Citation:

Title
:

G.R. No. 161434

March 3, 2004
TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. vs.COMELEC, FPJ

Facts:

Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to

disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy
upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate
of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth,
according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley
Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national,
being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child
of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of
respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage
to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second,
even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly
only a year after the birth of respondent.
Petitioners also questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in
taking cognizance of and deciding the citizenship issue affecting
Fernando Poe Jr. They asserted that under Section 4(7), Article VII of
the 1987 Constituition, only the Supreme Court had original and
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue of the case.
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634,
invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took
cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead
take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional
provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the
1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole
judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this
Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas, 4 as "not (being) justiciable"
controversies or disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse
prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An

Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear

and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the
Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of
Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal.
Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of government
under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No.
1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived
under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election
scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo
warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in
view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the
phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April
1992, would support this premise "Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President of the Philippines.
"Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of
an election protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President
or Vice-President. An election protest shall not include a petition for
quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an election
protest.
"Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President
or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third
highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or
the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with
the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days
after the proclamation of the winner."
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "VicePresident", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or VicePresident. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action
against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a
public office.5 In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a

post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would

have received either the second or third highest number of votes could file
an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases
directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for
the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs.
Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo
Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have
to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Issue:

1) Whether or not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen?

2) Whether or not the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the qualifications
of presidential candidates?
Ruling:

1. It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ

is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not
the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a
Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged
illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino
citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino
citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption
that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been
born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under
Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence
upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could
have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo
Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if
acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of
respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime
respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons
whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children
are legitimate or illegitimate. But while the totality of the evidence may
not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen

of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his

favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of
Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
2. No. An examination of the phraseology in Rule 12, 13, and Rule 14 of
the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the
Supreme Court on April 1992 categorically speak of the jurisdiction of
the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines,
and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto
proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person
who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a
post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who
would have received either the second or third highest number of
votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a postelection scenario. It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it,
questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vicepresidency before the elections are held.

Title
:
Citation :

Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration

G.R. No. L-21289 October 4, 1971

Facts:

On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa

to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. In the interrogation
made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to
enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing
at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to
the Philippines to visit her great granduncle Lau Ching Ping for a
period of one month. She was permitted to come into the Philippines
on 13 March 1961, and was permitted to stay for a period of one
month which would expire on 13 April 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher
Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among
others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines
on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this
country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of

Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow. After

repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the
Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she
contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an
alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the
Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her
arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay,
she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction. At the
hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was
admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either English or
Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak either English or
Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbour, with a Filipino
name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law,
or sisters-in-law. The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705)
denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen
Yeung appealed.
Issue:

Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her
marriage to a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:

Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a

Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided
she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the
same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently
naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the
moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not
suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the
alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15
is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for
naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to
go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a
Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot
be denied the same privilege.
This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the
Legislature intended to treat them differently. As the laws of our country,
both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a
substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a

Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and
established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime
she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise
a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that the citizenship is
not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of
citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains
even as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is
material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case. Whatever the
corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be
threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung,
was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her
marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of
25 January 1962.

Title :
Citation
:

IN RE: FLORENCIO MALLARE

A.M. No. 533 September 12, 1974

Facts:
On complaint of then Acting Immigration Commissioner, Martiniano P. Vivo,
this Court ordered the investigation of the matter of citizenship of Florencio
Mallare, who was admitted to the Philippine Bar on March 5, 1962, for the
purpose of determining whether his name should be stricken from the roll of
persons authorized to practice law in the Philippines.
After an investigation conducted by this Court's Legal Officer Investigator, a
decision was rendered by this Court on April 29, 1968, holding that by
preponderance of evidence, it appeared that respondent Mallare's father,
Esteban Mallare, was a Chinese up to his death; and his mother admittedly
being a Chinese, respondent is likewise a Chinese national. Consequently
respondent Florencio Mallare was declared excluded from the practice of law;
his admission to the bar was revoked, and he was ordered to return to this
Court, the lawyer's diploma previously issued to him.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of the decision, which was denied by
the Court in its resolution of January 10, 1969. On February 4, 1969,
respondent petitioned the Court for the reopening of the case and for new
trial on the ground, inter alia, of newly discovered evidence, the introduction
of which could alter the decision previously promulgated. The evidence
proposed to be presented consisted of (1) an entry in the registry of baptism

of the Immaculate Concepcion Church at Macalelon, Quezon, purporting to

show that Estaben Mallare (respondent's father) is the natural son of Ana
Mallare, a Filipino; and (2) testimonies of certain persons who had a known
Esteban Mallare and his mother during their lifetime
Accordingly, the parties submitted their respective additional evidences
before the Court's investigator.
Respondent's petition to set aside the decision of this Court of April 29, 1968,
as well as the resolution of January 10, 1969, is premised upon three basic
arguments, to wit: (a) Respondent's father, Esteban Mallare, being the
natural son of Ana Mallare, a Filipino, was a Filipino citizen; (b) Esteben
Mallare, the son of a Filipino mother, by his own overt acts, had chosen
Philippine citizenship; and (c) respondent, a legitimate son of Esteban
Mallare, is a Filipino citizen.
The determinative issue in this controversy, therefore, revolves around the
citizenship of respondent's father, Esteban Mallare, for if Esteban were a
Filipino as respondent claims, the latter axiomatically would also be a Filipino
and the objection against his inclusion in the Roll of Attorneys in the
Philippines would lose legal basis.
After a painstaking study of the original and additional evidences herein
presented, the Court finds sufficient grounds to warrant a definite setting
aside of Our decision of April 29, 1968, and a definitive declaration that
respondent Florencio Mallare is a Filipino citizen and therefore with
qualification and right to continue the practice of law in the Philippines
Ruling:
In Our decision of April 29, 1968, respondent's claim that he is a Filipino was
denied for lack of evidence proving the Philippine citizenship of his father,
Esteban Mallare. It was ruled that Ana Mallare (Esteban's mother) can not be
considered a Filipino, there being no proof that she was "an inhabitant of the
Philippines continuing to reside therein who was a Spanish subject on the
eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine"; that the landing
certificate issued by the Bureau of Immigration which referred to
respondent's mother, Te Na, as "wife of Dy Esteban, P.I. citizen", was based
upon an ex parte determination of the evidence presented by therein
applicant and consequently carries little evidentiary weight as to the
citizenship of her said husband; and that the affidavit of Esteban Mallare,

executed on February 20, 1939, to the effect that he had chosen to follow
the citizenship of his Filipino mother was not only self-serving, but also it can
not be considered a re-affirmation of the alleged election of citizenship since
no previous election of such citizenship has been proved to exist.

Digested:
Facts:
Mallares father Esteban was the illegitimate child of a Chinese father and
a Filipino mother, and believed himself to be Chinese. Mallare became a
lawyer, but his admission to the bar was revoked because his citizenship was
questionable.
Issue:
Is Mallare a Filipino citizen?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court reversed the revocation after finding that Esteban was a
Filipino because his mother was not married to his Chinese father.
Furthermore, when Mallare came of age, he registered as a voter and
exercised his right of suffrage. The Court considered these acts to be enough
to show that Mallare had elected Filipino citizenship, without needing any
formal declaration on his part.
Title : Aznar vs. Comelec and Osmea
Facts:
1) On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea filed his
certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial
Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections.
2) On January 22, 1988, petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent
Provincial Chairman filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification
of private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen,
being a citizen of the United States of America.
3) On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a
Certificate issued by the then Immigration and Deportation Commissioner
Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private respondent is an American
and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and
Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on
March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively. (Annex "B-1").
4) During the hearing at the COMELEC Private respondent, maintained that he is
a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D.
Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmea, Sr.; that he is

a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on

March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines
since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months; and
that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 19 65.
5) Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition
for disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient
proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen. Hence, the petition for
Certiorari

Issue:
Whether or not a person is considered an American under the laws of the
United States does not concern Us here.
Ruling:
By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that
private respondent is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner
to prove that private respondent had lost his Philippine citizenship. As earlier
stated, however, the petitioner failed to positively establish this fact.
In declaring both Frivaldo and Labo not citizens of the Philippines, therefore,
disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon and Mayor
of Baguio City, respectively, the Court considered the fact that by their own
admissions, they are indubitably aliens, no longer owing any allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines since they have sworn their total allegiance to
a foreign state.
In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the
oath of allegiance of the United States (p. 81, Rollo). He is a holder of a valid
and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the
electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a
voter and as a candidate (pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus, private respondent
remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be
presumed.
In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he stresses the fact that
because Osmea obtained Certificates of Alien Registration as an American
citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24 years old and the second in 1979,
he, Osmea should be regarded as having expressly renounced Philippine
citizenship. To Our mind, this is a case of non sequitur (It does not follow).
Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an
American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American
does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. Thus, by way of analogy, if a

person who has two brothers named Jose and Mario states or certifies that he
has a brother named Jose, this does not mean that he does not have a
brother named Mario; or if a person is enrolled as student simultaneously in
two universities, namely University X and University Y, presents a
Certification that he is a student of University X, this does not necessarily
mean that he is not still a student of University Y. In the case of Osmea, the
Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a
Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there
is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is
even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the
renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express", it
stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine 'citizenship
when there is no renunciation either "'express" or "implied".
Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that "dual allegiance
of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law"(Art. IV, Sec. 5) has no retroactive effect. And while it is true that even
before the 1987 Constitution, Our country had already frowned upon the
concept of dual citizenship or allegiance, the fact is it actually existed. Be it
noted further that under the aforecited proviso, the effect of such dual
citizenship or allegiance shall be dealt with by a future law. Said law has not
yet been enacted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the
Resolution of the COMELEC is hereby AFFIRMED.

Title :

Bengson vs. Cruz

FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of

the constitutional requirement that no person shall be a Member of the
House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in
1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine
Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an
oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino
citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which
Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, rendering service
to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship

was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with
his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under
RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by
Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting
Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for
and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in
the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running
for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with
respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member
of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI,
section
6
of
the
Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and
declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said election.
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen,
can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.
HELD: petition dismissed
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the
same in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by
which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:
1.
by
naturalization,
2.
by
repatriation,
and
3.
by
direct
act
of
Congress.
**
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship
due
to:
1.
desertion
of
the
armed
forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,

4.
marriage
of
a
Filipino
5. political economic necessity

woman

to

an

alien;

and

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that
a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior
status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally
a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A.
No.
2630
provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service
to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or
after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United
States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with
Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the
Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any
other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in
accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered
his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at
birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he
lost his Philippine citizenship.

Title: Frivaldo vs. Comelec

Facts:
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of
Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27,
1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, represented by its President,
Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the COMELEC a
petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that
he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on
January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was

naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative
defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against
President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a
means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's
agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA
revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. In their Comment, the private
respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized American
citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on
January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor.
They also argued that their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really
for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate
purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his candidacy and
election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Speaking for the
public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was
not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his
naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public
office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the electorate
of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the
Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's argument that
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the
League and Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation
and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination of
Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a
Filipino.
Issue:
Whether or Not petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the
time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.
Held:
The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution
that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution
"allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local
Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a
citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is
running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter
must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an
indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
Constitution. In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo
described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of
any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was
naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification
from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly
authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in
San Francisco, California, U.S.A. The Court sees no reason not to believe that the
petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot
agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American
citizenship.

His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and
voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright. This Court
will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country
while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by
the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule
limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The
qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate
alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the
candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the
deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the
Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and
renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.
It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is
favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should
be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced,
the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its
difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it
is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The
returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of
his loyalty and love. Petition Dismissed. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby
declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as
Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office
and surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the said province once
this decision becomes final and executory.
Title :

Co vs. HRET

Facts:

The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino
citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The
congressional election for the second district of NorthernSamar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the
second legislativedistrict are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co
and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. RespondentOng was proclaimed the
duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The
petitioners filed election protests on the grounds that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a
natural born citizen of thePhilippines and not a resident of the second district
of Northern Samar.
Issue: Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines.
Held:
Yes. In the year 1895, the private respondents grandfather, Ong Te, arrived
in the Philippines fromChina and established his residence in the municipality
of Laoang, Samar. The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was
born in China in 1905 but was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915,

he filed withthe court an application for naturalization and was declared a

Filipino citizen.In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named
Desiree Lim. For the elections of 1984 and1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered
himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and voted there during those
elections.Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and
those born of Filipino mothers with analien father were placed on equal
footing. They were both considered as natural born citizens. Besides,
privaterespondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He
has established his life here in thePhilippines.On the issue of residence, it is
not required that a person should have a house in order to establish
hisresidence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality
or in a rented house or in that of afriend or relative. To require him to own
property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamountto a
property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet
the age, citizenship, votingand residence requirements.
Title

TABASA VS CA

Nature of the Case: The instant petition for review1[2] under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
contests the denial by the Court of Appeals (CA) of the Petition for Habeas Corpus interposed by
petitioner Joevanie Arellano Tabasa from the Order of Summary Deportation issued by the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID) for his return to the United States.
Facts:

Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

In 1968, when petitioner was seven years old (minor), his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a

naturalized citizen2 of the United States.

By derivative petitioner also acquired American citizenship.
On August 3, 1995 Petitioner arrived in the Philippines, and was admitted as a balikbayan for

one year.
After that petitioner was arrested and detained by agent Wilson Soluren of the BID on May 23,

1996, pursuant to BID Mission Order No. LIV-96-72 in Baybay, Malay, Aklan.
Subsequently, he was brought to the BID Detention Center in Manila.
Petitioner was investigated by Special Prosecutor Atty. Edy D. Donato at the Law and

Investigation Division of the BID on May 28, 1996

On the same day, Tabasa was accused of violating Section 8, Chapter 3, Title 1, Book 3 of the
1987 Administrative Code, in a charge sheet which alleged:
1.That on 3 August 1995, Tabasa arrived in the Philippines and was admitted as a
balikbayan;

1
2

2.

That in a letter dated 16 April 1996, Honorable Kevin Herbert, Consul General

of U.S. Embassy, informed the Bureau that respondents Passport had been revoked
by the U.S. Department of State;
3.

Hence, Tabasa is now an undocumented and undesirable alien and may be

summarily deported pursuant to Law and Intelligence Instructions No. 53 issued by

then Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago to effect his deportation.

On May 29, 1996 - BID ordered petitioners deportation to his country of origin, the United States.
US Consul filed a request with the Bureau to apprehend and deport the
Tabasa on the ground that a standing warrant for several federal charges has been
issued against him, and that the Tabasas passport has been revoked.

Schonemann vs. Commissioner Santiago Sc ruled that if a foreign

embassy cancels the passport of an alien, or does not reissue a valid
passport to him, the alien loses the privilege to remain in the country.
Further, under Office Memorandum Order No. 34 issued on 21 August
1989, summary deportation proceedings lie where the passport of the alien

has expired.
Thus, it is apparent that respondent has lost his privilege to remain in the
country.

Petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Preliminary Injunction

and/or Temporary Restraining Order

Tabasa alleged that he was not afforded due process; that no warrant of arrest for
deportation may be issued by immigration authorities before a final order of
deportation is made; that no notice of the cancellation of his passport was made by
the U.S. Embassy; that he is entitled to admission or to a change of his
immigration status as a non-quota immigrant because he is married to a Filipino
citizen as provided in Section 13, paragraph (a) of the Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940; and that he was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines prior to his
derivative naturalization when he was seven years old due to the naturalization
of his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, in 1968.

At the time Tabasa filed said petition, he was already 35 years old.
On May 30, 1996, the CA ordered the respondent Bureau to produce the person of the petitioner
on June 3, 1996 and show the cause of petitioners detention, and restrained the Bureau from

summarily deporting him.

On June 3, 1996, the BID presented Tabasa before the CA

On June 6, 1996, the CA granted both parties ten (10) days within which to file their memoranda,
after which the case would be considered submitted for decision. Meanwhile, the Commissioner

of Immigration granted the petitioners temporary release on bail on a PhP 20,000.00 cash bond.
On June 13, 1996, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that he had acquired Filipino
citizenship by repatriation in accordance with RA 8171, and that because he is now a

Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the respondent Bureau.

On August 7, 1996 Decision, denied Tabasas petition on the ground that he had not legally and
successfully acquiredby repatriationhis Filipino citizenship as provided in RA 8171.
The court said that although he became an American citizen by derivative naturalization when his
father was naturalized in 1968, there is no evidence to show that he lost his Philippine
citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, as explicitly provided in Section
1, RA 8171the law governing the repatriation of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their
citizenship. The affidavit does not state that political or economic necessity was the compelling

reason for petitioners parents to give up their Filipino citizenship in 1968.

CA concluded that his only reason to want to reacquire Filipino citizenship is to avoid criminal

prosecution in the United States of America.

The court ruled against Tabasa, whose petition is now before us.

Issue whether or not the petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171.
Note: If there is no valid repatriation, then he can be summarily deported for his being an undocumented
alien.
Ratio:

RA 8171, An Act Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino Women Who Have
Lost Their Philippine Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born
Filipinos, was enacted on October 23, 1995.

It provides for the repatriation of only two classes of persons:

(1) Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and
(2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship including their minor
children, on account of political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship
through repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as
amended: Provided, That the applicant is not a:
(1)

Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of

persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government;

(2) Person deending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
association for the predominance of their ideas;

(3)Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or

(4)Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases.

Tabasa does not qualify as a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine citizenship by
reason of political or economic necessity under RA 817.

Persons qualified for repatriation under RA 8171

Petitioner theorizes that he could be repatriated under RA 8171 because he is a child of a

natural-born Filipino, and that he lost his Philippine citizenship by derivative naturalization
when he was still a minor.

Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to
natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity,

and to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos.

This means that if a parent who had renounced his Philippine citizenship due to political
or economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation will also
benefit his minor children according to the law. This includes a situation where a former
Filipino subsequently had children while he was a naturalized citizen of a foreign country. The
repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship and

automatically vest Philippine citizenship on his children of jus sanguinis or blood relationship.
To claim the benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time the
petition for repatriation is filed by the parent.

Where to file a petition for repatriation pursuant to RA 8171

He has to file his petition for repatriation with the Special Committee on Naturalization (SCN),
which was designated to process petitions for repatriation pursuant to Administrative Order No.

285 (A.O. No. 285)

Applicants for repatriation are required to submit documents in support of their petition such as
their birth certificate and other evidence proving their claim to Filipino citizenship.These
requirements were imposed to enable the SCN to verify the qualifications of the applicant

particularly in light of the reasons for the renunciation of Philippine citizenship.

What petitioner simply did was that he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; then, executed an affidavit of repatriation, which he registered, together with the
certificate of live birth, with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. The said office

subsequently issued him a certificate of such registration.

At that time, the SCN was already in place and operational by virtue of the June 8, 1995
Memorandum issued by President Fidel V. Ramos.

Although A.O. No. 285 designating the SCN to process petitions filed pursuant to RA 8171 was
issued only on August 22, 1996, it is merely a confirmatory issuance according to the Court in
Angat v. Republic. Thus, petitioner should have instead filed a petition for repatriation before the
SCN.

Requirements for repatriation under RA 8171

SCN requires a petitioner for repatriation to set forth, the reason/s why petitioner lost his/her
Filipino citizenship, whether by marriage in case of Filipino woman, or whether by political or
economic necessity in case of a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his/her Filipino citizenship.

In case of the latter, such political or economic necessity should be specified.

P.D. 725 and the sponsorship speech on House Bill No. 1248, it is incontrovertible that the intent
of our legislators in crafting Section 1 of RA 8171, as it is precisely worded out, is to exclude
those Filipinos who have abandoned their country for reasons other than political or

economic necessity.
Petitioner contends it is not necessary to prove his political or economic reasons since the act of
renouncing allegiance to ones native country constitutes a necessary and unavoidable shifting
of his political allegiance, and his fathers loss of Philippine citizenship through naturalization

cannot therefore be said to be for any reason other than political or economic necessity.
While it is true that renunciation of allegiance to ones native country is necessarily a political act,
it does not follow that the act is inevitably politically or economically motivated as alleged by

petitioner.
Thus, assuming petitioner Tabasa is qualified under RA 8171, it is incumbent upon him to prove
to the satisfaction of the SCN that the reason for his loss of citizenship was the decision of his
parents to forfeit their Philippine citizenship for political or economic exigencies. He failed to

undertake this crucial step, and thus, the sought relief is unsuccessful.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner was a Filipino at birth.
In 1968, while he was still a minor, his father was naturalized as an American citizen; and by
derivative naturalization, petitioner acquired U.S. citizenship.
Reasons why the petitioner cannot reacquire Philippine citizenship.
1. Petitioner was no longer a minor at the time of his repatriation on June 13, 1996.
2. Neither can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino who left the country due to political or economic
necessity.
3. He lost his Philippine citizenship by operation of law and not due to political or economic
exigencies. It was his father who could have been motivated by economic or political reasons in

deciding to apply for naturalization. The decision was his parents and not his.
The privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is extended directly to the natural-born Filipinos
who could prove that they acquired citizenship of a foreign country due to political and
economic reasons, and extended indirectly to the minor children at the time of repatriation.

Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 (Republic Act No. 9225) by simply taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Even if we concede that petitioner Tabasa can avail of the benefit of RA 8171, still he failed to
follow the procedure for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

He has to file his petition for

repatriation with the Special Committee on Naturalization (SCN), which was designated to process

petitions for repatriation.

Therefore, petitioner Tabasa, whose passport was cancelled after his admission into the country,
became an undocumented alien who can be summarily deported. His subsequent repatriation
cannot bar such deportation especially considering that he has no legal and valid reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.

DOCTRINE:
Repatriation is not a matter of right, but it is a privilege granted by the State. This is mandated by
the 1987 Constitution under Section 3, Article IV, which provides that citizenship may be lost or reacquired
in the manner provided by law. The State has the power to prescribe by law the qualifications, procedure,
and requirements for repatriation. It has the power to determine if an applicant for repatriation meets the
requirements of the law for it is an inherent power of the State to choose who will be its citizens, and who
can reacquire citizenship once it is lost. If the applicant, like petitioner Tabasa, fails to comply with said
requirements, the State is justified in rejecting the petition for repatriation.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, this petition for review is DISMISSED, and the August 7, 1996 Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. No costs to the petitioner.

Title:

MERCADO VS MANZANO

Facts: Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Private respondent Eduardo Manzano are candidates for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May, 1998 elections. Private respondent was the winner of the
said election but the proclamation was suspended due to the petition of Ernesto Mamaril regarding the
citizenship of private respondent. Mamaril alleged that the private respondent is not a citizen of
thePhilippines but of the United States. COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified the private
respondent for being a dual citizen, pursuant to the Local Government code that provides that persons
who possess dual citizenship are disqualified from running any public position. Private respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration which remained pending until after election. Petitioner sought to intervene in
the case for disqualification. COMELEC reversed the decision and declared private respondent qualified

to run for the position. Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers proclaimed
private respondent as vice mayor. This petition sought the reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC and
to declare the private respondent disqualified to hold the office of the vice mayor of Makati.
Issue: Whether

or

Not

private

respondent

is

qualified

to

hold

office

as

Vice-Mayor.

Held: Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are
citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the
doctrine of jus soli. Private respondent is considered as a dual citizen because he is born of Filipino
parents but was born in San Francisco, USA. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on
his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of
our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to posses dual
citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle
of jus soli; (2) Those born in thePhilippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
fathers country such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the
latters country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to
have renounced Philippine citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which
a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is

involuntary,

dual

allegiance

is

the

result

of

an

individuals

volition.

By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent
elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such
certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification

he

might

have

as

dual

citizen.

By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident
or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and
bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent
has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and
anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondents oath of
allegiance to the Philippine, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood,
received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this
country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

Title: JACOT VS COMELEC

Petitioner Nestor Jacot assails the Resolution of COMELEC disqualifying him

from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14
May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to make
a personal renouncement of US citizenship. He was a natural born citizen of
the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December
1989. He sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No.
9225.
ISSUE: Did Nestor Jacot effectively renounce his US citizenship so as to
qualify
him
to
run
as
a
vice-mayor?
HELD: No. It bears to emphasize that the oath of allegiance is a general
requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine
elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional
requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts,
considering their special circumstance of having more than one citizenship