V At the central government level a vast array of

discretionary powers of the executive remain non-

justiciable. This state of affairs is not conducive to the
vigorous application of the rule of law. I agree this
statement according to few materials which I have
read.
V As an example for this situation,
there is difficulty of distinguishing the different function among
the body consist in separation of powers.

 6hen judges, for example, adjudicate on which rules do or do

not apply in particular cases, they also often end up setting
precedents that in effect constitute new rules.
 Similarly, officials frequently have to create rules in the course of
implementing as given law that in turn come to take on a life of
their own.
 Meanwhile, legislators are inevitable concerned with how the
laws they frame will be interpreted and applied to specific cases.

Thus, each branch of government will find itself engaged in all

three activities to one degree or another. The more complex the
activities of government, the more interrelated they are likely to
become. Therefore, it would said that executive body is not
conducive to the vigorous application of the rule of law.
V Second example for discretionary powers of the
executive remain non-justiciable is when the political
decline of Parliament and the ascendancy of the
Executive, and of the Prime Minister in particular, over
the Parliament has been a familiar theme for so many
decades. The rise of centralized tightly controlled
political parties, the power of the bureaucracy, the
power of Prime Minister to call an election at any time,
and the near powerless state of the Opposition have all
been the subject of a vast literature and need no
repeating.