Professional Documents
Culture Documents
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 31 31 AUC 1944
B r i g a d i e r Genertll, USA
Ad j u t o n t General
-
NOTE* observers f r o m t h i e headquarters have been d i r e c t e d t o t r a n s m i t infor-
mation r e g a r d i n g coordination of a i r , armored and other ground f o r c e s i n f a s t
moving o p e r a t i o n e i n as much d e t a i l &nd a e r a p i d l y a 3 p o s s i b l e e The informa-
t i o n given below is contained in t h e f i r s t r e p o r t on t h i s subject. other re-
p o r t s w i l l be disseminated a s promptly a s p o s s i b l e a f t e r r e c e i p t .
,kcproduce& fief
the ing/neerRe~ro,
/2tb Amy, &t?;;a
TWELFTH A R M Y C R O U P
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No, 32 31 A U C 1944
L
H. B. LGIIISL
Brigadier General, USA
Ad jut a ~ Gener
t a1
--_--.-----.-------------
I USE OF CUB PLANE3 FOR PHOTO WSSIONS:
1. .We improvised a photo laboratory and dark roam by making ply-wood aides and top
f o r a 1-ton t r a i l e r . I n t h i s laboratory r e do the e n t i r e proceesing including enlarge-
ments and can normally d e l i v e r about 20 photos two hours a f t e r request f o r a photo mie-
sion. A l l photos a r e oblique and a r e taken from l i a i s o n planes with the regular K-20
camera.
3 . *An enlarged (10 x 14) photo waich shows the l o c a t i o n s or any suspected wmtm
h o a t i l e a r t i l l e r y is uaed by Cub Observer while i n the air. Should the enemy open f i r e ,
upon radio c a l l of observer, our f i r e is delivered on the suspected location nearest t o
the point indicated by t h e observer. This point is usually within a few hundred yards
of a suspected location. Often the f i r e s o delivered has been r i g h t on the h o s t i l e
artillery.
INITIAL OBJECTIVE ,
\ Fr
i l e f , /2fh Army
& , u c e d by ."re Engineer Rep~oducf~on
No. 33 Ak:c r2,9&$,
- d 3
1. The After Action .3eysit of &he :&&t ' a ' d & e f i i & P i c i ~:
;
i Z a y E30k 'Li~e~i-ibgb
t h e e f f e u t i v e m e of i t 8 light tank c o q a n y aa a mopping UP "mix i i ~~vomecG,isaaith
t h e a t t a c k i n euppsrti of elemteato of* t h e 2nd DSvfaion i n %Esv area mosthetaut of St, Lo,
4. *The r u l e e of wnen and when not t o open f i r e ahould ba brought home with g r e a t e r
emgneeis t o s e e t i o n leadere i n training. It i e a great mistake and a waete of ammu-
n i t i o n f o r a gun cnmmnnder t o open f i r e bofore a target is within range.#
IV G~SUIWITRICK.
German U S ' mines ham beau found s i x t o eight iaehes apart with one i g n i e a r above
ground but with a threa-prong i g n i t e r buried soms distance away. Amine detector
operator san e a s i l y d e t e c t t h i o mt-up by t h a double warbling on tne sound indicator.--
lkcaa After Action Report, 4th Infantry Mvlsion.
- 2 -
Qepduccd by the Enp/neer Reproduct/on Drf, /Z fh Army Group
TWELFTH ARMY CROUP
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 34 31 AUC 1944
- B a t t l e Experiences* a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t n i s headquarter8 t o enable
u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t f x m t h e l a t e s t canbat experiences of our t r o o p s now
f i g h t i n g t h e Cernana i n France, Although t h e experienaes of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r location a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y applicable t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s ,
the it- published rill be those baaed on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recoimrsnded
f o r c a r e f u l consideration by u n i t s which may encounter similar problems, Report8
of corroborativs o r a o n t r a r y experiences a r e p a r t i c u 1 a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y or' the indicated b a t t l e lesaon may be d e t e m n e d .
except d l f r m -.
*Troop8 sad lower headquarters desire a o i t u a t i o n map and glimpse of the big pic-
ture more than -hi- 1% seems t h a t s p e c i a l d i e t r i b u t i o n of
m a h i n f m t i a n , l i m i t e d a s pecoasary far s e c u r i t y , could be r a p i d l y disseminated t o
d i v i s i o n s o r rrgimsntr for.reporduction,m-- En CO, 3 5 t h Division.
Noto: Itu Xn Corps 0 2 S e a t i o n hao p r o d d e d e x e e l l e n t * b i g p i c t u r e m G 2 r e p o r t s
far dimtribution t o u c h company i n t h e Corpm.
SCREENING FORCE.
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 35
By a-nd of l i e u t e n a n t ~ e n e r a W
l IEY:
B r i g a d i e r ~ e n e r a l ,USL
----....................................... Mj u t a n t ~ e n a r a l
2. atr role. 'we have a n o t h e r acheme that works well. we c a l l them r a i d e r s and
U g h t hawke. E i g h t men a r e s e l e c t e d from s e c h r i f l e p l a t for t h e i r endurance, i n i t i a -
t i v e , u i g h t v i s i o n , a n d a b i l i t y t o r e a d rmpe. They do no f i g h t i n g d u r i n g t h e day and
no ~ p guard,
, f a t i g u e , e t c . They are s p e c i a l l y t r a i n e d n i g h t f i g h t e r s only. They have
a two-fold miaeionc f i r s t , t o go t o a a p e c l f i c p l a c e and e c c m p l i a h a e p e c i f i c t h i n g ;
second, having accanplished t h e i r rnisaion, t o haraaa t h e enemy a e much aa p o s s i b l e ,
even s h o o t i n g captured G e r m burp gun8 (schmeiseer p i s t o l s ) a t them. when t h i a happens,
t h e @wmana come r u ~ i n gout y e l l i n g end a f r a i d t o shoot t h e i r o m men. ~8 en t3Xarnplt3,
last n i g h t f o u r r a d i o p a t r o l s of f i v e men eech brought back 33 German pri8aners.fl
TWELFTH ARMY CRQUP
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 36 31 AUC 1944
B r i ~ d i e rw n e r a l , US
Adjutant General
----.-.--------.---.----.-
I ONE WAY CF FIXITG S N I P E R S .
1. The f o l l o w i n g i a f r m a m i t i ~ hp u b l i c a t i o n :
flgnipers i n hayetacka were more e f f e c t i v e l y e n ~ g e dby s e t t i n g f i r e t o t h e hay-
s t a c k with t r a c e r s and then s h o o t i n g t h e s n i p e r a 8 he r a n out,
-
1. Rcn, HThere i s a n a b s o l u t e n e c e s s i t y f o r p e r s o n a l rcn. AS a n example, I ,ggt
l o s t on a cow path one day and n e a r l y got captured, The next day my knowledge of t h e
cow p a t h enabled me t o work a co t o t h e enemy18 r e a r , whereupon t h e e n t i r e enemy p o s i -
t i o n surrendered.
I11 DIVISION T R U C W D S .
IX Q.UICK PUNCH.
U Ihave organized a f o r c e composed of two r i f l e squads, one un squad, and one
60 mm laortar squad, t o use where a quick hard punch is needed. T h i s p r o v i s i o n a l p l a t
is composed of s e l e c t e d personnel and is assigned t o Hq d i r e c t l y under m y c o n t r o l , s o
t h a t I can employ i t on s h o r t n o t i c e . During a march t h i s p l a t a c t s a s a point o f
the advance g~ard.w--Bn CO, 1st Div.
X INFOFUdATION FROM H S .
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 37 I SEPT 1944
By command of Lieutenant w n s r a l
wi gadier General, US
Ad j u t a n t General
- I - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I - - - - . - - - - . - - - O - - -
6. menoh Collaboration8 Vhe naquie have been most halpful and cooperative r i n e e
re hr&e out of the N a r m ~ n d ypsnineula. ~n t h e -re sector, t h e maquis supplieC each
of our p l a t laadars with accurate and h e l p f u l mapa showing d e t a i l e d enany positions,
ineludlng enipers, l& empla,cs;~ents, and other poa1tiona.a
-
7. m d i c s . # m e m d i e s arc b i n g a uondrrful job in t h i s - 0 They have
@eat courage and exercise a high d e s e e of t r e i n i n g and s k i l l i n the perfarnrance of
their d u t i e s o f t e n under heavy memy f t m . I owe ~qyl i f e t o t h e aomage and s k i l l of
a co a i d rmn, who ran t o rn under heavy mrtar f i r e and, together with one of quad
leaders, applied tourniquete t o xiy and then carried nu^ t o oomparative a a f e t y in a
d i t c h some 75 yarb t o %he rear.@
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 38 3 SEPT 1944
He Be LEmS
B r i g a d i e r General, USA
Adjutant General
m - m s - - - - . - - m - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - w - w . . - - - - - - . - - -
5 0 .On one occasion we mile an unexpected move f o r which no a i r cover had been
p ~ r l d e d . Information w a s received of a group of h o s t i l e tanks i n some woods three
or four miles away. I called d i r e c t t o a plane o p e ~ a t i n gi n the zone of another corps
and asked him t o r e l a y a request t o f i g h t e r control center f o r sane fighters. mithin
15 minutes about 12 planes reported i n t o me. I located my tank f o r t h e plane can-
mander by t e l l i n g him of the yellow panel, then vectored him on t o the woods whare the
enemy w a s reported. When'he seaned t o he uver .tMe t a r c e t , I told him t o c i r c l e and
aheak the woods under him. IB located the tanks, and they were attacked s u c c e s s f u l l y ~
6. . I thinlc t h e air support party 0 with amd columna should perform f o r the a i r
much the same function as the perform f a r arty. He should be i n a tank and must
have outside vision and control of his own radio. Assigning a tank f o r t h i s purpose
does not reduce the tank strength of t h e axmi unit. Our tank was habitually immediately
in r e a r of the attacking wave of tanks, and in many cases we actually took part in the
f i g h t .a
AR'11Pram
. An?OP'S.
10 .We handle a i r Opes by coordinating levele w e d by div ard corps planes. For
example d i v planes f l y t o 1000 f e e t an$ c o r p a b v e 1500. T h i s procedure is e s s e n t i a l
i n attack of a s m a l l area. We also l i m i t the number of planes in the a i r a t aqy one
time by having FA Group planes patrol on a timb schedule.
2. "We back up cav rcn with a i r OP patrols. ~t one time we organized a t a c t i c a l
rcn f o r t h e corps commander t o report on t r a f f i c and bridge conditions, location of
leading e l e ments and t o cover exposed f lante, etc. G-38s sole d a t a a t one stage c a m
from a i r OPls. Ve a l s o reported l o c a t i o n of enemy tanka t o our own tank elements, who
then deployed and surroundad the enemy.
4. "Corpe arty planes have had only one fatality-that through c o l l i s i o n in the
air. Flying technique on s h r r t f i e l d s should be stressed. Green p i l o t s arriving
h w e not had enough of t h i s t y p training. We send p i l o t s back t o the r e a r t o re-
practice in a d e r t o avoid lmmess i n f l y i n g and hold down the accident rate.
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 39 6 SEPT 1944
aBattle ~ e r i e n c e sare ~ published regularly by t h i s headquarters t o enable
u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t caubat experienoer of our troops nor
f i g h t i n g the Germans i n France. Although the experiences of a e r t a i n unita a t a
p a r t i c u l a r location a r e not necessarily applicable t o a l l unite i n a l l e i t u a t i o n ~ ,
t h e item publiehed rill be thoae based on p r a a t i c a l experience and are recamended
f o r careful consideration by u n i t s which may encounter similar problem, Report8
of corroborative or contrary expwiencea are p a r t i c u l a r l y desired i n order t h a t the
v a l i d i t y of the indioated b a t t l e lesaon may be d e t e d n e d .
H. B. Lmcs
b 5 g a d i e r General, USA
Adjutant General
I KEEPIN3 W O N 3 I N ACTION.
n C r e r served weapons, p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e BBR'a and t h e bazookas, hare not been kept
i n a c t i o n err they should by member8 of t h e a r e r when t h e gunner becamen a caaualty, o r
when t h e weapon has been s l i g h t l y d q e d , Idmy e n l i s t e d men have not been taught t h a t
supply i n combat c o n s i s t s t o a large degree of repair o r t h e issue of repaired items,
Crew8 must keep weapons i n a c t i o n as long a s t h e r e i a a man left, o r i f the weapon i e
damaged, the crew must i n i t i a t e r e p a i r 8 o r replacement pereonnally o r by reporting t h e
location. Weapons replacement became s a t i s f a c t o r y i n one u n i t only a f t e r a salvage
o f f i c e r and d e t a i l were s e t up t o recover the combat loneas. This crew e i t h e r made
minor r e p a i r s o r evacuated t h e weapon throvgh t h e uaual channe1a.a--0'8 of t h e 134 Id.
2. C l e a r i ~S t a t i o n s , nsome d i v i s i o n s keep t h e i r c l e a r i n g s t a t i o n s e n t i r e l y t o o
f a r t o the r e a r . On one occaaion we were forced t o remain f i f t e e n m i l e s benind t h e
l i n e s o r s e t up forward of t h e c l e a r i n g s t a t i o n s .
-
s t r e t o h e 8 o f main roads t o e n f i l a d e troops end transprt. Where roads are l i n e d with
t r e e s t h e enemy f i r e 8 i n t o t h e s e and i n t o hedges f o r a i r bursts. To meet thi8 r e s t a y
off t h e s e long s t r e t c h e s and d e t o u r our leading e l e m n t s around them. Method of r e -
ducing t h e s e t h r e a t 8 i a t o advance on a broad f r o n t s o t o o u t f l a n k road blocks.*--
Brig Gen A. D.. Warnask, Barrt D i r Comdr, 5 t h Div,
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 4 0 8 SEPT 1944
.Battle Experiences* a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquarters t o enable
u n i t a i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t combat experiences of our troop8 now
f i g h t i n g t h e German8 i n E u r o p e Although t h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t e a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s ,
t h e items published nil1 be t h o s e based on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e reco~lrmended
f o r c a r e f u l consideration by u n i t a which m a y encounter similar problems. Reports
of corroborative o r contrary experiences a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n order t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e indicated b a t t l e lesson may be determined.
H. B. LBWIS
Brigadier General, USA
~d jutant General
3. "On 16 July, t h e a t t a c k of the 134th Inf having been successful, t h e mortar cor
were attaoked t o t h e various regiments f o r independent d i r e c t eupport missions. Co C
continued i n aupport of t h e 134th; Co B was aeaigned t o t h e 137th and Co A t o t h e 320tl
During t h i s period each co s e n t forward FO p a r t i e e with t h e leading element8 of t h e id
and f i r e d mission8 deaired by t h e bn commander on t a r g e t 8 of opportunity. Co C , f o r
example, accounted f o r f o u r machine guns with an exgenditure of 26 rounda. The tiw,
lapse from ' t a r g e t s i g h t e d t u n t i l 'mission accamplished* was eleven mlnutes.
4. "At a l l time durFng these independent missions, each co had a t l e a s t two platoon^
i n f i r i n g p o s i t i o n . glthough platoons were normally assigned t o support the a s s a u l t bna,
t h e f i r e of a l l platoons was controlled through t h e Co FDC and the co could always mme
f i r e on the regimental f r o n t . Normal defensive f i r e s were assigned each night with
mortars l a i d and ammunition prepared. The attachment t o regiments f o r d i r e c t eupport
l a s t e d 2 days and a l l coa reverted t o bn c o n t r o l a t 1800 houre 17 July.
1. "1 have learned not t o place mgr 57-nm~AT guns too close together. On 26 August
east epd n o r t h of FONTENAY 3 P1IWl.E. we were attacked by tanka. I had two 57-mn aT guns
ebout f i f t y yarda a p a r t with an observer i n a straw stack. The enemy s e t the s t a c k on
f i r e and jockeyed h i s tanka s o t h a t he kept h i s heavily armored f r o n t towards both gune
so t h a t n e i t h e r could g e t a shot i n t o t h e flank. One gun was put out of action before ,
I
a h i t through t h e t r e a d end f r o n t aprocket immobilized t h e tank.*-40, 1st Bn, 314th Id.
a t t a c k by uee 6 i f HB 8hePla in 5'7-rum g~lae. The ground naa s o f t from r a i n and s h e l l s aciillq
not explode on impact, There was a hard s u r f a c e road t h a t the en- had t o croee, 8c r e I
f i r e d a t t h h t , causing considerable c a s u a l t i e s . b o t h e r t h e , t h e enemy employed 6 how.$
as a strong point. We wrecked the w e l l s with annor p i e r c i n g s n e l l s and then used EE
causing a b u t t a e n t y a m u a l t i e a out of about t h i r t y Germme using the bui1di~a.A--GO, ,
AT Co, 314th 1D-f.
III .
1, 'Young officir~should be t a u t t o f i r s p r e c i s i c n adjustments, Forward obaer-
sati~~ methods
z ax-e ns$ ea e f f e c t i v e as p r e c i s i o n methods i l a f i r i n g at ensmy conerate g g
emplacements. W s t y a w o f f i c e r s cannot f i r s precision adjutnsgnte.
--
*One of t h e g r e a t e s t t r a i n i n g needs i s i n night scouting and p a t r o l l i n g especiallk
i n the maintenance of contact with t h e enerqy. Around Vire contact waa not maintained a t
night and t h e enemy succeeded i n withdrawing. We muat a180 s t r e e s and re-streea f i r e
and movemeat i n a l l training.*--C0, 116th Inf, 29th Div.
TWELFTH ARMY CROUP
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No 41 I I SEPT 1944
*Battle grperienceo8 an published raguParly Bhir headquarters t o enabla
rraitr i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t a o t cambat ergerienaer of our troop8 n o r
fighting t h e dermane i n m o p e . Although the ergeriancee of c e r t a i n units a t a
p a r t i c u l a ~l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c a s r a r i l y appliaable t o all u n i t e i n all eituation8,
the i t m a publinhad rill be tho80 basad on p r a c t i a a l experience and a r e recammended
for aareiP1 a o n d d e r a t i o n by unit. rhich may encounter r i m i l a r probl-. Reports
of corroborative o r oontrary axparionoar a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n order t h a t tho
v a l i d i t y of tha indicated b a t t l e leseon nay be datermined.
H. B. LmIs
Erigadier Oenernl, U S
Adjutant Oensral
- - I I I I I ~ o ~ - I - - - - o o - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ o o ~ ~ ~
*Recently planted minefield8 i n varioue ereae have been marked by two rows of warn-
ing boards, t h e outer row painted black with white l e t t e r i n g , and the inner row painted
white with black l e t t e r i n g . The spaaa between t h e rows is f r e e fromndnes. In other
areas t h e presenue of mines i e reported t o be indicated by lengths of barbed wire wound
around t h e wooden poets of t h e bopadary fences. Anti-personnel miner a r e indicated by a
length of wire p r o j e a t i ~about three inches frca! t h e top of t h e post while two hoops d
wire forming a d o r ~on top of *he post i n d i c a t e antitank mines..*--MIS, VD Bulletin.
2. The Attack: Cos I and L were t h e aasault cos, I on the r i g h t , .and 60 K ras i n
r e e e m , The a s s a u l t coa, each with a s e c t i o n of heavy E s attached, advanced i n column
of g l a t 8 , Co f advanced under f i r e over t h e north elope ~f t h e hill, dropping its heavy
a section a t t h e c r e s t t o a s s i s t Co L, and reached position8 200 yard8 down the reverse
mlope where i t etogped. Co ~ * advance a w a 8 pinned down by heavy f i r e on the eastern elopsr
of the h i l l u n t i l dark, A gap of soape 600 yards @ f i s t e d between Cos I and L, Under the
eover s f d a r h e s s Co K waa moved i n t o t h e gap. -1y in the mornfgg @oL resumed t b s
advance, t h e i i r o t p l a t f r o n t a l l y , t h e second p l a t maneuvering t o the south. One squad
of the f i r s t p l a t w a s committed on the r i g h t f r o n t t o i n f i l t r a t e i n t o t h a enemy lines.
T h i e aqua8 succseded i n p e n e t r a t i n g the enemy p o s i t i o n unobserved and began attacking tha
re8iatastre with grenade, eutslmatio weapon and r i f l e f i r e , A t Q6W t h e enemy counter-
attacked t n e euppomed gap betwese Cos I and L i n co strength. Co K k i l l e d or captured
the e n t i r e oounterattaaking f o r c e ard than moved up on t h e l e f t flank of 60 1 and opened
f i r e om enemy p o s i t i o n s on top of the h i l l . Under cover of the attaok made by the squad
$fa r Co % mmel up and t h e bn aap-
the f i r s t p l a t and t h e f i r e fram Co X t h e r c m ~ ~ i n d eof
tured the h i l l by 1600,
END
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 42 12 SEPT I944
* B a t t l e Experiencesr a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquartera t o e n a b l e
u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t combat experiences of our t r o o p s n o r
f i g h t i n g t h e Germans i n Europe. Although t h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n j t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n all s i t u a t i o n e ,
t h e item published w i l l be t h o s e baaed on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recommended
f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s which may encounter s i m i l a r p r o b l e m . Reports
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y experiences a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may be determined.
H. B. LEWIS
B r i g a d i e r General, U '
Adjutant General
1. T a c t i c 8 i n Advance, a. * I n t h e e a r l y s t a g e s t h e d i v o f t e n h a l t e d i n a column
extending more t h a n 40 miles. I do not t h i n k r e f a n out' f a s t enough. I l i k e combat
cannnands t o more i n m u l t i p l e columns..~--A g e n e r a l o f f i c e r .
b. rDo not stand on t h e road 2 or 3 hours while some one t r i e s t o g e t i n touch
with h i s s e n i o r . Make up your mind and do something. When a column s t o p s f i n d out
what is s t o p p i n g it,"-A general officer,
c. '1 agree about u s i n g m u l t i p l e columns, even t h o u g h . i t does complicate t h e
supply s i t u a t i o n and report8.n--Division G-.!t.
d. 'Our d i f f i c u l t y is having enough reconnaissance i n f r o n t of us. We went
s t r a i g h t down t h e road and f r e q u e n t l y t h e f i r s t 2 o r 3 v e h i c l e s were knocked out. I f
we have t o keep going d o m roads and through towns, we w i l l use advanced guards of i n f
and a p l a t of t a n k s t o f i n d o u t t h e situetion.."--Lt Col of a combat command..
e. "he armor should go around c i t i e s and t h e i n f f o l l o w up and go i n and t a k e
--
or'f i cer .
them. The main t h i n g I want t o impress on you i s keep moving fo17oard.n-- A g e n e r a l
I1 AIR-GROUND W e
2. Panels. When ground elements dismount they must d i s p l a y panels t o insure against
g e t t i n g s t r a f e d by f r i e n d l y planes.
-
4. Minee, *PWe s t a t e t h a t minea a r e
of curves i n t h e roads, The theory being
being l a i d hurriedly on t h e i n s i d e and o u t s i d e
t h a t tanks and amd v e h i c l e s rounding t h e
curves hug t h e s i d e t o g e t a good view i n an e f f o r t t o spot enemy positions and v e h i c l e s
and do not watch f o r mines,*--6-2 Report, 30th Dio.
5. Uae of Germ= Mines i n blocking a road, rnPWa say t h a t T-35 mines hove been used
t o block roads a s fsllowa: A t r e n c h about 10 inchee deep is dug acroea t h e road. Three
o r 4 mines are placed in it. A s t e e l connecting bar i a bolted across t h e pressure p l a t e s
of t h e mines. A f l a t i r o n p l a t e i s then placed on top of the connecting bar. Pressure
a t any p o i n t w i l l detonate a l l mines,n--G2 Report, 83rd Inf Mye
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 43 13 SEPT 1944
r g a t t l e ~ p e r i e n c e sa~r e published r e g d g l y by t h i s hesdquarters t o enable
units i n t r a b h g t o p r o f i t fram t h e l a t e s t combet experjences of our troops now
f i g h t i n g the Wrmans i n m o p e . ~ l t h o u g ht h e experiences nf c e r t a i n u n i t e a t a
p e r t i a u k l a a t i o n are not n e c e s s a r i l y applicable t o a l l u n i t s i n e l l s i t u a t i o m ,
the i t e m .published w i l l be those based on p r a c t i c e 1 experience and are recormended
f o r aaraf ul consideration by u n i t s which may encounter similar problems. m p o r t s
of aorroboretive or c o n t r a r y experiences q e p a r t i c u l a r l y desired i n order t h a t t h e
n a f i d i t y of t h e indicated b e t t l e lesaon may be determined.
C
i BP&
A.
Adjutant General
- - ~ - - ~ - ~ , 0 ~ ~ - - ~ - - ~ - " - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
SUPPLY WITHm TRE BnISION. (Rote 8 The following discussion of the operation i n
oombat cd supply in d i v i a i a n s and lower u n i t s i e e x t r a c t e d f'rcan a number of r e p o r t s
oa t h e subject.)
1 c w 1 SUPPLY.
1. plrpcibildty. a. -
Since r a t i o n s reach t h e using unit 48 hours a f t e r re-
Q u i a i t i o n , it is manifestly impracticable t o eeize unexpected opportunities t o
e b e t t e r type r a t i o n , such as may r e s u l t fram a 2-dey r e l i e f frm t h e l i n e
of a oertaini =it. OUT 3-4 t r i e s t o keep on hand a PO-in-1 or B r a t i o n far t h i s
PWpoee, eddition, we t r y t o meet the d e e i r e e and apecial s i t u a t i o n s of sub-
=dinate units. rneguently we i s s u e two-thirde of a C r e t i o n and one-third of
a K r a t i o n , o r vice-versa, f o r a s i n g l e day. -(Sf i c e r e of the 137th ~ n f ,s t h
Df. Diva
b. -We maintain (r reserve. C an mezpe&ed opportunity s r i a e s f o r a u n i t
t o use a B ar 10o.i~-1 r a t i o n and they $ a m d r a m another kind, we e%chan@ with
them and adjust by t h e use of our reaeme. -EL. C o l . Van ~ o t t e n
Dir.
30th pf. - -
Reparati-. a. -
When w e sem6 e i t h e r the @ or t h e 18-in-1 r a t i o n , they
a r e f b e t heated in t h e kitohens. We u u a l P y serve them hot far k e a l b a a t end e u -
Per ~t noon t h e msn e a t a cold K r a t i o n . - ~ tesl.
, m r , G-4 Pat Dive
b. we nark thie eyetem t o serve hot c rations+ Tke r a t i o n s , s t i l l i n e m s ,
a r e heated i n b o m g water. They a r e then i e t o marmSte m n a , d o preheated
in b o U n g water. They reach CYbe troops hozs -Mi'.cers of t h e 137th ~ n f ,35th
Ini. Div.
3. ~ ~ w m s pnmt a r d . a. - 91 Tne a r e alwaye r e l e a s e d t o units.
They care
i e s w d between 0600 and 1280 -
moved v
mn f m a r d befare dark.
not during hours of darknees.
Rations ueruaffy
zt. Cole -
G-4 1st Dive
b* Rations m e moved f m d in] t o n trucke %o bn am dps, where so jeepa
Biak them up and take them aa aloee t o t h e l i n e s as p r a c t i a a b l e seldcrrP more than
500 yards array, p l a t w y i n g g a r t i e s take them t h e r e a t of t h e way. r he e m a @
-
tireb f r m kitchen8 t o troope i s about two hours. dfi c e r a of t h e 137th Info -
1. veepone. a. -
o b t a i n mapan replscemente throu& t h i s co, d i r e c t f r m U p s . -
we have a medium ord ao i n d i r e c t support of t h e dim* we
~ t 1201.
. mr,
0-4 lrat Diva
b. gm a while we reported weapon r e p a i r and r e p l e c e m n t needs ea& night
through 9-4. ~ o r m a ltime of replauenrsnt was two dayao mter we d e t a i l e d a d v a g e
o f f i a e r with s e v e r a l men with t h e Bnty of handling t h i e e~ork, w e b improvement has
been noted.
oo would be a ereat help. -
ie believed a amell stock af weapons m d spare parta in t h e service
Lt. c o l a o ~ ~ a ~ eC8, l l 2nd
, an 3-3 L37 W.
clothin . principcrl d i f f i a u l t i e a i n t h e resupply of ulothinpt were d w t o
t h e r a p i d a7d -m a e and t h e shortage of transportation. 08 d t h e 137th X n f m
auggusted nabtenance of a emall stock af clothing i n t h e M%PV 00 d 8 0 .
d. m h i a l e e . ~ e h i c l ereplacement e have been obtainad i n t h e tigb neoesaary
t o send t o t h e ~ g end p r e t u r n them. y~ostof t h e vehicles l o e t m e jeeps. 1f t h e
1. a. -
Eaah r e g t and sep bn and co &are d i r e c t from the ~X'W dace 111
truckbead, ~ o r m e r l yt h i s was 6 t o l5 milee back. Now it is a s much a8 150 t.0
w5 milee. Tho d i v o a r r i e s a reserve of 4000 m l l o n e of @wofinem To save t h e
m y , O -
lower u n i t e t h e long haul, we iaaue t h e d i v r e 8 and then r e f i l l it
30th 1nf Div, we
Maj R e Me -
b. -
he Dip ~ b tranrsporte
b @ m e III supplies f r o m ASP^ t o aiv dps, d w a
they a r e pioked up by u i n g unite. m c e n t l y we have ~ B P o t t e dan e n t i r e t r u c k
campany t o moving f o r w a r d these supplies, but they . a r e ketwina up 0 n . l ~with d i f f i -
culty. -mjur Huff, Aeet G-4. 9 t h ~ i v .
IB. C U S S IV.
1. u1
r e p a r t e indicate t h a t class IV supply aervicea have operated well and
are well etooked. ~n some oases, they have f a l l e n t o o far behind.
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 44 I6 SEPT 1944
By comr.wnd of Ij e u t e m t ~ e n e r a lEWkDms
He B* LEWIS
B r i g a d i e r General,
Ad j u t e n t G e n e r d
--
1. L e e d e r ~ b l ppzmdaxental. prm my o p i n i o n , l e a d e r a h i p r e q u i r e s t h a t bn, co and
p l a t comilrs c o n s t a n t l y keep up w i t h t h e men i n t h e l i n e and encr.)ura&e them by example.
The week l e a d e r must be promptly r e p l a c e d or t h e r e a c t i o n w i l l gc on down t o t h e last
man and t h e u n i t w i l l n o t move. Leadership i s a c . i e s t i o n of l i f e o r d e a t h t o t h e men
i n t h e ranks.
------
2. An memple. one n i g h t t h e Germns opened with two 280 mns on our personnel.
The 280 has v e r y large. sheJ.1 f r a p n t s ~ n di s not a n a n t i p e r s o n n e l weepon, but t h e
b b . s t i a t e r r i f jc. he Germna m d e no d i r e c t h i t s . we had no s e r i o u s c a s u a l t i e s
but two men were buried j.n t h e i r f o f i . o l e s e n d hkd t o be dug out. hqorale wae s e v e r e l y
s t r ~ i n e d . However, t h e men s t o o d t o t h e i r f o x h o l e s ; l e s s w e l l t r a i n e d me11 might have
retired.
3. m c t h e r m a m ~ l e . Lt. ~ d l j nprovided what I consider a good example of lead-
ership. He l e d a p a t r o l of 10 men i n t o t h e 280 m (Uwaf SpeeM) b a t t e r y neer L o m i s t .
He e n t e r e d t h e t p of the German b t r y comdr with a h c ~ dgrenade i n his hand and de-
mended surrender. he Garroan c e l l e d colonel F u r s t , i n c o m n d of t h e &mmne on t h e
p e n i n a u k , then offered t o a r b i t r a t e . m l i n i n s i s t e d upon inrmediate surrender. 1
had a r r i v e d i n t h e meantime and c o l o n e l F u r s t r e q r ~ e s t e dwe corn t o h i s Cp, 3000 yds
away. I moved t r o o p s around wst 1s C? t h e n took Edliil ts p a t r o l i n with me. m a t
surrendered t h e f m t and we took about 500 prisoners.
-
4. HOW t o ~ a v eI n f e n t r y . a.- 1nf sometimes t a k e s heavy l o s s e a when a l i n e ie
b u i l t up t o o s t r o n g l y and t h e enemy a t t a c k s with a r t y and mccrta. We ahould keep
moving and f l a n k i n g out posj.tions. If I cannot f i n d a flank, I hold t i g h t and
b u i l d up i n s ~ . o t h e rp l a c e by a t e a l t h o r under cover of darkness.
b.- In one. case where we were b u i l t u!, e t r o n g l y , we s u f f e r e d 30 c a e u a l t i e e among
240 men i n two hours - more t h a n our C R R U I~ t i e s f cr any o t h e r two deye. The next
dey we f l a n k e d the p o s i t i o n and gained 2000 yds with only 21 c a s u a l t i e s o
c.- when warking with t k s we should use minimum numbers of inf around t h e tke
only enough t o p r o t e c t t h e t k s from bezooka f i r e f r o m both flanks. 1f we plaoe a
-
l o t of inf around t h e t k e , t h e y t s k e c a s u a l t i e s from w t y and mort fire aimed a t
t h e tks.
RND
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 4 5 16 SEPT 1944
n g a t t l e S p e r i e n c e s r a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s t o e n a b l e
u n i t e i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e a t cambat experiences of our t r o o p s nor
f i g h t i n g t h e -mans i n m o p e . ~ l t h o u g ht h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t e
P a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n are not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t 8 i n a l l e i t u a t i o m ,
t h e items published rill be t h o s e based on p r a c t i c a l eorperience and e r e reconmended
f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t e which m y enoounter s i m i l a r problems. ~ e p o r t s
of c o r r o b a r a t i v e or c o n t r a r y experiences a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e e i r e d i n order t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e leaaon m y be determined.
ICBPYs-,
H* B. m1s
B r i m d i m General, U ~ A
Adjutant General
The s h i e l d i a made of 3/8 o r 1/2 inch s t e e l , slit8 1/2 inch wide and 6 t o 8 inches long
~ o C.O.
l Regt. -
Permit vision. T h i s device provides good p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t 9A f i r e and has g e e t l y re-
duced t h e number of m i p e r v i c t ime.--I;t R a k e r , co 1st gn, 66th
- :
- 2 - A%pmducer?&~+heEngtneer .?eproduct,on Del, /Zfh Army Groq
TWELFTH ARMY CRCUP
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 46 22 SEPT 1944
W h t t l e Experiences# a r e p u b l i d e d r c g u l s r l y by t h i s h s s d q u a r t e r s t o e n a b l e
u n i t s i n t r n i n i n ~t o ?profit from t h e l a t e s t combat e x p e r i e n c e s of our t r o o p 8 now
f ightin~t h e Gems i n Ei~rofle. Althoti& t h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t e a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c ~ t i o nEire n o t n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c e b l e t o a l l . u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t iona,
t h e i t e m s publi..shed w i l l be t h o s e baaed on p r a c t i c a l ex?erience and a r e reconmended
f o r ceref u l a o n s i d e r a t i n n by u n i t e which m y encounter s i m i l a r problems. , R e p o r t s
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e or c o n t r a r y e x p e r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
y e l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b e t t l e l e s s o n may be determined.
C. R. L4NDm
Colonel, AGD
Ad j u t a n t General
..........................................
I WIRE CO~LIIMKNICATIQIJ
U\J FAST MdVIIJG SITUAT IONS.
T h e recent 15 to 75 m i l e d a i l y advances m d e by t h e d i v p r ~ s e n t e da s i t u a t i o n
in which i t was beyond t h e c s p a b i l i t i e s of t h e d i v personnel and equipment t o main-
t a i n continunus wire a o m u n i c a t i o n with f i e l d wire. Extensive r e c o n n a i s s a n c e wae
c ~ i r r i e do u t y i o r t o t h e movanent of t h e C P s o t h a t a wire n e t could be q u i c k l y
l a i d . A l l a ~ a i l ~ b French
le c m e r c i p . 1 w i r e and _noam l i n e s were used; i n one in-
e t a n c e R n e t of 70 m i l e s o f o ? e r a t i n g c i r c u i t s was i n s t a l l e d i n 3 h o w w i t h o n l y
1 2 m i l e s of f i e l d wire. It wag found beat t o decld-end c i r c u i t s a t each end of a
v i l l a g e ~ n lda y f i e l d wire t h r o u ~ hthe-town. T h i s e l i m i n s t e d t h e n ~ e dof c u t t i n g
numeroils l e ~ d - i n st o bui1dings.L-Reports from u n i t s of 9 t h 113Div.
N ---
CO~IDDiATi'I3PJ
----- GF RCN 'L'ROUP 2.145 &
-
I R PLi;r WTrH
3. ---
P r i s o n e r--.--.-
s of Yier. *n0 n o t s e p e r s t o p r i s c > n e r s and t h e documents t h e y cmry.
b y t i m e s w e get m r k e d u p s snit d o c u m e n t , ~t h ~ mt e need t h e p r i s c n e r s t o e x p l a i n .
--Lt Col. M . r r a y , G-2, 7 t h A m d Div.
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 47 24 SEPT 1944
*Battle BperienceaQre published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s t o e n a b l e
u n i t a i n t r a i n i n g t o *prof it from t h e l a t e s t combat e x p e r i e n c e s of our t r o o p s now
f i g h t i n g t h e G e r m n s i n Burope. Although t h e ex,periences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t e
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p 2 l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s ,
t h e items published w i l l be t h o s e based on p r a c t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e and a r e recornended
f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by i m i t s which m y encounter similar 2 r o b l e m . R e p o r t s
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y e x p e r i e n c e s a r e g a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may be determined.
Co R. LANDON
Colonel, AGD
Ad j u t ant General
---------,-------
----.................................................. ----------
CLASS I SUPPLY 11\1 CCMBAT
2. Treatment. A summary of t h e i n f o r m a t i o n o b t a i n e d w i t h r e s p e c t t o C l a s s I
supply i s given i n succeeding paragraphs. A more o r l e s s t y p i c a l d e e c r i p t i o n of t h e
g e n e r a l methods of o p e r e t i o n is followed by a d e s c r i p t i o n of c e r t a i n e x p e d i e n t s or
methods adopted t o minimize a d i f f i c u l t y i n t h e system o r o t h e r w i s e t o improve t h e
s e r v i c e t o t h e combat t r o o p e . Other c l a s a e s of s u p p l y w i l l be di?cuseed i n f u t u r e
iesuea of Q t t l e experience^^.
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No.48 25 SEPT 1944
S, R. PINDChI
Colonel, UID
U@t~lk
t mbl
- - - - - - - ~ ~ s B ~ - - ~ o ~ c . = ~ u - w ~ ~ ~ ~ o , - - ~
i n t e r e s t e d c a r e of h i s men.
b,+.~*iene,rs~'.
p.&t$lci $ ~ ~ publish&
.e r e N - 1 3 69- f3;i.s h e i , 5 ; i , ~ r $ m 8 emblts iia.Q.&e
2% % r a u i n gt a the &te@t $.l.t.~a s r p e r h o ~ e e sid Q%= :-roopr nm! %f&&R,~g ::h
&L~hou& t h e experaseces 02 c a - t s h u i be rr-t a p a r t i c u l a r Pacat n >;,n
ne.n~sm.~iHya p p % ~ a b B teo a l l u d t ~ i.5 ehtihatiags, &he itams publishei-: w ~ i '
be thoso -b&e& p e g t i o a l snpsrianoe gz;, rec a d d far;. 3zardul e o a e i d ~ a r : ~bny
- u h t a , wDi& m;; e n m u t a r BMLW p r ~ b l w , 3 e p ) ~ 2~f t c~a r r i i i x r a t i r e or c o a t r m g ex-
parianoes m e p a r t i c u l a r l y deeired i n order e h e the L.,-&2idfty r P t h e indicated beit%%@
C. R. UNDON
Colonel, AGD
Ad jutant General
w D - _ - O _ - e - - _ - _ _ - * - - w - - - ~ ~ - - ~ - - - - ~ ~ - - - - - - - - ~ -
4, New ~ X % W X weeDon.
~ @Wehave oaptured a new Geraran 888811 pieoe t h a t can be mr&
handled and w h i d hadl only cs 2 foot s i l h o u e t t e above g o u r d when i t a oarriage wheels a r e
~eamved, We have found 2 of theee in t h e r i a i n i t y of on9 pillbax.
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. SO 2 8 SEPT I944
# b a t t l e Experiences# a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquarters t o enable
u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h o l a t e s t combat experiences of our troops n o r
f i g h t i n g t h e Germans i n Europe.. Although t h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o all u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n a ,
t h e item published w i l l be t h o s e based on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recammended
f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t ion by. u n i t s which may encounter similar problems. Reports
of corroborative o r contrary e x p e r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n order t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of ' t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may be determined,
C. R. LANDON
Colonel, AGD
Ad j u t a n t General
............................................
I FIGKTING IN THE CITY OF BReST
Note: The following i s e x t r a c t e d from camnents of Maj Gen Walter M. Robertson, CG*
2d Inf Mv. on t h e f i g h t i n g w i t h i n t h e c i t y of Brest.
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 51 29 SEPT 1944
* B e t t l e Experiences* are published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquarters t o enable
u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t combat e x p e r i e n c e s of our troops n o r
f i g h t i n g t h e Germans i n ~ u r o ? e , Although t h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s ,
t h e item8 published rill be those based on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recommended
f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s which may encounter s i m i l a r problems. Reports
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y e x p e r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of the i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s a o n may be determined.
C . R . I.ANmN
Colonel, AGD
Ad j u t a n t General
nWe have established dpe f o r 4.2 mort, when atohd, due t o t h e d i f f i c u l t y t h e cml
coa have i n resupplying themselvee.. They have only i - t o n t r k s and t r a i l e r s and t o
send t h e s e back f o r am would be an uneconomical use of T. We use d i v T t o b r i n g am
from t h e ASP f o r t h e s e wpns and. e s t a b l i s h a IIP c l o s e t o t h e r e g t l f i e l d t n of t h e
r e g t t o which t h e mrts a r e a t c h d . a - - h j . T.M..Andrewa, G 4 , 40th Inf Mv..
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 52 3 0 SEPT 1944
' B a t t l e m e r i e n c e s n a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s t o e n a b l e
u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t conbat e x h e r i e n c e s of our t r o o p s now
f i g h t i n g t h e Germans i n Europe. Although t h e e x p e r i e n c e s of c e r t a i n Unit8 a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s ,
t h e i t e m s p u b l i s h e d w i l l be t h o s e based on p r a c t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e and a r e r e c o m n d e d
f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s which may encounter s i m i l a r problems. R e p o r t s
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y e x p e r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may be determined.
C. R. IARDCN
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General
I1 BAZOOKA TEAMS.
6
ment t a c t i c s . The bazooka i s d e f i n e l y e f f e c t i v e a g a i n s t t h e t k . H i t i t on t h e s i d e ,
do not shoot st t h e f r o n t . A f t e r i i s stopped work around t o t h e r e a r and l e t him
have one, : a d t h e t k w i l l normally c a t c h fire.--Rsport of 1st Bn, 1 1 9 t h Inf t o 3 0 t h Div.
AS a i d t o c o n t r o l v i t h i n p l a t s , we have been l a y i n g wire t o each gun p o s i t i o n ,
p r o v i d i n g t h e p l a t comdr w i t h r a p i d sure cam t o e a c h gun s g t . We f i n d t h i s more r e -
l i a b l e t h a n r a d i o . Also a t e l e p h o n e can be o p e r e t e d from a f o x h o l e . When we u s e
r a d i c we dismount an SCR-610 and p l a c e i t i n t h e f o x h o l e w i t h t h e operator.--Report of
823d TD Bn t o 3 3 t h I n f Div.
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 53 I OCT 1944
C. R. IISQMBl
Co10p.1, AaD
Adjutant b a m r a l
1, Opmar
s . e m d and t o
. le we t h e inf t o d~temainsr h a t poaitione ape
tanka aan be b r o w t up t o fkFO om them, We .eve
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
' B a t t l e Experiencesa a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i a headquarters t o enable
u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t combat experience8 of our t r o o p s now
f i g h t i n g t h e ~ e r m a n si n Burope. Although t h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s ,
t h e i t e m published w i l l be those based on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recamended
f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s which may encounter a i m i l a r problems. Reports
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y e x p r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y desired i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s a o n m y be determined.
C. R. LANDON
Colonel, AGD
Ad jutant General
..........................................
END
TWELFTH ARMY CROUP
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 55 3 OCT 1944
C. R. LANDOM
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General
-----.---------------------------
cus3 11 ~SSDIII m a y m COW
a. Clasa -
S u ~ p l z . a. I n armcrod units. (1) The 6 t h Anad D i r follows the-
methods of resupply of tuel and lubricants, aceording t o t h e situation. Whon a p p l y
p o i n t s a v a i l a b l e t o the d i r are aloae, re-aupply i 8 e f f e c t e d by a b o r d i n a t e uait t r b
on a can-exchaqp barnis. In a moving s i t u a t i o n t h e d i r e s t a b l i s h e s a C l a s s I11 sapply
point i n i t s d i r t r a i n area.
(2) I n t h e 3 r d Armd M r . d i r t r k a w u a l l y k i n g forward the supplies from the
U P and d e l i v e r tam t o t h e using unlts about dark. T'he d i r f u e l t r k s tnen r e t u r n t o
the supply p o f i t f o r a r e f i l l .
(3) I n the m d TD En t h e bn fuel t r u c k is sent forward an a a l l from the 008. The
t r k is met by p l a t guides who lead it t o the p l a t CPs o r t o individual vehicles, i f
practicable. Normally the d i e t r i b u t i i n is from p l a t Bs by hand-carry when the unit is
engaged.
b. In inf units. (1) The 2nd MI QM draws suppliee from a carps or ASP and estab-
l i s h e s o m o r more dir dp8. The r e g t a &an from t h e m dps and e s t a b l i s h r e g t l dpa.
Vehicles fram loner u n i t s r e t u r n t o the r e g t l dp f o r r e f i l l o r , on oocaeion, t h e neoded
supplies are s e n t forward on a l i g h t t r k .
(2) Both t h e 13th Inf and the 3 U t h Inf conebnt an t n e f a c t t h a t no f u e l t r k i a
organically a v a i l a b l e t o id r e g t s . Making one a v a i l a b l e f o r normal supply a c t i d t i e s
causeo no e p e c i a l concern, but i n f a s t wring a i t u a t i o n e , when two or three t r k e i r e
needed, considerable d i f f i o u l t y i s oncotmtered.
(3) The 134th Inf r e p o r t s using 2 2) T t r k a with t r a i l e r s (not explaining where
t h e t r k s came f r a n ) t o haul t h o supplies frcm the BSP t o t h e r e g t l f i e l d t n b i r ~ . En
m i n t vehicles t h e r e exchange empty f o r f u l l can8 end a l l v e h i c l e s oaning i n t o the
biv are d i r e c t e d t o f i l l up t o save transportation. The bns usually have t o ground
sane gasoline, i n order t o use the d n t v e h i c l e s , but seldom very narch.
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 56 4 OCT I944
C. R. UmOH
Colonel, AGD
Adjut ant 6enerdP
wmy nmn do not r e a l i z e the power of t h e i r own SA biro. Recently on. of our
outposts of 4 men, located about 20Q 4- i n front of t h o m, maw a Cernan nigh*
p a t r o l of 8 xmn mars aurore t h e i r f r o n t only about 30 yda away. Another group of 5
enemy went i n the o t h e r direction. The outpost personnel s a i d t h a t they d i d not f i r e
beeapse they were out-nubared and f i r i q would d i s c l o a e t h e i r position. BQth group.
could have been ellmlnated by a few b l a e t s from the BAR and with two o r three penndes..
--PM: M. T. Didelot, DLi R i f l e Co, 30th M r .
1x1 FIGHPrnG I N OPEN COUm'RY
*Aiter f i g h t i n g i n tbe hedg~rowsour u n i t s , back i n open country, did not appreci-
a t e a t f i r e t t h a t t h e en- could. by lang range f i r e ' , catch t h e e n t i r e eait r i t h one
burst, Now it i s neceeaary t o hare t h e scout6 and flanker8 well out. I n o m a c t i o n
t h r Garmans l e t the aaauts g e t within 50 yd8 boiore f i r i n g . Aa tho p l a t waa t o o alose
i t w a s pinned down while s t i l l i n column and could mt develop enough f i r e power t o
engage t b e e m , If we had not had t k s present .&Be careualtlee would Bare been heaqr,a
- - ~ n iGO c e , 30th mv.
'on one occmion during t h e recent o p e r a t i o m , our three r i f l e aos were attaaking
t h e en- position " *cat three s i d e s , Wire aoer w a s available and t h e o m l i n e t o eaah
co wars put on a conference c i r c u i t . The bn eolpdr I n a t m c t e d t h e co e c d r s t h a t he would
monitor t h e o i r c u i t and a s e i s t where possible, but t h a t the ehow d e f i n i t e l y belonged t o
t h s co comdrs. By w e of t h e conference eironi* the oo caadrs were able t o exchange in-
formatiaar &ad coordinate t h e i r e f f o r t s . A l l coppdps concerned believe t h a t t h i s prooe-
d w e gmatxy aided i n t h e weedy reduction of the en- p a s i t i o n . * - 4 0 2d Ea, 28th Id.
2. U B ~of Tank Daatroyers M Tsnk.. "TIM 8hould got be ueed e4 t k a ; they omnot
firs while moving and do not hare the U)s and naneurerability of the*--Repcart of 701at
-,,
TD Bn*
3. Bezceka Fire. "The bazooka i 8 an excellent rpn a g a i ~ th, t hooser and p i l l -
boxe8. Frequently enemy machine gunners located i n boasea w i l l withdraw .h.n bazooka
f i r e i s directed against them. Every ran ahould be a b l e t o f i r e t b bazooka i n %he
event t h a t the r e g u l a r bazooka man becoma a casualty.*--3gt %. Si-r, inb r i f l e eo,
3 0 t h EElf MI.
4. ? l a n . k i ~Fire.
~ "The Gsrmma put t h e i r mall AT guns d i r e o t l g t o your f m n t t o
draw your a t t e n t i o n while h i s 88's h i t yow. tk8 f r o m tha flank. W-a h a m f e r n s lwses
when the morts smoke our f l a n k s aa we jmp off.*--Lt, 31at Tk a.
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 57 4 OCT 1944
* m t f 10 m r i e m O 8 a pub1i.M F.ad~'u thi8 h O C d ~ w t W 8t o e d l 0
u n i t a in tralnihg t o p r o f i t e ar t h e l a t e s t oaabat expsriencaa of our troop8 nor
f i g h t i n g t h o Ci.rranr i n m o p . . ~ l t h o u g ht h e orp.rienco8 of a o r t a i n unit8 a t a
p a r t i c u l a r looation an not w m 8 8 a r i l y applicable t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o ~ ,
tho it- published w i l l be thoam bsrwd cm p r a o t i c i l exporieme and an reoara6pd.d
f o r oaroful ooamideration \mit8 d i o h may enaourrter a i r i l a r problsr~e.. Reparta
of c o r r o b o r a t i r , o r contrary o ~ i o n a e 8are p a r t i o d l a r l y desired i n ordm that tho
v a l i d i t y of tho Indicated battle loaaon rag k detuminod.
C. R, LlrblDON
Colonsl, AGD
Ad Jut ant General
- - - I D I I - - n - - - n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3. p e c o n n a l s a a r , ~ , ch b-3 I r e n t r i t h t h e t k oo o a r d r , p l a t e a d r , eeoh of U8
t k aorpdrs and t h e t k r a n 0, t o tho i a f bm CP whore t k and i n f a-8 disouaeed p l a ~
and operations. a l l went togqtbsr l a t e r i n t h e evening t o t b p o a i t i o n from rhfeh
the i n f would launch i t 8 attaok. Ik t h e e ohom. l m a t i o n o f o r t h e t k r i r e gap and f o r
a dug-in t k position, mob t k o c d r w a 8 8hom the o b j e e t i m , t h e maspeated loeation
of enemy gun positiona and t h e approximate position eaeh t k rcmld take after p.seing
through t h e wire. m o h t k ctmdr w a s i r p r e 8 d with t h e i r g o r t a n w of keeping h i 8 f i r e
I n f r o n t of t h e advanaing id. The i n f 0 rho rss t o p r o r i d . t h e ' t k gaides worked with
the t k r a n 0 on their l o o a t i o m . le returned t o t h e i n f CP and disauemd t h e a t t a a k
f u r t h e r i n t h e l i g h t of what we hed learned.
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 58 5 OCT 1944
4. assault tesars. .Re urn a 12 t o 16 man aaeault team. Bach man muat know h i s
wpn and job, plus t h e rpn and job of everyone e l s e i n t h e team (fl- tbrower, dam- '
l i t i o n charge, rocket launcher, e t c ) . We som9timbs a s s i g n eaoh r i f l e p l a t e f i x e d zone
of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Each p i l l b o x bcorsra a phase l i n e f o r coordination and reorgani-
zation. I n many i n s t a n c e s one p l a t can cause 2 or 3 p i l l b o x e s t o wbutton upB by f i r i n g '
a t t h e embrasures, but t h e en- o f t e n oan continue t o f i r e through 8 m a l l slits i n t h e
embrasure. h n must not f o r g e t t h a t p i l l b o x e s a r e mutually supportirrg. Inalude i n
your p l a n f i r e on flanking p i l l b o r n e a s well as on those t o be cusaulted,
8. Dim- ~ 1 tfh e enemy doen not eurrender, some men mu8t work t o t h e
blind s i d e of t h e p i l l b o x and blow t h e embrasure with TNT. H t e r this, it is beat t o
work f r a n t h e t o p t o place a pole chargu a g a i n a t t h e door. l e v e r allow anyone t o e n t e r
the excavated a r e a t o t h e r e a r of t h e p i l l b o x an i t is always c w e r e d by a amall an-
braeure b u i l t e s p e c i a l l y f o r t h a t purpoae, W e r no circumstance allow anyone t o e n t e r
the p i l l b o x t o take prieonera;, make t h u come t o you, Socnetiresta t m y rill claim t o be
injured, but we have found t h a t a f t e r a 8econd aharge of TWT they samebow manage t o walk
out. When approaching t h e s e p i l l b o x e s all persona should '6s warned againat 'ointment
box' mines. They are very a m a l l , but very dangarous, (NOTE: T h i s mine is a m e t a l box
2w i n diameter and 1' t h i c k , It telescope8 when 8bpped on, t h u r a c t i v a t i n g t h e 3 oz
charge ).
9. other methods of knocking them a. 'If t h e above measure8 f a i l , a demoliticm
charge can be used, t k s can b l a s t i n t h e rear of t h e p i l l b o x , o r a t k doter ean oover
the door and embrasures with d i r t . The UBO of t k dozer. may not p r o m m ~ c e s s f u li n
the f u t u r e because the J e r r i e s are p l a n t i a g minea, some of them activated by remote
c o n t r o l , a s a counter remsdy. The f l a a s throwor and pole charge method of a t t a a k
proved q u i t e s u c c e s s f u l t h e one t i m we w d it, The combination a t m t e d a f i r e itr
t h e i n t e r i o r of t h e p i l l b o x among som am and the r e e u l t i n g c o n f u i o n made it eeay t o
clean out.
iO. The 'W grenade. a J e r r y w i l l o f t e n remain i n r i i u h o l e a f t e r an embrasure :-as
been blown o u t u n t i l persuaded t o leave by a flame thrower o r hand grenade. A hand gre-
nade i n t h e v e n t i l a t o r of a p i l l b o x sometimes s t u n s t h e aoche b u t a KP g r e n a d e i n t h e
same a i r s h a f t i s a g r e a t l i t t l e r e v i v e r ,
10. 3 s e of p e r s c u e l . U t h e a t t a c k we u s e t h e i n s t r u m e n t c p l s f o r I n . The p l a t s
do not send a r u n n e r t o co. They 'need e v e r y man. We u s e t h e T c p l s and d r i v s r s a s
c a r r y i n g p a r t i e s when needed."
-
4. Forward Obeervsrs, 'FO's tend t o g e t too f a r forward with the foremost ele-
ments of t h e r i f l e coa. When pinned down t h e FO cannot observe and often cannot use
the SCR 300 because the long mtenna draws a d d i t i o n a l f i r e . We ham used the method
of l e a p f r o g g i n g from one point of oban t o the o t h e r and have been able t o d i r e c t f i r e
on enemy ~ p ~ . - ~ ~when t i o int presents i t e e l f . W; have adjusted f i - e through FO1s ex-
clusively since we arrived i n France.
5. P i r e aontrol. 'The SCR 300 is very e a t i s f a c t o r y f o r com 'between obsr and gun
position. A r e l a y s t a t i o n was necessary only when the r a d i o s were masked by g u l l e y s
or denae mode. We are experimenting with 610ea, mounted i n jeeps, a s r e l a y a t a t l o n s
one 610 a t the gun position and one near t h e bn CP a8 r e l a y o n
2. p a c u a t i , , , , a h o t h e r o f our p r a c t i c e s i s t o e s t a b l i s h t h e bn a i d a t a t i o n where
t h e ambulances ce- come t o i t , I k r i n g p e r i o d s of heavy c a s u a l t i e s t h e l i t t e r b e a r e r s
of the o o l l co a- used ahead c f t h e a i d a t a t l o n t o h e l p clear t h e f i e l d . We b s l i e v u
i t would be d e a i r b l e t o have r e g t l corn t o t h e s u g p o r t i n g c c l l C O D Such can would a l l o w
more a c c u r a t e co, -t t h a n t h e u n c e r t a i n method of ambulance I n which i s a o t . a l w a y a
s a t i s f a c t o r y in r e p i d moves,@
bX COLBEJNICAl'IOE.' ( C o m e n t e of R e g b e n t a l Chxamnicatioe O f f i c e r
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 59 5 OCT 1944
mmmttla bcperisnom. a m publinlted r e g u l a r l y by t h i r headquarters t o ennbla
unit8 la t r a i n l a g t o p r o f i t f r a tbe 1ata.t oombat argariencas of our troops now
fighting the c 3 o n ~ 1 i n~ m p a . Although the eqxwioncea of c e r t a i n u n i t 8 a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o a a t i o n a r m not n a a a ~ a r i l yapplicabla t o a l l u n i t 8 in all 8 i t u a t i o n a ,
tbb itam pnbliahod rill k tho80 batad on p r a c t i o a l axperienoe and an raegp.ynded
f o r c a r a f n l oonsidaratioa units which aay enocmntar a i m i l a r problem. RaPQFt8
of w r r o b o r a t i r s or contrary eqnrriencas are p a r t i c u l a r l y &sir& in o r d a t h t t b
r a l i d i t y of t h e 1ndioat.d b a t t l e leraon re^' be QtaFsliW.
a- of ~ i e u t e n a n tGeneral ERADLQr
C. R. m n
Colonel, YID
Adjutant General
, , , , , , - , - - , - , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - L L L L L L - - -
-
1. .When a t k on whiah id i r r i d i n g I8 Inroekd o u t thm id ahcmld i r p e d i a k l y
mmnt a w t h e r tk. So more than 4 parp rhould r i b on one tk. A g r e a t o r ~umborrry
p r e r s a t mvammnt of t h e turmt When t k 8 attnek i n r a m 8 t h e machine g ~ n n a si n
t h e r e a r t k s must be careful t o a m i d h i t t i n g tho m n on t h e 1
- tk8.m--GO Co .B.,
33d mw m.
2. .when m w inf on th. r a a r do& of 7atr t k 8 through t o m u k mre that
t h e t k r l a r e a r do not f i r e their borr garu 88 t h e b u l l e t 8 rill gl8noo o f i bulldl438
.and i n f l i c t o r n r a l t i e 8 wly your o m id..--Lt, 31nt Tk B4.
.
Repmducedby Engr Repro Def 12.46 ,
TWELf TH ARMY CROUP
BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 6 0 8 OCT 1944
' B e t t l e Experiences* a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquarters t o enable
u n i t e i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t frcra t h e l a t e s t combat experience8 of our t r o o p s now
f i g h t i n g t h e Germane i n IPurope. Although t h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r location a r e not necessarily applicable t o a l l units i n a l l e i t u a t i o m ,
t h e items published w i l l 6e those baaed on p r a c t i a a l experienae and a r e recamended
f o r c a r e f u l consideration by u n i t s which may encounter similar p r o b l u u . Reports
of corroborativm o r contrary experience8 a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y desired i n order t h a t the
v a l i d i t y of t h e indicated b a t t l e lesson may be determined.
C . R. .LANDON
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant Oeneral
..........................................
* W i n g an a t t a c k against a f o r t i f i e d hill t h e ao c d r of t h e reserve co brought
h i s co i n t o t h e l i n e a t 0700 hours. He personally l e d a t t a c k s with SA, hand grenades
and bayoneta u n t i l wounded i n the aplp a t 1000 hours. Refusing t o be evaouated he l e d
another a t t a c k and waa cut o f f . Tha Germans demanded h i e surrender and upon h i s re-
f u s a l attaaked. Standing up hs k i l l e d four Oennans, f i r i n g hi8 aarbine with h i e good
hand. He continued t o lead t h e a t t a a k u n t i l 1800 houre when moat of t h e h i l l w a s
c l e a r , and then went t o t h e OP and adjusted a r t y f i r e f o r two houre before he allowed
himself t o be evaauated-*--Extracted f r u n an 8 t h Inf document.
2. p i v e r croaaing. *In our area tba WURM River has very ateep bank. 6 t o 7 f e e t
high and i a about 3) f e e t deep and 10 t o 15 f e e t wide. To f a c i l i t a t e cronsing by
troop8 s e v e r a l three-section foot bridge. were construated, 12 f e e t long and 2 f e e t
wide. m o seationa were placed a t a s l a n t , one on each bank, extending from t h e
bottom of t h e r i v e r t o t h e t o p of the bank. The t h i r d s e c t i o n wae plaaed ae a bridge
between t h e other two.*--CO, 1st Bn, 117th Inf.
3. Breechiwc wire. *The only r i r e obstacle found along the German border con-
s i s t e d of two rows of double apron fenae with concertina between t h e rows. We blew
gaps i n i t with 4.2 morte using 703 rounds of HE t o make two gaps.'-4-3, 3 0 t h XIS Div.
4 Trenches o u t s i d e of pillboxes. * W s t p i l l b o x e e had foxholes f o r W e dug on
t h e t h r e e a i d e s not covered by an embrasure. Riflemen were found i n most of tho-
occupied -- our a r t y and mart-
f i r e a p p a r e n t l y having prevented t h e W 8 from being
b o u g h t up.l--+3, 3 0 t h Inf Mv.
5. ~ e f e n s i r ef i r e e . * I f r e q u e n t l y have my a r t y bn CO prepare t h e f i r e p l a n f o r
t h e employment of a l l upns l a r g e r t h a n t h e 81mm mort, t o include t h e i n d i r e c t f i r e s
sf t h e 4.2 m o r t , AT co and TDa. Thi8 procedure saves d u p l i c a t i o n of e f f o r t and make8
f o r b e t t e r coordination of f i r e s . * - 4 0 9 t h Inf Regt..
IV ~gcmT3NM)USCOMMENTS
1. S n i p e r s r i f l e , # I f e f f e c t i v e use l a t o be made sf t h i s wpn t h e s n i p e r must
be considered a e p e c i a l i s t -- not a f r o n t l i n e rifleman. Snipers 8hould be oarefizlly
s c l e c t e d and not allowed t o t r e d e t h e i r r i f l e f o r an M-1 b e c a u e of its g r e a t e r f i r e -
p o w e r , * - - ~ ~ , 1st EZI, 26th 1nf.