Case Principle/Doctrine

1 Llamado vs CA
In Llamado v. Court of Appeals (G.R. L-84850, June 29, 1989), the Supreme Court
ruled that a judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to contract it.
Whatever temptations the statesmanship of policy-making might wisely suggest,
construction must eschew interpolation and evisceration. He must not read in any
way of creation. He must not read out except to avoid patent nonsense of internal
contradictions. (Underscoring Supplied)
The old ruling in People v. Mapa, G.R. No. L-22301, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA
1164, is still unchanged. The Supreme Court said:

"Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demoiistrated

that applicationi is impossible or inadequate with them. It is not with- in the
power of a court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory
provision."

The ruling in Llamado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-84850, June 29, 1989,
although basically the same as the ruling in People v. Mapa, is more articulate. The
Supreme Court said that "the words to be given meaning whether they be found in
the Constitution or in a statute, define and therefore limit the authority and
discretion of the judges who must apply those words. If judges may, under cover of
seeking the "true spirit" and "real intent" of the law, disregard the words in fact used
by the law-giver, the judges will effectively escape the constitutional and statutory
limitations on their authority and discretion."
1989 CASES

LLAMADO v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 84850, June 29, 1989

PRINCIPLE
WHILE IT IS TRUE THAT ANY STATUTORY LAN- GUAGE THAT APPEARS TO
FAVOR THE ACCUSED IN A CRIMINAL CASE SHOULD BE GIVEN A "LIBERAL
INTERPRETATION," COURTS, HOWEVER, HAVE NO AUTHORITY TO INVOKE
"LIBERAL INTERPRETATION" OR "THE SPIRIT OF THE LAW" WHERE THE
WORDS OF THE STATUTE THEMSELVES LEAVE NO ROOM FOR DOUBT OR
INTERPRETATION.
LLAMADO v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 84850, June 29, 1989

PRINCIPLE:

WHEREAS CLAUSES ARE NOT PART OF A STATUTE

Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute, strictly speak- ing. They are not part
of the operative language of the statute. None- theless, whereas clauses may be
helpful to the extent they articulate the general purpose or reason underlying a new
enactment (e.g. an enactment which drastically but clearly change the substantive
con- tent of Section 4 existing before the promulgation of PD No. 1990). Whereas
clauses, however, cannot control the specific terms of the statute. In the instant
case, the whereas clauses of PD No. 1990 do not purport to control or modify the
terms of Section 4 as amended.

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2 Chua vs CSC
Expresio Unius

This statutory construction principle states that: where a statute, by its terms, is
expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would
not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to
restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.78

Exceptions:

• 1)  When adherence to such will lead to incongruities and in a violation of the

equal protection clause of the Constitution79
Political Law; Constitutional Law; No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.—The case of Fegurin, et al. v. NLRC, et al.,
comes to mind where, workers belonging to a work pool, hired and re-hired
continuously from one project to another were considered non-project-regular and
permanent employees. Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in four (4)
successive projects during a span of fifteen (15) years. Although no proof of the
existence of a work pool can be assumed, her service record cannot be
disregarded. Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees: No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws.” “x x x In Felwa vs. Salas, L-26511, Oct.
29, 1966, We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or
things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the
subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but
also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4)
the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.” Applying the
criteria set forth above, the Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection
clause were we to sustain respondents’ submission that the benefits of said law are
to be denied a class of government employees who are similarly situated as those
covered by said law. The maxim of Expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not
be the applicable maxim in this case but the doctrine of necessary

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Statutory Construction; Doctrine of Necessary Implication; What is implied in a
statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. —“No statute can be
enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application. There is always
an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the time of
enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the
unfolding events of the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is
enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the
doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine states that what is implied in a
statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is
understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to
effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or
jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary
consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate
legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all
incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater includes the
lesser, expressed in the maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus.”
CASUS OMISUS PROOMISSO HABENDUS EST

A corollary to expressio unius estexclusioalteriusis the doctrine of casus omisus pro

omisso habendus est which provides that a person, object or thing omitted from an
enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.51 The rule applies
only if and when the omission has been clearly established.52

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE STATUTE. -

Such history may be found in reports of legislative committees, in the transcript of

stenographic notes taken during a hearing, legislative investigation, or legislative
debates.

Are personal opinions of some legislators appropriate aids of construction?

As a general rule, they are not appropriate aids of construction. However, if there is
unanimity among the supporters and oppositors to a bill with respect to the
objective sought to be accomplished, the debates may then be used as evidence of
the purpose of the act.
3 People vs Manantan
7. Casus Omisus Pro Omisso Habendus Est

Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be
held to have been omitted intentionally.89

In the case of People v. Manantan,90 the Court ruled that the maxim "casus
omisus" can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly
established. In the case under consideration, it has already been shown that the
legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of
officers precluded from engaging in partisan political activities. Rather, they were
merely called by another term. In the new law, or Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code, justices of the peace were just called "judges."

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Expresio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius - Express mention is implied exclusion.

This principle has also been used and applied in a litany of cases. The rule has not
changed. The enumeration of specified matters in a statute is construed, as an
exclusion of matters not enumerated unless a different intention appears.

4 Lazatin vs Desierto
The Philippine Supreme Court has held that abandoning stare decisis must be
based on strong and compelling reasons; otherwise, the predictability which is
expected from its decisions would be immeasurably affected, and the public's
confidence in the stability of the solemn pronouncements diminished. "Verily, only
upon showing that circumstances attendant in a particular case override the great
benefits derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, can the
courts be justified in setting aside the same."24
5 Pesca vs Pesca
We are aware that in Pesca vs. Pesca, the Court countered an argument that Molina
and Santos should not apply retroactively with the observation that the
interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that
law as of the date the statute was enacted. Yet we approach this present case from
utterly practical considerations. The requirement that psychological inca- pacity
must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that
necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was
no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondent’s psychological
incapac- ity was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal ne- cessity
yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly
propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be
undue prejudice to those cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially those
presently on appellate review, where presumably the respective petitioners and their
ex- pert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of
incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological
incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the
trial court level.

The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the

contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and
construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is
enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a
different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted
in good faith in accordance therewith. [Pesca v Pesca (2001)]
6 Chaves vs JBC

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Noscitur a sociis

Word construed with reference to accompanying or associated words.

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. JUDICIAL BAR COUNCIL (JBC)

G.R. No. 202242; April 16, 2013

Facts:

The case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Judicial Bar Council (JBC) in a
prior decision rendered July 17, 2012 that JBC’s action of allowing more than one
member of the congress to represent the JBC to be unconstitutional. Respondent
contends that the phrase “a representative of congress” refers that both houses of
congress should have one representative each, and that these two houses are
permanent and mandatory components of “congress” as part of the bicameral
system of legislature. Both houses have their respective powers in performance of
their duties. Art. VIII Sec. 8 of the constitution provides for the component of the
JBC to be 7 members only with only one representative from congress.

Issue:

Whether or not the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the
House of Representatives to be unconstitutional as provided in Art. VIII. Sec 8 of the
constitution.

Ruling:

The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase “a representative of
congress” should be construed as to having only one representative that would
come from either house, not both.

Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is
ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words
in which it is founded or with which it is associated.

ASSOCIATED WORDS

NOSCITUR A SOCIIS
Every meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the
context of the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used
in association with other words or phrases, and its meaning may be modified or
restricted by the latter.30

The third rule cited in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council'8 is ut magis valeat quam
pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.
The framers intended the JBC to be composed of 7 members only. Intent is for
each co-equal branch of gov’t to have one representative. There is no dichotomy
between Senate and HOR when Congress interacts with other branches. But the
SC is not in a position to say who should sit. [Chavez v. JBC, G.R. No. 202242, Jul.
17, 2012]
7 Orceo vs COMELEC

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Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda

What is generally spoken shall be generally understood

Orceo vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 190779; March 26, 2010

Facts:

Petitioner asserts that playing airsoft provides bonding moments among family
members, and families are entitled to protection by the society and the State under
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Pursuant thereto, they are free to
choose and enjoy their recreational activities. These liberties, petitioner contends,
cannot be abridged by the COMELEC. Thus, petitioner contends that Resolution
No. 8714 is not in accordance with the State policies. As a response, COMELEC
defends that constitutional freedoms are not absolute in a sense, and they may be
abridged to some extent to serve appropriate and important interests.

Issue:

WON the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in including airsoft guns and their
replicas/imitations in the term “firearm” in Section 2(b) of RA 8714?

Ruling:

NO. A word of general significance in a stature is to be taken in its ordinary sense

and comprehensive sense, unless it is shown that the word is intended to be given
a different or restricted meaning; what is generally spoken shall be generally
understood and general words shall be understood in a general sense.

The term “firearm” in Resolution No. 8714 was intended for purposes of the gun
ban during the election period. The inclusion of airsoft guns in the term “firearm”
and their resultant coverage by the election gun ban is to avoid the possible use of
recreational guns in sowing fear, intimidation or terror during the election period. An
ordinary citizen may not be able to distinguish between a real gun and an airsoft
gun. It is fear subverting the will of a voter, whether brought about by the use of a
real gun or a recreational gun which is sought to be averted.

8 Duque vs Veloso

9 Liwag vs Happy

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EMETERIA LIWAG v. HAPPY GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.

G.R. No. 189755, Jtily 4, 2012

PRINCIPLE:

WHERE A GENERAL WORD OR PHRASE FOLLOWS AN ENUMERATION OF

PARTICULAR AND SPECIFIC WORDS OF THE SAME CLASS, THE GENERAL
WORD OR PHRASE IS TO BE CONSTRUED TO INCLUDE - OR TO BE
RESTRICTED TO -THINGS AKIN TO OR RESEMBLING, OR OF THE SAME
KIND OR CLASS AS, THOSE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED.

The basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis states that where a
general word or phrase follows an enumera- tion of particular and specific words of
the same class, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include - or to be
restricted to - things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind or class as, those
specifically mentioned.

Applying this principle to the afore-quoted Section 1 of PD No. 1216, we find that
the enumeration refers to areas reserved for the common welfare of the community.
Thus, the phrase "other similar

facilities and amenities" should be interpreted in like manner.

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Ejusdem generis

Of the same kind or specie

LIWAG vs. HAPPY GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.

G. R. No. 189755, July 04, 2012

Facts:

In 1978, F. G. R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen Loop, loaned from
Ernesto Marcelo, owner of T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation. The former failed to
settle its debts with the latter, so, he assigned all his rights to Marcelo over several
parcels of land in the Subdivision including the receivables from the lots already
sold. As the successor-in-interest, Marcelo represented to lot buyers, the National
Housing Authority (NHA) and the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission
(HSRC) that a water facility is available in the subdivision. The said water facility

has been the only source of water of the residents for thirty (30) years. In September
1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block 5 to Hermogenes Liwag. As a result, Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-350099was issued to the latter. In 2003,
Hermogenes died. Petitioner, wife of Hermogenes, subsequently wrote to the
respondent Association demanding the removal of the over headwater tank over the
parcel of land. The latter refused and filed a case before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board against T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation, petitioner and the
surviving heirs of Hermogenes. The HLURB ruling was in favor of the respondent
Association. One of the things it affirmed was the existence of an easement for
water system/facility or open space on Lot 11, Block 5 of TCT No. C-350099
wherein the deep well and overhead tank are situated. However, on appeal before
the HLURB Board of Commissioners, the Board found that Lot 11, Block 5 was not
an open space.

Issue:

Whether or not Lot 11, Block 5 of the Happy Glen Loop is considered an “open
space” as defined in P. D. 1216.

Ruling:

Yes, the aforementioned parcel of land is considered an “open space.”


The Court used the basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis to
determine whether the area

falls under “other similar facilities and amenities” since P. D. 1216 makes no specific
mention of areas reserved for water facilities.

Ejusdem generis - states that where a general word or phrase follows an

enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class, the general word or
phrase is to be construed to include or to be restricted to things akin to or
resembling, or of the same kind or class as, those specifically mentioned. Applying
that principle, the Court found out that the enumeration refers to areas reserved for
the common welfare of the community.

Therefore, the phrase “other similar facilities and amenities” should be interpreted in
like manner. It is without a doubt that the facility was used for the benefit of the
community. Water is a basic necessity, without which, survival in the community
would be impossible

10 Ang Bagong Bayani vs

COMELEC

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In the Philippines, courts adhere to certain conventions when interpreting the
Constitution. The fundamental principle in constitutional construction is that the
primary source from which to ascertain the intent or purpose of the Constitution is
the language of the provision itself. It is presumed that the words in which the
constitutional provisions are written express the objectives the Constitution seeks
to attain. This rule - verba legis- means that when the meaning of the words used in
the Constitution are unclear, courts can rely on extraneous aids of construction and
interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or
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Convention, to ascertain the intent or purpose of the provision being construed.

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Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC

GR 147589 [June 26, 2001]

Facts. In connection with the oncoming May 2001 elections, COMELEC issued a
resolution which approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties in the
party-list elections. Petitioners party-list participants seek the disqualification of
respondents party-list participants, arguing mainly that the party-list system was
intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream
political parties, and the non marginalized or overrepresented which the
respondents allegedly are or to which they allegedly belong.

Issues.

(1) May political parties participate in party-list elections?


(2) Is the party-list system exclusive to “marginalized and underrepresented”
sectors and organizations?

(3) What are the guidelines for screening party-list participants?

Held.

(1) Yes. Sec 5, Art VI of the Const. provides that members of the House of Reps
may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations." Furthermore, under Secs 7 and 8, Art IX(C) of the
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same, political parties may be registered under the party-list system. This is clear
also from the deliberations of the Const. Commission. Indubitably, therefore,
political parties—even the major ones—may participate in the party-list elections.

(2) Yes. The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people,
not only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling
them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the
policy of the implementing law, RA 7941, is likewise clear: “to enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
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parties, x x x, to become members of the House of [Reps].” Where the language
of the law is clear, it must be applied according to its express terms. To allow the
[non-marginalized or overrepresented] to participate desecrates the spirit of the
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party-list system.

(3) The Court remanded the case to the COMELEC to determine whether the 154
organizations and parties allowed to participate in the party- list elections comply
with the requirements of the law, issuing the following guidelines:

The registrant must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups

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identified in Sec 5 of RA 7941. It must show thus—through its constitution,
articles of incorporation, by laws, history, platform of government and track record
—that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has
chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.

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A: In Ang Bagong Bayani- OFW Labor Party v COMELEC67, the Supreme Court
said that even if major political parties are allowed by the Constitution to participate
in the party- list system, they must show, however, that they represent the interests
of the marginalized and under- represented. The following guidelines should be
followed in order that a political party registered in the party- list system may be
entitled to a seat in the House of Representatives:

1. Must represent marginalized and under- represented sectors;

2. Major political parties must comply with this statutory policy;

3. Ang Bagong Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (as a party) must be subject to the
express constitutional prohibition against religious sects;

4. The party must not be disqualified under RA 7941;

5. The party must not be an adjunct of an entity or project funded by the

government;

6. The party and its nominees must comply with the requirements of law;

7. The nominee must also represent the marginalized or under- represented sector;
and

8. The nominee must be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of

appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation.

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