,
however,notagenerallegislativepowerupontheCongress,butratherapower"judicial
incharacter"uponeachHouseoftheCongress.Barryv.UnitedStatesexrel.
Cunningham,279U.S.597,613 (1929).ThepowerofeachHousetojudgewhetherone
claimingelectionasSenatororRepresentativehasmettherequisitequalifications,
Powellv.McCormack,395U.S.486 (1969),cannotreasonablybetranslatedintoa
powergrantedtotheCongressitselftoimposesubstantivequalificationsontherightto
soholdsuchoffice.WhateverpowerCongressmayhavetolegislate,suchqualifications
mustderivefrom4,ratherthan5,ofArt.I.
AppelleesalsorelyontheTwelfthAmendmenttotheConstitutioninsofarasthe
authorityoftheCommissiontoregulatepracticesinconnectionwiththePresidential
electionisconcerned.ThisAmendmentprovidesthatcertificatesofthevotesofthe
electorsbe"sealed[and]

Page424U.S.1,134
directedtothePresidentoftheSenate,"andthatthe"PresidentoftheSenateshall,inthe
presenceoftheSenateandHouseofRepresentatives,openallthecertificatesandthe
votesshallthenbecounted."ThemethodbywhichCongressresolvedthecelebrated
disputedHayesTildenelectionof1876,reflectedin19Stat.227,supportstheconclusion
thatCongressviewedthisAmendmentasconferringuponitstwoHousesthesamesortof
power"judicialincharacter,"Barryv.UnitedStatesexrel.Cunningham,supra,at613,
aswasconferreduponeachHousebyArt.I,5,withrespecttoelectionsofitsown
members.
WearealsotoldbyappelleesandamicithatCongresshadgoodreasonfornotvestingin
aCommissioncomposedwhollyofPresidentialappointeestheauthoritytoadministerthe
Act,sincetheadministrationoftheActwouldundoubtedlyhaveabearingonany
incumbentPresident'scampaignforreelection.Whileonecannotdisputethebasisfor
thissentimentasapracticalmatter,itwouldseemthatthosewhosoughttochallenge
incumbentCongressmenmighthaveequallygoodreasontofearaCommissionwhich
wasunduly responsivetomembersofCongresswhomtheywereseekingtounseat.But
suchfears,howeverrational,donotbythemselveswarrantadistortionoftheFramers'
work.
AppelleeCommissionandamicifinallycontend,andthemajorityoftheCourtof
Appealsagreedwiththem,thatwhatevershortcomingstheprovisionsforthe
appointmentofmembersoftheCommissionmighthaveunderArt.II,Congresshad
ampleauthorityundertheNecessaryandProperClauseofArt.Itoeffectuatethisresult.
Wedonotagree. TheproperinquirywhenconsideringtheNecessaryandProperClause
isnottheauthorityofCongresstocreateanofficeoracommission,whichisbroad
indeed,butratheritsauthoritytoprovide

Buckleyv.Valeo
Page424U.S.1,135
thatitsownofficersmaymakeappointmentstosuchofficeorcommission.
Soframed,theclaimthatCongressmayprovideforthismannerofappointmentunder
theNecessaryandProperClauseofArt.Istandsonnobetterfootingthantheclaimthat
itmayprovideforsuchmannerofappointmentbecauseofitssubstantiveauthorityto
regulatefederalelections.Congresscouldnot,merelybecauseitconcludedthatsucha
measurewas"necessaryandproper"tothedischargeofitssubstantivelegislative
authority,passabillofattainderorexpostfactolawcontrarytotheprohibitions
containedin9ofArt.I.Nomoremayitvestinitself,orinitsofficers,theauthorityto
appointofficersoftheUnitedStateswhentheAppointmentsClausebyclearimplication
prohibitsitfromdoingso.
ThetrilogyofcasesfromthisCourtdealingwiththeconstitutionalauthorityofCongress
tocircumscribethePresident'spowertoremoveofficersoftheUnitedStatesisentirely
consistentwiththisconclusion.InMyersv.UnitedStates, 272U.S.52 (1926),theCourt
heldthatCongresscouldnotbystatutedivestthePresidentofthepowertoremovean
officerintheExecutiveBranchwhomhewasinitiallyauthorizedtoappoint.In
explainingitsreasoninginthatcase,theCourtsaid:
"ThevestingoftheexecutivepowerinthePresidentwasessentiallyagrantofthepower
toexecutethelaws.ButthePresidentaloneandunaidedcouldnotexecutethelaws.He
mustexecutethembytheassistanceofsubordinates....Asheischargedspecificallyto
takecarethattheybefaithfullyexecuted,thereasonableimplication,evenintheabsence
ofexpresswords,wasthataspartofhisexecutivepowerheshouldselectthosewhowere

Page424U.S.1,136
toactforhimunderhisdirectionintheexecutionofthelaws.
.....
"Ourconclusiononthemerits,sustainedbytheargumentsbeforestated,isthatArticleII
grantstothePresidenttheexecutivepoweroftheGovernment,i.e.,thegeneral
administrativecontrolofthoseexecutingthelaws,includingthepowerofappointment
andremovalofexecutiveofficersaconclusionconfirmedbyhisobligationtotakecare
thatthelawsbefaithfullyexecuted...."Id.,at117,163164.
InthelatercaseofHumphrey'sExecutor,whereitwasheldthatCongresscould
circumscribethePresident'spowertoremovemembersofindependentregulatory
agencies,theCourtwascarefultonotethatitwasdealingwithanagencyintendedtobe
independentofexecutiveauthority"exceptinitsselection."295U.S.at625(emphasisin
original).Wienerv.UnitedStates, 357U.S.349 (1958),whichappliedtheholdingin
Humphrey'sExecutortoamemberoftheWarClaimsCommission,didnotquestionin

Buckleyv.Valeo
anyrespectthatmembersofindependentagenciesarenotindependentoftheExecutive
withrespecttotheirappointments.
ThisconclusionisbuttressedbythefactthatMr.JusticeSutherland,theauthor ofthe
Court'sopinioninHumphrey'sExecutor,likewisewrotetheopinionfortheCourtin
Springerv.PhilippineIslands,277U.S.189 (1928),inwhichitwassaid:
"Nothavingthepowerofappointment,unlessexpresslygrantedorincidentaltoits
powers,thelegislaturecannotengraftexecutivedutiesuponalegislativeoffice,sincethat
wouldbetousurpthepowerofappointmentbyindirectionthoughthecasemightbe
differentiftheadditionalduties

Page424U.S.1,137
weredevolveduponanappointeeoftheexecutive."Id.,at202.
3.TheCommission'sPowers
Thus,ontheassumptionthatallofthepowersgrantedinthestatutemaybeexercisedby
anagencywhosemembershavebeen appointedinaccordancewiththeAppointments
Clause,[Footnote175]theultimatequestioniswhich,ifany,ofthosepowersmaybe
exercisedbythepresentvotingCommissioners,noneof whomwasappointedas
providedbythatClause.Ourpreviousdescriptionofthestatutoryprovisions,seesupra,
at109113,disclosedthattheCommission'spowersfallgenerallyintothreecategories:
functionsrelatingtotheflowofnecessaryinformation receipt,dissemination,and
investigationfunctionswithrespecttotheCommission'staskoffleshingoutthestatute
rulemakingandadvisoryopinionsandfunctionsnecessarytoensurecompliancewiththe
statuteandrulesinformalprocedures,administrativedeterminationsandhearings,and
civilsuits.
InsofarasthepowersconfidedintheCommissionareessentiallyofaninvestigativeand
informativenature,fallinginthesamegeneralcategoryasthosepowerswhichCongress
mightdelegatetooneofitsowncommittees,therecanbenoquestionthatthe
Commissionaspresentlyconstitutedmayexercisethem.Kilbournv.Thompson,103
U.S.168 (1881)McGrainv.Daugherty,

Page424U.S.1,138
273U.S.135 (1927)Eastlandv.UnitedStatesServicemen'sFund,421U.S.491 (1975).
AsthisCourtstatedinMcGrain,supra,at175:
"Alegislativebodycannotlegislatewiselyoreffectivelyintheabsenceofinformation
respectingtheconditionswhichthelegislationisintendedtoaffectorchangeandwhere
thelegislativebodydoesnotitselfpossesstherequisiteinformation whichnot

Buckleyv.Valeo
infrequentlyistrue recoursemustbehadtootherswhodopossessit.Experiencehas
taughtthatmererequestsforsuchinformationoftenareunavailing,andalsothat
informationwhichisvolunteeredisnotalwaysaccurateorcompletesosomemeansof
compulsionareessentialtoobtainwhatisneeded.Allthiswastruebeforeandwhenthe
Constitutionwasframedandadopted.Inthatperiodthepowerofinquiry withenforcing
processwasregardedandemployedasanecessaryandappropriateattributeofthe
powertolegislateindeed,wastreatedasinheringinit."
Butwhenwegobeyondthistypeofauthoritytothemoresubstantialpowersexercised
bytheCommission,wereachadifferentresult.TheCommission'senforcementpower,
exemplifiedbyitsdiscretionarypowertoseekjudicialrelief,isauthoritythatcannot
possiblyberegardedasmerelyinaidofthelegislativefunctionofCongress.Alawsuitis
theultimateremedyforabreachofthelaw,anditistothePresident,andnottothe
Congress,thattheConstitutionentruststheresponsibilityto"takeCarethattheLawsbe
faithfullyexecuted."Art.II,3.
CongressmayundoubtedlyundertheNecessaryandProperClausecreate"offices"inthe
genericsenseandprovidesuchmethodofappointmenttothose"offices"asitchooses.
ButCongress'powerunderthatClause

Page424U.S.1,139
isinevitablyboundedbytheexpresslanguageofArt.II,2,cl.2,andunlessthemethodit
providescomportswiththelatter,theholdersofthoseofficeswillnotbe"Officersofthe
UnitedStates."Theymay,therefore,properlyperformdutiesonlyinaidofthose
functionsthatCongressmaycarryoutbyitself,orinanareasufficientlyremovedfrom
theadministrationandenforcementofthepubliclawastopermittheirbeingperformed
bypersonsnot"OfficersoftheUnitedStates."
ThisCourtobservedmorethanacenturyagowithrespecttolitigationconductedinthe
courtsoftheUnitedStates:
"Whethertested,therefore,bytherequirementsoftheJudiciaryAct,orbytheusageof
thegovernment,orbythedecisionsofthiscourt,itisclearthatallsuchsuits,sofarasthe
interestsoftheUnitedStatesareconcerned,aresubjecttothedirection,andwithinthe
controlof,theAttorneyGeneral."ConfiscationCases,7Wall.454,458459(1869).
TheCourtechoedsimilarsentiments59yearslaterinSpringerv.PhilippineIslands,277
U.S.,at202,saying:
"Legislativepower,asdistinguishedfromexecutivepower,istheauthoritytomakelaws,
butnottoenforcethemorappointtheagentschargedwiththedutyofsuchenforcement.
Thelatterareexecutivefunctions.Itisunnecessarytoenlargefurtheruponthegeneral
subject,sinceithassorecentlyreceivedthefullconsiderationofthisCourt.Myersv.
UnitedStates, 272U.S.52.

Buckleyv.Valeo
"Nothavingthepowerofappointment,unlessexpresslygrantedorincidentaltoits
powers,thelegislaturecannotengraftexecutivedutiesuponalegislativeoffice,sincethat
wouldbetousurpthepowerofappointmentbyindirectionthoughthe

Page424U.S.1,140
casemightbedifferentiftheadditionaldutiesweredevolveduponanappointeeofthe
executive."
WeholdthattheseprovisionsoftheAct,vestingintheCommissionprimary
responsibilityforconductingcivillitigationinthecourtsoftheUnitedStatesfor
vindicatingpublicrights,violateArt.II,2,cl.2,oftheConstitution.Suchfunctionsmay
bedischargedonlybypersonswhoare"OfficersoftheUnitedStates"withinthe
languageofthatsection.
AllaspectsoftheActarebroughtwithintheCommission'sbroadadministrativepowers:
rulemaking,advisoryopinions,anddeterminationsofeligibilityforfundsandevenfor
federalelectiveofficeitself.Thesefunctions,exercisedfreefromdaytodaysupervision
ofeitherCongress[Footnote176]ortheExecutiveBranch,aremorelegislativeand
judicialinnaturethanaretheCommission's

Page424U.S.1,141
enforcementpowers,andareofkindsusuallyperformedbyindependentregulatory
agenciesorbysomedepartmentintheExecutiveBranchunderthedirectionofanActof
Congress.Congressviewedthesebroadpowersasessentialtoeffectiveandimpartial
administrationoftheentiresubstantiveframeworkoftheAct.Yeteachofthesefunctions
alsorepresentstheperformanceofasignificantgovernmentaldutyexercisedpursuantto
apubliclaw.WhilethePresidentmaynotinsistthatsuchfunctionsbedelegatedtoan
appointeeofhisremovableatwill,Humphrey'sExecutorv.UnitedStates, 295U.S.602
(1935),noneofthemoperatesmerelyinaidofcongressionalauthoritytolegislateoris
sufficientlyremovedfromtheadministrationandenforcementofpubliclawtoallowitto
beperformedbythepresentCommission.Theseadministrativefunctionsmaytherefore
beexercisedonlybypersonswhoare"OfficersoftheUnitedStates."[Footnote177]

Page424U.S.1,142
ItisalsoourviewthattheCommission'sinabilitytoexercisecertainpowersbecauseof
themethodbywhichitsmembershavebeenselectedshouldnotaffectthevalidityofthe
Commission'sadministrativeactionsanddeterminationstothisdate,includingits
administrationofthoseprovisions,upheldtoday,authorizingthepublicfinancingof
federalelections.ThepastactsoftheCommissionarethereforeaccordeddefacto
validity,justaswehaverecognizedshouldbethecasewithrespecttolegislativeacts

Buckleyv.Valeo
performedbylegislatorsheldtohavebeenelectedinaccordancewithanunconstitutional
apportionmentplan.Connorv.Williams,404U.S.549,550551(1972).SeeRyanv.
Tinsley,316F.2d430,431432(CA101963)Schaeferv.Thomson,251F.Supp.450,
453(Wyo.1965),aff'dsubnom.Harrisonv.Schaeffer,383U.S.269 (1966).Cf.Cityof
Richmondv.UnitedStates, 422U.S.358,379 (1975)(BRENNAN,J.,dissenting).We
alsodrawontheCourt'spracticein

Page424U.S.1,143
theapportionmentandvotingrightscasesandstay,foraperiodnottoexceed30days,
theCourt'sjudgmentinsofarasitaffectstheauthorityoftheCommissiontoexercisethe
dutiesandpowersgranteditundertheAct.ThislimitedstaywillaffordCongressan
opportunitytoreconstitutetheCommissionbylawortoadoptothervalidenforcement
mechanismswithoutinterruptingenforcementoftheprovisionstheCourtsustains,
allowingthepresentCommissionintheinterimtofunctiondefactoinaccordancewith
thesubstantiveprovisionsoftheAct.Cf.Georgiav.UnitedStates, 411U.S.526,541
(1973)Fortsonv.Morris,385U.S.231,235 (1966)MarylandComm.v.Tawes, 377
U.S.656,675676(1964).

CONCLUSION
Insummary,[Footnote178]wesustaintheindividualcontributionlimits,thedisclosure
andreportingprovisions,andthepublicfinancingscheme.Weconclude,however,that
thelimitationson campaignexpenditures,onindependentexpendituresbyindividuals
andgroups,andonexpendituresbyacandidatefromhispersonalfundsare
constitutionallyinfirm.Finally,weholdthatmostofthepowersconferredbytheAct
upontheFederalElectionCommissioncanbeexercisedonlyby"OfficersoftheUnited
States,"appointedinconformitywithArt.II,2,cl.2,oftheConstitution,andtherefore
cannotbeexercisedbytheCommissionaspresentlyconstituted.
InNo.75436,thejudgmentoftheCourtofAppeals

Page424U.S.1,144
isaffirmedinpartandreversedinpart.ThejudgmentoftheDistrictCourtinNo.75437
isaffirmed.Themandateshallissueforthwith,exceptthatourjudgmentisstayed,fora
periodnottoexceed30days,insofarasitaffectstheauthorityoftheCommissionto
exercisethedutiesandpowersgranteditundertheAct.
Soordered.
MR. JUSTICESTEVENStooknopartintheconsiderationordecisionofthesecases.

Buckleyv.Valeo

APPENDIXTOPERCURIAMOPINION*
TITLE2.THECONGRESS
CHAPTER14FEDERALELECTIONCAMPAIGNS
SUBCHAPTERI.DISCLOSUREOFFEDERALCAMPAIGN
FUNDS
431.Definitions.
WhenusedinthissubchapterandsubchapterIIofthischapter
(a)"election"means
(1)ageneral,special,primary,orrunoffelection
(2)aconventionorcaucusofapoliticalpartyheldtonominateacandidate
(3)aprimaryelectionheldfortheselectionofdelegatestoanationalnominating
conventionofapoliticalpartyand
(4)aprimaryelectionheldfortheexpressionofapreferenceforthenominationof
personsforelectiontotheofficeofPresident

Page424U.S.1,145
(b)"candidate"meansanindividualwhoseeksnominationforelection,orelection,to
Federaloffice,whetherornotsuchindividualiselected,and,forpurposesofthis
paragraph,anindividualshallbedeemedtoseeknominationforelection,orelection,if
hehas
(1)takentheactionnecessaryunderthelawofaStatetoqualifyhimselffornomination
forelection,orelection,toFederalofficeor
(2)receivedcontributionsormadeexpenditures,orhasgivenhisconsentforanyother
persontoreceivecontributionsormakeexpenditures,withaviewtobringingabouthis
nominationforelection,orelection,tosuchoffice
(c)"Federaloffice"meanstheofficeofPresidentorVicePresidentoftheUnitedStates
orofSenatororRepresentativein,orDelegateorResidentCommissionerto,the
CongressoftheUnitedStates
(d)"politicalcommittee"meansanycommittee,club,association,orothergroupof
personswhichreceivescontributionsormakesexpendituresduringacalendaryearinan
aggregateamountexceeding$1,000
(e)"contribution"
(1)meansagift,subscription,loan,advance,ordepositofmoneyoranythingofvalue
madeforthepurposeof
(A)influencingthenominationforelection,orelection,ofanypersontoFederalofficeor
forthepurposeofinfluencingtheresultsofaprimaryheldfortheselectionofdelegates
toanationalnominatingconventionofapoliticalpartyor

Buckleyv.Valeo
(B)influencingtheresultofanelectionheldfortheexpressionofapreferenceforthe
nominationofpersonsforelectiontotheofficeofPresidentoftheUnitedStates

Page424U.S.1,146
(2)meansacontract,promise,oragreement,expressedorimplied,whetherornotlegally
enforceable,tomakeacontributionforsuchpurposes
(3)meansfundsreceivedbyapoliticalcommitteewhicharetransferredtosuch
committeefromanotherpoliticalcommitteeorothersource
(4)meansthepayment,byanypersonotherthanacandidateorapoliticalcommittee,of
compensationforthepersonalservicesofanotherpersonwhicharerenderedtosuch
candidateorpoliticalcommitteewithoutchargeforanysuchpurposebut
(5)doesnotinclude
(A)thevalueofservicesprovidedwithoutcompensationbyindividualswhovolunteera
portionoralloftheirtimeonbehalfofacandidateorpoliticalcommittee
(B)theuseofrealorpersonalpropertyandthecostofinvitations,food,andbeverages,
voluntarilyprovidedbyanindividualtoacandidateinrenderingvoluntarypersonal
servicesontheindividual'sresidentialpremisesforcandidaterelatedactivities
(C)thesaleofanyfoodorbeveragebyavendorforuseinacandidate'scampaignata
chargelessthanthenormalcomparablecharge,ifsuchchargeforuseinacandidate's
campaignisatleastequaltothecostofsuchfoodorbeveragetothevendor
(D)any unreimbursedpaymentfortravelexpensesmadebyanindividualwhoonhis
ownbehalfvolunteershispersonalservicestoacandidate
(E)thepaymentbyaStateorlocalcommitteeofapoliticalpartyofthecostsof
preparation,

Page424U.S.1,147
display,ormailingorotherdistributionincurredbysuchcommitteewithrespecttoa
printedslatecardorsampleballot,orotherprintedlisting,ofthreeormorecandidatesfor
anypublicofficeforwhichanelectionisheldintheStateinwhichsuchcommitteeis
organized,exceptthatthisclauseshallnotapplyinthecaseofcostsincurredbysuch
committeewithrespecttoadisplayofanysuchlistingmadeonbroadcastingstations,or
innewspapers,magazines,orothersimilartypesofgeneralpublicpoliticaladvertising
or
(F)anypaymentmadeorobligationincurredbyacorporationoralabororganization
which,undertheprovisionsofthelastparagraphofsection610ofTitle18,wouldnot
constituteanexpenditurebysuchcorporationorlabororganization
totheextentthatthecumulativevalueofactivitiesbyanyindividualonbehalfofany
candidateundereachofclauses(B),(C),and(D)doesnotexceed$500withrespectto
anyelection

Buckleyv.Valeo
(f)"expenditure"
(1)meansapurchase,payment,distribution,loan,advance,deposit,orgiftofmoneyor
anythingofvalue,madeforthepurposeof
(A)influencingthenominationforelection,ortheelection,ofanypersontoFederal
office,ortotheofficeofpresidentialandvicepresidentialelectoror
(B)influencingtheresultsofaprimaryelectionheldfortheselectionofdelegatestoa
nationalnominatingconventionofapoliticalpartyorfortheexpressionofapreference
for

Page424U.S.1,148
thenominationofpersonsforelectiontotheofficeofPresidentoftheUnitedStates
(2)meansacontract,promise,oragreement,expressorimplied,whetherornotlegally
enforceable,tomakeanyexpenditure
(3)meansthetransferoffundsbyapoliticalcommitteetoanotherpoliticalcommittee
but
(4)doesnotinclude
(A)anynewsstory,commentary,oreditorialdistributedthroughthefacilitiesofany
broadcastingstation,newspaper,magazine,orotherperiodicalpublication,unlesssuch
facilitiesareownedorcontrolledbyanypoliticalparty,politicalcommittee,orcandidate
(B)nonpartisanactivitydesignedtoencourageindividualstoregistertovoteortovote
(C)anycommunicationbyanymembershiporganizationorcorporationtoitsmembers
orstockholders,ifsuchmembershiporganizationorcorporationisnotorganized
primarilyforthepurposeofinfluencingthenominationforelection,orelection,ofany
persontoFederaloffice
(D)theuseofrealorpersonalpropertyandthecostofinvitations,food,andbeverages,
voluntarilyprovidedbyanindividualtoacandidateinrenderingvoluntarypersonal
servicesontheindividual'sresidentialpremisesforcandidaterelatedactivitiesifthe
cumulativevalueofsuchactivitiesbysuchindividualonbehalfofanycandidatedo[sic]
notexceed$500withrespecttoanyelection
(E)anyunreimbursedpaymentfortravelexpensesmadebyanindividualwhoonhisown
behalfvolunteershispersonalservicestoacandidateifthecumulativeamountforsuch
individualincurredwithrespecttosuchcandidate

Page424U.S.1,149
doesnotexceed$500withrespecttoanyelection
(F)anycommunicationbyanypersonwhichisnotmadeforthepurposeofinfluencing
thenominationforelection,orelection,ofany persontoFederalofficeor
(G)thepaymentbyaStateorlocalcommitteeofapoliticalpartyofthecostsof
preparation,display,ormailingorotherdistributionincurredbysuchcommitteewith
respecttoaprintedslatecardorsampleballot,orotherprintedlisting,ofthreeormore
candidatesforanypublicofficeforwhichanelectionisheldintheStateinwhichsuch
committeeisorganized,exceptthatthisclauseshallnotapplyinthecaseofcosts

Buckleyv.Valeo
incurredbysuchcommitteewithrespecttoadisplayofanysuchlistingmadeon
broadcastingstations,orinnewspapers,magazinesorothersimilartypesofgeneral
publicpoliticaladvertisingor
(H)anypaymentmadeorobligationincurredbyacorporationoralabororganization
which,undertheprovisionsofthelastparagraphofsection610ofTitle18,wouldnot
constituteanexpenditurebysuchcorporationorlabororganization
(g)"Commission"meanstheFederalElectionCommission
(h)"person"meansanindividual,partnership,committee,association,corporation,labor
organization,andanyotherorganizationorgroupofpersons
(i)"State"meanseachStateoftheUnitedStates,theDistrictofColumbia,the
CommonwealthofPuertoRico,andanyterritoryorpossessionoftheUnitedStates

Page424U.S.1,150
(j)"identification"means
(1)inthecaseofanindividual,hisfullnameandthefulladdressofhisprincipalplaceof
residenceand
(2)inthecaseofanyotherperson,thefullnameandaddressofsuchperson
(k)"nationalcommittee"meanstheorganizationwhich,byvirtueofthebylawsofa
politicalparty,isresponsibleforthedaytodayoperationofsuchpoliticalpartyatthe
nationallevel,asdeterminedbytheCommission
(l)"Statecommittee"meanstheorganizationwhich,byvirtueofthebylawsofapolitical
party,isresponsibleforthedaytodayoperationofsuchpoliticalpartyattheStatelevel,
asdeterminedbytheCommission
(m)"politicalparty"meansanassociation,committee,ororganizationwhichnominatesa
candidateforelectiontoanyFederaloffice,whosenameappearsontheelectionballotas
thecandidateofsuchassociation,committee,ororganizationand
(n)"principalcampaigncommittee"meanstheprincipalcampaigncommitteedesignated
byacandidateundersection432(f)(1)ofthistitle.

432.Organizationofpoliticalcommittees.
(a)Chairmantreasurervacanciesofficialauthorizations.Everypoliticalcommittee
shallhaveachairmanandatreasurer.Nocontributionandnoexpenditureshallbe
acceptedormadebyoronbehalfofapoliticalcommitteeatatimewhenthereisa
vacancyintheofficeofchairmanortreasurerthereof.Noexpenditureshallbemadefor

Buckleyv.Valeo
oronbehalfofapoliticalcommitteewithouttheauthorizationofitschairmanor
treasurer,ortheirdesignatedagents.
(b)Accountofcontributionssegregatedfunds.

Page424U.S.1,151
Everypersonwhoreceivesacontributioninexcessof$10forapoliticalcommitteeshall,
ondemandofthetreasurer,andinanyeventwithin5daysafterreceiptofsuch
contribution,rendertothetreasureradetailedaccountthereof,includingtheamountof
thecontributionandtheidentificationofthepersonmakingsuchcontribution,andthe
dateonwhich received.Allfundsofapoliticalcommitteeshallbesegregatedfrom,and
maynotbecommingledwith,anypersonalfundsofofficers,members,orassociatesof
suchcommittee.
(c)Recordkeeping.Itshallbethedutyofthetreasurerofapoliticalcommitteetokeepa
detailedandexactaccountof
(1)allcontributionsmadetoorforsuchcommittee
(2)theidentificationofeverypersonmakingacontributioninexcessof$10,andthedate
andamountthereofand,ifaperson'scontributionsaggregate morethan$100,the
accountshallincludeoccupation,andtheprincipalplaceofbusiness(ifany)
(3)allexpendituresmadebyoronbehalfofsuchcommitteeand
(4)theidentificationofeverypersontowhomanyexpenditureismade,thedateand
amountthereofandthenameandaddressof,andofficesoughtby,eachcandidateon
whosebehalfsuchexpenditurewasmade.
(d)Receiptspreservation.Itshallbethedutyofthetreasurertoobtainandkeepa
receiptedbill,statingtheparticulars,foreveryexpendituremadebyoronbehalfofa
politicalcommitteeinexcessof$100inamount,andforanysuchexpenditureinalesser
amount,iftheaggregateamountofsuchexpenditurestothesamepersonduringa
calendaryearexceeds$100.Thetreasurer

Page424U.S.1,152
shallpreserveallreceiptedbillsandaccountsrequiredtobekeptbythissectionfor
periodsoftimetobedeterminedbytheCommission.
(e)Unauthorizedactivitiesnotice.Anypoliticalcommitteewhichsolicitsorreceives
contributionsormakesexpendituresonbehalfofanycandidatethatisnotauthorizedin
writingbysuchcandidatetodososhallincludeanoticeonthefaceorfrontpageofall
literatureandadvertisementspublishedinconnectionwithsuchcandidate'scampaignby
suchcommitteeoronitsbehalfstatingthatthecommitteeisnotauthorizedbysuch
candidateandthatsuchcandidateisnotresponsiblefortheactivitiesofsuchcommittee.

Buckleyv.Valeo
(f)PrincipalcampaigncommitteesonecandidatelimitationofficeofPresident:national
committeeforcandidateduties.
(1)EachindividualwhoisacandidateforFederaloffice(otherthantheofficeofVice
PresidentoftheUnitedStates)shalldesignateapoliticalcommitteetoserveashis
principalcampaigncommittee.Nopoliticalcommitteemaybedesignatedastheprincipal
campaigncommitteeofmorethanonecandidate,exceptthatthecandidatefortheoffice
ofPresidentoftheUnitedStatesnominatedbyapoliticalpartymaydesignatethe
nationalcommitteeof suchpoliticalpartyashisprincipalcampaigncommittee.Exceptas
providedintheprecedingsentence,nopoliticalcommitteewhichsupportsmorethanone
candidatemaybedesignatedasaprincipalcampaigncommittee.
(2)Notwithstandinganyotherprovisionofthissubchapter,eachreportorstatementof
contributionsreceivedorexpendituresmadebyapoliticalcommittee(otherthana
principalcampaigncommittee)whichisrequiredtobefiledwiththeCommissionunder
thissubchaptershallbefiledinsteadwiththeprincipalcampaign

Page424U.S.1,153
committeeforthecandidateonwhosebehalfsuchcontributionsareacceptedorsuch
expendituresaremade.
(3)Itshallbethedutyofeachprincipalcampaigncommitteetoreceiveallreportsand
statementsrequiredtobefiledwithitunderparagraph(2)ofthissubsectionandto
compileandfilesuchreportsandstatements,togetherwithitsownreportsand
statements,withtheCommissioninaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthissubchapter.

433.Registrationofpoliticalcommittees.
(a)Statementsoforganization.Eachpoliticalcommitteewhichanticipatesreceiving
contributionsormakingexpendituresduringthecalendaryearinanaggregateamount
exceeding$1,000shallfilewiththeCommissionastatementoforganization,within10
daysafteritsorganizationor,iflater,10daysafterthedateonwhichithasinformation
whichcausesthecommitteetoanticipateitwillreceivecontributionsormake
expendituresinexcessof$1,000.Each suchcommitteeinexistenceatthedateof
enactmentofthisActshallfileastatementoforganizationwiththeCommissionatsuch
timeasitprescribes.
(b)Contentsofstatements.Thestatementoforganizationshallinclude
(1)thenameandaddressofthecommittee
(2)thenames,addresses,andrelationshipsofaffiliatedorconnectedorganizations
(3)thearea,scope,orjurisdictionofthecommittee
(4)thename,address,andpositionofthecustodianofbooksandaccounts
(5)thename,address,andpositionofotherprincipalofficers,includingofficersand
membersofthefinancecommittee,ifany

Buckleyv.Valeo
Page424U.S.1,154
(6)thename,address,officesought,andpartyaffiliationof
(A)eachcandidatewhomthecommitteeissupportingand
(B)anyotherindividual,ifany,whomthecommitteeissupportingfornominationfor
election,orelection,toanypublicofficewhateveror,ifthecommitteeissupportingthe
entireticketofanyparty,thenameoftheparty
(7)astatementwhetherthecommitteeisacontinuingone
(8)thedispositionofresidualfundswhichwillbemadeintheeventofdissolution
(9)alistingofallbanks,safetydepositboxes,orotherrepositoriesused
(10)astatementofthereportsrequiredtobefiledbythecommitteewithStateorlocal
officers,and,ifso,thenames,addresses,andpositionsofsuchpersonsand
(11)suchotherinformationasshallberequiredbytheCommission.
(c)Informationchangesreport.Anychangeininformationpreviouslysubmittedina
statementoforganizationshallbereportedtotheCommissionwithina10dayperiod
followingthechange.
(d)Disbandingofpoliticalcommitteesorcontributionsandexpendituresbelow
prescribedceilingnotice.Anycommitteewhich,afterhavingfiledoneormore
statementsoforganization,disbandsordeterminesitwillnolongerreceivecontributions
ormakeexpendituresduringthecalendaryearinanaggregateamountexceeding$1,000
shallsonotifytheCommission.
(e)Filingreportsandnotificationswithappropriateprincipalcampaigncommittees.In
thecaseofapolitical

Page424U.S.1,155
committeewhichisnotaprincipalcampaigncommittee,reportsandnotifications
requiredunderthissectiontobefiledwiththeCommissionshallbefiledinsteadwiththe
appropriateprincipalcampaigncommittee.

434.Reportsbypoliticalcommitteesandcandidates.
(a)Receiptsandexpenditurescompletiondate,exception.
(1)Exceptasprovidedbyparagraph(2),eachtreasurerofapoliticalcommittee
supportingacandidateorcandidatesforelectiontoFederaloffice,andeachcandidatefor
electiontosuchoffice,shallfilewiththeCommissionreportsofreceiptsand
expendituresonformstobeprescribedorapprovedbyit.Thereportsreferredtointhe
precedingsentenceshallbefiledasfollows:
(A)(i)InanycalendaryearinwhichanindividualisacandidateforFederalofficeand
anelectionforsuchFederalofficeisheldinsuchyear,suchreportsshallbefilednotlater
thanthe10thdaybeforethedateonwhichsuchelectionisheldandshallbecompleteas
ofthe15thdaybeforethedateofsuchelectionexceptthatanysuchreportfiledby

Buckleyv.Valeo
registeredorcertifiedmailmustbepostmarkednotlaterthanthecloseofthe12thday
beforethedateofsuchelection.
(ii)suchreportsshallbefilednotlaterthanthe30thdayafterthedayofsuchelectionand
shallbecompleteasofthe20thdayafterthedateofsuchelection.
(B)Inanyothercalendaryearin whichanindividualisacandidateforFederaloffice,
suchreportsshallbefiledafterDecember31ofsuchcalendaryear,butnotlaterthan
January31ofthefollowingcalendaryearandshallbecompleteasofthecloseofthe
calendaryearwithrespecttowhichthereportisfiled.

Page424U.S.1,156
(C)Suchreportsshallbefilednotlaterthanthe10thdayfollowingthecloseofany
calendarquarterinwhichthecandidateorpoliticalcommitteeconcernedreceived
contributionsinexcessof$1,000,ormadeexpendituresinexcessof$1,000,andshallbe
completeasofthecloseofsuchcalendarquarterexceptthatanysuchreportrequiredto
befiledafterDecember31ofanycalendaryearwithrespecttowhichareportisrequired
tobefiledundersubparagraph(B)shallbefiledasprovidedinsuchsubparagraph.
(D)Whenthelastdayforfilinganyquarterlyreportrequiredbysubparagraph(C)occurs
within10daysofanelection,thefilingofsuchquarterlyreportshallbewaivedand
supersededbythereportrequiredbysubparagraph(A)(i).
Anycontributionof$1,000ormorereceivedafterthe15thday,butmorethan48hours,
beforeanyelectionshallbereportedwithin48hoursafteritsreceipt.
(2)Eachtreasurerofapoliticalcommitteewhichisnotaprincipalcampaigncommittee
shallfilethereportsrequiredunderthissectionwiththeappropriateprincipalcampaign
committee.
(3)Uponarequestmadebyapresidentialcandidateorapoliticalcommitteewhich
operatesinmorethanoneState,oruponitsownmotion,theCommissionmaywaivethe
reportingdatessetforthinparagraph(1)(otherthanthereportingdatesetforthin
paragraph(1)(B)),andrequireinsteadthatsuchcandidateorpoliticalcommitteefile
reportsnotlessfrequentlythanmonthly.TheCommissionmaynotrequireapresidential
candidateorapoliticalcommitteeoperatinginmorethanoneStatetofilemorethan12
reports(notcountinganyreportreferredtoinparagraph(1)(B))duringanycalendar
year.IftheCommissionactsonitsownmotion
Page424U.S.1,157
underthisparagraphwithrespecttoacandidateorapoliticalcommittee,suchcandidate
orcommitteemayobtainjudicialreviewinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofchapter7
ofTitle5.
(b)Contentsofreports.Eachreportunderthissectionshalldisclose
(1)theamountofcashonhandatthebeginningofthereportingperiod
(2)thefullnameandmailingaddress(occupationandtheprincipalplaceofbusiness,if
any)ofeachpersonwhohasmadeoneormorecontributionstoorforsuchcommitteeor
candidate(includingthepurchaseofticketsforeventssuchasdinners,luncheons,rallies,
andsimilarfundraisingevents)withinthecalendaryearinanaggregateamountorvalue
inexcessof $100,togetherwiththeamountanddateofsuchcontributions

Buckleyv.Valeo
(3)thetotalsumofindividualcontributionsmadetoorforsuchcommitteeorcandidate
duringthereportingperiodandnotreportedunderparagraph(2)
(4)thenameandaddressofeachpoliticalcommitteeorcandidatefromwhichthe
reportingcommitteeorthecandidatereceived,ortowhichthatcommitteeorcandidate
made,anytransferoffunds,togetherwiththeamountsanddatesofalltransfers
(5)eachloantoorfromanypersonwithinthecalendaryearinanaggregateamountor
valueinexcessof$100,togetherwiththefullnamesandmailingaddresses(occupations
andtheprincipalplacesofbusiness,ifany)ofthelender,endorsers,andguarantors,if
any,andthedateandamountofsuchloans
(6)thetotalamountofproceedsfrom

Page424U.S.1,158
(A)thesaleofticketstoeachdinner,luncheon,rally,andotherfundraisingevent
(B)masscollectionsmadeatsucheventsand
(C)salesofitemssuchaspoliticalcampaignpins,buttons,badges,flags,emblems,hats,
banners,literature,andsimilarmaterials
(7)eachcontribution,rebate,refund,orotherreceiptinexcessof$100nototherwise
listedunderparagraphs(2)through(6)
(8)thetotalsumofallreceiptsbyorforsuchcommitteeorcandidateduringthereporting
period,togetherwithtotalexpenditureslesstransfersbetweenpoliticalcommitteeswhich
supportthesamecandidateandwhichdonotsupportmorethanonecandidate
(9)theidentification ofeachpersontowhomexpenditureshavebeenmadebysuch
committeeoronbehalfofsuchcommitteeorcandidatewithinthecalendaryearinan
aggregateamountorvalueinexcessof$100,theamount,date,andpurposeofeachsuch
expenditureandthenameandaddressof,andofficesoughtby,eachcandidateonwhose
behalfsuchexpenditurewasmade
(10)theidentificationofeachpersontowhomanexpenditureforpersonalservices,
salaries,andreimbursedexpensesinexcessof$100hasbeenmade,andwhichisnot
otherwisereported,includingtheamount,date,andpurposeofsuchexpenditure
(11)thetotalsumofexpendituresmadebysuchcommitteeorcandidateduringthe
calendaryear,togetherwithtotalreceiptslesstransfersbetweenpoliticalcommittees
whichsupportthesamecandidateandwhichdonotsupportmorethanonecandidate

Page424U.S.1,159
(12)theamountandnatureofdebtsandobligationsowedbyortothecommittee,insuch
formasthesupervisoryofficermayprescribeandacontinuousreportingoftheirdebts
andobligationsaftertheelectionatsuchperiodsastheCommissionmayrequireuntil
suchdebtsandobligationsareextinguished,togetherwithastatementastothe
circumstancesandconditionsunderwhichanysuchdebtorobligationisextinguished
andtheconsiderationthereforand
(13)suchotherinformationasshallberequiredbytheCommission.

Buckleyv.Valeo
(c)Cumulativereportsforcalendaryearamountsforunchangeditemscarriedforward
statementofinactivestatus.Thereportsrequiredtobefiledbysubsection(a)ofthis
sectionshallbecumulativeduringthecalendaryeartowhichtheyrelate,butwherethere
hasbeennochangeinanitemreportedinapreviousreportduringsuchyear,onlythe
amountneedbecarriedforward.Ifnocontributionsorexpenditureshavebeenaccepted
orexpendedduringacalendaryear,thetreasurerofthepoliticalcommitteeorcandidate
shallfileastatementtothateffect.
(d)MembersofCongressreportingexemption.ThissectiondoesnotrequireaMember
oftheCongresstoreport,ascontributionsreceivedorasexpendituresmade,thevalueof
photographic,matting,orrecordingservicesfurnishedtohimbytheSenateRecording
Studio,theHouseRecordingStudio,orbyanindividualwhosepayisdisbursedbythe
SecretaryoftheSenateortheClerkoftheHouseofRepresentativesandwhofurnishes
suchservicesashisprimarydutyasanemployeeoftheSenateorHouseof
Representatives,orifsuchserviceswerepaidforbytheRepublicanorDemocratic
SenatorialCampaignCommittee,theDemocraticNationalCongressional

Page424U.S.1,160
Committee,ortheNationalRepublicanCongressionalCommittee.Thissubsectiondoes
notapplytosuchrecordingservicesfurnishedduringthecalendaryearbeforetheyearin
whichtheMember'stermexpires.
(e)Reportsbyotherthanpoliticalcommittees.Everyperson(otherthanapolitical
committeeorcandidate)whomakescontributionsorexpenditures,otherthanby
contributiontoapoliticalcommitteeorcandidate,inanaggregateamountinexcessof
$100withinacalendaryearshallfilewiththeCommissionastatementcontainingthe
informationrequiredbythissection.Statementsrequiredbythissubsectionshallbefiled
onthedatesonwhichreportsbypoliticalcommitteesarefiledbutneednotbe
cumulative.

437a.Reportsbycertainpersonsexemptions.
Anyperson(otherthananindividual)whoexpendsanyfundsorcommitsanyact
directedtothepublicforthepurposeof influencingtheoutcomeofanelection,orwho
publishesorbroadcaststothepublicanymaterialreferringtoacandidate(byname,
description,orotherreference)advocatingtheelectionordefeatofsuchcandidate,
settingforththecandidate'spositiononanypublicissue,hisvotingrecord,orother
officialacts(inthecaseofacandidatewhoholdsorhasheldFederaloffice),or
otherwisedesignedtoinfluenceindividualstocasttheirvotesfororagainstsuch
candidateortowithholdtheirvotesfromsuchcandidateshallfilereportswiththe
Commissionasifsuchpersonwereapoliticalcommittee.Thereportsfiledbysuch
personshallsetforththesourceofthefundsusedincarryingoutanyactivitydescribedin
theprecedingsentenceinthesamedetailasifthefundswerecontributionswithinthe

Buckleyv.Valeo
meaningofsection431(e)ofthistitle,andpaymentsofsuchfundsinthesamedetailas
iftheywereexpenditureswithinthemeaningofsection431(f)ofthistitle.The
provisions

Page424U.S.1,161
ofthissectiondonotapplytoanypublicationorbroadcastoftheUnitedStates
Governmentortoanynewsstory,commentary,oreditorialdistributedthroughthe
facilitiesofabroadcastingstationorabonafidenewspaper,magazine,orother
periodicalpublication.Anewsstory,commentary,oreditorialisnotconsideredtobe
distributedthroughabonafidenewspaper,magazine,orotherperiodicalpublicationif
(1)suchpublicationisprimarilyfordistributiontoindividualsaffiliatedbymembership
orstockownershipwiththeperson(otherthananindividual)distributingitorcausingit
tobedistributed,andnotprimarilyforpurchasebythepublicatnewsstandsorpaidby
subscriptionor
(2)thenewsstory,commentary,oreditorialisdistributedbyaperson(otherthanan
individual)whodevotesasubstantialpartofhisactivitiestoattemptingtoinfluencethe
outcomeofelections,ortoinfluencepublicopinionwithrespecttomattersofnationalor
Statepolicyorconcern.

437c.FederalElectionCommission.
(a)Establishmentmembershiptermofofficevacanciesqualificationscompensation
chairmanandvicechairman.
(1)ThereisestablishedacommissiontobeknownastheFederalElectionCommission.
TheCommissioniscomposedoftheSecretaryoftheSenateandtheClerkoftheHouse
ofRepresentatives,exofficioandwithouttherighttovote,andsixmembersappointedas
follows:
(A)twoshallbeappointed,withtheconfirmationofamajorityofbothHousesofthe
Congress,bythePresidentprotemporeoftheSenateupontherecommendationsofthe
majorityleaderoftheSenateandtheminorityleaderoftheSenate

Page424U.S.1,162
(B)twoshallbeappointed,withtheconfirmationofamajorityofbothHousesofthe
Congress,bytheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives,upontherecommendationsof
themajorityleaderoftheHouseandtheminorityleaderoftheHouseand
(C)twoshallbeappointed,withtheconfirmationofamajorityofbothHousesof the
Congress,bythePresidentoftheUnitedStates.
Amemberappointedundersubparagraph(A),(B),or(C)shallnotbeaffiliatedwiththe
samepoliticalpartyastheothermemberappointedundersuchparagraph.
(2)MembersoftheCommissionshallservefortermsof6years,exceptthatofthe
membersfirstappointed

Buckleyv.Valeo
(A)oneofthemembersappointedunderparagraph(1)(A)shallbeappointedforaterm
endingontheApril30firstoccurringmorethan6monthsafterthedateonwhichheis
appointed
(B)oneofthemembersappointedunderparagraph(1)(B)shallbeappointedforaterm
ending1yearaftertheApril30onwhichthetermofthememberreferredtoin
subparagraph(A)ofthisparagraphends
(C)oneofthemembersappointedunderparagraph(1)(C)shallbeappointedforaterm
ending2yearsthereafter
(D)oneofthemembersappointedunderparagraph(1)(A)shallbeappointedforaterm
ending3yearsthereafter
(E)oneofthemembersappointedunderparagraph(1)(B)shallbeappointedforaterm
ending4yearsthereafterand
(F)oneofthemembersappointedunderparagraph

Page424U.S.1,163
(1)(C)shallbeappointedforatermending5yearsthereafter.
Anindividualappointedtofillavacancyoccurringotherthanbytheexpirationofaterm
ofofficeshallbeappointedonlyfortheunexpiredtermofthememberhesucceeds.Any
vacancyoccurringinthemembershipoftheCommissionshallbefilledinthesame
mannerasinthecaseoftheoriginalappointment.
(3)Membersshallbechosenonthebasisoftheirmaturity,experience,integrity,
impartiality,andgoodjudgmentandshallbechosenfromamongindividualswho,atthe
timeoftheirappointment,arenotelectedorappointedofficersoremployeesinthe
executive,legislative,orjudicialbranchoftheGovernmentoftheUnitedStates.
(4)MembersoftheCommission(otherthantheSecretaryoftheSenateandtheClerkof
theHouseofRepresentatives)shallreceivecompensationequivalenttothecompensation
paidatlevelIVoftheExecutiveSchedule(5U.S.C.5315).
(5)TheCommissionshallelectachairmanandavicechairmanfromamongitsmembers
(otherthantheSecretaryoftheSenateandtheClerkoftheHouseofRepresentatives)for
atermofoneyear.Nomembermayserveaschairmanmoreoftenthanonceduringany
termofofficetowhichheisappointed.Thechairmanandthevicechairmanshallnotbe
affiliatedwiththesamepoliticalparty.Thevicechairmanshallactaschairmaninthe
absenceordisability ofthechairman,orintheeventofavacancyinsuchoffice.
(b)Administration,enforcement,andformulationofpolicyprimaryjurisdictionofcivil
enforcement.
TheCommissionshalladminister,seektoobtaincompliancewith,andformulatepolicy
withrespecttothisActandsections608,610,611,613,614,615,616,

Page424U.S.1,164
and617ofTitle18.TheCommissionhasprimaryjurisdictionwithrespecttothecivil
enforcementofsuchprovisions.

Buckleyv.Valeo
(c)Votingrequirementnondelegationoffunction.
AlldecisionsoftheCommissionwithrespecttotheexerciseofitsdutiesandpowers
undertheprovisionsofthissubchaptershallbemadebyamajorityvoteofthemembers
oftheCommission.AmemberoftheCommissionmaynotdelegatetoany personhis
voteoranydecisionmakingauthorityordutyvestedintheCommissionbytheprovisions
ofthissubchapter.
(d)Meetings.
TheCommissionshallmeetatleastonceeachmonthandalsoatthecallofanymember.
(e)Rulesforconductofactivitiesseal,judicialnoticeprincipaloffice.
TheCommissionshallpreparewrittenrulesfortheconductofitsactivities,shallhavean
officialsealwhichshallbejudiciallynoticed,andshallhaveitsprincipalofficeinornear
theDistrictofColumbia(butitmaymeetorexerciseanyofitspowersanywhereinthe
UnitedStates).
(f)Staffdirectorandgeneralcounsel:appointmentandcompensationappointmentand
compensationofpersonnelandprocurementofintermittentservicesbystaffdirectoruse
ofassistance,personnel,andfacilitiesofFederalagenciesanddepartments.
(1)TheCommissionshallhaveastaffdirectorandageneralcounselwhoshallbe
appointedbytheCommission.Thestaffdirectorshallbepaidataratenottoexceedthe
rateofbasicpayineffectforlevelIVoftheExecutiveSchedule(5U.S.C.5315).The
generalcounselshallbepaidataratenottoexceedtherateofbasicpayineffectfor
levelVoftheExecutiveSchedule(5U.S.C.5316).Withtheapprovalofthe

Page424U.S.1,165
Commission,thestaffdirectormayappointandfixthepayofsuchadditionalpersonnel
asheconsidersdesirable.
(2)WiththeapprovaloftheCommission,thestaffdirectormayprocuretemporaryand
intermittentservicestothesameextentasisauthorizedbysection3109(b)ofTitle5,but
atratesforindividualsnottoexceedthedailyequivalentoftheannualrateofbasicpay
ineffectforgradeGS15ofthegeneralschedule(5U.S.C.5332).
(3)IncarryingoutitsresponsibilitiesunderthisAct,theCommissionshall,tothefullest
extentpracticable,availitselfoftheassistance,includingpersonnelandfacilities,of
otheragenciesanddepartmentsoftheUnitedStatesGovernment.Theheadsofsuch
agenciesanddepartmentsmaymakeavailabletotheCommissionsuchpersonnel,
facilities,andotherassistance,withorwithoutreimbursement,astheCommissionmay
request.

Buckleyv.Valeo
437d.PowersofCommission.
(a)Specificenumeration.
TheCommissionhasthepower
(1)torequire,byspecialorgeneralorders,anypersontosubmitinwritingsuchreports
andanswerstoquestionsastheCommissionmayprescribeandsuchsubmissionshallbe
madewithinsuchareasonableperiodoftimeandunderoathorotherwiseasthe
Commissionmaydetermine
(2)toadministeroathsoraffirmations
(3)torequirebysubpena,signedbythechairmanorthevicechairman,theattendance
andtestimonyofwitnessesandtheproductionofalldocumentaryevidencerelatingtothe
executionofitsduties
(4)inanyproceedingorinvestigation,toordertestimonytobetakenbydeposition
beforeanypersonwhoisdesignatedbytheCommissionandhas

Page424U.S.1,166
thepowertoadministeroathsand,insuchinstances,tocompeltestimony andthe
productionofevidenceinthesamemannerasauthorizedunderparagraph(3)ofthis
subsection
(5)topaywitnessesthesamefeesandmileageasarepaidinlikecircumstancesinthe
courtsoftheUnitedStates
(6)toinitiate(throughcivilproceedingsforinjunctive,declaratory,orotherappropriate
relief),defend,orappealanycivilactioninthenameoftheCommissionforthepurpose
ofenforcingtheprovisionsofthisAct,throughitsgeneralcounsel
(7)torenderadvisoryopinionsundersection437ofthistitle
(8)tomake,amend,andrepealsuchrules,pursuanttotheprovisionsofchapter5ofTitle
5,asarenecessarytocarryouttheprovisionsofthisAct
(9)toformulategeneralpolicywithrespecttotheadministrationof thisActandsections
608,610,611,613,614,615,616,and617ofTitle18
(10)todevelopprescribedformsundersubsection(a)(1)ofthissectionand
(11)toconductinvestigationsandhearingsexpeditiously,toencouragevoluntary
compliance,andtoreportapparentviolationstotheappropriatelawenforcement
authorities.
(b)JudicialordersforcompliancewithsubpenasandordersofCommissioncontemptof
court.
AnyUnitedStatesdistrictcourtwithinthejurisdictionofwhichanyinquiryiscarriedon,
may,uponpetitionbytheCommission,incaseofrefusaltoobeyasubpenaororderof
theCommissionissuedundersubsection(a)ofthissection,issueanorderrequiring
compliancetherewith.Anyfailuretoobeytheorderofthe

Buckleyv.Valeo
Page424U.S.1,167
courtmaybepunishedbythecourtasacontemptthereof.
(c)Civilliabilityfordisclosureofinformation.
Nopersonshallbesubjecttocivilliabilitytoanyperson(otherthantheCommissionor
theUnitedStates)fordisclosinginformationattherequestoftheCommission.
(d)TransmittaltoCongress:Budgetestimatesorrequestsandlegislative
recommendationspriortransmittaltoCongress:legislativerecommendations.
(1)WhenevertheCommissionsubmitsanybudgetestimateorrequesttothePresidentof
theUnitedStatesortheOfficeofManagementandBudget,itshallconcurrentlytransmit
acopyofsuchestimateorrequesttotheCongress.
(2)WhenevertheCommissionsubmitsanylegislativerecommendations,ortestimony,or
commentsonlegislation,requestedbytheCongressorbyanyMemberoftheCongress,
tothePresidentoftheUnitedStatesortheOfficeofManagementandBudget,itshall
concurrentlytransmitacopythereoftotheCongressortotheMemberrequestingthe
same.NoofficeroragencyoftheUnitedStatesshallhaveanyauthoritytorequirethe
Commissiontosubmititslegislativerecommendations,testimony,orcommentson
legislation,toanyofficeoragencyoftheUnitedStatesforapproval,comments,or
review,priortothesubmissionofsuchrecommendations,testimony,orcommentstothe
Congress.

437e.ReportstoPresidentandCongress.
TheCommissionshalltransmitreportstothePresidentoftheUnitedStatesandtoeach
HouseoftheCongressnolaterthanMarch31ofeachyear.Eachsuchreportshall
containadetailedstatementwithrespecttotheactivitiesoftheCommissionincarrying
outitsdutiesunderthissubchapter,togetherwithrecommendations

Page424U.S.1,168
forsuchlegislativeorotheractionastheCommissionconsidersappropriate.
437f.Advisoryopinions.
(a)Writtenrequestswrittenopinionswithinreasonabletimespecifictransactionsor
activitiesconstitutingviolationsofprovisions.
UponwrittenrequesttotheCommissionbyanyindividualholdingFederaloffice,any
candidateforFederaloffice,oranypoliticalcommittee,theCommissionshallrenderan
advisoryopinion,inwriting,withinareasonabletimewithrespecttowhetherany
specifictransactionoractivity bysuchindividual,candidate,orpoliticalcommittee
wouldconstituteaviolationofthisAct,ofchapter95orchapter96ofTitle26orof
section608,610,611,613,614,615,616,or617ofTitle18.

Buckleyv.Valeo
(b)Presumptionofcompliancewithprovisionsbasedongoodfaithactions.
Notwithstandinganyotherprovisionoflaw,anypersonwithrespecttowhoman
advisoryopinionisrenderedundersubsection(a)ofthissectionwhoactsingoodfaithin
accordancewiththeprovisionsandfindingsofsuchadvisoryopinionshallbepresumed
tobeincompliancewiththeprovisionofthisAct,ofchapter95orchapter96ofTitle26,
orofsection608,610,611,613,614,615,616,or617ofTitle18,withrespecttowhich
suchadvisoryopinionisrendered.
(c)RequestsmadepublictransmittaltoCommissionofcommentsofinterestedparties
withrespecttosuchrequests.
Anyrequestmadeundersubsection(a)shallbemadepublicbytheCommission.The
Commissionshallbeforerenderinganadvisoryopinionwithrespecttosuchrequest,
provideanyinterestedpartywithanopportunitytotransmitwrittencommentstothe
Commissionwithrespecttosuchrequest.

Page424U.S.1,169
437g.Enforcement.
(a)ViolationscomplaintsandreferralsnotificationandinvestigationbyCommission:
venue,judicialordersreferraltolawenforcementauthorities:civilactionsbyAttorney
General:venue,judicialorders,bondsubpenasreviewbycourtsofappeals:timefor
petition,finalityofjudgmentreviewbySupremeCourtdocket:advancementand
priorities.
(1)(A)AnypersonwhobelievesaviolationofthisActorofsection608,610,611,613,
614,615,616,or617ofTitle18hasoccurredmayfileacomplaintwiththeCommission.
(B)InanycaseinwhichtheClerkoftheHouseofRepresentativesortheSecretaryofthe
Senate(whoreceivereportsandstatementsascustodianfortheCommission)hasreason
tobelieveaviolationofthisactorsection608,610,611,613,614,615,616,or617of
Title18hasoccurredheshallrefersuchapparentviolationtotheCommission.
(2)TheCommissionuponreceivinganycomplaintunderparagraph(1)(A),orareferral
underparagraph(1)(B),orifithasreasontobelievethatanypersonhascommitteda
violationofany suchprovision,shallnotifythepersoninvolvedofsuchapparent
violationandshall
(A)reportsuchapparentviolationtotheAttorneyGeneralor
(B)makeaninvestigationofsuchapparentviolation.
(3)Anyinvestigationunderparagraph(2)(B)shallbeconductedexpeditiouslyandshall
includeaninvestigationofreportsandstatementsfiledbyanycomplainantunderthis
subchapter,ifsuchcomplainantisacandidate.Anynotificationorinvestigationmade
underparagraph(2)shallnotbemadepublicbytheCommissionorby

Buckleyv.Valeo
Page424U.S.1,170
anyotherpersonwithoutthewrittenconsentofthepersonreceivingsuchnotificationor
thepersonwithrespecttowhomsuchinvestigationismade.
(4)TheCommissionshall,attherequestofanypersonwhoreceivesnoticeofan
apparentviolationunderparagraph(2),conductahearingwithrespecttosuchapparent
violation.
(5)IftheCommissiondetermines,afterinvestigation,thatthereisreasontobelievethat
anypersonhasengaged,orisabouttoengageinanyactsorpracticeswhichconstituteor
willconstituteaviolationofthisAct,itmayendeavortocorrectsuchviolationby
informalmethodsofconference,conciliation,andpersuasion.IftheCommissionfailsto
correcttheviolationthroughinformalmethods,itmayinstituteacivilactionforrelief,
includingapermanentortemporaryinjunction,restrainingorder,oranyotherappropriate
orderinthedistrictcourtoftheUnitedStatesforthedistrictinwhichthepersonagainst
whom suchactionisbroughtisfound,resides,ortransactsbusiness.Uponaproper
showingthatsuchpersonhasengagedorisabouttoengageinsuchactsorpractices,the
courtshallgrantapermanentortemporaryinjunction,restrainingorder,orotherorder.
(6)TheCommissionshallreferapparentviolationstotheappropriatelawenforcement
authoritiestotheextentthatviolationsofprovisionsofchapter29ofTitle18are
involved,oriftheCommissionisunabletocorrectapparentviolationsofthisActunder
theauthoritygivenitbyparagraph(5),oriftheCommissiondeterminesthatanysuch
referralisappropriate.
(7)WheneverinthejudgmentoftheCommission,afteraffordingduenoticeandan
opportunityforahearing,anypersonhasengagedorisabouttoengageinanyactsor
practiceswhichconstituteorwillconstituteaviolationofanyprovisionofthisActorof
section608,610,611,613,614,615,616,or617ofTitle18,

Page424U.S.1,171
uponrequestbytheCommissiontheAttorneyGeneralonbehalfoftheUnitedStates
shallinstituteacivilactionforrelief,includingapermanentortemporaryinjunction,
restrainingorder,oranyotherappropriateorderinthedistrictcourtoftheUnitedStates
forthedistrictinwhichthepersonisfound,resides,ortransactsbusiness.Uponaproper
showingthatsuchpersonhasengagedorisabouttoengageinsuchactsorpractices,a
permanentortemporaryinjunction,restrainingorder,orotherordershallbegranted
withoutbondbysuchcourt.
(8)Inanyactionbroughtunderparagraph(5)or(7)ofthissubsection,subpenasfor
witnesseswhoarerequiredtoattendaUnitedStatesdistrictcourtmayrunintoanyother
district.
(9)Anypartyaggrievedbyanordergrantedunderparagraph(5)or(7)ofthissubsection
may,atanytimewithin60daysafterthedateofentrythereof,fileapetitionwiththe
UnitedStatescourtofappealsforthecircuitinwhichsuchorderwasissuedforjudicial
reviewofsuchorder.
(10)Thejudgmentofthecourtofappealsaffirmingorsettingaside,inwholeorinpart,
anysuchorderofthedistrictCourtshallbefinal,subjecttoreviewbytheSupremeCourt

Buckleyv.Valeo
oftheUnitedStatesuponcertiorariorcertificationasprovidedinsection1254ofTitle
28.
(11)Anyactionbroughtunderthissubsectionshallbeadvancedonthedocketofthe
courtinwhichfiled,andputaheadofallotheractions(otherthanotheractionsbrought
underthissubsectionorundersection437hofthistitle).
(b)ReportsofAttorneyGeneraltoCommissionrespectingactiontakenreportsof
Commissionrespectingstatusofreferrals.
InanycaseinwhichtheCommissionrefersanapparentviolationtotheAttorney
General,theAttorney

Page424U.S.1,172
Generalshall respondbyreporttotheCommissionwithrespecttoanyactiontakenby
theAttorneyGeneralregardingsuchapparentviolation.Eachreportshallbetransmitted
nolaterthan60daysafterthedatetheCommissionrefersanyapparentviolation,andat
thecloseofevery30dayperiodthereafteruntilthereisfinaldispositionofsuchapparent
violation.TheCommissionmayfromtimetotimeprepareandpublishreportsonthe
statusofsuchreferrals.

437h.Judicialreview.
(a)Actions,includingdeclaratoryjudgments,forconstructionofconstitutionalquestions
eligibleplaintiffscertificationofsuchquestionstocourtsofappealssittingenbanc.
TheCommission,thenationalcommitteeofanypoliticalparty,oranyindividualeligible
tovoteinanyelectionfortheofficeofPresidentoftheUnitedStatesmayinstitutesuch
actionsintheappropriatedistrictcourtoftheUnitedStates,includingactionsfor
declaratoryjudgment,asmaybeappropriatetoconstruetheconstitutionalityofany
provisionofthisActorofsection608,610,611,613,614,615,616,or617ofTitle18.
ThedistrictcourtimmediatelyshallcertifyallquestionsofconstitutionalityofthisActor
ofsection608,610,611,613,614,615,616,or617ofTitle18,totheUnitedStatescourt
ofappealsforthecircuitinvolved,whichshallhearthemattersittingenbanc.
(b)AppealtoSupremeCourttimeforappeal.
Notwithstandinganyotherprovisionoflaw,anydecisiononamattercertifiedunder
subsection(a)ofthissectionshallbereviewablebyappealdirectlytotheSupremeCourt
oftheUnitedStates.Suchappealshallbebroughtnolaterthan20daysafterthedecision
ofthecourtofappeals.
(c)Advancementonappellatedocketandexpediteddepositionofcertifiedquestions.

Buckleyv.Valeo
Page424U.S.1,173
ItshallbethedutyofthecourtofappealsandoftheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates
toadvanceonthedocketandtoexpeditetothegreatestpossibleextentthedispositionof
anymattercertifiedundersubsection(a)ofthissection.

438.Administrativeandjudicialprovisions.
(a)FederalElectionCommissionduties.
ItshallbethedutyoftheCommission
(1)Forms.TodevelopandfurnishtothepersonrequiredbytheprovisionsofthisAct
prescribedformsforthemakingofthereportsandstatementsrequiredtobefiledwithit
underthissubchapter
(2)Manualforuniformbookkeepingandreportingmethods.Toprepare,publish,and
furnishtothepersonrequiredtofilesuchreportsandstatementsamanualsettingforth
recommendeduniformmethodsofbookkeepingandreporting
(3)Filing,coding,andcrossindexingsystem.Todevelopafiling,coding,andcross
indexingsystemconsonantwiththepurposesofthissubchapter
(4)Publicinspection copiessaleoruserestrictions.Tomakethereportsandstatements
filedwithitavailableforpublicinspectionandcopying,commencingassoonas
practicablebutnotlaterthantheendoftheseconddayfollowingthedayduringwhichit
wasreceived,andtopermitcopyingofanysuchreportorstatementbyhandorby
duplicatingmachine,asrequestedbyanyperson,attheexpenseofsuchperson:
Provided,Thatanyinformationcopiedfromsuchreportsandstatementsshallnotbesold
orutilizedbyany personforthepurposeofsolicitingcontributionsorforanycommercial
purpose
(5)Preservationofreportsandstatements.Topreservesuchreportsandstatementsfora
periodof

Page424U.S.1,174
10yearsfromdateofreceipt,exceptthatreportsandstatementsrelatingsolelyto
candidatesfortheHouseofRepresentativesshallbepreservedforonly5yearsfromthe
dateofreceipt
(6)IndexofreportsandstatementspublicationinFederalRegister.Tocompileand
maintainacumulativeindexofreportsandstatementsfiledwithit,whichshallbe
publishedintheFederalRegisteratregularintervalsandwhichshallbeavailablefor
purchasedirectlyorbymailforareasonableprice
(7)Specialreportspublication.Toprepareandpublishfromtimetotimespecialreports
listingthosecandidatesforwhomreportswerefiledasrequiredbythissubchapterand
thosecandidatesforwhomsuchreportswerenotfiledassorequired
(8)Auditsinvestigations.Tomakefromtimetotimeauditsandfieldinvestigationswith
respecttoreportsandstatementsfiledundertheprovisionsofthissubchapter,andwith
respecttoallegedfailurestofileanyreportorstatementrequiredundertheprovisionsof
thissubchapter

Buckleyv.Valeo
(9)Enforcementauthoritiesreportsofviolations.Toreportapparentviolationsoflawto
theappropriatelawenforcementauthoritiesand
(10)Rulesandregulations.Toprescribesuitablerulesandregulationstocarryoutthe
provisionsofthissubchapter,inaccordancewiththeprovisionsofsubsection(c)ofthis
section.
(b)Commissionduties:nationalclearinghouseforinformationstudies,scope,
publication,copiestogeneralpublicatcost.ItshallbethedutyoftheCommissionto
serveasanationalclearinghouseforinformationinrespecttotheadministrationof
elections.Incarryingoutitsdutiesunderthissubsection,theCommissionshallenterinto
contractsforthepurposeofconductingindependent

Page424U.S.1,175
studiesoftheadministrationofelections.Suchstudiesshallinclude,butshallnotbe
limitedto,studiesof
(1)themethodofselectionof,andthetypeofdutiesassignedto,officialsandpersonnel
workingonboardsofelections
(2)practicesrelatingtotheregistrationofvotersand
(3)votingandcountingmethods.
StudiesmadeunderthissubsectionshallbepublishedbytheCommissionandcopies
thereofshallbemadeavailabletothegeneralpublicuponthepaymentofthecost
thereof.
(c)Proposedrulesorregulationsstatement,transmittaltoCongressPresidential
electionsandCongressionalelections"legislativedays"defined.
(1)TheCommission,beforeprescribinganyruleorregulationunderthissection,shall
transmitastatementwithrespecttosuchruleorregulationtotheSenateortheHouseof
Representatives,asthecasemaybe,inaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthissubsection.
Suchstatementshallsetforththeproposedruleorregulationandshallcontainadetailed
explanationandjustificationofsuchruleorregulation.
(2)IftheappropriatebodyoftheCongresswhichreceivesastatementfromthe
Commissionunderthissubsectiondoesnot,throughappropriateaction,disapprovethe
proposedruleorregulationsetforthinsuchstatementnolaterthan30legislativedays
afterreceiptofsuchstatement,thentheCommissionmayprescribesuchruleor
regulation.Inthecaseofanyruleorregulationproposedtodealwithreportsor
statementsrequiredtobefiledunderthissubchapterbyacandidatefortheofficeof
President

Page424U.S.1,176
oftheUnitedStates,andbypoliticalcommitteessupportingsuchacandidateboththe
SenateandtheHouseofRepresentativesshallhavethepowertodisapprovesuch

Buckleyv.Valeo
proposedruleorregulation.TheCommissionmaynotprescribeanyruleorregulation
whichisdisapprovedunderthisparagraph.
(3)IftheCommissionproposestoprescribeanyruleorregulationdealingwithreportsor
statementsrequiredtobefiledunderthissubchapterbyacandidatefortheofficeof
Senator,andbypoliticalcommitteessupportingsuchcandidate,itshalltransmitsuch
statementtotheSenate.IftheCommissionproposestoprescribeanyruleorregulation
dealingwithreportsorstatementsrequiredtobefiledunderthissubchapterbya
candidatefortheofficeofRepresentative,Delegate,orResidentCommissioner,andby
politicalcommitteessupportingsuchcandidate,itshalltransmitsuchstatementtothe
HouseofRepresentatives.IftheCommissionproposestoprescribeanyruleorregulation
dealingwithreportsorstatementsrequiredtobefiledunderthissubchapterbya
candidatefortheofficeofPresidentoftheUnitedStates,andbypoliticalcommittees
supportingsuchcandidateitshalltransmitsuchstatementtotheHouseof
RepresentativesandtheSenate.
(4)Forpurposesofthissubsection,theterm"legislativedays"doesnotinclude,with
respecttostatementstransmittedtotheSenate,anycalendardayonwhichtheSenateis
notinsession,andwithrespecttostatementstransmittedtotheHouseofRepresentatives,
anycalendardayonwhichtheHouseofRepresentativesisnotinsession,andwith
respecttostatementstransmittedtobothsuchbodies,anycalendardayonwhichboth
HousesoftheCongressarenotinsession.

Page424U.S.1,177
(d)RulesandregulationsissuancecustodyofreportsandstatementsCongressional
cooperation.
(1)TheCommissionshallprescribesuitablerulesandregulationstocarryoutthe
provisionsofthissubchapter,includingsuchrulesandregulationsasmaybenecessaryto
requirethat
(A)reportsandstatementsrequiredtobefiledunderthissubchapterbyacandidatefor
theofficeofRepresentativein,orDelegateorResidentCommissionerto,theCongressof
theUnitedStates,andbypoliticalcommitteessupportingsuchcandidate,shallbe
receivedbytheClerkoftheHouseofRepresentativesascustodianfortheCommission
(B)reportsandstatementsrequiredtobefiledunderthissubchapterbyacandidatefor
theofficeofSenator,andbypoliticalcommitteessupportingsuchcandidate,shallbe
receivedbytheSecretaryoftheSenateascustodianfortheCommissionand
(C)theClerkoftheHouseofRepresentativesandtheSecretaryoftheSenate,as
custodiansfortheCommission,eachshallmakethereportsandstatementsreceivedby
himavailableforpublicinspectionandcopyinginaccordancewithparagraph(4)of
subsection(a)ofthissection,andpreservesuchreportsandstatementsinaccordance
withparagraph(5)ofsubsection(a)ofthissection.
(2)ItshallbethedutyoftheClerkoftheHouseofRepresentativesandtheSecretaryof
theSenatetocooperatewiththeCommissionincarryingoutitsdutiesunderthisActand
tofurnishsuchservicesandfacilitiesasmayberequiredinaccordancewiththissection.

Buckleyv.Valeo
Page424U.S.1,178
439.StatementsfiledwithStateofficers.
(a)"AppropriateState"defined.Acopyofeachstatementrequiredtobefiledwiththe
CommissionbythissubchaptershallbefiledwiththeSecretaryofState(or,ifthereisno
officeofSecretaryofState,theequivalentStateofficer)oftheappropriateState.For
purposesofthissubsection,theterm"appropriateState"means
(1)forreportsrelatingtoexpendituresandcontributionsinconnectionwiththecampaign
fornominationforelection,orelection,ofacandidatetotheofficeofPresidentorVice
PresidentoftheUnitedStates,eachStateinwhichanexpenditureismadebyhimoron
hisbehalf,and
(2)forreportsrelatingtoexpendituresandcontributionsinconnectionwiththecampaign
fornominationforelection,orelection,ofacandidatetotheofficeofSenatoror
Representativein,orDelegateorResidentCommissionerto,theCongressoftheUnited
States,theStateinwhichheseekselection.
(b)DutiesofStateofficers.ItshallbethedutyoftheSecretaryofState,ortheequivalent
Stateofficer,undersubsection(a)ofthissection
(1)toreceiveandmaintaininanorderlymannerall reportsandstatementsrequiredby
thissubchaptertobefiledwithhim
(2)topreservesuchreportsandstatementsforaperiodof10yearsfromdateofreceipt,
exceptthatreportsandstatementsrelatingsolelytocandidatesfortheHouseof
Representativesshallbepreservedforonly5yearsfromthedateofreceipt
(3)tomakethereportsandstatementsfiledwithhimavailableforpublicinspectionand
copyingduringregularofficehours,commencingassoon

Page424U.S.1,179
aspracticablebutnotlaterthantheendofthedayduringwhichitwasreceived,andto
permitcopyingofanysuchreportorstatementbyhandorbyduplicatingmachine,
requestedbyanyperson,attheexpenseofsuchpersonand
(4)tocompileandmaintainacurrentlistofallstatementsorpartsofstatements
pertainingtoeachcandidate.

439a.UseofcontributedamountsforcertainpurposesrulesofCommission.
Amountsreceivedbyacandidateascontributionsthatareinexcessofanyamount
necessarytodefrayhisexpenditures,andanyotheramountscontributedtoanindividual
forthepurposeofsupportinghisactivitiesasaholderofFederaloffice,maybeusedby
suchcandidateorindividual,asthecasemaybe,todefrayanyordinaryandnecessary
expensesincurredbyhiminconnectionwithhisdutiesasaholderofFederaloffice,may
becontributedbyhimtoanyorganizationdescribedinsection170(c)ofTitle26,ormay
beusedforanyotherlawfulpurpose.Totheextentanysuchcontribution,amount

Buckleyv.Valeo
contributed,orexpenditurethereofisnototherwiserequiredtobedisclosedunderthe
provisionsofthissubchapter,suchcontribution,amountcontributed,orexpenditureshall
befullydisclosedinaccordancewithrulespromulgatedbytheCommission.The
Commissionisauthorizedtoprescribesuchrulesasmaybenecessarytocarryoutthe
provisionsofthissection.

441.Penaltiesforviolations.
(a)Anypersonwhoviolatesanyoftheprovisionsofthissubchaptershallbefinednot
morethan$1,000orimprisonednotmorethan1year,orboth.

Page424U.S.1,180
(b)Incaseofanyconvictionunderthissubchapter,wherethepunishmentinflicteddoes
notincludeimprisonment,suchconvictionshallbedeemedamisdemeanorconviction
only.

SUBCHAPTERII.GENERALPROVISIONS

454.Partialinvalidity.
IfanyprovisionofthisAct,ortheapplicationthereoftoanypersonorcircumstance,is
heldinvalid,thevalidityoftheremainderoftheActandtheapplicationofsuchprovision
tootherpersonsandcircumstancesshallnotbeaffectedthereby.

456.Additionalenforcementauthority.
(a)Findings,afternoticeandhearing,orfailuretofiletimelyreportsdisqualificationfor
prescribedperiodfromcandidacyinfutureFederalelections.
InanycaseinwhichtheCommission,afternoticeandopportunityforahearingonthe
recordinaccordancewithsection554ofTitle5,makesafindingthatapersonwho,
whileacandidateforFederaloffice,failedtofileareportrequiredbysubchapterIofthis
chapter,andsuchfindingismadebeforetheexpirationofthetimewithinwhichthe
failuretofilesuchreportmaybeprosecutedasaviolationofsuchsubchapterI,such
personshallbedisqualifiedfrombecomingacandidateinanyfutureelectionforFederal
officeforaperiodoftimebeginningonthedateofsuchfindingandendingoneyearafter
theexpirationofthetermoftheFederalofficeforwhichsuchpersonwasacandidate.
(b)Judicialreviewoffindings.
AnyfindingbytheCommissionundersubsection(a)ofthissectionshallbesubjectto
judicialreviewinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofchapter7ofTitle5.

Buckleyv.Valeo
Page424U.S.1,181
TITLE18.CRIMESANDCRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
CHAPTER29ELECTIONSANDPOLITICALACTIVITIES

591.Definitions.
Exceptasotherwisespecificallyprovided,whenusedinthissectionandinsections597,
599,600,602,608,610,611,614,615,and617ofthistitle
(a)"election"means
(1)ageneral,special,primary,orrunoffelection,
(2)aconventionorcaucusofapoliticalpartyheldtonominateacandidate,
(3)aprimaryelectionheldfortheselectionofdelegatestoanationalnominating
conventionofapoliticalparty,or
(4)aprimaryelectionheldfortheexpressionofapreferenceforthenominationof
personsforelectiontotheofficeofPresident
(b)a"candidate"meansanindividualwhoseeksnominationforelection,orelection,to
Federaloffice,whetherornotsuchindividualiselected,and,forpurposesofthis
paragraph,anindividualshallbedeemedtoseeknominationforelection,orelection,to
Federaloffice,ifhehas
(1)takentheactionnecessaryunderthelawofaStatetoqualifyhimselffornomination
forelection,orelection,or
(2)receivedcontributionsormadeexpenditures,orhasgivenhisconsentforanyother
persontoreceivecontributionsormakeexpenditures,withaviewtobringingabouthis
nominationforelection,orelection,tosuchoffice
(c)"Federaloffice"meanstheofficeof PresidentorVicePresidentoftheUnitedStates,
orSenator

Page424U.S.1,182
orRepresentativein,orDelegateorResidentCommissionerto,theCongressofthe
UnitedStates
(d)"politicalcommittee"meansanycommittee,club,association,or othergroupof
personswhichreceivescontributionsormakesexpendituresduringacalendaryearinan
aggregateamountexceeding$1,000
(e)"contribution"
(1)meansagift,subscription,loan,advance,ordepositofmoneyoranythingofvalue
(exceptaloanofmoneybyanationalorStatebankmadeinaccordancewiththe
applicablebankinglawsandregulationsandintheordinarycourseofbusiness,which

Buckleyv.Valeo
shallbeconsideredaloanbyeachendorserorguarantor,inthatproportionoftheunpaid
balancethereofthateachendorserorguarantorbearstothetotalnumberofendorsersor
guarantors),madeforthepurposeofinfluencingthenominationforelection,orelection,
ofanypersontoFederalofficeorforthepurposeofinfluencingtheresultsofaprimary
heldfortheselectionofdelegatestoanationalnominatingconventionofapoliticalparty
orfortheexpressionofapreferenceforthenominationofpersonsforelectiontothe
officeofPresidentoftheUnitedStates
(2)meansacontract,promise,oragreement,expressorimplied,whetherornotlegally
enforceable,tomakeacontributionforsuchpurposes
(3)meansfundsreceivedbyapoliticalcommitteewhicharetransferredtosuch
committeefromanotherpoliticalcommitteeorothersource

Page424U.S.1,183
(4)meansthepayment,byanypersonotherthanacandidateorapoliticalcommittee,of
compensationforthepersonalservicesofanotherpersonwhicharerenderedtosuch
candidateorpoliticalcommitteewithoutchargeforanysuchpurposebut
(5)doesnotinclude
(A)thevalueofservicesprovidedwithoutcompensationbyindividualswhovolunteera
portionoralloftheirtimeonbehalfofacandidateorpoliticalcommittee
(B)theuseofrealorpersonalproperty andthecostofinvitations,food,andbeverages,
voluntarilyprovidedbyanindividualtoacandidateinrenderingvoluntarypersonal
servicesontheindividual'sresidentialpremisesforcandidaterelatedactivities
(C)thesaleofanyfoodorbeveragebyavendorforuseinacandidate'scampaignata
chargelessthanthenormalcomparablecharge,ifsuchchargeforuseinacandidate's
campaignisatleastequaltothecostofsuchfoodorbeveragetothevendor
(D)anyunreimbursedpaymentfortravelexpensesmadebyanindividualwhoonhis
ownbehalfvolunteershispersonalservicestoacandidateor
(E)thepaymentbyaStateorlocalcommitteeofapoliticalpartyofthecostsof
preparation,display,ormailingorotherdistributionincurredbysuchcommitteewith
respecttoaprintedslatecardorsample

Page424U.S.1,184
ballot,orotherprintedlisting,ofthreeormorecandidatesforanypublicofficeforwhich
anelectionisheldintheStateinwhichsuchcommitteeisorganized,exceptthatthis
clauseshallnotapplyinthecaseofcostsincurredbysuchcommitteewithrespecttoa
displayofanysuchlistingmadeonbroadcastingstations,orinnewspapers,magazinesor
othersimilartypesofgeneralpublicpoliticaladvertisingtotheextentthatthe
cumulativevalueofactivitiesbyanypersononbehalfofanycandidateundereachof
clauses(B),(C),and(D)doesnotexceed$500withrespecttoanyelection

Buckleyv.Valeo
(f)"expenditure"
(1)meansapurchase,payment,distribution,loan,advance,deposit,orgiftofmoneyor
anythingofvalue(exceptaloanofmoneybyanationalorStatebankmadein
accordancewiththeapplicablebankinglawsandregulationsandintheordinarycourse
ofbusiness),madeforthepurposeofinfluencingthenominationforelection,orelection,
ofanypersontoFederalofficeorforthepurposeofinfluencingtheresultsofaprimary
heldfortheselectionofdelegatestoanationalnominatingconventionofapoliticalparty
orfortheexpressionofapreferenceforthenominationofpersonsforelectiontothe
officeofPresidentoftheUnitedStates
(2)meansacontract,promise,oragreement,expressorimplied,whetherornotlegally
enforceable,tomakeanyexpenditureand
(3)meansthetransferoffundsbyapoliticalcommitteetoanotherpoliticalcommittee
but

Page424U.S.1,185
(4)doesnotinclude
(A)anynewsstory,commentary,oreditorialdistributedthroughthefacilitiesofany
broadcastingstation,newspaper,magazine,or otherperiodicalpublication,unlesssuch
facilitiesareownedorcontrolledbyanypoliticalparty,politicalcommittee,orcandidate
(B)nonpartisanactivitydesignedtoencourageindividualstoregistertovoteortovote
(C)anycommunicationbyanymembershiporganizationorcorporationtoitsmembers
orstockholders,ifsuchmembershiporganizationorcorporationisnotorganized
primarilyforthepurposeofinfluencingthenominationforelection,orelection,ofany
persontoFederaloffice
(D)theuseofrealorpersonalpropertyandthecostofinvitations,food,andbeverages,
voluntarilyprovidedbyanindividualtoacandidateinrenderingvoluntarypersonal
servicesontheindividual'sresidentialpremisesforcandidaterelatedactivities
(E)anyunreimbursedpaymentfortravelexpensesmadebyanindividualwhoonhisown
behalfvolunteershispersonalservicestoacandidate
(F)anycommunicationbyanypersonwhichisnotmadeforthepurposeofinfluencing
thenominationforelection,orelection,ofanypersontoFederaloffice
(G)thepaymentbyaStateorlocalcommitteeofapoliticalpartyofthecostsof

Page424U.S.1,186
preparation,display,ormailingorotherdistributionincurredbysuchcommitteewith
respecttoaprintedslatecardorsampleballot,orotherprintedlisting,ofthreeormore
candidatesforanypublicofficeforwhichanelectionisheldintheStateinwhichsuch
committeeisorganized,exceptthatthisclauseshallnotapplyinthecaseofcosts
incurredbysuchcommitteewithrespecttoadisplayofanysuchlistingmadeon
broadcastingstations,orinnewspapers,magazinesorothersimilartypesofgeneral
publicpoliticaladvertising

Buckleyv.Valeo
(H)anycostsincurredbyacandidateinconnectionwith thesolicitationofcontributions
bysuchcandidate,exceptthatthisclauseshallnotapplywithrespecttocostsincurredby
acandidateinexcessofanamountequalto20percentoftheexpenditurelimitation
applicabletosuchcandidateundersection 608(c)ofthistitleor
(I)anycostsincurredbyapoliticalcommittee(assuchtermisdefinedbysection608(b)
(2)ofthistitle)withrespecttothesolicitationofcontributionstosuchpolitical
committeeortoanygeneralpoliticalfundcontrolledbysuchpoliticalcommittee,except
thatthisclauseshallnotapplytoexemptcostsincurredwithrespecttothesolicitationof
contributionstoanysuchpoliticalcommitteemadethroughbroadcastingstations,
newspapers,magazines,outdooradvertisingfacilities,and

Page424U.S.1,187
othersimilartypesofgeneralpublicpoliticaladvertising
totheextentthatthecumulativevalueofactivitiesbyanyindividualonbehalfofany
candidateundereachofclauses(D)or(E)doesnotexceed$500withrespecttoany
election
(g)"person"and"whoever"meananindividual,partnership,committee,association,
corporation,oranyotherorganizationorgroupofpersons
(h)"State"meanseachStateoftheUnitedStates,theDistrictofColumbia,the
CommonwealthofPuertoRico,andanyterritoryorpossessionoftheUnitedStates
(i)"politicalparty"meansanyassociation,committee,ororganizationwhichnominatesa
candidateforelectiontoanyFederalofficewhosenameappearsontheelectionballotas
thecandidateofsuchassociation,committee,ororganization
(j)"Statecommittee"meanstheorganizationwhich,byvirtueofthebylawsofapolitical
party,isresponsibleforthedaytodayoperationofsuchpoliticalpartyattheStatelevel,
asdeterminedbytheFederalElectionCommission
(k)"nationalcommittee"meanstheorganizationwhich,byvirtueofthebylawsofthe
politicalparty,isresponsibleforthedaytodayoperationofsuchpoliticalpartyatthe
nationallevel,asdeterminedbytheFederalElectionCommissionestablishedunder
section437c(a)ofTitle2and
(l)"principalcampaigncommittee"meanstheprincipalcampaigncommitteedesignated
byacandidateundersection432(f)(1)ofTitle2.

608.Limitationsoncontributionsandexpenditures.
(a)Personalfundsofcandidateandfamily.
(1)Nocandidatemaymakeexpendituresfrom

Buckleyv.Valeo
Page424U.S.1,188
hispersonalfunds,orthepersonalfundsofhisimmediatefamily,inconnectionwithhis
campaignsduringanycalendaryearfornominationforelection,orforelection,to
Federalofficeinexcessof,intheaggregate
(A)$50,000,inthecaseofacandidatefortheofficeofPresidentorVicePresidentofthe
UnitedStates
(B)$35,000,inthecaseofacandidatefortheofficeofSenatororfortheofficeof
RepresentativefromaStatewhichisentitledtoonlyoneRepresentativeor
(C)$25,000,inthecaseofacandidatefortheofficeofRepresentative,orDelegateor
ResidentCommissioner,inanyotherState.
Forpurposesofthisparagraph,anyexpendituremadeinayearotherthanthecalendar
yearinwhichtheelectionisheldwithrespecttowhichsuchexpenditurewasmade,is
consideredtobemadeduringthecalendaryearinwhichsuchelectionisheld.
(2)Forpurposesofthissubsection,"immediatefamily"meansacandidate'sspouse,and
anychild,parent,grandparent,brother,orsisterofthecandidate,andthespousesofsuch
persons.
(3)Nocandidateorhisimmediatefamilymaymakeloansoradvancesfromtheir
personalfundsinconnectionwithhiscampaignfornominationforelection,orfor
election,toFederalofficeunlesssuchloanoradvanceisevidencedbyawritten
instrumentfullydisclosingthetermsandconditionsofsuchloanoradvance.
(4)Forpurposesofthissubsection,anysuchloanoradvanceshallbeincludedin
computingthetotalamountofsuchexpendituresonlytotheextent

Page424U.S.1,189
ofthebalanceofsuchloanoradvanceoutstandingandunpaid.
(b)Contributionsbypersonsandcommittees.
(1)Exceptasotherwiseprovidedbyparagraphs(2)and(3),nopersonshallmake
contributionstoanycandidatewithrespecttoanyelectionforFederalofficewhich,in
theaggregate,exceed$1,000.
(2)Nopoliticalcommittee(otherthanaprincipalcampaigncommittee)shallmake
contributionstoanycandidatewithrespecttoanyelectionforFederalofficewhich,in
theaggregate,exceed$5,000.Contributionsbythenationalcommitteeofapoliticalparty
servingastheprincipalcampaigncommitteeofacandidatefortheofficeofPresidentof
theUnitedStatesshallnotexceedthelimitationimposedbytheprecedingsentencewith
respecttoanyothercandidateforFederaloffice.Forpurposesofthisparagraph,theterm
"politicalcommittee"meansanorganizationregisteredasapoliticalcommitteeunder
section433,Title2,UnitedStatesCode,foraperiodofnotlessthan6monthswhichhas
receivedcontributionsfrommorethan50personsand,exceptforanyStatepoliticalparty
organization,hasmadecontributionsto5ormorecandidatesforFederaloffice.
(3)Noindividualshallmakecontributionsaggregatingmorethan$25,000inany
calendaryear.Forpurposesofthisparagraph,anycontributionmadeinayearotherthan
thecalendaryearinwhichtheelectionisheldwithrespecttowhichsuchcontribution

Buckleyv.Valeo
wasmade,isconsideredtobemadeduringthecalendaryearinwhichsuchelectionis
held.
(4)Forpurposesofthissubsection
(A)contributionstoanamedcandidatemade

Page424U.S.1,190
toanypoliticalcommitteeauthorizedbysuchcandidate,inwriting,toaccept
contributionsonhisbehalfshallbeconsideredtobecontributionsmadetosuch
candidateand
(B)contributionsmadetoorforthebenefitofanycandidatenominatedbyapolitical
partyforelectiontotheofficeofVicePresidentoftheUnitedStatesshallbeconsidered
tobecontributionsmadetoorforthebenefitofthecandidateofsuchpartyforelectionto
theofficeofPresidentoftheUnitedStates.
(5)Thelimitationsimposedbyparagraphs(1)and(2)ofthissubsectionshallapply
separatelywithrespecttoeachelection,exceptthatallelectionsheldinanycalendaryear
fortheofficeofPresidentoftheUnitedStates(exceptageneralelectionforsuchoffice)
shallbeconsideredtobeoneelection.
(6)Forpurposesofthelimitationsimposedbythissection,allcontributionsmadebya
person,eitherdirectlyorindirectly,onbehalfofaparticularcandidate,including
contributionswhichareinanywayearmarkedorotherwisedirectedthroughan
intermediaryorconduittosuchcandidate,shallbetreatedascontributionsfromsuch
persontosuchcandidate.Theintermediaryorconduitshallreporttheoriginalsourceand
theintendedrecipientofsuchcontributiontotheCommissionandtotheintended
recipient.
(c)Limitationsonexpenditures.
(1)Nocandidateshallmakeexpendituresinexcessof
(A)$10,000,000,inthecaseofacandidatefornominationforelectiontotheofficeof
PresidentoftheUnitedStates,exceptthat

Page424U.S.1,191
theaggregateofexpendituresunderthissubparagraphinanyoneStateshallnotexceed
twicetheexpenditurelimitationapplicableinsuchStatetoacandidatefornominationfor
electiontotheofficeofSenator,Delegate,orResidentCommissioner,asthecasemay
be
(B)$20,000,000,inthecaseofacandidateforelectiontotheofficeofPresidentofthe
UnitedStates
(C)inthecaseofanycampaignfornominationforelectionbyacandidatefortheoffice
ofSenatororbyacandidatefortheofficeofRepresentativefromaStatewhichisentitled
toonlyoneRepresentative,thegreaterof
(i)8centsmultipliedbythevotingagepopulationof theState(ascertifiedunder
subsection(g))or

Buckleyv.Valeo
(ii)$100,000
(D)inthecaseofanycampaignforelectionbyacandidatefortheofficeofSenatororby
acandidatefortheofficeofRepresentativefromaStatewhichisentitledtoonlyone
Representative,thegreaterof
(i)12centsmultipliedbythevotingagepopulationoftheState(ascertifiedunder
subsection(g))or
(ii)$150,000
(E)$70,000,inthecaseofanycampaignfornominationforelection,orforelection,bya
candidatefortheofficeofRepresentativeinanyotherState,DelegatefromtheDistrictof
Columbia,orResidentCommissioneror
(F)$15,000,inthecaseofanycampaignfornominationforelection,orforelection,by

Page424U.S.1,192
acandidatefortheofficeofDelegatefromGuamortheVirginIslands.
(2)Forpurposesofthissubsection
(A)expendituresmadebyoronbehalfofanycandidatenominatedbyapoliticalparty
forelectiontotheofficeofVicePresidentoftheUnitedStatesshallbeconsideredtobe
expendituresmadebyoronbehalfofthecandidateofsuchpartyforelectiontotheoffice
ofPresidentoftheUnitedStatesand
(B)anexpenditureismadeonbehalfofacandidate,includingavicepresidential
candidate,ifitismadeby
(i)anauthorizedcommitteeoranyotheragentofthecandidateforthepurposesof
makinganyexpenditureor
(ii)anypersonauthorizedorrequestedbythecandidate,anauthorizedcommitteeofthe
candidate,oranagentofthecandidate,tomaketheexpenditure.
(3)Thelimitationsimposedbysubparagraphs(C),(D),(E),and(F)ofparagraph(1)of
thissubsectionshallapplyseparatelywithrespecttoeachelection.
(4)TheCommissionshallprescriberulesunderwhichanyexpenditurebyacandidatefor
presidentialnominationforusein2ormoreStatesshallbeattributedtosuchcandidate's
expenditurelimitationineachsuchState,basedonthevotingagepopulationinsuch
Statewhichcanreasonablybeexpectedtobeinfluencedbysuchexpenditure.
(d)Adjustmentoflimitationsbasedonpriceindex.
(1)Atthebeginningofeachcalendaryear(commencingin1976),astherebecome
availablenecessary

Page424U.S.1,193
datafromtheBureauofLaborStatisticsoftheDepartmentofLabor,theSecretaryof
LaborshallcertifytotheCommissionandpublishintheFederalRegisterthepercentum
differencebetweenthepriceindexforthe12monthsprecedingthebeginningofsuch
calendaryearandthepriceindexforthebaseperiod.Eachlimitationestablishedby

Buckleyv.Valeo
subsection(c)andsubsection(f)shallbeincreasedbysuchpercentumdifference.Each
amountsoincreasedshallbetheamountineffectforsuchcalendaryear.
(2)Forpurposesofparagraph(1)
(A)theterm"priceindex"meanstheaverageoveracalendaryearoftheConsumerPrice
Index(allitemsUnitedStatescityaverage)publishedmonthlybytheBureauofLabor
Statisticsand
(B)theterm"baseperiod"meansthecalendaryear1974.
(e)Expenditurerelativetoclearlyidentifiedcandidate.
(1)Nopersonmaymakeanyexpenditure(otherthananexpendituremadebyoron
behalfofacandidatewithinthemeaningofsubsection(c)(2)(B))relativetoaclearly
identifiedcandidateduringacalendaryearwhich,whenaddedtoallotherexpenditures
madebysuchpersonduringtheyearadvocatingtheelectionordefeatofsuchcandidate,
exceeds$1,000.
(2)Forpurposesofparagraph(1)
(A)"clearlyidentified"means
(i)thecandidate'snameappears
(ii)aphotographordrawingofthecandidateappearsor

Page424U.S.1,194
(iii)theidentityofthecandidateisapparentbyunambiguousreferenceand
(B)"expenditure"doesnotincludeanypaymentmadeorincurredbyacorporationora
labororganizationwhich,undertheprovisionsofthelastparagraphofsection610,
wouldnotconstituteanexpenditurebysuchcorporationorlabororganization.
(f)ExceptionsfornationalandStatecommittees.
(1)Notwithstandinganyotherprovisionoflawwithrespecttolimitationson
expendituresorlimitationsoncontributions,thenationalcommitteeofapoliticalparty
andaStatecommitteeofapoliticalparty,includinganysubordinatecommitteeofaState
committee,maymakeexpendituresinconnectionwiththegeneralelectioncampaignof
candidatesforFederaloffice,subjecttothelimitationscontainedinparagraphs(2)and
(3)ofthissubsection.
(2)Thenationalcommitteeofapoliticalpartymaynotmakeanyexpenditurein
connectionwiththegeneralelectioncampaignofanycandidateforPresidentofthe
UnitedStateswhoisaffiliatedwithsuchpartywhichexceedsanamountequalto2cents
multipliedbythevotingagepopulationoftheUnitedStates(ascertifiedundersubsection
(g)).Anyexpenditureunderthisparagraphshallbeinadditiontoanyexpenditurebya
nationalcommitteeofapoliticalpartyservingastheprincipalcampaigncommitteeofa
candidatefortheofficeofPresidentoftheUnitedStates.
(3)Thenationalcommitteeofapoliticalparty,or aStatecommitteeofapoliticalparty,
includinganysubordinatecommitteeofaStatecommittee,maynotmakeany
expenditureinconnectionwiththegeneralelectioncampaignofacandidatefor

Buckleyv.Valeo
Page424U.S.1,195
FederalofficeinaStatewhoisaffiliatedwithsuchpartywhichexceeds
(A)inthecaseofacandidateforelectiontotheofficeofSenator,orofRepresentative
fromaStatewhichisentitledtoonlyoneRepresentative,thegreaterof
(i)2centsmultipliedbythevotingagepopulationoftheState(ascertifiedunder
subsection(g))or
(ii)$20,000and
(B)inthecaseofacandidateforelectiontotheofficeofRepresentative,Delegate,or
ResidentCommissionerinanyotherState,$10,000.
(g)Votingagepopulationestimates.DuringthefirstweekofJanuary1975,andevery
subsequentyear,theSecretaryofCommerceshallcertifytotheCommissionandpublish
intheFederalRegisteranestimateofthevotingagepopulationoftheUnitedStates,of
eachState,andofeachcongressionaldistrictasofthefirstdayofJulynextprecedingthe
dateofcertification.Theterm"votingagepopulation"meansresidentpopulation,18
yearsofageorolder.
(h)Knowingviolations.Nocandidateorpoliticalcommitteeshallknowinglyacceptany
contributionormakeanyexpenditureinviolationoftheprovisionsofthissection.No
officeroremployeeofapoliticalcommitteeshallknowinglyacceptacontributionmade
forthebenefitoruseofacandidate,orknowinglymakeanyexpenditureonbehalfofa
candidate,inviolationofanylimitationimposedoncontributionsandexpendituresunder
thissection.
(i)Penalties.Anypersonwhoviolatesanyprovisionofthissectionshallbefinednot
morethan$25,000orimprisonednotmorethan1year,orboth.

Page424U.S.1,196
610.Contributionsorexpendituresbynationalbanks,corporationsorlabor
organizations.
Itisunlawfulforanynationalbank,oranycorporationorganizedbyauthorityofanylaw
ofCongress,tomakeacontributionorexpenditureinconnectionwithanyelectiontoany
politicaloffice,orinconnectionwithanyprimaryelectionorpoliticalconventionor
caucusheldtoselectcandidatesforanypoliticaloffice,orforanycorporationwhatever,
oranylabor organizationtomakeacontributionorexpenditureinconnectionwithany
electionatwhichpresidentialandvicepresidentialelectorsoraSenatororRepresentative
in,oraDelegateorResidentCommissionertoCongressaretobevotedfor,orin
connectionwithanyprimaryelectionorpoliticalconventionorcaucusheldtoselect
candidatesforanyoftheforegoingoffices,orforanycandidate,politicalcommittee,or
otherpersontoacceptorreceiveanycontributionprohibitedbythissection.

Buckleyv.Valeo
Everycorporationorlabororganizationwhichmakesanycontributionorexpenditurein
violationofthissectionshallbefinednotmorethan$25,000andeveryofficeror
directorofanycorporation,orofficerofanylabororganization,whoconsentstoany
contributionorexpenditurebythecorporationorlabororganization,asthecasemaybe,
andanypersonwhoacceptsorreceivesanycontribution,inviolationofthissection,shall
befinednotmorethan$1,000orimprisonednotmorethan1year,orboth andifthe
violationwaswillful,shallbefinednotmorethan$50,000orimprisonednotmorethan2
yearsorboth.
Forthepurposesofthissection"labororganization"meansanyorganizationofanykind,
oranyagencyoremployeerepresentationcommitteeorplan,inwhichemployees
participateandwhichexistforthepurpose,

Page424U.S.1,197
inwholeorinpart,ofdealingwithemployersconcerninggrievances,labordisputes,
wages,ratesofpay,hoursofemployment,orconditionsofwork.
Asusedinthissection,thephrase"contributionorexpenditure"shallincludeanydirect
orindirectpayment,distribution,loan,advance,deposit,orgiftofmoney,orany
services,oranythingofvalue(exceptaloanofmoneybyanationalorStatebankmade
inaccordancewiththeapplicablebankinglawsandregulationsandintheordinary
courseofbusiness)toanycandidate,campaigncommittee,orpoliticalpartyor
organization,inconnectionwithanyelectiontoanyoftheofficesreferredtointhis
sectionbutshallnotincludecommunicationsbyacorporationtoitsstockholdersand
theirfamiliesorbyalabororganizationtoitsmembersandtheirfamiliesonanysubject
nonpartisanregistrationandgetoutthevotecampaignsbyacorporationaimedatits
stockholdersandtheirfamilies,orbyalabororganizationaimedatitsmembersandtheir
familiestheestablishment,administration,andsolicitationofcontributionstoaseparate
segregatedfundtobeutilizedforpoliticalpurposesbyacorporationorlabor
organization:Provided,Thatitshallbeunlawfulforsuchafundtomakeacontribution
orexpenditurebyutilizingmoneyoranythingofvaluesecuredbyphysicalforce,job
discrimination,financialreprisals,orthethreatofforce,jobdiscrimination,orfinancial
reprisalorbydues,fees,orothermoniesrequiredasaconditionofmembershipina
labororganizationorasaconditionofemployment,orbymoniesobtainedinany
commercialtransaction.

611.ContributionsbyGovernmentcontractors.
Whoever
(a)enteringintoanycontractwiththeUnitedStatesoranydepartmentoragencythereof
either

Buckleyv.Valeo
Page424U.S.1,198
fortherenditionofpersonalservicesorfurnishinganymaterial,supplies,orequipmentto
theUnitedStatesoranydepartmentoragencythereoforforsellinganylandorbuilding
totheUnitedStatesoranydepartmentoragencythereof,ifpaymentfortheperformance
ofsuchcontractorpaymentforsuchmaterial,supplies,equipment,land,orbuildingisto
bemadeinwholeorinpartfromfundsappropriatedbytheCongress,atanytime
betweenthecommencementofnegotiationsforandthelaterof
(1)thecompletionofperformanceunder,or
(2)theterminationofnegotiationsfor,suchcontractorfurnishingofmaterial,supplies,
equipment,landorbuildings,
directlyorindirectlymakesanycontributionofmoneyorotherthingofvalue,or
promisesexpresslyorimpliedlytomakeanysuchcontribution,toanypoliticalparty,
committee,orcandidateforpublicofficeortoanypersonforanypoliticalpurposeor
useor
(b)knowinglysolicitsanysuchcontributionfromanysuchpersonforanysuchpurpose
duringanysuchperiodshallbefinednotmorethan$25,000orimprisonednotmore
than5years,orboth.
Thissectiondoesnotprohibitormakeunlawfultheestablishmentoradministrationof,or
thesolicitationofcontributionsto,anyseparatesegregatedfundbyanycorporationor
labororganizationforthepurposeofinfluencingthenominationforelection,orelection,
ofanypersontoFederaloffice,unlesstheprovisionsofsection610ofthistitleprohibit
ormakeunlawfultheestablishmentoradministrationof,orthesolicitationof
contributionsto,suchfund.
Forpurposesofthissection,theterm"labororganization"

Page424U.S.1,199
hasthemeaninggivenitbysection610ofthistitle.

TITLE26.INTERNALREVENUECODE

6096.Designationbyindividuals.
(a)Ingeneral.Everyindividual(otherthananonresidentalien)whoseincometax
liabilityforthetaxableyearis$1ormoremaydesignatethat$1shallbepaidovertothe
PresidentialElectionCampaignFundinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofsection9006
(a).Inthecaseofajointreturnofhusbandandwifehavinganincometaxliabilityof$2
ormore,eachspousemaydesignatethat$1shallbepaidtothefund.
(b)Incometaxliability.Forpurposesofsubsection(a),theincometaxliabilityforan
individualforanytaxableyearistheamountofthetaximposedbychapter1onsuch

Buckleyv.Valeo
individualforsuchtaxableyear(asshownonhisreturn),reducedbythesumofthe
credits(asshowninhisreturn)allowableundersections33,37,38,40,and41.
(c)Mannerandtimeofdesignation.Adesignationundersubsection(a)maybemade
withrespecttoanytaxableyear
(1)atthetimeoffilingthereturnofthetaximposedbychapter1forsuchtaxableyear,
or
(2)atanyothertime(afterthetimeoffilingthereturnofthetaximposedbychapter1for
suchtaxableyear)specifiedinregulationsprescribedbytheSecretaryorhisdelegate.
SuchdesignationshallbemadeinsuchmannerastheSecretaryorhisdelegateprescribes
byregulationsexceptthat,ifsuchdesignationismadeatthetimeoffilingthereturnof
thetaximposedbychapter1forsuchtaxableyear,suchdesignationshallbemadeeither
onthe
Page424U.S.1,200
firstpageofthereturnoronthepagebearingthetaxpayer'ssignature.

CHAPTER95PRESIDENTIALELECTIONCAMPAIGNFUND

9001.Shorttitle.
Thischaptermaybecitedasthe"PresidentialElectionCampaignFundAct."

9002.Definitions.
Forpurposesofthischapter
(1)Theterm"authorizedcommittee"means,withrespecttothecandidatesofapolitical
partyforPresidentandVicePresidentoftheUnitedStates,anypoliticalcommittee
whichisauthorizedinwritingbysuchcandidatestoincurexpensestofurthertheelection
ofsuchcandidates.Suchauthorizationshallbeaddressedtothechairmanofsuch
political committee,andacopyofsuchauthorizationshallbefiledbysuchcandidates
withtheCommission.Anywithdrawalofanyauthorizationshallalsobeinwritingand
shallbeaddressedandfiledinthesamemannerastheauthorization.
(2)Theterm"candidate"means,withrespecttoanypresidentialelection,anindividual
who
(A)hasbeennominatedforelectiontotheofficeofPresidentoftheUnitedStatesorthe
officeofVicePresidentoftheUnitedStatesbyamajorparty,or
(B)hasqualifiedtohavehisnameontheelectionballot(ortohavethenamesofelectors
pledgedtohimontheelectionballot)asthecandidateofapoliticalpartyforelectionto
eithersuchofficein10ormoreStates.
Forpurposesofparagraphs(6)and(7)ofthissectionandpurposesofsection9004(a)
(2),theterm"candidate"means,withrespecttoanyprecedingpresidential

Buckleyv.Valeo
Page424U.S.1,201
election,anindividualwhoreceivedpopularvotesfortheofficeofPresidentinsuch
election.
(3)Theterm"Commission"meanstheFederalElectionCommissionestablishedby
section437c(a)(1)ofTitle2,UnitedStatesCode.
(4)Theterm"eligiblecandidates"meansthecandidatesofapoliticalpartyforPresident
andVicePresidentoftheUnitedStateswhohavemetallapplicableconditionsfor
eligibilitytoreceivepaymentsunderthischaptersetforthinsection9003.
(5)Theterm"fund"meansthePresidentialElectionCampaignFundestablishedby
section9006(a).
(6)Theterm"majorparty"means,withrespecttoanypresidentialelection,apolitical
partywhosecandidatefortheofficeofPresidentintheprecedingpresidentialelection
received,asthecandidateofsuchparty,25percentormoreofthetotalnumberof
popularvotesreceivedbyallcandidatesforsuchoffice.
(7)Theterm"minorparty"means,withrespecttoanypresidentialelection,apolitical
partywhosecandidatefortheofficeofPresidentintheprecedingpresidentialelection
received,asthecandidateofsuchparty,5percentormorebutlessthan25percentofthe
totalnumberofpopularvotesreceivedbyallcandidatesforsuchoffice.
(8)Theterm"newparty"means,withrespecttoanypresidentialelection,apolitical
partywhichisneitheramajorpartynoraminorparty.
(9)Theterm"politicalcommittee"meansanycommittee,association,ororganization
(whetherornotincorporated)whichacceptscontributionsormakesexpendituresforthe
purposeofinfluencing,orattemptingtoinfluence,thenominationorelectionofoneor
moreindividualstoFederal,State,orlocalelectivepublicoffice.

Page424U.S.1,202
(10)Theterm"presidentialelection"meanstheelectionofpresidentialandvice
presidentialelectors.
(11)Theterm"qualifiedcampaignexpense"meansanexpense
(A)incurred
(i)bythecandidateofapoliticalpartyfortheofficeofPresidenttofurtherhiselectionto
suchofficeortofurthertheelectionofthecandidateofsuchpoliticalpartyfortheoffice
ofVicePresident,orboth,
(ii)bythecandidateofapoliticalpartyfortheofficeofVicePresidenttofurtherhis
electiontosuchofficeortofurthertheelectionofthecandidateofsuchpoliticalpartyfor
theofficeofPresident,orboth,or
(iii)byanauthorizedcommitteeofthecandidatesofapoliticalpartyfortheofficesof
PresidentandVicePresidenttofurthertheelectionofeitherorbothofsuchcandidatesto
suchoffices
(B)incurredwithintheexpenditurereportperiod(asdefinedinparagraph(12)),or
incurredbeforethebeginningofsuchperiodtotheextentsuchexpenseisforproperty,
services,orfacilitiesusedduringsuchperiodand
(C)neithertheincurringnorpaymentofwhichconstitutesaviolationofanylawofthe
UnitedStatesoroftheStateinwhichsuchexpenseisincurredorpaid.

Buckleyv.Valeo
Anexpenseshallbeconsideredasincurredbyacandidateoranauthorizedcommitteeif
itisincurredbyapersonauthorizedbysuchcandidateorsuchcommittee,asthecase
maybe,toincursuchexpenseonbehalfofsuchcandidateorsuchcommittee.Ifan
authorizedcommitteeofthecandidatesofapoliticalpartyfor

Page424U.S.1,203
PresidentandvicePresidentoftheUnitedStatesalsoincursexpensestofurtherthe
electionofoneormoreotherindividualstoFederal,State,orlocalelectivepublicoffice,
expensesincurredbysuchcommitteewhicharenotspecificallytofurthertheelectionof
suchotherindividualorindividualsshallbeconsideredasincurredtofurthertheelection
ofsuchcandidatesforPresidentandVicePresidentinsuchproportionasthe
Commissionprescribesbyrulesorregulations.
(12)Theterm"expenditurereportperiod"withrespecttoanypresidentialelectionmeans

(A)inthecaseofamajorparty,theperiodbeginningwiththefirstdayofSeptember
beforetheelection,or,ifearlier,withthedateonwhichsuchmajorpartyatitsnational
conventionnominateditscandidateforelectiontotheofficeofPresidentoftheUnited
States,andending30daysafterthedateof thepresidentialelectionand
(B)inthecaseofapartywhichisnotamajorparty,thesameperiodastheexpenditure
reportperiodofthemajorpartywhichhastheshortestexpenditurereportperiodforsuch
presidentialelectionundersubparagraph(A).

9003.Conditionforeligibilityforpayments.
(a)Ingeneral.Inordertobeeligibletoreceiveanypaymentsundersection9006,the
candidatesofapoliticalpartyinapresidentialelectionshall,inwriting
(1)agreetoobtainandfurnishtotheCommissionsuchevidenceasitmayrequestofthe
qualifiedcampaignexpensesofsuchcandidates
(2)agreetokeepandfurnishtotheCommissionsuchrecords,books,andother
informationasitmayrequestand
(3)agreetoanauditandexaminationbythe

Page424U.S.1,204
Commissionundersection9007andtopayanyamountsrequiredtobepaidundersuch
section.
(b)Majorparties.Inordertobeeligibletoreceiveanypaymentsundersection9006,the
candidatesofamajorpartyinapresidentialelectionshallcertifytotheCommission,
underpenaltyofperjury,that

Buckleyv.Valeo
(1)suchcandidatesandtheirauthorizedcommitteeswillnotincurqualifiedcampaign
expensesinexcessoftheaggregatepaymentstowhichtheywillbeentitledundersection
9004and
(2)nocontributionstodefrayqualifiedcampaignexpenseshavebeenorwillbeaccepted
bysuchcandidatesoranyoftheirauthorizedcommitteesexcepttotheextentnecessary
tomakeupanydeficiencyinpaymentsreceivedoutofthefundonaccountofthe
applicationofsection9006(d),andnocontributionstodefrayexpenseswhichwouldbe
qualifiedcampaignexpensesbutforsubparagraph(C)ofsection9002(11)havebeenor
willbeacceptedbysuchcandidatesoranyoftheirauthorizedcommittees.
Suchcertificationshallbemadewithinsuchtimepriortothedayofthepresidential
electionastheCommissionshallprescribebyrulesorregulations.
(c)Minorandnewparties.Inordertobeeligibletoreceiveanypaymentsundersection
9006,thecandidatesofaminorornewpartyinapresidentialelectionshallcertifytothe
Commission,underpenaltyofperjury,that
(1)suchcandidatesandtheirauthorizedcommitteeswillnotincurqualifiedcampaign
expensesinexcessoftheaggregatepaymentstowhichtheeligiblecandidatesofamajor
partyareentitledundersection9004and

Page424U.S.1,205
(2)suchcandidatesandtheirauthorizedcommitteeswillacceptandexpendorretain
contributionstodefrayqualifiedcampaignexpensesonlytotheextentthatthequalified
campaignexpensesincurredbysuchcandidatesandtheirauthorizedcommitteescertified
tounderparagraph(1)exceedtheaggregatepaymentsreceivedbysuchcandidatesoutof
thefundpursuanttosection 9006.
Suchcertificationshallbemadewithinsuchtimepriortothedayofthepresidential
electionastheCommissionshallprescribebyrulesorregulations.

9004.Entitlementofeligiblecandidatestopayments.
(a)Ingeneral.Subjecttotheprovisionsofthischapter
(1)Theeligiblecandidatesofeachmajorpartyinapresidentialelectionshallbeentitled
toequalpaymentsundersection9006inanamountwhich,intheaggregate,shallnot
exceedtheexpenditurelimitationsapplicabletosuchcandidatesundersection608(c)(1)
(B)ofTitle18,UnitedStatesCode.
(2)(A)Theeligiblecandidatesofaminorpartyinapresidentialelectionshallbeentitled
topaymentsundersection9006equalintheaggregatetoanamountwhichbearsthe
sameratiototheamountallowedunderparagraph(1)foramajorpartyasnumberof
popularvotesreceivedbythecandidateforPresidentoftheminorparty,assuch
candidate,intheprecedingpresidentialelectionbearstotheaveragenumberofpopular
votesreceivedbythecandidatesforPresidentofthemajorpartiesinthepreceding
presidentialelection.

Buckleyv.Valeo
(B)Ifthecandidateofoneormorepoliticalparties(notincludingamajorparty)forthe
officeofPresidentwasacandidateforsuchofficeintheprecedingpresidentialelection
andreceived5percent

Page424U.S.1,206
ormorebutlessthan25percentofthetotalnumberofpopularvotesreceivedbyall
candidatesforsuchoffice,suchcandidateandhisrunningmatefortheofficeofVice
President,uponcompliancewiththeprovisionsofsection9003(a)and(c),shallbe
treatedaseligiblecandidatesentitledtopaymentsundersection9006inanamount
computedasprovidedinsubparagraph(A)bytakingintoaccountallthepopularvotes
receivedbysuchcandidatefortheofficeofPresidentintheprecedingpresidential
election.Ifeligiblecandidatesofaminorpartyareentitledtopaymentsunderthis
subparagraph,suchentitlementshallbereducedbytheamountoftheentitlementallowed
undersubparagraph(A).
(3)Theeligiblecandidatesofaminorpartyoranewpartyinapresidentialelection
whosecandidateforPresidentinsuchelectionreceives,assuchcandidate,5percentor
moreofthetotalnumberofpopularvotescastfortheofficeofPresidentinsuchelection
shallbeentitledtopaymentsundersection9006equalintheaggregatetoanamount
whichbearsthesameratiototheamountallowedunderparagraph(1)foramajorparty
asthenumberofpopularvotesreceivedbysuchcandidateinsuchelectionbearstothe
averagenumberofpopularvotesreceivedinsuchelectionbythecandidatesforPresident
ofthemajorparties.Inthecaseofeligiblecandidatesentitledtopaymentsunder
paragraph(2),theamountallowableunderthisparagraphshallbelimitedtotheamount,
ifany,bywhichtheentitlementundertheprecedingsentenceexceedstheamountofthe
entitlementunderparagraph(2).
(b)Limitations.Theaggregatepaymentstowhichtheeligiblecandidatesofapolitical
partyshallbeentitled

Page424U.S.1,207
undersubsections(a)(2)and(3)withrespecttoapresidentialelectionshallnotexceed
anamountequaltothelowerof
(1)theamountofqualifiedcampaignexpensesincurredbysucheligiblecandidatesand
theirauthorizedcommittees,reducedbytheamountofcontributionstodefrayqualified
campaignexpensesreceivedandexpendedorretainedbysucheligiblecandidatesand
suchcommitteesor
(2)theaggregatepaymentstowhichtheeligiblecandidatesofamajorpartyareentitled
undersubsection(a)(1),reducedbytheamountofcontributionsdescribedinparagraph
(1)ofthissubsection.
(c)Restrictions.Theeligiblecandidatesofapoliticalpartyshallbeentitledtopayments
undersubsection(a)only

Buckleyv.Valeo
(1)todefrayqualifiedcampaignexpensesincurredbysucheligiblecandidatesortheir
authorizedcommitteesor
(2)torepayloanstheproceedsofwhichwereusedtodefraysuchqualifiedcampaign
expenses,orotherwisetorestorefunds(otherthancontributionstodefrayqualified
campaignexpensesreceivedandexpendedbysuchcandidatesorsuchcommittees)used
todefraysuchqualifiedcampaignexpenses.

9005.CertificationbyCommission.
(a)Initialcertifications.Notlaterthan10daysafterthecandidatesofapoliticalpartyfor
PresidentandVicePresidentoftheUnitedStateshavemetallapplicableconditionsfor
eligibilitytoreceivepaymentsunderthischaptersetforthinsection9003,the
CommissionshallcertifytotheSecretaryforpaymenttosucheligiblecandidatesunder
section9006paymentinfullofamountstowhichsuchcandidatesareentitledunder
section9004.

Page424U.S.1,208
(b)Finalityofcertificationsanddeterminations.InitialcertificationsbytheCommission
undersubsection(a),andalldeterminationsmadebyitunderthischaptershallbefinal
andconclusive,excepttotheextentthattheyaresubjecttoexaminationandauditbythe
Commissionundersection9007andjudicialreviewundersection9011.

9006.Paymentstoeligiblecandidates.
(a)Establishmentofcampaignfund.Thereisherebyestablishedonthebooksofthe
TreasuryoftheUnitedStatesaspecialfundtobeknownasthe"PresidentialElection
CampaignFund."TheSecretaryshall,fromtimetotime,transfertothefundanamount
notinexcessofthesumoftheamountsdesignated(subsequenttotheprevious
Presidentialelection)tothefundbyindividualsundersection6096.Thereisappropriated
tothefundforeachfiscalyear,outofamountsinthegeneralfundoftheTreasurynot
otherwiseappropriated,anamountequaltotheamountssodesignatedduringeachfiscal
year,whichshallremainavailabletothefundwithoutfiscalyearlimitation.
(b)Transfertothegeneralfund.If,afteraPresidentialelectionandafteralleligible
candidateshavebeenpaidtheamountwhichtheyareentitledtoreceiveunderthis
chapter,therearemoneysremaininginthefund,theSecretaryshalltransferthemoneys
soremainingtothegeneralfundoftheTreasury.
(c)Paymentsfromthefund.UponreceiptofacertificationfromtheCommissionunder
section9005forpaymenttotheeligiblecandidatesofapoliticalparty,theSecretaryshall
paytosuchcandidatesoutofthefundtheamountcertifiedbytheCommission.Amounts
paidtoanysuchcandidatesshallbeunderthecontrolofsuchcandidates.

Buckleyv.Valeo
(d)Insufficientamountsinfund.Ifatthetimeofa

Page424U.S.1,209
certificationbytheCommissionundersection9005forpaymenttotheeligible
candidatesofapoliticalparty,theSecretaryorhisdelegatedeterminesthatthemoneysin
thefundarenot,ormaynotbe,sufficienttosatisfythefullentitlementsoftheeligible
candidatesofallpoliticalparties,heshallwithholdfromsuchpaymentsuchamountashe
determinestobenecessarytoassurethattheeligiblecandidatesofeachpoliticalparty
willreceivetheirproratashareoftheirfullentitlement.Amountswithheldbyreasonof
theprecedingsentenceshallbepaidwhentheSecretaryorhisdelegatedeterminesthat
therearesufficientmoneysinthefundtopaysuchamounts,orportionsthereof,toall
eligiblecandidatesfromwhomamountshavebeenwithheld,but,iftherearenot
sufficientmoneysinthefundtosatisfythefullentitlementoftheeligiblecandidatesof
allpoliticalparties,theamountssowithheldshallbepaidinsuchmannerthattheeligible
candidatesofeachpoliticalpartyreceivetheirproratashareoftheirfullentitlement.

9007.Examinationsandauditsrepayments.
(a)Examinationsandaudits.Aftereachpresidentialelection,theCommissionshall
conductathoroughexaminationandauditofthequalifiedcampaignexpensesofthe
candidatesofeachpoliticalpartyforPresidentandVicePresident.
(b)Repayments.
(1)IftheCommissiondeterminesthatanyportionofthepaymentsmadetotheeligible
candidatesofapoliticalpartyundersection9006wasinexcessoftheaggregate
paymentstowhichcandidateswereentitledundersection9004,itshallsonotifysuch
candidates,andsuchcandidatesshallpaytotheSecretaryanamountequaltosuch
portion.
(2)IftheCommissiondeterminesthattheeligiblecandidatesofapoliticalpartyandtheir
authorized

Page424U.S.1,210
committeesincurredqualifiedcampaignexpensesinexcessoftheaggregatepaymentsto
whichtheeligiblecandidatesofamajorpartywereentitledundersection9004,itshall
notifysuchcandidatesoftheamountofsuchexcessandsuchcandidatesshallpaytothe
Secretaryanamountequaltosuchamount.
(3)IftheCommissiondeterminesthattheeligiblecandidatesofamajorpartyorany
authorizedcommitteeofsuchcandidatesacceptedcontributions(otherthancontributions
tomakeupdeficienciesinpaymentsoutofthefundonaccountoftheapplicationof
section9006(d))todefrayqualifiedcampaignexpenses(otherthanqualifiedcampaign
expenseswithrespecttowhichpaymentisrequiredunderparagraph(2)),itshallnotify

Buckleyv.Valeo
suchcandidatesoftheamountofthecontributionssoaccepted,andsuchcandidatesshall
paytotheSecretaryanamountequaltosuchamount.
(4)IftheCommissiondeterminesthatanyamountofanypaymentmadetotheeligible
candidatesofapoliticalpartyundersection9006wasusedforanypurposeotherthan
(A)todefraythequalifiedcampaignexpenseswithrespecttowhichsuchpaymentwas
madeor
(B)torepayloanstheproceedsofwhichwereused,orotherwisetorestorefunds(other
thancontributionstodefrayqualifiedcampaignexpenseswhichwerereceivedand
expended)whichwereusedtodefraysuchqualifiedcampaignexpenses,
itshallnotifysuchcandidatesoftheamountsoused,andsuchcandidatesshallpaytothe
Secretaryanamountequaltosuch amount.
(5)Nopaymentshallberequiredfromtheeligible

Page424U.S.1,211
candidatesofapoliticalpartyunderthissubsectiontotheextentthatsuchpayment,when
addedtootherpaymentsrequiredfromsuchcandidatesunderthissubsection,exceedsthe
amountofpaymentsreceivedbysuchcandidatesundersection9006.
(c)Notification.NonotificationshallbemadebytheCommissionundersubsection(b)
withrespecttoapresidentialelectionmorethan3yearsafterthedayofsuchelection.
(d)Depositofrepayments.AllpaymentsreceivedbytheSecretaryundersubsection(b)
shallbedepositedbyhiminthegeneralfundoftheTreasury.

9008.Paymentsforpresidentialnominatingconventions.
(a)Establishmentofaccounts.TheSecretaryshallmaintaininthefund,inadditiontoany
accountwhichhemaintainsundersection9006(a),aseparateaccountforthenational
committeeofeachmajorpartyandminorparty.TheSecretaryshalldepositineachsuch
accountanamountequaltotheamountwhicheachsuchcommitteemayreceiveunder
subsection(b).Suchdepositsshallbedrawnfromamountsdesignatedbyindividuals
undersection6096andshallbemadebeforeanytransferismadetoanyaccountforany
eligiblecandidateundersection 9006(a).
(b)Entitlementtopaymentsfromthefund.
(1)Majorparties.Subjecttotheprovisionsofthissection,thenationalcommitteeofa
majorpartyshallbeentitledtopaymentsunderparagraph(3),withrespecttoany
presidentialnominatingconvention,inamountswhich,intheaggregate,shallnotexceed
$2million.
(2)Minorparties.Subjecttotheprovisionsofthissection,thenationalcommitteeofa
minorparty

Buckleyv.Valeo
Page424U.S.1,212
shallbeentitledtopaymentsunderparagraph(3),withrespecttoanypresidential
nominatingconvention,inamountswhich,intheaggregate,shallnotexceedanamount
whichbearsthesameratiototheamountthenationalcommitteeofamajorpartyis
entitledtoreceiveunderparagraph(1)asthenumberof popularvotesreceivedbythe
candidateforPresidentoftheminorparty,assuchcandidate,inthepreceding
presidentialelectionbearstotheaveragenumberofpopularvotesreceivedbythe
candidatesforPresidentoftheUnitedStatesofthemajorpartiesinthepreceding
presidentialelection.
(3)Payments.UponreceiptofcertificationfromtheCommissionundersubsection(g),
theSecretaryshallmakepaymentsfromtheappropriateaccountmaintainedunder
subsection(a)tothenationalcommitteeof amajorpartyorminorpartywhichelectsto
receiveitsentitlementunderthissubsection.Suchpaymentsshallbeavailableforuseby
suchcommitteeinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofsubsection(c).
(4)Limitation.Paymentstothenationalcommittee ofamajorpartyorminorpartyunder
thissubsectionfromtheaccountdesignatedforsuchcommitteeshallbelimitedtothe
amountsinsuchaccountatthetimeofpayment.
(5)Adjustmentofentitlements.Theentitlementsestablishedbythissubsectionshallbe
adjustedinthesamemannerasexpenditurelimitationsestablishedbysection608(c)and
section608(f)ofTitle18,UnitedStatesCode,areadjustedpursuanttotheprovisionsof
section608(d)ofsuchtitle.
(c)Useoffunds.Nopartofanypaymentmadeundersubsection(b)shallbeusedto
defraytheexpenses

Page424U.S.1,213
ofanycandidateordelegatewhoisparticipatinginanypresidentialnominating
convention.Suchpaymentsshallbeusedonly
(1)todefrayexpensesincurredwithrespecttoapresidentialnominatingconvention
(includingthepaymentofdeposits)byoronbehalfofthenationalcommitteereceiving
suchpaymentsor
(2)torepayloanstheproceedsofwhichwereusedtodefraysuchexpenses,orotherwise
torestorefunds(otherthancontributionstodefraysuchexpensesreceivedbysuch
committee)usedtodefraysuchexpenses.
(d)Limitationofexpenditures.
(1)Majorparties.Exceptasprovidedbyparagraph(3),thenationalcommitteeofamajor
partymaynotmakeexpenditureswithrespecttoapresidentialnominatingconvention
which,intheaggregate,exceedtheamountofpaymentstowhichsuchcommitteeis
entitledundersubsection(b)(1).
(2)Minorparties.Exceptasprovidedbyparagraph(3),thenationalcommitteeofaminor
partymaynotmakeexpenditureswithrespecttoapresidentialnominatingconvention
which,intheaggregate,exceedtheamountoftheentitlementofthenationalcommittee
ofamajorpartyundersubsection(b)(1).

Buckleyv.Valeo
(3)Exception.TheCommissionmayauthorizethenationalcommitteeofamajorpartyor
minorpartytomakeexpenditureswhich,intheaggregate,exceedthelimitation
establishedbyparagraph(1)orparagraph(2)ofthissubsection.Suchauthorizationshall
bebaseduponadeterminationbytheCommissionthat,duetoextraordinaryand
unforeseencircumstances,suchexpendituresarenecessary

Page424U.S.1,214
toassuretheeffectiveoperationofthepresidentialnominatingconventionbysuch
committee.
(e)Availabilityofpayments.Thenationalcommitteeofamajorpartyorminorpartymay
receivepaymentsundersubsection(b)(3)beginningonJuly1ofthecalendaryear
immediatelyprecedingthecalendaryearinwhichapresidentialnominatingconvention
ofthepoliticalpartyinvolvedisheld.
(f)Transfertothefund.If,afterthecloseofapresidentialnominatingconventionand
afterthenationalcommitteeofthepoliticalpartyinvolvedhasbeenpaidtheamount
whichitisentitledtoreceiveunderthissection,therearemoneysremaininginthe
accountofsuchnationalcommittee,theSecretaryshalltransferthemoneyssoremaining
tothefund.
(g)CertificationbyCommission.Anymajorpartyorminorpartymayfileastatement
withtheCommissioninsuchformandmannerandatsuchtimesasitmayrequire,
designatingthenationalcommitteeofsuchparty.Suchstatementshallincludethe
informationrequiredbysection433(b)ofTitle2,UnitedStatesCode,togetherwithsuch
additionalinformationastheCommissionmayrequire.Uponreceiptofastatementfiled
undertheprecedingsentences,theCommissionpromptlyshallverifysuchstatement
accordingtosuchproceduresandcriteriaasitmayestablishandshallcertifytothe
Secretaryforpaymentinfulltoanysuchcommitteeofamountstowhichsuchcommittee
maybeentitledundersubsection(b).Suchcertificationsshallbesubjecttoan
examinationandauditwhichtheCommissionshallconductnolaterthanDecember31of
thecalendaryearinwhichthepresidentialnominatingconventioninvolvedisheld.
(h)Repayments.TheCommissionshallhavethesameauthoritytorequirerepayments
fromthenational

Page424U.S.1,215
committeeofamajorpartyoraminorpartyasithaswithrespecttorepaymentsfromany
eligiblecandidateundersection9007(b).Theprovisionsofsection9007(c)andsection
9007(d)shallapplywithrespecttoanyrepaymentrequiredbytheCommissionunder
thissubsection.

Buckleyv.Valeo
9009.ReportstoCongressregulations.
(a)Reports.TheCommissionshall,assoonaspracticableaftereachpresidentialelection,
submitafullreporttotheSenateandHouseofRepresentativessettingforth
(1)thequalifiedcampaignexpenses(showninsuchdetailastheCommissiondetermines
necessary)incurredbythecandidatesofeachpoliticalpartyandtheirauthorized
committees
(2)theamountscertifiedbyitundersection9005forpaymenttoeligiblecandidatesof
eachpoliticalparty
(3)theamountofpayments,ifany,requiredfromsuchcandidatesundersection9007,
andthereasonsforeachpaymentrequired
(4)theexpensesincurredbythenationalcommitteeofamajorpartyorminorpartywith
respecttoapresidentialnominatingconvention
(5)theamountscertifiedbyitundersection9008(g)forpaymenttoeachsuch
committeeand
(6)theamountofpayments,ifany,requiredfromsuchcommitteesundersection9008
(h),andthereasonsforeachsuchpayment.
EachreportsubmittedpursuanttothissectionshallbeprintedasaSenatedocument.
(b)Regulations,etc.TheCommissionisauthorizedtoprescribesuchrulesand
regulationsinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofsubsection(c),toconductsuch

Page424U.S.1,216
examinationsandaudits(inadditiontotheexaminationsandauditsrequiredbysection
9007(a)),toconductsuchinvestigations,andtorequirethekeepingandsubmissionof
suchbooks,records,andinformation,asitdeemsnecessarytocarryoutthefunctionsand
dutiesimposedonitbythischapter.
(c)Reviewofregulations.
(1)TheCommission,beforeprescribinganyruleorregulationundersubsection(b),shall
transmitastatementwithrespecttosuchruleorregulationtotheSenateandtotheHouse
ofRepresentatives,inaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthissubsection.Suchstatement
shallsetforththeproposedruleorregulationandshallcontainadetailedexplanationand
justificationofsuchruleorregulation.
(2)IfeithersuchHousedoesnot,throughappropriateaction,disapprovetheproposed
ruleorregulationsetforthinsuchstatementnolaterthan30legislativedaysafterreceipt
ofsuchstatement,thentheCommissionmayprescribesuchruleorregulation.The
Commissionmaynotprescribeanyruleorregulationwhichisdisapprovedbyeithersuch
Houseunderthisparagraph.
(3)Forpurposesofthissubsection,theterm"legislativedays"doesnotincludeany
calendardayonwhichbothHousesoftheCongressarenotinsession.

Buckleyv.Valeo
9010.ParticipationbyCommissioninjudicialproceedings.
(a)Appearancebycounsel.TheCommissionisauthorizedtoappearinanddefend
againstanyactionfiledundersection9011,eitherbyattorneysemployedinitsofficeor
bycounselwhomitmayappointwithoutregardtotheprovisionsofTitle5,UnitedStates
Code,governingappointmentsinthecompetitiveservice,and

Page424U.S.1,217
whosecompensationitmayfixwithoutregardtotheprovisionsofchapter51and
subchapterIIIofchapter53ofsuchtitle.
(b)Recoveryof certainpayments.TheCommissionisauthorizedthroughattorneysand
counseldescribedinsubsection(a)toappearinthedistrictcourtsoftheUnitedStatesto
seekrecoveryofanyamountsdeterminedtobepayabletotheSecretaryasaresultof
examinationandauditmadepursuanttosection9007.
(c)Declaratoryandinjunctiverelief.TheCommissionisauthorizedthroughattorneys
andcounseldescribedinsubsection(a)topetitionthecourtsoftheUnitedStatesfor
declaratoryorinjunctivereliefconcerninganycivilmattercoveredbytheprovisionsof
thissubtitleorsection6096.UponapplicationoftheCommissionanactionbrought
pursuanttothissubsectionshallbeheardanddeterminedbyacourtofthreejudgesin
accordancewiththeprovisionsofsection2284ofTitle28,UnitedStatesCode,andany
appealshalllietotheSupremeCourt.Itshallbethedutyofthejudgesdesignatedtohear
thecasetoassignthecaseforhearingattheearliestpracticabledate,toparticipateinthe
hearinganddeterminationthereof,andtocausethecasetobeineverywayexpedited.
(d)Appeal.TheCommissionisauthorizedonbehalfoftheUnitedStatestoappealfrom,
andtopetitiontheSupremeCourtforcertioraritoreview,judgmentsordecreesentered
withrespecttoactionsinwhichitappearspursuanttotheauthorityprovidedinthis
section.

9011.Judicialreview.
(a)Reviewofcertification,determination,orotheractionbytheCommission.Any
certification,determination,orotheraction bytheCommissionmadeortakenpursuantto
theprovisionsofthischaptershallbesubjecttoreviewbytheUnitedStatesCourtof
Appealsfor

Buckleyv.Valeo
Page424U.S.1,218
theDistrictofColumbiauponpetitionfiledinsuchCourtbyanyinterestedperson.Any
petitionfiledpursuanttothissectionshallbefiledwithin30daysafterthecertification,
determination,orotheractionbytheCommissionforwhichreviewissought.
(b)Suitstoimplementchapter.
(1)TheCommission,thenationalcommitteeofanypoliticalparty,andindividuals
eligibletovoteforPresidentareauthorizedtoinstitutesuchactions,includingactionsfor
declaratoryjudgmentorinjunctiverelief,asmaybeappropriatetoimplementorconstrue
1aanyprovisionsofthischapter.
(2)ThedistrictcourtsoftheUnitedStatesshallhavejurisdictionofproceedings
institutedpursuanttothissubsectionandshallexercisethesamewithoutregardto
whetherapersonassertingrightsunderprovisionsofthissubsectionshallhaveexhausted
anyadministrativeorotherremediesthatmaybeprovidedatlaw.Suchproceedingsshall
beheardanddeterminedbyacourtofthreejudgesinaccordancewiththeprovisionsof
section 2284ofTitle28,UnitedStatesCode,andanyappealshalllietotheSupreme
Court.Itshallbethedutyofthejudgesdesignatedtohearthecasetoassignthecasefor
hearingattheearliestpracticabledate,toparticipateinthehearinganddetermination
thereof,andtocausethecasetobeineverywayexpedited.

9012.Criminalpenalties.
(a)Excessexpenses.
(1)ItshallbeunlawfulforaneligiblecandidateofapoliticalpartyforPresidentandVice
Presidentinapresidentialelectionoranyofhisauthorizedcommitteesknowinglyand
willfullytoincurqualified

Page424U.S.1,219
campaignexpensesinexcessoftheaggregatepaymentstowhichtheeligiblecandidates
ofamajorpartyareentitledundersection9004withrespecttosuchelection.Itshallbe
unlawfulforthenationalcommitteeofamajorpartyorminorpartyknowinglyand
willfullytoincurexpenseswithrespecttoapresidentialnominatingconventioninexcess
oftheexpenditurelimitationapplicablewithrespecttosuchcommitteeundersection
9008(d),unlesstheincurringofsuchexpensesisauthorizedbytheCommissionunder
section9008(d)(3).
(2)Anypersonwhoviolatesparagraph(1)shallbefinednotmorethan$5,000,or
imprisonednotmorethan1yearorboth.Inthecaseofaviolationbyanauthorized
committee,anyofficerormemberofsuchcommitteewhoknowinglyandwillfully
consentstosuchviolationshallbefinednotmorethan$5,000,orimprisonednotmore
than1year,orboth.

Buckleyv.Valeo
(b)Contributions.
(1)Itshallbeunlawfulforaneligiblecandidateofamajorpartyinapresidentialelection
oranyofhisauthorizedcommitteesknowinglyandwillfullytoacceptanycontributionto
defrayqualifiedcampaignexpenses,excepttotheextentnecessarytomakeupany
deficiencyinpaymentsreceivedoutofthefundonaccountoftheapplicationofsection
9006(d),ortodefrayexpenseswhichwouldbequalifiedcampaignexpensesbutfor
subparagraph(C)ofsection9002(11).
(2)Itshallbeunlawfulforan eligiblecandidateofapoliticalparty(otherthanamajor
party)inapresidentialelectionoranyofhisauthorizedcommitteesknowinglyand
willfullytoacceptandexpendorretaincontributionstodefrayqualified

Page424U.S.1,220
campaignexpensesinanamountwhichexceedsthequalifiedcampaignexpenses
incurredwithrespecttosuchelectionbysucheligiblecandidateandhisauthorized
committees.
(3)Anypersonwhoviolatesparagraph(1)or(2)shallbefinednotmorethan$5,000,or
imprisonednotmorethan1year,orboth.Inthecaseofaviolationbyanauthorized
committee,anyofficerormemberofsuchcommitteewhoknowinglyandwillfully
consentstosuchviolationshallbefinednotmorethan$5,000,orimprisonednotmore
than1year,orboth.
(c)Unlawfuluseofpayments.
(1)Itshallbeunlawfulforanypersonwhoreceivesanypaymentundersection9006,or
towhomanyportionofanypaymentreceivedundersuchsectionistransferred,
knowinglyandwillfullytouse,orauthorizetheuseof,suchpaymentorsuchportionfor
anypurposeotherthan
(A)todefraythequalifiedcampaignexpenseswithrespecttowhichsuchpaymentwas
madeor
(B)torepayloanstheproceedsofwhichwereused,orotherwisetorestorefunds(other
thancontributionstodefrayqualifiedcampaignexpenseswhichwerereceivedand
expended)whichwereused,todefraysuchqualifiedcampaignexpenses.
(2)Itshallbeunlawfulforthenationalcommitteeofamajorpartyorminorpartywhich
receivesanypaymentundersection9008(b)(3)touse,orauthorizetheuseof,such
paymentforanypurposeotherthanapurposeauthorizedbysection9008(c).
(3)Anypersonwhoviolatesparagraph(1)shall

Page424U.S.1,221
befinednotmorethan$10,000,orimprisonednotmorethan5years,orboth.
(d)Falsestatements,etc.
(1)Itshallbeunlawfulforanypersonknowinglyandwillfully

Buckleyv.Valeo
(A)tofurnishanyfalse,fictitious,orfraudulentevidence,books,orinformationtothe
Commissionunderthissubtitle,ortoincludeinanyevidence,books,orinformationso
furnishedanymisrepresentationofamaterialfact,ortofalsifyorconcealanyevidence,
books,orinformationrelevanttoacertificationbytheCommissionoranexamination
andauditbytheCommissionunderthischapteror
(B)tofailtofurnishtotheCommissionanyrecords,books,orinformationrequestedby
itforpurposesofthischapter.
(2)Anypersonwhoviolatesparagraph(1)shallbefinednotmorethan$10,000,or
imprisonednotmorethan5years,orboth.
(e)Kickbacksandillegalpayments.
(1)Itshallbeunlawfulforanypersonknowinglyandwillfullytogiveoracceptany
kickbackoranyillegalpaymentinconnectionwithanyqualifiedcampaignexpenseof
eligiblecandidatesortheirauthorizedcommittees.Itshallbeunlawfulforthenational
committeeofamajorpartyorminorpartyknowinglyandwillfullytogiveoracceptany
kickbackoranyillegalpaymentinconnectionwithanyexpenseincurredbysuch
committeewithrespecttoapresidentialnominatingconvention.
(2)Anypersonwhoviolatesparagraph(1)shallbefinednotmorethan$10,000,or
imprisonednotmorethan5years,orboth.

Page424U.S.1,222
(3)Inadditiontothepenaltyprovidedbyparagraph(2),anypersonwhoacceptsany
kickbackorillegalpaymentinconnectionwithanyqualifiedcampaignexpenseof
eligiblecandidatesortheirauthorizedcommittees,orinconnectionwithanyexpense
incurredbythenationalcommitteeofamajorpartyorminorpartywithrespecttoa
presidentialnominatingconvention,shallpaytotheSecretary,fordepositinthegeneral
fundoftheTreasury,anamountequalto125percentofthekickbackorpayment
received.
(f)Unauthorizedexpendituresandcontributions.
(1)Exceptasprovidedinparagraph(2),itshallbeunlawfulforanypoliticalcommittee
whichisnotanauthorizedcommitteewithrespecttotheeligiblecandidatesofapolitical
partyforPresidentandVicePresidentinapresidentialelectionknowinglyandwillfully
toincurexpenditurestofurthertheelectionofsuchcandidates,whichwouldconstitute
qualifiedcampaignexpensesifincurredbyanauthorizedcommitteeofsuchcandidates,
inanaggregateamountexceeding$1,000.
(2)Thissubsectionshallnotapplyto
(A)expendituresbyabroadcasterregulatedbytheFederalCommunications
Commission,orbyaperiodicalpublication,inreportingthenewsorintakingeditorial
positionsor
(B)expendituresbyanyorganizationdescribedinsection501(c)whichisexemptfrom
taxundersection501(a)incommunicatingtoitsmemberstheviewsofthatorganization.

Buckleyv.Valeo
(3)Anypoliticalcommitteewhichviolatesparagraph(1)shallbefinednotmorethan
$5,000,andanyofficerormemberofsuchcommitteewhoknowinglyandwillfully
consentstosuchviolationand

Page424U.S.1,223
anyotherindividualwhoknowinglyandwillfullyviolatesparagraph(1)shallbefined
notmorethan$5,000,orimprisonednotmorethan1year,orboth.
(g)Unauthorizeddisclosureofinformation.
(1)Itshallbeunlawfulforanyindividualtodiscloseanyinformationobtainedunderthe
provisionsofthischapterexceptasmayberequiredbylaw.
(2)Anypersonwhoviolatesparagraph(1)shallbefinednotmorethan$5,000,or
imprisonednotmorethan1year,orboth.

CHAPTER96PRESIDENTIALPRIMARYMATCHINGPAYMENT
ACCOUNT

9031.Shorttitle.
Thischaptermaybecitedasthe"PresidentialPrimaryMatchingPaymentAccountAct."

9032.Definitions.
Forthepurposesofthischapter
(1)Theterm"authorizedcommittee"means,withrespecttothecandidatesofapolitical
partyforPresidentandVicePresidentoftheUnitedStates,anypoliticalcommittee
whichisauthorizedinwritingbysuchcandidatestoincurexpensestofurthertheelection
ofsuchcandidates.Suchauthorizationshallbeaddressedtothechairmanofsuch
politicalcommittee,andacopyofsuchauthorizationshallbefiledbysuchcandidates
withtheCommission.Anywithdrawal ofanyauthorizationshallalsobeinwritingand
shallbeaddressedandfiledinthesamemannerastheauthorization.
(2)Theterm"candidate"meansanindividualwhoseeksnominationforelectiontobe
PresidentoftheUnitedStates.Forpurposesofthisparagraph,

Page424U.S.1,224
anindividualshallbeconsideredtoseeknominationforelectionifhe
(A)takestheactionnecessaryunderthelawofaStatetoqualifyhimselffornomination
forelection
(B)receivescontributionsorincursqualifiedcampaignexpensesor

Buckleyv.Valeo
(C)giveshisconsentforanyotherpersontoreceivecontributionsortoincurqualified
campaignexpensesonhisbehalf.
(3)Theterm"Commission"meanstheFederalElectionCommissionestablishedby
section437c(a)(1)ofTitle2,UnitedStatesCode.
(4)Exceptasprovidedbysection9034(a),theterm"contribution"
(A)meansagift,subscription,loan,advance,ordepositofmoney,oranythingofvalue,
thepaymentofwhichwasmadeonorafterthebeginningof thecalendaryear
immediatelyprecedingthecalendaryearofthepresidentialelectionwithrespecttowhich
suchgift,subscription,loan,advance,ordepositofmoney,oranythingofvalue,ismade
forthepurposeofinfluencingtheresultofaprimaryelection
(B)meansacontract,promise,oragreement,whetherornotlegallyenforceable,tomake
acontributionforanysuchpurpose
(C)meansfundsreceivedbyapoliticalcommitteewhicharetransferredtothat
committeefromanothercommitteeand
(D)meansthepaymentbyanypersonotherthanacandidate,orhisauthorized
committee,ofcompensationforthepersonalservicesofanotherpersonwhichare
renderedtothecandidateorcommitteewithoutchargebut

Page424U.S.1,225
(E)doesnotinclude
(i)exceptasprovidedinsubparagraph(D),thevalueofpersonalservicesrenderedtoor
forthebenefitofacandidatebyanindividualwhoreceivesnocompensationfor
renderingsuchservicetoorforthebenefitofthecandidateor
(ii)paymentsundersection9037.
(5)Theterm"matchingpaymentaccount"meansthePresidentialPrimaryMatching
PaymentAccountestablishedundersection9037(a).
(6)Theterm"matchingpaymentperiod"meanstheperiodbeginningwiththebeginning
ofthecalendaryearinwhichageneralelectionfortheofficeofPresidentoftheUnited
Stateswillbeheldandendingonthedateonwhichthenationalconventionoftheparty
whosenominationacandidateseeksnominatesitscandidatefortheofficeofPresidentof
theUnitedStates,or,inthecaseofapartywhichdoesnotmakesuchnominationby
nationalconvention,endingontheearlierof
(A)thedatesuchpartynominatesitscandidatefortheofficeofPresidentoftheUnited
Statesor
(B)thelastdayofthelastnationalconventionheldbyamajorpartyduringsuchcalendar
year.
(7)Theterm"primaryelection"meansanelection,includingarunoffelectionora
nominatingconventionorcaucusheldbyapoliticalparty,fortheselectionofdelegates
toanationalnominatingconventionofapoliticalparty,orfortheexpressionofa
preferenceforthenominationofpersonsforelectiontotheofficeofPresidentofthe
UnitedStates.

Buckleyv.Valeo
Page424U.S.1,226
(8)Theterm"politicalcommittee"meansanyindividual,committee,association,or
organization(whetherornotincorporated)whichacceptscontributionsorincurs
qualifiedcampaignexpensesforthepurposeofinfluencing,orattemptingtoinfluence,
thenominationofanypersonforelectionto theofficeofPresidentoftheUnitedStates.
(9)Theterm"qualifiedcampaignexpense"meansapurchase,payment,distribution,
loan,advance,deposit,orgiftofmoneyorofanythingofvalue
(A)incurredbyacandidate,orbyhisauthorizedcommittee,inconnectionwithhis
campaignfornominationforelectionand
(B)neithertheincurringnorpaymentofwhichconstitutesaviolationofanylawofthe
UnitedStatesoroftheStateinwhichtheexpenseisincurredorpaid.
Forpurposesofthisparagraph,anexpenseisincurredbyacandidateorbyanauthorized
committeeifitisincurredbyapersonspecificallyauthorizedinwritingbythecandidate
orcommittee,asthecasemaybe,toincursuchexpenseonbehalfofthecandidateorthe
committee.
(10)Theterm"State"meanseachStateoftheUnitedStatesandtheDistrictofColumbia.

9033.Eligibilityforpayments.
(a)Conditions.Tobeeligibletoreceivepaymentsundersection9037,acandidateshall,
inwriting
(1)agreetoobtainandfurnishtotheCommissionanyevidenceitmayrequestof
qualifiedcampaignexpenses
(2)agreetokeepandfurnishtotheCommissionanyrecords,books,andother
informationitmayrequestand
(3)agreetoanauditandexaminationbythe

Page424U.S.1,227
Commissionundersection9038andtopayanyamountsrequiredtobepaidundersuch
section.
(b)Expenselimitationdeclarationofintentminimumcontributions.Tobeeligibleto
receivepaymentsundersection9037,acandidateshallcertifytotheCommissionthat
(1)thecandidateandhisauthorizedcommitteeswillnotincurqualifiedcampaign
expensesinexcessofthelimitationonsuchexpensesundersection9035
(2)thecandidateisseekingnominationbyapoliticalpartyforelectiontotheofficeof
PresidentoftheUnitedStates
(3)thecandidatehasreceivedmatchingcontributionswhichintheaggregate,exceed
$5,000incontributionsfromresidentsofeachofatleast20Statesand
(4)theaggregateofcontributionscertifiedwithrespecttoanypersonunderparagraph(3)
doesnotexceed$250.

Buckleyv.Valeo
9034.Entitlementofeligiblecandidatestopayments.
(a)Ingeneral.Everycandidatewhoiseligibletoreceivepaymentsundersection9033is
entitledtopaymentsundersection 9037inanamountequaltotheamountofeach
contributionreceivedbysuchcandidateonorafterthebeginningofthecalendaryear
immediatelyprecedingthecalendaryearofthepresidentialelectionwithrespecttowhich
suchcandidateisseekingnomination,orbyhisauthorizedcommittees,disregardingany
amountofcontributionsfromanypersontotheextentthatthetotaloftheamounts
contributedbysuchpersononorafterthebeginningofsuchprecedingcalendaryear
exceeds$250.Forpurposesof thissubsectionandsection9033(b),theterm
"contribution"meansagiftofmoneymadebyawritteninstrumentwhichidentifies

Page424U.S.1,228
thepersonmakingthecontributionbyfullnameandmailingaddress,butdoesnot
includeasubscription,loan,advance,ordepositofmoney,oranythingofvalueor
anythingdescribedinsubparagraph(B),(C),or(D)ofsection9032(4).
(b)Limitations.Thetotalamountofpaymentstowhichacandidateisentitledunder
subsection(a)shallnotexceed50percentoftheexpenditurelimitationapplicableunder
section608(c)(1)(A)ofTitle18,UnitedStatesCode.

9035.Qualifiedcampaignexpenselimitation.
Nocandidateshallknowinglyincurqualifiedcampaignexpensesinexcessofthe
expenditurelimitationapplicableundersection608(c)(1)(A)ofTitle18,UnitedStates
Code.

9036.CertificationbyCommission.
(a)Initialcertifications.Notlaterthan10daysafteracandidateestablisheshiseligibility
undersection9033toreceivepaymentsundersection9037,theCommissionshallcertify
totheSecretaryforpaymenttosuchcandidateundersection9037paymentinfullof
amountstowhichsuchcandidateisentitledundersection9034.TheCommissionshall
makesuchadditionalcertificationsasmaybenecessarytopermitcandidatestoreceive
paymentsforcontributionsundersection9037.
(b)Finalityofdeterminations.InitialcertificationsbytheCommissionundersubsection
(a),andalldeterminationsmadebyitunderthischapter,arefinalandconclusive,except
totheextentthattheyaresubjecttoexaminationandauditbytheCommissionunder
section9038andjudicialreviewundersection9041.

Buckleyv.Valeo
9037.Paymentstoeligiblecandidates.
(a)Establishmentofaccount.TheSecretaryshallmaintaininthePresidentialElection
CampaignFund

Page424U.S.1,229
establishedbysection9006(a),inadditiontoanyaccountwhichhemaintainsundersuch
section,aseparateaccounttobeknownasthePresidentialPrimaryMatchingPayment
Account.TheSecretaryshalldepositintothematchingpaymentaccount,forusebythe
candidateofanypoliticalpartywhoiseligibletoreceivepaymentsundersection9033,
theamountavailableaftertheSecretarydeterminesthatamountsforpaymentsunder
section9006(c)andforpaymentsundersection9008(b)(3)areavailableforsuch
payments.
(b)Paymentsfromthematchingpaymentaccount.Uponreceiptofacertificationfrom
theCommissionundersection9036,butnotbeforethebeginningofthematching
paymentperiod,theSecretaryorhisdelegateshallpromptlytransfertheamountcertified
bytheCommissionfromthematchingpaymentaccounttothecandidate.Inmakingsuch
transferstocandidatesofthesamepoliticalparty,theSecretaryorhisdelegateshallseek
toachieveanequitabledistributionoffundsavailableundersubsection(a),andthe
Secretaryorhisdelegateshalltakeintoaccount,inseekingtoachieveanequitable
distribution,thesequenceinwhichsuchcertificationsarereceived.

9038.Examinationsandauditsrepayments.
(a)Examinationsandaudits.Aftereachmatchingpaymentperiod,theCommissionshall
conductathoroughexaminationandauditofthequalifiedcampaignexpensesofevery
candidateandhisauthorizedcommitteeswhoreceivedpaymentsundersection9037.
(b)Repayments.
(1)IftheCommissiondeterminesthatanyportionofthepaymentsmadetoacandidate
fromthematchingpaymentaccountwasinexcessoftheaggregateamountofpayments
towhichsuchcandidatewasentitledundersection9034,itshall

Page424U.S.1,230
notifythecandidate,andthecandidateshallpaytotheSecretaryorhisdelegatean
amountequaltotheamountofexcesspayments.
(2)IftheCommissiondeterminesthatanyamountofanypaymentmadetoacandidate
fromthematchingpaymentaccountwasusedforanypurposeotherthan
(A)todefraythequalifiedcampaignexpenseswithrespecttowhichsuchpaymentwas
madeor

Buckleyv.Valeo
(B)torepayloanstheproceedsofwhich wereused,orotherwisetorestorefunds(other
thancontributionstodefrayqualifiedcampaignexpenseswhichwerereceivedand
expended)whichwereused,todefrayqualifiedcampaignexpenses
itshallnotifysuchcandidateoftheamountsoused,andthecandidateshallpaytothe
Secretaryorhisdelegateanamountequaltosuchamount.
(3)Amountsreceivedbyacandidatefromthematchingpaymentaccountmaybe
retainedfortheliquidationofallobligationstopayqualifiedcampaignexpensesincurred
foraperiodnotexceeding6monthsaftertheendofthematchingpaymentperiod.After
allobligationshavebeenliquidated,thatportionofanyunexpendedbalanceremainingin
thecandidate'saccountswhichbearsthesameratiotothetotalunexpendedbalanceasthe
totalamountreceivedfromthematchingpaymentaccountbearstothetotalofall
depositsmadeintothecandidate'saccountsshallbepromptlyrepaidtothematching
paymentaccount.
(c)Notification.NonotificationshallbemadebytheCommissionundersubsection(b)
withrespecttoamatchingpaymentperiodmorethan3yearsaftertheendofsuchperiod.

Page424U.S.1,231
(d)Depositofrepayments.AllpaymentsreceivedbytheSecretaryorhisdelegateunder
subsection(b)shall bedepositedbyhiminthematchingpaymentaccount.

9039.ReportstoCongressregulations.
(a)Reports.TheCommissionshall,assoonaspracticableaftereachmatchingpayment
period,submitafullreporttotheSenateandHouseofRepresentativessettingforth
(1)thequalifiedcampaignexpenses(showninsuchdetailastheCommissiondetermines
necessary)incurredbythecandidatesofeachpoliticalpartyandtheirauthorized
committees
(2)theamountscertifiedbyitundersection9036forpaymenttoeacheligiblecandidate
and
(3)theamountofpayments,ifany,requiredfromcandidatesundersection9038,andthe
reasonsforeachpaymentrequired.
EachreportsubmittedpursuanttothissectionshallbeprintedasaSenatedocument.
(b)Regulations,etc.TheCommissionisauthorizedtoprescriberulesandregulationsin
accordancewiththeprovisionsofsubsection(c),toconductexaminationsandaudits(in
additiontotheexaminationsandauditsrequiredbysection9038(a)),toconduct
investigations,andtorequirethekeepingandsubmissionofanybooks,records,and
information,whichitdeterminestobenecessarytocarryoutitsresponsibilitiesunder
thischapter.

Buckleyv.Valeo
(c)Reviewofregulations.
(1)TheCommission,beforeprescribinganyruleorregulationundersubsection(b),shall
transmitastatementwithrespecttosuchruleorregulationtotheSenateandtotheHouse
ofRepresentatives,

Page424U.S.1,232
inaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthissubsection.Suchstatementshallsetforththe
proposedruleorregulationandshallcontainadetailedexplanationandjustificationof
suchruleorregulation.
(2)IfeithersuchHousedoesnot,throughappropriateaction,disapprovetheproposed
ruleorregulationsetforth insuchstatementnolaterthan30legislativedaysafterreceipt
ofsuchstatement,thentheCommissionmayprescribesuchruleorregulation.The
Commissionmaynotprescribeanyruleorregulationwhichisdisapprovedbyeithersuch
Houseunderthisparagraph.
(3)Forpurposesofthissubsection,theterm"legislativedays"doesnotincludeany
calendardayonwhichbothHousesoftheCongressarenotinsession.

9040.ParticipationbyCommissioninjudicialproceedings.
(a)Appearancebycounsel.TheCommissionisauthorizedtoappearinanddefend
againstanyactioninstitutedunderthissection,eitherbyattorneysemployedinitsoffice
orbycounselwhomitmayappointwithoutregardtotheprovisionsofTitle5,United
StatesCode,governingappointmentsinthecompetitiveservice,andwhose
compensationitmayfixwithoutregardtotheprovisionsofchapter51andsubchapterIII
ofchapter53ofsuchtitle.
(b)Recoveryofcertainpayments.TheCommissionisauthorized,throughattorneysand
counseldescribedinsubsection(a),toinstituteactionsinthedistrictcourtsoftheUnited
StatestoseekrecoveryofanyamountsdeterminedtobepayabletotheSecretaryorhis
delegateasaresultofanexaminationandauditmadepursuanttosection9038.

Page424U.S.1,233
(c)Injunctiverelief.TheCommissionisauthorized,throughattorneysandcounsel
describedinsubsection(a),topetitionthecourtsoftheUnitedStatesforsuchinjunctive
reliefasisappropriatetoimplementanyprovisionofthischapter.
(d)Appeal.TheCommissionisauthorizedonbehalfoftheUnitedStatestoappealfrom,
andtopetitiontheSupremeCourtforcertioraritoreview,judgmentsordecreesentered
withrespecttoactionsinwhichitappearspursuant totheauthorityprovidedinthis
section.

Buckleyv.Valeo
9041.Judicialreview.
(a)ReviewofagencyactionbytheCommission.AnyagencyactionbytheCommission
madeundertheprovisionsofthischaptershallbesubjecttoreviewbytheUnitedStates
CourtofAppealsfortheDistrictofColumbiaCircuituponpetitionfiledinsuchcourt
within30daysaftertheagencyactionbytheCommissionforwhichreviewissought.
(b)Reviewprocedures.Theprovisionsofchapter7ofTitle5,UnitedStatesCode,apply
tojudicialreviewofanyagencyaction,asdefinedinsection551(13)ofTitle5,United
StatesCode,bytheCommission.

9042.Criminalpenalties.
(a)Excesscampaignexpenses.Anypersonwhoviolatestheprovisionsofsection9035
shallbefinednotmorethan$25,000,orimprisonednotmorethan5years,orboth.Any
officerormemberofanypoliticalcommitteewhoknowinglyconsentstoanyexpenditure
inviolationoftheprovisionsofsection9035shallbefinednotmorethan$25,000,or
imprisonednotmorethan5years,orboth.
(b)Unlawfuluseofpayments.
(1)Itisunlawfulforanypersonwhoreceivesanypaymentundersection9037,orto
whomanyportion

Page424U.S.1,234
ofanysuchpaymentistransferred,knowinglyandwillfullytouse, orauthorizetheuse
of,suchpaymentorsuchportionforanypurposeotherthan
(A)todefrayqualifiedcampaignexpensesor
(B)torepayloanstheproceedsofwhichwereused,orotherwisetorestorefunds(other
thancontributionstodefrayqualifiedcampaignexpenseswhichwerereceivedand
expended)whichwereused,todefrayqualifiedcampaignexpenses.
(2)Anypersonwhoviolatestheprovisionsofparagraph(1)shallbefinednotmorethan
$10,000,orimprisonednotmorethan5years,orboth.
(c)Falsestatements,etc.
(1)Itisunlawfulforanypersonknowinglyandwillfully
(A)tofurnishanyfalse,fictitious,orfraudulentevidence,books,orinformationtothe
Commissionunderthischapter,ortoincludeinanyevidence,books,orinformationso
furnishedanymisrepresentationofamaterialfact,ortofalsifyorconcealanyevidence,
books,orinformationrelevanttoacertificationbytheCommissionoranexamination
andauditbytheCommissionunderthischapteror
(B)tofailtofurnishtotheCommissionanyrecords,books,orinformationrequestedby
itforpurposesofthischapter.

Buckleyv.Valeo
(2)Anypersonwhoviolatestheprovisionsofparagraph(1)shallbefinednotmorethan
$10,000,orimprisonednotmorethan5years,orboth.
(d)Kickbacksandillegalpayments.
(1)Itisunlawfulforanypersonknowinglyandwillfullytogiveoracceptanykickback
oranyillegal

Page424U.S.1,235
paymentinconnectionwithanyqualifiedcampaignexpenseofacandidate,orhis
authorizedcommittees,whoreceivespaymentsundersection9037.
(2)Anypersonwhoviolatestheprovisionsofparagraph(1)shallbefinednotmorethan
$10,000,orimprisonednotmorethan5years,orboth.
(3)Inadditiontothepenaltyprovidedbyparagraph (2),anypersonwhoacceptsany
kickbackorillegalpaymentinconnectionwithanyqualifiedcampaignexpenseofa
candidateorhisauthorizedcommitteesshallpaytotheSecretaryfordepositinthe
matchingpaymentaccount,anamountequalto125percentofthekickbackorpayment
received.

Buckleyv.Valeo
FOOTNOTES
Footnote1 FederalElectionCampaignActof1971,86Stat.3,asamendedbytheFederal
ElectionCampaignActAmendmentsof1974,88Stat.1263.Thepertinentportionsof
thelegislationaresetforthintheAppendixtothisopinion.
Footnote2 171U.S.App.D.C.172,519F.2d821(1975).
Footnote3 TheRevenueActof1971,TitleVIII,85Stat.562,asamended,87Stat.138,
andfurtheramendedbytheFederalElectionCampaignActAmendmentsof1974,403et
seq.,88Stat.1291.Thissubtitleconsistsoftwoparts:Chapter95dealswithfunding
nationalpartyconventionsandgeneralelectioncampaignsforpresident,andChapter96
dealswithmatchingfundsforPresidentialprimarycampaigns.
Footnote4 "437h.Judicialreview.
"(a)...
"TheCommission,thenationalcommitteeofanypoliticalparty,oranyindividual
eligibletovoteinanyelectionfortheofficeofPresidentoftheUnitedStatesmay
institutesuchactionsintheappropriatedistrictcourtoftheUnitedStates,including
actionsfordeclaratoryjudgment,asmaybeappropriatetoconstruetheconstitutionality
ofanyprovisionofthisActorofsection608,610,611,613,614,615,616,or617of
Title18.Thedistrictcourtimmediatelyshallcertifyallquestionsofconstitutionalityof
thisActorofsection608,610,611,613,614,615,616,or617ofTitle18,totheUnited
Statescourtofappealsforthecircuitinvolved,whichshallhearthemattersittingen
banc.
"(b)...
"Notwithstandinganyotherprovisionoflaw,anydecisiononamattercertifiedunder
subsection(a)ofthissectionshallbereviewablebyappealdirectlytotheSupremeCourt
oftheUnitedStates.Suchappealshallbebroughtnolaterthan20daysafterthedecision
ofthecourtofappeals.
"(c)...
"ItshallbethedutyofthecourtofappealsandoftheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates
toadvanceonthedocketandtoexpedite

Page424U.S.1,9
tothegreatestpossibleextentthedispositionofanymattercertifiedundersubsection(a)
ofthissection."
Footnote5 CenterforPublicFinancingofElections,CommonCause,theLeagueof
WomenVotersoftheUnitedStates,ChellisO'NealGregory,NormanF.Jacknis,Louise
D.Wides,DanielR.Noyes,Mrs.EdgarB.Stern,CharlesP.Taft,JohnW.Gardner,and
RuthClusen.

Buckleyv.Valeo
Footnote6 TheCourtofAppealsalsosuggestedinitsenbancorderthattheissues
arisingunderSubtitleH(relatingtothepublicfinancingofPresidentialcampaigns)might
require,under26U.S.C.9011(b)(1970ed.,Supp.IV),adifferentmodeofreviewfrom
theotherissuesraisedin thecase.ThecourtsuggestedthatathreejudgeDistrictCourt
shouldconsidertheconstitutionalityoftheseprovisionsinordertoprotectagainstthe
contingencythatthisCourtmighteventuallyholdtheseissuestobesubjectto
determinationbyathreejudgecourt,eitherunder9011(b),or28U.S.C.2282,

Page424U.S.1,10
2284.171U.S.App.D.C.168,170,519F.2d817,819(1975).Thecasewasargued
simultaneouslytoboththeCourtofAppeals,sittingenbanc,andathreejudgeDistrict
Court.ThethreejudgecourtlimiteditsconsiderationtoissuesunderSubtitleH.The
threejudgecourtadoptedtheCourtofAppeals'opiniononthesequestionsintotoand
simplyenteredanorderwithrespecttothosematters.401F.Supp.1235.Thus,two
judgmentsarebeforeus onefromeachcourt upholdingtheconstitutionalityofSubtitle
H,thoughthetwocasesbeforetheCourtwillgenerallybereferredtohereinafterinthe
singular.SincethejurisdictionofthisCourttohearatleastoneoftheappealsisclear,we
neednotresolvethejurisdictionalambiguitiesthatoccasionedthejointsittingofthe
CourtofAppealsandthethreejudgecourt.
Footnote7 Thecourtheldoneprovision,437a,unconstitutionallyvagueandoverbroad
onthegroundthattheprovisionis"`susceptibletoareadingnecessitatingreportingby
groupswhoseonlyconnectionwiththeelectiveprocessarisesfromcompletely
nonpartisanpublicdiscussionofissuesofpublicimportance.'"171U.S.App.D.C.,at
183,519F.2d,at832.Noappealhasbeentakenfromthatholding.
Footnote8 Thecourtrecognizedthatsomeofthepowersdelegatedto the

Page424U.S.1,11
Commission,whenexercisedinaconcretecontext,maybepredominantlyexecutiveor
judicialorunrelatedtotheCommission'slegislativefunctionhowever,sincethe
Commissionhadnotyetexercisedmostofthesechallengedpowers,considerationofthe
constitutionalityofthosegrantsofauthoritywaspostponed.Seen.157,infra.
Footnote9 Seen.4,supra.
Footnote10 ThisCourthasheld,forinstance,thatanorganization"mayassert,onbehalf
ofitsmembers,arightpersonaltothemtobeprotectedfromcompelleddisclosure...of
theiraffiliation."NAACPv.Alabama,357U.S.449,458 (1958).SeealsoBatesv.Little
Rock, 361U.S.516,523 n.9(1960).Similarly,partieswithsufficientconcreteinterests
atstakehavebeenheldtohavestandingtoraiseconstitutionalquestionsofseparationof
powerswithrespecttoanagencydesignatedtoadjudicatetheirrights.Palmorev.United

Buckleyv.Valeo
States, 411U.S.389 (1973)GliddenCo.v.Zdanok, 370U.S.530 (1962)Colemanv.
Miller,307U.S.433 (1939).
Footnote11 Accordingly,thetworelevantcertifiedquestionsareansweredasfollows:
1.Doesthefirstsentenceof315(a)oftheFederalElectionCampaignAct,asamended,2
U.S.C.437h(a)(1970ed.,Supp.IV),inthecontextofthisaction,requirecourtsofthe
UnitedStatestorenderadvisoryopinionsinviolationofthe"caseorcontroversy"
requirementofArticleIII,2,oftheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates?NO.
2.Haseachoftheplaintiffsallegedsufficientinjurytohisconstitutionalrights
enumeratedinthefollowingquestionstocreateaconstitutional"caseorcontroversy"
withinthejudicialpowerunderArticleIII?YES.
Footnote12 See18U.S.C.608(b)(1),(3)(1970ed.,Supp.IV).setforthinthe
Appendix,infra,at189.Anorganizationregisteredasapoliticalcommitteefornotless
thansixmonthswhichhasreceivedcontributionsfromatleast50personsandmade
contributionstoatleastfivecandidatesmaygiveupto$5,000toanycandidateforany
election.18U.S.C.608(b)(2)(1970ed.,Supp.IV),setforthintheAppendix,infra,at
189.Othergroupsarelimitedtomakingcontributionsof$1,000percandidateper
election.
Footnote13 See18U.S.C.608(e)(1970ed.,Supp.IV),setforthintheAppendix,infra,
at193194.
Footnote 14 See18U.S.C.608(a)(1970ed.,Supp.IV),setforthintheAppendix,infra,
at187189.
Footnote15 See18U.S.C.608(c)(1970ed.,Supp.IV),setforthintheAppendix,infra,
at190192.
Footnote16 ArticleI,4,oftheConstitutiongrantsCongressthepowertoregulate
electionsofmembersoftheSenateandHouseofRepresentatives.SeeSmileyv.Holm,
285U.S.355 (1932)ExparteYarbrough, 110U.S.651 (1884).AlthoughtheCourtat
onetimeindicatedthatpartyprimarycontestswerenot"elections"withinthemeaningof
Art.I,4,Newberryv.UnitedStates, 256U.S.232 (1921),itlaterheldthatprimary
electionswerewithintheConstitution'sgrantofauthoritytoCongress.UnitedStatesv.

Page424U.S.1,14
Classic,313U.S.299 (1941).TheCourthasalsorecognizedbroadcongressionalpower
tolegislateinconnectionwiththeelectionsofthepresidentandVicePresident.
Burroughsv.UnitedStates, 290U.S.534 (1934).SeePartIII,infra.
Footnote17 Thenongovernmentalappelleesarguethatjustasthedecibelsemittedbya
soundtruckcanberegulatedconsistentlywiththeFirstAmendment,Kovacsv.Cooper,
336U.S.77 (1949),theActmayrestrictthevolumeofdollarsinpoliticalcampaigns

Buckleyv.Valeo
withoutimpermissiblyrestrictingfreedomofspeech.SeeFreund,CommentaryinA.
Rosenthal,FederalRegulationofCampaignFinance:SomeConstitutionalQuestions72
(1971).Thiscomparisonunderscoresafundamentalmisconception.Thedecibel
restrictionupheldinKovacslimitedthemannerofoperatingasoundtruck,butnotthe
extentofitsproperuse.Bycontrast,theAct'sdollarceilingsrestricttheextentofthe
reasonableuseofvirtuallyeverymeansofcommunicatinginformation.AstheKovacs
Courtemphasized,thenuisanceordinanceonlybarredsoundtrucksfrombroadcasting"in
aloudandraucousmanneronthestreets,"336U.S.,at89,andimposed"norestriction
uponthecommunicationofideasordiscussionofissuesbythehumanvoice,by
newspapers,bypamphlets,bydodgers,"orbysoundtrucksoperatingatareasonable
volume.Ibid.SeeSaiav.NewYork, 334U.S.558,561562(1948).
Footnote18 Beingfreetoengageinunlimitedpoliticalexpressionsubjecttoaceilingon
expendituresislikebeingfreetodriveanautomobileasfarandasoftenasonedesireson
asingletankofgasoline.
Footnote19 Politicalpartiesthatfailtoqualifyacandidateforapositionontheballotare
classifiedas"persons"andaresubjecttothe$1,000independentexpenditureceiling.See
18U.S.C.591 (g),(i),608(e)(1),(f)(1970ed.,Supp.IV).Institutionalpressfacilities
ownedorcontrolledbycandidatesorpoliticalpartiesarealsosubjecttoexpenditure
limitsundertheAct.See18U.S.C.591(f)(4)(A),608(c)(2)(B),(e)(1)(1970ed.,
Supp.IV).
UnlessotherwiseindicatedallsubsequentstatutorycitationsinPartIofthisopinionare
toTitle18oftheUnitedStatesCode,1970edition,SupplementIV.
Footnote20 Therecordindicatesthat,asofJanuary1,1975,onefullpageadvertisement
inadailyeditionofacertainmetropolitannewspapercost$6,971.04 almostseventimes
theannuallimitonexpenditures"relativeto"aparticularcandidateimposedonthevast
majorityofindividualcitizensandassociationsby608(e)(1)
Footnote21 ThestatisticalfindingsoffactagreedtobythepartiesintheDistrictCourt
indicatethat17of65majorpartysenatorialcandidatesin1974spentmorethanthe
combinedprimaryelection,generalelection,andfundraisinglimitationsimposedbythe
Act.591(f)(4)(H),608(c)(1)(C),(D).The1972senatorialfiguresshowedthat18of
66majorpartycandidatesexceededtheAct'slimitations.Thisfiguremaysubstantially
underestimatethenumberofcandidateswhoexceededthelimitsprovidedintheAct,
sincetheActimposesseparateceilingsfortheprimaryelection,thegeneralelection,and
fundraising,anddoesnotpermitthelimitstobeaggregated.608(c)(3).Thedatafor
HouseofRepresentativeselectionsarealsoskewed,sincestatisticsreflectacombined
$168,000limitinsteadofseparate$70,000ceilingsforprimaryandgeneralelectionswith
uptoanadditional20%permittedforfundraising.591(f)(4)(H),608(c)(1)(E).Only
22ofthe810majorpartyHousecandidatesin1974and20ofthe816majorparty
candidatesin1972exceededthe$168,000figure.BothPresidentialcandidatesin1972
spentinexcessofthecombinedPresidentialexpenditureceilings.608(c)(1)(A),(B).

Buckleyv.Valeo
Footnote22 Otherfactorsrelevanttoanassessmentofthe"intensity"ofthesupport
indicatedbyacontributionincludethecontributor'sfinancialabilityandhispast
contributionhistory.
Footnote23 Statisticalfindingsagreedtobythepartiesrevealthatapproximately5.1%of
the$73,483,613raisedbythe1,161candidatesforCongressin1974wasobtainedin
amountsinexcessof$1,000.In1974,twomajorpartysenatorialcandidates,Ramsey
Clarkand

Page424U.S.1,22
SenatorCharlesMathias,Jr.,operatedlargescalecampaignsoncontributionsraised
underavoluntarilyimposed$100contributionlimitation.
Footnote24 TheActexemptsfromthecontributionceilingthevalueofallvolunteer
servicesprovidedbyindividualstoacandidateorapoliticalcommitteeandexcludesthe
first$500spentbyvolunteersoncertaincategoriesofcampaignrelatedactivities.591(e)
(5)(A)(D).Seeinfra,at3637.
TheActdoesnotdefinethephrase"forthepurposeofinfluencing"anelection that
determineswhenagift,loan,oradvanceconstitutesacontribution.Othercourtshave
giventhatphraseanarrowmeaningtoalleviatevariousproblemsinothercontexts.See
UnitedStatesv.NationalComm.forImpeachment,469F.2d1135,11391142(CA2
1972)AmericanCivilLibertiesUnionv.

Page424U.S.1,24
Jennings,366F.Supp.1041,10551057(DC1973)(threejudgecourt),vacatedasmoot
subnom.Staatsv.AmericanCivilLibertiesUnion,422U.S.1030(1975).Theuseofthe
phrasepresentsfewerproblemsinconnectionwiththedefinitionofacontribution
becauseofthelimitingconnotationcreatedbythegeneralunderstandingofwhat
constitutesapoliticalcontribution.Fundsprovidedtoacandidateorpoliticalpartyor
campaigncommitteeeitherdirectlyorindirectlythroughanintermediaryconstitutea
contribution.Inaddition,dollarsgiventoanotherpersonororganizationthatare
earmarkedforpoliticalpurposesarecontributionsundertheAct.
Footnote25 Expendituresbypersonsandassociationsthatare"authorizedorrequested"
bythecandidateorhisagentsaretreatedascontributionsundertheAct.Seen.53,infra.
Footnote26 Contributionlimitationsalonewouldnotreducethegreaterpotentialvoice
ofaffluentpersonsandwellfinancedgroups,whowouldremainfreetospendunlimited
sumsdirectlytopromotecandidatesandpoliciestheyfavorinanefforttopersuade
voters.

Buckleyv.Valeo
Footnote27 Yet,aceilingonthesizeofcontributionswouldaffectonlyindirectlythe
costsofpoliticalcampaignsbymakingitrelativelymoredifficultforcandidatestoraise
largeamountsofmoney.In1974,forexample,94.9%ofthefundsraisedbycandidates
forCongresscamefromcontributionsof$1,000orless,seen.23,supra.Presumably,
someorallofthecontributionsinexcessof$1,000couldhavebeenreplacedthrough
effortstoraiseadditionalcontributionsfrompersonsgivinglessthan$1,000.Itisthe
Act'scampaignexpenditurelimitations,608(c),notthecontributionlimits,thatdirectly
addresstheoverallscopeoffederalelectionspending.
Footnote28 TheCourtofAppeals'opinioninthiscasediscussedanumberoftheabuses
uncoveredafterthe1972elections.See171U.S.App.D.C.,at190191,andnn.3638,
519F.2d,at839840,andnn.3638.
Footnote29 AlthoughtheCourtinLetterCarriersfoundthatthisinterestwas
constitutionallysufficienttojustifylegislationprohibitingfederalemployeesfrom
engagingincertainpartisanpoliticalactivities,itwascarefultoemphasizethatthe
limitationsdidnotrestrictanemployee'srighttoexpresshisviewsonpoliticalissuesand
candidates.413U.S.,at561,568,575576,579.Seen.54,infra.
Footnote30 TheAct'sdisclosureprovisionsarediscussedinPartII,infra.
Footnote31 Whileprovidingsignificantlimitationsontheabilityofallindividualsand
groupstocontributelargeamountsofmoneytocandidates,theAct'scontributionceilings
donotforeclosethemakingofsubstantialcontributionstocandidatesbysomemajor
specialinterestgroupsthroughthecombinedeffectofindividualcontributionsfrom
adherentsortheproliferationofpoliticalfundseachauthorizedundertheActto
contributetocandidates.Asaprimeexample,610permitscorporationsandlaborunions
toestablishsegregatedfundstosolicitvoluntarycontributionstobeutilizedforpolitical
purposes.Corporateandunionresourceswithoutlimitationmaybeemployedto
administerthesefundsandtosolicitcontributionsfromemployees,stockholders,and
unionmembers.Eachseparatefundmaycontributeupto$5,000percandidateper
electionsolongasthefundqualifiesasapoliticalcommitteeunder608(b)(2).SeeS.
Rep.No.931237,pp.5052

Page424U.S.1,29
(1974)FederalElectionCommission,AdvisoryOpinion197523,40Fed.Reg.56584
(1975).
TheActplacesnolimitonthenumberoffundsthatmaybeformedthroughtheuseof
subsidiariesordivisionsofcorporations,oroflocalandregionalunitsofanationallabor
union.Thepotentialforproliferationofthesesourcesofcontributionsisnotinsignificant.
In1972,approximately1,824,000activecorporationsfiledfederalincometaxreturns.
InternalRevenueService,PreliminaryStatisticsofIncome1972,CorporationIncome
TaxReturns,p.1(pub.159(1174)).(Itisnotclearwhetherthistotalincludessubsidiary
corporationswheretheparentfiledaconsolidatedreturn.)Inthesameyear,71,409local

Buckleyv.Valeo
unionswerecharteredbynationalunions.DepartmentofLabor,BureauofLabor
Statistics,DirectoryofNationalUnionsandEmployeeAssociations1973,p.87(1974).
TheActallowsthemaximumcontributiontobemadebyeachunit'sfundprovidedthe
decisionorjudgmenttocontributetoparticularcandidatesismadebythefund
independentlyofcontrolordirectionbytheparentcorporationorthenationalorregional
union.SeeS.Rep.No.931237,pp.5152(1974).
Footnote32 TheAct'slimitationsapplicabletobothcampaignexpendituresanda
candidate'spersonalexpendituresonhisownbehalfarescaledtotakeaccountofthe
differencesintheamountsofmoneyrequiredforcongressionalandPresidential
campaigns.See608(a)(1),(c)(1)(A)(E).
Footnote33 Inthisdiscussion,weaddressonlytheargumentthatthecontribution
limitationsaloneimpressiblydiscriminateagainstnonincumbents.Wedonotaddressthe
moreseriousargumentthattheselimitations,incombinationwiththelimitationon
expendituresbyindividualsandgroups,thelimitationonacandidate'suseofhisown
personalandfamilyresources,andtheoverallceilingoncampaignexpenditures
invidiouslydiscriminateagainstmajorpartychallengersandminorpartycandidates.
Sinceanincumbentissubjecttotheselimitationstothesamedegreeashisopponent,the
Act,onitsface,appearstobeevenhanded.Theappearanceoffairness,however,may
notreflectpoliticalreality.Althoughsomeincumbentsaredefeatedinevery
congressionalelection,itisaxiomaticthatanincumbentusuallybeginstheracewith
significantadvantages.Inadditiontothefactorsofvoterrecognitionandthestatus
accruingtoholdingfederaloffice,theincumbenthasaccesstosubstantialresources
providedbytheGovernment.TheseincludelocalandWashingtonoffices,staffsupport,
andthefrankingprivilege.Wheretheincumbenthasthesupportofmajorspecialinterest
groupswhichhavetheflexibilitydescribedinn.31,supra,andisfurthersupportedbythe
media,theoveralleffectofthecontributionandexpenditurelimitationsenactedby
Congresscouldforecloseanyfairopportunityofasuccessfulchallenge.
However,sincewedecideinPartIC,infra,thattheceilingsonindependent
expenditures,onthecandidate'sexpendituresfromhispersonalfunds,andonoverall
campaignexpendituresareunconstitutionalundertheFirstAmendment,weneednot
expressanyopinionwithregardtotheallegedinvidiousdiscriminationresultingfromthe
fullsweepofthelegislationasenacted.
Footnote34 In1974,forexample,40majorpartychallengersdefeatedincumbent
membersoftheHouseofRepresentativesinthegeneralelection.Fourincumbent
Senatorsweredefeatedbymajorpartychallengersinthe1974primaryandgeneral
electioncampaigns.
Footnote35 Inthe1974racesfortheHouseofRepresentatives,threeofthe22major
partycandidatesexceedingthecombinedexpenditurelimitscontainedintheActwere
challengerstoincumbentsandninewerecandidatesinracesnotinvolvingincumbents.
Thecomparable1972statisticsindicatethat14ofthe20majorpartycandidates
exceedingthecombinedlimitswerenonincumbents.

Buckleyv.Valeo
Footnote36 In1974,majorpartychallengersoutspentHouseincumbentsin22%ofthe
races,and22ofthe40challengerswhodefeatedHouseincumbentsoutspenttheir
opponents.In1972,24%ofthemajorpartychallengersinsenatorialelectionsoutspent
theirincumbentopponents.The1974statisticsforsenatorialcontestsrevealsubstantially
greaterfinancialdominancebyincumbents.
Footnote37 Ofthe$3,781,254incontributionsraisedin1974bycongressional
candidatesoverandabovea$1,000percontributorlimit,almosttwiceasmuchmoney
wenttoincumbentsastomajorpartychallengers.
Footnote38 AppellantscontendthattheActdiscriminatesagainstchallengers,because,
whileitlimitscontributionstoallcandidates,theGovernmentmakesavailableother
materialresourcestoincumbents.Seen.33,supra.Yet,takingcognizanceofthe
advantagesanddisadvantagesofincumbency,thereislittleindicationthatthe$1,000
contributionceilingwillconsistentlyharmtheprospectsofchallengersrelativeto
incumbents.
Footnote39 BetweenSeptember1,1973,andDecember31,1974,majorparty
candidatesfortheHouseandSenateraisedover$3,725,000incontributionsoverand
above$1,000comparedto$55,000raisedbyminorpartycandidatesinamounts
exceedingthe$1,000contributionlimit.
Footnote40 AppellantLibertarianParty,accordingtoestimatesofitsnationalchairman,
hasreceivedonly10contributionsinexcessof$1,000outofatotalof4,000
contributions.Eventhese10contributionswouldhavebeenpermissibleundertheActif
thedonordidnotearmarkthefundsforaparticularcandidateanddidnotexceedthe
overall$25,000contributionceilingforthecalendaryear.See608(b).Similarly,
appellantsConservativeVictoryFundandAmericanConservativeUnionhavereceived
onlyaninsignificantportionoftheirfundingthroughcontributionsinexcessof$1,000.
TheaffidavitoftheexecutivedirectoroftheConservativeVictoryFundindicatesthatin
1974,atypicalfundraisingyear,theFundreceivedapproximately$152,000throughover
9,500individualcontributions.Onlyoneofthe9,500contributions,an$8,000
contributionearmarkedforaparticularcandidate,exceeded$1,000.In1972,theFund
receivedonlythreecontributionsinexcessof$1,000,allofwhichmighthavebeenlegal
undertheActifnotearmarked.AndbetweenApril7,1972,andFebruary28,1975,the
AmericanConservativeUniondidnotreceiveanyaggregatecontributionsexceeding
$1,000.Moreover,theCommitteeforaConstitutionalPresidency McCarthy'76,
anotherappellant,engagedinaconcertedefforttoraisecontributionsinexcessof$1,000
beforetheeffectivedateoftheActbutobtainedonlyfivecontributionsinexcessof
$1,000.
Althoughappellantsclaimthatthe$1,000ceilinggoverningcontributionstocandidates
willpreventtheacquisitionofseedmoneynecessarytolaunchcampaigns,theabsenceof
experienceundertheActpreventsusfromevaluatingthisassertion.Asappelleesnote,it
isdifficulttoassesstheeffectofthecontributionceilingontheacquisitionofseedmoney
sincecandidateshavenotpreviouslyhadtomakeaconcertedefforttoraisestartup
fundsinsmallamounts.

Buckleyv.Valeo
Footnote41 AppellantBuckleywasaminorpartycandidatein1970whenhewaselected
totheUnitedStatesSenatefromtheStateofNewYork.
Footnote42 Althoughexpendituresincidentaltovolunteerserviceswouldappearself
limiting,itispossibleforaworkerinacandidate'scampaigntogeneratesubstantial
travelexpenses.AnaffidavitsubmittedbyStewartMott,anappellant,indicatesthathe
"expendedsome$50,000forpersonalexpenses"inconnectionwithSenatorMcGovern's
1972Presidentialcampaign.
Footnote43 TheActcontainsidentical,parallelprovisionspertainingtoincidental
volunteerexpensesunderthedefinitionsofcontributionandexpenditure.Compare591
(e)(5)(B)(D)with591(f)(4)(D),(E).Thedefinitionshavetwoeffects.First,volunteer
expensesthatarecountedascontributionsbythevolunteerwouldalsoconstitute
expendituresbythecandidate'scampaign.Second,somevolunteerexpenseswould
qualifyascontributionswhereasotherswouldconstituteindependentexpenditures.The
statutedistinguishesbetweenindependentexpendituresbyindividualsandcampaign
expendituresonthebasisofwhetherthecandidate,anauthorizedcommitteeofthe
candidate,oranagentofthecandidate"authorizedorrequested"theexpenditure.See608
(c)(2)(B)(ii),(e)(1)S.Rep.No.93689,p.18(1974)H.R.Rep.No.931239,p.6
(1974).Asaresult,onlytravelthatis"authorizedorrequested"bythecandidateorhis
agentswouldinvolveincidentalexpenseschargeableagainstthevolunteer'scontribution
limitandthecandidate'sexpenditureceiling.Seen.53,infra.Shouldaperson
independentlytravelacrossthecountrytoparticipateinacampaign,anyunreimbursed
travelexpenseswouldnotbetreatedasacontribution.Thisinterpretationisnotonly
consistentwiththestatute

Page424U.S.1,38
andthelegislativehistorybutisalsonecessarytoavoidtheadministrativechaosthat
wouldbeproducedifeachvolunteerandcandidatehadtokeeptrackofamountsspenton
unsolicitedtravelinordertocomplywiththeAct'scontributionandexpenditureceilings
andthereportinganddisclosureprovisions.Thedistinctionbetweencontributionsand
expendituresisalsodiscussedatn.53,infra,andinPartIIC2,infra.
Footnote44 Seen.19,supra.
Footnote45 Thesamebroaddefinitionof"person"applicabletothecontribution
limitationsgovernsthemeaningof"person"in608(e)(1).Thestatuteprovidessome
limitedexceptionsthroughvariousexclusionsfromtheotherwisecomprehensive
definitionof"expenditure."See591(f).Themostimportantexclusionsare:(1)"any
newsstory,commentary,oreditorialdistributedthroughthefacilitiesofanybroadcasting
station,newspaper,magazine,orotherperiodicalpublication,unlesssuchfacilitiesare
ownedorcontrolledbyanypoliticalparty,politicalcommittee,orcandidate,"591(f)(4)

Buckleyv.Valeo
Page424U.S.1,40
(A),and(2)"anycommunicationbyanymembershiporganizationorcorporationtoits
membersorstockholders,ifsuchmembershiporganizationorcorporationisnot
organizedprimarilyforthepurposeofinfluencingthenominationforelection,or
election,ofanypersontoFederaloffice,"591(f)(4)(C).Inaddition,theActsets
substantiallyhigherlimitsforpersonalexpendituresbyacandidateinconnectionwithhis
owncampaign,608(a),expendituresbynationalandstatecommitteesofpoliticalparties
thatsucceedinplacingacandidateontheballot,591(i),608(f),andtotalcampaign
expendituresbycandidates,608(c).
Footnote46 Section608(i)providesthatanypersonconvictedofexceedinganyofthe
contributionorexpenditurelimitations"shallbefinednotmorethan$25,000or
imprisonednotmorethanoneyear,orboth."
Footnote47 Severalofthepartieshavesuggestedthatproblemsofambiguityregarding
theapplicationof608(e)(1)tospecificcampaignspeechcouldbehandledbyrequesting
advisoryopinionsfromtheCommission.Whileacomprehensiveseriesofadvisory
opinionsoraruledelineatingwhatexpendituresare"relativetoaclearlyidentified
candidate"mightalleviatetheprovision'svaguenessproblems,relianceonthe
Commissionisunacceptablebecausethevastmajorityofindividualsandgroupssubject
tocriminalsanctionsforviolating608(e)(1)donothavearighttoobtainanadvisory
opinionfromtheCommission.See2U.S.C.437f(1970ed.,Supp.IV).Section437f(a)
ofTitle2accordsonlycandidates,federal

Page424U.S.1,41
officeholders,andpoliticalcommitteestherighttorequestadvisoryopinionsanddirects
thattheCommission"shallrenderanadvisoryopinion,inwriting,withinareasonable
time"concerningspecificplannedactivitiesortransactionsofanysuchindividualor
committee.ThepowersdelegatedtotheCommissionthusdonotassurethatthe
vaguenessconcernswillberemediedpriortothechillingofpoliticaldiscussionby
individualsandgroupsinthisorfutureelectionyears.
Footnote48 Insuchcircumstances,vaguelawsmaynotonly"traptheinnocentbynot
providingfairwarning"orfoster"arbitraryanddiscriminatoryapplication"butalso
operatetoinhibitprotectedexpressionbyinducing"citizensto`steerfarwiderofthe
unlawfulzone'...thaniftheboundariesoftheforbiddenareaswereclearlymarked.'"
Graynedv.CityofRockford, 408U.S.104,108109(1972),quotingBaggettv.Bullitt,
377U.S.360,372 (1964),quotingSpeiserv.Randall,357U.S.513,526 (1958).
"BecauseFirstAmendmentfreedomsneedbreathingspacetosurvive,governmentmay
regulateintheareaonlywithnarrowspecificity."NAACPv.Button, 371U.S.415,433
(1963).
Footnote49 Thisinterpretationof"relativeto"aclearlyidentifiedcandidateissupported
bythediscussionof608(e)(1)intheSenateReport,S.Rep.No.93689,p.19(1974),

Buckleyv.Valeo
theHouseReport,H.R.Rep.No.931239,p.7(1974),theConferenceReport,S.Conf.
Rep.No.931237,pp.5657(1974),andtheopinionoftheCourtofAppeals,171U.S.
App.D.C.,at203204,519F.2d,at852853.
Footnote50 Inconnectionwithanotherprovisioncontainingthesameadvocacylanguage
appearingin608(e)(1),theCourtofAppealsconcluded:
"Publicdiscussionofpublicissueswhichalsoarecampaignissuesreadilyandoften
unavoidablydrawsincandidatesandtheirpositions,theirvotingrecordsandother
officialconduct.Discussionsofthoseissues,andaswellmorepositiveeffortsto
influencepublicopiniononthem,tendnaturallyandinexorablytoexertsomeinfluence
onvotingatelections."171U.S.App.D.C.,at226,519F.2d,at875.
Footnote51 Section608(e)(2)defines"clearlyidentified"torequirethatthecandidate's
name,photographordrawing,orotherunambiguousreferencetohisidentityappearas
partofthecommunication.Suchotherunambiguousreferencewouldincludeuseofthe
candidate'sinitials(e.g.,FDR),thecandidate'snickname(e.g.,Ike),hisoffice(e.g.,the
PresidentortheGovernorofIowa),orhisstatusasa

Page424U.S.1,44
candidate(e.g.,theDemocraticPresidentialnominee,thesenatorialcandidateofthe
RepublicanPartyofGeorgia).
Footnote52 Thisconstructionwouldrestricttheapplicationof608(e)(1)to
communicationscontainingexpresswordsofadvocacyofelectionordefeat,suchas
"votefor,""elect,""support,""castyourballotfor,""SmithforCongress,""voteagainst,"
"defeat,""reject."
Footnote53 Section608(e)(1)doesnotapplytoexpenditures"onbehalfofacandidate"
withinthemeaningof608(c)(2)(B).Thelattersubsectionprovidesthatexpenditures
"authorizedorrequestedbythecandidate,anauthorizedcommitteeofthecandidate,or
anagentofthecandidate"are tobetreatedasexpendituresofthecandidateand
contributionsbythepersonorgroupmakingtheexpenditure.TheHouseandSenate
Reportsprovideguidanceindifferentiatingindividualexpendituresthatarecontributions
andcandidateexpendituresunder608(c)(2)(B)fromthosetreatedasindependent
expendituressubjecttothe608(e)(1)ceiling.TheHouseReportspeaksofindependent
expendituresascosts"incurredwithouttherequestorconsentofacandidateorhis
agent."H.R.Rep.No.931239, p.6(1974).TheSenateReportaddressestheissuein
greaterdetail.Itprovidesanexampleillustratingthedistinctionbetween"authorizedor
requested"expendituresexcludedfrom608(e)(1)andindependentexpenditures
governedby608(e)(1):
"[A]personmightpurchasebillboardadvertisementsendorsingacandidate.Ifhedoesso
completelyonhisown,andnotattherequestorsuggestionofthecandidateorhisagent's
[sic]thatwouldconstitutean`independentexpenditureonbehalfofacandidate'

Buckleyv.Valeo
Page424U.S.1,47
undersection614(c)ofthebill.Thepersonmakingtheexpenditurewouldhavetoreport
itassuch.
"However,iftheadvertisementwasplacedincooperationwiththecandidate'scampaign
organization,thentheamountwouldconstituteagiftbythesupporterandanexpenditure
bythecandidate justasiftherehadbeenadirectcontributionenablingthecandidateto
placetheadvertisement,himself.Itwouldbesoreportedbyboth."S.Rep.No.93689,p.
18(1974).
TheConferencesubstituteadoptedtheprovisionoftheSenatebilldealingwith
expendituresbyanyperson"authorizedorrequested"tomakeanexpenditurebythe
candidateorhisagents.S.Conf.Rep.No.931237,p.55(1974).Inviewofthis
legislativehistoryandthepurposesoftheAct,wefindthatthe"authorizedorrequested"
standardoftheActoperatestotreatallexpendituresplacedincooperationwithorwith
theconsentofacandidate,hisagents,oranauthorizedcommitteeofthecandidateas
contributionssubjecttothelimitationssetforthin608(b).
Footnote54 AppelleesmistakenlyrelyonthisCourt'sdecisioninCSCv.LetterCarriers,
assupporting608(e)(1)'srestrictionon thespendingofmoneytoadvocatetheelection
ordefeatofaparticularcandidate.InupholdingtheHatchAct'sbroadrestrictionsonthe
associationalfreedomsoffederalemployees,theCourtrepeatedlyemphasizedthe
statutoryprovisionandcorrespondingregulationpermittinganemployeeto"`[e]xpress
hisopinionasanindividualprivatelyandpubliclyonpoliticalsubjectsandcandidates.'"
413U.S.,at579,quoting5CFR733.111(a)(2).See413U.S.,at561568,575576.
AlthoughtheCourt"unhesitatingly"foundthatastatuteprohibitingfederalemployees
fromengaginginawidevarietyof"partisanpoliticalconduct"would"unquestionablybe
valid,"itcarefullydeclinedtoendorseprovisionsthreateningpoliticalexpression.Seeid.,
at556,579581.TheCourtdidnotruleontheconstitutionalquestionspresentedbythe
regulationsforbiddingpartisancampaignendorsementsthroughthemediaand
speechmakingtopoliticalgatheringsbecauseitfoundthattheserestrictionsdidnot
"makethestatutesubstantiallyoverbroadandsoinvalidonitsface."Id.,at581.
Footnote55 NeitherthevotingrightscasesnortheCourt'sdecisionupholdingtheFederal
CommunicationsCommission'sfairnessdoctrinelendssupporttoappellees'positionthat
theFirstAmendmentpermitsCongresstoabridgetherightsofsomepersonstoengagein
politicalexpressioninordertoenhancetherelativevoiceofothersegmentsofour
society.
Casesinvalidatinggovernmentallyimposedwealthrestrictionsontherighttovoteorfile
asacandidateforpublicofficerestontheconclusionthatwealth"isnotgermanetoone's
abilitytoparticipateintelligentlyintheelectoralprocess"andisthereforeaninsufficient
basisonwhichtorestrictacitizen'sfundamentalrighttovote.Harperv.VirginiaBd.of
Elections,383U.S.663,668 (1966).SeeLubinv.Panish,415U.S.709 (1974)Bullock
v.Carter, 405U.S.134 (1972)Phoenixv.Kolodziejski,399U.S.204 (1970).These
votingcasesandthereapportionmentdecisionsservetoassurethatcitizensareaccorded
anequalrighttovotefortheirrepresentativesregardlessoffactorsofwealthor
geography.Buttheprinciplesthatunderlieinvalidationofgovernmentallyimposed
restrictionsonthefranchisedonotjustifygovernmentallyimposedrestrictionson

Buckleyv.Valeo
politicalexpression.Democracydependsonawellinformedelectorate,notacitizenry
legislativelylimitedinitsabilitytodiscussanddebatecandidatesandissues.
InRedLionBroadcastingCo.v.FCC, 395U.S.367(1969),theCourtupheldthe
politicaleditorialandpersonalattackportionsof

Page424U.S.1,50
theFederalCommunicationsCommission'sfairnessdoctrine.Thatdoctrinerequires
broadcastlicenseestodevoteprogramingtimetothediscussionofcontroversialissuesof
publicimportanceandtopresentbothsidesofsuchissues.RedLion"makesclearthat
thebroadcastmediaposeuniqueandspecialproblemsnotpresentinthetraditionalfree
speechcase,"bydemonstratingthat"`itisidletopositanunbridgeableFirstAmendment
righttobroadcastcomparabletotherightofeveryindividualtospeak,write,orpublish.'"
ColumbiaBroadcastingv.DemocraticComm.,412U.S.94,101 (1973),quotingRed
LionBroadcastingCo.,supra,at388.RedLionthereforeundercutsappellees'claimthat
608(e)(1)'slimitationsmaypermissiblyrestricttheFirstAmendmentrightsof
individualsinthis"traditionalfreespeechcase."Moreover,incontrasttotheundeniable
effectof608(e)(1),thepresumedeffectofthefairnessdoctrineisoneof"enhancingthe
volumeandqualityofcoverage"ofpublicissues.395U.S.,at393.
Footnote56 TheActexemptsmostelementsoftheinstitutionalpress,limitingonly
expendituresbyinstitutionalpressfacilitiesthatareownedorcontrolledbycandidates
andpoliticalparties.See591(f)(4)(A).But,whateverdifferencestheremaybebetween
theconstitutionalguaranteesofafreepressandoffreespeech,itisdifficulttoconceive
ofanyprincipledbasisuponwhichtodistinguish608(e)(1)'slimitationsuponthepublic
atlargeandsimilarlimitationsimposeduponthepressspecifically.
Footnote57 The$35,000ceilingonexpendituresbycandidatesfortheSenatealso
appliestocandidatesfortheHouseofRepresentativesfromStatesentitledtoonlyone
Representative.608(a)(1)(B).
TheCourtofAppealstreated608(a)asrelaxingthe$1,000percandidatecontribution
limitationimposedby608(b)(1)soastopermitanymemberofthecandidate's
immediatefamily spouse,child,grandparent,brother,sister,orspouseofsuchpersons
to

Page424U.S.1,52
contributeuptothe$25,000overallannualcontributionceilingtothecandidate.See171
U.S.App.D.C.,at205,519F.2d,at854.TheCommissionhasrecentlyadoptedasimilar
interpretationoftheprovision.SeeFederalElectionCommission,AdvisoryOpinion
197565(Dec.5,1975),40Fed.Reg.58393.However,boththeCourtofAppealsandthe
CommissionapparentlyoverlookedtheConferenceReportaccompanyingthefinal
versionoftheActwhichexpresslyprovidesforacontraryinterpretationof608(a):

Buckleyv.Valeo
"Itistheintentoftheconfereesthatmembersoftheimmediatefamilyofanycandidate
shallbesubjecttothecontributionlimitationsestablishedbythislegislation.Ifa
candidatefortheofficeofSenator,forexample,alreadyisinapositiontoexercise
controloverfundsofamemberofhisimmediatefamilybeforehebecomesacandidate,
thenhecoulddrawuponthesefundsuptothelimitof$35,000.If,however,the
candidatedidnothaveaccesstoorcontroloversuchfundsatthetimehebecamea
candidate,theimmediatefamilymemberwouldnotbepermittedtograntaccessor
controltothecandidateinamountsupto$35,000,iftheimmediatefamilymember
intendsthatsuchamountsaretobeusedinthecampaignofthecandidate.Theimmediate
familymemberwouldbepermittedmerelytomakecontributionstothecandidatein
amountsnotgreaterthan$1,000foreachelectioninvolved."S.Conf.Rep.No.931237,
p.58(1974).
Footnote58 TheCourtofAppealsevidentlyconsideredthepersonalfundsexpendedby
thecandidateonhisownbehalfasacontributionratherthananexpenditure.See171
U.S.App.D.C.,at205,519F.2d,at854.However,unlikeaperson'scontributiontoa
candidate,acandidate'sexpenditureofhispersonalfundsdirectlyfacilitateshisown
politicalspeech.
Footnote59 ThelegislativehistoryoftheActclearlyindicatesthat608(a)wasnot
intendedtosuspendtheapplicationofthe$1,000contributionlimitationof608(b)(1)
formembersofthecandidate'simmediatefamily.Seen.57,supra.Althoughtheriskof
improperinfluenceissomewhatdiminishedinthecaseoflargecontributionsfrom
immediatefamilymembers,wecannotsaythatthedangerissufficientlyreducedtobar
Congressfromsubjectingfamilymemberstothesamelimitationsasnonfamily
contributors.
Thelimitationonacandidate'sexpenditureofhisownfundsdiffersmarkedlyfroma
limitationonfamilycontributionsbothintheabsenceofanythreatofcorruptionandthe
presenceofalegislative

Page424U.S.1,54
restrictiononthecandidate'sabilitytofundhisowncommunicationwiththevoters.
Footnote60 Expendituresmadebyanauthorizedcommitteeofthecandidateoranyother
agentofthecandidateaswellasanyexpenditurebyanyotherpersonthatis"authorized
orrequested"bythecandidateorhisagentarechargedagainstthecandidate'sspending
ceiling.608(c) (2)(B).
Footnote61 ExpendituresmadebyoronbehalfofaVicePresidentialcandidateofa
politicalpartyareconsideredtohavebeenmadebyoronbehalfoftheparty's
Presidentialcandidate.608(c)(2)(A).
Footnote62 Thecampaignceilingscontainedin608(c)wouldhaverequiredareduction
inthescopeofanumberofpreviouscongressionalcampaignsandsubstantiallylimited

Buckleyv.Valeo
theoverallexpendituresofthetwomajorpartyPresidentialcandidatesin1972.Seen.
21,supra.
Footnote63 Thisnormalrelationshipmaynotapplywherethecandidatedevotesalarge
amountofhispersonalresourcestohiscampaign.
Footnote64 Asanopiniondissentinginpartfromthedecisionbelownoted:"Ifa
senatorialcandidatecanraise$1fromeachvoter,whatevilisexacerbatedbyallowing
thatcandidatetouseallthatmoneyforpoliticalcommunication?Iknowofnone."171
U.S.App.D.C.,at268,519F.2d,at917(Tamm,J.).
Footnote65 ForthereasonsdiscussedinPartIII,infra,Congressmayengageinpublic
financingofelectioncampaignsandmayconditionacceptanceofpublicfundsonan
agreementbythecandidatetoabidebyspecifiedexpenditurelimitations.Justasa
candidatemayvoluntarilylimitthesizeofthecontributionshechoosestoaccept,hemay
decidetoforgoprivatefundraisingandacceptpublicfunding.
Footnote66 SubtitleHoftheInternalRevenueCodealsoestablishedseparatelimitations
forgeneralelectionexpendituresbynationalandstatecommitteesofpoliticalparties,
608(f),andfornationalpoliticalpartyconventionsforthenominationofPresidential
candidates.26U.S.C.9008(d)(1970ed.,Supp.IV).Appellantsdonotchallengethese
ceilingsonFirstAmendmentgrounds.Instead,theycontendthattheprovisions
discriminateagainstindependentcandidatesandregionalpoliticalpartieswithout
nationalcommitteesbecausetheypermitadditionalspendingbypoliticalpartieswith
nationalcommittees.Ourdecisiontodayholding608(e)(1)'sindependentexpenditure
limitationunconstitutionaland608(c)'scampaignexpenditureceilingsunconstitutional
removesthepredicateforappellants'discriminationclaimbyeliminatinganyalleged
advantagetopoliticalpartieswithnationalcommittees.
Footnote67 Accordingly,theanswerstothecertifiedconstitutionalquestionspertaining
totheAct'scontributionandexpenditurelimitationsareasfollows:
3.Doesanystatutorylimitation,ordotheparticularlimitationsinthechallengedstatutes,
ontheamountsthatindividualsororganizationsmaycontributeorexpendinconnection
withelectionsforfederalofficeviolatetherightsofoneormoreoftheplaintiffsunder
theFirst,Fifth,orNinthAmendmentortheDueProcessClauseoftheFifthAmendment
oftheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates?
(a)Does18U.S.C.608(a)(1970ed.,Supp.IV)violatesuchrights,inthatitforbidsa
candidateorthemembersofhisimmediatefamilyfromexpendingpersonalfundsin
excessoftheamountsspecifiedin18U.S.C.608(a)(1)(1970ed.,Supp.IV)?
Answer:YES.
(b)Does18U.S.C.608(b)(1970ed.,Supp.IV)violatesuchrights,inthatitforbidsthe
solicitation,receiptormakingofcontributionsonbehalfofpoliticalcandidatesinexcess
oftheamountsspecifiedin18U.S.C.608(b)(1970ed.,Supp.IV)?
Answer:NO.
(c)Do18U.S.C.591(e)and608(b)(1970ed.,Supp.IV)violatesuchrights,inthatthey
limittheincidentalexpenseswhichvolunteersworkingonbehalfofpoliticalcandidates

Buckleyv.Valeo
mayincurtotheamountsspecifiedin18U.S.C.591(e) and608(b)(1970ed.,Supp.
IV)?
Answer:NO.
(d)Does18U.S.C.608(e)(1970ed.,Supp.IV)violatesuchrights,inthatitlimitsto
$1,000theindependent(notonbehalfofacandidate)expendituresofanypersonrelative
toanidentifiedcandidate?
Answer:YES.
(e)Does18U.S.C.608(f)(1970ed.,Supp.IV)violatesuchrights,inthatitlimitsthe
expendituresofnationalorstatecommitteesofpoliticalpartiesinconnectionwith
generalelectioncampaignsforfederaloffice?
Answer:NO,astotheFifthAmendmentchallengeadvancedbyappellants.
(f)Does9008oftheInternalRevenueCodeof1954violate

Page424U.S.1,60
suchrights,inthatitlimitstheexpendituresofthenationalcommitteeofapartywith
respecttopresidentialnominatingconventions?
Answer:NO,astotheFifthAmendmentchallengeadvancedbyappellants.
(h)Does18U.S.C.608(b)(2)(1970ed.,Supp.IV)violatesuchrights,inthatitexcludes
fromthedefinitionof"politicalcommittee"committeesregisteredforlessthantheperiod
oftimeprescribedinthestatute?
Answer:NO.
4.Doesanystatutorylimitation,ordotheparticularlimitationsinthechallengedstatutes,
ontheamountsthatcandidatesforelectedfederalofficemayexpendintheircampaigns
violatetherightsofoneormoreoftheplaintiffsundertheFirstorNinthAmendmentor
theDueProcessClauseoftheFifthAmendment?
(a)Does18U.S.C.608(c)(1970ed.,Supp.IV)violatesuchrights,inthatitforbids
expendituresbycandidatesforfederalofficeinexcessoftheamountsspecifiedin18
U.S.C.608(c)(1970ed.,Supp.IV)?
Answer:YES.
Footnote68 Unlessotherwiseindicated,allstatutorycitationsinPartII ofthisopinion
aretoTitle2oftheUnitedStatesCode,1970edition,SupplementIV.
Footnote69 Appellantsdocontendthatthereshouldbeablanketexemptionfromthe
disclosureprovisionsforminorparties.SeePartIIB2,infra.
Footnote70 TheCourtofAppeals'rulingthat437aisunconstitutionalwasnotappealed.
Seen.7,supra.
Footnote71 Pastdisclosurelawswererelativelyeasytocircumventbecausecandidates
wererequiredtoreportonlycontributionsthattheyhadreceivedthemselvesorthatwere
receivedbyothersforthemwiththeirknowledgeorconsent.307,43Stat.1072.Thedata
thatwerereportedwerevirtuallyimpossibletousebecausetherewerenouniformrules
forthecompilingofreportsorprovisionsforrequiringcorrectionsandadditions.See

Buckleyv.Valeo
Redish,CampaignSpendingLawsandtheFirstAmendment,46N.Y.U.L.Rev.900,
905(1971).
Footnote72 SeePartI,supra.TherelevantprovisionsofTitle2aresetforthinthe
Appendixtothisopinion,infra,at144etseq.
Footnote73 NAACPv.Alabama,357U.S.,at463.SeealsoGibsonv.Florida
LegislativeComm.,372U.S. 539,546 (1963)NAACPv.Button,371U.S.,at438Bates
v.LittleRock,361U.S.,at524.
Footnote74 Id.,at525.
Footnote75 Gibsonv.FloridaLegislativeComm.,supra,at546.
Footnote76 TheCourtofAppealsheldthattheapplicabletestforevaluatingtheAct's
disclosurerequirementsisthatadoptedinUnitedStatesv.O'Brien,391U.S.367 (1968),
inwhich"`speech'and`nonspeech'elements[were]combinedinthesamecourseof
conduct."Id.,at376.O'Brienisappropriate,theCourtofAppealsfound,becausetheAct
isdirectedtowardthespendingofmoney,andmoneyintroducesanonspeechelement.
AsthediscussioninPartIA,supra,indicates,O'Brienisinapposite,formoneyisa
neutralelementnotalwaysassociatedwithspeechbutanecessaryandintegralpartof
many,perhapsmost,formsofcommunication.Moreover,theO'Brientestwouldnotbe
met,evenifitwereapplicable.O'Brienrequiresthat"thegovernmentalinterest[be]
unrelatedtothesuppressionoffreeexpression."Id.,at377.Thegovernmentalinterest
furtheredbythedisclosurerequirementsisnotunrelatedtothe"suppression"ofspeech
insofarastherequirementsaredesignedtofacilitatethedetectionofviolationsofthe
contributionandexpenditurelimitationssetoutin18U.S.C.608(1970ed.,Supp.IV).
Footnote77 H.R.Rep.No.92564,p.4(1971).
Footnote78 Ibid.S.Rep.No.93689,p.2(1974).
Footnote79 Wehavesaidelsewherethat"informedpublicopinionisthemostpotentof
allrestraintsuponmisgovernment."Grosjeanv.American PressCo., 297U.S.233,250
(1936).Cf.UnitedStatesv.Harriss,347U.S.612,625(1954)(upholdingdisclosure
requirementsimposedonlobbyistsbytheFederalRegulationofLobbyingAct,TitleIII
oftheLegislativeReorganizationActof1946,60Stat.839).
Footnote80 L.Brandeis,OtherPeople'sMoney62(NationalHomeLibraryFoundation
ed.1933).
Footnote81 Seesupra,at60.
Footnote82 Postelectiondisclosurebysuccessfulcandidatesissuggestedasaless
restrictivewayofpreventingcorruptpressuresonofficeholders.Delayeddisclosureof
thissortwouldnotservetheequallyimportantinformationalfunctionplayedbypre

Buckleyv.Valeo
electionreporting.Moreover,thepublicinterestinsourcesofcampaignfundsislikelyto
beatitspeakduringthecampaignperiodthatisthetimewhenimproperinfluencesare
mostlikelytobebroughttolight.
Footnote83 NoristhisacasecomparabletoPollardv.Roberts,283F.

Page424U.S.1,70
Supp.248(EDArk.)(threejudgecourt),aff'd,393U.S.14 (1968),inwhichanArkansas
prosecutingattorneysoughttoobtain,byasubpoenaducestecum,therecordsofa
checkingaccount(includingnamesofindividualcontributors)establishedbyaspecific
party,theRepublicanPartyofArkansas.
Footnote84 SeeDevelopmentsintheLawElections,88Harv.L.Rev.1111,1247n.75
(1975).
Footnote85 SeeWilliamsv.Rhodes, 393U.S.23,32(1968)("Thereis,ofcourse,no
reasonwhytwopartiesshouldretainapermanentmonopolyontherighttohavepeople
votefororagainstthem.Competitioninideasandgovernmentalpoliciesisatthecoreof
our electoralprocessandoftheFirstAmendmentfreedoms")Sweezyv.New
Hampshire,354U.S.234,250251(1957)(pluralityopinion).
Footnote86 Cf.Talleyv.California,362U.S.60,6465(1960).
Footnote87 Allegationsmadebyabranch oftheSocialistWorkersPartyinacivilaction
seekingtodeclaretheDistrictofColumbiadisclosureandfilingrequirements
unconstitutionalasappliedtoitsrecordswereheldtobesufficienttowithstandamotion
todismissinDoev.Martin,404F.Supp.753(1975)(threejudgecourt).TheDistrictof
Columbiaprovisionsrequireeverypoliticalcommitteetokeeprecordsofcontributionsof
$10ormoreandtoreportcontributorsof$50ormore.
Footnote88 Forexample,acampaignworkerwhohadsolicitedcampaignfundsforthe
LibertarianPartyinNewYorktestifiedthattwopersonssolicitedinaPartycampaign
"refusedtocontributebecausetheywereunwillingfortheirnamestobedisclosedor
published."Noneoftheappellantsoffersstrongerevidenceofthreatsorharassment.
Footnote89 Thesecriteriaweresuggestedinanopinionconcurringinpartanddissenting
inpartfromthedecisionbelow.171U.S.App.D.C.,at258n.1,519F.2d,at907n.1
(Bazelon,C.J.).
Footnote90 Ageisalsounderinclusiveinthatitwouldpresumablyleavelong
establishedbutunpopularpartiessubjecttothedisclosurerequirements.TheSocialist
LaborParty,whichisnotapartytothislitigationbutwhichhasfiledanamicusbriefin
supportofappellants,claimstobeabletoofferevidenceof"directsuppression,
intimidation,harassment,physicalabuse,andlossofeconomicsustenance"relatingtoits

Buckleyv.Valeo
contributors.BriefforSocialistLaborPartyasAmicusCuriae6.ThePartyhasbeenin
existencesince1877.
Footnote91 171U.S.App.D.C.,at258,519F.2d,at907n.1(BazelonC.J.).
Footnote92 Id.,at260,519F.2d,at909.SeealsoDevelopmentsintheLawElections,
88Harv.L.Rev.1111,12471249(1975).
Footnote93 SeeAppendixtothisopinion,infra,at160.
Footnote94 SeePartIC1,supra.
Footnote95 305,86Stat.16.
Footnote96 88Stat.1265.
Footnote97 S.Rep.No.92229,p.57(1971).
Footnote98 Seen.71,supra.
Footnote99 Section441(a)provides:"Anypersonwhoviolatesanyof

Page424U.S.1,77
theprovisionsofthissubchaptershallbefinednotmorethan$1,000orimprisonednot
morethanoneyear,orboth."
Footnote100 431(e),(f).SeeAppendixtothisopinion,infra,at145149.
Footnote101 Seesupra,at6163.
Footnote102 S.Rep.No.9296,p.33(1971)S.Rep.No.93689,pp.12(1974).
Footnote103 Seen.53,supra.
Footnote104 SeePartIC1,supra.
Footnote105 Section431(d)defines"politicalcommittee"as"anycommittee,club,
association,orothergroupofpersonswhichreceivescontributionsormakes
expendituresduringacalendaryearinanaggregateamountexceeding$1,000."
Footnote106 Atleasttwolowercourts,seekingtoavoidquestionsofunconstitutionality,
haveconstruedthedisclosurerequirementsimposedon"politicalcommittees"by434(a)
tobenonapplicabletononpartisanorganizations.UnitedStatesv.NationalComm.for
Impeachment,469F.2d,at11391142AmericanCivilLibertiesUnionv.Jennings,366

Buckleyv.Valeo
F.Supp.,at10551057.Seealso171U.S.App.D.C.,at214n.112,519F.2d,at863n.
112.
Footnote107 Somepartisancommitteesgroups withinthecontrolofthecandidateor
primarilyorganizedforpoliticalactivitieswillfallwithin434(e)becausetheir
contributionsandexpendituresfallinthe$100to$1,000range.Groupsofthissortthat
donothavecontributionsandexpendituresover$1,000arenot"politicalcommittees"
withinthedefinitionin431(d)thosewhosetransactionsarenotasgreatas$100arenot
requiredtofilestatementsunder434(e).
Footnote108 Seen.52,supra.