Does New Zealand want an arms indust

(page 2)

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In This Issue:
.. )OES NEW ZEALAN'J WANT Ai, fK�S INDU3THY-'

** NEW ZEALANJ �88NOMY TAR::;ET :):< 0.:). 2UB\lEfL;L)!'i

** CREATION OF CHAOS: S2ENARI:, 2-':)R T:'"i[ LAN;:.-, ;J\,:::H,l;V:I�,�ri'?
1!-* SWIN1IN} CURREN8IESt YlOOJ�; AND J-OVER::UVL:-\T3
** ROBIE, TARnT O� nNOETTA
** MONIT8RINJ SUBVERSION: ;i;OTES
•• WAIHOPAI OCCUPIED, JE8LARED OPEN TJ TH: FLJFL Cc
.. JBITUARY - MURf.AY HORTON' 3 BACK l'ENCE
.. BOOK REVIEW: ''IN THE RUN" BY PHILIP AJ:"
2

DOES NEW ZEALAND WANT AN ARMS INDUSTRY?

"The first official indication of Gov.eI1lmant for the creation of a

defance industry in New Zealand was by the Prime Minister,
Mr Lange."
'The Press', 13 June 1989, p. 2

It is hardly surprising that two days later Canterbury manufacturers

welcomed Mr Lange's remarks which were made to the Dominion Council of the
Returned Services Association ('The Press', 13 June 1989), There is much talk
about technology and skills transfer to New Zealand if the frigates are bought
and partially made here. But what are the implications of this radical new
direction for manufacturing? There are plenty of clues in media reports.

A spokesman for the newly formed industry association, the Defence

Manufacturers Association, Mr David Moloney was reported as saying "New
Zealand defence officials acknowledged the importance of having a
viable industry base" ('The Press', 19 April 1939, p. 31) ..

Mr Moloney said the Association also the capabilities of

industry to defence officials in New Ze"land and abroad". 'rhe links to
Australia are of ccurse strong, and firmly tied to the project�

A few days earlier Mr Moloney had said "The Australian Minister of

Defence. Mr Beazley, made it clear Australia would New Zealand industry
equal opportunity to participate across the whole range of its defence

April 1939).
procurement provided New Zealand contributed [to guess whatJ" ('The Press', 13

The Australian stakes in all this are neatly summed upin a Press
headline: "Anzac frigates pivotal to revived Aust. industry" (15 May 1333, p.
13). The accompanying article by defence reporter Dave Wilson described the
maze of companies in various consortia that are competing for the Anzac
contract - Australian, New Zealand and companies ",1tht;entacles in
many areas of technology and manufacture including electronic weapons
systems,

The print media have published a number of stcrie� on the optimistic

claims of manufacturing and economic benefits of the Anzac frigates project.
But media reports on opposing point", of view have been few a.Cld far between.
Not that we haven'� tried in Christchurch. What little of our releases the
press have chosen to print has failed to convey the SUbstance of the releases.
There Is a clear lack of balance in the about the defence industry
issue.

There must be many in the peace movement and in the general population
who are opposed to New Zealand developing an arm� indu�try. We call upon
those individuals and groups to speak out forcefully in letters to the editor
and in media releases (follow up on your r'eleases; im.1st on balanced
reporting). And make your views known to your MP in person. Does New Zealand
really want to join the glob'll arm.. b:lzaar? That may be one of the
implications of what we are now reading 1" our newspaper's almost daily. We
urge you to think about it - and act.

Now ti:ut extremely fast and intelligent anti·

whole ship, the call is for a highly dlixtive
surfuce missiles cm rnem the -end of a

shipborne close-ifl weapon system.

Rc:ason 3. growing number of navies
tbeir
 A PROPOSAL FOR THE ENTRENCHMENT
OF PORTIONS OF THE
NEW ZEALAND NUCLEAR FREE ZONE, DISARMJili!ENT AND ARMS CONTROL ACT (1337)

by Barbara Leonard

INTRODUCTION:

Almost all legislation is "single , which means thu t it can be

repealed or amended by a bare majority of the voting Members of Parliament.
However, it is possible to "double entrench" (hereinafter reforTed to simply
as "entrench") a legislative act so that a particular porticn could not be
amended or repealed unless passed by a speoified per"cent (eg. 7511;) of all of
the Members of Parliament or after approval in a referendum. "EntrenChment"
of any legislation would need to meet two criteria: (1) the legislation must
be widely supported by the population and (2) the legislation must be of
fundamental constitutional importance.

In order to protect New Zealand - s Nuclear Free Act, and to provide an

enduring Nuclear ['ree policy for New Zealand, this paper- proposes that
portions of the Nuclear Free Act be entrenched. As with the proposed
entrenched Bill of Rights (1985), the entrenchment of the Nuclear Free Act
could be decided by a Simple ��jority in a conscience vote in the house.

THE INTRu�CHMENT DEBATE:

New Zealand"s unwritten constitution consists of three hundred years of

laws and rules tracing back to the British Bill of Rights of 1533 (Bowden,
1934) . The Bill of Rights 1533 established the rights of Parliament, as
3gainst the rights of the Crown, and was the foundaticn of the doctrine of
Parliamentary sovereignty (Jewe11, 1954).

According to Professor H.W.R. Wade cf Cambridge University, in his Hamlyn

Lecture series "Constitutional Fundamentals", it is the "dogma" of
Parliamentary sovereignty that has been the major stumbling block to British
attempts at entrenchment. He states that the view of the British legal
establishment appears to be that entrenched provisions are impossible because
"the P�rliament of today cannot fetter the Parliament of tomorrow with any
sort of permanent restraint".

However, Professor Wade notes that New Zealand may be in the process of
rejecting the old doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty. In 1956 New
Zealand" s Parliam'ent passed the Electoral Act which contains a ProVision,
section 189, entrenching other specified portions of the Act. "At the time
it was accepted that this provision could itself be repealed by an ordinary
Act. Now that it has been respected for over [30] years it 8eems possible
that a kind of moral entrenchment may have been achieved, and it has been
seriously suggested that legislation infringing it might be put in question by
the lovernol'-Jeneral refusing assent to it" (Wade, 1380).

In other wordS, although section 139 itself was originally only intended
to be single entrenched, the unwritten understanding ("constitution3l
ccnventio,,", Bowden, 1984) that it should not be repealed or amended has
resulted in a de facto double entrenchment of the section, which would now be
honored by the 10venor-3eneral - and possibly the courts.

Section 7 of the }overnment"" 1935 White Paper on a Bill of Rights for

New Ze3.land describes how "over the past 35 years, leading courts in the
Commonweelth including the Privy Council, have decided that provisions 01 a
basic constitutional document CAN [emphasis added] control future
parliaments". The viewpoint expressed in these court deciSions is that "the
CUl'rent rule that an Act of Parliament is to be passed through the House of
Representatives only by a simple majority is a rule of law whic. h
can change. because Parliament-" power to .change the law includes the power to
J
change the law "ffecting itself" (Palmer, 1935). -/"
4

".. It i s import"nt to note her e that the pr imar y objection to 3:: e:'trenched
Bill of Rights is the "power given to the j udic iary" (Justice and Law ReforT.
Co:;]:itte::, 1933) . This objection would not apply to entrenchme::t of
provis i o" s in the Nuclear free Act. ,'WTth an entrenched Bill of Rights, the
courts would have he:d to d ecide whethDr inco::eistent 1egisl3.tion WIS JUSTIn"O
in terms of v3rious 80 c13 1 and other consideratio:18. A: entrenched BLl of
Rights 'Nould be likely to cause the courts to "have to ill3ke import:;:l.n:: 'I ",l1...:e
judgmer,ts with c onsider able cODiiie quence s " (Palmer, 1935) . E;:tr8�lchrnent 0:'
p:�ovisior:s in the Nuclear F:.:'ee Act, h owever, could only i:':.vclve th,:! cOl,;.rts in
,:� singl:: decision: whethe r or n ot P:J.r113mer:.t C:"lD i:Jy J. CLlre ma t�/ ov',� 2"ide
the .ntronched provisions.

[For '}:Tl::)re detailed discussion of the entrel',chmel"�t deba te pI e::: s ,-' S"�
7 of 19B5 White Paper on a Bi�l of Rights for New Z ecland. j

R :QUIR:_M. NTS FOR ENTReNCHMENT:

The Minister of Justice, Jeaf Palmer, s t;::; tBS th::.:, t

::,>:served fo:.' provisions o::�� fund:J.mental cons::i tution3.1
,,3'-1::;.,_
i�"wolvir',g J1atters 0;1 ;N'hich a £eneral co:".se:"iSUS L. the COITL,.tE'),ity is
(lccter from the Minist er, 13 October 1933) .

We propose that the Nuclear F:'e'. .

Z;:)C 1sectio:-� 4 t 3.:1d the sections described as "Prohio: tior:s i:"� ReI :"ti-;·n tQ
\'"",cle3.r :�xplosive Devices and Biological Weapons" sections S thr<)�l.sti L"
t • ut:"

tr-::1ched. Th " s e s ections pertain to freedo:n from weapons of oa"s

C(,�strL:.ction - a rii;ht tha::; must be of as funda:nental cOlls titutL:JT.:.l.l
28 t\-.G right to assembly and f r ee dom of th'- press.

It is generaL�.y ::lccepted, worldwide, that Nucle;JT 8':'8;" p:::'ovisi.:);::;:, JXC

,:;.;)p:�oprL-3.te for inclusio" 1:: a:-" 0:-1trenched constitution. BeL:.u ;3.r.d the
Philip-;:::�:;"ne8 have Nuclear 8't'ez::. provisioDii in the::'r entre :: ch,;. d co'��si t u t i Y ; s , :::: �
J .."pa� is g'3ner:J.lly assumed (erroneously) to have 8:1 s hrine d its NLiclua.;,.' 2'r·.'8
policy ir: :: ts constitution also (8'orei.e,n Af·'.:,1irs
1935) •

As
for "scertaini�g the will of the paople regardinii: the iSCJU8, p3r:g:' ph
7.13 of the 1985 Bill of Rightil White Paper describes several methods �hat
could be used, includinii: a referendum or 3 tr3vellinii: select cOO1::i ttee. The
;:,opc;lari ty .0{ the J overn ment ' s Nucle3r Frr,e policy h.: :s 3lready
11
docu;r;ent :,d with sample polls of the com;:1 un i ty (Heylen _"E:1S Witnas�_�: pol l
d·;'.Jscribc"d
BClrea� DoL des cribed in "The Press". 11 / 9 /35; and the rep ort of th e Ddf roc,
Co ;ni tt.· e of �nquiry, July 1936) . It would be a stra i ght-fo c'wa rd matter to
co�dJct 3�0ther st�tistically valid sample poll if necess ary.

PROPOS,-:O :!JTR::CHM2NT AMENDMEnT:

The :'1uclear Ei'rec' Act can be :1mended by i::sertin� a se ctio r� to 2:' ·t:ru:·�ch
existinii: provisions (specified sections, and/or portions of sections) of the
Nuclear Free Act. These specified provisions would then be referred to as
"reserved provisions". The wording of the entrenchment section could be
based on the wording of section 189 of the Electoral Act 1956 and section 23
of the proposed entrenched B11l of Rl�htB - which 1 8 itself based on section
139 of the Electoral Act.

Amendments to stren"then the Nuclear Free Act could be introduced at the

same time as the entrenchment amendment, and thus be able to be specified as
reserve provisions in the entrenchment section.

[The most straiii:htforward way to strengthen the current Nuclear Free Act
would to be to replace the wordin" of sections 9 and 10, as well as the �
wording of their respective Bub-sections, with the followin,,: �.
 5
"9. Jj;ntry into internal waterm ot New Zealand - No nuclear capable
/""
warship shall be granted approval, to enter into the internal waters of
New Zealand."

"10. Landing in New Zealand - No·aircraft carrying any nuclear explosive

device shall be granted approVal to land in New Zealand." J

But whether or not the Act could be IItren�htened at that time, existing
provisions should be "afeguarded by entrenchment as soon as possible.

POSSIBLE WORDINJ OF ENTRENCHMENT AlI'lENDMENT:

In Appendix A, we have presented pOlIslble wording of an entrenchment

section, section 26, for the existing Nuclear Free Act. The proposed section
23 lists the individual Bubsection!! and para��pha of existing sections 4 thru
11 as S EPARATE reserved provision.. Th! .. would allow future (single
entrenched) subsection and paragraph ADDITIONS to strengthen the sections.

The following is an example of a paragraph ADDITION that would

significantly strengthen a section. It i8 balled on a proposal by the New
Zealand Nuclear-�ree Peacemaking Association.

The existing subsection 5 (1) read" "No person who ie a New Zealand
citizen or a person ordinarily re"ldent in New Zealand, shall, within the New
Zealand Nuclear �ree Zone, -
(a) Manufacture, acquire, or posse"". or have control over any nuclear
explosive device; or
(b) Aid, abet, or procure any per"on to manufacture, acquire, possess, or
have control over any nuclear explosive device".

The proposed paragraph addition to sub!llectlon 5(1) is as follows:

"(c) Aid, abet, or procure any person to manufacture, acquire, possess, or
have control over the development of information for the potential, or
improved, guidance and delivery of any nuclear explosive device to its
intended target".

Additional subsections and/or paragraphs to sections 9 and 10, deSigned

to make the Prime Minister accountable for hI. evaluation of nuclear-capable
warships and aircraft, would also greatly strengthen the Nuclear �ree Act.

The proposed entrenchment wording include.. the reqlrement that NO

RESERVED PROVISro,N SHALL HAVE ITS STATED PROHIBITIONS I N ANY WAY WEAKENED BY
A
SUBSEQUENT LE3ISLATION unle•• the proposal 1s passed by 75% of the Members of -/"

/:NTRENcl-l.
HIE. ACT ??I
6
�the House or by a referendum. This Is intended as a safeguard against
attempts to weaken the Act uSing subsequent amendments. It Is also intended
as a safeguard against attempts to weaken the entrenched prohibitions by
passage of other bills.

The wording 1s inspired by the wording of the entrenchment section

proposed in the 1985 BUl of Rightiil "Wh1te paper: "No providon of this B111 of
Rights shall be repealed or amended OR IN ANY WAY APPECTED [emphasis added]
unless the proposal ...... .

Our inclusion of section 25, the entrenchment section, in the list of

reserved provisions, is also inspired by the 1985 White paper's wording:
"The reference to 'no provision of this Bill of Rights' means that the
entrenching provillion is i tilelf entrenched".

THE VOTE ON AN ENTRENCHMENT AMENDMENT:

Had an entrenched Bll1 of Rights been put to a vote, in the opinion of

the research staff of the Ministry of JustIce, it would have required only a
simple majority in the House of Representatives - and the vote would have been
declared a conscience vote (personal communication, Nov. 1933).

A simple majority is all that is required for the passing of any

legislation that does not affect any previously entrenched legislative
provision. A simple majority is considered to be adequate for the passing of
entrenching legislation I� THE LEJISLATION HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED TO EXPRESS
THE WILL O� THE PEOPLE (Palmer, 1935).

The decillion as to whether or not a particular matter is a "conscience

issue", and thus subject to a "free vote", is decided by the individual
parties. It is possible that for a particular bill, one party might grant a·
free vote and the other part might not (Jack.on, 1987). The Labour Party. at
least, was expected to consider an entrenched Blll of Rights to be 3
conscience issue. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that the Party
should consider the entrenchment of provisions relating to freedom from
weapons of mass deEitruction to be a com.eience issue &180.

RE�ERENCES

Bowden, B. (1934)
Parliament and the People. Wellington: }overnment Printer.
Defence Committee of Enquiry (1936)
"Defence and Security: What New Zealanders Want". Wellington: Jovernment
Printer.
"Electoral Act" (1953)
Wellington: Jovernment Printer.
Poreign Affairs and Defence Select Committee (1933)
"Report on the Inquiry into Disarmament and Arms Control". Wellington:
Jovernment Printer.
Jackson, K. (1997)
The Dilemma of Parliament. Wellington: Port Nicholson Press.
Jewell, R.E.C. (1964)
The British Constitution. London: The English Universities Press Ltd.
Justice and Law Reform Committee (1933)
"Pinal Report on a Whitoe Paper on a Bill of Rights for New Zealand".
Wellington: Jovernment Printer.
"New Zealand Nuclear Pree Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act" (1')37)
Wellington: Jovernment Printer.
Palmer, G. (1965)
"White Paper on a Bill of Rights for New Zealand". Wellington: }overnment
Printer.
"The Press", Chriatchurch (1 Apr. 1983)
"N-stance backing steady". p.14.
"The Press", Chrlstchurch (11 Sep. 1933)
"N-armed ships still oppolled". p.l.
Wade, H.W.R. (1938)
Constitutional Fundamentals. London: Stevens � Sons.
7' APPENDIX A
7

Possible Wordln� of Nuclear �ree Act Entrenchment Section

Entrenchment of certain provi�ione

(1) Thh section referll to the following provH:iom. of this Act (hereinafter
referred to as reserved provisions). Each reserved provision is listed
independently of subordinate reserved provisions. The reserved provisions
are
(a) Section 4 (New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone);
(b) Section 5 (Prohibition on acquieitlon of nuclear explosive devices)
title;
(c) Subsection (1) of section 5 ;
(d) Subsection (2) of section 5 ;
(e) Paragraphs (a) and (b) and (c) of subsections (1) and (2) of
section S;
(f) Section
6 (Prohibition on stationing of nuclear explosive devices);
(g) Section 7 (Prohibition on testing of nuclear explosive devices);
Ch) Section 3 (Prohibition of biological weapons);
(1) Section 9 (Entry into internal waters of New Zealand) title;
(j) Subsection (1) of section 9;
(k) Subsection (2) of Bection 3;
(1) Section 10 (Landing in New Zealand) title;
(m) Subsection (1) of sBction 10;
(n) Subsection (2) of section 10;
(0) Subsection (3) of section 10;
(p) Section 11 (Visits by nuclear powered ships) title;
(q) This section. section 26.

(2) No reserved provision shall be repealed or amended, nor shall its stated
prohibitions be in any way weakened by aubaequent legislation, unless the
prop osal
(a) Is passed by a majority of 75 percent of all the members of the House of
Representatives; or
Cb) Has been carried by a majority of the valid votes cast at a poll of the
electors of the General and Maor! electoral districts".

NEW ZEALAND ;;:CONOMY TAR:iET O� U.S. SUBVERSION

by Nu clear ,ree Kiwis

Former' US Navy Secretary, John Lehman� has said tmt Reag-.ln"'s US Oefence
Secretary, Caspar Weinberger , had once wanted to hit NZ's economy over the
ANZUS row. The proposal would have involved shifting the US Antarctic support
oper ation from Christchurch to Hobart, To.smanio., and 1.oi tiating a review �f
NZ's "speci3.1 economic pri vilege s" eThe Press', 21 Jan 1933). A ccord ing to
Le hma n , the proposal which he held backed lapsed for want of bureaucratic
support.

Yet other means of e conomic pressure on NZ go on it; various forms. This

pressure tends to be low key and subtle. It is pr ob ably not deliberately
contrived or orchestrated in many cases � Rather r there is simply L1Cili ta.tion
:J.�ld e nc ourag ement of econom ic trends :llready in place, i �e �, increased
pen"tration :l:;d cooptation of NZ busine�s iC1terests with a potential to foster
a pro -US tangent.

US }overnme nt-wide �trategy toward NZ

In May 1936 it was reported. " Follow ing the di rection of the Nation:ll

The J
Security Council, US Inform ation Agency [Service] is leading a government-wide
public aff:lirs strategy addre""ing the i.... ue" of NZ's nuclear free stand.
8
",medict have ::,eferred to this strategy ail meanino;: public relations (e.o;:., 'The
( Press'. 22 May 1936). Public relations efforts are often the most visible
clement of this strategy. A lot, of course, goes on that is not detected by
alert observers. At an even deeper level 'o;:overnment-wide' means the
8Llployment by the whole rano;:e of relevant US agencies of methods to subvert
our nucle::lr f:r'eedom.

In his epic study of "The CIA: A Porgotten History" (Zed Books, n33, p.
13) Wi:liam Blum identifies several principal tactics used by the CIA in
country after country. Aside from the training aCId support of mill tary /police
forces, the CIA has applied four basic types of tactic: a) inf11 tratior and
manipul:ltion of selected o;:roups, b) news manipulation, cl dirty tricks, and cO)
econooic means. The latter category has 80 far received little 3.::ter,tion by
those monitoring US subversion in NZ. But significantly, Blum says thec:e
econor::ic means !lare without number"_

Phillip Knio;:htley, author of a new bioo;:raphy of British double age'1t Ki,:

Philby. was interviewed recentl� by a 'Dominion' reporter (1) June 193') .
Knightley "warns that the CIA might consider trying a few tricks in orde; to
h3stf;n the downfall of the anti-nuclear Lan�e Jover!1ment� The agency is ;:>

hugh empire with enormous resources and great iJ.utonomy, he Sc::q8 A'("] �

enthusiastic; section of it could well decide to try inflicting Cl l1 ttle

on the New Zeal:md economy in L'�ter;'la.tiol1:.l1 money markebill �

Weinbero;:er and Lehman supposedly consider :; just

Back in Reagctn's heyday,
� few pOL:Sible overt methods of economic pressure. These means ';.!Ould h'lve
Dem grossly evident to the taro;:eted population. More covertly subversh,,,
rEd ,�n8 ]re to hand �

T3rgetin� race relations

The disruption cf o;:oad race relations in NZ has been Cl eledr obj8:;tiv'�) of

US into.2.1igence for Borne time. The HonolLlu l02n sc:.:tm w�s j C3.S8 L":; poir:t
(�NZ Mor.thly Review", No. 235J March 1337)� Moreover, a po.ttern of 1')3..:"';. SC,�;r:S

seems to be e::lergin�, with the latest revelation reported in The Domic<.i:);-;

Sunday Times', 23 May 1939. A staggering $1.3 billion overseas loan was
promised to the Maori people but has failed to ar:cive. This scam seens to
h:lV,�' 'ken based in Los Ano;:e188.
Ao;:ain, a whole web of murky intrigue is
i:nplicated. with even the apparent involvement of the forme:' CIA-linked Cook
Isl",�;ds gover::ment, '" strono;: ",dvocClte at the time of the Honolulu loan
Dro:notiGo ('NZ Monthly Review', No. 301, Sept 1937). Ao;:ain, there; a"0 vClgue
intimations of Middle Eastern sources for the loan. Several pro:nircent Maor1
'nve linked it to; the orio;:inal Honolulu (:.:s::ally refer;ced to as the M10ril
10 �r �f3.ir. They are no,} wisely expressin" concern that the loan does not
exist �nd th:t off-shore promises may be aimed �t destabilisin" the Maori
2C0;:0;;:.v and stirrino;: up racial tension.

As :llre3dy indicated above, it may be hard to unravel any subversive

lspects f rom tlnormalll on£oin� trends. Any economic activity which ties uS
closer to the US or even to Australia, :J,nd mClkes us more dependc.::r:t, ca::-', Serv",
the ;Jurpose of eventually erodlno;: our self-determination. Then cgain,
"normccl" p�3tterns of activity can be intensely reinforced and stimu13 ted
towaL� desired ends? It mio;:ht have been normal under ANlUS for NZ to h3ve
its old frio;:ates with an Australi:m-built fleet. So thi} US perceives
si tuati�)r on which it can bring pressure to beal"' t directly or indirectl,,? t to
.:<e<'p NZ tied into the old tradit.:1.ona,l W?iYS � Senior officers in the US Pacif �;

C>::cs:J.:1d havc..: b·;(;n reported from Honolulu as indicatin� that the US wantE:d the
ANZAC frii,;ate project to "et NZ back into ANZUS ('Christchurch Star', 2� ,ob
1939) •

The US-NZ Council

Besides the ANZAC frlo;:ates project there have �11so beim } v�'riety OC
sma2.1er diverse indications of US interest lr; increasing its economic
influer,ce o:c NZ. The flourishin" trade between the US and NZ, desDi to the
l
ANZUS rift. has opened up plenty of opportunities. An important l'Ner for the.
 CREATICN O� CHAOS: 11
se ENARIO �OR TH.E LAN:i E :iOVERNMENT?

by Nuclear 8'ree Kiwis

A particularlY insightful art:lcle on CIA covert techniques was written by

fired Landis, "CIA Media Operations in Chile, Jamaica, and NicJ.ragua,"
published in 'Covert Action', March 1932 (1), The reader may have noticed an
i�crease in political, social, ethnic and economic tensions since New
Zealanders elected a llnuclear-free!1 government� A few pOints from the Landis
article may help to explain some of the things that people are feeling.
New Zealanders have been cautioned

While Landis' 1382 article does not refer to New Zealand, in 1986 people
here were alerted to some of the tactics he describes. A former CIA "gent
with 23 ye"rs of experience behind him, Ralph McCiehee, was brought out to this
country by the NZ Nuclear-B'ree Zone Committee in August-September 1933. He
w"rned New Ze"l"nders to expect problems originating from outside:

"It is axiom"Uc that the CIA is going to "ttempt to the

[nuclear-free] position of the g;over:lment, or change the government
('The Star'. 11 August 1933).

To help counter such attempts to subvert NZ pOlicies and govermle":t, he

counselled th"t: "The CIA's techniques "re so subtle and so pernicious that
you have to be very alert and you have to make a concerted effort to educate
yourself "bout these and "ct on your knowledge New Ze"l"nders must protect
• . •

themselves" COtago Daily Time,,', 14 August 1935).

McJ.ehec stressed that the CIA uses a comprehensive prog':-'3m:f;e in

undermiDing. a country"s IDdep():Jdence� On several occasions he emphasized that
the model used in Chile in the 1960B and 13708 was the one most likely in the
NZ situation McGehee strongly recoclmended to US a US Senate report entitled
0

"Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973" (2) . By the relevance of the ::hilean model
McSuhue did not mean the violence of the Chilean experienee ("lthough some
violence is "lw"ys possible in the future), but inste"d the methods of media
manipulation, of economic subverSion, and so on. Agencies like the CIA and
the USIS infiltr"te "nd manipul"te elements of the politic"l structure, the
cultur"l scene, the social fabric, the religious spectrum, the milit"ry, the
medi". "nd cmy other signific"nt social grouping. Note how the USI3
IGternational Visitor Jrant Pro�ramme draws well-placed New Ze�landers from
throughout NZ society for free trips to the US. "A government-wide str"tegy"
involves US "genoies applying pressure "nd/or influence wherever it is deemed
appropri::zte4

Such str"tegies go back many years, Official documents from 1361 and
1935, obt"ined in 1936 by the 'Campaign "gainst Foreign Control of Aotearoa',
3ffirm that there has long been a very pervasive US policy to m"int,lin "
strong influence here. The 1960" documents are US State Department
I!J-uidelines for Policy and Operation - New Zeal;3.nd11 They call for "reaching
�

of the yOUelg "nd potent1,,1 leadership in ,,11 circles in New Zeal"nd . •to •

eneour"",e 3 pro-US orient"tioO' when they occupy 3ctual pcsitions of

leadershipH� It continues, saying that there should be tla't: the salTle time� an
"ttempt to influence those young people who might seek to frustr"te the
?,chidvement of US objectives". And thi", comes from a highly sanl tized
document!

9r L"ndls: social "nd political p01"risation the key

Or ti'T'ed Landis gives an excellent and succinct account of the techniques

of what he 0,,118 "psychological warfare". He ia well placed to do so. He
wrote his doctoral thesis on "Psychologic"l Warf"re and Media Operations in
Chile. 1970-73". He then served in the mid-70s "s " con8ult"nt for the US
Senate investigation of CIA covert action in Chile by the Church Committee - a
Lmdmark in the document"tion of CrA activities and method... As he noted
"For the first time the US government would give official status ·t , o
on CIA covert "ctivity" • According to the Church Committee report, "The CIA ....J.
12
conducted 9JO major covert operations and several thousand smaller projects
rr
since 1961 Covert operations are not an exceptional policy only used in
• • •

raI'e cases. Presidents have made exce....ive and self-defeating use of covert
11 '"
action

To distill Landi.' points. the basic principles underlying the successf;Jl

destabilization of a society and its government are relatively clear-cut.
F'irst, the potentially divisive areas are defined. These includo sthnic,
economic, political and religious dimen"ion.. , Then opinions are polarised oy
cultivating extremes at both end .. on such matters, Pressures will also be put
on the economy_

The result is that the institutions of a society, especially the

government itself. come under continual, climaxing waves of prec:sures from
many fronts. The government will have continual difficulties end":�vouring to
get on tcp of problems as these seem to get increasingly out of hand. In a
word, the old "divide and conquer" technique is refined into something of "l:'

3.:,t farm.

Under pressure and caught up in the various conflicts that h:we be',n s t
up or aggravated, people can frequently be counted on to take sides 'Ni thout
grasping that they are being manipulated by outside interests whose bottoCl
Lne is destabilization (in NZ. of our nuclea:- free policy and government).

"Destabilization defined

Landis offers a simple but thought-provoking definition. He sc:tys:

"Oestabilization means that having studied the glue that keeps a society [:or
po li tical party?] together. one uses tha t knowledge to :nake the socist" come
'J,:lglued" •

He continues with a definition of the goals of destabilization fro:, US

Army "Manual of Psychological Operation" as: "To stimulate disse:lsior: b;.,tW("0r:
:nill tary :md political estates: to undermine confidence in leadership; to
encourage disaffection on the part of religious, ethnic. poll tical, e'�0:1c:\ic
" nd other elements against the government or a.. ::tinst each other; to u3ke
friendly leaders strong and enemy leaders weaker.tl

He says, as McGehee also noted, that all the resources ,;nd ccep3rt'l1ents of
the US gover::-:,ment are brought to beo.r as an economic, diplomatic and even
par.:cmilitary campaign is mounted in conjunctioC' with a propagand,\ oL"er:sive
bott'. ;Ni thin and outside the country concerned.

Extensive media manipulation

'
The 8IA s propaganda machine covers the globe. Landis notes tha tit: "hlS
" cess to over 200 newspapers, advised by its ilorld-Wide Prop ..,glndl Guidance
Desk" which advises every CIA station i;c the world nlice 83ch week on how to
deal with local media contacts.

The central aim of propaglndCl used in a destabilization ca:n paign is to

g:;:1er .. te .on atmosphere of continual criIBiII. Local ciltastrophes are

highlighted [in some instances even gener"ted] in a way th'.

sc"ne seem "dark, frightening, and claustrophic". He el;,borates: "The first

theme is econo:nic chaos, because tha.t is the easiest for the US to cre'lte.

The next theme is social chaos Suddenly 'National .Enquirer--type 'I1�terial

. •

fills the front pages: violence, chaos» t

permane:-:: crisis " • . .

The government the target

A key element in destabilization is that "this situation is bl:lmed o� the

goverr:ment". Jove:rnrnent ministers may be worked 0:) one by one, li.ke "31. che;;;s
game in 'Nhich one eliminates the pawlls 1nd works up to the king". This

hSlDpcned in Chile, aocording to Landia. " There is an atte:n p 'c to mO:l:lize

. . •

J
the masses agCtinst the governme:ot". If that fails. then I'} the Third World
 13
situations described by Landi_, resort is had to a military coup and/or the
�
marines are sent in�

In mid-1339 the NZ Labour government seem.. to be falling apart. A fierce

internal power struggle has developed. The New Labour Party has arisen.
Mc]ehee warned that one likely CIA 'tactic would be to faciH tate a spU t
within Labour. While so many of the roots of Labour's internal conflict are
domestic, the question can be well asked as to whether external forces have
been able to lubricate and stimulate existing divisions. It should 3lw3Ys be
kept in mind that the critical ideological input driving Rogernomies is
American monetarism. Again the Backbone Club's disruptive tactics have
seriously embarrassed the government; what subversive agents might be active
here?

Prime Minister David Lange ia under great pressure. Late last ye�r.
former US Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger said in Jane's D e fen ce
Weekly' (23 Nov 1933) that there was 9. need to "get rid' of Lange" to de,11 with
"the problem of New Zealandii* Since then� certain journalists in New Ze::lland
have got stuck in more vigorously than usual. The term 'destabilization' h38
even been laundered by elements of the media to refer to
domestically-generated conflict rather than foreign-generatcd
At times as in the case of Lange'11 Yale speech on ANZUS, cortai'l journalists
have seriously distorted what he actually said - in other words CI'e1ting the
news about the Prime Minister rather than reporting ito The fu;:oro over the
Yale speech was very deliberately and artificially contrived.

One car' draw up a list of NZ journalists whose writing raisee:

A confidential report to Nuclear Free Kiwis has also fingered a journalist
with suspect intelligence links who ill accredited to the NZ p3rliaT.ental'Y
preES ",alle ry
• Lange himself spoke darkly of cert3in powerful individuals and
�rganisations who would go to any lengths to undermine NZ" S I1ucle3.r-f;'B8 zone
�

FroD 'TiDe' mC\gazine' s picture of Lange lollir'g in the grass to local media
excesses, the conservative Western medi� machine is showing a1: the of
being cranked up to steamroller the Lange government.

Build-up of tensions?

It remains to be seen how far the tensions will build up in our society
from here on. In CIA-orchestrated operations these have been built up in a
rhythmic pattern as "emotional tidal waves and poll tical eClrthquakes" of
increasing intensity were created. The Honolulu Loan Scam evoked this
atmosphere to some degree. Economic problems, and race issues in 1990, to
name just two big ones, guarantee Labour a stormy passage next ye3.r.

To cope with the problem, both Landis and Mc}ehee have said it is
essential to be aware of the techniques that are used. Landis calls for
"timely and fiI'm defensive measures, and particularly education of the
popul:lCe as to the nature of psycholog1c:ol w:orfare". The imperative for the
peace moveDent is to try and discern the key features of the pattern described
by Mc}()hs'8 and Landis, and then to effectively promote these insights to the
public at large.

(1) Thirteen-page article available for $1.30 (add postage) from the NZ
Nucle'1r �rGe Peacemaking Assn. Box 13541, Christchurch, New Zealand. �ite
c'1talogue No. 10-53.

(2) The paper is a Staff Report to the Seloct Committee to Study }overnmental
Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities'. A copy can be obt'1ined
from the the address in (l). Cite catalogue No. LJ-g, $3 (add postage).
14
SWINGING MOODS AND 30VERNMENTS',

by Nuclear fi'ree Kiwis

" • the New Zealand c!urrency ie. at prime risk to outside manipulation
• •

because of the ANZUS row. "i!

- Alan Carroll of the New rlork-based consultants. Business International',
•

quoted in The NZ Times'. Sept 1985 ,�

As a small nation rely,ing
needs an· exchange rate that 'll.s relatively stable and more or less reflects the
condition of its internal e,!�onomy - its strength or weakness. A volatile or
excessively unpredictable dollar can make business or economic placening
decisions difficult and poiientially very costly. If its shifts are within 21:1
artificially broad range oV,er
manufacturing and agricultural exports, costing the economy many jobs and the
government much popularity.

Exchange rates, depression and unemployment

Economics Professor Tony Raynor of Lincoln Colle,.e indicated the positive

impact for farmers of Cl fall in the dollar: "Each fall of one US cent in New
Zealand means another $30 million for New Zealand' s dairy farmers alone" ("The
Press', 16 July 1933, p. 1).

That statement also has negative corollary: that for every ·ise of a
cent, $3J million is lost by these farmers. Further, with a volatile dollar
over a lon,. period numerous sharp shifts and swings occur $3J million for
-

each cent, just for dairy farmers alone I This can contribute to an endemic
sense of uncertainty, and a sense of loss of control (and presu�ably a
succession of exhaustin,. mood swings to match the dollar swin,.s).

A basic tenet of 'Ro&ernomics' that strongly ri&ht-wing advisers have

persuaded our finance ministers to maintain is a purely market-determined,
"free-floatln&" dollar. The exceptional vulnerability of this dollar has been
well described by a president of the Canterbury Manufacturers' Association, Mr
Alan Shadwell, when he retired from the position. He said that, "We have a
minor currency that now, because of speculation and cap! tal movements, is
reputed to be the ninth most actively traded currency in the world We are
• • •

really in the star Wars lea&ue" ('The Press', 25 Aug 1988, p. 26).

He also described the effect of this volatility on the sector he

represented, blaming "the fluctuations in the NZ dollar as the main cause of
the deterioration in the country's manufacturing", He traced the impact of
disadvantageous exchange rate movements on export competitiveness and, in
turn, on NZ jobs. The competitiveness of our exports in relation to our "main
customer countries had fluctuated alarmingly in recent years and largely moved
against us more than 40,000 manufacturing jobs have been lost throughout
• • •

the country".

A number of complex factors affect manufacturing trends but Mr Shadwell,

in the thick of it, feels the exchange rate is the major factor in its decline
and the accompanying massive loss of jobs. Whether or not that is entirely
the case, clearlY the exchange rate can be seen as a big source of the
pressure that is on manufacturing.

Business consultant links 'nuclear-free' with volatile $NZ

It is most interesting that Alan Carroll, an international business

consultant who has been accused of involvement in the CIA and dirty work in
fi'ijian elections, pred}cted some four year a,.o that the AN?US issue.would be a

2:J
major factor affectln& the exchange rate. Reporter �ran 0 Sullivan s account
of his prognosis opened with the words: "Powerful United states interests Wil
punish New Zealand by kicking around the Kiwi dollar unless the }overnment
 15

/" caves in on its strong stance bannl�"g nuclear ships" (-The NZ Times - . 1 Sept
1 98 5 )
•

She continued that he "says the New Zeal::;;,nd cur:'ency is at �"'isk to

outsi d e manipulation because of ths'ANZUS row. You play around in these
Olrenas with the big boys who' ve got other agendas ond 111 of 0 sudden things
haDpen, I mean it ' s very simple 85 % of the world s currency [Sic J is
- '

no .. -trade related ' " < ' The NZ Times ' , 1 Sept 1 9 35).

Alan Carroll s views cannot be lightly dismissed. He is he'ld of the

Austrlolian branch of ' Business InternationCll-, Cl global organisation. His
firm ' s clients in Australia lt the time of the interview cl ted "bove included
12 multinational Austr,\lian corporations, and he was targeting big NZ
companies . ['ran O ' Sullivan wrote that occording to an ' Australi�n
Businessweek'" profile early in 1985t "His scenarios tend to become f3.ctll� It
may be significant that Carroll is a gr3.du.::.o,te of the strategic studies centrr:
1t Washington DC's Jeorgetown UniversivJ. This centre has be c ome base for
e.n i-1formal ANZUS think-tank ;etwork !ii e t up in the light of the nucle::r ships
�an. 3. project initiated by former C I A deputy director Or Ray Cline .

Dol"ar volatility

C ertainly Mr Carr-oll" s pro�nosi8 of major Kiwi. dollar

DBcome fact"� We shall quote fi7'lancial news reports about the Kiwi dollar
over the last three years which document this.

Just recently :
"The New Zealand dollar had "' topsy-turvy dav yesterday,
• . . 08'01'8
;inis h ing slightly firmer" CThe Press ' , 2 5 May 1 939, p . 35).

Last year :
According to one exchange dealer: " I t ' s a very complex and deceptive
market . It has been Hydroslide Cl ty witt", heavy New York s ellirg,
. • ,md e
. •

complet81y nervous inter-bank market" ( ' The Pre s s ' , IS July LJ33, p . 27).

A s mall and relatively weak economy like ours is less able the:1 others to
3.bsorb such os cillations, and our IIfree float" means that nothing can be done
'lbout them . The par"lmeters of the oscillations hElve :\lso beteD (to o
significant ,extent quite mysteriously) out of chClra cter for our doll?r, as is
seen in the following quotes .

Two years ctgo :

Headed EXCHANJE RATE BAD NEWS , one f1n""ci21 :'lews report l"I,,,d -
"fCAC T : New Z ealand ' s exchange rate this week hit the highest pOillt si:1ce the
dollar WllS floated.
f"AC T : Workers ' real incomes have fllllen again, lrdlire now lovier them they
were in 1 984 � . " �

The article continues j " I n countries like Japan t 3. stror:g cur:�ency

projects the underlying strength of the economy, surpluses in tr',de and
_ . •

products that outsell the competition . H

"Now the Kiwi dollar is acquiring the same kind of macho image the
. . •

interns tiolal com"unity must perceive strengths wi th�n this country - s economy
hidden froe most New Z e3!landers • "
• •

"One theory prevalent 1:1 the top echelon" of l) big producel" board, hard
hit by the dollar ' s ris e , is th.l.t cartel of Americ.en banks is Ianipuleti:1g
the Kiwi for its own reasons" (' Chri .. tchurch Star'. 3 Oct 1937).

The value of the Kiwi dollar was being kept up way beyond what the
economy Wl:ll'ranted. It is interesting that some producer board "top echelons"
pointed the finger at. a "csrtel of American b:mks" - Alan C,,"rroll �ight have
been able to elucidate the matter f urther. Just looming up then 'Nas the mejor
share market crash of October 1937. New Ze'l\Lmd suf;�ered more than others
then and since . And yet - �
 Accordin,. t o a report tw<: months later in 19B7 , exchsn,.e
16
dealers said
I'"offshore support was bolster:l.r:g the Kiwi d o l l a r and i t l ooked a s if i t was
,.oin,. t o tJo'ade highsr , but they were not sure why . " I t d e f i e s a l l fundamental
,:tnal y s i s , " ' one s a i d ( ' Th e Pres", ' , 2 Dec 1987 , p . 3 9 ) .

Here the sense of mystery remai n.. , but only i f AlaI' Carro l l ' s explan'ltlon
is not conE\idered ! Analysts are ;�ware of how thin,... l i ke high New Zealand
interest rates have contri buted to the higher Kiwi dollar by attracting
overseas investors , but their pUZZl ement " t i l l per$ists despite this . At
other times there have been drops in the value of the do l l ar , bu t on occas ion
they h a v e b e e n very drama t i o , inexp l i c ab l e , a n d i n their own WCly a l s o
destab i l i z ing a s can b e seen in a report from 1936 :

The mid -illay report was headed "Dramatic $NZ drop puz z l e s the d e aler s " :
"Dealers yest erday were s t i l l attempting to d i s cover the reasons behind the
drama t i c s l ump of the New Zealand dollar overnight on Tue sday The Kiwi • • .

doll::!r was s o l d down heav i l y in the Asian market in the most dramatic s lump
since D e c ember 1 5 , when it lost 6 . 1 % of its value . Tuesday n ight ' s
took the Kiwi down to less than US-55 cents , amounting to 7 % deval ua t io n
ag::!i n s t the American uni t . The Australian dollar olso f e l l �g :.iflst other
currenci es , but the Kiwi fell f rom Aust7 3 . 8 cents to a low of 75 . S c ents
despite the f a l l of the Austra lian un i t against other currenci e s " ( ' The
Pr es s ' , I S May 1986) .

Case Study : Impact on wool markets

The case of wool shows how exports can be a f f e c te d by a vo ls:ti l e do l L!!' .

The volatility of the Kiwi has m i l i t::!ted against wool s a l e s in both do::nward
!., nd upward s w i n..s , causing a relatively long-term d e c l i n e in the demand th !t
would oth e rwise exi s t . Even when the Kiwi dollar has beero movie'g dO,IDw::: rds !l S
j u s t described , its volati l i ty c o u l d mean opporturoities los t f o r sa l e s . as c:m
bc see� iro another May 1935 report a few days later headed KIWI DOLLAR
VOLATI L I TY ' FRUSTRATES' WOOL SALES : " The yo -yo swin ..s of the cur:'ency :narket
cont i nue to frustrate wool sales Iroternation::: l manufactu='ers 3.re s hOw ing
• • •

stron.. i:oterest in New ZeaL�nd special ty woo l s , but contlccue to postpone

purch3ses while looking to catch even more favourabl e currency movements "
( ' The Dominio cc ' , 19 May 1935 , p . 1 4 ) .

Convers e ly , s trong upswings also irohibit s a l e s ; at one po i nt eighteen

months Loter the dollar was rising . At US-65 cents when i t was "puz z l in..
dealers by its strengthU it was noted tha t , Honce 3.2a i n , a firming Kiw: do l lar
has imp inged on th'e wool marke t , s topping new bus iness in its tracks" ( ' The
Press ' , 2 Dec 1937 , pp . 33 and 3 4 , respective l y ) .

The impact of the then high $NZ could be s e�n iro the substi.tution e f
synthetics fo r New Zealand woo l . According to a managing director in the wool
:Jusines s , Mr Don Quested of Hart Woo l , Christchurch : " dur ing the last rew
• • •

;nonths 3 pic tur e has been emerging of in cr ea s ing substitution of New Z e ::l l::"" n d
\'1')01 i n :\l mos t a l l end uses One of our major cust om e rs ( i n Asia) has
. . •

reduced the compo ne'1 t of 3 3 micron wool in his blends from 3J% to 1 3 % ir; order
to stay competitive . This i s not an isolated case " .

Volati l e :)xchange rates , e conomy , and moods

The cCtse of woo l i l l ustrates how potential buyers car: c o me to 8 8 , ' K

/11 ternative sources and products when the Kiwi dollar i s volat i l e . especially
'''he'! i t moves for a l o n.. period mostly within a "high" range .

The im pac tof the volatile (and mostly hi ..h) $NZ on manuf , c t 'J ri ng 'NJ8
noted by Mr Shadwell as contributb.. significantly to the loss of 48 , :l0) jobs .
We have noted Lincoln College Economics Professoro Raynor ' s calculatiolC )f
$30 m i l l ion 1 0 8 s by NZ ' d a i ry farmers for each one cent decline in the $US . H e
was speaking ot " time i n L l 3 3 when the $NZ went from US-72 c en ts down t o 64 .f
ce :cts in the space of j u s t over 3 we e ks I ../'
 17

r Th , vo l a t i l i ty of the d o l lar 2:8 tr:l c e d in this arti c l e m u s t ::ide to the

.
d i " � f i c w ,.ty ��or' farmers , a n d for those who depend o n them e i the::::"' p e rs o r:t e. l or
fi.::13"-: c i t l J,, ], . t o know someti,':! e s whether "lre comin£ o r "up 0::"
"
down "

It 1>'13 8 the pro -ANZUS M r who s t r e s s e d the l i nk betw:J _;<� th;_

gov'3r"�;r �r: t " s nuclear-free p o l i cy and exchange-r;.::.te
: vola t l l i ty � If his
� "
3D ' \ 1y s i to b e 8 8 l i evGd t the farmel's :J.nd others a.r'B p::" e S �l:Ti Hi t to
t.: ::d<'''' th 3 i ::::'" frustraticDS out on the they certa i:"lv c or: t r i b:..r:: e to
the r <-; 8 .<cvoi::" of d i s conte;")t 3.::d ;]1:::1. 1 : i s e 'i. n New Z ea l :,) n d :.:1
"ircu;;,s :a;'; c e s beyond their contro l .

W}-, L e h 03Y :: 1 8 0 pc;.rtly h e l p to expLain 1.::-: e c oT1C' m i c ter28 'f.fha. t D "� ? '''"ed
l;:"�,n.cis :iescribes as the CIA s HdemonstrJ.ted
� to C I' 0';'';t:e BJ1oti o;L3.1 tidal
'fl 3ves id poli ti,cal e.'_?rthqu,�1.kes" ( see "' Creation of ch::io s " 2 r ti c l e �:' th:::',s
L:su;:) • The fined question that must be p o s e d here is " e t on Nl:'0the:'
,
extc:r,",, ? l ['orces 3re :n,:J.nipulating the NZ dollar fOT thei:� O'.f!','l -<::1S 'J ___ t ).ih �th- �'
� , ,sh i s p l 'l,ned for e l e c t ion year 1 9 90 .

" RO B I E TARJET O� VEr,DETTA"

Tr e April 1 3 3 9 issue of New Z e a 1 3 n d Journ::i l i s t car.r i e s o story ebou�

journ::i l l s t David R o b i e with t h e above headl i n e . Wrl t t e n by Ha:'!'y s t on e r , the
story 1 3ports o n a d i spute between reporter R o b i e and a recent employ a r , the
SUV2. -b-:,:-;, 3 ed ffiJ.ga z in e � I s la n d Bus ines s " � At tbe heart of the dispute is Robi'B s �

d e ta i l e d and h::ird-hitting investigative reporting De P ::i c i f i c I s l ::i n d ef ' ...: i r s ,

w i t h particular empha s i s o n i n j us t i c e and t h e s t rugg l e s of indigenous peoples
for s e l f -determina t i o n . Robie is w e l l know" f o r h i s w i d e l y pub : i sh e d
f i r s t -hand accounts ; h e fvJ.S a n W1canny a b i l ! t y t o b e a t t h e right p l a c e and
the right t i m e .

" I t was the h i r i n" of David Los . ::i nO:1- j ouro::i l i s t who runs an t::: g l i s h
language s c h o o l a n d has s in c e 1984 c a r r i e d o u t a p o i s o:1 pen c::impaign lg::iinst
Pa c i f i c j o urnal i s t s h e re"arded as t o o sympathe t i c to Kanak ncltio!,Cll i s m i n
Noume::i , that p r e c ip i ta t e d R o bi e ' s s p l i t with I B " . Robie also critici s e d IB as
b e i n g s o f t o n Rabuk::i a n d o f p u b l i s h i n " pro -coup prop::igemd:l . H i s work for I B
c e a s e d i n e::irly 1 9 8 8 as R o b i e became increasi"gly c o n c e rn e d a bout t h e freeeom
and qua l i ty o f Pac i f i c medi::i reportin". He s h i f t e d his own ccrrespcndence
work t o I B rival ' Pa c i f i c I s land Monthl y ' which is a l s o Suv::i-ba s e d . But i t
W::iS X l �. r t i c l e entitled "The muzzling o f the P ::i c i f i c pres s ?" i n the NZ
M o ro t h l y Review (No . 3 1 4 . D e c 1 3 8 8 ) that r ea l l y r i l e d l B .

T h e r e s u l t has b e e n a s e r i e s o f v i tr i o l i c verb::il ::ind l egal ::itt::icks both

on R o b i e and on rival m::i"az i n e P I M . A piece by David Los i n I B even
threa t e n e d R o b i e not t o s e t foot i n New C a l e do n i ::i "'",0 in • "Robie himself said
i t WJ5 s C Jndalous that I B c o u l d ' wa g e a ma l i c i ous vende tt::i l i ke this \gainst ::i
journa l i s t and then ga,g, rival maga z i n e from trying to e x p o s e the truth in 3,C:
edi torial ' . ' Pa c i f i c I s land Monthl y ' , which i s owned by Rupert Murd o c h , had
vigourously def e n d e d R O b i e in the e d i torial m e n t i or: e d . a r: d h:1 S indicclted i t
,,:1:' 1 c O C1 t i n u e t o p ub l i s h h i s materia l .

David R o b i e i s performing a dellper::itely n e e de d service w i th h i s

cour::igeous reporting i n the Pac i f i c . O n e wonders j u s t how long ::i
Murdo c h -owned pub l i ca t i o n w i l l back him up ::is he strugii, l es for a free press
:g::iinst the o d d s . R o b i e d e s e rves a l l the support we can g1 ve him .
18 MONITORIN3 SUBVERSION :
NOTES

by Nuclear Free Kiwis

I . The Academic Connection

"The American Connection" 18 the title of a major systematic study of

US-spons ored reprelll lllion in El Salvador and 3 uatemala . Written by Michael
McCllntock, it lays bare the roots of foreign subversion ra mpan t L' the
Third Wor ld . By coincidence , "The Am e ri c an Connection" i8 3l80 the title
of a study about US-NZ relations . Edited by Malcolm McKin'lO the second
•

"Connection" is subtitled "Essays from the stout Centre " and is 3

collection of artic l es by NZ aC"1demics .

The stout Research Centre for t he Study of NZ Society. Historv "n,d

CuI ture "1t Vict oria University is one of the 3cademic institut i ons targeted
'
by US planners to help them undermine NZ's nuclear-free zone' ( Pencc'
Researcher ' No . 1 3 , p. 11 ) . M anipulation of pliable academics has lcn",
been part of US strategy . It can take many forms but the USc."," techrd q u e s
3.re a;:;ple money and opportunities f o.:� research, publication: , ovorseas trips
- the main draw cards of academic lif e . No doubt various of the NZ
,cademics concerned have the best of intentions , which only cn"kes the US
approach Ql1 the more insidious.

An obvious objective of US strategy here is to get NZ acccdec: i cs

enlisted in identifyin" their society ' s weak pOints . the most vulner3,8 l e
areas for persuasion o r pressure . A n even :Dore obvious obJective i s
gettin" N Z " cademic s to b e keenly pro-US and pro-ANZUS . Ever since ex-CIA
Deputy D irector and Cold Wa rrior Or Ray Cline proposed his ANZUS
think-tank, elements of Victoria U ni vers ity have been the subject of
'
special attention from US intelligence-linked academics . Pe3ce
Researcher ' No . 13 documented the backgrotL'ld to the H)waiian East'-West
Centre ' s joint ANZUS study with Victoria ' s NZ Institute of P o l i c y Studies
and the Australian I nstitute of I nternatio nal Affairs . This study h'ls been
facilitated by a Cline associate . Professor Henry Albinski of Pe:nsyl vanL:
St'lte Universit y , USing his contacts at Victoria.

Prof Albinski was a rece nt attendee at yet another right-wi:1g

conference in Washington in May. He spoke on 'The Securfty Dimerlsion ' •

A NZ academic a tt;e ndee was Steve Hoadle y , political scientist at Auckland

His Australian :!rld NZ Studies Centre Clt Pen:; State was one of the sponsors .

had his f a re paid to Taiwan for a \yACL [World Anti-CoE',munist League J

University . According to Wellingtoc; Pacif ic Report (May 1 9 3 3 ) , "Hoadley

conference in January of th1a yea r n . Our mm Ministry of i:.xtern3.1

Rela t ions and Trade is payin" for th e se ),c'ldemic forays . We wonder if
mirlistry folk are monitoring the results of such handouts.

Several US outft ts are involved in subverting Victorian lC:ldemi:l . The

Stout C entre and Victoria Uni versity expressed their appreciation to the
US-NZ Educational Foundation for the fina:ccial asshtance it has providec
towards the cost of pUblishing its version of "The America;] Co:cnection " .
This publication had its most i m c,ediate origins .c:c the proceedin"s of the
Conference on US-NZ relations or"anized in July 1 986 by the Centre.
Academics are often a soft touch for the sort of subversion prc3ctised by
Al binski and Co .

A relevant case in point h that of Kevin Clements, the pence

'"
mo vement S 'N'eak link on the Corner Com:nittee (NZ DefenCe Committee of
Enquiry in 1 986). I n his book "Sack from the Brink " , Clements says the
visit in 1 936 by Ralph Mc}ehee (author of "My 2S Years in the CIA " )
fostered "paranoia" aoout US covert activity h ere . ::iiven political reality
as defined by 'perceptive , l iber al 'lcldemics ' li"e Clements. US

�
have a l o t of receptive material to work on . Clements ' ' Accent article
( August 1 98 5 ) on how NZ could remain Le ANZUS and yet somehow "c ' P its
 19
f"""n uclear free zone i l lustrates the confused, compromised thi:1King s o evident
today ::::vlO ng certain e l ements o f NZ aC-3. demia .. No wonder U S amo'.:1 sEu,dor
C l ev e l end was moved to compliment e l ements on his perception ! Or C l er;eClts
d o e s a p )ear to have moderated hh opiQior; abcut the ANZUS s p l i t . A
proporle-1t of " common s e c uri ty,'" he says , HThe b2sic :3tss u::n ptior: ,:: :'; CQ.".!TIO::
s e c ur i t 1 is tha t natior; states can::ot expect to their d e i ;:1Cr
interests un i laterally o r in concert with a l l i e s (HSeyond the B r ir;i-\. H , p.
18 3 ) •

NZ academics should maintain :.::. scrupt,;lously s t:J.:"l C e ,d

res i s t :he lure o f foreig,n agencies with f:�1t bankro l l s .. Our c a d ea:ics have
a role ::0 play in moni tori :-\ii,i. f o re i gn sUbversion i;'- __ NZ and thJ,t �.:",cl:...;,d es
keeping c l ea r heads about subv ersive incursions i:1to their OVln oai. l j,jl i c :.<: .

IT . Na t io na l ' s CIA-Backed E l ection Campaign

Tt-,e National Party i s unashame d l y shaping up f o r the l '3 9 J e l c? c ticc; :,s the
U S ' s Du:opet party . This is hardly surprising for those of US who h2ve p a i d
attenti:m to Nationa l '" s c l o s e Amer i can c onn e c ti on s � A f u l l ret:.lrn t o lU\,ZUS
was to be expected as a central p o l i cy platf orm � Howeve r , wh;;:;t wa:.:�
was National ' s open c o l laboration w i th President BUSh ' s e l e c t i o n t03.m . The
fact tr et ,National could b e s o open about this is a gcod indicatiolO of hcw it
sees tr' 2 state of democracy i n NZ : a s 3. kind of farce i n which a s uper�)ower
can b l " tantly interfere to further its OW;1 elO ds .

Of course � there is some precedent f o r Na t i ona l � 8 l a t e s t e L ) c tioD

strategy . Remember back in 1975 ? - those li t t l e C o s s a cks darrc across our
TV s c re ens t courtesy o f U S cartoon moguls Han:-a -Bc1I'bel"d . U S -s po n s o r e d
tricks helped National win the e l e c t i o n : The main t r i c k in th::lt caSe ;tJ?lS th e
promo tl::m of a red scare . Labour was portrayed (is the cover f o r ,5

Soviet-backed takeover plot .

If the peace movement could get its a c t together , this time N"-1 t i o :l ?:':.l h:ts
actua l ly handed i t a marve.l1ous prop�,gunda weapolO . President Bush is a former
D i r e c t o r o f the C I A iNl th alO extensive background o f shady je'lling s . "V en

C The
c on s e rvative newspaper editors and the National Party ginger group , tt18 SUlOday
Club , c r i t i ci z e d Nationa l ' s d e c l aration of US support Press ' , 3l Jan
1989 ) . I t should! be a s im p l e matter to show up National ( to use that
colourful o l d Chinese phra s e ) as "the run:1ing do g " of the Am e ri ca ns , tS the
h op e l es s ly corrupted party that i t i s . I n an editorial ( 1 Feb 1 9 3 9 ) the
' Ch r i s t church Star' asked " Does National n e e d to use di rty tri cks ?" I t ;lpt l y
s a i d t h a t National MPs s h o u l d be " we l l "ware o f th e pol i t i c o l dangers o f the
National Party b e i ng a s s i s t e d in a:1 e l e c ti o n campaig,n by Ame r i c an e m i s s3.ries �
They a r e l i kely to be as helpful , as f Zt r 38 pub l i c opinion i s concerne d , as
would be the C I A " ! !

When the then Secretary-Jeneral o f the Nat i o n ;, l Party , Max B rilcf ord ,
return e d from a US trip in l a t e 1983 , he stated th3t the le[;80n8 of B u s h ' s win
were b e ing learnt by National for the next e L , c tion ( - Chris tchurcl; Stilr ' , 9
Nov 1983) , Bradford had be e n in the US f o r cc weeks to study R e p u b l i c2\n, Party
strategy , picking the brains o f top Bush campaign .ldvisers . Bra d f o;:;] '13.8
lookinii, f o =-"'ward to greater us e of harsh 'il::lttack " ads or; TV � m o r e po l l to
determi ne. the m o s t appropri.3.te presentation of i s s uB'::'; ) u k i l f LJ. l : y tar,setDd
direct mai l i ngs , and a tightly -run prof e s s i ona.l campa i g n based on few ba S i c
"messages" .

"

" I t works" s a id B r'adfond C C hri s t : hurch

Bush s campaign had h ig h l i �hte d the s l ea ze L}ctor with p l e n ty of dirt:,;
personal attacks o n i,ts oppo;;ents .
Star ' , 9 Nov 1 98 3 ) , He enthUS i a s t i ca l ly endorsed the q u i ck-respons e , vc

J
advert is ilOg u s e d b y Bush d e s p i to many US voters saying tl13t th e y found the 1ds
o f f e n s ive . Bradford c l a i m e d that Nation}l would not want tec c.;J;] :: e ; ' t n t0 0'0
20

,..-personali ties as d i d Bush but would run ads which were "hard-hitting on the
issues" . However , he did comment that personal i ti e s would not be im'l1une from
attack .

I t is comically ironic that Bradford ' s own persona l i ty was the subject of
ar internal National Party attack wnich saw him dumpe d . But the Bush-inspired
election s trategy sti � l continues . Party President Neville Young , who opposed
Bradford in the Party s internal wrang l e , endorsed the proposition tlv:l t
'
high-powered and highly paid political strategists who ran }eorge BUSh s US
Presidential campaign would help this National Party in the next NZ e l ection
( ' Th e Press ' , 3 0 Jan 1 939 ) . Republican Cldvisers have Cl l ready visited N Z and
discussed Nationa l ' S campaign , Mr Young actually said that it W:1S qui te
poss i b l e that some of the people who helped Mr Bush would work "for nothing"
because of their comni tment to conservative politics . Young reaf" irmed
Nationa l ' s co�mitment to use US Republican Party advice to win the next
election ( ' The Press ' , 17 �eb 1939),

The Bush advisers w i l l very probably include NZ bus iness lawyer P e t sI'
Watson , who was part of the staff of the transition ",over:oment of P r e s i dent
Bush ( ' The Press ' , 14 Nov 1 9 33 ) . \IIa tson has been involved in advising Bush on
ANZUS matters and in various activities to subvert NZ ' s nuclear-free zone
'
( s e e , for example , ' W e l l i ngton Pacific Report' No . 3 , Feb 1 } 33 ) , BUSh s CIA
links were undoubtedly drawn on for the American campai",n , The Association of
Former Intell i�ence O f f icers t a key force in ReagJ.n '" 8 e l ection \l i ctori B S ,
Dubl i c l y made plain their backin£ for Bush ( ' Th e Press ' , 1 4 Oct 1 333 ) .
Several former inte l l ieence a�ents said their strong support foY' M:;: Bush 'J.J3,S
based on his year in 1 97 6 as head of the CIA when he did 1 1 ttle to ints::'fere
in their dirty work , The CIA ' ", sophisticated election manipulation techniques
�re now at the National Party ' s disposal in what must be the most contempt :ous
gesture for the NZ democratic process ever shown by. a major poli t i c a : pJ.rty ,
I t is up to the peace movement to tie this CIA .11batroc8 around National ' s
neck,

Ill . ' W ELLINGTON PACI �IC REPORT ' - A PRIME SOURCE OF INFORMATION

A double number of WPR has just been received , This bumper May issue ,
playin", a bit of catch-up after a quiet perio d , focusses on various right-win�
groups and individuals active in the Paci f i c region and pos s ibly involved in
destab i l i zation of the New Z ealand nuclear free government in one way or
anothe r .

,or exampl e , you might be curious about recent activities and

associat ions of familiar folk like steve Hoadley (political s c i entist at
Auckland University who seems to have replaced Rod Alley as a frequent TV
expert on ANZUS and things nuclear) , Denis McLean ( recently retired NZ
Secretary of Defence ) , Dal ton West ( former NZ academic who returned to his
n:1tive U S ) , Admiral Lloyd Vasey ( founder of the Pacific Forum ) , Peter Watson
(peripatetic Bush aide , formerly of NZ ) , and many more .

WPR gives us a bit of pointed and humourous ins ight into Mrs D e l la
Newman , s lated to become the new US Ambassador to NZ , and a perfect foil for
US desta b i l i zation efforts against the Lan",e £overnment .

' W e l lington Pacif i c Report' - an excellent source of information from an

mClzin£ :1rray of sources , Clnd a good read .
•. Let uS know if yOU would l i ke more
information "bout WPR .
 21
IV . R E DdECK RACIST SCARE

Tho Holmes show on TV 1 , 12 June t f e a tured a.n item 0:1 :11 -:;f
a.rmed M:�ori subvers i on .. R umours are s a i d t o be a:;:�ound the uppe:c" North
I s ls.nd :. bout Russian boats o f f l o ,}dL-1g 'we a pons f o r g:ngs 0: M:l.Jri
revolut . onaries trair.ing in s e cret camps �

A 1 "ariety of stori e s on th i s theme 3.bound � cen tr·J. l to 1L:::' T/ of

them is :) woman c a l l ed SharoD Ei'awcett , who decl ined to b�;' i;lterv i ',;>�fed 0:1 the
Holmes ' ) rogr3.ffii-:-i 8 . This is not surp-:t'i sing the rub'::dsh t:-J:it: she i s
s prea. d ! 19 b y a u d io -ta pe d i s t ributio.;'; :::md t::.dKS t o g roup s � I<o:r: e of 8' a�J-J c e t t " s
cla i;ns , of cours e , can be substanti:::l t e d by the po l i c e � 8I 8 , Cl B f 02 H o l T!.BS
sta::" f . Further'more , a l l e gs. t ion s about RUGs i:J.T1 arm:::,; s upp l i e s and t r a i t''''
camps f Jr Maori ?evo lution3ries have ::180 p r'oved grDund l e s s . Therz., h,") s :l0Ver
b',;8r, :3.[: I re l iab l e , concrete evidence of such acti vi ties �

Or e of li'awcett " s highly s w� p e c t stories Le; that two ve!'y un l i �{',; l",'
indivicLtals have stayed at Voge1 H ous e f th e Prime M i. n i s ter � S O" f i c l.:11
re s i d e r :; 8 . She says they were, Theodore :3..n d R o L:md
Rm"/LL d �

The TV :"eport mentioned that t h e goverr"ment had sco"'fed at the; sto :-·y � Th;:)re
'}Jas p a r t i cu13r ,).muserr.ent 3.bout Tiny Rm'llaCl d , VJho is the kt:y p ::rSor:, :)f01'1i,;1d ti"::�:.�
Lonhro nul t inationa l company But ntd the:::'" the TV
� ;'lor the
governr;, ,?:': t , had anything to say :"� bout MY' , ·"Ji"lO �/e c::::. r. 0-- 1 :-." :'. S �3 ,-�;ne ..-:- s t
b e t h e '1ot or ious ex-CIA agen t T a d ShJ.ckley was i:i.v o l v e d in the ovel�thI�':)'{/ o f
d

the C h i l ean government i : 1 1 3 7 3 . 1:1 the destab i l l z " t iO:1 ,'O f the Whi t l a:J L ',oo,
gove rme It . in 1 97 5 t and i n a host of othe::c d i rty 'dork over the years .

wr 3.tever the weird and wonderful wo r k i ngs of Sha.r�)n F _�_lw c et t � S lli:; d , i t

ca:c rei s ona c l y be inferred that the CIA tLS hand s om , '}/h',T,J i n these v!i l d
a l 1 egat ions o f Russian-fomented revolution ( Th e C I A i s unlixely t o b e 'j;�Jr<ing
Jut o f Vogel Hous e ) . As we noted in R e s e archer' No . 13 ( De c 1 9 3 7 ) , a
typ i c 3. � CIA media concoctio:: CG..i. cer:': s " s to r i e s of RU8 �-:; ian ships
weapon� ·?It i s o l a t e d beachesH (p � 5) . A l s o S ',;(] R "' s ea.! c h e ::- );o � 17, Feb
1 93 3 . f' , 1 5 . (Our source for this obs ervation 'NCl S the study x, the
Phi l i pp ines " R ight-Wing V i g i l antes and US I :��volvl3mentlt , one of the z,-uthors of
which " s ex-CIA agent Ralph Mc3ehee . ) At that tL1l8 we ref , r r:: d to '" )],) d L ,
stOI'�" ' - e ry sugg e s t i v e o f pos s i b l e C I A invo l v ement which in NZ T ::"uth
(9 JunE' 1 3 3 7 ) ent i t l e d "Russians a.rm Kiwi gangs " , A l Oi t e r Truth- story ( 2 3
June 1 9 8 7 ) e xpand ed o n this theme a l l e", ing thilt M::cr1 army rebels "18re
smugg l i ng suns to revo lution3.. ry gar1,fi,s "

Wi th the latest reV e lations 0;-'). t he Holmes show , ODe Cc'3.':1 se,'" :::)','1 hOh: the
CIA COL-Id work to f o s ter a whi t e bJeckL.sh " Labour s een to
be pClrtial to Maori interes ts . ( R ef e r a l s e to tho 'l r t i c l e ') l s ,)wh,)r: i n this
issu , e n t i t l ed ' Creation o f Chaos - , a:od not;" the i n s ight s of Or
Land1s OD the CIA - s use of psychologi ca l warf::re . ) As we c;mph'ls i ze d in our
art i c l e 0," WiDston Peters in ' p oa c R e s 8a:'cher' No . 19 ( June 1 9 89 ) , race
relations i s the obvious i s s u e for CIA manipul(::l. tior� to '.1,n se,),t the Labour
gover�.rr_ent . A l l sorts of ma,teri-Jl can. b e ffi_::; n:...Sactured for u s e by the far
right t o inflame pub l i c f e e l ing on race mJi t t ers . The opcortuDi t l e s c o ::­
sti.:-rir,g o n t h e s e matters a r e l imi t l es s � The potB:-'1 t i _::;, 1 s c er;ario th")_t m:3.Y
unfo l d ir, the next 1 3 months is OElinOU8 :deDd ,.
22

Off
WAIHOPAI OCCUPIED, DECLARED OPEN TO THE PEOPLE

by Bob Leonard

The Sixth National Demonstration a t the construction site of a sate l l i te

spy base in the Waihopai Val l ey got off to an early and, to some , a surpris ing
start . The f i rs t surprise came late on the Friday night (May � ) at the camp
beside the Wairau River . Those who had arrived early were aroused from their
half-baked/ha l f -chi lled torpor in front of the campfire by the II pm arrivll
of the W e l l ington contingent . These f i r ebrands had hatched a plan on the
ferry and succeeded in convincing the assembled masses, eome of whom had to be
dragged from their warm tents , of the desirability of an immediate occupaticn
of the target bas e .

' Immediate ' was about 2 : 30 am after hours o f planning and a convoy
departure from camp under what some campers were "ure was pOlice surveillance .
(Police had watched the camp in November thus thwarting a simi lar �ction . )
But this time i t was a successful occupation : that was the second Burpris e .
The defenders o f the spy base did not have a chance �gainBt 1 0 0 + inv�ders
operating with wire cutters, marine flares (used to marvelous effect inside
the security fence ) , and gumboots . I t was drizzling with rain but,
merciful l y , there was no wind .

The handful of police and s e curity personnel had no choice but to

negoti a t e with the ABC l ia1son people . who did a superb job throughout . A
tour around the outside o f the buildings was accepted and commenced . By this
time nearly a l l of the protest contingent was inside the security fence - a
result that had not been anticipated . Detailed planning had designated only
limited groups w i l l ing to put themselves in arrestable s i tuations . But no
arrests took place as the police were in no position to cope without
reinforcements .

During the tour, and w e l l away from the main body o f protestors , entry
was gained to the main building by breaking through high-strength window
glas s . Nine were arrested for this act when they refused to l eave the
build ing . The intent was two-fol d : to gain information about the spy base and
to occupy the top-secret fac i l i ty in the name of the people of New Zealand .
But the interior of the base operations centre yielded no new information .
Internal phys ical security i s tight . Also , Waihopai is not yet operational
and much of the equipment remained outsi d e in shipping containers . Attempts
to open the containers were not successful .

Reinforcements did arrive after over an hour . By this time the main
protest g roup was finding its way out of the compound by the same way i t
entered through large gaps in the fence . The newly arrived police were
understandably a bit grumpy . The arrestees had a l ready been loaded into a
police van by the original tiny security force . There was little for the new
arrivals to do but race their trucks and vans around the perimeter fence in
the mud encouraging s tragglers to retrea t . Adding t o their bad mood was the
fact that the protest convoy was parked en massa in front of the main security
gate and also blocked much of the entry road . Access to the base could only
be had by going cross -country through the paddocks .

The action ended peacefully, two -hours after the initial occupation . It
was s t i l l pitch black and drippy . The invasion force returned to camp wet, �
?" exh,.usted
23
and we l l -satisfied . Waihopai had been occupied by the people and
taklm out of the hands of the , if only symbolica l l : ' and briefly .

')n SaturdaY .1 fternoon the planned demo went aheCl d , b;)t there was to b e no
second occupation � ABCers were a l l owed access to the outnide of the security
fence , \';hich had been hastily repaired . Police presence 'vas heavy Clnd
included one mounted officer whose purpose was hard to f:,thom. But it was a
handsome horse and certain l y added to the festive mood 2,3 the fence was
decorated with banners ::md .1 game of Zlnti-bZlse� bas e ba l l was played. In
'
additior. to the banners were strings of brightly coloured people •

,'epres e r , ting the thousands of unemployed in NZ who cou l d be given useful

employment with the m i l l ions of dollars spent on the \IIaihopai bClse.
'
This WGS another project of L IMIT the W e l l ington women s action group.

'
Action at the base finished with the reading of � PEOPLE S D ECLARATION ON
WAIHOPAI in the stentorian tones of a member of the ABC-Christchurch
contingent. It went like this :

WE THE PEOPLE 08' AOTEAROA/NEW ZEALAND .

IN A TIME OF UNPR2C:lD2NTED UNEMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL DISRUPTION , OE:LARE
THE EXPENDITURE 0 8' UNTOLD M ILLIONS 0 2' DOLLARS ON THIS WAIHOPAI SPY
BAS E FOR THj BENEFIT OF THE AMERICAN Spy ESTABLISHMENT TO B E
INDEi'ENSI BLE .
IF' THE }OVERNMENT PERSISTS I N BUILDIN} THIS SPY BASE WE INIErn TO MAKE
IT INDEFENSIBLE.
'
IN R ECO}NITION OF THE CITIZENS RDHTS TO AC8ESS TO AND CONTROL OF'
THIS LAND FOR TH;': BENEF'IT OF ALL fi' R � i., PEOPLES , Wi:: H1REBY DECLARE THIS
B'ENCE OPEN.
24

WA I HOPA I FLASH ! -

YANK" R I G Spy D I SH ON TOWER

As this issue goes to press PR has j us t �Teceived word from recent v l s i tors to
the Waihopai s i te that the l B - metre d iameter receiving d i s h is in place on its
steel tower . The rigging was done by Americans . Why ? Did they just h3pper:
to be going by the s i te and saw incompetent Kiwis s truggl ing w i th the d i s h ?
Or , 38 s e ems a b i t more l i k e l y , d i d they come a s part of 3. pdck"ge d e J. l T roJ:
SOL'1f.':wh8re l i ke Houston Texas as d i d s everal of the shipping containers on the
s i te -? P e rhaps they ve even been
� 11 v i ng i D tho s e containers $

I t appears that security has been s l ightly enhanced w i th the addition o f one
or two } C S B guards s e en inside the fence . There wi l l probably be more sllch
guards by the time of the August demonstration ( L 8 -2 8 th ) . We expect the
pol i c e ro l e in securing the base to b e phased out as the GCSB takes full
respons i b i L i ty . Sat e l l i t e spying w i l l probably commence i ::l July .

O B I TUARY
Murray Horton ' s Back Fence

When Egypt d e c i d e d to reclaim the Sinai f rom I s ra e l in the 1 3 7 3 ¥om

?:ippur War , its troops practised on mockups of the Suez Cana l . I t workeg
What has any of this got to do with Harewoo d ? Wel l , during that war ,
P r e s i d e n t Nixon put a l l US m i l i tary bases worldwi de , including the Navy and
Air 2"orce base at Harewoo d , on Defcon 3 Ca state of heightened m i I i tary
readines s ) ,

And when the Anti -Bases Campaign decided to reclaim sovereignty from the
US bas e during the October 1 938 Harewood demonstra t ion , i t s members a ls o
pra c t i s e d o n a s c a l e model - Murray Horton ' s back fence . Now this was no
ordinary f e nc e , but a formidably ramshackle wire construction , topped with
several strands of barbed wire , I n short , a perfect facs i m i l e of the f e n c 8
around H arewood airport .

The purpo s e -built assault ladders ( later used at i/aihopa i l were tri e d cut
by the p eop l e ' s heroes the week before the demo . As the dry run took place in
a no r ' we s t ga l e , it was a d j udged a very rea l i s t i c rehears a l . The real thing
w�s a p i e c e of c ake , by comparison - particularly for those ( l ike Horton) who
entered through a hole that miraculously appeared in the f e n c e .

And how d i d Mr Horton ' s handyman ' s dream come by such a d i s t i n c t i v e

fence? H i s property backs onto � large vacant b l o c k owned by the
extraordinarily named Big Brother Developments H o ldings Ltd ( the l a s t owner of
Horton ' s place was the Moral R earmament Trust Board ) . There was no fence
until Horton ' s former partne r , Chri stine B i r d , complained that Big B rother ' s
big do£;s had come over once too often for a chicken takeaway . After careful
consideratioG o f the proletarian �mbience o f the area , Big Brother ha s t i l y
threw u p the fenc e , 3ang Fortress S ty l e .

Now a l :l s , due to the relentless gentrification of Addington . i t ' s a ll

gone . Rumours of a tunnel starting in a certain back yard are compl e t e l y
untrue - i t ' s actually the foundations for a spa poo l .

Oh yes , the Christine B i :d arrested with Murray Horton at Harewood is no

relation to her namesake - it 8 just one of those stranger than f i c t ion
coincidences (Borton and partner-Bird were arr'ested together several times at
protests ) . Both Birds. have a s im i l a r atti tude toward po l i c emen . I t i s also
worth n o t i n g that t h e Ms B i r d arrested at Harewood actually breached the f(mco
using one of the assault ladders , and without any prior training on Horton ' s
back f en c e ,
 25
BOOK REVIEW
"On the Run" by Phll1p Agee
(Lyle Stuart Inc . 400 pp . $A3 9 . 90 (hardback)

rev i ewed by /Ilurray Morton

1'0 ' three years ( 1994-3 7 ) , I and the group of which I - m the s e c r e tary
( Camp a i ;n Against Foreign Control of Aotearoa) worked to organi s e an
Aus t ra l . s lan speaking tour by Philip Agee . \lie put in a lot of work , raised
several thousand dollars , and generated the kind o f media controversy that
attends anything to do with Agee . I t a l l ended with a late night call from
him in Madrid , cancelling the tour to concentrate on a North American
prom o t i onal trip for this bock . It was his f i rs t trip home to the US in
nearly 20 years , and it was fraught with peril for him . It was only after he
canc e l l , d that the servi l e Aus tra lian government an:couc:ced that i t 'Nouldn t -

hav e g i 'ren him a visa anyway .

I r )nically this book i s no t , and 3pparently will not be , 3.V"li1:1b:Ce in N Z .

I had to import my copy from Austra l ia . If it had been aV"lil"lblc before I
got involved in organ i s i ng the abortive tour, i t would have 8xpl"lined a lot
more , i 'ldeed I would. have been forewarned . Agee i s 2. ma;'l unde:-- enormous
pres s ur 3 , who undertakes more internatio,ul com,"i tQents than he cc.n pos=ibly
fulf i l l .

Ph i l i p Agee served 1 2 years with the C I A , speci"lllsing in the po l i t i ca l

f i l th t oey spread in their " b"lckyard" - Latin America . When he could take no
more , r. 3 qui t . And went pub l i c . H i s seminal book " I n s i d e the Comp"lny : CIA
Diary" had an explosive worldwide e f f ec t , wiping out whole networks of US
spies and local traitors thro�hout that continer}t . H e then became 3 full time
po l i t i c ', 1 activi s t , dedicated to exposin.. the C I A worldw i d e . H e named
hund r e c s of "lgents , under both diplomatic "lnd comnercial cover . He b e c"lme l

devoteE of Cub"l , and a supporter of Third World l i beration movements . By

dellber3tely choosln.. to continue living i n the West (not in Cuba , where he
could r.ave been s et for l i f e ) , he exposed himself to the full retribution of
the covert and overt arms of the US government and its sate l l i te s .

Agee was hounded out of Britain (because he exposed jOint US /UK

inte l l igence destabi l i za t i o n of Michael Manley ' s gover�ment in Jamaica ) . He
was subsequently exp e l l e d from Holland "l n d France , :md p.;}d a real hassle
gettin� permission to live in West :iermany . More than once he "", s a r're s ted or
held at "l l rports . As a result o f trumped up accusations "lt the time o f the
Iraniar hostage s i tuation , he was stripped o f his US passport . H e then
trav e l l ed on a :it'enadan "nd ,row a Ni c"lr"lgu",n one . He has been SUbject to
constant physi c"ll and electronic surv e i l lance . He has had spies planted on
him , and found their tools of tr"lde (e .g. , the famous bu"",ed typewriter in the
cover photo of "CIA D iary" ) . "On the Ru'1" includes a photographic record o f
Agee confronting one of t h e s e spies when she w a s found a t h e r n e x t d e J P cover
a s s i gnment . She fled the scene on the spo t .

H e has been called a K3B agen t , a Cuban spy , a trai tor , and a murderer
(he has been l i be l l ously blamed for the k i l l ing of the CIA - s Athens st"ltion
chief by an urban gue r i l l a ..roup ) . A l l these c"ln'lrds were dredged up in the
NZ pres s , c l ting unnamed liIashington sources , when it W"lS a:cnounced th:l t he was
coming her e .

H e continues to inspire fe"lr and lO:lthing "lt the highest levels of the
American governmen t . 3eorge Bush, himself '1 former CIA d i rector , ventured
this opinion when asked how he felt about Agee - s re turn home after 20 Y()3;:'s ,
" Disgraceful , despicable • • • I have nothing but disdain for Phi l i p Age e " .

"On the Run" i s the aptly-titled human record o f hi s life in the CIA
�
a
whilst writing the " D i a ry " , cmd :18 an autho r , activist "lnd fugitive in th
years ,, 1nc8 . It is l i fe that ruB exaeted '1 perilonCtl toL - the CIA
encouraged h i s ex-wife to use their two sons '1" bait to lure hi" home . The
constac t pressure has broken up more than o:(e subsequent rela tionship . H e i s ....;fi
26
!"" now married t o Cl b a l l e r in a / teacher - h e found h e r tota l l y d i f f e rent world an
antidote to the par::mo ld , secretive one of spy and counters py .

L i f e would have been much eas i e r f o r Agee i f he had been what De hets been
, ; cused of - et defector and a traitor . . He could have held a Moscow deleD;) or a
Hav:uL v i l l Cl . But he chose to stay and f i g h t , and take the hea t . The wo r l d

ov,;e8 him d debt of thanks for a l l that he has revealed about the CIA.

Nor is he a w i s hywashy reformer . who ;"ants to clean up the C I A O f l tow

b",,',d There havG been s everal other agent,s who have gone pub l i c s in c e
Agee , w r i t t e n books , toured N Z in o n e case . They live in t h e US� B u t AgBc is
tnGted ,s cm implacable enemy because has come full c i rc l e . H e activelY
espous e s revolutionary s o c i a l i sm , with Cuba ClS the mode l . Hence h i s
edmiration for Maurice -
B i s ho p s Clrenz,da ( b e f o r e the US invasion ) . and
cur.::" en tly for N i car3.gu:' H e c J. n b e a c c u s e d of naivety and p,J.r:::m oi2. (wi th
great j u s t i f i cation i n the latter cas e ) .. But he has never s wccve d from h i s
h2rdfought p r i n c i p l e s - that t:he secret w o r l d o f U S int e l l iger:,cd :nust be
expo s e d , and that the i m p e r i a l i s m i t s erves must be fought worldwi d e . R e . d as
a �lutobiography j liOn the Run" is riveting,; as J. chron i c l e of gr2""'Jing

local books t,"lop and

pol i tic 1 war�'� ne88 frOG someone i n a pO iiil i tion t o hit h i s f o :c"tGer ma z::; ters v e ry
hard� it is :'nvaluabl e " Go to your demand to k.-::)w Lhv t:", i s
bOOK i s t�,') t o n s a l ,; h e r e �

Black B i rch Art i c l e - PR No . 22

The f o l lowi n g p a r ag r a p h is r e p r i n t ed h e r e b e c au s e i t was not

c l e ar l y p r i n t ed in i ssue 22 on page 12 .

We r e turned to the seminar room for a ch"t about the more controver s i a l
aspects of the B l a c k B i rch programm e . According t o the u s r s minder , Mr
Stol tz , at the beginnir�g o f our tour , our d i s cussions were to be off the
record i n order to a l low a freer exchange of o p i n i ons . We reluctantly agreed
to that condition . But Mike Gould of the US Emba s s y later gave a d i s torted
report t o the media about our tour and thus violated the agreem ent_ He
c l a i m e d h e - d not known about i t . As far a s it went the discussion was fairly
open and f r i endly , but the participants f in a l l y had to agree to d i s agree about
the m i l i tary importance o f the trans it-circle data . The astronomers were
reluctant to discuss the Hughes testi mony . Dennis Robinson was of the s incere
opinio� that t e s t imony o f the kind given by his bos s , Dr James Hughes , a t the
W"shington DC hearings ( s e e PR No . 20) was d e l i berately s l anted to empha s i z e
the national security implications because that w a s the m o s t effective way to
convince the pla�ning commi s s ion to block the apartment construction . Hughes
hims e l f has ,oa i d that very thing in a letter to the NZ ambassador trying to
e xp l a i n dway h i s apparent dupl i c i ty . I n effect , we are being asked to be l i e v e
that a w h o l e array o f m i l i tary a n d c i v i l ian o f f i c i a l s representing key
s t ra teg i c a g e n c i e s and programmes , such as star Wars and ba l l i s t i c m i s s i l e HQ ,
were q u i t e wi l l ing to exaggerate or even l i e about their programn:e n e e d s for
high l y 2. ::'; cur�:1 ':::: e star data just to bo l s te r Hughes' case against the :J.partment
buil ding . I t just doesn - t wash. The evidence i s comp e l l ing that Hughe s ie
the one who i s tai loring h i s story t o f i t h i s aud i ence . If the developer in
Washingto:' somehow came to b e l ieve h i s apartment project was turned dow"
because Hughes invoked a heavy dos e of � National Security" just fo r e f f e c t , he
might be more than c, 11 t t l e ups e t .
 27

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comes i n . You r decisions, you r a ctio ns,
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Pel i ca n 2 r�pOi1s ipOSS s u b: Requests
halo assistance. I ntel l i ge n ce i nd icates
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T h e n, APS3 i nforms you : 'lOW Boge�4
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