1.

People vs Ferrer
Facts:
On March 10, 1970, a prima facie case was filed against Feliciano Co in the
Court of First Instance in Tarlac concerning the Anti-Subversion Act. He was
accused of being an officer or a ranked leader of the Communist Party of the
Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the
government of the Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion
or any other illegal means. Co claimed that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of
attainder. On May 25, 1970, Nilo Tayag and five others were also charged in
the same court with subversion. Tayag copied Cos attack on the law. The
court ruled the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and
that it is vague overbroad. Government appealed to the SC as a special civil
action for certiorari.
Issues:
Relevant: WoN the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder
Irrelevant: WoN it is vague and overbroad
Irrelevant: WoN it denies the defendants the due process of the law
Held And Ratio:
Relevant: No. Only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to
easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict
punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder.
(US v. Lovett 328 US 303 1946)
Irrelevant: No. The contention about the word overthrow regarding the
government (peaceful overthrowing) is clarified by the provision of the
clause: by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion or any other illegal
means.
Irrelevant: No. The freedom of expression and freedom of association is
superseded by the right of the state to self-preservation.
Decision: The questioned resolution is set aside.
2. Taada vs Tuvera
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern
as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be
published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to

compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various

presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal
of the case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the
instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law
or statute becomes valid and enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in
the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its
effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It
would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for
the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in
the Official Gazette. The word shall therein imposes upon respondent
officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional
right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given
substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general
applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of
general application which have not been published have no force and effect.
3. Pesigan vs. Angeles
FACTS:
Petitioners Anselmo and Marcelino Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in a
10-wheeler truck in April 1982, 26 carabaos and a calf, from Camarines Sur to
Batangas. Despite the health certificate, permit to transport, and certificate
of inspection issued to them by the provincial veterinarian, provincial

commander and constabulary command, respectively, while petitioners were

negotiating the town of Basud, Camarines Norte, the carabaos were
confiscated by private respondents, Police Station Commander Lt. Zanarosa,
and provincial veterinarian Dr. Miranda. The confiscation was based on
Executive Order 626-A which prohibited the transport of carabaos from one
province to another. Pursuant to EO 626-A, Dr Miranda distributed the
carabaos to 25 farmers of Basud. Petitioners filed for recovery of the
carabaos and damages, against private respondent Judge Angeles who heard
the case in Daet and later transferred to Caloocan City, and dismissed the
case for lack of cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 626-A be enforced before its publication in the
Official Gazette.
HELD:
Said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2,
1982 because, as already noted, it is a penal regulation published more than
two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became
effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code
and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars
and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise
the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties
binding on the persons affected thereby.
4. Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons
FACTS: Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to
reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
robbery, arson and kidnapping (along with Agapito, Palmares and Padua). The
decision for the first two petitioners was rendered on March 8, 1954 and the
third on Dec. 5, 1955. The last petitioner Bagolbagol was penalized with
reclusion perpetua on Jan. 12, 1954. Each of the petitioners have been
imprisoned for more than 13 years by virtue of their convictions.
They now invoke the doctrine laid down in People v. Hernandez which
negated such complex crime, a ruling which was not handed down until after
their convictions have become final. In People v. Hernandez, the SC ruled that
the information against the accused for rebellion complexed with murder,
arson and robbery was not warranted under Art. 134 of the RPC, there being
no such complex offense. This ruling was not handed down until after their
convictions have become final. Since Hernandez served more than the

maximum penalty that could have been served against him, he is entitled to
freedom, and thus, his continued detention is illegal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 22 of the RPC which gives a penal judgment a
retroactive effect is applicable in this case (WON judicial decisions favourable
to the accused/convicted for the same crime can be applied retroactively)
RULING: Yes. Judicial decisions favourable to the accused must be applied
retroactively. Petitioners relied on Art. 22 of the RPC, which states the penal
laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favour the accused who is
not a habitual criminal. The Civil Code also provides that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the Constitution forms part of our legal
system. Petitioners even raised their constitutional right to equal protection,
given that Hernandez et al., has been convicted for the same offense as they
have, though their sentences were lighter. Habeas corpus is the only means
of benefiting the accused by the retroactive character of a favorable decision.
5. People vs. Manaba (To be digested :D)
VICKERS, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of Judge Eulalio Garcia in this Court of
First Instance of Oriental Negros in criminal case No. 1827 dated November
15, 1932, finding the defendant guilty of rape and sentencing him to suffer
seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal, and the accessory
penalties of the law, to indemnify the offended party, Celestina Adapon, in
the amount of P500, to maintain the offspring, if any, at P5 a month until said
offspring should become of age, and to pay the costs.
The defendant appealed to this court, and his attorney de oficio now
makes the following assignments of error:
1. El juzgado a quo erro al no estimar en favor del acusado apelante la
defensa de double jeopardy o legal jeopardy que ha interpuesto.
2. El Juzgado a quo erro al no declarar insuficientes las pruebas de
identificacion del acusado apelante.
3. El Juzgado a quo tambien erro al pasar por alto las incoherencias de los
testigos de la acusacion y al no declarar que no se ha establecido fuera de
toda duda la responsabilidad del apelante.
4. El Juzgado a quo erro al condenar al acusado apelante por el delito de
violacion y al no acceder a su mocion de nueva vista.
It appears that on May 10, 1932, the chief of police of Dumaguete
subscribed and swore to a criminal complaint wherein he charged Pedro

Manaba with the crime of rape, committed on the person of Celestina

Adapon. This complaint was filed with the justice of the peace of Dumaguete
on June 1, 1932 and in due course the case reached the Court of First
Instance. The accused was tried and convicted, but on motion of the attorney
for the defendant the judgment was set aside and the case dismissed on the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or
the subject matter of the action, because the complaint had not been filed by
the offended party, but by the chief of police (criminal case No. 1801).
On August 17, 1932, the offended girl subscribed and swore to a
complaint charging the defendant with the crime of rape. This complaint was
filed in the Court of First Instance (criminal case No. 1872), but was referred
to the justice of the peace of Dumaguete for preliminary investigation. The
defendant waived his right to the preliminary investigation, but asked for the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that he had previously been placed
in jeopardy for the same offense. This motion was denied by the justice of the
peace, and the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance, where the
provincial fiscal in an information charged the defendant with having
committed the crime of rape as follows:
Que en o hacia la noche del dia 9 de mayo de 1932, en el Municipio de
Dumaguete, Provincia de Negros Oriental, Islas Filipinas, y dentro de la
jurisdiccion de este Juzgado. el referido acusado Pedro Manaba,
aprovechandose de la oscuridad de la noche y mediante fuerza, violencia e
intimidacion, voluntaria, ilegal y criminalmente yacio y tuvo acceso carnal
con una nia llamada Celestina Adapon, contra la voluntad de esta. El
acusado Pedro Manaba ya ha sido convicto por Juzgado competente y en
sentencia firme por este mismo delito de violacion.
Hecho cometido con infraccion de la ley.
The defendant renewed his motion for dismissal in the case on the
ground of double jeopardy, but his motion was denied; and upon the
termination of the trial the defendant was found guilty and sentenced as
hereinabove stated.
Whether the defendant was placed in jeopardy for the second time or
not when he was tried in the present case depends on whether or not he was
tried on a valid complaint in the first case. The offense in question was
committed on May 9, 1932, or subsequent to the date when the Revised
Penal Code became effective.
The third paragraph of the article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, which
relates to the prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction,
rape and acts of lasciviousness reads as follows:

The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness,

shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party
or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender
has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may
be.
The Spanish text of this paragraph is as follows:
Tampoco puede procederse por causa de estupro, rapto, violacion o
abusos deshonestos, sino en virtud de denuncia de la parte agraviada, o de
sus padres, o abuelos o tutor, ni despues de haberse otorgado al ofensor,
perdon expreso por dicha partes, segun los casos.
It will be observed that the Spanish equivalent of the word "filed" is not
found in the Spanish text, which is controlling, as it was the Spanish text of
the Revised Penal Code that was approved by the Legislature.
The first complaint filed against the defendant was signed and sworn to
by the chief of police of Dumaguete. As it was not the complaint of the
offended party, it was not a valid complaint in accordance with the law. The
judgment of the court was therefore void for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, and the defendant was never in jeopardy.
It might be observed in this connection that the judgment was set
aside and the case dismissed on the motion of defendant's attorney, who
subsequently set up the plea of double jeopardy in the present case.
The other assignments of error relate to the sufficiency of the
evidence, which in our opinion fully sustains the findings of the trial judge.
The recommendation of the Solicitor-General is erroneous in several
respects, chiefly due to the fact that it is based on the decision of July 30,
1932 that was set aside, and not on the decision now under consideration.
The accused should not be ordered to acknowledge the offspring, if should
there be any, because the record shows that the accused is a married man.
It appears that the lower court should have taken into consideration
the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity. The defendant is therefore
sentenced to suffer seventeen years, four months, and one day of reclusion
temporal, to indemnify the offended party, Celestina Adapon, in the sum of
P500, and to support the offspring, if any. As thus modified, the decision
appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of both instances against the
appellant.
6. Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners
Facts: Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against the

Board of Medical Examiners. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing
of an administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants
announced that he would present as his first witness the petitioner.
Thereupon, petitioner, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying
on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself.
Petitioner then alleged that to compel him to take the witness stand, the
Board of Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion
for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it
could call petitioner to the witness stand and interrogate him, the right
against self-incrimination being available only when a question calling for an
incriminating answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged that the
right against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative
hearing. Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could
not be compelled to be the first witness of the complainants, he being the
party proceeded against in an administrative charge for malpractice. Hence,
this appeal by respondent Board.
Issue: Whether or Not compelling petitioner to be the first witness of the
complainants violates the Self-Incrimination Clause.
Held: The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a
medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical
Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the
person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent. The
Court found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle
that "the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer
incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand." If petitioner
would be compelled to testify against himself, he could suffer not the
forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a medical
practitioner. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence:
"The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be
used as a presumption of his guilt." It is the right of a defendant "to forego
testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand
with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will."
The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted
an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished
and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be
accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of
respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the
democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those
suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. The constitutional
foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must

accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.

7. People vs. Wong Cheng
Facts:
The appellant, in representation of the Attorney General, filed an appeal that
urges the revocation of a demurrer sustained by the Court of First Instance of
Manila presented by the defendant. The defendant, accused of having
illegally smoked opium aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English
nationality while the said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay, two and a half
miles from the shores of the city. In the said demurrer, the defendant
contended the lack of jurisdiction of the lower court of the said crime, which
resulted to the dismissal of the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime
committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdictional waters.
Held:
Yes. The crime in the case at bar was committed in our internal waters thus
the Philippine courts have a right of jurisdiction over the said offense. The
Court said that having the opium smoked within our territorial waters even
though aboard a foreign merchant ship is a breach of the public order
because it causes such drugs to produce pernicious effects within our
territory. Therefore, the demurrer is revoked and the Court ordered further
proceedings.
2 fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with
International Law
French rule-according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant
vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose
territorial jurisdiction they were committed
UNLESS: their commission affects the peace and security of the territory
English rule
-based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States
-according to which crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in
general triable in the courts of the country within territory they were
committed.
8. US vs Look Chaw

FACTS:
Upon arrival of steamship Erroll of English nationality, that it came from
Hongkong, and that it was bound for Mexico, via the call ports of Manila and
Cebu, 2 sacks of opium where found during the inspection and search of the
cargo.
o Smaller sack of opium on the cabin near the saloon
o larger sack in the hold
Later on, there was also 4 cans of opium found on the part of the ship where
the firemen habitually sleep the firemen and crew of foreign vessels,
pursuant to the instructions he had from the Manila custom-house, were
permitted to retain certain amounts of opium, always provided it should not
be taken shore so it was returned.
2 charges were filed against Look Chaw at the Court of First Instance of Cebu:
o unlawful possession of opium
o unlawful sale of opium
Look Chaw admitted that he had bought these sacks of opium, in Hongkong
with the intention of selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and
that, as his hold had already been searched several times for opium, he
ordered two other Chinamen to keep the sack.
The court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the crime had
been committed within its district, on the wharf of Cebu. The court sentenced
him to5 years imprisonment, to pay a fine of P10,000, with additional
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvencyxxx It further ordered the
confiscation, in favor of the Insular Government.
ISSUE: W/N the Philippine court has jurisdiction.
HELD: YES. Modified by reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to
six months and P1,000

GR: mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands,

aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does NOT constitute a
crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel being
considered as an extension of its own nationality

EX: when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine
Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon
Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the laws of the land with
respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of

the commission of the crime, only the court established in that said place
itself had competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an
international treaty.
9. US vs Ah Sing
FACTS: The defendant is a subject of China employed as a fireman on a
steamship. The steamship is a foreign steamer which arrived the port of Cebu
on April 25, 1917, after a voyage direct from the port of Saigon. The
defendant bought eight cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on board the
steamship and had them in his possession during the trip from Saigon to
Cebu. When the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu, the authorities on
making the search found the cans of opium hidden in the ashes below the
boiler of the steamer's engine. The defendant confessed that he was the
owner of the opium and that he had purchased it in Saigon. He did not
confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the opium. He did not say that
it was his intention to import the prohibited drug.
ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of illegal importation of opium into the
Philippine Islands has been proven?
RULING: Yes. It is the onus of the government to prove that the vessel from
which the drug discharged came into Philippine waters from a foreign country
with the drug on board. In this case, it is to be noted that Sec. 4 of Act No.
2381 begins, Any person who shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited
drug into the Philippine Islands Import and bring should be construed as
synonymous terms. The mere act of going into a port, without breaking bulk,
is prima facie evidence of importation. The importation is not the making
entry of goods at the customhouse, but merely the bringing them into the
port, and the importation is complete before the entry to the customhouse.
Moreover, possession for personal use is unlikely, judging from the size of the
amount brought.
10. Barrioquinto vs Fernandez
FACTS
Petitioner Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto were charged with the
crime of murder. Barrioquinto had not yet been arrested. The case proceeded
against Jimenez and he was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Before the period of perfecting an appeal had expired, Jimenez availed of
Proclamation No. 8. However, the Amnesty Commission had their cases
returned to the CFI-Zamboanga, without deciding whether or not they are
entitled to the benefit s of the said Amnesty Proclamation, on the ground that
neither Barrioquinto alleged that it was Hipolito Tolentino who shot and killed

the victim, they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.

ISSUE
WON petitioners are precluded from availing the benefits of Amnesty as they
have not admitted to the commission of the crime.
RULING
No. Respondents fail to differentiate between amnesty and pardon.
In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation of
1946, it is not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua
non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is
charged and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the
evidence either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense
committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation.
11. People vs. Hassan