Aristotle: Biology

Aristotle (384-322 B.C.E.) may be said to be the

first biologist in the Western tradition. Though there are physicians and
other natural philosophers who remark on various flora and fauna before
Aristotle, none of them brings to his study a systematic critical
empiricism. Aristotles biological science is important to understand, not
only because it gives us a view into the history and philosophy of science,
but also because it allows us more deeply to understand his nonbiological works, since certain key concepts from Aristotles biology
repeat themselves in his other writings. Since a significant portion of the
corpus of Aristotles work is on biology, it is natural to expect his work in
biology to resonate in his other writings. One may, for example, use
concepts from the biological works to better understand the ethics or
metaphysics of Aristotle.

This article will begin with a brief explanation of his biological views and
move toward several key explanatory concepts that Aristotle employs.
These concepts are essential because they stand as candidates for a
philosophy of biology. If Aristotles principles are insightful, then he has
gone a long way towards creating the first systematic and critical system
of biological thought. It is for this reason (rather than the particular
observations themselves) that moderns are interested in Aristotles
biological writings.

Table of Contents
1. His Life
2. The Scope of Aristotles Biological Works
3. The Specialist and the Generalist
4. The Two Modes of Causal Explanation
5. Aristotles Theory of Soul
6. The Biological Practice: Outlines of a Systematics
7. The more and the less and Epi to polu
8. Significant Achievements and Mistakes
9. Conclusion
10. References and Further Reading
a. Primary Text
b. Key Texts in Translation
c. Selected Secondary Sources

1. His Life
Aristotle was born in the year 384 B.C. in the town of Stagira (the modern
town Stavros), a coastal Macedonian town to the north of Greece. He was
raised at the court of Amyntas where he probably met and was friends
with Philip (later to become king and father to Alexander, the Great).
When Aristotle was around 18, he was sent to Athens to study in Platos
Academy. Aristotle spent twenty years at the Academy until Platos death,
although Diogenes says Aristotle left before Platos death. When Plato
was succeeded by his nephew, Speusippus, as head of the Academy,
Aristotle accepted an invitation to join a former student, Hermeias, who
was gathering a Platonic circle about him in Assos in Mysia (near Troy).
Aristotle spent three years in this environment. During this time, he may
have done some of the natural investigations that later became The
History of Animals.

At the end of Aristotles stay in Mysia, he moved to Lesbos (an adjacent

island). This move may have been prompted by Theophrastus, a fellow of
the Academy who was much influenced by Aristotle. It is probable

(according to DArcy Thompson) that Aristotle performed some

important biological investigations during this period.
Aristotle returned to Athens (circa 334-5). This began a period of great
productivity. He rented some grounds in woods sacred to Apollo. It was
here that Aristotle set-up his school (Diog. Laert V, 51).
At his school Aristotle also accumulated a large number of manuscripts
and created a library that was a model for later libraries in Alexandria
and Pergamon. According to one tradition, Alexander (his former pupil)
paid him a handsome sum of money each year as a form of gratitude (as
well as some exotic animals for Aristotle to study that Alexander
encountered in his conquests).
At the death of Alexander in 323, Athens once again was full of antiMacedonian sentiment. A charge of impiety was brought against Aristotle
due to a poem he had written for Hermeias. One martyr for philosophy
(Socrates) was enough for Aristotle and so he left his school to his
colleague, Theophrastus, and fled to the Macedonian Chalcis. Here in 322
he died of a disease that is still the subject of speculation.

2. The Scope of Aristotles Biological

Works
There is some dispute as to which works should be classified as the
biological works of Aristotle. This is indeed a contentious question that is
especially difficult for a systematic philosopher such as Aristotle.
Generally speaking, a systematic philosopher is one who constructs
various philosophical distinctions that, in turn, can be applied to a
number of different contexts. Thus, a distinction such as the more and
the less that has its roots in biology explaining that certain animal parts
are greater (bigger) among some individuals and smaller among others,
can also be used in the ethics as a cornerstone of the doctrine of the mean
as a criterion for virtue. That is, one varies from the mean by the principle
of the more and the less. For example, if courage is the mean, then the

defect of excess would be foolhardiness while the defect of paucity

would be cowardice. The boundary between what wed consider
biology proper vs. what wed think of as psychology, philosophy of
mind, and metaphysics is often hard to draw in Aristotle. Thats because
Aristotles understanding of biology informs his metaphysics and
philosophy of mind, but likewise, he often uses the distinctions drawn in
his metaphysics in order to deal with biological issues.
In this article, the biological works are: (a) works that deal specifically
with biological topics such as: The Parts of Animals (PA), The Generation of
Animals (GA), The History of Animals (HA), The Movement of Animals, The
Progression of Animals, On Sense and Sensible Objects, On Memory and
Recollection, On Sleep and Waking, On Dreams, On Prophecy in Sleep, On
Length and Shortness of Life, On Youth and Old Age, On Life and Death, On
Respiration, On Breath, and On Plants, and (b) the work that deals
with psuche (soul), On the Soulthough this work deals with metaphysical
issues very explicitly, as well. This list does not include works such as
the Metaphysics, Physics, Posterior Analytics, Categories, Nicomachean
Ethics, or The Politicseven though they contain many arguments that are
augmented by an understanding of Aristotles biological science. Nor
does this article examine any of the reputedly lost works (listed by ancient
authors but not existing today) such as Dissections, On Composite Animals,
On Sterility, On Physiognomy, and On Medicine . Some of these titles may
have sections that have survived in part within the present corpus, but
this is doubtful.

3. The Specialist and the Generalist

The distinction between the specialist and the generalist is a good starting
point for understanding Aristotles philosophy of biology. The specialist
is one who has a considerable body of experience in practical fieldwork
while the generalist is one who knows many different areas of study. This
distinction is brought out in Book One of the Parts of Animals (PA). At PA
639a 1-7 Aristotle says,

In all study and investigation, be it exalted or mundane, there appear to be two

types of proficiency: one is that of exact, scientific knowledge while the other is
a generalists understanding. (my tr.)
Aristotle does not mean to denigrate or to exalt either. Both are necessary
for natural investigations. The generalists understanding is holistic and
puts some area of study into a proper genus, while scientific knowledge
deals with causes and definitions at the level of the species. These two
skills are demonstrated by the following example:
An example of what I mean is the question of whether one should take a single
species and state its differentia independently, for example, homo sapiens nature
or the nature of Lions or Oxen, etc., or should we first set down common
attributes or a common character (PA 639a 15-19, my tr.).
In other words, the methodology of the specialist would be to observe and
catalogue each separate species by itself. The generalist, on the other
hand, is drawn to making more global connections through an
understanding of the common character of many species. Both skills are
needed. Here and elsewhere Aristotle demonstrates the limitations of a
single mode of discovery. We cannot simply set out a single path toward
scientific investigationwhether it be demonstrative (logical) exactness
(the specialists understanding) or holistic understanding (the
generalists knowledge). Neither direction (specialist or generalist) is the
one and only way to truth. Really, it is a little of both working in tandem.
Sometimes one half takes the lead and sometimes the other. The
adoption of several methods is a cornerstone of Aristotelian pluralism, a
methodological principle that characterizes much of his work.
When discussing biological science, Aristotle presents the reader two
directions: (a) the modes of discovery (genetic order) and (b) the
presentation of a completed science (logical order). In the mode of
discovery, the specialist sets out all the phenomena in as much detail as
possible while the generalist must use her inter-generic knowledge to sort
out what may or may not be significant in the event taking place before
her. This is because in the mode of discovery, the investigator is in the
genetic order. Some possible errors that could be made in this order (for
example) might be mistaking certain animal behaviors for an end for
which they were not intended. For example, it is very easy to mistake

mating behavior for aggressive territorial behavior. Since the generalist

has seen many different types of animals, she may be in the best position
(on the basis of generic analogy) to classify the sort of behavior in
question.
In the mode of discovery one begins with the phenomenon and then seeks
to create a causal explanation (PA 646a 25). But how does one go about
doing this? In the Posterior Analytics II.19, Aristotle suggests a process of
induction that begins with the particular and then moves to the universal.
Arriving at the universal entails a comprehensive understanding of some
phenomenon. For example, if one wanted to know whether fish sleep, one
would first observe fish in their environment. If one of the behaviors of
the fish meets the common understanding of sleep (such as being
deadened to outside stimulus, showing little to no movement, and so
forth), then one may move to the generalization that fish sleep (On
Sleeping and Waking 455b 8, cf. On Dreams 458b 9). But one cannot stop
there. Once one has determined that fish sleep (via the inductive mode of
discovery), it is now up to the researcher to ferret out the causes and
reasons why, in a systematic fashion. This second step is the mode of
presentation. In this mode the practitioner of biological science seeks to
understand why the universal is as it is. Going back to the example of
sleeping fish, the scientist would ask why fish need to sleep. Is it by
analogy to humans and other animals that seem to gather strength
through sleep? What ways might sleep be dangerous (say by opening the
individual fish to being eaten)? What do fish do to avoid this?
These, and other questions require the practitioner to work back and
forth with what has been set down in the mode of discovery for the
purpose of providing an explanation. The most important tools for this
exercise are the two modes of causal explanation.

4. The Two Modes of Causal Explanation

For Aristotle there are four causes: material, efficient, formal, and final.
The material cause is characterized as That out of which something
existing becomes (Phys. 194b 24). The material has the potential for the

range of final products. Within the material is, in a potential sense, that
which is to be formed. Obviously, one piece of wood or metal has the
potential to be many artifacts; yet the possibilities are not infinite. The
material itself puts constraint upon what can be produced from it. One
can execute designs in glass, for example, which could never be brought
forth from brass.
The efficient cause is depicted as that from whence comes the first
principle of kinetic change or rest (Phys. 194b 30). Aristotle gives the
example of a male fathering a child as showing an efficient cause. The
efficient cause is the trigger that starts a process moving.
The formal cause constitutes the essence of something while the final
cause is the purpose of something. For example, Aristotle believed the
tongue to be for the purpose of either talking or not. If the tongue was for
the purpose of talking (final cause), then it had to be shaped in a certain
way, wide and supple so that it might form subtle differences in sound
(formal cause). In this way the purpose of the tongue for speaking
dovetails with the structural way it might be brought about (P.A. 660a
27-32).
It is generally the case that Aristotle in his biological science interrelates
the final and formal causes. For example Aristotle says that the efficient
cause may be inadequate to explain change. In the On Generation and
Corruption 336a Aristotle states that all natural efficient causes are
regulated by formal causes. It is clear then that fire itself acts and is acted
upon. What this means is that while the fire does act as efficient cause,
the manner of this action is regulated by a formal/final cause. The formal
cause (via the doctrine of natural placethat arranges an ascending
hierarchy among the elements, earth, water, air and fire) dictates that fire
is the highest level of the sub-lunar phenomena. Thus, its essence defines
its purpose, namely, to travel upward toward its own natural place. In
this way the formal and final cause act together to guide the actions of
fire (efficient cause) to point upward toward its natural place.
Aristotle (at least in the biological works) invokes a strategy of redundant
explanation. Taken at its simplest level, he gives four accounts of
everything. However, in the actual practice, it comes about that he really
only offers two accounts. In the first account he presents a case for

understanding an event via material/kinetic means. For the sake of

simplicity, let us call this the ME (materially-based causal explanation)
account.
In the second case he presents aspects of essence (formal cause) and
purpose (final cause). These are presented together. For the sake of
simplicity, let us call this the TE (teleologically-based causal explanation)
account. For an example of how these work together, consider
respiration.
Aristotle believes that material and efficient causes can give one account
of the motions of the air in and out of the lungs for respiration. But this
is only part of the story. One must also consider the purpose of
respiration and how this essence affects the entire organism (PA 642a 31642b 4). Thus the combination of the efficient and material causes are
lumped together as one sort of explanation ME that focus upon how the
nature of hot and cold air form a sort of current that brings in new air and
exhales the old. The final and formal causes are linked together as
another sort of explanation TE that is tied to why we have respiration in
the first place.
In Aristotles account respiration we are presented with a partner to TE
and ME: necessity. When necessity attaches itself to ME it is called simple
or absolute necessity. When necessity attaches itself to TE it is called
conditional necessity. Let us return to our example of respiration and
examine these concepts in more detail.
First, then there is the formal/final cause of respiration. Respiration
exists so that air might be brought into the body for the creation
of pneuma (a vital force essential for life). If there were no respiration,
there would be no intake of air and no way for it to be heated in the region
of the heart and turned intopneumaan element necessary for life among
the blooded animals who live out of water. Thus the TE for respiration is
for the sake of producing an essential raw material for the creation
of pneuma.

The second mode of explanation, ME, concerns the material and efficient
causes related to respiration. These have to do with the manner of a
quasi-gas law theory. The hot air in the lungs will tend to stay there unless
it is pushed out by the cold incoming air that hurries its exit (cf. On
Breath 481b 11). (This is because hot and cold are two of the essential
contraries hot/cold & wet/dry). It is the material natures of the elements
that dictate its motions. This is the realm of the ME.
ME is an important mode of explanation because it grounds the
practitioner in the empirical facts so that he may not incline himself to
offer mere a priori causal accounts. When one is forced to give material
and kinetic accounts of some event, then one is grounded in the tangible
dynamics of what is happening. This is one important requirement for
knowledge.
Now to necessity. Necessity can be represented as a modal operator that
can attach itself to either TE or to ME. When it attaches itself to TE, the
result is conditional necessity. In conditional necessity one must always
begin with the end to be achieved. For example, if one assumes the
teleological assumption of natural efficiency, Nature does nothing in vain
(GA 741b 5, cf. 739b20, et. al.) then the functions of various animal parts
must be viewed within that frame. If we know that respiration is
necessary for life, then what animal parts are necessary to allow
respiration within different species? The acceptance of the end of
respiration causes the investigator to account for how it can occur within
a species. The same could be said for other given ends such as gaining
nutrition, defending ones self from attack, and reproduction, among
others. When the biologist begins his investigation with some end
(whether in the mode of discovery or the mode of scientific presentation),
he is creating an account of conditional necessity.
The other sort of necessity is absolute necessity that is the result of matter
following its nature (such as fire moving to its natural place). The very
nature of the material, itself, creates the dynamicssuch as the quasi gas
law interactions between the hot and cold air in the lungs. These
dynamics may be described without proximate reference to the purpose
of the event. In this way ME can function by itself along with simple
necessity to give one complete account of an event.

In biological science Aristotle believes that conditional necessity is the

most useful of the two necessities in discovery and explanation (PA 639b
25). This is because, in biology, there is a sense that the entire explanation
always requires the purpose to set out the boundaries of what is and what
is not significant. However, in his practice it is most often the case that
Aristotle employs two complete accounts ME and TE in order to reveal
different modes of explanation according to his doctrine of pluralism.

5. Aristotles Theory of Soul

The word for soul in Aristotle is psuche. In Latin it is translated
as anima. For many readers, it is the use of the Latin term (particularly as
it was used by Christian, Moslem, and Jewish theologians) that forms the
basis of our modern understanding of the word. Under the theological
tradition, the soul meant an immaterial, detached ruling power within a
human. It was immortal and went to God after death. This tradition gave
rise to Descartes metaphysical dualism: the doctrine that there are two
sorts of things that exist (soul and matter), and that soul ruled matter.
Aristotle does not think of soul as the aforementioned theologians do.
This is because matter (hyle) and shape (morphe) combine to create a
unity not a duality. The philosopher can intellectually abstract out the
separate constituents, but in reality they are always united. This unity is
often termed hylomorphism (after its root words). Using the terminology
of the last section we can identify hyle with ME and morphe with TE. Thus,
Aristotles doctrine of the soul (understood as hylomorphism) represents
a unity of form and function within matter.
From the biological perspective, soul demarcates three sorts of living
things: plants, animals, and human beings. In this way soul acts as the
cause of a bodys being alive (De An 415b 8). This amalgamation (soul
and body) exhibits itself through the presentation of a particular power
that characterizes what it means to be alive for that sort of living thing.
The soul is the form of a living body thus constituting its first actuality.
Together the body and soul form an amalgamation. This is because when
we analyze the whole into its component parts the particular power of the
amalgamation is lost. Matter without TE, as we have seen, acts through

the nature of its elements (earth, air, fire, and water) and not for its
organic purpose. An example that illustrates the relationship between
form and matter is the human eye. When an eye is situated in a living
body, the matter (and the motions of that matter) of the eye works with
the other parts of the body to present the actualization of a particular
power: sight. When governed by the actuality (or fulfillment) of its
purpose, an eyeball can see (De An 412b 17). Both the matter of the
eyeball and its various neural connections (hyle, understood as ME) along
with the formal and final causes (morphe, understood as TE) are
necessary for sight. Each part has its particular purpose, and that purpose
is given through its contribution to the basic tasks associated with
essence of the sort of thing in question: plant, animal, human.
It is important not to slip into the theological cum Cartesian sense
of anima here. To say that plants and animals have souls is not to assert
that there is a Divine rose garden or hound Heaven. We must remember
that soul for Aristotle is a hylomorphic unity representing a monism and
not a dualism. (The rational souls status is less clear since it is situated
in no particular organ since Aristotle rejected the brain as the organ of
thinking relegating it to a cooling mechanism, PA652b 21-25). It is the
dynamic, vital organizing principle of lifenothing more, nothing less.
Plants exhibit the most basic power that living organisms possess:
nutrition and reproduction (De An 414a 31). The purpose of a plant is to
take in and process materials in such a way that the plant grows. Several
consequences follow (for the most part) from an individual plant having
a well-operating nutritive soul. Lets examine one sort of plant, a tree. If
a plant exhibits excellence in taking in and processing nutrition it will
exhibit various positive effects. First, the tree will have tallness and girth
that will see it through different weather conditions. Second, it will live
longer. Third, it will drop lots of seeds giving rise to other trees. Thus, if
we were to compare two individual trees (of the same species), and one
was tall and robust while the other was small and thin, then we would be
able to render a judgment about the two individual trees on the basis of
their fulfillment of their purpose as plants within that species. The tall
and robust tree of that species would be a better tree (functionally). The
small and thin tree would be condemned as failing to fulfill its purpose as
a plant within that species.

Animals contain the nutritive soul plus some of the following powers:
appetite, sensation, and locomotion (De An 414a 30, 414b 1-415a 13).
Now, not all animals have all the same powers. For example, some (like
dogs) have a developed sense of smell, while others (like cats) have a
developed ability to run quickly with balance. This makes simple
comparisons between species more difficult, but within one species the
same sort of analysis used with plants also holds. That is, between two
individual dogs one dog can (for example) smell his prey up to 200
meters away while the other dog can only detect his prey up to 50 meters.
(This assumes that being able to detect prey from a distance allows the
individual to eat more often.) The first dog is better because he has
fulfilled his souls function better than the second. The first dog is thus a
good dog while the second a bad example of one. What is important here
is that animals judged as animals must fulfill that power (soul) particular
to it specifically in order to be functionally excellent. This means that
dogs (for example) are proximately judged on their olfactory sense and
remotely upon their ability to take in nutrition and to reproduce.
Humans contain the nutritive soul and the appetitive-sensorylocomotive souls along with the rational soul. This power is given in a
passive, active, and imaginative sense (De An III 3-5). What this means
is that first there is a power in the rational soul to perceive sensation and
to process it in such a way that it is intelligible. Next, one is able to use
the data received in the first step as material for analysis and reflection.
This involves the active agency of the mind. Finally, the result (having
both a sensory and ratiocinative element) can be arranged in a novel
fashion so that the universal mixes with the perceived particular. This is
imagination (De An III.3). For example, one might perceive in step-one
that your door is hanging at a slant. In step-two you examine the hinges
and ponder why the door is hanging in just this way. Finally, in step-three
you consider types of solutions that might solve the problemsuch as
taking a plane to the top of the door, or inserting a shim behind one of
the hinges. You make your decision about this door in front of you based
upon your assessment of the various generic solutions.
The rational soul, thus understood as a multi-step imaginative process,
gives rise to theoretical and practical knowledge that, in turn, have other

sub-divisions (EN VI). Just as the single nutritive soul of plants was
greatly complicated by the addition of souls for the animals, so also is the
situation even more complicated with the addition of the rational soul for
humans. This is because it has so many different applications. For
example, one person may know right and wrong and can act on this
knowledge and create habits of the same while another may have
productive knowledge of an artist who is able to master the functional
requirements of his craft in order to produce well-wrought artifacts. Just
as it is hard to compare cats and dogs among animal souls, so it is difficult
to judge various instantiations of excellence among human rational souls.
However, it is clear that between two persons compared on their ethical
virtues and two artists compared on their productive wisdom, we may
make intra-category judgments about each. These sorts of judgments
begin with a biological understanding of what it means to be a human
being and how one may fulfill her biological function based on her
possession of the human rational soul (understood in one of the subcategories of reason). Again, a biological understanding of the soul has
implications beyond the field of biology/psychology.

6. The Biological Practice: Outlines of a

Systematics
Systematics is the study of how one ought to create a system of biological
classification and thus perform taxonomy. (Systematics is not to be
confused with being a systematic philosopher. The former term has a
technical meaning related to the theoretical foundations of animal
classification and taxonomy. The latter phrase has to do with a tightly
structured interlocking philosophical account.) In Aristotles logical
works, he creates a theory of definition. According to Aristotle, the best
way to create a definition is to find the proximate group in which the type
of thing resides. For example, humans are a type of thing (species) and
their proximate group is animal (or blooded animal). The proximate
group is called thegenus. Thus the genus is a larger group of which the
species is merely one proper subset. What marks off that particular
species as unique? This is the differentia or the essential defining trait. In

our example with humans the differentia is rationality. Thus the

definition of human is a rational animal. Human is the species,
animal is the genus and rationality is the differentia.
In a similar way, Aristotle adapts his logical theory of genus and species
to biology. By thinking in terms of species and their proximate genus,
Aristotle makes a statement about the connections between various types
of animals. Aristotle does not create a full-blown classification system
that can describe all animals, but he does lay the theoretical foundations
for such.
The first overarching categories are the blooded and the non-blooded
animals. The animals covered by this distinction roughly correspond to
the modern distinction between vertebrates and invertebrates. There are
also two classes of dualizers that are animals that fit somewhat between
categories. Here is a sketch of the categorization:
I. Blooded Animals
A. Live bearing animals
1. Homo Sapiens2. Other mammals without a distinction for primates
B. Egg-laying animals
1. Birds2. Fish
I. Non-Blooded Animals
A. Shell skinned sea animals: testaceaB. Soft shelled sea animals: Crustacea
C. Non-shelled soft skinned sea animals: Cephalopods
D. Insects
E. Bees
I. Dualizers (animals that share properties of more than one group)
A. Whales, seals and porpoisesthey give live birth yet they live in the
seaB. Batsthey have four appendages yet they fly
C. Spongesthey act like both plants and like animals

Aristotles proto-system of classification differs from that of his

predecessors who used habitat and other non-functional criteria to
classify animals. For example, one theory commonly set out three large
groups: air, land, and sea creatures. Because of the functional orientation
of Aristotles TE, Aristotle repudiates any classification system based
upon non-functional accidents. What is important is that the primary
activities of life are carried out efficiently through specially designated
body parts.
Though Aristotles work on classification is by no means comprehensive
(but is rather a series of reflections on how to create one), it is appropriate
to describe it as meta-systematics. Such reflections are consistent with
his other key explanatory concepts of functionalism (TE and ME) as well
as his work on logic in the Organon with respect to the utilization of genus
and species. Though incomplete, this again is a blueprint of how to
construct a systematics. The general structure of meta-systematics also
acts as an independent principle that permits Aristotle to examine
animals together that are functionally similar. Such a move enhances the
reliability of analogy as a tool of explanation.

7. The more and the less and Epi to

polu
The more and the less is an explanatory concept that is allied to the ME
account. Principally, it is a way that individuation occurs in the nonuniform parts. Aristotle distinguishes two sorts of parts in animals: the
uniform and the non-uniform. The uniform parts are those that if you
dumped them into a bucket and cut the bucket in half, they would still
remain the same. For example, blood is a uniform part. Dump blood into
a bucket and cut it in half and its still the same blood (just half the
quantity). The same is true of tissue, cartilage, tendons, skin, et al. Nonuniform parts change when the bucket test is applied. If you dump a lung
into a bucket and cut it in half, you no longer have a proper organ. The
same holds true of other organs: heart, liver, pancreas, and so forth, as
well as the skeleton (Uniform PartsPA 646b 20, 648b, 650a 20, 650b,

651b 20, 652a 23; Non-Uniform PartsPA 656b 25, 622a 17, 665b 20,
683a 20, 684a 25.)
When an individual has excess nutrition (trophe), the excess (perittoma)
often is distributed all around (GA 734b 25). An external observer does
not perceive the changes to the uniform partsexcept, perhaps, stomach
fat. But such an observer would perceive the difference in a child who has
been well fed (whose non-uniform parts are bigger) than one who hasnt.
The difference is accounted for by the principle of the more and the less.
How does an external observer differentiate between any two people?
The answer is that the non-uniform parts (particularly the skeletal
structure) differ. Thus, one persons nose is longer, another stands taller,
a third is broader in the shoulders, etc. We all have noses, stand within a
range of height and broadness of shoulders, etc. The particular mix that
we each possess makes us individuals.
Sometimes, this mix goes beyond the range of the species (eidos). In these
instances a part becomes non-functional because it has too much
material or too little. Such situations are beyond the natural range one
might expect within the species. Because of this, the instance involved is
characterized as being unnatural (para phusin).
The possibility of unnatural events occurring in nature affects the status
of explanatory principles in biology. We remember from above that there
are two sorts of necessity: conditional and absolute. The absolute
necessity never fails. It is the sort of necessity that one can apply to the
stars that exist in the super lunar realm. One can create star charts of the
heavens that will be accurate for a thousand years forward or backward.
This is because of the mode of absolute necessity.
However, because conditional necessity depends upon its telos, and
because of the principle of the more and the less that is non-teleologically
(ME) driven, there can arise a sort of spontaneity (cf. automaton,
Phys. II.6) that can alter the normal, expected execution of a task because
spontaneity is purposeless. In these cases the input from the material
cause is greater or lesser than is usually the case. The result is an
unnatural outcome based upon the principle of the more and the less. An

example of this might be obesity. Nourishment is delivered to the body in

a hierarchical fashion beginning with the primary needs. When all
biological needs are met, then the excess goes into hair, nails and body
fat. Excess body fat can impair proper function, but not out of design.
Because of the possibility of spontaneity and its unintended
consequences, the necessary operative in biological events (conditional
necessity) is only for the most part (hs epi to polu). We cannot expect
biological explanatory principles to be of the same order as those of the
stars. Ceteris paribis principles are the best the biological realm can give.
This brute fact gives rise to a different set of epistemic expectations than
are often raised in the Prior Analytics and the Posterior Analytics. Our
expectations for biology are for general rules that are true in most cases
but have many exceptions. This means that biology cannot be an exact
science, unlike astronomy. If there are always going to be exceptions that
are contrary to nature, then the biologist must do his biology with
toleration for these sorts of peripheral anomalies. This disposition is
characterized by the doctrine of epi to polu.

8. Significant Achievements and Mistakes

This section will highlight a few of Aristotles biological achievements
from the perspective of over 2,300 years of hindsight. For simplicitys
sake let us break these up into bad calls (observations and conclusions
that have proven to be wrong) and good calls (observations and
conclusions that have proven to be very accurate).
We begin with the bad calls: lets start with a few of Aristotles mistakes.
First, Aristotle believed that thinking occurred in the region around the
heart and not in the brain (a cooling organ, PA 652b 21-25, cf. HA 514a
16-22). Second, Aristotle thought that men were hotter than women (the
opposite is the case). Third, Aristotle overweighed the male contribution
in reproduction. Fourth, little details are often amiss such as the number
of teeth in women. Fifth, Aristotle believed that spontaneous generation
could occur. For example, Aristotle observed that from animal dung
certain flies could appear (even though careful observation did not reveal

any flies mating and laying their eggs in the dung. The possibility of the
eggs already existing in the abdomen of the animal did not occur to
Aristotle.) However, these sorts of mistakes are more often than not the
result of an a priori principle such as women being colder and less
perfectly formed than men or the application of his method on (in
principle) unobservablessuch as human conception in which it is
posited that the male provides the efficient, formal, and final cause while
the woman provides merely the material cause.
Good Calls: Aristotle examined over 500 different species of animals.
Some species came from fishermen, hunters, farmers, and perhaps
Alexander. Many other species were viewed in nature by Aristotle. There
are some very exact observations made by Aristotle during his stay at
Lesbos. It is virtually certain that his early dissection skills were utilized
solely upon animals (due to the social prohibition on dissecting humans).
One example of this comes from the Generation of Animals in which
Aristotle breaks open fertilized chicken eggs at carefully controlled
intervals to observe when visible organs were generated. The first organ
Aristotle saw was the heart. (In fact it is the spinal cord and the
beginnings of the nervous system, but this is not visible without
employing modern staining techniques.) On eggs opened later, Aristotle
saw other organs. This led Aristotle to come out against a popular theory
of conception and development entitled, the pre-formation theory. In
the pre-formation theory, whose advocates extended until the eighteenth
century, all the parts appear all at once and development is merely the
growth of these essential parts. The contrary theory that Aristotle
espouses is the epigenetic theory. According to epigenesis, the parts are
created in a nested hierarchical order. Thus, through his observation,
Aristotle saw that the heart was formed first, then he postulated that
other parts were formed (also backed-up by observation). Aristotle
concludes,
I mean, for instance, not that the heart once formed, fashions the liver, and then
the liver fashions something else; but that the one is formed after the other (just
as man is formed in time after a child), not by it. The reason of this is that so far
as the things formed by nature or by human art are concerned, the formation of
that which is potentially brought about by that which is in actuality; so that the
form of B would have to be contained in A, e.g., the form of liver would have to
be in the heartwhich is absurd. (GA 734a 28-35, Peck trans.)

In epigenesis the controlling process of development operates according

to the TE plan of creating the most important parts first. Since the heart
is the principle (arche) of the body, being the center of blood production
and sensation/intelligence, it is appropriate that it should be created first.
Then other parts such as the liver, etc. are then created in their
appropriate order. The epigenesis-preformation debate lasted two
thousand years and Aristotle got it right.
Another interesting observation by Aristotle is the discovery of the
reproductive mode of the dog shark,Mustelus laevis (HA 6.10, 565b 1ff.).
This species is externally viviparous (live bearing) yet internally
oviparous (egg bearing). Such an observation could only have come from
dissections and careful observations.
Another observation concerns the reproductive habits of cuttlefish. In
this process of hectocotylization, the sperm of the Argonauta among other
allied species comes in large spermataphores that the male transfers to
the mantle cavity of the female. This complicated maneuver, described in
HA 524a 4-5, 541b 9-15, cf. 544a 12, GA 720b 33, was not fully verified by
moderns until 1959!
Though Aristotles observations on bees in HA seems to be entirely from
the beekeepers point of view (HA 625b7-22), he does note that there are
three classes of bees and that sexual reproduction requires that one class
give way. He begins his discussion in the Generation of Animals with the
following remark, The generation of bees is beset with many problems
(GA 759a 9). If there are three classes and two genders, then something
is amiss. Aristotle goes through what he feels to be all the possibilities.
Though the observations are probably second-hand, Aristotle is still able
to evaluate the data. He employs his systematic theory using the overriding meta-principle that Nature always acts in an orderly way (GA 760a
32) to form his explanation of the function of each type of bee. This means
that there must be a purposeful process (TE) that guides generation.
However, since neither Aristotle nor the beekeepers had ever seen bee
copulation, and since Aristotle allows for asexual generation in some fish,
he believes that the case of bees offers him another case in which one class
is sterile (complies with modern theory on worker bees), another class
creates its own kind and another (this is meant to correspond to the
Queen beethat Aristotle calls a King Bee because it has a stinger and

females in nature never have defensive weapons), while the third class
creates not its own class but another (this is the drone).
Aristotle has got some of this right and some of it wrong. What he has
right is first, bees are unusual in having three classes. Second, one class
is infertile and works for the good of the whole. Third, one class (the
Queen) is a super-reproducer. However, in the case of bees it is Aristotles
method rather than his results that stirs admiration. Three metaprinciples cause particular note:
1. Reproduction works with two groups not three. The quickest solution
would have been to make one group sterile and then make the other two
male and female. [This would have been the correct response.] However,
since none of the beekeepers reported anything like reproductive
behavior among bees and because Aristotles own limited observations
also do not note this, he is reluctant to make such a reply. It is on the
basis of the phainomena that Aristotle rejects bee copulation (GA 759a
10).
2. Aristotle holds that a priori argument alone is not enough. One must
square the most likely explanation with the observed facts.
3. Via analogy, Aristotle notes that some fish seem not to reproduce and
even some flies are generated spontaneously. Thus, assigning the roles
to the various classes that he does, Aristotle does not create a sui generis
instance. By analogy to other suppositions of his biological theory,
Aristotle is able to solve a troublesome case via reference to analogy.
(Aristotle is also admirably cautious about his own theory, saying that
more work is needed.)
What is most important in Aristotles accomplishments is his
combination of keen observations with a critical scientific method that
employs his systematic categories to solve problems in biology and then
link these to other issues in human life.

9. Conclusion
Since Aristotles biological works comprise almost a third of his writings
that have come down to us, and since these writings may have occurred

early in his career, it is very possible that the influence of the biological
works upon Aristotles other writings is considerable. Aristotles
biological works (so often neglected) should be brought to the fore, not
only in the history of biology, but also as a way of understanding some of
Aristotles non-biological writings.

10. References and Further Reading

a. Primary Text

Bekker, Immanuel (ed) update by Olof Gigon , Aristotelis Opera. Berlin, Deutsche
Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1831-1870, rpt. W. de Gruyter, 1960-1987.

b. Key Texts in Translation

Barnes, Jonathan (ed). The Complete Works of Aristotle: the Revised Oxford
Translation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.
The Clarendon Series of Aristotle:
Balme, David (tr and ed). Updated by Allan Gotthelf, De Partibus Animalium I with De
Generatione Animalium I (with passages from II 1-3). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).
Lennox, James G. (tr and ed) Aristotle on the Parts of Animals I-4. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 2002.
The Loeb Series of Aristotle (opposite pages of Greek and English).

c. Selected Secondary Sources

Balme, David. Aristotles Use of Differentiae in Zoology. Aristote et les Problms de

Mthode.Louvain: Publications Universitaires 1961.
Balme, David. GENOS and EIDOS in Aristotles Biology The Classical Quarterly. 12
(1962): 81-88.
Balme, David. Aristotles Biology was not Essentialist Archiv Fr Geschichte der
Philosophie. 62.1 (1980): 1-12.
Bourgey, Louis. Observation et Experince chez Aristote. Paris: J. Vrin, 1955.
Boylan, Michael. "Mechanism and Teleology in Aristotle's Biology" Apeiron 15.2 (1981):
96-102.
Boylan, Michael. "The Digestive and 'Circulatory' Systems in Aristotle's Biology" Journal
of the History of Biology 15.1 (1982): 89-118.
Boylan, Michael. Method and Practice in Aristotles Biology. Lanham, MD and London:
University Press of America, 1983.
Boylan, Michael. "The Hippocratic and Galenic Challenges to Aristotle's Conception
Theory" Journal of the History of Biology 15.1 (1984): 83-112.
Boylan, Michael. "The Place of Nature in Aristotle's Biology" Apeiron 19.1 (1985).
Boylan, Michael. "Galen's Conception Theory" Journal of the History of Biology 19.1
(1986): 44-77.
Boylan, Michael. "Monadic and SystemicTEleology" in Modern Problems in
Teleology ed. Nicholas Rescher (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1986).

Charles, David. Aristotle on Meaning and Essence. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000.
Deverreux, Daniel and Pierre Pellegrin. Eds. Biologie, Logique et Mtaphysique chez
Aristote. Paris: ditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique,1990.
Dring, Ingemar. Aristotles De Partibus Animalium, Critical and Literary
Commentary. Goeteborg, 1943, rpt. NY.: Garland, 1980.
Ferejohn, M. The Origins of Aristotelian Science. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1990.
Gotthelf, Allan and James G. Lennox, eds. Philosophical Issues in Aristotles Biology. NY:
Cambridge University Press, 1987.
Grene, Marjorie. A Portrait of Aristotle. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963.
Joly, Robert. La Charactrologie Antique Jusqu Aristote. Revue Belge de Philologie et
dHistoire40 (1962): 5-28.
Kullmann, Wolfgang. Wissenscaft und Methode: Interpretationen zur Aristotelischen
Theorie der Naturwissenschaft. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1974.
Kullmann, Wolfgang. Aristoteles und die moderne Wissenschaft Stuttgart: F. Steiner,
1998.
Kullmann, Wolfgang. Aristotles wissenschaftliche Methode in seinen zoologischen
Schriften in Wrhle, G., ed. Geschichte der Mathematik und der
Naturwissenschaften. Band 1 Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1999, pp. 103-123.
Kullmann, Wolfgang. Zoologische Sammelwerk in der Antike in Wrhle, G.,
ed. Geschichte der Mathematik und der Naturwissenschaften. Band 1 Stuttgart: F. Steiner
1999, pp. 181-198.
Kung, Joan. Some Aspects of Form in Aristotles Biology Nature and System 2 (1980):
67-90.
Kung, Joan. Aristotle on Thises, Suches and the Third Man Argument Phronesis 26
(1981): 207-247.
Le Blonde, Jean Marie. Aristote, Philosophie de la Vie. Paris: ditions Montaigne, 1945.
Lesher, James. NOUS in the Parts of Animals. Phronesis 18 (1973): 44-68.
Lennox, James. Teleology, Chance, and Aristotles Theory of Spontaneous
Generation Journal of the History of Philosophy 20 (1982): 219-232.
Lennox, James. The Place of Mankind in Aristotles Zoology Philosophical Topics 25.1
(1999): 1-16.
Lennox, James. Aristotles Philosophy of Biology: Studies in the Origins of Life
Sciences. NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Lloyd, G.E.R. Right and Left in Greek Philosophy Journal of Hellenic Studies. 82
(1962): 67-90.
Lloyd, G.E.R. Polarity and Analogy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966.
Lloyd, G.E.R. Aristotle: The Growth and Structure of his Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1969.
Lloyd, G.E.R. Saving the Appearances Classical Quarterly. n.s. 28 (1978): 202-222.
Lloyd, G.E.R. Magic, Reason, and Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1979.
Lloyd, G.E.R. The Revolutions of Wisdom. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,
1987
Lloyd, G.E.R. Methods and Problems in Greek Science. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991.
Lloyd, G.E.R. Aristotelian Explorations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Louis, Pierre. La Gnration Spontane chez Aristote Congrss International dHistoire
des Sciences (1968): 291-305.
Louis, Pierre. La Dcouverte de la Vie. Paris: Hermann, 1975.
Owen, G.E.L. TITHENAI TA PHAINOMENA Aristote et les Problms de
Mthode. Louvain, 1975.

Owen, G.E.L. The Platonism of Aristotle. London: British Academy: Dawes Hicks Lecture
on Philosophy, 1965.
Pellegrin, Pierre. La Classification des Animaux chez Aristote: Statut de la Biologie et
Unite de lAristotlisme.Paris: Societ ddition Les Belles Lettres, 1982.
Pellegrin, Pierre. Logical Difference and Biological Difference: The Unity of Aristotles
Thought in Gotthelf, Allan and James G. Lennox, eds. Philosophical Issues in Aristotles
Biology. NY: Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 313-338.
Pellegrin, Pierre. Taxonomie, moriologie, division in Deverreux, Daniel and Pierre
Pellegrin. Eds.Biologie, Logique et Mtaphysique chez Aristote. Paris, 1990, 37-48.
Preus, Anthony. Aristotles Parts of Animals 2.16 659b 13-19: Is it Authentic? Classical
Quarterly18.2 (1968): 170-178.
Preus, Anthony. Nature Uses. . . . Apeiron 3.2 (1969): 20-33.
Preus, Anthony. Science and Philosophy in Aristotles Biological Works. NY: Olhms,
1975.
Preus, Anthony. Eidos as Norm Nature and System 1 (1979): 79-103.
Solmsen, Friedrich. Aristotles System of the Physical World: A Comparison with his
Predecessors.Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1960.
Sorabji, Richard. Necessity, Cause, and Blame. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1980.
Thompson, DArcy. Aristotle as Biologist. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1913.
Thompson, DArcy. Growth and Form. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1917.
Ulmer, K. Wahrheit, Kunst und Natur bei Aristotles. Tbingen: M. Niemayer, 1953.
Witt, Charlotte. Substance and Essence in Aristotle: An Interpretation of Metaphysics VIIIX.Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989.
Wrhle, Georg and Jochen Althoff, eds. Biologie in Geschichte der Mathematik und der
Naturwissenschaften(series). Band 1 Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1999.

Author Information
Michael
Boylan
Email:
michael.boylan@marymount.edu
Marymount
University
U. S. A.










Source: http://www.iep.utm.edu/aris-bio/
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