STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION MIDTERM REVIEWER

CHAPTER 1: GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Statutory Construction
Has been defined as the art or process of discoerin!
and e"po#ndin! the $eanin! and intention of the
a#thors of the %a& &ith respect to its app%ication to a
!ien case' &here that intention is rendered do#btf#%'
a$on! others' b( reason of the fact that the !ien
case is not e"p%icit%( proided for in the %a& )Ca%te"
*+hi%ippines, Inc - +a%o$ar' ./ SCRA 0123
Statute
Is an act of the %e!is%at#re as an or!ani4ed bod(5 it is
the &ritten &i%% of the %e!is%at#re' e"pressed accordin!
to the for$ necessar( to constit#te it a %a& of the
state' and rendered a#thentic b( certain prescribed
for$s and so%e$nities-
RULE 1: Subject of Statutory Construction- Only statutes
with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be subject of
statutory construction.
RULE 2: Statutory Construction, Essentially Judicial:
Although it is true under proper circumstances that some aid
may be derived from executive or legislative construction of
statutes, it is ultimately the courts province and duty to
construe laws enacted by the legislature.
CHAPTER 2: JUDICIAL AUTHORIT AND DUT
A! COURT"S PRI#AR DUT TO APPL THE LA$
RULE 1: Where the law is clear, the court may not, on grounds
of convenience, expediency or prompt dispatch of cases,
disregard the law or circumvent the same. The remedy lies
with the legislature if it could be convinced of the necessity of
amending the law. -
RULE 2: The first and fundamental duty of the courts is to
apply the law. onstruction and interpretation come only after
it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inade!uate without them. "t is not within the power of a court to
set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory
provision.
RULE %: The first and fundamental duty of the courts is to
apply the law. Where the language of the law is clear and the
intent of the legislature is e!ually plain, there is no room for
interpretation and construction of the statute.
RULE &: "f the language of the statute is clear, plain, and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation, leaving the court no room for
any extended ratiocination or rationali#ation of the laws.
'! COURTS HA(E NO PO$ER TO CHANGE THE LA$
RULE 1: ourt has no power to change, but only to interpret,
the law as it stands at any given time.
C! COURTS #UST NOT DISTINGUISH $HERE THE LA$
DOES NOT DISTINGUSH!
RULE 1: When the law does not distinguish the courts
should not distinguish. The r#%e' fo#nded on %o!ic' is a
coro%%ar( of the princip%e that !enera% &ords and phrases in a
stat#te sho#%d ordinari%( be accorded their nat#ra% and !enera%
si!nificance-
D! DUT O) COURTS TO E))ECTUATE POLIC OR
PURPOSE O) THE LA$!
RULE 1: Once the policy or purpose of the law has been
ascertained, effect should be given to it by the judiciary.
D! LEGISLATI(E )INDINGS O) )ACT 'ND THE COURTS
RULE 1: "t is not the courts duty to examine the validity of
legislative findings articulated in the statute.

CHAPTER %: RULES O) CONSTRUCTION
Pur*ose o+ Construction
The p#rpose of a%% r#%es as to the constr#ction of stat#tes
is to discoer the tr#e intention of the %a&- S#ch r#%es are
#sef#% on%( in case of do#bt' and are neer to be #sed to create
do#bt b#t on%( to re$oe it-
A! PRESU#PTIONS TO AID CONSTRUCTION
N#$ero#s pres#$ptions obtain as aids in the constr#ction
of stat#tes' s#ch as *., t,at t,e act e-*resses t,e intention
o+ t,e .e/is.ator' *0, t,at t,e .e/is.ature acte0 1it, +u..
2no1.e0/e as to e-istin/ con0itions' and *6, t,at t,e
.e/is.ature 0i0 not inten0 un3ust4 or unreasona5.e
consen6uences!
A!1! PRESU#PTION AGAINST INE))ECTI(ENESS
RULE 1: "n the interpretation of a statute, t,e court s,ou.0
start 1it, t,e assu7*tion t,at t,e .e/is.ature inten0e0 to
enact an e++ect8e .a14 and the legislature is not presumed to
have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute.
A!2! PRESU#PTION AS TO $ORDS4 PHRASES4 AND
PRO(ISIONS!
RULE 1: resumption as to words, phrases, and
pro!isions used in statutes include "#$ presumptions that
the legislature understood their meaning and intended their
use, and "%$ used them in their ordinary and common
meaning, and "&$ that every word sentence, sentence, or
provision has a purpose and is to be given effect.
'! LEGISLATI(E INTENT
RULE 1: The fundamental rule of statutory construction is
to ascertain and, if possible, give effect to the intention or
purpose of the $egislature as expressed in the statute.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION MIDTERM REVIEWER
'!1! INTENT ASCERTAINED )RO# THE LANGUAGE USED
RULE 1: The intent of the legislature is to be ascertained
primarily from the language used in the statute, with the
aid of the canons of construction.
'!2! (ER'A LEGIS
RULE 1: %nder the principles of statutory construction, if the
language of the statute is clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be gi!en its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. &This plain'meaning rule or
verba legis is derived from the maxim index animi sermo est
(speech is the index of the intention) rest on the valid
presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a
statute correctly express its intent and preclude the court from
construing it differently.*
'!%! A#'IGUITIES
A75i/uity is a condition of ad$ittin! t&o or $ore
$eanin!s' of bein! #nderstood in $ore than one &a(' or of
referrin! to t&o or $ore thin!s at the sa$e ti$e- A stat#te is
a$bi!#o#s if it is ad$issib%e of t&o or $ore possib%e
interpretations-
RULE 1: Subject of Statutory Construction. Only when the
law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may the court
interpret or construe its true intent.
RULE 2: ' statue or act may be said to be !ague when it
lac+s comprehensible standards that men ,of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application.- To be declared null and void, an act
must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be
clarified by either a saving clause or by construction. *+eop%e -
Na4ario' .78 SCRA ./7,
RULE %: Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will
avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. 9P!A!A!:
'!&! INTENT ASCERTAINED )RO# THE $HOLE STATUTE
RULE 1: "t is a cardinal rule in statutory construction t,at
.e/is.ati8e intent 7ust 5e ascertaine0 +ro7 a consi0eration
o+ t,e statute as a 1,o.e an0 not 7ere.y o+ a *articu.ar
*ro8ision.
RULE 2: (egislati!e intent must be ascertained from a
consideration of the whole statute. words and phrases and
clauses should not be studied in isolation or detached from the
rest.
RULE %: ;/rovided the interpretation is reasonable and not in
conflict with legislative intent,< all parts of a statute are to be
harmoni)ed and reconciled so that effect may be given to
each and every part thereof.
'!=! INTENT ASCERTAINED )RO# UNI)OR# TREND O)
LEGISLATION
C! CONSTRUCTION TO E))ECT LEGISLATI(E PURPOSE
RULE 1: "n construing a statute, (0) the court must loo* to
the object to be accomplished, the e!ils and mischief
sought to be remedied, or the purpose to be subser!ed
and (1) place on it a reasonable or liberal construction
which will best effect its purpose rather than one which
will defeat it.
RULE 2: 2tatutes are to be construed in the light of the
purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied.
D! SPIRIT OR LETTER
RULE 1: 's a general rule in statutory construction, the
spirit or intention of a statute pre!ails o!er the letter
thereof, and whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within
the statute although it is not within the letter thereof, while that
which is within the letter, but not within the spirit of a statute, is
not within the statute. (343/T"O5) but, where the law is free
from ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded on the
pretext of pursuing its spirit.
RULE 2: Court may consider the spirit and reason of a
statute where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, injustice or would defeat the clear purpose of the
law'ma+ers. 9P!A!A!:
E! E))ECT AND CONSEN>UENCES
RULE 1: Where the language of a statute ade+uately
e,presses the intention of the legislature, it must be given
effect regardless of the conse!uences.
RULE 2: Where the intention of the legislature is so
inade+uately or !aguely e,pressed as to re!uire
construction, the court may consider the results and
conse!uences of any proposed construction, and should, if
possible, avoid a construction which will cause objectionable
results.
RULE %: ' literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would
be unjust or lead to absurd results. 2tatutes should receive
a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the
legislative intention and to avoid an unjust or absurd
conclusion. 9P!A!A!:
)! DOCTRINE O) NECESSAR I#PLICATIONS ? &hat is
i$p%ied in a stat#te is as $#ch a part thereof as that &hich is
e"pressed-
RULE 1: ,5o statute can be enacted that can provide all the
details involved in its application. There is always an omission
that may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the
time of the enactment, to be an all'embracing legislation may
be inade!uate to provide for unfolding events of the future.
The so'called gaps in the law develop as the law enforced.
One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap
is the doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine states
that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as
that which is expressed6.- *Ch#a - CSC, Under this doctrine'
eer( stat#te is #nderstood' b( i$p%ication' to contain a%% s#ch
proisions as $a( be necessar( to effect#ate its ob9ect and
p#rpose-
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION MIDTERM REVIEWER
G! #ATTERS O#ITTED
RULE 1: As a general rule, the courts cannot supply omissions
in a statute
H! #EANING O) $ORDS
H!1! NATURAL @ CO##ONL UNDERSTOOD #EANING
RULE 1: As a !enera% r#%e' words used in a statute are to be
gi!en their usual and commonly understood meaning,
#n%ess it is plain from the statute that a different meaning
is intended.
RULE 2: "t is well settled that the word -may. is merely
permissi!e and operates to confer discretion upon a
party. %nder ordinary circumstances, the term ,may be-
connotes possibility. it does not connote certainty. ,7ay- is an
auxiliary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission, or
possibility.
RULE %: The word -shall. means -ought to, must, , , ,
obligations 8 used to express a command or exhortation,
used in laws, regulations or directives to e,press what is
mandatory..
H!2! RIGHT TO (AR #EANING O) $ORDS
RULE 1: "n interpreting statutes courts must eschew the
tyranny of words and may extend or restrict the ordinary and
usual meaning of the words employed in the statute in order to
give effect to the legislative intent. but the power is exercised
with reluctance and only in extraordinary cases.
RULE 2: In its ordinar( si!nification the word -shall. is
imperati!e or mandatory. Ho&eer' this si!nification is not
a%&a(s fo%%o&ed. it may be construed as -may,. when so
re+uired by the conte,t or by the intention of the statute.
H!%! REASONA'LE @ E))ECTI(E CONSTRUCTION
RULE 1: The words and phrases employed in a statute
should be gi!en a reasonable and sensible construction
so as to ma+e the statute wor+able and effective.
H!&! TECHNICAL TER#S
RULE 1: Words and phrases ha!ing a technical meaning
are construed according to their technical sense' unless it
is apparent that a different meaning was intended by the
legislature.
H!&! ASSOCIATED $ORDS 9Noscitur a sociis:
RULE 1: "n accordance with the rule or maxim of noscitur a
sociis, doubtful words and phrases used in statutes are
construed in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained
by reference to, the words and phrases with which they are
associated.
RULE 2: %nder the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase
should be interpreted in relation to, or gi!en the same
meaning of, words with which it is associated.
I! GENERAL @ SPECI)IC $ORDS
GENERAL RULE: 9eneral words in a statute should receive a
general construction.
I!1! EJUSDE# GENERIS
$,en a**.ica5.eA
RULE 1: Where general words follow the enumeration of
particular classes of persons or things, the general words,
under the rule or maxim of construction +nown as ,ejusdem
generis,- W/(( 0E C12ST34E5 'S '(/C'0(E 12(6 to
persons or things of the same general nature or class as
those enumerated, unless an intention to the contrary is
clearly shown.
RULE 2: The rule of ejusdem generis '(/ES 12(6
where the specific words preceding the general
e,pression are of the same nature.
$,en not a**.ica5.eA
RULE %: 91: "f the intent clearly appears from other parts of the
law, and 92: such intent thus clearly manifested is contrary to
the result which would be reached by the application of the
rule of ejusdem generis, the latter must gi!e way.
J! EBPESS #ENTION AND I#PLIED EBCLUSION
*E:+RESSIO UNIUS EST E:C;USIO A;TERIUS,
$,en a**.ica5.eA
RULE 1: 9enerally, the maxim, ,3xpressio %nius est 3xclusio
Alterius-, is applicable in the construction of statutes, where
the intention of the lawma+ing body is not otherwise clear and
under such rule of construction, where a statute enumerates
the subjects or things on which it is to operate, or the
persons affected, or forbids certain things, it is to be
construed as e,cluding from its effect all those not
e,pressly mentioned.
Li7itations o+ ru.e
RULE 2: The maxim, 3xpressio %nius est 3xclusio
Alterius, is merely an au,iliary rule of statutory
construction which is not of uni!ersal application
and not conclusi!e. it *., should be applied only as a
means of disco!ering the legislati!e intent &hich is not
other&ise $anifest' and *0, should ne!er be permitted to
defeat the plainly purpose of the legislature.
RULE %: The $a"i$' 3xpressio %nius est 3xclusio Alterius , IS
TO 'E IGNORED where other circumstances indicate that the
enumeration was not intended to be exclusive-
C! RELATI(E AND >UALI)ING TER#S AND RELATION
TO ANTECEDENTS
RULE 1: 4nder the doctrine of the -last antecedent,.
relative and !ualifying words, phrases, and clauses are to be
applied to the words or phrase immediately preceding.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION MIDTERM REVIEWER
76 but this rule is to be applied only "#$ where there exist
uncertainties and ambiguities in the statute, and "%$ the clear
intent of the legislature is to be ascertained.8
RULE 2: The doctrine of the -last antecedent,. should
21T 0E '(/E5 "#$ where the intention of the law is to
apply the phrase to all the antecedent O: "%$ when prevented
by the context.
L! CONJUNCTI(E AND DISJUNCTI(E $ORDS
RULE 1: 9enerally the words ,or- and ,and- in a statute are
not treated as interchangeable and their ordinary meaning
should be followed. but such words may be construed
interchangeable when necessary to effectuate the obvious
intention of the legislature.
RULE 2: When -or. is used, the various members of the
enumeration are to be ta+en separately.
#! NEGATI(E AND A))IR#ATI(E $ORDS D SINGULAR
AND PLURAL $ORDS
RULE 1: A;;":7AT"<3 WO:=2 in a statute ordinarily imply
a negati!e of what is not affirmed, and 539AT"<3 WO:=2
therein imply the affirmati!e of what is not negati!ed.
RULE 2: Words in the /$%:A$ number will be construed to
include the singular, and words importing the 2"59%$A:
only will be applied to the plural of persons and things,
where such construction is necessary to give effect to the
legislative intent.
N! Di++erent Lan/ua/es an0 Trans.ation
RULE 1: Where a statute has been enacted in different
languages, both te,ts are to be read in ascertaining the
legislati!e intent, and either text may be loo+ed to in doubtful
cases.
RULE 2: The r#%e that !oerns in this 9#risdiction is that the
English te,t of a law should pre!ail o!er Spanish te,t
when the same had been promulgated in that language.
O! RULES O) GRA##AR
RULE 1: The ordinary rules of grammar will be applied for
the purpose of ascertaining the meaning of a statute, but
they are not controlling when an intent in conflict therewith is
disclosed.
RULE 2: 9enerally, punctuation is no part of a statute' and
cannot control its construction against the manifest intent of
the legislature. but punctuation may, when the meaning of
the statute is uncertain, be loo*ed to in ascertaining the
real meaning.
RULE %: "n construing a statute, the court may punctuate or
disregard the punctuation as may be necessary to
ascertain and gi!e effect to the real intent of the
legislature.
P! $ORDS O#ITTEDDCASUS O#ISSUS
GENERAL RULE: Cas#s O$iss#s
Under the r#%e of <cas#s o$iss#s pro o$isso habend#s est'= a
person or thin! o$itted fro$ an en#$eration $#st be he%d to
hae been o$itted intentiona%%(- )Th#s' SUCH OMISSIONS
CANNOT >E SU++;IED >Y THE COURTS-3
EBCEPTION TO G!R: Whi%e ordinarily the court cannot add to
the words used in a statute, where it appears from the context
that certain words have been inadertent%( *care%ess%(, o$itted
fro$ the sa$e *Cas#s O$iss#s,' the co#rt $a( s#pp%( s#ch
&ords as are necessar( to co$p%ete the sense' and to e"press
the %e!is%atie intent-
RULE: The r#%e of <cas#s o$iss#s pro o$isso habend#s est=
can operate and app%( on%( if and &hen the o$ission has been
c%ear%( estab%ished-
>! INTRINSIC AIDS IN CONSTRUCTION
>!1! STATUTE AS A $HOLE *see Chapter 0, *RU;E 6,

>!2! CON)LICTING PRO(ISIONS
RULE: %nless a legislative intention to the contrary appears,
special or particular provisions O5T:O$ O<3: general
provisions, terms or expressions.
>!%! CONTEBT AND RELATED CLAUSES *re%ate &ith stat#te
as a &ho%e,
RULE: "t is a rule in 2.. that e!ery part of the statute must
be interpreted with reference to the conte,t, i.e., that every
part of the statute must be considered together with other
parts, and +ept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.
>!&! PREA#'LE @ RECITALS
RU;E? "n case of doubt as to the proper construction of the
body of a statute, resort must be had to the preamble or
recitals, for the purpose of ascertaining intent. 7but, where the
enacting part of the statute is unambiguous, its meaning will
not be controlled or affected by the preamble or recitals.8
>!=! TITLE4 HEADINGS4 an0 #ARGINAL NOTES!
GENERAL RULE: "n case of ambiguity in a statute, the title
and headings may be resorted to as an aid in the
ascertainment of legislative intent.
EBCEPTION TO G!R!: The title to the articles being nothing
more than a convenient index to the contents of the ode, they
cannot in any e!ent ha!e the effect of modifying or
limiting the unambiguous words of the te,t.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION MIDTERM REVIEWER
R! EBTRINSIC AIDS IN CONSTRUCTION
$,en a**.ica5.eA
RULE: Where the language of the provision appears to be
ambiguous' 3E(/'2CE :'6 0E :'5E 12 E;T3/2S/C
'/5S such as the records of the deliberations of the body that
framed the law in order to ascertain the real intent.
R!1! EBISTING GENERAL or PU'LIC POLIC O) STATE
RULE: "n construing an ambiguous statute, resort may be
had to the general or public policy of the state, unless the
intent of the legislature is clearly to depart from that policy.
R!2! CONTE#PORANEOUS CIRCU#STANCES
RULE: Where the language of the statute is ambiguous, the
courts should consider the circumstances e,isting at the
time the law was enacted.
R!%! #OTI(ES an0 OPINIONS O) LEGISLATURE or ITS
#E#'ERS or O) THIRD PERSONS!
GENERAL RULE: in construing a statute the court W/((
21T in+uire into the moti!es and opinions of the
legislature or its members, or of third persons.
RULE: ourts are not bound by a legislators opinion
expressed in ongressional debates regarding the
interpretation of a particular legislation.
R!&! HISTOR an0 PASSAGE O) ACT
RULE: "n order to determine the legislative intent in case of
ambiguity, resort may be had to the history of the statute.
R!=! LEGISLATI(E DE'ATES AND REPORTS O)
CO##ITTEES OR CO##ISSIONS

GENERAL RULE: As a general rule where a statute is
ambiguous resort may be had to legislati!e debates and
reports of committees or commissions as an aid to
construction, >%T such materials will not be considered
where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous.
RULE: Courts may a!ail themsel!es of the actual
proceedings of the legislati!e body to assist in determining
the construction of a statute of doubtful meaning.
RULE: "n case of doubt as to what a provision of a statute
means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative
deliberations may be adopted.
S! CONTE#PORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION
RULE: Where the language of a statute is ambiguous or
uncertain, the construction placed on it by contemporaries
may be resorted to as an aid in ascertaining the legislati!e
intent.
RULE: Whi%e conte$poraneo#s constr#ction is not decisie for
the co#rts' (et &here a constr#ction of stat#tes has been
adopted b( the %e!is%atie depart$ent and accepted b( the
ario#s a!encies of the e"ec#tie depart$ent' it is entit%ed to
!reat respect-
T! PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION OR USAGE GENERALL
Co$$on%( #sa!e and practice #nder a stat#te are of !reat
a%#e in deter$inin! its $eanin! &here the stat#te is
a$bi!#o#s-
U! EBECUTI(E CONSTRUCTION
a- @#a%ification of R#%es
The consideration of e,ecuti!e or
administrati!e construction in construing a statute
"#$ should be restricted to cases in which the meaning
of the statute is really doubtful, and "%$ the courts are
not bound to follow, or justified in following, an
executive which is clearly erroneous.
b- App%ication of R#%es
The r#%es as to the &ei!ht and si!nificance to
be !ien in the constr#ction of a stat#te to the
conte$poraneo#s constr#ction p%aced on it b( the
officers char!ed &ith its e"ec#tion and ad$inistration
hae been app%ied in the constr#ction of a &ide ariet(
of stat#tes b( ario#s officers' boards' and
co$$issions-
RULE: Contemporaneous construction placed upon a
statute by e,ecuti!e officers charged with implementing
and enforcing the pro!isions of the statute should be
gi!en controlling weight, %5$322 such interpretation is
clearly erroneous.
(! LEGISLATI(E CONSTRUCTION
The constr#ction of a stat#te b( the %e!is%atie' as
indicated b( the %an!#a!e of %ater enact$ents' is entit%ed to
consideration as an aid in the constr#ction of the stat#te' b#t is
not !enera%%( re!arded as contro%%in!-
A- Constr#ction &ith reference to other %a&s
.- In Benera%
Stat#tes are to be constr#ed in
connection and in har$on( &ith the e"istin! %a&s' and as a
part of a !enera% and #nifor$ s(ste$ of 9#rispr#dence-
0- Constr#ction &ith Reference to Cii% ;a&
a- In those states or co#ntries
&hose 9#rispr#dence based on
the cii%' rather than on the
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION MIDTERM REVIEWER
co$$on %a&' stat#tes &i%% be
constr#ed &ith reference to the
princip%es of the cii% %a&-

6- Constr#ction &ith Reference to other
Stat#tes
a- Benera%%( &here a stat#te is
#ncertain and on its face
s#sceptib%e of $ore than one
constr#ction' the co#rt $a( %ooC
to prior and conte$poraneo#s
stat#tes to deter$ine its
$eanin!5 b#t the proisions of
another dissi$i%ar are not
pers#asie-
1- Stat#tes Re%atin! to Sa$e S#b9ect Matter
in Benera%- *In pari $ateria,
a- Benera% R#%es
Stat#tes &hich re%ate to the
sa$e person or thin!' or to the
sa$e c%ass of persons or thin!s' or
&hich hae a co$$on p#rpose are
in pari $ateria' and it is a !enera%
r#%e that in the constr#ction of a
partic#%ar stat#te' or in the
interpretation of its proisions' a%%
other stat#tes in pari $ateria sho#%d
be read in connection &ith it' as
to!ether constit#tin! one %a&' and
the( sho#%d be har$oni4ed' if
possib%e-
b- ;i$itations of R#%e of +ari
Materia-
The !enera% r#%e that the
$eanin! of a stat#te $a( be
deter$ined fro$ its constr#ction in
connection &ith other stat#tes in pari
$ateria is not one of #niersa%
app%ication' b#t is resorted to on%( in
search of %e!is%atie intent5 and the
r#%e cannot be inoCed &here the
%an!#a!e of a stat#te is c%ear and
#na$bi!#o#s-
d- +artic#%ar Stat#te
.- In Benera%
The !enera% r#%e of
constr#ction that a%%
stat#tes in pari $ateria are
to be constr#ed to!ether
b#t that stat#tes not in pari
$ateria need not be
constr#ed to!ether has
been app%ied in the
constr#ction of n#$ero#s
partic#%ar stat#tes-
0- Re$edies' +%eadin!'
+ractice' and
+roced#re
The !enera% r#%e
that' &here the $eanin! of
a stat#te is do#btf#%' it $a(
or sho#%d be constr#ed in
connection &ith other
stat#tes dea%in! &ith the
sa$e or re%ated s#b9ect
$atter has been app%ied
&ith respect to the
constr#ction of stat#tes
concernin! re$edies'
p%eadin!' practice and
proced#re-
6- Ta"ation
The r#%e that
stat#tes in paar $ateria
$#st be constr#ed to!ether
in deter$inin! the $eanin!
of a$bi!#o#s proisions is
pec#%iar%( pertinent in
constr#in! stat#tes dea%in!
&ith ta"ation' b#t the co#rt
&i%% not consider other
stat#tes &here the( are not
in pari $ateria' or &here
the stat#te in D#estion is
c%ear and #na$bi!#o#s-
8- Stat#tes Adopted at Sa$e Session
a- In Benera%
The r#%e that stat#tes
in pari $ateria sho#%d be
constr#ed to!ether and
har$oni4ed' if possib%e'
app%ies &ith pec#%iar force to
stat#tes passed at the sa$e
session of the %e!is%at#re'
especia%%( &here the( are
passed or approed on the
sa$e da(5 b#t c%ear and
#na$bi!#o#s proisions in a
stat#te $#st be !ien their
ordinar( $eanin! &itho#t
re!ard to other stat#tes
adopted b( the sa$e
%e!is%at#re-
b- Conf%ictin! or Inconsistent
Stat#tes
Benera%%(' stat#tes
adopted at the sa$e session
of the %e!is%at#re are not to be
constr#ed as inconsistent or in
conf%ict if it is possib%e to
constr#e the$ other&ise' b#t'
&here the( are necessari%(
inconsistent' the D#estion of
&hich sha%% taCe effect
depends on the intent of the
%e!is%at#re and ordinari%( the
stat#te %atest in point of ti$e
&i%% preai%-
7- Conf%ictin! stat#tes
a- Stat#tes in pari $ateria'
a%tho#!h in apparent conf%ict'
or containin! apparent
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION MIDTERM REVIEWER
inconsistencies' sho#%d as far
as reasonab%( possib%e' be
constr#ed in har$on( &ith
each other' so as to !ie force
and effect to each5 b#t if there
is an #nreconci%ab%e conf%ict'
the %atest enact$ent &i%%
contro%' or &i%% be re!arded as
an e"ception to' or
D#a%ification of' the prior
stat#te-
b- When the co#rts are
confronted &ith apparent%(
conf%ictin! stat#tes' the(
sho#%d not dec%are o#tri!ht the
ina%idit( of one a!ainst the
other' the( sho#%d endeaor to
reconci%e the$-
2- Benera% and Specia% Stat#tes
a- Benera% and specia% stat#tes
sho#%d be read to!ether and
har$oni4ed' if possib%e5 b#t' to
the e"tent of an( necessar(
rep#!nanc( bet&een the$'
the specia% stat#te &i%% preai%
oer the !enera% #n%ess it
appears that the %e!is%at#re
intended to $aCe the !enera%
act contro%%in!-
b- Where there are t&o stat#tes'
the ear%ier specia% and the
%ater !enera%E the ter$s of the
!enera% broad eno#!h to
inc%#de the $atter proided for
in the specia% F the fact that
one is specia% and the other is
!enera% creates a pres#$ption
that the specia% is to be
considered as re$ainin! an
e"ception to the !enera% ' one
as a !enera% %a& of the %and'
the other as the %a& of a
partic#%ar case-
f- The fact that one stat#te is
specia% and the other !enera%
creates a pres#$ption that the
specia% is to be considered as
re$ainin! an e"ception to the
!enera%' one as a !enera% %a&
of the %and' the other as the %a&
of a partic#%ar case- Ho&eer'
the r#%e readi%( (ie%ds to a
sit#ation &here the specia%
stat#te refers to a s#b9ect in
!enera%' &hich the !enera%
stat#te treats in partic#%ar-
!- As bet&een specific and
!enera% stat#te' the for$er
$#st preai% since it einces
the %e!is%at#re intent $ore
c%ear%( than a !enera% stat#te
does- And &here a
reconci%iation bet&een the
stat#te is possib%e' as in the
case bar ' the for$er sho#%d be
dee$ed an e"ception to the
%atter-
h- The r#%e is that a specia% and
%oca% stat#te app%icab%e to a
partic#%ar case is not repea%ed
b( a %ater stat#te &hich is
!enera% in its ter$s' proisions
and app%ication een if the
ter$s of the !enera% act are
broad eno#!h to inc%#de the
cases n the specia% %a& #n%ess
there is $anifest intent to
repea% or a%ter the specia% %a&-
9- A specia% %a& $#st be intended
to constit#te an e"ception to
the !enera% %a& in the absence
of specia% circ#$stances
forcin! a contrar( conc%#sion-