NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM INTERVIEW WITH ROBERT S. MCNAMARA By R. CARGHLL HALL WASHINGTON, DC 25 March 1999Preface This brief oral history interview with former Secretary of Defense Robert 8, McNamara Focused on the origins and fist years of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the American leoders involved with it and the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP), In the course of the interview it became clear that Mr. McNamara, though certain of his reasons for creating the NRO and Defense Intelligence Agency, for example, had left the management of them to trusted subordinates. He did not recall details of their operation or of the institutional tensions of tie day. Nevertheless, his recollections of the 1960 Presidential election and its “missile gap” controversy, of the importance of reconnaissance satellite intelligence for ‘American leaders in the 1960s, and of the iment to protect these vital national assets by restricting the development of space weapons, contribute significantly to our understanding of this particular period in the Cold War. This interview is unclassified, R Cargill Hall Chief Historian ‘National Reconnaissance OfficeProceedings all: This is an interview with Robert S, McNamara in Washington, DC, ot his offices. ‘The date is March 25, 1999."The interviewer is Cargill Hall ‘To begin, Joseph Charyk remained in office after the Kennedy Administration came in, in charge of the Reconnaissance Satellite Office for the Air Force. In the Spring and Summer of 1961 plans were mage 10 bring all of the overhead reconnaissance programs together into a single office, What is your recollection of those plans? ‘McNamara: Well, I have a very hazy recollection of the details, but I was anxious 10 strengthen overhead reconnaissance and everything having to do with it because I almost instinctively placed a great value on it. Secondly, | had tremendous regard for Charyk—his intelligence, his experience and his judgment, And thirdly, I had found when I came into defense a fragmented Department on many issues. Tl give you an illustration. One of the reasons why the missile gap became such a controversial issue in the 1960 presidential campaign was that the intelligence services were so fragmented that they held disparate views, which were never at all reconciled. And the same thing was true of many of the military logistic supply agencies, so I set up a defense-wide supply department and, similarly, a defense-wide intelligence agency—the Defense Intelligence Agency—while allowing the services to maintain what I am going to call “tactical intelligence.” And I thought that by concentrating the overhead intelligence service responsibilities in one office and under an intelligent, wise, responsible director we could strengthen it. I wanted to see it strengthened because it had potentially tremendous value to the Department. I think, all that proved correct. But I don’t deserve any real credit for it. Ht ‘When Joseph Charyk left the federal government to become president of the COMSAT Corporation in early 1963, he wrote for you an end-of-tour report in which hecautioned that DCI Join MeCone was unhappy with the DOD/CIA arrangement for the National Reconnaisance Program, and that he seemed intent on weakening the authority of the Director of the NRO. Do you recell how this came about? M: —Tdon't recall very much about it, but what I do recall is that there was plenty of evidence that concentrating the authority for these black activities led to expedited action and much more effective action, I don’t think the U-2 would ever have been developed had not Dick Bissell had the power he hed, and the Skunk Works had the power it had, And similarly, I think: the overhead intelligence activities—reconnaissance activities benefited from a similar concentration of power. Beyond that, McCone was well known for building up what Pll call “the power of his activity.” whether it was justified or not. McCone was an able person, and I had a tremendous regard for the CIA, But in this particular activity.—this reconnaissance activity —we were getting into such highly technical matters that it seemed to me that it was perfectly appropriate that the Defense Department, Joo Charyk, and this reconnaissance activity be concentrated, and that's why I favored it. H: —Charyk’s successor was Brockway MeMillan who came into office in March of "63. Do you recall who selected him? Mi — Tdon’t. Iwas very close to Joe and had a lot to do with his appointment and his activities in the organization, and what he did and so on. But by the time he left, things were ‘moving on rather well, and so I didn't have to pay a lot of attention to it and T didn’t have a lot to do with Brock McMillan H: When Dr. McMillan could ot secure agreement with or the compliance of his CIA counterparts who were running what was then the CORONA part of the story, it’s my impression that you delegated to the Undersecretary of Defense, Roswell Gilpatric, and DDR&E,Eugene Fubini, authority to deal with McCone on these matters, Is that impression correct? ‘M: I think that is correct because I had tremendous confidence in both Ros Gilpatric and Gene Fubini, Gene was a superb—I was going to say technician, but he was much more than that—he was a superb scientist and I had immense confidence in his technical judgments. Ros ‘was an old veteran in the government bureaucracy and between the two of them, T was pretty sure that matters would be handled properly. So Tet them take care of it H: Well, they were the ones that negotiated with McCone for that period between ‘61 and ‘65 when the final agreement was ironed out. There was this sort of a constant, it seems to me, jockeying for a position between DOD and CIA over whether the Director of the NRO would be « CEO, and direct the whole thing as you intended, or would he be a chairman of the board as MeCone preferred? M: — No, what T intended was... he (the DNRO) would ran it, He would be technically qualified and administratively qualified to mun it, and it seemed to me that was the best way to do it, That's the way T wanted it done. H: On 10 July 1962, President Kennedy issued his National Security Council Action 2454 on space policy, which said in effect that the US would continue in intemational fora to seek acceptance for the legitimacy of reconnaissance from outer space and would make no Aistinetion between civil and military earth observation, There was subsequently a cancellation of the SAINT anti-satellite interceptor and it has ofien appeared to me that there was a conflict, between insulating these vital—what were now becoming vital—national assets for intelligence from unwanted disturbances, and the desire to put weapons in orbit that could altack other sacellites. Did that consideration play a role in the decision to end SAINT, do you recall? ‘Oh, T think it probably did. I know T was always opposed to starting an orbitalarms race that would put some of our vital space assets at risk. If we put satellites up there to shoot down other satellites, the Soviets would go and do the same, and we had satellites we didn't want shot down, At least, I didn’t want them sho: dawn, so T am sure that played a part. I don’t recall exactly how we came to the conclusion to drop it, but J think thet was the reason. H: I know that before the election in November 1960, Kennedy was not briefed by Eisenhower on the intelligence information returned by the U-2 and the first of the CORONAS, and that shortly after entering office, when you held that press conference and acknowledged that there was no “missile gap,” in terms of @ report that had been prepared, it created quite a stir. M: Oh, sure as Hell did. The reporters were in a room and the first question was “what do you think of the missile gap?” 1 said, “well, it's obviously a matter of tremendous importance. 1 spent @ good portion of my first few weeks examining it, and I have finally concluded there isn't a gap and if there is it is in our favor.” My God, you couldn't keep them in. They broke down the door to get to their editors. The late edition of the Evening Star had that report in it.The next day, Senator Dirkson demanded my resignation and & rerun of the election because he said that Kennedy had won on faise grounds. But the point of the story, as it relates to some of the things you're talking about, is that it doesn’t indicate that anybody lied. Whea T got into it, Ros Gilpatrio and T personally tracked down the source of the report that there was a missile gap. It was the A2 of the Air Force, a Major General, the ACSI, I can't think of his name at the moment. And at that time, because there wasn't a Defense Intelligence Agency, the Army, Navy, and Air Force issued separate intelligence reports, The others believed there wasn't a missile gap and the Air Force believed there was. The report—the CIA report—came out with all these views shown and in fact dida’t say that one was more credible than the other. The Air Force, I believe, leaked theit version toSenator Symington, who had been the Air Force Secretary, and he leaked it to Kennedy. Kennedy used it, believing it was correct So when we came in, I got these intelliges repons, and [ found the Air Force had it and on what basis. So Ros reported there was a serious gap. T wanted 10 know who repo. and L went up and we met with the A2 snd we asked nim. We didn’t question his honesty, we just said we wanted to know what the idence was. So he got out all of his photographs. We ‘went over them, and it didn't ve to me that there was a missile gap. But he was not lying, He was looking at the photographs through Air Force-colored giasses. This is @ typical human weakness—we all do that—so T concluded several things. One: that we ought to have one defense intelligence agency, and not several, each representing a particular service with operational interests involved in it, And number two: we ought to improve our intelligence ‘gathering capability as best we could. And that’s why I was particularly interested in satellite reconnaissance. H: In fact, I just interviewed the Air Foree intelligence chief that followed him, I think the A2 was a Major General James Walsh, Tam not sure now, but Jack Thomas was the ‘one that followed him. He said that indeed your views are based on your perception of the Soviet ‘Union and the threat it represented. And if they have seen three or four missiles at three bases, and say, “wel, that's about 10 percent of the total, so we've got 30 bases and... .” so its all extrapolated in a way that can cause all sorts of grief when you haven't got concrete data, M: Yes, there's no question about it, As T say, they weren’t lying. Ik wasn’t that, it ‘was just their inherent biases because of their association with foreign Air Forces and missiles, H; The final Memorandum of Agreement that reorganized the NRP and the NRO ‘was secured with the CIA and signed in August of ‘65 by Admiral Rayoum who was then DCI,and Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance. arate agency of the DOD with the Secretary of Defense named as Exec NRP, and the DCI now named as the Senior US Intelligence Advisor to it, What can you tel. me of the deliberations that preceded this agreement. M: — Tean't. H: —Yoncan’t, You weren't directly involved? M: No. I'm sure Cy kept me fully informed but the aaswer is T can't, H: OK. Perhaps we could tum to McCone briefly since you were acquainted with hhim and his period at the Agency. One of the aspects that intrigued me sas that he had served previously under President Bisenhower, M: Yes, but notin the Agency. H: No, No, The AEC, I think, But President Kennedy selected him as DCL I don’t think he had any great experience in intelligence. M: No, don't either. H: He was known to be an effective manager? M: Yes. H: Can you tell me what the reasons might have for that selection? M: No, I can"s, I think Keanedy wanted :o 21 ‘he Administration and the security field, foreign policy, the cast of bi-parisenship, He did have Doug Dillon, who was @ card carrying Republican, as the Secretar of the Treas! y. Kennedy actually thought T was a Republican when he appointed me, I was not, but ne thought I was. The reason he thought so ‘was because I was from Califomia, When you first registered to vote in California you had to indicate a party preference, and I had pat down Republican, though I did not vole Republicanafter that, But I think he brought in McCone because he had a reputation in business and some in Rovemment, and be was a Republican, I think Kennedy wanted to try to avoid the charge of partisanship in connection with intelligence. H: You have partly answered my last question in advance, but I'll return to it, M: Sure, H: Strategic space reconnaissance in the 1960s came to play a critical role in shaping US foreign policy and in the conduct of intemational affairs. It not only provided indications and ‘warning of impending hostilities, and the disposition and kinds of strategic forces an adversary possessed, but it permitted formulating negotiation strategies in these other settings as well. ‘When you and Presidents Kennedy and Johnson came to office in the early and mid-60s, did the potemtial value of th 1232 overhead intelligence astets appear self-evident or did it only become apparent to you later? M: Well, it éidn't appear self-evident to me, but it certainly became evident very sickly, within # matter of weeks, But I didn't know anything about it when I came in. So by the time oF the Culban missile tiss Sf Ohyit ure as Hell was evident In October “62, you knew what the missile count was? That's right. [knew how important vo the nation it was, Toe concludes my questions. My thanks for your time,