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CRUZ v. PARAS
123 SCRA 569 (1983)
Nature: Petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to review decision of
Bulacan CFI
 Petitioners had been previously issued licenses for their night clubs by the
Municipal Mayor of Bocaue Bulacan.
 Then Ordinance no. 84, Series of 1975 [Prohibition and Closure Ordinance] took
effect in Bocaue, Bulacan which provided that no operator of night clubs,
cabarets or dance halls shall henceforth be issued permits/licenses to operate
within the jurisdiction of the municipality and no license/permit shall be issued to
any professional hostess, hospitality girls and professional dancer for
employment in any of the aforementioned establishments. The prohibition also
included prohibition in the renewal thereof. (Sec. 3)
 It further provided for the revocation of permits and licenses upon the expiration
of the 30-day period and that the operation of such establishments within the
jurisdiction of the municipality shall then on be illegal (Sec. 4)
 Petitioners thus filed in the Bulacan CFI for prohibition with preliminary injunction
on the grounds that:
o Ordinance No. 84 is null and void as a municipality has no authority to
prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling.
o Ordinance No. 84 is violative of the petitioners' right to due process and the
equal protection of the law, as the license previously given to petitioners was
in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing.
o That under P.D. No. 189, as amended, by P.D. No. 259, the power to license
and regulate tourist-oriented businesses including night clubs, has been
transferred to the Department of Tourism.
 Lower court upheld constitutionality and validity of Ordinance 84 and dismissed
case.
Issue: WON a municipal corporation (Bocaue, Bulacan as represented by Municipal
Mayor Matias Ramirez and Municipal Vice-Mayor Mario Mendoza) can prohibit the
exercise of a lawful trade, operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful
occupation, such clubs employing hostesses.
 NO. The reliance on the police power of the lower court is insufficient to justify
the enactment of the assailed ordinance. It must be declared null and void.
 Police power is granted to municipal corporations by Sec. 2238, Revised Admin
Code (practically a reproduction of the former Sec. 39 of Municipal Code)
 U.S. v. Abendan, Moreland as ponente: An ordinance enacted by virtue thereof is
valid, unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or an
Act of the Philippine Legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is
unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of common
right. Where the power to legislate upon a given subject, and the mode of its
exercise and the details of such legislation are not prescribed, the ordinance
passed pursuant thereto must be a reasonable exercise of the power, or it will be
pronounced invalid.
 U.S. v. Salaveria, Malcolm as ponente: (applying present Admin Code provision)
It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found
in the general welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general
powers and purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or
policy of the State.
 If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the
assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. In the two leading cases above
set forth, this Court had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general
powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the
laws or policy of the State.
 It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue
could qualify under the term reasonable as objective of fostering public morals
can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field such as
reasonable restrictions as opposed to absolute prohibition.
 Furthermore, this case refers to R.A. 938 which was originally entitled: “an act
granting municipal or city boards and councils the power to regulate the
establishment, maintenance and operation of certain places of amusement within
their respective territorial jurisdictions.”
 This act gives the municipal or city board or council of each chartered city the
power to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation
of night clubs, cabarets, and other similar places of amusement within its
territorial jurisdiction. Then the 1st section was amended to include not merely
"the power to regulate, but likewise "Prohibit ... "
 The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938. The
power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition. There is thus support
for the view advanced by petitioners that to construe RA 938 as allowing the
prohibition of the operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional
question.
 The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof. " (Art. VIII, Sec. 19, par. 1).
 Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not
prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the
Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited.
 There is reinforcement to the conclusion reached by virtue of a specific provision
of the recently-enacted Local Government Code whose general welfare clause
clearly provides that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of
night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their
business.
 Respondents cited Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v.
City Mayor of Manila. However, in that case, it imposed a regulatory measure.
Necessarily, there was no valid objection on due process or equal protection
grounds. It did not prohibit motels. It merely regulated the mode in which it may
conduct business in order precisely to put an end to practices which could
encourage vice and immorality.
Held: writ of certiorari is granted and the decision of the lower court reversed, set
aside, and nulled. Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975 of the Municipality of Bocaue is
declared void and unconstitutional.
MBARA LIDASAN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Facts:
On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as
Republic Act 4790, now in dispute. The body of the statute reads:
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“SECTION 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-
bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan,
Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain,
Matimos and Magolatung, in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan,
Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated from said municipalities and
constituted into a distinct and independent municipality of the same
province to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del
Sur. The seat of government of the municipality shall be in Togaig.
SEC. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new municipality
shall be elected in the nineteen hundred sixty-seven general elections for
local officials.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the
municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong,
Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, and
Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality
of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.
Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its resolution of August 15,
1967, indicating that pursuant to R.A. 4790, twelve barrios - in two
municipalities in the province of Cotabato - are transferred to the province
of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two
provinces.
Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the President,
through the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the
operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."
Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation,
declared that the statute "should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional
by 'the Supreme Court."
This triggered the present original action for certiorari and prohibition by Bara
Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a
qualified voter for the 1967 elections. He prays that Republic Act 4790 be declared
unconstitutional; and that Comelec's resolutions of August 15, 1967 and September
20, 1967 implementing the same for electoral purposes, be nullified.
Issues:
1. WON Republic Act 4790 is null and void for embracing more than one
subject in a bill.
2. WON Republic Act 4790 may still be salvaged with reference to the nine
barrios in the municipalities of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, with
the mere nullification of the portion thereof which took away the twelve
barrios in the municipalities of Buldon and Parang in the other province of
Cotabato.
3. WON petitioner has substantial interest affected by the implementation of
RA 4790.
Ratio/Holding: Republic Act 4790 is null and void. Respondent Commission is
prohibited from implementing the same for electoral purposes.
1. Yes.
Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement aforestated, that " [n]o bill
which in ay be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill. It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the
constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First.
Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous
subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to
notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single
subject thereof.
Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be
"expressed in the title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes
the spirit of command." Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the
Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its
deliberations the entire text of the bill.
In order to ascertain whether or not the title of a statute conforms with the
constitutional requirement, the following, may be taken as guidelines:
"The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and,
while technical accuracy is not essential, arid the subject need not be
stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set
forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would
not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its
contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one
subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in
omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act,
is bad. In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather
than its form should be considered, and the purpose of the constitutional
requirement, of giving, notice to all persons interested, should be kept in
mind by the court.”
The title - "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao
del Sur" 8 - projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is
affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that
communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this
new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur,"
read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive.
For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in
one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one
barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur;
and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities, in Cotabato, a province different from
Lanao del Sur.
The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive.
Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of
the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in
Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is
being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent
Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns
and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures
which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.
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Respondent's stance is that the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting
in "the substantial diminution of the territorial limits" of Cotabato province is
"merely the incidental legal results of the definition of the boundary" of the
municipality of Dianaton and that, therefore, reference to the fact that portions in
Cotabato are taken away "need not be expressed in-the title of the law." This
posture - we must say - but emphasizes the error of constitutional
dimensions in writing down the title of the bill. Transfer of a sizeable
portion of territory from one province to another of necessity involves
reduction of area, population and income of the first and the corresponding
increase of those of the other. This is as important as the creation of a
municipality. And yet, the title did not reflect this fact.
Felwa vs. Salas is not a case in focus. For there, the title of the Act (Republic Act
4695) reads: "An Act Creating the Provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao,
and Kalinga-Apayao." That title was assailed as unconstitutional upon the averment
that the provisions of the law (Section 8 thereof) in reference to the elective officials
of the provinces thus created, were not set forth in the title of the bill. We there
ruled that this pretense is devoid of merit "for, surely, an Act creating said
provinces must be expected to provide for the officers who shall run the affairs
thereof" - which is "manifestly germane to the subject" of the legislation, as set
forth in its title. The statute now before us stands altogether on a different
footing. The lumping together of barrios in adjacent but separate provinces
under one statute is neither a natural nor logical consequence of the
creation of the new municipality of Dianaton. A change of boundaries' of
the two provinces may be made without necessarily creating a new
municipality and vice versa.
In Hume vs. Village of Fruitport, the statute in controversy bears the title "An Act to
Incorporate the Village of Fruitport, in the County of Muskegon.The statute,
however, goes beyond the restriction and its title was therefore described as
“erroneous in the worst degree, for it is misleading." Similar statutes aimed at
changing boundaries of political subdivisions, which legislative purpose is not
expressed in the title, were likewise declared unconstitutional. 10
2. No.
We are not unmindful of the rule, that where a portion of a statute is rendered
unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will be separated, and the
constitutional portion upheld. Black, however, gives the exception to this rule, thus:
" . . . But when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and
connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations
for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as
a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature
would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are
unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional,
or connected, must fall with them." In substantially similar language, the
same exception is recognized in the jurisprudence of this Court, thus:
"The general rule is that where part of the statute is void, as repugnant to
the Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable
from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, the
valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair
to presume that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they had
supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. . . . Enough
must remain to make a complete. intelligible, and valid statute, which
carries out the legislative intent. . . , The language used in the invalid part
of the statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever,
and what remains must express the legislative will independently of the
void part, since the court has no power to legislate ... “
Could we indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended, by the Act, to
create the restricted area of nine barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan in
Lanao del Sur into the town of Dianaton, if the twelvve barrios in the towns of
Buldon and Parang, Cotabato, were to be excluded therefrom? The answer must
be in the negative.
Republic Act 4790 to read a Dianaton town of nine instead of the originally intended
twenty-one barrios. Really, if these nine barrios are to constitute a town at all,
it is the function of Congress, not of this Court, to spell out that
congressional will. Republic Act 4790 is thus inseparable, and it is
accordingly null and void in its totality.
3. Here, the validity of a statute is challenged on the ground that it violates the
constitutional requirement that the subject of the bill be expressed in its title.
Capacity to sue, therefore, hinges on whether petitioner's substantial
rights or interests are impaired by lack of notification in the title that the
barrio in Parang, Cotabato, where he is residing has been transferred to a
different provincial hegemony. The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of
a community affected by legislation creating a town to ascertain that the law so
created is not dismembering his place of residence "in accordance with the
Constitution" is recognized in this jurisdiction.
Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in the 1967 elections His right to
vote in his own barrio before it was annexed to a new town is affected. Since by
constitutional direction the purpose of a bill must be shown in its title for the
benefit, amongst others, of the community affected thereby, it stands to reason to
say that when the constitutional right to vote on the part of any citizen of
that community is affected, he may become a suitor to challenge the
constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.
Guingona vs. Carague
PETITIONERS: Teofisto Guingona, Jr. and Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., members of the
Senate
RESPONDENTS: Guillermo Carague, Secretary of Dept. of Budget and
Management; Rozalina Cajucom, National Treasurer; and
Commission on Audit
FACTS:
 The 1990 budget totals
P233.5B
 It consists of
1. P155.3B appropriated by Congress under RA6831 (General
Appropriations Act of 1990 or GAA 1990), of which 27B will go to
DECS, the highest among all departments; and
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2. P98.4B in automatic appropriations (P86B for debt
servicing) pursuant to:
a. PD81 (which amends RA4860, Foreign Borrowing
Act),
b. PD1177 (entitled “Revising the Budget Process in
Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the
New Society), and
c. PD1967 (“An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and
Payment Positions of the Rep. of the Phil. On Its Contingent
Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by
Appropriating Funds for the Purpose”)
 Petitioners, are seeking:
1. the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree Nos. 81,
1177 (Section 31) and 1967; and
2. the restraining of the disbursement for the debt service under the 1990
budget under said decrees (i.e. the P86B automatic appropriations).
 They are basing their petition on 3 grounds:
1. By appropriating more funds for debt servicing (P86B)
than for education (P27B), such appropriations are violative of Section 5,
Article 14 of the Constitution.
2. PDs 81, 1177 and 1967 are no longer operative under
the present Constitution (1987)
3. Such PDs violate Section 29(1), Article 6 of the
Constitution, which states that “no money shall be paid out of the National
Treasury except in pursuance to an appropriation made by law.”
PROCEDURAL ISSUES:
1. Locus Standi – as Senators, they may raise the issue of unconstitutionality
− as taxpayers, they have personal interest in restraining unlawful
expenditure of public funds
2. Justiciability – in Gonzales vs. Macaraig, Jr., which involves the
constitutionality of the presidential veto of certain provisions of
GAA 1990, the Court held that the political doctrine interposes
no obstacle to the judicial determination of rival claims under
the Constitution.
− With the Senate maintaining that the
President’s veto is unconstitutional, and that the charge being
controverted, there is an actual case or justiciable controversy
between the Upper House of Congress and the Executive that
may be taken cognizance of by the SC
ISSUES:
I. W/N the P86B debt servicing appropriation is violative of Section 5,
Article 14 of the Constitution and, therefore, invalid.
NO. The fact the DECS appropriation is the highest budgetary appropriation
among all department budgets is a clear and sufficient compliance with
the constitutional mandate according highest priority to education.
 The Constitution mandates the assignment of highest budgetary
priority to education in order to insure that teaching will attract and retain its
rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration
and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment
 However, this does not mean that Congress is so hamstrung that it is
deprived of the power to respond to the imperatives of national interest and
for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.
 Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good
judgment, to provide an appropriation that can reasonably service our
enormous debt
 It is a matter of:
1. honor
2. protecting our credit standing
3. the very survival of our economy
II. W/N PD81, PD1177 and PD1967 are still operative under the
Constitution.
YES. Section 3, Article 18 of the Constitution recognizes that all existing
decrees not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative
under amended, repealed or revoked. Implied repeal and revocation
is frowned upon.
 PD 81 amends RA 4860, which authorizes the president to obtain
foreign loans and credits and appropriates the necessary funds therefore, by
providing that funds are hereby appropriated from the National
Treasury to cover any deficiency for debt servicing
 PD1177 provides for the automatic appropriations for
expenditures for, inter alia, principal and interests on public debt
 PD1967 provides that “there is hereby appropriated, out of
any funds in the National Treasury, such amounts as may be
necessary to effect payments on foreign or domestic loans
 Their purpose is to enable the government to make prompt
payment and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain the credit
standing of the country
 Petitioners allege that said decrees became functus officio when
Pres. Marcos was ousted because, with the expiration of the one-man
legislature, the legislative power was restored to Congress and that new
legislation for automatic appropriations must come from Congress.
 The SC held that it could not have been the intention of the
framers of the Constitution to require all existing laws to pass through
Congress again
 The requirement of Sections 24 and 27, which requires
appropriations and bills to originate from the House of Representatives and
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be approved by the President, applies only to bills that are still to be passed
by Congress
 This is all the more true because of the “political wisdom” of
automatic appropriations, which is to provide flexibility to the government for
effective execution of debt management policies.
III. W/N they are unconstitutional by violating Sections 24 and 29(1),
Article 6 of the Constitution
or
W/N under the said PDs there is undue delegation of legislative power
NO. If the delegation of the authority to execute the legislative intent satisfies
the test of completeness, then there is a valid delegation. The
legislature does not abdicate its function when it describes what job
must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.
 In Edu vs. Ericta, the SC said that “to avoid the taint of unlawful
delegation, there must be a standard that implies, at the very least, that
the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down
fundamental policy… the standard may be either express or implied from
the policy and purpose.”
 The SC found that, in this case, the questioned laws are complete in all
their essential terms and conditions and sufficient standards are indicated
therein.
 Although the decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid,
necessitated by the very nature of the problem being addressed, the
amounts nevertheless are made certain by the legislative parameters
provided in the decrees
 The Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be
disbursed
 The mandate is only to pay the principal, interest, taxes, and other
normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness… No
uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be the exact
amounts as shown by the books of the Treasury
 Section 29(1), Article 6 merely states that appropriation should be
made by law
 It does not provide or prescribe any particular form of words or
religious recitals in which authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be
made, except that it be done “by law”
 This is precisely what the decrees did, it made appropriations by law
Tolentino vs. Sec. Of Finance
Bolinao Electronics Corp v. Valencia (1964)
Original Petition for prohibition, mandatory injunction w/ preliminary injunction
FACTS:
The Sec of Public Works & Communications and the Acting Chief of the Radio
Control Division have instigated an investigation against petitioners who are the
owners and operators of radio and tv stations namely: (1) Bolinao Electronics Corp,
(2) Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc. and (3) Monserrat Broadcasting System,
Inc. RP, as operator of the Phil Broadcasting Service (PBS), later intervened in the
case having been granted a construction permit to install and operate a tv station in
Mla.
Although it is a valid exercise of the power vested in the Sec by virtue of Act 3846,
petitioners still question the purpose of the dept’s investigation. It is assailed that
although the Sec may approve or disapprove any application for renewal of station
or operator license, the said investigation has no legal basis because the dept’s
purpose for doing so was not in connection w/ the application for renewal of license.
The dept stated its purpose for the investigation was in relation only to the late
filing1 of the applications for renewal. However, the dept itself, through a circular,
condoned such act if the named radio and tv stations took the necessary steps to
correct their practices. Therefore, the issue being resolved, the violation ceased to
exist and hence, there is no more reason nor need for the present investigation.
Next issue raised by the petitioners is WON there was abandonment or
renunciation by petitioner CBN of its right to operate on Channel 9. It was
admitted that indeed there was no express agreement to this effect. What was
agreed upon was that CBN would transfer to Channel 10 once the Baguio station
starts to operate. However, the statement “Channel 10 assigned in lieu of Channel
9” did not mean abandonment by the station of its right to operate and broadcast
on the existing Channel 9 in Quezon City. Such transfer was merely to avoid
interference of its broadcast w/ that of another station, Channel 8, operated by the
Clark Air Force Base. Therefore, CBN still had the right to operate therein.
Consequently, because there was no express agreement made between CBN and
PBS for the exchange of use of Channel 9 and 10, the last issue raised that WON
PBS can legally operate Channel 9 and claim for damages for CBN’s refusal to give
up operations thereof must be resolved against PBS. No right belonging to PBS was
violated by CBN’s refusal to give up its present operation of Channel 9. Moreover,
the President vetoed the appropriation for the operation of the PBS fund that no
portion of the appropriation shall be used for the operation of tv stations in Luzon or
any part of the Phils where there are tv stations.
Under the Constitution, the President has the power to veto any particular item or
items of an appropriation bill. However, when a provision of an appropriation
bill affects one or more items of the same, the Pres cannot veto the
provision w/o at the same time vetoing the particular item or items to w/c
it relates2 (Art VI Sec 20).
Hence, any expenditure made by intervenor PBS for the purpose of installing or
operating a tv station in Manila, where there are already tv stations in operation,
would be in violation of the express condition for the release of the appropriation
and consequently, was null and void. Therefore, PBS is not entitled to
reimbursement of its illegal expenditures.
1
First issue: late filing of the application was resolved and therefore investigation lost its raison d’etre.
2
Compare w/ 1987 Consti Art VI Sec 27 (2): The Pres shall have the power to veto any particular item or
items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to w/c he
does not object.
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Writ granted. Writ of preliminary injunction made permanent.
NOTES: As a general rule, if the Pres disapproves a bill approved by Congress, he
should veto the entire bill. He is not allowed to veto separate items of a bill. It is
only in the case of appropriation, revenue, and tariff bills that he is authorized to
exercise item-veto ( Comments of Fr Bernas on the 1987 Consti).
Gonzales vs. Macaraig Jr. [Nov. 19, 1990]
Petition for prohibition/madamus assailing constitutionality of Pres’l veto of Sec.55
Facts:
♥ Congress passed HB No. 19186 or the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for
the Fiscal Year (FY) 1989. It eliminated/decreased certain items included in the
proposed budget submitted by the Pres. GAB signed into law (RA No. 6688) by
the Pres who vetoed 7 special provisions & Sec. 55, a general provision. Senate
then, thru Senate Resolution No. 381 declared the veto as unconstitutional &
void & upheld validity of Sec. 55. Petition filed assailing the constitutionality of
the veto & sought to enjoin implementation of RA No. 6688. Senate authorized
this petition by the members of the Senate Committee on Finance who filed this
case in their capacity as committee members & as taxpayers. Respondents are
Cabinet members tasked to implement the GAA of 1989 & 1990 all sued in their
official capacities.
♥ A supplemental petition was filed this time questioning the president’s veto
of certain provisions, Sec. 16 of HB 26934 (GAB for FY 1990) in particular.
♥ Sec. 55 of GAA of FY 1989 (Prohibition against the restoration or increase
of recommended appropriations disapproved and/or reduced by Congress):
Appropriations items recommended by the Pres in Budget submitted to
Congress w/c has been reduced/disapproved shall not be restored/increased
using appropriations authorized for other purposes by augmentation. A
recommendation is deemed disapproved if Congress did not provide for a
corresponding appropriation for that purpose.
♥ Reason for Presidential Veto: Violative of sec. 25 (5) of Art. VI of the Consti
in effect disallowing Pres, Sen. Pres., Speaker of the House, SC CJ, head of
Constitutional commissions to augment items in the GAA for their offices from
savings in other items even in cases of calamity or when there is an urgent
need to accelerate implementation of essential pub service/infrastructure.
♥ Sec. 16 of GAA of FY 1990 (Use of Savings): Allowed augmentation but
1989’s Sec. 55 was attached as a condition/restriction. Same reason was given
for the veto along with the fact that a case was already pending in the SC
concerning the validity of the 1989 veto.
♥ Petitioners’ contentions:
1. Pres can only veto item/s & not provision/s such as Secs 16 & 55.
2. When Pres vetoes a provision, she should likewise veto the entire bill.
3. Item-veto power does not allow Pres to veto conditions/restrictions.
4. Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of Consti has to be provided for by law & Congress has
power to impose restrictions on exercise of that pow.
♥ Respondents’ contentions:
1. It’s a political question.
2. Petitioners had a political remedy – override the veto.
3. Sec. 55 is a rider since it’s unrelated to the Appropriations Act.
4. Budget Law (PD 1177, Secs. 44-45) allows the Pres to augment items in
the appropriations for the exec dept.
5. Consti allows pres to veto provisions or other distinct & severable parts of
an Appropriations Bill.
Issues & Ratio:
1. WON SC has jurisdiction. - YES
♥ Demetria vs Alba: Where the legislature or executive acts beyond the
scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to
declare what other branches of the gov’t had assumed to do as void.
♥ Imperative need for a definitive ruling on the matter in order to avoid
recurrences in the future.
♥ Taxpayers (Sanidad vs. COMELEC) & members of Senate (Tolentino vs.
COMELEC) have the requisite standing to question the constitutionality of issues
raised.
♥ This is pursuant to the court’s power of judicial review.
♥ Court took cognizance of cases involving the constitutionality of a
Presidential veto such as Bengson vs Sec. of Justice & Bolinao Electronics vs.
Valencia.
2. WON the President has the power to veto “provisions” of the GAB? - YES
♥ Sec. 27, Art. VI of the Consti provides for the veto pow of the Pres. Par. 1
refers to the gen veto power w/c results to the veto of the entire bill whereas
Par. 2 refers to the item-veto or line-veto power allowing exercise of veto over
particular item/s in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill. This power does not
grant the authority on the Pres to veto a part of an item & to approve the
remaining portion of the same item.
♥ Item: particulars, the details, the distinct & severable parts of the bill. It’s
an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose. It’s a specific
appropriation of money & not some general provision of law w/c happens to be
put into an appropriation bill.
♥ Petitioners urge a restrictive interpretation of the provision. It disregards
the fact that distinct & severable parts of a bill may be the subj of a separate
veto & thus eliminating the need of vetoing the entire bill (Sec. 25.2, Art. VI).
It likewise overlooks the Constitutional mandate w/c provides that a provision
in an appropriations bill is limited in its operation to some particular
appropriation to w/c it relates & it does not relate to the entire bill.
♥ Petitioners erroneously claim that the veto pow of the Pres is legislative &
should be strictly construed. In Bengzon, the Court said that the Consti is a
limitation upon the legislative pow & a grant of pow to the executive and that
the courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a
veto as it will presume the constitutionality of a legislative act.
3. WON the provisions are inappropriate - YES
These are not provisions in the budgetary sense. Sec. 25.2, Art. VI of the Consti
provides that all provisions/enactments shall relate specifically to some particular
appropriation & their operation shall be limited to the appropriation to w/c they
relate to. But these provisions apply generally to all items disapproved/reduced by
Congress & not to a particular/distinctive appropriation. The disapproved/reduced
items are not found on the Bill either. One would still need to resort to the
President’s original recommendation to discover w/c items have been
disapproved/reduced. These provisions are more of an expression of Congressional
policy re: augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary appropriation. These
are inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose of the
President’s veto power (Henry vs Edwards).
4. WON conditions/restrictions are inappropriate - YES
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♥ Inherent in the pow of appropriation is the pow to specify how money shall
be spent. Exec is not allowed to veto a condition/proviso while allowing the
appropriation itself to stand. But restrictions should be such in the real sense of
the term, not some matters w/c are more properly dealt w/in a separate
legislation. It must exhibit a connection w/money items in a budgetary sense in
the schedule of expenditures.
♥ Although the provisions were made to appear as conditions/limitations,
they were actually general law measures more appropriate for substantive &
separate legislation. Neither of the provisions show the necessary connection
w/a schedule of expenditures.
♥ Bolinao case is inapplicable. The veto there was held invalid because it
carried w/it the approval of the condition attached to it whereas in this case, no
condition in the budgetary sense, attached to an appropriation/item in the
appropriation bill w/c was struck out. What we have here is a gen provision of
law w/c happens to be put in an appropriation bill.
5. WON the veto is valid - YES
♥ Provisions are indeed violative of Art. VI, Sec. 25(5) as president argued in
his veto. In Demetria vs. Alba, the Court held that heads of different branches
of the gov’t should be afforded considerable flexibility in the use of public funds
& resources. They should be allowed to transfer funds for purpose of
augmenting an item fr savings in another item in the appropriation of the gov’t
branch/constitutional body concerned. Such was affirmed in the 73 Consti and
in PD 1177, Sec. 44-45. Even the 1989 (Sec. 12) and 1990 (Sec. 16) GAA
allow such.
♥ The doctrine of separation of powers is not endangered because the
transfer is made only w/in a dept. Likewise, it does not vest in the exec the
power to rewrite the entire budget since transfers are limited w/in the
dept/branch concerned.
♥ An appropriations bill makes appropriation of money from the public
treasury whereas the power of augmentation from savings cannot be
considered a specific appropriation of money. It’s a non-appropriation item w/c
has no place in an appropriation measure. They are more of substantive
expressions of a legislative obj. They are matters of gen law & more properly
the subj of a separate legislation that will embody, define & delimit the scope of
the special pow of augmentation fr savings. If, as Congress claims, these
provisions were included to repeal PD 1177, then all the more that it should be
provided in a separate enactment since implied repeals are not favored.
♥ Besides, as the respondents contend, Consti has laid down a remedy for
the petitioners. They could have overridden the veto by 2/3 votes of its
members. But they did not do so.
Held: Veto upheld. Petition dismissed.
BENGZON V. DRILON
Petitioners: Retired SC justices
Respondents: Drilon (Exec Sec); Carague (DBM Sec); Cajucan (Nat’l Treasurer)
FACTS:
• June 10, 1953: RA 910 was enacted to provide the retirement pensions of
SC & CA justices
• June 21, 1957: RA 910 was amended by RA 1797 w/c says that should the
salary of the justices increase/ decrease, such increase/decreased salary
shall be deemed to be the salary or retirement pension of retired SC justice
(Sec 3-A)
• RA 1568 (amended by RA 3595) provided identical retirement benefits to
members of the Const’l Commission
• PD 578: provided similar benefits to AFP members, along with automatic
readjustment features.
• PD 644 (Jan 25, 1975) repealed Sec 3-A of RA 1797 & RA 3595 & PD 578
• PD 1638: the automatic readjustment of pensions of AFP members who
retired before Sept ’79
• WHILE ADJUSTMENT OF RETIREMENT PENSIONS OF AFP WAS RESTORED,
THAT OF THE RETIRED JUSTICES WAS NOT.
• Thus, Congress approved in 1990 HB 16297, a bill for the reenactment of
the repealed provisions of RA 1797 & RA 3595
• In July 11, 1990, Pres Awuino VETOED HB 16297 to strictly enforce the
standardization of compensation (RA 6758) & bec the govt should not
grant distinct privileges to select grp of officials whose retirement benefits
under existing laws already enjoy preferential treatment over those of the
others.
• Prior to instant petition, retired CA justices filed a letter/petition (Apr 22,
1991), which is treated as an ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER (A.M.) Petitioners
therein asked Court for readjustment of their monthly pensions in
accordance w/ RA 1797. They said that PD 644 repealing RA 1797 didn’t
become law as there was no valid publication pursuant to Tanada v.
Tuvera)
• PD 644 promulgated on Jan 24, 1975 appeared for the 1st time only in the
supplemental issue of OG, dated Apr 4, 1977, published only Sept 5, 1983.
• A.M. RESOLUTION: above request granted. The monthly pensions were
authorized to be adjusted & paid on the basis of RA 1797.
• Pursuant to A.M. Resolution, Congress included in Gen Appropriation Bill for
FY 1992 the appropriation for the Judiciary for payment of the adjusted
pension rates due the retired SC justices (HB 34925)
• HB 34925 basically authorizes the CJ to augment, among others, the
payment of adjusted pension rates to retired Justices entitled thereto
pursuant to A.M. Resolution. Payment from its savings.
• In Jan 15, 1992, Aquino vetoed the underlined portions of HB 34925 (p.
141), for the reason that the A.M. Resolution nullified the veto of HB
16297. Aquino reiterated the same reasons for the prior veto of HB 16297.
• PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS: 1) subject veto is not an item veto; 2) veto by
executive violates separation of powers; 3) veto deprives retired justices of
their rights to the pensions due them; 4) veto impairs fiscal autonomy
guaranteed by Consti
ISSUES:
Basic issue: Constitutionality of the veto by the President of certain provision in the
GAA for FY 1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices
of the SC & CA.
1. WON subject veto is an item veto – NO
2. WON PD 644 became law - NO
3. WON subject veto violates separation of powers - YES
4. WON veto deprives retired justices of their rights to pensions due them -
YES
5. WON veto impairs fiscal autonomy - YES
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RATIO
1. Subject veto is not an item veto
• On Appropriation, revenue, & tariff bills: Exec can’t veto entire bill even if it
may contain objectionable features. Thus, Consti provides for “item veto
power” to avoid inexpedient riders being attached to an indispensable
appropriation or revenue measure
• Only a particular item/s may be vetoed.
• Power to disapprove any item/s in an appropriate bill DOES NOT GRANT
the authority to veto a part of an item & to approve the remaining portion
of the same item (Gonzales v. Macaraig)
• ITEM: refers to the particulars, details, the distinct & severable parts; it’s
an indivisible sum of money, not some general provision of law w/c
happens to be put into an appropriation bill.
• The general fund adjustment is an ITEM w/c appropriates P500M to enable
the govt to meet certain unavoidable obligations w/c may have been
inadequately funded by the specific items for the diff branches, depts.,
bureaus, agencies, & offices of govt. THE PRES DIDN’T VETO THIS ITEM.
• WHAT WERE VETOED WERE METHODS OR SYSTMS placed by the Congress
to ensure that permanent & continuing obligations to certain officials would
be paid when they fell due.
• Portions of the item have been chopped up into vetoed & unvetoed parts.
Less than all of an item has been vetoed.
• THE VETOED PORTIONS ARE NOT ITEMS BUT PROVISIONS.
• The augmentation from savings is a PROVISION and NOT AN ITEM. It gives
the CJ the power to transfer funds from one item to another. No specific
appropriation of money was involved.
2. PD 644 never became law
• Simply because it was not properly published. (PD 644 is among those
declared w/o force & effect in Tanada v. Tuvera)
• Thus, RA 1797 was never repealed. HB 16297 was superfluous as it tried to
restore benefits w/c were never taken away validly by PD 644. The veto of
HB 16297 in 1990 also did not produce effect. Both were based on
erroneous & non-existent premises.
• When the Pres vetoed certain provisions of the GAA 1992, SHE WAS
ACTUALLY VETOING RA 1797 w/c is beyond her power to accomplish.
3. Subject veto violated separation of powers
• EXECUTIVE HAS NO AUTHORITY TO SETA SIDE & OVERRULE A DECISION
OF SC
• Congress included in the GAA 1992 provisions identifying funds & savings
used to pay the adjusted pensions pursuant to the SC Resolution. As long
as retirement laws remain in the statute book, there is an existing
obligation on the part of the govt to pay the adjusted pension rate
pursuant to RA 1797 & the A.M. Resolution
• NEITHER MAY THE VETO POWER BE EXERCISED AS A MEANS OF
REPEALING RA 1797.
• Pres has no power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her
predecessors much less to repeal existing laws.
4. The attempt to use the veto power deprives retirees of benefits given them
by RA 1797
• The right to a public pension is of statutory origin. This is founded on
services rendered to the state. Where a judge has complied w/ the
statutory prerequisites for retirement w/ pay, his right to retire & draw
salary becomes vested & may not thereafter be revoked or impaired.
• In RP, retirement laws have been enacted to entice competent men &
women to enter the govt service & permit them to retire therefrom w/
relative security.
• The rationale behind the veto w/c implies that Justices & constitutional
officers are unduly favored is misimpression.
• The provisions regarding retirement pensions of Justices arise from the
package of protections given by the Consti to guarantee & preserve the
independence of the judiciary.
• Any argument w/c seeks to remove special privileges given by law to
former Justices on the ground that there should be no grant of distinct
privileges or preferential treatment to retired Justices ignores the Const’l
provisions (Art VIII & Sec 30, Art VI) that the Judiciary is not only
independent, but also co-equal & coordinate.
5. Veto infringed on fiscal autonomy in Sec 3, Art VIII
• Fiscal autonomy is a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate & utilize their
resources w/ the wisdom & dispatch that their needs require. It means
freedom from outside control.
• The imposition of restrictions & constraints on the manner the independent
const’l offices allocate & utilize the funds appropriated for their operations
is anathema to fiscal autonomy & violative not only the express mandate of
the Consti but especially as regards the SC, of the independence & sep of
powers upon w/c the entire fabric of our const’l system is based.
• In the case at bar, the veto of specific provisions of GAA 1992 is
tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized,
w/c is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the CJ to make
adjustments in the utilization of the funds appropriated for the
expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of any savings from any
particular item to cover deficits or shortages in other items of the judiciary
is withheld.
• Art VI, Sec. 25: …CJ…may…augment any item in the gen appropriations
law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.”
• The vetoed provisions w/c relate to the use of savings for augmenting
items for the payment of the pension differentials, among others, are
clearly in consonance w/ the abovestated pronouncements of the Court.
The veto impairs the power of the CJ to augment other items in the
Judiciary’s appropriation, in contravention of the const’l provision on fiscal
autonomy.
Miller vs. Mardo [July 31, 1961]
Appeals from the decisions of different Courts of First Instance.
Facts:
 The Supreme Court consolidated here 5 cases which assails the validity of
the Reorganization Plan 20-A
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 Reorganization Plan 20-A confers jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of the

Department Labor to decide cases other than those falling under the
Workmen’s Compensation Law. Reorganization Plan 20-A was created
under the authority of RA 997 as amended by RA 1241.
 Section 6 of RA 997 authorizes a law to be passed by mere inaction of
Congress.
 On February 14, 1956 Reorganization Plan No. 20-A which was submitted
by the Reorganization Commission to the president was forwarded to
Congress. Congress adjourned its session without passing a resolution
disapproving or adopting the reorganization plan.
 It is contended that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A is not merely the
creation of the Reorganization Commission but it is a regular statute
directly and duly passed by Congress in the exercise of its legislative
powers.

Issue: WON the Reorganization Plan No. 20-A is unconstitutional. YES

Ratio:
 Approval of a bill cannot be made by Congress by mere silence,
adjournment or concurrent resolution. The constitution requires the two
houses to hold separate sessions for deliberations, and to submit the
determination of one to the separate determination of the other, unless a
joint session is provided for.
 The method of passing the law amounts to an abdication by Congress of its
legislative prerogative to the executive.
 Congress cannot deem a draft submitted by an executive agency passed as
law by mere inaction within a certain period. It must go through the 3
readings and the submission of the bill to the president.

Tanada vs. Tuvera (see Crim notes)