STATCON

NOTES

Prefinals
(Please don’t disseminate this to anybody cause this is the personal copyright of the pwner
who worked hard to transcribe)

Use this on your own risk

III. CARDINAL RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
(only in case of doubt)
Context.
If one does not know the meaning of a word, he puts in a sentence and gets the meaning out of it. That is how context works.
A person might not be able to fully explain a particular word, but if that word is surrounded by other phrases of words, or
sentences – that is when you articulate the meaning.
For example, a headline says “Juan is a thief”, normally, it impugn one’s reputation. But the story was actually about praising
Juan, that he was so qualified to enter into office that “Juan stole our trust and confidence.”
Standing alone, the headline might be damaging to one’s reputation.
But the context inside the story tells differently.

Legislative intent, how ascertained.

Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not of an isolated part of a particular
provision alone.
That is, one must look the statute as a whole and not just as a part or provisions.
We need to examine a statute as a whole because if we limit ourselves to one provision, we cannot understand the whole law.
This is because one provision is actually connected with all the other provisions. That is why you need to contextualize in order to
understand the law.
Liberal or strict construction,
factors to consider and when applied.
Normally one is confronted whether or not he will strictly or liberally construe the law.
Factors to considered:
(1) The former law on the matter.

There is a legislative history here where it tells that there are prior laws before ‘this’ law. This law could have been amended,
revised, or appealed.
But the prior law/s would have factored in how one construes the law
(2) The persons or rights with which it deals.

This tells a person:

who are the beneficiaries of the law?
what are the rights being dealt with to them?
(3) The letter or language of the law.

This is the plain meaning of the law. (Intent is the spirit of the law.)
(4) The purpose and objects of the statute.

This is the fourth consideration when one construes for strictly/liberal construction.
Statutes in derogation of common rights,
how construed. (strictly construed)
Scenario:
A person has a private property. And the government wants to use such property for public use upon payment for just
compensation. The person might not want to sell the property because of sentimental value (ancestral perhaps). But the person
has no choice if the State can prove all the requisites to expropriation.
So, here is a law that derogates you common right of property. What if that law is vague – how does one construe?
In the scenario, where is derogation of common rights, one construes the law:
(1) literally in favor of the private individual; and
(2) strictly against the government.

The reason here is that the individual, standing alone, is virtually powerless and defenseless against the state.
Even in criminal cases, if there is doubt in the law, the law is construed:
(1) in favor the accused to the private individual; &
(2) against the government or State.

If there is no doubt, you apply the express language of the law, and no construction.
Statutes prescribing formalities of wills,
how construed. (strictly construed)
Scenario:
If one’s parents executed a last will and testament, once the they die, the last will and testament will come into fusion, i.e., it will
become subject for the approval of the court. However, if there is notarial will, it undergoes a lot of written formalities and very
technical, such as:
(1) the will must be paged in numbers (if there is a missing page, it will be rendered as invalid).

One cannot escape the technicalities of the will (and just go with the substance of the will) because it is the mouth piece of the
dead. In other words, one cannot anymore consult the dead person—“dead men tell no tales.”
That is why, the written formalities must be intact and fully comply the technicalities. This is to make sure that the will is the
intention of the testator, prior to his death.
(no need for notary public, it is allowed. This is called autographic will, in other words, everything there is signed, written, and
dated by the testator. But the burden of proof that there was consent from the testator in writing the ‘will’ will be tested in the court.
Otherwise, if there is vitiated consent, it will be invalid.)
Again, this only applies when there is doubt. If there is no doubt, apply the law accordingly.
*** in the exam, you must identify that there is doubt, otherwise, if there is no doubt, no need to construe whether literally or
strictly. Construe the express language of the law, or the intent of the law.
Naturalization laws, how construed. (strictly construed)
If there is doubt, the naturalization law is construed:
(1) in favour of the government; &
(2) against the applicant.
There is a strict construing of naturalization laws because we might as well as naturalized an undesirable alien. Out of 100+
millions of Filipinos, how many are badlungon? Probably more than 50%. Now, we make an additional one citizen by
naturalization. If so, the naturalized person must be an asset to our country.
Statute conferring the right of eminent domain, how construed. (strictly construed)
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private
rights, and the rule in this case is that the authority must be strictly construed.
Statute granting rights to laborers, how construed.
(liberally construed)
Statutes granting rights to laborers, debtors and the poor or to persons known to be suffering from disadvantages area liberally
construed.
Hence, a statute regulating the relations between the insurer is strictly construed
(1) against the insurer; and
(2) liberally in favour of the insured.

Statutes conferring rights to laborers: in case of doubt, statute must be construed:

(1) in favor of the laborers.
(2) Against the employer.

This is because the laborers are marginalized, which means they are powerless and defenceless.
The kind of legislation intended to laborers is social legislation. This is pursuant to the case of Federation of Freedom Farmers.
There was no doubt in the case of Federation of Freedom Farmers. The express language of the law was very clear. But the SC
decided to construe the law otherwise it will defeat the purpose of the law.
*** in Atty.’s previous exam, there was a scenario where: there is 1 day menstrual leave – the law did not distinguish, so there
was doubt on the date, claiming – what if it falls on a Sunday – so no need for a 1 day leave. But what specific day, weekend,
holiday, etc.
You resolve this in favour of the employee.

Tax laws, how construed.

Tax exemptions are held strictly against the taxpayer, and if not expressly mentioned in the law must be within its purview by clear
legislative intent.
In case of doubt, strictly construe:
(1) in favour of the tax authority, and
(2) against the taxpayer.

This is because taxation is the lifeblood of government/source of income.

General Rule.
Medical Phils., Inc. v. CIR
This involves health maintenance organization. And we pay them hundreds of thousands per year. Where does the money go?
Normally, the money goes 20% to the companies & 80% goes to the doctors and the laboratories. Now there is a law that states
GROSS receipts of NHO should be subject to VAT. 100% should be VAT-able.
The companies content that it should not be 100% because they only receive 20% of the money.
The SC decided to look at the law. The GROSS receipts does not specifically provides whether or not against which should it be
in favour. The SC claimed that if there is no clarity in the language of the law, insofar as tax exemptions are concerned, the rule
will be:
(1) in favour to the taxpayer, and
(2) against the court.

The reason here is that when you impose tax, you impose a burden. When you impose a burden, there must be an express
language of the law that supports the burden.
Exceptions.
The exception is when you apply tax exceptions.
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
It states here that exemptions from VAT should be revoked. And the SC said that it should be revoked. In case of doubt, tax
exemptions should be ruled, provided that you revoke the exemption, the rule will be:
(1) In favour of the government, &
(2) Against taxpayer.

This is because of life-blood rule. And tax exemption is a privilege, so in case of doubt, apply the rule above.
Elections statutes, how construed.
Prospective & retrospective interpretation, distinguished.
Prospective interpretation.
It is that which limits the operation of a statute to such facts and causes arising after its enactment.
Retrospective interpretation.
It is that which holds the statute to be applicable to or governing transactions or states of facts wholly completed prior to its
enactment
*** take note that this talks about interpretation and not application. Application – apply it to a set of facts. Interpretation – merely
theoretical.
What is the effect of retrospective application?
It takes away or impairs vested rights. Exactly why it should not be retroactive.
Exception:
There is retrospective application if we talk about procedural laws. In procedural laws, no right is vested. If no right is vested to
begin with, no right is impaired.
Prospective & retrospective interpretation,
how determined.
General rule.
A statute will be construed prospectively,
Exception.
Unless the legislative intent that it be given a retrospective operation clearly appears by necessary or unavoidable implication.
Prospective operation, determinant.
If by its terms a statute is to apply hereafter or thereafter, or it is to take effect at a fixed future date or immediately.
Retroactive operation, determinant.
“heretofore” and “theretofore” or other expression denoting a past time.
What if the law is silent – no “heretofore/after”?
In case of doubt, prospective interpretation.
Retrospective application of law, effect of.
Statutes have no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided therein.
Effect → it takes away or impairs vested rights. Exactly why it should not be retroactive.
Prospective application of law.
Statutes should be construed prospectively, as a general rule.
IV. PARTICULAR RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
(again, requisite for construction is ambiguity,
If there is no ambiguity, no need for construction)
Verba legis or plain meaning rule.
If the language of the law is clear, no need for interpretation. This pertains to the literal translation of the law, i.e. the letter of the
law.
Index animi sermo est.
Speech is the index of intention.
SWS & Pulse Asia, Inc. v. COMELEC
Dura lex sed lex.
The law may be harsh but it is the law.
Where the language of the law is too plain and unambiguous, there is no need to inquire into the legislative intent.
For example:
Death penalty, one can never decide in accordance to your conscience, if the law says that such penalty is imposable on the
charge, one has no choice but to impose the law. Regardless of one’s beliefs, duties of judges is to uphold the law.
Ratio legis.
In construing a statute, the court must look into the spirit of the law or the reason for the law. The spirit or intention of the law
prevails over the letter thereof.
Mens legislatories.
This is more or less the same with ratio legis, but mens legislatories is broader because it includes the principle of which the courts
look into the object to be accomplished, the evils and mischiefs to be remedied, or the purpose to be subserved by the law.
Simply, this is the intent of the law. But here, it can actually associate the legislative purpose. That is, what impelled congress to
pass a law; the conditions; the status quo.
This made Congress to say that they will change the status quo and pass a law to remedy the situation → mens legislatories.
Ejusdem generis.
This applies when specific words are followed by general expression, provided that the general expressions are the same in class
or of the same nature as those specifically enumerated.
That is, one mentions first the specific things. Then, one gets tired of the enumeration and one now goes to the general terms.
Ejusdem generis, purpose.
The purpose is to abbreviate the law. And we cannot be expected to enumerate each and every member of the class, otherwise
we might miss out on something.
For example:
There is a birthday party. Invitation sends to specific people: A,B,C,D, and all of his classmates. When he says “all of his
classmates”, he was tired writing all his classmates’ names. This is because if he is to enumerate each one of his classmates and
it will be too long.
This is the same case in laws. If one enumerates, the law is going to be lengthy.
The danger here is when one enumerates very specific, there is a possibility that one omits in the enumeration and no longer
being covered in the law, just because it might have been forgotten in the enumeration.
This is precisely because, when one is omitted, the omission is done by purpose.
(use of “and others, and such other person”)
Reddendo singular singulis.
Association between two words that are frequently used together. Under this principle where a sentence has several antecedents
and several consequents they are to be read distributively.
Important reminder:
Normally when one uses “respectively,” that is when you distribute. You just match the antecedent to the consequent.
For example:
G1 and B1, & G2 and B2. They are cousins and nephews respectively.
Harun and Villa are from 301 and 302, respectively.
For example: case
Lacuna v. Abes
“The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or
during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public
office or to be elected to such office.”
Antecedent
“perpetual or temporary special disqualification”
Consequent
“perpetually or during the term of the sentence”
Meaning:
When there is perpetual disqualification, you are perpetually barred to run for public office.
But temporary disqualification, it refers to during the term of the sentence. In other words, while you are serving the term of the
sentence, you cannot be qualified to run for public office. After the service of such sentence, you can now be qualified.
Difference:
The duration is different because instead of merging the durations into one period, the provision states that such duration is
according to such nature of penalty, which means whether the penalty is perpetual or temporary.
Doctrine of collocation.
Distribution of antecedent and consequent.
Used respectively.
Aratea v. COMELEC
This rule means that the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another.
If you are not part of the enumeration, you are not covered with it. This is because your omission was done on purpose.
Calderon v. Carale
In this case, there was doubt as to whether or not the appointment of the NLRC chair needs the consent of the Commission of
Appointments.
The SC looked into the language of the law. There it enumerates appointees that need to be nominated, consented, and
appointed by the President. They are “heads…ambassadors…consuls…” it did not mention “any others.” But it does states “and
other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.” It does not say NLRC chair.
But this provision is tricky. It says “and other officers…” It refers to a general class. If you examine the provision, it is exclusive
insofar as the enumeration of this officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution is concerned.
Even if it uses signifiers in general terms (e.g. and others), that might indicate ejusdem generis; because this provision is
restrictive. This is because when you say “and other officers…” there is a very specific enumeration, they are: Commissioners of
CSC and COA, regular members of the JBC, representative of IBP, a professor of law, retired member of the SC, representative of
a private sector, and sectoral representative. These are the only people who are not expressly enumerated but might have been
included in the phrase that says “other officers…” that might tell that it is ejusdem generis, but it is not because the enumeration is
specific & very exclusive.
*** do not be misled by the indicators precisely because the Constitution is very specific.
Exception.
When it violates the equal protection clause.
Chua v. CSC
This is about the case of the early retirement law where it enumerates those can avail such law. But here comes a contractual
employee who wants to avail the law. But her status as an employee was not part of the enumeration.
The SC claims that if one applies the expressio unius ext exclusion alterius, it will lead to incongruities. This is because the
purpose of the law was to trim down the bloated bureaucracy, and here is someone who wants to avail it. Also, there is a violation
of the equal protection clause, i.e., the SC finds no distinction between a contractual employee from temporary, casual, employees
etc. – they are all temporary employees in the law.
The maxim “expressio unius est exclusion alterius” does not apply when words are mentioned by way of example, or to remove
doubts.
Noscitur a sociis.
When two or more words of analogous meaning are employed together in a statute, they are understood to be used in their
cognate sense, to express the same relations and give color and expression to each other.
This pertains to context. You cannot isolate one word or one provision from the rest of the law, otherwise, you are going to be lost
in translation
Casus omissus.
General rule for casus omissus, if there is an omission, that which is not mentioned in the legislation, but the presumption is that it
was done on purpose, the SC has the license to supply the missing word by virtue of cassus omissus, provided the missing texts
are:
(1) it is palpable – which means that it is clear there is a missing word but was not written; and
(2) verifiable in other parts of the law – i.e. you can verify the missing text in other parts of the law.

There is a need to supply something that is missing in the law, so that the law can be enforced. Otherwise, the law would be
nonsensical.
The maxim casus omissus can operate and apply only and when the omission has been clearly established.
Omission, 2 ways of knowing:
(1) you are omitted but out of inadvertence (this is when you supply the missing texts); or
(2) you are omitted on purpose.

Exception.
There is an evidence of inadvertence.
This is also tricky. This is because when you are omitted from the enumeration, it means to say that you are omitted on purpose.
*** coverage for pre-finals is going to be technical
V. CONSTRUCTION OF WORDS AND PHRASES
Shall.
Imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced.
Exception.
The word shall uses mandatory character when contextualized with modifiers in the same provision. Modifiers are otherwise
known as conditions.
For example:
Investment funds, or banks, or other financial institutions that is over the control of the government shall subject to the availability
of… funds…accept and discount not more than 2% of annum for 10 years.
2nd modifier → not more than 2% of annum for 10 years (this is mandatory).
1st modifier → subject to the availability of funds (it depends on the liquidity). This means that even if it uses the word shall, it is
not mandatory.
Guingona v. Carage
In the constitutional provision, it states that “The state shall assign the highest budgetary priority to the education.”
However, in this case, if that constitutional provision is not self-executing, it is not demandable as a matter of right. You cannot
claim the law because of the word “shall” and employ that it is mandatory. This is because without the enabling law, you cannot
invoke that as a matter of right.
The SC claimed that even if there is the word “shall”, it is only discretionary. Otherwise we are going to encroach upon the
prerogative of Congress to answer to imperatives of national interest.
It is not necessary that you allocate the highest budget to education because there are pressing matters that Congress need to
attend to in the name of national interest.
May & shall, distinguished.
May.
It is mere permissive only and operates to confer discretion (i.e. it is discretionary).
Shall.
First instinct, it is mandatory. But in some instances, shall are not mandatory. It mean also convey as discretionary, despite the
word shall.
May not.
May is permissive. But if it is paired with the negative word “not”, it does not necessarily lose its permissive character.
For example:
Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary condition of any administrative actual omission complained of the
beliefs that the complaint was filed after 1 year from the occurrence of the actual commission complained of.
Here, it would seem that there is a prescriptive period, insofar as administrative liability is concerned. But it does not necessarily
prescribed. It is up to the Ombudsman WON it pursues despite the lapse of 1 year.
Special or technical meaning.
Words and phrases having a special or technical meaning are construed in their technical sense. This rule applies to terms having
well-established trade, business, commercial or professional significance.
In ordinary parlance, there are jargons. In one class, they have a language they all understand. And in that class, there are
groups. These groups have also have their own language/jargon that they can only understand.
This are coded languages.
Thus, the law respects the jargons pertaining to a particular sector. It does not impose how it understands when the words are
used commonly by these particular sectors.
Example: “disposed of”
Without actually tempering payment, and without actual delivery of the item sold, that is considered sold.
The legislature takes into consideration the custom of merchants using the phrase “disposed of”, in its commercial sense, and not
technical sense. Art. 14,15 of the Civil Code.
So when you say “disposed of” – the parties already agreed that you will buy something, and that thing is already reserved for you
(no payment yet, and no delivery). Hence, in this case, you are not yet liable for tax because this is the issue in contention here.
Exception.
Where the legislature clearly intended a different meaning and where the technical interpretations would defeat the legislative
purpose. That is, when intended otherwise by the Congress, or if it defeats legislative intent.
Conjunctive and.
When used in a various members of a sentence, it is to be taken jointly.
Disjunctive or.
It refers to an alternative. It often connects a series of words or propositions indicating a choice of either. You cannot combine
them.
“OR” is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation from each of the other things enumerated unless the context requires a different
interpretation.
When “or” is used the various members of the sentence are to be taken separately.
Conjunctive and disjunctive terms,
“AND” & “OR” distinguished.
Exceptions.
(1) If you restrict the meaning of a broad word, with a restrictive word, separated by the word AND.

That is, when there are 2 words (one of which is broad, and the other is restrictive), and separated from the conjunctive AND, the
restrictive word limits the meaning of the broad word.
For example:
Possession AND occupation.
Possession is broader because when you possess something, you need not occupy that. Like holding a microphone, you possess
it but you do not occupy it. But what he occupies, he still possess.
This is applies to cases in occupancy in good or bad faith. You occupy that openly for everybody to see.
(2) AND may mean OR, if it defeats legislative intent.

This means that there are times that AND means OR. One cannot combined the words using AND if it defeat legislative intent.
For example:
Copyright infringement.
Copyrighted grants owner exclusive rights to print, reprint, publish, copy, distribute, multiply, sell AND make photographs, and
pictorial illustrations of the works.
This means that if you sell, you must take a photograph first of what you are selling before you can be held accountable. That is,
you must do both things to be held liable.
But from the proposition above, it defeats the purpose of the law. SC said that the word AND here actually means OR. In other
words, you are liable if you sell, or if you make a photograph, either OR. They are not necessarily in tandem to each other.
(3) OR may mean AND.

Except when the context or intent of the law warrants, OR may mean AND.
For example:
There is a law that says that a municipal trial court judge, has the power to conduct preliminary examination OR investigation.
First instinct, the OR means 1 of the two choices. That is, he can conduct examination witout investigation, or the other way
around.
But looking at the context and intent of the law, the judge is endowed with both powers. That is, examination OR investigation.
However, it uses the word OR. But by construction we say that the judge must do both, examination & investigation.
(4) OR may also mean successively.

For example:
You can either take up statutory construction OR philosophy of law.
There are times when OR means successively, that is, you cannot choose the 2 nd without choosing the 1st one first.
Another example:
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape, or a acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon an offended party
OR her parents, OR grandparents, OR guardians, nor in any case…
This means that the first to file should be offended party. If the offended party is incapable, minor, that is the time when the parent
come in, OR grandparents, and so on.
Bottom line here: OR is not always alternative, it can be successive.
All, any, every.
All.
Whether the legislature used the word “all” in its universal or all comprehensive sense or merely as a general term depends upon
the demands of sound reason.
Every.
This word is generally regarded as a word of inclusion.
Any.
This word is given a restrictive interpretation in some cases. It can also refer to multiple person.
Gatachalian v. COMELEC
When it says ANY candidate, or ANY election, even if that election pertains to Constitutional Commission.
Just like when one says that a President is not eligible for ANY reelection, whether successive, or with interval, or the President is
incumbent or not.
Etcetera.
The meaning of the term “and so forth” or its abbreviation “etc.” depends largely on the text of the statute, the description and
enumeration of matters preceding the term and the subject matter to which it is applied.
It is to be given its usual and natural signification.
Grammar.
The ordinary rules of grammar will be applied in the construction of a statute for the purpose of ascertaining the legislative intent.
Limitation.
If grammar is not conclusive if it defeats legislative intent.
The rules on punctuation, tense, gender and number have very little weight.
Punctuation.
Courts may punctuate or repunctuate a statute in order to give effect to what appear to be its true meaning.
Moreno v. COMELEC
` Sec. 40 A – LGC. Those offenses…involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by 1 year or more(,) within 2 years after
serving sentence(,) is disqualified to run.
The meaning of the COMMA after “1 year or more”, means that the “2 years after serving sentence” apply to both offenses: (1) offense
involving moral turpitude, & (2) an offense punishable by 1 year or more. This means that you remain disqualified into running in public
office within 2 years after serving sentence. You can run, the 2 years already elapsed.
Statutes expressed in the future may nevertheless be regarded as having a present effect.
Using SHALL or MAY, always in the future tense, regardless of the language of the law where it connotes future tense, it actually
applies to present tense.
Gender.
The use of the masculine gender in a statute does not preclude its application to females, where the legislative intent requires it.
UNLESS, there is a specific law that applies only to women.
Number.
The general rule is that words importing the singular number may be extended or applied to several persons or things unless such
construction would go against legislative intent.
When penal laws say ANY person, it does not apply to only one singular person. but it applies to ALL who commit a felon.
Further, the term of ANY candidates does not apply to only 1 candidate but to all candidates.
Inaccuracies, inadvertence or clerical errors.
Where there is an evident typographical error or misprint, which, if uncorrected, would render the law nonsensical, it is the duty of
the court to give the statute a sensible construction.
But you do not change the errors mechanically, you change it out of construction. This is because it is an enrolled bill, you cannot
change it anymore. But by construction, you can actually change it.
Also, do not be too literal, it would entail to be nonsensical.
Foreign Language.
Where a statute has been enacted simultaneously in different language, both texts are to be read in ascertaining the legislative
intent, and either text may be looked into in doubtful cases.
RPC is a mere translation of the Spanish texts. In case of doubt between the English text and the Spanish text, the Spanish text
prevails.
Spanish text is the language of promulgation, while English text is the language of translation.
*** take note of the exceptions: insofar as the AND/OR and the SHALL/MAY. These are very tricky. Stat Con – Pre-Finals | Atty.
FGS Gujilde | by: Bayocboc, Jr., Yolando
8
VI. INSTRINSIC AIDS IN CONSTRUCTION
Intrinsic aids, defined.
One resort to intrinsic aids if one needs to clarify an
ambiguity present in the law.
One finds intrinsic aids in the printed copy or printed
page of law. Anything one finds in the body or the printed
copy of the law, this refers to intrinsic aids.
The moment one goes out the four walls of the
document of the law, the aids now becomes extrinsic.
In determining what a statute aims to convey, the first
logical thing to look into is the statute itself, its context,
language, title, preamble and the like. These are the
intrinsic aids resorted to in the interpretation of a statute.
Intrinsic aids, enumerated.
Context.***[guaranteed 10 points in the pre-finals]
A statute must be construed as a whole. It should be
read in its entirety. All parts, provisions or sections of a
statute or section, must be read, considered or
construed together, and each must be-considered in the
light of all the others.
SWS & Pulse Asia, Inc. v. COMELEC
If you compel a media entity on what to write and not to
write, you violate the freedom of the press and freedom
of expression, and freedom of speech. In the case at
hand, if you look at the provision, standing alone, it will
really violate because it compels you to publish
something that is not in your like. And there is another
law that says to publish “these names” – they are
dictating upon you, what to publish and not to publish.
Prior restraint & subsequent punishment.
Freedom of expression is allowed unless it is libelous.
But prior to publication, no one is dictated on what to and
not to publish, otherwise, it constitutes prior restraint
[gipug-ngan ka daan]. And if you are penalized after
publishing something, that becomes subsequent
punishment. BOTH are not allowed, except if libel or
obscenity.
In the case at hand, the law that allows publication the
names of the subscribers are not libelous or obscene.
But there was prior restraint, which pertains that it is
unconstitutional. The law standing alone entails a prior
restraint, which declares it unconstitutional. But the SC
looked at the provision as a whole, which makes the law
constitutional.
The moment the law was contextualized, it was
discovered that the reason why the law compels one to
publish the names of the subscribers is because they
want to monitor campaign expenses. And the reason is
equalize opportunities to public service.
In other words, if you exceed campaign expenses, that
cannot be allowed. This is the reason why we compel
them to publish the names of subscribers.
There was no prior restraint because it is actually inferior
with the purpose of the law that we need to equalize
public opportunities.
Take note:
A word, phrase, or omission may mean one thing, but
when you contextualize, it means something else.
[MTRCB – before the film is being shown to public, they
will watch the entirety of the film. They do not cut the
scenes but they classify [sex/violence], if they find many
of those things, they will “X” the film. So, if you are the
producer, you are compelled to cut the scenes on your
own. – this prior watching of the film is considered as
prior restraint.
But in the old case, the SC declared that there is no prior
restraint here, because the MTRCB is only classifying. It
does not prevent your work of art to be shown publicly.]
Matibag v. Benipayo
In this case, there is an independent constitutional body.
If you are appointed in this body, in a temporary
capacity, is not allowed. But a temporary appointment
can be revoked. That is, when the President appoints
someone in the COMELEC in a temporary capacity,
what happens is that if the President does not like what
the appointee is doing in the COMELEC, he is going to
revoke the appointment. And it is here when it violates
the independence to the public, exactly why it cannot be
allowed. You cannot appoint a person to the COMELEC
in a temporary capacity because it becomes
unconstitutional. It violates the separation of powers.
In the case at hand, somebody was appointed when
there was a RECESS in the Congress. This appointment
is called ad interim appointment. And ad interim
appointment is temporary and simply defined in the
dictionary as “for the time being.” By being temporary, it
violates the independent character on the COMELEC.
But the SC did not employ the plain meaning of ad
interim; rather they construe it as permanent by virtue of
context. The SC claimed that if we contextualize ad
interim in Philippine jurisprudence and law, it means
something else – it means permanent.
“ad interim” manner v. nature, of appointment.
The ad interim appointment of the President is by
manner of appointment, not by nature of appointment.
This is because, if we put it by nature of appointment, it
simply becomes temporary. But what we are describing
in this case is the manner of appointment – this
becomes permanent in character.
Punctuation.
The importance of punctuation as an intrinsic aid is of
low degree. It is a minor and not decisive or controlling
element in the interpretation of a statute.
Unless, warranted by the legislative intent, the
punctuations will matter.
Calderon v. Carale
There is a law that says the NLRC Chair and
Commissioners are to be appointed by the President.
However, their appointments are going to be subjected
to the action of Commission of Appointments. But it
stated in the case that there was no need for CoA. In the
law, there are multiple phrases separated by punctuation
marks.
The first sentence talks about the processes: first, the
President nominates; then the Commission on
Appointments provides its consents; if there is consent,
the President can now appoint you. In the enumeration,
you do not fine the word “NLRC Chair.” But there is a
part in the law, there it says “and other officers whose
appointments are vested in me in this Constitution.” Stat
Con – Pre-Finals | Atty. FGS Gujilde | by: Bayocboc,
Jr., Yolando
9
Thus, you look at the entirety of the Constitution and
whether the Constitution says that to be an officer, the
President must appoint you – subject to the consent of
the CoA. The “and others” – is not ejusdem generis –
because it pertains to specific officers vested in the
Constitution. And further, the law says “but not otherwise
provided for by law” – this means, if the law is silent on
who is the appointing authority, the President will
appoint. This is because the President is the default
upon the authority if the law is silent.
In the 2nd sentence [of the law], it does not mention of
undergoing process under the CoA. Thus, the NLRC
belongs to this line. Hence, the NLRC chair does not
need to undergo the CoA.
Period. [continuity of the same case]
If you are not in the 1st sentence, you belong to the 2nd
sentence. And the sentences are separated by the
punctuation of “period.”
Hyphen.
[you cannot be elected as SK, if you are not a member
of the KK]
Topacio v. Paredes
In this case, the term “governor-elect” is with hyphen.
But the “third member elect” has no hyphen.
What happens if the word “elect” is attach to a position,
such as “governor”? It means that you have won or
elected as officer, but not yet assumed the office
because it is not yet your term. The moment the present
governor steps down, the governor-elect will assume
office, be referred as governor. [no more elect]
But the “governor-elect” [with hyphen] & “third member
elect” [no hyphen], as a general rule, hyphens do not
matter. But other times, it will matter, such as this case.
Comma.
Moreno v. COMELEC
If you are on probation, you do not spend time on jail.
But you report on your probation officer every month.
The officer may impose duty on you like doing
community service; to prove that you are worthy and
safe to go back to mainstream of society.
In this case, it talks about disqualification from running
for public office. It says that if one is convicted with a
crime involving moral turpitude, or a crime carrying at
least 1 year of imprisonment(,) are disqualified for 2
years from serving sentence.
Moral turpitude involves mental dishonesty, such as
falsification, or estafa. Imagine someone convicted with
dishonesty is going to run for public office.
In the case at hand, there was conviction of Moreno.
However, the law says “after 2 years from serving
sentence” → this a modifier of the 2 kinds of conviction
in the law. It means that it applies both of the crime
involving moral turpitude or any crime involving 1 year
imprisonment. That is, Moreno did not serve time,
because he was on probation. The disqualification does
not apply to him.
Comma as modifier.
Because of the modifier, which is comma (,), that
modifier applies to both crimes.
Capitalization.
Capitalization has no bearing, unless in other case, it
warrants legislative intent.
Unabia v. City Mayor
In this case, there is a capitalization of the terms “Civil
Service” & a lowercase “civil service.” It would seem that
the SC says it does not matter whether it is capital or
not; there is no difference. However, the SC claimed that
if at all there is a difference – the “Civil Service” refers to
the group of classified employee of the government; but
the “civil service” refers to the system. But there is no
bearing at all insofar as the security of tenure is
concerned.
Language or lingual text.
Language of promulgation prevails over the language of
translation. (e.g. RPC – Spanish text prevails over
English text).
Title.
Resort may be had to the title of a statute as an aid in its
interpretation. In expressive, it may resolve doubts as to
its proper construction by extending its purview or by
restraining it or by correcting an obvious error.
Poe v. COMELEC
Poe was questioned about her citizenship of running as
President in the Philippines. The problem of Poe was
that she was a foundling and her parents were unknown.
Further, the oppositions claimed that they can never tell
that she is a natural born Filipino.
There are two laws of adoptions presented here, viz,
inter-country adoption and domestic adoption. In the
titles of the two adoptions, those who may be adopted
are Filipino children.
The SC claimed that if Poe was adopted, she is a
Filipino child because the adoption title presupposes that
you cannot be adopted if you are not a Filipino citizen to
begin with. If she was adopted, it presupposes that she
is a child of a Filipino. The titles were used as intrinsic
aid of construction.
Also, inter-country adoption law is 1995, and domestic
adoption law is 1998. The SC uses the 1990’s law,
where in fact, Poe was born in 1968. This case is merely
an accommodation of Grace Poe to run in Presidency.
Declaration of policy.
Declaration of policy is part and parcel of the law.
Oposa v. Factoran
Inter-generational responsibility is not found in the body
of the law. But in the declaration of policy, it talks about
the future generations and generations to come. The SC
allowed the minors to sue (with representation) because
it is about inter-generational responsibility. This justifies
their locus standi to go to SC.
Chapter, article and section headings.
Normally, a chapter says 2 or 3 words. For example, Bill
of Rights – the following articles and subsections talks
about civil and political rights. The headings are
introductions that tells you what to expect insofar as the
following provisions are concerned.
In case of doubt the SC can use chapters, articles, and
section headings to unlock some mysteries of the law.
Stat Con – Pre-Finals | Atty. FGS Gujilde | by:
Bayocboc, Jr., Yolando
10
Head notes or epigraphs.
Epigraphs are those in italics in the first line of every article, e.g. RPC. They are only introductory concepts.
In case of discrepancy between the headnote and the texts that follows the headnotes, the texts prevail over the introductions,
because introductions does not tell in specifics but merely introduces, the substance is in the texts.
Marginal notes.
If there is printed copy of the law, the Speaker of the House can insert his/her handwriting to the paper because there was
something missing. The handwritten insertion is the marginal notes. This can be allowed provided there is consent of authority
coming from Congress.
Preamble.
It is not part and parcel of the Constitution. It does not create rights, it does not grant powers. But in ascertaining legislative intent
resort may be made to the preamble.
A PREAMBLE is the key of the statute, to open the minds of the makers as to the mischiefs which are to be remedied, and object
which are to be accompanied, by the provisions of the statute.
Preamble is not a source of right, but a source of light.
In the Constitution, the preamble is clearly indicated. In the law, it states whereas – they are the preamble of the law.
Legislative definitions and interpretative clauses.
Where the legislature has defined the words used in a statute and has declared the construction to be placed thereon, such
definition or construction should be followed by the courts.
Definition sections are not mandatory in the law. One uses the definition prescribed by the law. If not, go outside the law –
extrinsic aid.
In common meanings, you understand it right away, they intrinsic. You can easily understand them in the law. But if there is a
vague word, you consult in the dictionary.
Interpretative clause. This is when Congress says “in case of doubt, it should be in result in favor of…” In other words, the
Congress tries to tell the SC the vague provisions of the law. But it is not binding in the SC because it violates separation of
powers. Stat Con – Pre-Finals | Atty. FGS Gujilde | by: Bayocboc, Jr., Yolando
11
VII. EXTRINSIC AIDS IN CONSTRUCTION Ejercito again claimed it was forged. But the COMELEC
Extrinsic aids, defined. did not believe him.
Extrinsic aids are extraneous facts, circumstances and Assuming it was his signature and all, Ejercito claimed
means of explanation resorted to for the purpose of that the contribution should not be attributed to him. But
determining the legislative intent. the issue was on campaign expenses. The SC looked at
Simply, they are aids existing outside the printed page of the law and there was an ambiguous part there – you
the law. They are found outside of the four walls of the cannot find contribution or donation in the law.
law. But the SC says contribution and donation is included
Resort to extrinsic aids, when. from the basis of its legislative history. The reason why
If all the intrinsic aids have been availed of and the we limit campaign expenses is because when you spend
ambiguity in the statute still exists, resort may then be so much in elections, there is that tendency to reimburse
had to outside or extrinsic aids. the investment by way of corruption.
Order of construction: (not binding) There were at least 4 prior laws that has a common
(1) Intrinsic aids, exhaust these first. denominator which is consistent that includes
contribution and donation from 3rd party. That is how the
We first go to this because it is the best measure of SC unlocks the ambiguity in the case. It went back 1971
exposition. This is the best gauge of what the law really & 1978. Thus, contributors and donations are included in
means because they include the express language of campaign expenses. Otherwise we encouraged the
the law. But again, this is not binding in the SC – it investments, and it will spawn corruption.
violates separation of powers. President’s message to legislature.
(2) Extrinsic aids. The President can go to Congress and tell them what
laws to prioritize is by SONA. But this does not violate
This is the second resort if the intrinsic aids are of no the separation of powers; rather they are merely
use. coordinating to each other.
But sometimes the SC, go directly to the extrinsic aids, Characteristics of separation of powers (CIC):
because the rules of construction does not bind the SC. (1) Co-equal. [one is not above the other]
(3) Legislative deliberation, last resort. (2) Independent. [exactly why they are separate]
(3) Coordinate.
Extrinsic aids, enumerated.
Contemporaneous circumstances. Separation of powers does not necessarily entail that the
They refer to the facts and circumstances existing at the branches of government are compartmentalize. This is
time in the enactment of the law. In other words, the because along the way, these separated powers would
Congress saw something wrong in the present situation meet halfway and that is why you called as blending of
that impels them to pass a law to remedy the problem. powers.
In the Free Farmer’s case, we distinguish legislative The best example is when the a bill passes to Congress,
purpose, intent, and meaning. it is the President that will approve such and make it a
Intent and purpose, in ordinary parlance, is similar. But law. Hence, there is coordination. So, the President
legislative purpose (look backward), insofar as statutory actually participates in legislation. And that is not
construction is concerned – it is the facts and encroachment the power to legislate. That is blending of
circumstances that impelled Congress the need to pass powers.
a law to remedy the situation. Explanatory note.
In the case of Free Farmers – there was exploitation, Explanatory note introduces what the bill is all about. We
thus, they intend to equalize the economic opportunities put that on top of the bill because it also called Stat Con
of planters. This is the intent. – Pre-Finals | Atty. FGS Gujilde | by: Bayocboc, Jr.,
The legislative intent (look forward) – is the end result of Yolando
the passage of the law. 12
In interpreting a statute, the history of the times and the
state of things existing when the same was framed or
adopted may be construed.
Legislative history.
The first extrinsic aid that courts have turned to in
construing a statute is the history of the measure during
its enactment, that is, from its introduction in the
legislature up to its final passage.
Legislative history is somehow broad. It encompasses
several steps toward the enactment of the law.
Ejercito v. COMELEC
There are 3 pesos per registered voters, and there were
1.5 million voters in Laguna. Ejercito was only allowed
4.5 million campaign expense. But for ABS-CBN alone,
he spent in advertisement to represent himself as
governor of Laguna. Of course, that exceeds the 4.5
million. By this, he was disqualified by the COMELEC.
Ejercito’s defense was expenditure and contribution are
not the same. That is, he was given funds by his
sponsors to be used in the campaign. He claimed that
he did not spend on the 23 million and should not be
added in his campaign expense.
There are 3 provisions cited in the case. Ejercito claimed
that the 3 provisions does not apply to him because
there was only campaign donations given to him. He
further claimed that he did not authorize and never knew
about the donation.
The COMELEC said that if there is a donation, you need
to accept. And the acceptance is embodied by consent
and his signature when he accepted the donation. But
as the covering letter. [however, there is no absolute rule that it must be placed on top – but practice and commonsense
tells us that we should place it on top because it introduces.]
Explanatory note is not part and parcel of the law, but it can be a reference if there is ambiguity.
Federation of Free Farmers v. CA
There was import of sugar from the Philippines to the US. And during import, the US prioritize the Philippines with regard
to sugar production. If there is a decrease of production, the US will go to another place of importation. However, there
were only 3 years left upon the expiration of the preferential commitment insofar as US is concerned. And they were
looking for importation from other countries. In other words, the sugar industries were dying. This was the purpose or the
condition of the sugar industry. They want the Congress to pass a law that allows them to salvage the sugar industry.
The SC finds this purpose in the explanatory note. That there is a crisis in the sugar industry. Thus, the Congress tends to
do its police power [there is compulsion here that will right your property or contract]. The explanatory note explains the
urgency of why the Congress needs to pass the law to equalize economic opportunities.
Reports & recommendation of legislative committees.
The reports and recommendations of legislative committees, as recorded in the legislative journals constitute a lucrative
source of information helpful in construction.
(Reports are not controlling and may not be considered for the purpose for clearing and ambiguity.)
Legislative debates, views and deliberations.
This is the best gauge of legislative intent because the court allows the legislative to speak, not just by mere writing. Thus,
we are able to hear what the legislative really has to say beyond the written texts of the law or insofar as the stenographic
journal is concerned.
Poe v. COMELEC
That Poe was a natural born citizen because of her appearance, i.e. citizen by appearance, and the statistics otherwise
favors her to be a Filipino child. Also, the adoption law being used presupposes that she is already a Filipino child.
The 1935 Constitution governs the citizenship of Poe. In the citizenship article, there is no mention of foundling in the
enumeration. Thus, in the expressed language of law, foundling does not belong in the enumeration.
Thus, the SC resorts first in the extrinsic aid before the intrinsic aid. The SC resort to the debates and deliberations of the
Congress. In the deliberations of making the 1935 Const4itution, they mentioned the foundling and consider them as
Filipino citizen. But the makers of the Constitution did not include it in the enumeration because foundlings are only of few
cases.
Legislative deliberation is the best gauge for legislative intent because you can actually hear the lawmakers themselves.
But this is considered as the last resort for extrinsic aid. We quote the deliberations from the Journal of Congress.
Public Policy.
In construing the law, the legislative policy or intent behind the enactment must be ascertained. Where the legislative
policy is so strong, as shown not only by the provisions of the law under examination but also by the amendatory acts
thereto, a construction to carry out the evident policy of the law must be undertaken. E.g. incestuous marriage and those
violate public policy.
Power to construe.
The power to construe not necessarily belongs to the SC. Hence construction is not exclusive to the SC.
Construction by executive orders.
The executive and its agencies can construe the law. As a matter of fact, the executive department is the first to construe
the law. This is because one cannot execute or enforce a law if one does not understand it to begin with.
Executive construction, though not binding, is valid until the SC says otherwise.
Executive construction, kinds.
(1) Pronouncements. [verbal (few) and written].

Quasi-judicial functions.
(2) Decisions by adversary proceedings – BIR. When it issues a ruling, the SC can actually can use it. But it is as good as
it gets precisely because the SC is the final arbiter.

(3) Letter of instruction.

(4) Opinions issued by private officers.

Legislative construction.
Where a particular construction has been adopted by the legislative department and accepted by the various agencies of
the executive department, such construction is entitled to great weight.
Judicial construction.
Judicial decision interpreting certain statutes should be taken into consideration in construing similar subsequent statutes.
Doctrine of stare decisis.
It means that if the SC decided a case today involving a particular set of facts, applying the same set of principles, and 5
days after, it is confronted with the similar state of facts and issues, we apply the same legal principles.
The purpose is the stability of the law, for uniformity and consistency.
1. A lawyer must demonstrate that the court is bound to follow a prior decision because the court sits in the same
jurisdiction as the court that decided the earlier case.
2. A lawyer must demonstrate that the legal issue decided in the earlier case is the same legal issue raised in the case-at-
bar.
3. A lawyer must demonstrate that the facts in the case-at-bar are the same or similar to the facts in the controlling
authority.

Doctrine of stare decisis is not absolute. The SC can change its mind in some period of time.
Obiter dictum.
It is a passing remark or statement. This is not controlling. This is not a source of a precedent. Stat Con – Pre-Finals |
Atty. FGS Gujilde | by: Bayocboc, Jr., Yolando
13
Ledesma v. CA
More or less, nothing in the Constitution uses the word “recommend”; exactly why it gave rise to that ambiguity on
whether or not the order of the Ombudsman for disciplinary action is going to be mandatory or recommendatory.
Within the law itself, although it starts “recommend” that’s on the ambiguity whether or not the Ombudsman is to be
followed; in the same law, it says “to ensure compliance therewith.” Again the context of the law; from recommendatory, it
transforms into mandatory because it says to ensure compliance therewith. The power of the Ombudsman is mandatory.
However, there was a precedent that the SC decided the case to be recommendatory, but the ruling of the precedent
does not apply. This is because the pronouncement is a mere obiter dictum.
Maquiling v. COMELEC
A mayor was issued a disqualification protest. But he won. Then the SC claimed that it should be the 2 nd placer who will
replace him and not the vice mayor.
This is because, if you are a disqualified candidate, you are not a candidate to begin with. The 2nd placer is actually the 1st
placer among qualified candidates.
However, it mentions also in this case that there was a previous case that issues a ruling that the 2 nd placer cannot be
proclaimed the mayor because he is not the chosen by the people.
Quote: “the need for victory cannot be transferred to an ineligible candidate.” In other words, regardless of what happens
to the 1st placer, the 2nd placer cannot be proclaimed the winner because he is not the chosen by the people.
In declaring who is the mayor would depend on what doctrine to follow.
(1) If the ground for disqualification is because you are not a candidate to begin with, the 2 nd placer can be proclaimed
winner.
(2) But if you are a candidate to begin with, but you offended election laws along the way, the 2 nd placer cannot replace
him because the 1st placer was a valid candidate.

But the SC did not follow the prior ruling of the previous case because the ruling was mere obiter dictum. However, the
SC believed that this ruling [the quote] was a ratio decidendi.
In case of disqualifications in election laws, it will be in favor from the decision of the sovereign. But again, it depends on
the grounds.
Obiter dictum and ratio decidendi, distinguished.
Obiter dictum is not controlling in cases. But ratio decidendi, which is the main reason why the court made its ruling, is
binding and controlling to be a weight for the case to be controlling.
Ratio decidendi as the main reason of the ruling of a case addresses the crux of the controversy; otherwise, if not, it is
only obiter dictum.
One reason why obiter dictum is controlling because the justices are presumed to know too much; if they know too much,
they have plenty to unload and write more to the relevant issues in the case.
*** in the exam, you have to identify if the issues being detected addresses the main issue of the case.
Construction by the Bar.
Those who are part of the bar are the lawyers, judges.
A construction of a statute given to it by the Bar of the state for many years is entitled to consideration and weight.
Textbooks.
Legal textbooks are also used for extrinsic aid for construction.
Poe v. COMELEC
The SC normally goes to the textbooks authored by Agpalo if it wants to consult statutory construction. Martin is dead
(1980’s guy).
Dictionaries.
The courts may resort to legal, scientific or general dictionaries if there is ambiguity in the law, and there are no definition
sections in the law (cause they are not mandatory), the SC can refer to dictionaries for its meaning.
Lexicographers.
Definitions given by lexicographers cannot always be adopted.
Matibag v. Benipayo
The term “ad interim” means for the meantime or temporary. The temporary word becomes permanent by virtue of
context.
Foreign jurisprudence.
Our constitution is adopted from the US constitution. The Philippine SC can use the decisions of the foreign jurisprudence
but not mandatory. It is only persuasive and a mere guide.
There has been numerous number of foreign jurisprudence followed by the Philippine courts. So, we cut the umbilical cord
from the foreign jurisprudence. We only use American jurisprudence where there is a particular aspect that concerns the
Philippine laws.
Morales v. CA
The condonation doctrine has finally been abandoned by the SC. This is because we realize that under Philippine laws
and jurisprudence, it has no basis.
Doctrine of implications and inferences.
This is a doctrine that which is implied in a statute where it is much a part of it as that which is expressed.
Presumption in aid of construction.
There is a presumption in favor of constitutionality. However, if there is doubt, it will be favored of constitutionality.
(1) In general.

There are numerous presumption have been availed of by the courts as aids in the construction of statutes.
(2) Presumption that the legislature acted within the scope of its authority.

It is the duty of the courts to assume that the lawmaking power was acting within the scope of its authority. Stat Con –
Pre-Finals | Atty. FGS Gujilde | by: Bayocboc, Jr., Yolando
14
(3) Presumption against violation of international law.

It shall be presumed that construing a statute is in harmony and in agreement with the rules and principles of intentional
law.
(4) Presumption against extra-territorial operation of statutes.

It is presumed that a statute is confined in its operation within the territorial limits of the state enacting it.
(5) Presumption against unconstitutionality.

Every presumption should be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of a statute, and the burden of proof is on him who
claims that sa statute is unconstitutional.
(6) Presumption of validity of Sec. 2175 of the Rev. A.C. barring ecclesiastics from appointment or election to a municipal
office.

Reason of the dissenting Seven:

a. Supremacy of the Constitution.
b. Sec. 2175 of the Rev. Adm. Code is superseded or rendered inoperative by the Constitution.
c. Sec. 2175 – repealed by Sec. 23 of the Election Code (1971).

Reason of the minority (but controlling) five:

(7) Every act of the legislature is presumed to be constitutional until the contrary is clearly shown.

(8) A law should not be interpreted in a manner that would render its application violative of a constitutional inhibition.

(9) Presumption against inconsistency.

The legislative mind is presumed to be consistent, hence, its enactments are presumed to be consistent with each other.
(10) Presumption against injustice.

In case of doubt, it shall be presumed that the legislature intended right and justice to prevail.
(11) Presumption as to the motive of the legislature.

It is presumed that the legislature acted from honorable motives in accordance with reason and common sense.
(12) Presumption in favor of beneficial operation of statutes.

It shall be presumed that the legislature intended to enact a valid and permanent statute which would have the most
beneficial effect that its language permits.
(13) Presumption against inconvenience.

If there is ambiguity that will lead to great inconvenience, the court may adopt some other construction in order to avoid
such results.
(14) Presumption against absurdity.

It is presumed that the legislature does not intend an absurdity or that its enactments produce absurd results.
Whenever possible, a legal provision must not be so construed to be a useless surplusage, and accordingly meaningless,
in the sense of adding nothing of the law or having no effect whatsoever thereon.
(15) Presumption against ineffectiveness of statutes.

Presumptions are indulged against a construction which would render a statute ineffective or inefficient.
Where the language of the law is susceptible of two or more constructions, one which will render the statute ineffective or
inefficient and another which will tend to give effect to the evident intent of the legislature, the latter construction must be
made there being a presumption against ineffectiveness of statutes.
(16) Presumption as to public policy.

A statute will be presumed to be in accordance, or not to be intended to conflict, with the public policy of the state.
(17) Presumption against irrepealable laws.

The legislature is presumed not to intend its enactment to be irrepealable or to divest the state of any portion of its
sovereignty.
(18) Presumption against repeal.

The presumption against repeal is stronger.

(19) Presumption against unnecessary changes in the laws.

It may be presumed that by enacting a statute the legislature intended some change in the existing law, it is also
presumed that the legislature did not intend to make any alteration in the existing law beyond what is explicitly declared
either expressly or by implication.
(20) Presumption against implied repeals.

Repeals by implication are not favored; hence the presumption against implied repeals.
(21) Implied repeals not favored.

(22) Presumption of acquiescence to judicial construction.

Where a particular construction has been placed in a statute by the court, and the legislature at its subsequent session
has left the statute materially unchanged, it is presumed that the legislature has acquiesced in that interpretation.
(23) Presumption to existing laws.

Laws are presumed to have been passed with full knowledge of all existing laws on the subject.
(24) Presumption in favor of exceptions to general language.
It is presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its general language which would avoid injustice, oppression or
absurdity, if a literal construction is adopted.
(25) Presumption as to jurisdiction of courts.

It is presumed that the legislature by its enactments does not intend to oust or restrict the jurisdiction of superior courts, or
to vest a new jurisdiction in them, unless there are express words or a necessary implication to that effect.
(26) Presumption as to foreign laws.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, the laws of other states will be presumed to be in accordance with those of the state of the
forum