GAME THEORY

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 GAME THEORY
DISCIPLINE AIMED AT MODELING SITUATIONS

DECISION MAKERS HAVE TO MAKE SPECIFIC

ACTIONS THAT MIGHT HAVE CONFLICTING
CONSEQUENCES

ECONOMICS, POLITICS ,BIOLOGY

TO SOLVE ROUTING AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION

PROBLEMS

DEVICES HAVE TO COPE WITH A LIMITED

TRANSMISSION RESOURCE
PROBLEMS AT VARIOUS PROTOCOL
LAYERS
PROTOCOL LAYERS
UPPER LAYERS
NETWORKING LAYER 1. Forwarder’s Dilemma
2. Joint Packet Forwarding
Problem Game
MEDIUM ACCESS LAYER Medium Access Game
PHYSICAL LAYER Jamming Problem Game
FORWARDER’S DILEMMA

IF PLAYER P1 FORWARDS THE PACKET OF P2,IT COSTS

PLAYER P1 A FIXED COST 0<C<<1

ENABLING COMMUNICATION BETWEEN P2 AND DST2

GIVES P2 A BENEFIT OF 1.

THE PAYOFF IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN COST AND

BENEFIT.
JOINT PACKET FORWARDING PROBLEM

IF BOTH THE PLAYERS FORWARD THE PACKET ,EACH OF

THEM RECEIVES A BENEFIT OF 1
 MULTIPLE ACCESS GAME

TWO PLAYERS TRY TO ACCESS THE COMMON

MEDIUM SIMULTANEOUSLY

BOTH THE PLAYERS ARE IN THE POWER RANGE OF

EACH OTHER

IF PLAYER P1 FORWARDS THE PACKET ALONE , IT

COSTS PLAYER P1 A FIXED COST 0<C<<1 AND A
BENEFIT OF 1

IF P1 AND P2 SEND SIMULTANEOUSLY THEN A

COLLISION OCCURS
 JAMMING GAME

PLAYER P1 WANTS TO FORWARD THE PACKET AND

P2 TRIES TO BLOCK IT

IF THE PLAYER P1 IS ABLE TO AVOID BEING JAMMED

BY THE OTHER PLAYER P1 RECEIVES A PAYOFF OF 1

IF P1 IS UNABLE TO AVOID BEING JAMMED ,HE

RECEIVES A PAYOFF OF -1

THE PAYOFFS ARE OPPOSITE FOR P2

REPRESENTATION OF GAMES

 STATIC GAMES IN STRATEGIC FORM

G = (N,S,U)

P2
F D
P1 F (1-C,1-C) (-C,0)
D (1,-C) (0,0)
SOLUTION TO GAMES
ITERATED DOMINANCE

WEAK DOMINANCE

NASH EQUILIBRIUM

MIXED STRATEGIES

PARETO-OPTIMALITY
ITERATED DOMINANCE
STRICT DOMINANCE

P2
F D
P1 F (1-C,1-C) (-C,0)
D (0,0) (0,0)
ITERATED DOMINANCE
ITERATED STRICT DOMINANCE

P2
F D
P1 F (1-C,1-C) (-C,0)
D (0,0) (0,0)
ITERATED DOMINANCE
ITERATED STRICT DOMINANCE

P2
F D
P1 F (1-C,1-C) (-C,0)
D (0,0) (0,0)
WEAK DOMINANCE
IF PLAYER P1 DROPS THE PACKET, THEN THE MOVE OF PLAYER
P2 IS INDIFFERENT AND THUS WE CANNOT ELMINIATE HIS
STARTEGY D BASED ON STRICT DOMINANCE

TO OVERCOME THE REQUIREMENTS OF STRICT DOMINANCE,WE

USE THE CONCEPT OF WEAK DOMINANCE
NASH EQUILIBRIUM
BEST RESPONSE

IS A STRATEGY PROFILE COMPRISED OF MUTUAL

BEST RESPONSES OF THE PLAYER

P2
W A
P1 W (0,0) (0,1-C)
A (1-C,0) (-C,-C)
MIXED STRATEGIES
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MIXED STRATEGIES AND PURE
STRATEGIES

PLAYERS WANT TO MAXIMIZE THEIR EXPECTED

UTILITY
MIXED STRATEGIES

U1=Q1*(1-Q2)(1-C)-Q1*Q2*C =Q1*(1-Q2-C)

LIKEWISE,U2=Q2*(1-Q1-C)

Best response
MIXED STRATEGIES

P2(jammer)
x y
P1(sender) x (-1,1) (1,-1)
y (1,-1) (-1,1)

Jamming game in strategic form

EFFICIENCY OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND
EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION

 EVERY FINITE STRATEGIC FORM GAME HAS A

MIXED STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIUM

UNIQUE EQUILIBRIUM POINT

THE PRICE OF ANARCHY

EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
PARETO-OPTIMALITY

OBTAINING THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM POINT BY

COMPARING THE STRATEGY PROFILES
 DYNAMIC GAMES
EXTENSIVE FORM WITH PERFECT INFORMATION

BACKWARD INDUCTION

EXTENSIVE FORM WITH IMPERFECT

INFORMATION
EXTENSIVE FORM WITH PERFECT
INFORMATION

The sequential multiple access game in

extensive form
BACKWARD INDUCTION

The backward induction solution of the

sequential multiple access game in extensive
form
EXTENSIVE FORM WITH IMPERFECT
INFORMATION

The original multiple access game in

extensive form
 CONCLUSION

BASIC NOTATIONS FROM NON CO-OPERATIVE

GAME THEORY

WE HAVE MODELED DEVICES AS PLAYER

THERE CAN BE PLAYERS AS PARTICIPANTS

EXAMPLE:-NETWORK OPERATORS
THANK YOU