Professional Documents
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Analyst:
Overall Company Score (CGS) CGS–8.6 (maximum CGS–10)
Dan Konigsburg Sovereign Credit Rating* BB/Stable/B
London
Component Scores:
Tel. +44 (0) 20 826 3814
Email: Dan_Konigsburg@ Ownership structure and external influence 9.0 (maximum 10)
standardandpoors.com Shareholder rights and stakeholder relations 8.3 (maximum 10)
Revathy Sreedharan Transparency, disclosure & audit 9.2 (maximum 10)
Bangalore
Board structure and effectiveness 8.0 (maximum 10)
Tel. +91 80 558 0899
Executive Summary
Infosys is a large software company, based in Bangalore, India, specializing in customized
software and development solutions. The company provides business consulting, systems
integration, and application development to multinational companies using its proprietary
“Global Delivery Model,” which divides large projects into components that are then
completed in different parts of the world, including India and the US. Infosys clients include
U.S. corporations Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance, VISA, and retailers Nordstrom and
JCPenney, and Japanese companies like Toshiba.
Infosys has used its corporate governance practices and in particular increased transparency,
as a distinguishing competitive feature for several years before its Nasdaq Listing. Given that a
majority of its business is based in the US, Infosys believes that leadership in corporate
governance will inspire confidence among its current and potential customers and employees
both in its home market of India and in Western markets, where it may be less well-known.
The company’s governance policies are more robust than those promoted by India’s domestic
corporate governance codes, even the most recent guidance on audit committees, a SEBI
committee led by Infosys’ own chairman.
For a cash-generative company with no debt on its balance sheet, there would seem to be
little need for a US listing, but the company clearly saw this as an important step to build
brand equity among its US client base, create a currency for acquisitions, and allow the grant
of employee stock options in a US-registered security in order to compete for US-based talent.
*For important information Since its listing, Infosys has decided to comply with all US securities laws, even those that do
on Corporate Governance not apply to it as a company not incorporated in the US. Except for parts of Rule 16(a) of the
Scores, including Country
Securities Exchange Act 1934 (See Section 3.1), Infosys behaves as if it were fully regulated by
Factors, please see the last
page of this report. the SEC, though its corporate law remains, of course, Indian. It submits all SEC filings
electronically through the EDGAR system, including annual and quarterly reports and even S-8
filings about employee stock option awards. It also files each of these reports within 60 days,
even though filing deadlines have until last year been more generous.
Infosys has scored strongly or very strongly in each of Standard & Poor’s four sections of
analysis. Its Ownership Structure is transparent and well disclosed, and there is a strict
separation of ownership from control among the founder/managers of the company. Financial
Stakeholder Relations are also assessed strongly: though shareholders cannot legally vote for
all items by post (see Section 2.1, below) or the internet, ownership rights are strongly
defended, there is a simple share structure, and there are no explicit anti-takeover defenses in
the company’s Articles. Financial Transparency and Information Disclosure is assessed as very
strong: financial and non-financial disclosure is very strong and in some cases Infosys provides
thoughtful disclosure on items that few other companies have pursued; timing and access to
disclosure is very strong given the company’s compliance with the U.S. SEC’s Regulation Fair
Disclosure and its lobbying of the Indian regulators in this area. Board Structure and Process is
assessed as strong given the work that has been put in to date to bring onto the board a large
number of outside directors in a relatively short amount of time. The board is nearing
completion of its transition from an insider-dominated group of directors affiliated with a
founding group to a globally-representative, majority independent body. Although the board is
generally effective and cohesive, a number of aspects continue to develop including the
involvement of non-executives in strategy-setting and the balance between the roles of the
executives and non-executive directors. Compensation for non-executives, while among the
highest in India, risks encountering objections from domestic shareholders while at the same
time risks not being high enough to continue to attract the best-qualified director
Infosys shares are widely held and its shareholding structure is transparent. In addition to
disclosing shareholdings by category, the company’s annual report also discloses a distribution
of shareholdings by size, class and categories of shareholders. Substantial shareholders are
disclosed down to the level of five percent. The largest single shareholder (Mr.Narayana
Murthy and his family) holds 6.7% of Infosys’ shares. Shareholdings of directors are
adequately disclosed.
Standard & Poor’s has seen evidence of a strict separation between ownership and control and
between the roles of founders as owners and as executives. The separation is reflected in the
absence of most personal benefits that would normally accrue to a founding executive (there is
Despite this, there is positive influence from the founders collectively, on everything from the
company’s culture of transparency to its long-term strategy. The extent to which this can be
maintained will depend to some degree on the continuity of current management. Indeed, one
of the few potential areas where influence might be negatively felt is in a change of control, as
there are reasonable questions about what would happen were a bid to be made that did not
coincide with the company’s (and founders’) values. For its part, the company has seized the
earliest opportunity to increase the limit on foreign ownership of its shares to 100 percent,
showing increased openness to a bid (See Section 2.3). Also, Standard and Poor’s assesses as
positive the recent amendment to the company’s Articles that removed protection for Mr.
Murthy’s position as CEO (managing director) providing he held at least five percent of the
company’s equity
There are no explicit anti-takeover provisions in the company’s Articles. The company has Positive
removed from its Articles protections regarding Mr. Murthy’s position that may have been
invoked during a takeover.
Rights attached to Infosys shares are secure and fully transferable. Karvy consultants, who
are reputable independent registrars and share transfer agents in India, are given charge of
shares of the company. The company’s ADR issue is administered by Deutsche Bank.
All ordinary (common) shares are equal; no preference is given to any particular holding.
Owners of ordinary shares have the right to vote, receive dividend payments, and in the case of
liquidation of the company, to receive proportional payment in turn.
Voting rights are laid out by the Companies Act of India, 1956. Shareholders vote on all
major company decisions including the election and removal of directors, appointment of
auditors, dividends, remuneration plans, article amendments, share buyback plans and major
acquisitions and disposals via either ordinary or special resolutions as laid out by the
Companies Act. Shareholders may also put forward shareholder proposals and convene
extraordinary shareholder meetings according to reasonable and well-articulated procedures.
The company has a clearly stated dividend policy of distributing up to 20 percent of profit
after tax, which it has followed. Infosys has been prompt in paying declared dividends. The
company’s Memorandum and Articles of Association do not have any explicit anti-takeover
provisions. The company has removed from its Articles a provision that, if invoked, could have
thwarted an otherwise value-enhancing bid. Section 107 of the company’s charter stated that
Mr. Murthy would not be required to stand for reelection as CEO (managing director)
provided he or his relatives held five percent of the company’s shares.
In line with the Indian Companies Act, a company cannot refuse any share transfer on the
pretext of a takeover threat or a possibility of change in management. Share transfers can,
however, be refused by the company’s board if good reason is given; including if the transferee
is not a desirable person in the context of the overall interest of the company. Any person
whose shareholding exceeds five percent should inform the company and the Securities and
Exchange Board of India (SEBI, the capital market regulator) in writing and must make an
open offer to remaining shareholders if shareholding exceeds 20 percent.
Hence, Infosys can only with great difficulty refuse any take-over attempt by any person
either by law or by provisions in its charter. Infosys has been proactive in this sense and
shareholders approved a management-sponsored resolution at its shareholder meeting in June,
2002, to increase the maximum limit on foreign holdings in the company from 49 to 100
percent, a change that would allow a legitimate takeover to succeed, including one by a foreign
company. Infosys proposed this change within months of India’s amendment of the Foreign
Exchange Management Act (FEMA), which permitted software companies to increase this
limit and made the change despite some opposition from local shareholders concerned about
how it might eventually affect the company’s nationality.
The company has decided not to expense options until consensus is reached among regulators Negative
and competitors in its industry.
Infosys’ high disclosure standards are already widely recognized. The company quite early in
its development adopted a policy of enhanced disclosure to give it a competitive advantage in
developing trust and attracting investors, counterparties and importantly, in its industry,
employees. For Western companies however, devoting the amount of time and money to
disclosure that Infosys does would likely be unsustainable or of questionable use of
shareholders’ funds. To the suggestion that there could be too much disclosure, or a point of
diminishing returns, management strongly disagreed. As long as disclosure continues to be a
competitive advantage for Infosys, we see no reason to differ. It does seem, however, to be of
most use to an emerging market company with a US-centered client base.
Infosys’ annual report and 20-F filing to the American SEC are very comprehensive: disclosure
includes an exhaustive corporate governance review, financial reports in four languages and
reconciliation to eight accounting standards and much else besides. Content is both deep and
broad, allowing shareholders to gain a thorough understanding of the company’s and the
industry’s financial health, business strategy and corporate governance practices.
Infosys discloses the aggregate remuneration paid to each full and part time directors. The
company provides details about related party transactions undertaken during the year (for
example, accounts held in financial institutions where Infosys directors also serve). The
Infosys’ standards of providing timely information to shareholders are very strong and in a
number of cases exceed local and US requirements. The company provides audited quarterly
results to its shareholders within two weeks from the close of each quarter and announces
when it will do so at the beginning of each year (Infosys announced its results for the quarter
Infosys’ auditors are appointed by shareholders on an annual basis, upon the recommendation
of the audit committee and the board of directors as a whole. The audit committee, whose role
has been clearly identified as one of monitoring audit independence, is composed entirely of
independent outside directors, with one exception. Standard & Poor’s saw clear evidence, in
interviews with committee members and in the minutes of the committee, of procedures and
practices that aim to maintain a high quality audit. Several of those who have worked with it
have commented to Standard & Poor’s that the present committee is among the most active
and engaged in India.
KPMG, the outside auditors, are reputable and well known, and the lead partner on the
engagement is a US partner recently relocated to India and fluent in both GAAP standards and
the latest in Sarbanes-Oxley related audit independence requirements. Neither internal nor
statutory auditors provide consulting or other services to Infosys, except for some minor
services provided by KPMG with respect to legal formalities (visa requirements) in countries
where Infosys is in the process of setting up offices. There is limited, specific disclosure about
the nature of these services in public reports.
The external auditors finalize their audit plan each year in consultation with the audit
committee. Quarterly reports are presented to the management for their comments and
responses. The full report is then discussed at a pre-audit committee meeting with the internal
The Infosys board has a clear majority of independent, non-executive members, a separation
of the Chairman and CEO positions, and independent board committees. Directors represent a
diversity of backgrounds and skills and all of the outside directors are judged to be
independent (The newest director was employed by the company’s auditor until one year ago,
but did not work on the Infosys audit). For its part, Infosys, which has adopted a stricter
definition of independence than has heretofore been required of it as a Nasdaq listed company,
discloses that all eight of its non-executives are independent in all material respects.
Given the executive chairman and founder, the board has decided to appoint a lead independent
director to whom other non-executives may approach with concerns. The Chairman is joined on the
board by an additional four executives who are also founders of the company. We also note that
Ms. Rama Bijapurkar, one of Infosys’ non-executive directors, also sits on the board of Crisil, a
local rating agency which assisted Standard & Poor’s with this Corporate Governance Score.
The board is relatively large compared to other global companies, reflecting the company’s desire to
increase the number of outside directors while allowing executive directors to leave by attrition. There
is a desire on the part of current management to maintain a significant executive presence on the board
to, among other reasons, provide incentives to future managers, and has received permission from the
Relationships that external directors have with the company are limited. Positive
An analysis of the current Infosys board shows the results of a transition from an insular board
dominated by its Indian-based founders and other insiders to an outward-looking body with a
majority of outsiders from a variety of backgrounds and geographies. Infosys added its first outside
directors in 1997 and many of its current non-executives have served on the board for less than
three years. As a result, the board is in some ways still digesting its new outside directors.
Standard & Poor’s met with all but four of the directors (and all but one of the non-
executives), and found an active, engaged, and questioning board of directors. Members
appear confident and involved in a wide variety of issues, including those of internal control
and risk management, review of strategy and business development, and management
oversight. Several directors have built deeper access to management, encouraged by the
chairman. Moreover, all directors pointed to the uninhibited nature of board discussions – few
believe there are any topics that could not be raised at board meetings.
With its growing size and diversity, the board has adapted to the need for greater formality
and more explicit procedures at meetings, though directors have carefully balanced this with
innovations such as day-long pre-board meetings and weekend offsites where more
unstructured discussions can take place. Historical ties among the founders may not have
lessened, but these have been balanced by more empowered non-executives .
Many outside members assist the company through unpaid networking or door-opening;
others provide ad-hoc expertise to management in their respective fields. Management also uses
its non-executives to receive more frequent feedback about strategic and other issues.
We also note the unusual role of Mr. Narayana Murthy himself. As the most prominent
founder of Infosys, his resignation from the CEO position to executive chairman and “chief
The approach Infosys has taken to executive pay is rooted in the modest and egalitarian
‘middle class Indian’ values espoused by its founders. While the original seven partners have
become wealthy via their equity stakes (their collective 26.62 percent stake in the company has
a market value of approximately USD 3.2 billion), they have insisted on modest annual salaries
A Corporate Governance Score (‘CGS’) reflects Standard & Poor’s assessment of a company’s corporate
governance practices and policies and the extent to which these serve the interests of the company’s
financial stakeholders, with an emphasis on shareholders’ interests. These governance practices and policies are
measured against Standard & Poor’s corporate governance scoring methodology, which is based on a synthesis
of international codes, governance best practices and guidelines of good governance practice.
Companies with the same score have, in the opinion of Standard & Poor’s, similar company specific governance
processes and practices overall, irrespective of the country of domicile. The scores do not address specific legal,
regulatory and market environments, and the extent to which these support or hinder governance at the company
level, a factor which may affect the overall assessment of the governance risks associated with an individual
company (see below ‘Country Factors’).
CGS 8 and CGS 7—a company that, in Standard & Poor’s opinion, has strong corporate governance
processes and practices overall. A company in these scoring categories has, in Standard & Poor’s opinion,
some weaknesses in certain of the major areas of governance analysis.
CGS 6 and CGS 5—a company that, in Standard & Poor’s opinion, has moderate corporate governance
processes and practices overall. A company in these scoring categories has, in Standard & Poor’s opinion,
weaknesses in several of the major areas of governance analysis.
CGS 4 and CGS 3—a company that, in Standard & Poor’s opinion, has weak corporate governance processes
and practices overall. A company in these scoring categories has, in Standard & Poor’s opinion, significant
weaknesses in a number of the major areas of governance analysis.
CGS 2 and CGS 1—a company that, in Standard & Poor’s opinion, has very weak corporate governance
processes and practices overall. A company in these scoring categories has, in Standard & Poor’s opinion,
significant weaknesses in most of the major areas of analysis.
GovernanceWatch
A ‘GovernanceWatch’ designation may be used to highlight the fact that identifiable governance events and
short-term trends have caused a CGS to be placed on review. GovernanceWatch does not mean that a change to
the CGS is inevitable. GovernanceWatch is not intended to include all CGSs under review, and changes to the
CGS may occur without the CGS having first appeared on GovernanceWatch.
Country Factors
Although Standard & Poor’s publishes country governance analyses from time to time, it is important to note that
Standard & Poor’s does not currently score individual countries. However, consideration of a country’s legal,
regulatory and market environment is an important element in the overall analysis of the risks associated with
the governance practices of an individual company. For example two companies with the same Company Scores,
but domiciled in countries with contrasting legal, regulatory and market standards, present different risk profiles
should their governance practices deteriorate i.e. in the event of deterioration in a specific company’s governance
standards, investors and stakeholders are likely to receive better protection in a country with stronger and better
enforced laws and regulations. However, in Standard & Poor’s opinion, companies with high corporate governance
scores have less governance related risk than companies with low scores, irrespective of the country of domicile.
In the absence of specific country governance scores, the sovereign credit rating can serve in many ways as a proxy.
Important Note
A CGS is based on current information provided to Standard & Poor’s by the company, its officers and any other sources Standard & Poor’s
considers reliable. A CGS is neither an audit nor a forensic investigation of governance practices. Standard & Poor’s may rely on audited
information and other information provided by the company for the purpose of the governance analysis. A CGS is neither a credit rating nor a
recommendation to purchase, sell or hold any interest in a company, as it does not comment on market price or suitability for a particular investor.
Scores may also be changed, suspended or withdrawn as a result of changes in, or unavailability of such information.
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