IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS

COUNTY DEPARTMENT, LAW DIVISION

Clarence E. George, Jr. )

)
Plaintiff, )
)
v ) No.
)
The Catholic Bishop of Chicago, a Corporation )
Sole a/k/a Archdiocese of Chicago, )
)
Defendant. )

COMPLAINT

NOW COMES, Plaintiff, Clarence E. George, Jr., by and through his attorneys, Jeff

Anderson and Associates, P.A., and for his Complaint against The Catholic Bishop of Chicago, a

corporation sole, a/k/a the Archdiocese of Chicago (collectively the "Archdiocese") states as

follows:

PARTIES

l. Clarence E. George, Jr. is and was at all relevant times a resident of Cook County

in the State of Illinois.

2. The Catholic Bishop of Chicago, a corporation sole, is and was at all relevant

times an Illinois corporation. At all times material to the Complaint, the Archdiocese of Chicago

is an ecclesiastical entity of the Roman Catholic Church which includes but is not limited to civil

corporations, decision making entities, officials, and employees authorized to conduct business

and conducting business in the State of Illinois, with its principal place of business in Cook

County, Illinois.

{00083462.DOCX}
 3. The Archdiocese is led by its Archbishop. The Archbishop is the chief operating

officer and ordinary of the Archdiocese and has ultimate authority and responsibility for, and at

all times relevant had complete control over all matters within the Archdiocese, including

employment matters related to priests.

FACTS

4. At all times material, Fr. John P. Smyth was a Roman Catholic priest under the

supervision, employ, agency and/or control of the Archdiocese. Fr. Smyth was at all relevant

times an employee, agent, or apparent agent of the Archdiocese.

5. At all relevant times, the Archdiocese owned, operated andlor controlled

Maryville Academy in Des Plaines, Illinois, which was a residential treatment facility for abused

or neglected children.

6. From approximately 1970 to 2003, at the direction of the Archdiocese, Fr. Smyth

was assigned to and served as the superintendent of Maryville Academy where he had access to

and worked with children as an integral part of his work.

7, In approximately 1995, when he was approximately 5 years old, Clarence was

taken from his abusive and neglectful home and placed into custody as a ward of the State of

Illinois.

8. In approximately 2001, when he was approximately 11 years old, after having

been transferred to several foster homes, group homes, and schools throughout Illinois, Clarence

was placed at Maryville Academy.

9. It was at this time when Clarence came in contact with Fr. Smyth as an agent and

representative of Defendant, and developed great admiration, trust, reverence and respect for

Defendant and its agent, Fr. Smyth.

2
{00083462.DOCX}
 10. Fr. Smyth took advantage of the admiration, trust, reverence and respect that

Clarence had for him and the Roman Catholic Church and sexually abused him on multiple

occasions between approximately 2001 and 2004, when Plaintiff was approximately 11 to 14

years old.

11. Defendant was under an affirmative duty to interfere and intervene when it knew

or reasonably should have known of sexually abusive conduct.

12. Defendant held its leaders and agents out as people of high morals, as possessing

immense power, teaching families and children to obey these leaders and agents, teaching

families and children to respect and revere these leaders and agents, soliciting youth and

families, and holding out the people that worked in its programs as safe.

13. Plaintiff reasonably relied on these representations and Defendant's omissions.

14. Defendant was in a specialized or superior position to receive and did receive

specific information regarding misconduct by its priests that was of critical importance to the

well-being, protection , care and treatment of innocent victims, including Plaintiff.

15. This knowledge was not otherwise readily available to Plaintiff.

16. Defendant exercised its special and superior position to assume control of said

knowledge and any response thereto.

17. Defendant created the misperception in the mind of Plaintiff and those otherwise

responsible for his care and safety that he and other children were safe with priests in general and

with Fr. Smyth in particular.

18. To the contrary, Plaintiff was a victim of a known and preventable hazard that

Defendant created and allowed to continue.

J
t00083462,DOCX)
 19. Further, as a result of the indoctrination, reverence and trust Clarence placed in

Defendant, and as a result of Defendant's silence regarding sexual abuse by its priests including

Fr. Smyth, Plaintiff had no reason to believe that Defendant was aware or involved in facilitating

the criminal sexual behavior and the wide-ranging efforts to conceal that criminal conduct from

him or others.

Defendant's Knowledge of Sexual Abuse and Non-Disclosure of Knowledge

20. At all relevant times in the United States, the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic

Church, including its officials, have had actual knowledge that priests sexually abused children

and have hid the information from its parishioners, students and the public, including Plaintiff.

21. Defendant's top officials have employed a pattern and practice of hiding and not

disclosing facts that sexually abusive priests served in positions with access to children.

22. In each of the years until the date of the filing of this Complaint, Defendant has

misrepresented and underreported the true nature of the problem of sexual abuse of children by

its clerics.

23. Defendant has had and presently has a financial incentive to misrepresent and

withhold the true nature of the scope of this problem, its contribution to and responsibility for the

problem, and the resulting harm to children like Plaintiff.

24. Because of Defendant's special relationship and assumed duty described in

greater detail herein, Defendant had a duty to disclose all that it knew, or reasonably should have

known, about sexual abuse by its priests, including Fr. Smyth.

25. Defendant had a duty to Plaintiff to warn them about the problem of sexual abuse

by its priests, and had a similar duty not to downplay, underreport, or otherwise misinfonn or

withhold facts regarding those issues to Plaintiff.

4
{00083462.DOCX}
 26. The failure of Defendant to take action regarding Fr. Smyth's sexual abuse of

Plaintiff is consistent with its practice of failing to respond to reports of sexual misconduct and

abuse.

Abuse of Clarence George

27. At first, Clarence was happy to have been placed at Maryville Academy, which

allowed him be involved in golf, basketball, and field trips.

28. Fr. Smyth made himself available as the touchstone for youth residents, including

Clarence, to voice their concerns about any issues they had with the program.

29. On multiple occasions, Clarence communicated issues he had with the program to

Fr. Smyth, including issues Clarence had in connection with certain privileges that had been

taken from him.

30. During these encounters, Clarence received candy or small amounts of money

from Fr. Smyth in exchange for his input.

31. Plaintiff revered and trusted Fr. Smyth as a priest and authority figure at

Maryville, and a male role model.

32. Approximately seven months after having been placed at Maryville Academy, Fr.

Smyth began taking advantage of that trust and began sexually abusing Plaintiff.

33. Residents at Maryville Academy requiring medical treatment would report to the

nurse's cottage to be transported off site for medical treatment.

34. On multiple occasions, while waiting for medical transport, Fr. Smyth brought

Clarence upstairs to a room at Maryville Academy where he sexually abused Clarence.

35. After the first instance of abuse, Clarence disclosed the abuse to an agent of

Defendant and was not believed.

5
{00083462.DOCX}
 36. This allowed the abuse to continue and escalate.

37. The incidents of sexual molestation alleged in this Complaint occurred on

property owned by, operated by, or under the control of Defendant.

38. The instances of abuse correlated with Clarence being granted certain privileges

at Maryville Academy, including being granted certain phone privileges and permission to leave

the Maryville Academy premises to visit his family.

39. On information and belief, Fr. Smyth abused other children before, during the

same timeframe as, and after he abused Clarence George. Fr. Smyth's abuse of children at

Maryville Academy continued until he was removed from Maryville Academy in 2004 after a

resident's suicide and allegations of abuse among residents.

40. Before Plaintiff was first sexually abused by Fr. Smyth, Defendant had actual

and/or constructive knowledge of material facts regarding Fr. Smyth's inappropriate and sexually

abusive behavior, but failed to act on that knowledge to protect children, including Clarence

George.

4I. As a direct result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiff was sexually abused by Smyth

and has suffered and will continue to suffer great pain of mind and body, severe and permanent

emotional distress, physical manifestations of emotional distress, embarrassment, loss of self-

esteem, humiliation and psychological injuries, was prevented and will continue to be prevented

from performing his normal daily activities and obtaining the full enjoyment of life, has and/or

will incur expenses for medical and psychological treatment, therapy and counseling.

6
{00083462.DOCX}
 COUNT I: NEGLIGENCS
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND) 8324(A)

Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs I through 4l of Complaint as if fully set forth under this

count and further alleges that:

42. Section 324(A) of the Restatement Second of Torts provides:

"One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services

to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a
third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person or his
things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting
from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking ifi

(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of harm, or

(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third
person; or

(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person
upon the undertaking. Restatement (Second) of Torts $ 324(,4.) (1965).

43. Defendant accepted minor parishioners, held Maryville Academy out as a safe

place for children, and held Fr. Smyth out as a fit priest.

44. Defendant agreed to and did undertake to provide for the supervision, care and

physical safety of children at and upon the premises of Maryville Academy, including Plaintiff.

45. Defendant had a duty of reasonable care because it solicited youth to reside and

attend programs at Maryville Academy; solicited participation in its youth programs; encouraged

youth participate in its progftrms; undertook custody of minor children, including Plaintiff;
promoted its facilities, schools and programs as being safe for children; held its agents, including

Fr. Smyth, out as safe to work with children; encouraged parents and children to spend time with

its agents; and encouraged its agents, including Fr. Smyth, to spend time with, interact with, and

recruit children.

7
{ooo83462.Docx}
 46. As alleged above, Defendant, by and through its agents, servants and employees,

knew or should reasonably have known:

a. of Fr. Smyth's dangerous and exploitative propensities as a child molester;

b. that some of the leaders and people working at Catholic institutions were not safe;

c. that they did not have sufficient information about whether or not its leaders and
people working at Catholic institutions, including Maryville Academy, were safe;

d. there was a risk of child sex abuse to children participating in Catholic programs
and activities, including Maryville Academy;

e. that it did not have sufficient information about whether or not there was a risk of
child sex abuse for children participating in Catholic programs and activities,
including Maryville Academy;

f. that they had numerous agents who had sexually molested children;

g. that child molesters have a high rate of recidivism; and

h. that there was a specific danger of child sex abuse to children participating in its
youth programs, including Plaintiff.

47. At all relevant times, Defendant owed a duty of reasonable care to Plaintiff to

protect Plaintiff from physical harm, including inappropriate sexual contact and abuse by Fr.

Smyth.

48. Defendant failed to exercise reasonable care to protect Plaintiff from such harm

and breached its duties to Plaintiff by unreasonably:

a. failing to recognize, identify, and/or intervene when faced with open and obvious
indications of child sexual abuse;

b. failing to warn Plaintiff and others of the risk that Fr. Smyth posed and the risks
ofchild sexual abuse by clerics;

8
{00083462.DOCX}
 c. failed to warn them about any of the knowledge that Defendant had about child
sex abuse;

d. actively maintaining and employing Fr. Smyth in a position of power, authority,

and control through which Fr. Smyth had access to children, including Plaintiff;
and

e. creating a dangerous condition by continuing to employ and hold Fr. Smyth out as
safe.

49. Defendant further failed to exercise reasonable care to protect Plaintiff from such

harm and breached its duties to Plaintiff by its unreasonable failure to: have sufficient policies

and procedures to prevent child sex abuse; properly implement the policies and procedures to

prevent child sex abuse; take reasonable measures to make sure that the policies and procedures

to prevent child sex abuse were working; adequately inform families and children of the risks of

child sex abuse; investigate risks of child molestation; properly train the workers at institutions

and programs within Defendant's geographical confines and/or control; have any outside agency

test its safety procedures; protect children in its programs from sexual abuse; adhere to the

applicable standard of care for child safety; investigate the amount and type of information

necessary to represent the institutions, programs, leaders and people as safe; train its employees

properly to identify signs of child molestation; by relying on people who claimed that they could

treat child molesters, and properly reporting child abuse.

50. Defendant failed to use reasonable care in determining whether its facilities were

safe and/or whether they had sufficient information to represent its facilities as safe. Defendant's

failures include, but are not limited to: failure to have sufficient policies and procedures to

prevent abuse at its facilities; failure to investigate risks at its facilities; failure to properly train

the workers at its facilities; failure to have any outside agency test its safety procedures; failure

to investigate the amount and type of information necessary to represent its facilities as safe;

9
{00083462.DOCX}
failure to train its employees properly to identify signs of child molestation by fellow employees;

failure by relying upon mental health professionals; and/or failure by relying upon people who

claimed they could treat child molesters.

51. The foregoing failures and breaches increased the risk of harm to Plaintiff.

52. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's nonfeasance and malfeasance as

set forth above, in conjunction with Plaintiffs detrimental reliance upon Defendant's
undertaking, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer great pain of mind and body, severe

and permanent emotional distress, physical manifestations of emotional distress, embarrassment,

loss of self-esteem, humiliation, physical, personal and psychological injuries. Plaintiff was

prevented, and will continue to be prevented, from performing normal daily activities and

obtaining the full enjoyment of life, and/or has incurred and will continue to incur expenses for

psychological treatment, therapy, and counseling, and, on information and belief has and/or will

incur loss of income and/or loss of eaming capacity.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Clarence George, requests that judgment be entered in favor of

the Plaintiff and against Defendant in an amount in excess of the jurisdictional limits of this

Court and such other relief as this Court deems just and equitable.

COUNT II: NEGLIGENCE

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND) S314A(4)

Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 52 of this Complaint as if fully set forth under

this count and further alleges that:

53. Section 314(A) of the Restatement Second of Torts imposes a duty to protect

against unreasonable risks of physical harm when certain special relationships exist, including

that of a voluntary custodian and ward. Restatement (Second) of Torts $ 324(4) (1965).

10
{00083462.DOCX}
 54. Defendant accepted minor parishioners, held its institutions, including Maryville

Academy, out as a safe place for children, and held Fr. Smyth out as a fit priest.

55. While Plaintiff was a resident at Maryville Academy, Defendant undertook

custody of Plaintiff and had exclusive custody and control of Plaintiff, so as to deprive those

previously responsible for Plaintiffs protection of its normal opportunities for protection of

Plaintiff, including, without limitation, the deprivation of its normal opportunity to protect

Plaintiff from the sexual abuse of a predator or pedophile.

56. By accepting custody of Plaintiff, Defendant had a special relationship with

Plaintiff.

57. While residing at Maryville Academy, Defendant had exclusive custody of

Plaintiff and by reason of the custodial relationship established between Plaintiff and Defendant,

had a duty to protect Plaintiff from foreseeable risks of harm.

58. As detailed more specifically above, Defendant, by and through its agents,

servants and employees, had superior knowledge about the risk that Fr. Smyth posed to Plaintiff,

the risk of abuse in general in its programs, and the risks that its facilities posed to minor

children, and as such, were in the best position to protect Plaintiff against the risk of harm

presented by Fr. Smyth.

59. As alleged above, Defendant, by and through its agents, servants and employees,

knew or should reasonably have known:

a. of Fr. Smyth's dangerous and exploitative propensities as a child molester;

b. that some of the leaders and people working at Catholic institutions were not safe;

11
{00083462,DOCX}
 c. that they did not have sufficient information about whether or not its leaders and
people working at Catholic institutions, including Maryville Academy, were safe;

d. there was a risk of child sex abuse to children participating in Catholic programs
and activities, including Maryville Academy;

e. that it did not have sufficient information about whether or not there was a risk of
child sex abuse for children participating in Catholic programs and activities,
including Maryville Academy;

f. that they had numerous agents who had sexually molested children;

g. that child molesters have a high rate of recidivism; and

h. that there was a specific danger of child sex abuse to children participating in its
youth programs.

60. As such, Defendant, by and through its agents, servants and employees, knew or

should reasonably have known of the foreseeable risk that Fr. Smyth would sexually abuse

children, including Plaintiff.

61. This created an affirmative duty on the part of Defendant to protect Plaintiff from

being sexually abused by Fr. Smyth.

62. Defendant breached this duty when it unreasonably:

a. failed to recognize, identiff, and/or intervene when faced with open and obvious
indications of child sexual abuse;

b. failed to warn Plaintiff of the risk that Fr. Smyth posed and the risks of child
sexual abuse by clerics;

c. failed to warn them about any of the knowledge that Defendant had about child
sex abuse;

d. actively maintained and employed Fr. Smyth in a position of power, authority,

and control through which Fr. Smyth had access to children, including Plaintiff;

e. created a dangerous condition by continuing to employ Fr. Smyth; and

l2
{00083462.oOCX}
 f. Failing to respond to and report claims of abuse.

63. Defendant further breached this duty by its unreasonable failure to: have

sufficient policies and procedures to prevent child sex abuse; properly implement the policies

and procedures to prevent child sex abuse; take reasonable measures to make sure that the
policies and procedures to prevent child sex abuse were working; adequately inform families and

children of the risks of child sex abuse; investigate risks of child molestation; properly train the

workers at institutions and progftrms within Defendant's geographical confines; have any outside

agency test its safety procedures; protect children in its programs from sexual abuse; adhere to

the applicable standard of care for child safety; investigate the amount and type of information

necessary to represent the institutions, programs, leaders and people as safe; train its employees

properly to identify signs of child molestation by fellow employees; and by relying on people

who claimed that they could treat child molesters.

64. Defendant further breached its duties to Plaintiff by failing to use reasonable care

in determining whether its facilities were safe andlor whether they had sufficient information to

represent its facilities as safe. Defendant's failures include, but are not limited to: failure to have

sufficient policies and procedures to prevent abuse at its facilities; failure to investigate risks at

its facilities; failure to properly train the workers at its facilities; failure to have any outside

agency test its safety procedures; failure to investigate the amount and type of information

necessary to represent its facilities as safe; failure to train its employees properly to identify signs

of child molestation by fellow employees; failure by relying upon mental health professionals;

and/or failure by relying upon people who claimed they could treat child molesters.

65. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's breach of its duties to Plaintiff,

Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer great pain of mind and body, severe and permanent

13
{00083462,DOCX}
emotional distress, physical manifestations of emotional distress, embarrassment, loss of self-

esteem, humiliation, physical, personal and psychological injuries. Plaintiff was prevented, and

will continue to be prevented, from performing normal daily activities and obtaining the full

enjoyment of life, and/or has incurred and will continue to incur expenses for psychological

treatment, therapy, and counseling, and, on information and belief has and/or will incur loss of

income and/or loss of earning capacity.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Clarence George, demands judgment against Defendant in an

amount in excess of the jurisdictional limits of this Court, and any other such relief as the Court

deems just and equitable.

CQUNT III: NEGLIGENCE REGARDING ACTIONS

oursrpE IHE scgPE pT,4MPLOYMENT
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND) S317

Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 65 of this Complaint as if fully set forth under

this count and further alleges that:

66. It was the duty of Defendant, through the acts of its employees and agents, to

exercise reasonable care for the protection and benefit of minor children, including Plaintiff.

67. In the alternative, the actions of Fr. Smyth described above were outside the scope

of Fr. Smyth's employment with Defendant, but were such acts for which Defendant has legal

responsibility.

68. Section 317 of the Restatement Second of Torts provides that an employer is

under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control his employee while the employee is acting

outside the scope of his employment in order to prevent his employee from harming others if: a)

the employee is on the employer's premises or using a chattel of the employer; and (b) the

T4
{00083462.DOCX}
employer knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his employee, and knows

or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising control over the employee.

Restatement (Second) of Torts $ 317(1965).

69. Defendant, as his master, also had a duty to use reasonable care to supervise and

control Fr. Smyth, its servant, so as not to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to others,

including specifically minor children such as Plaintiff.

70. Fr. Smyth was on the premises of Maryville Academy at the direction of

Defendant, and Defendant knew that it had the ability to control Fr. Smyth, and that he was or

was likely to have access to minors to which he had and was given access by Defendant.

7I. Fr. Smyth used premises owned by, operated by, and under the control of

Defendant, and the instruments of his employment as a priest granted to him by Defendant,

including his status, authority, and influence as a priest, to access and abuse Plaintiff.

72. As stated above, Defendant, by and through its agents, servants and employees,

knew or should reasonably have known of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such

control, as it knew or should reasonably have known:

a. of Fr. Smyth's dangerous and exploitative propensities as a child molester and

particular unfitness;

b. that some of the leaders and people working at Catholic institutions were not safe;

c. that they did not have sufficient information about whether or not its leaders and
people working at Catholic institutions, including Maryville Academy, were safe;

d. there was a risk of child sex abuse to children participating in Catholic programs
and activities, including Maryville Academy;

t5
{00083462.DOCX}
 e. that it did not have sufficient information about whether or not there was a risk of
child sex abuse for children participating in Catholic programs, including
Maryville Academy;

f. that it had numerous agents who had sexually molested children;

g. that child molesters have a high rate of recidivism;

h. that there was a specific danger of child sex abuse to children participating in its
youth programs; and

that allowing sexually abusive priests, including Fr. Smyth to be in remote or

private locations outside the presence of other adults, and allowing sexually
abusive priests unfettered access to children created a risk of harm to those
children.

73. Such harm occurred in the form of sexual abuse of Plaintiff by a priest of
Defendant that was neither supervised nor controlled for such wrongful conduct.

74. Defendant breached of its duties to Plaintiff by its: failure to have suffrcient

policies and procedures to prevent child sex abuse, failure to properly implement the policies and

procedures to prevent child sex abuse, failure to take reasonable measures to make sure that the

policies and procedures to prevent child sex abuse were working, failure to adequately inform

families and children of the risks of child sex abuse, failure to investigate risks of child
molestation, failure to properly train the workers at institutions and programs within Defendant's

geographical confines, failure to have any outside agency test its safety procedures, failure to

protect children in its programs from sexual abuse, failure to adhere to the applicable standard of

care for child safety, failure to investigate the amount and type of information necessary to

represent the institutions, programs, leaders and people as safe, failure to train its employees

properly to identify signs of child molestation by fellow employees, failure by relying upon

T6
{00083462.DOCX}
mental health professionals, and failure by relying on people who claimed that they could treat

child molesters.

75. Defendant failed to use reasonable care in determining whether its facilities were

safe and/or whether it had sufficient information to represent its facilities as safe. Defendant's

failures include, but are not limited to: failure to have sufficient policies and procedures to

prevent abuse at its facilities, failure to investigate risks at its facilities, failure to properly train

the workers at its facilities, failure to have any outside agency test its safety procedures, failure to

investigate the amount and type of information necessary to represent its facilities as safe, failure

to train its employees properly to identify signs of child molestation by fellow employees, failure

by relying upon mental health professionals, and/or failure by relying upon people who claimed

they could treat child molesters.

76. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's breach of its duties to Plaintiff,

Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer great pain of mind and body, severe and permanent

emotional distress, physical manifestations of emotional distress, embarrassment, loss of self-

esteem, humiliation, physical, personal and psychological injuries. Plaintiff was prevented, and

will continue to be prevented, from performing normal daily activities and obtaining the full

enjoyment of life, andlor has incurred and will continue to incur expenses for psychological

treatment, therapy, and counseling, and, on information and belief has and/or will incur loss of

income and/or loss of earning capacity.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Clarence George, demands judgment against Defendant in an

amount in excess of the jurisdictional limits of this Court, and any other such relief as the Court

deems just and equitable.

l7
{00083462.DOCX}
 JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff demands a jury trial.

Respectfully Submitted,

Jefhey R. Anderson
JEFF ANDERSON & ASSOCIATES, P.A.
366 Jackson St., Ste. 100
St. Paul, MN 55101
(6st)227-ee90
Firm ID No. 58733

l8
{00083462.DOCX}