IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF NORTHAMPTON COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA

CIVIL DIVISION

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
EX REL.,
No. C-48-CV-2009-13699
Plaintiff,

RON ANGLE,

Defendant.

ORDER OF COURT ->

AND NOW, this /$ day of June, 2010, upon consideration of the Defendant's

application for a stay/supersedeas of this Court's Order of June 4, 2010, it is hereby ORDERED

that the application is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, as set forth below.

1 . The Defendant's prohibition from participation in official Northampton County Council

proceedings as the representative from District 4, while he is in violation of Section 104

of the Home Rule Charter, remains in effect pursuant to the June 4, 2010 Order of Court.

2. The Defendant's forfeiture of his position as the County Council representative from

District 4 is stayed, pending the final disposition of the Defendant's appeal of this Court's

June 4, 2010 Opinion and Order of Court.

3. Northampton County Council shall refrain from declaring the Defendant's County

Council position "vacant" until after the final disposition of the Defendant's appeal.

STATEMENT OF REASONS

This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's application for a stay/supersedeas of

this Court's Order dated June 4, 2010, which grants the Defendant ten (10) days to cure his
violation of Section 104 of the Home Rule Charter of Northampton County ("HRC"),<or forfeit

his position as the Northampton County Council representative from District 4 under Section 107

of the HRC. The Order further provides that, in the event the Defendant does not cure his

violations of the HRC, the remaining members of County Council may declare his office

"vacant," and then fill the vacancy according to the procedures set forth in the HRC.

The Court reached this determination after engaging in a painstaking and comprehensive

analysis of the parties' respective arguments, as set forth in the accompanying Opinion of the

Court. The Defendant filed a timely appeal of the Court's determination to the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court, and now seeks a stay of the June 4, 2010 Order pending the disposition of his

appeal.

The Court held oral argument on the Defendant's application on June 9, 2010, and took

testimony from the Defendant and the County Council Clerk, Frank Flisser. The Commonwealth

objected to the taking of the testimony, but cross-examined the Defendant's witnesses. It also

submitted a brief in opposition to the Defendant's application. After a careful review of the

issues presented, we will grant the Defendant's application in part, and deny it in part.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has determined that the grant of a stay pending appeal

is warranted if the petitioner can satisfy the following four-part test:

(1) the petitioner makes a strong showing that he is likely to prevail on the merits;

(2) the petitioner has shown that without the requested relief, he will suffer irreparable

injury;

(3) the issuance of a stay will not substantially harm other interested parties in the

proceedings; and
 (4) the issuance of a stay will not adversely affect the public interest.
\
Pennsylvania Public Utility Com 'n v. Process Gas Consumers Group, 467 A.2d 805 (Pa.

1983); Maritrans G.P. Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 573 A.2d 1001 (Pa. 1990).

We will begin with the reasoning behind our denial of the Defendant's application for a

stay with respect to his ability to continue to participate in County Council during the pendency

of his appeal. As mentioned above, we performed a searching analysis before arriving at our

conclusion that the Defendant is currently in violation of Section 104 the Home Rule Charter by

virtue of his simultaneous occupation of the positions of County Council and School Director foi

the Bangor Area School District in Northampton County. Having reached this conclusion, it

follows that granting a stay to permit the Defendant to continue to participate in County Council

could adversely affect the public interest and expose the citizens of Northampton County to

substantial harm.

To begin, the citizens of Northampton County voted to enact the HRC via referendum. II

would frustrate the will of the Northampton County voters if this Court were to permit the

Defendant to continue to participate in County Council while he is in violation of the HRC. In

addition, while we will do not wish to engage in idle speculation with regard to the full

ramifications of this determination, it is conceivable that the Defendant's participation in County

Council proceedings while in violation of Section 104 could implicate the validity of those

proceedings. Accordingly, we conclude that the Defendant cannot satisfy the third and fourth

prongs of the test for a stay with respect to his ability to continue to participate in County

Council during the appeal period.

 We reach the opposite conclusion, however, with respect to the Defendant's forfeiture of

his position under Section 107 of the HRC. At the outset, we note that we are required to apply a

flexible standard to the requirement that the Defendant show that he is likely to prevail on the

merits on his appeal. See Pennsylvania Public Utility Com 'n v. Process Gas Consumers Group,

467 A.2d 805, 809 (Pa. 1983). Otherwise, it would be extremely unlikely that the reviewing

court, which has just rendered an adverse decision, would find that it is likely that its order will

be reversed on the merits. Id.

In this case, our determination that the Defendant is in violation of Section 104 of the

HRC is based upon the application of principles of statutory interpretation to an otherwise

ambiguous statutory provision. While we are confident that our analysis is correct, we must

allow for the possibility that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could reach a different conclusion.

In this regard, we note that two former solicitors for County Council reached opposing

conclusions with regard to the proper interpretation of the precise statutory language at issue in

this case. Accordingly, we are constrained to conclude that the Defendant has satisfied the first

prong of the test.

Turning to the second prong of the test, we conclude that the Defendant would suffer an

irreparable injury absent a stay on his forfeiture of his position with County Council. In

particular, the Defendant could face a cumbersome reinstatement process if our Order is reversed

after County Council has filled the Defendant's vacancy. Such a result would also harm the

voters from District 4, who elected the Defendant at the municipal election in November of

2007.
 With regard to the third prong and fourth prongs, we find that a stay would not

substantially harm other interested parties in the proceeding, such as the citizens of Northampton

County and the remaining members of County Council. While not expressly provided for in the

HRC, we take judicial notice of the fact that County Council has in the past operated for a

considerable period with an unfilled vacancy. Any resulting reduction in the effectiveness of

County Council as a result of the Defendant's absence is offset by the elimination of the

possibility that the Defendant's presence at and participation in County Council proceedings

while in violation of the HRC could render those proceedings void.

BY THE COURT:

Michael V. Franciosa, SJ