NOTES AND CASES

IN POLITICAL LAW

Volume II May 2009 Edition (For the September 2009 Bar Examinations) (BILL OF RIGHTS)

Prepared by:

ATTY. LARRY D. GACAYAN
Professor of Law (Constitutional Law Review, Constitutional Law 1 & 2)) UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS-BCF, BAGUIO CITY

Pre-Bar Reviewer COSMOPOLITAN LAW REVIEW CENTER (CRC) (Political Law) Baguio City UNIVERSITY OF PANGASINAN PRE-BAR REVIEW CENTER Dagupan City LEX REVIEW CENTER Zamboanga City

BAGUIO POWER-HAUS BAR REVIEW CENTER (Political Law) Baguio City, Santiago City, Isabela and Dipolog City

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CHAPTER 1 FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE (Police Power) 1. Define:
A.

police power---is the power vested in the legislature by the Constitution to make, ordain, establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws for the good and welfare of the State and its people. (ERMITA MALATE HOTEL VS. CITY MAYOR, July 31, 1967)

The basic purposes of police power are: to promote the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people; (ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. SECRETARY, 175 SCRA 343; US VS. TORIBIO, 15 Phil. 85 b. to promote and preserve public health; (VILLANUEVA VS. CASTANEDA, September 21, 1987; DECS VS. SAN DIEGO, 180 SCRA 533 [NMAT]; LORENZO VS. DIRECTOR OF HEALTH, 50 Phil. 595— apprehend and confine lepers in a leprosarium)
a.

PROFESSIONAL REGULATIONS COMMISSION VS. ARLENE DE GUZMAN, ET AL., June 21, 2004

THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE A PROFESSION Facts: After the Professional Regulations Commission (PRC) released the names of successful examinees in the Medical Licensure Examination, the Board of Medicines observed that the grades of the 79 Fatima College of Medicine successful examinees were unusually and exceptionally high in the two (2) most difficult subjects of the exam, i.e., Biochemistry and Obstetrics and Gynecology. The Board then issued Resolution No. 19 withholding the registration as physicians of all the examinees from Fatima College of Medicine. Compared with other examines from other schools, the results of those from Fatima were not only incredibly high but unusually clustered close to each other. The NBI Investigation found that the “Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions.” Held: It must be stressed that the power to regulate the practice of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State in an arbitrary, despotic or oppressive manner. However, the regulating body

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has the right to grant or forbid such privilege in accordance with certain conditions. But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, their exercise may be regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. As such, mandamus will not lie to compel the Board of Medicine to issue licenses for the respondents to practice medicine. RA 2382 which prescribes the requirements for admission to the practice of medicine, the qualifications of the candidates for the board examination, the scope and conduct of the examinations, the grounds for the denying of the issuance of a physician’s license, or revoking a license that has been issued. It is therefore clear that the examinee must prove that he has fully complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by law and the licensing authority to be granted the privilege to practice medicine. In short, he shall have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. The petition is therefore granted. to promote and protect public safety; (AGUSTIN VS. EDU, 88 SCRA 195; TAXICAB OPERATORS VS. JUINIO, 119 SCRA 897 ) d. to maintain and safeguard peace and order; (GUAZON VS. DE VILLA) e. to protect public morals; (CITY OF MANILA VS. JUDGE LAGUIO, JR., 455 SCRA 308; WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION VS. CITY OF MANILA, January 20, 2009; DE LA CRUZ VS. PARAS, 123 SCRA 569; ERMITA MALATE HOTEL VS. CITY MAYOR, July 31, 1967; JMM PROMOTIONS VS. CA, 260 SCRA 319; VELASCO VS. VILLEGAS, February 13, 1983)
c.

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. CITY OF MANILA, represented by MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009 TINGA, J.: With another city ordinance of Manila also principally involving the tourist district as subject, the Court is confronted anew with the incessant clash between government power and individual liberty in tandem with the archetypal tension between law and morality.

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In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., the Court affirmed the nullification of a city ordinance barring the operation of motels and inns, among other establishments, within the Ermita-Malate area. The petition at bar assails a similarly-motivated city ordinance that prohibits those same establishments from offering short-time admission, as well as prorated or “wash up” rates for such abbreviated stays. Our earlier decision tested the city ordinance against our sacred constitutional rights to liberty, due process and equal protection of law. The same parameters apply to the present petition. This Petition challenges the validity of Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, ShortTime Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila” (the Ordinance). The facts are as follows: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the Ordinance.2[4] The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder: SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up rate or other similarly concocted terms, are hereby prohibited in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall mean admittance and charging of room rate for less than twelve (12) hours at any given time or the renting out of rooms more than twice a day or any other term that may be concocted by owners or managers of said establishments but would mean the same or would bear the same meaning. SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall violate any provision of this ordinance shall upon conviction thereof be punished by a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos or imprisonment for a period of not exceeding one (1) year or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court; Provided, That in case of [a] juridical person, the president, the manager, or the persons in charge of the operation thereof shall be liable: Provided, further, That in case of subsequent conviction for the same
1

1[1]

[1]G.R. 118127, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 308.
2 [4]

Id. at 46.

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offense, the business license of the guilty party shall automatically be cancelled. On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order ( TRO)3[5] with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9 impleading as defendant, herein respondent City of Manila (the City) represented by Mayor Lim.4[6] MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of the Victoria Court in Malate, Manila it was authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a short time basis as well as to charge customers wash up rates for stays of only three hours. They contend that the assailed Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power. II. To students of jurisprudence, the facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila ruling, but our 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila.5[40] Ermita-Malate concerned the City ordinance requiring patrons to fill up a prescribed form stating personal information such as name, gender, nationality, age, address and occupation before they could be admitted to a motel, hotel or lodging house. This earlier ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices deemed harmful to public morals. A purpose similar to the annulled ordinance in City of Manila which sought a blanket ban on motels, inns and similar establishments in the Ermita-Malate area. However, the constitutionality of the ordinance in Ermita-Malate was sustained by the Court. The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by these establishments have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens.
3 [5] 4 [6]

Id. at 62-69. Id. at 45-46.

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[40]127 Phil. 306 (1967).

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The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.6[41] A. Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant.7[42] Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people.8[43] Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. These range from the regulation of dance halls,9[44] movie theaters,10[45] gas stations11[46] and cockpits.12[47] The awesome scope of police power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our nation’s legal system, its use has rarely been denied. The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. B. The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as guaranteed under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. Due process evades a precise definition.13[48] The purpose of the guaranty
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[41]City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., supra note 1; Tatel v. Municipality of Virac, G.R. No. 40243, 11 March 1992, 207 SCRA 157, 161; Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority, G.R. No. 102782, 11 December 1991, 204 SCRA 837, 845; Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., G.R. No. 111097, 20 July 1994, 234 SCRA 255, 268-267.
7

[42]Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, 127 Phil. 306 (1967).
8

JMM Promotion and Management Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 87, 94 (1996) citing Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660 (1919).
9[44]

[43]

U.S. v. Rodriguez, 38 Phil. 759. People v. Chan, 65 Phil. 611 (1938). Javier v. Earnshaw, 64 Phil. 626 (1937).

10[45]

11[46]
12 [47] 13

Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal, 56 Phil. 123 (1931).

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is to prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals. The due process guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned. The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct restrictions on government, "procedural due process" and "substantive due process." Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.14[49] Procedural due process concerns itself with government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a hearing. Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.15[50] The question of substantive due process, more so than most other fields of law, has reflected dynamism in progressive legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance of fundamental freedoms. Police power, traditionally awesome as it may be, is now confronted with a more rigorous level of analysis before it can be upheld. The vitality though of constitutional due process has not been predicated on the frequency with which it has been utilized to achieve a liberal result for, after all, the libertarian ends should sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the State. Instead, the due process clause has acquired potency because of the sophisticated methodology that has emerged to determine the proper metes and bounds for its application. C. The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is best tested when assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products.16 [51] Footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to the legislature unless there is a discrimination against a “discrete and insular” minority or infringement of a “fundamental right.”17[52] Consequently, two standards of judicial
[48]See U.S. v. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil. 104 (1908); Insular Government v. Ling Su Fan, 15 Phil. 58 (1910).
14

[49]Lopez v. Director of Lands, 47 Phil. 23, 32 (1924).
15 [50] See City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., supra note 1 at 330 citing CHEMERINSKY, ERWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, 2nd Ed. 523 (2002). 16 [51] 17 [52]

304 U.S. 144 (1938). Id, at 152.

Secretary of Agrarian Reform. G. Central Bank Employee’s Association v.21[56] While the test may have first been articulated in equal protection analysis.S. and the rational basis standard of review for economic legislation.26[61] The United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope 18[53] 19 [54] 20 [55] 21 [56] 22 Craig v.S. 19 November 2001. 71 (1971). governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered. 24[59] 25 [60] Mendoza. Reed. 79310.S.20[55] after the Court declined to do so in Reed v. 429 U. Sandiganbayan. G. 175 SCRA 343. Supreme Court for evaluating classifications based on gender18[53] and legitimacy. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.R. 429 U. A third standard. Nos. strict scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. supra note 1 at 324. laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. 26[61] . 190 (1976). gender.S. 531 (2004). 79744. No.. Clark v.25[60] Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech. 487 Phil. and 79777.19[54] Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. July 14. the permissible scope of regulatory measures is wider. it has in the United States since been applied in all substantive due process cases as well." 23[58] [57] Central Bank Employee’s Association v.8 review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process. but where the liberty curtailed affects what are at the most rights of property.23[58] Under intermediate review. Jeter.22[57] Using the rational basis examination. Concurring Opinion in Estrada v.R. 486 U. 190 (1976). We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges.S.S. Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. 369 SCRA 394. 148560. the Court in fact noted: “if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person. governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest. was later adopted by the U.24[59] Applying strict scrutiny. supra note 57. the standard for the validity of government acts is much more rigorous and exacting. 78742. rather than substantial. 404 U. denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny. In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances. 456 (1988). Supreme Court in Craig. the focus is on the presence of compelling. Id. 1989. Id. Boren. In Ermita-Malate. J. or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.

then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law which we are capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners. 401 U. The right to be let alone is the beginning of all freedom — it is the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. . Our holding therein retains significance for our purposes: We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or impair. Entire families are known to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes. as it was in the City of Manila case. it must include privacy as well. No. A.M. Connecticut.S. The City asserts before this Court that the subject establishments “have gained notoriety as venue of ‘prostitution. Their right to liberty under the due process clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. It has been opined by Chemerinsky that the use of the equal protection clause was to avoid the use of substantive due process since the latter fell into disfavor in the United States.” City of Manila v. 371 (1971). 98 (2000). 23 November 2004) Adults have a right to choose to forge such relationships with others in the confines of their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. In transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays 27[62] Bush v. 28[63] Shapiro v.S. 618 (1969). Gore. it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior among willing married or consenting single adults which is constitutionally protected31[69] will be curtailed as well. 29[64] Rollo. adultery and fornications’ in Manila since they ‘provide the necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry.’”30[68] Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate. PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (2nd ed. 531 U. (See Concerned Employee v. D.9 of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage. Thompson. Boddie v. presence and exit and thus became the ‘ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers. Laguio. supra note 1 at 337-338. if it is to be a repository of freedom. P-02-1564.S. judicial access28[63] and interstate travel. There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a day. 30 [68] 31 [69] “Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke this right to autonomy to consummate their bonds in intimate sexual conduct within the motel's premises — be it stressed that their consensual sexual behavior does not contravene any fundamental state policy as contained in the Constitution. Jr. Hon. Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful government restraint. an injury that would warrant the application of the most deferential standard – the rational basis test. 258. Yet as earlier stated. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows persons the right to make this choice. 2002).29[64] 27[62] If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar. p. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY. 394 U. as long as they do not run afoul of the law. we recognize the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons – those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question. Liberty should be the rule and restraint the exception. It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Glenda Espiritu Mayor.

118127. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. GR No. Indeed any person or groups of persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative. Ordinance No. are founded on age-old moral traditions. that phrase is more accurately interpreted as meaning that efforts to legislate morality will fail if they are widely at variance with public attitudes about right and wrong. the oft-quoted American maxim that “you cannot legislate morality” is ultimately illegitimate as a matter of law.. RTC. Moreover. Further. JR. WHEREFORE. April 12. they will remain so oriented. J. PERFECTO A. ALFREDO S. since as explained by Calabresi. the Petition is GRANTED.S. and as long as there are widely accepted distinctions between right and wrong. as Presiding Judge. E. et al vs. for one. CITY OF MANILA.10 in motels or hotels. Our penal laws. LAGUIO. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions. HON. the said Ordinance is entitled– AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF . 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.: Enacted by the City Council[9] on 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30 March 1993. Manila and MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. 2005 TINGA. To be candid about it. drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect “wash rates” from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments. HON. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila.

3. hereunder: SECTION 1. pursuant to P. the businesses enumerated in Section 1 hereof are hereby given three (3) months from the date of approval of this ordinance within which to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area. and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. services and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community. Handicrafts display centers 4. Cabarets 10. Discotheques 9. Sauna Parlors 2. or devoted to. such as but not limited to: 1. corporation or entity shall. Night Clubs 6. Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding. any business providing certain forms of amusement. Massage Parlors 3. annoy the inhabitants. Taft Avenue in the East. SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA. 499 be allowed or authorized to contract and engage in. 2 The City Mayor.[10] The Ordinance is reproduced in full. PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF. entertainment. Owners and/or operator of establishments engaged in. Records and music shops 6. partnership. temporary or otherwise.D.11 AMUSEMENT. Art galleries 5. the City Treasurer or any person acting in behalf of the said officials are prohibited from issuing permits. in the Ermita-Malate area bounded by Teodoro M. Vito Cruz Street in the South and Roxas Boulevard in the West. Souvenir Shops 3. Super Clubs 8. ENTERTAINMENT. such as but not limited to: 1. no person. Beerhouses 5. Motels 12. or from granting licenses and accepting payments for the operation of business enumerated in the preceding section. Curio or antique shop 2. Day Clubs 7. Karaoke Bars 4. Restaurants . AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Street in the North. Dance Halls 11. Inns SEC. Kalaw Sr. SEC.

liberty or property without due process of law. motor repair shop. with well-defined activities for wholesome family entertainment that cater to both local and foreign clientele. concerts and the like. [45] SEC. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building. Coffee shops 8. 1. it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute. is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. and property. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid. The maintenance of peace and order.[47] A. except new warehouse or open-storage depot.[44] SEC. The relevant constitutional provisions are the following: SEC. 11. 9. (5) must be general and consistent with public policy. and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. Theaters engaged in the exhibition. Flower shops 9. gasoline service station. art exhibitions. however broad and far-reaching. The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. 10. or funeral establishments. dock or yard. not only of motion pictures but also of cultural shows. the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws. (2) must not be unfair or oppressive. The Ordinance infringes . 5. Businesses allowable within the law and medium intensity districts as provided for in the zoning ordinances for Metropolitan Manila.[46] Sec. the protection of life. nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws. No person shall be deprived of life.[43] In the case at bar.12 7. and (6) must not be unreasonable. and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.[37] The Ordinance contravenes the Constitution The police power of the City Council. it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade. (3) must not be partial or discriminatory. stage and theatrical plays. Music lounge and sing-along restaurants. 14. liberty. and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. light industry with any machinery.

arbitrarily or despotically[57] as its exercise is subject to a qualification. refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life. . and to secure to all persons equal and impartial justice and the benefit of the general law. But if it is an area where strict scrutiny is used.) tells us that whether there is such a justification depends very much on the level of scrutiny used. substantive due process looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for the government’s action. such as for protecting fundamental rights. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically. liberty.[50] The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental encroachment against the life.S. in each appropriate case. and private corporations and partnerships are “persons” within the scope of the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned. . liberty or property without due process of law. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life. This standard is aptly described as a responsiveness to the supremacy of reason.[56] The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. . .”[48] There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. if a law is in an area where only rational basis review is applied. Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with what kind of notice and what form of hearing the government must provide when it takes a particular action. as the phrase implies. or property. forfeiture. be valid.” Procedural due process.13 the Due Process Clause The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat “(N)o person shall be deprived of life. and destruction without a trial and conviction by the ordinary mode of judicial procedure.[51] The guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation.[49] and as such it is a limitation upon the exercise of the police power. liberty. usually called “procedural due process” and “substantive due process. to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the government. to protect property from confiscation by legislative enactments. asks whether the government has an adequate reason for taking away a person’s life.[55] For example. In other words.[53] Substantive due process. or property. from seizure. obedience to the dictates of justice. liberty and property of individuals.[54] Case law in the United States (U. unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and distributive justice. as that phrase connotes. liberty or property.[52] This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government. then the government will meet substantive due process only if it can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose. substantive due process is met so long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.

adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to existence of motels. may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. licensed and tax-paying nightclubs. as distinguished from those of a particular class. personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. liberty and property. bars. the means employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.[58] Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life. [59] Requisites for the valid exercise of Police Power are not met To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance. a building or establishment. require an interference with private rights. v. Petitioners insist that even the Court in the case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association. the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights and a violation of the due process clause. Try as the Ordinance may to shape morality. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City Council’s police powers. girlie houses. accordingly. City Mayor of Manila[63] had already taken judicial notice of the “alarming increase in the rate of prostitution. it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral man out of it because immorality is not a thing.[60] It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work.[61] Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites. but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The City Council . not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally. and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity.”[64] The object of the Ordinance was. which provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry. Inc. karaoke bars. for even under the guise of protecting the public interest. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment. it bears emphasis. The Ordinance was enacted to address and arrest the social ills purportedly spawned by the establishments in the Ermita-Malate area which are allegedly operated under the deceptive veneer of legitimate. cocktail lounges. it is in the hearts of men. the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the community. The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. hotels and motels. presence and exit and thus become the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers. Individual rights. particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights.14 limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law.

fornication and other social ills.” “innocent” establishments. . day clubs. In other words. there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end. Modality employed is unlawful taking In addition.” Further.[77] The Ordinance in Section 1 thereof forbids the running of the enumerated businesses in the Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3 instructs its owners/operators to wind up business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said businesses into allowed businesses. it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations. cabarets.[67] and it may even impose increased license fees. it states in Section 4 that in cases of subsequent violations of the provisions of the Ordinance. karaoke bars. In Section 3 thereof. super clubs.[78] It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals. the governmental interference itself. they unwittingly punish even the proprietors and operators of “wholesome. but not to the detriment of liberty and privacy which are covenants. motels and inns in the Ermita-Malate area. In the instant case. Means employed are constitutionally infirm The Ordinance disallows the operation of sauna parlors. the “premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently. dance halls. owners and/or operators of the enumerated establishments are given three (3) months from the date of approval of the Ordinance within which “to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside the ErmitaMalate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area.” It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes. premiums and blessings of democracy.15 instead should regulate human conduct that occurs inside the establishments. infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person’s fundamental right to liberty and property. it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits. While petitioners’ earnestness at curbing clearly objectionable social ills is commendable. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation. night clubs. operating and patronizing those motels and property in terms of the investments made and the salaries to be paid to those therein employed. discotheques. there is a clear invasion of personal or property rights. massage parlors. If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution. the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property. personal in the case of those individuals desirous of owning. beerhouses.

” The provision is the most important protection of property rights in the Constitution. be upheld as valid. This is a sweeping exercise of police power that is a result of a lack of imagination on the part of the City Council and which amounts to an interference into personal and private rights which the Court will not countenance.[101] Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. it is about loss spreading. These lawful establishments may be regulated. so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. in other words. In part too. Not only is this impractical. The equal protection clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is concerned. Section 9. even without compensation. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade. even under the guise of exercising police power. The conversion into allowed enterprises is just as ridiculous. should be borne by the public as a whole. it cannot. This is a restriction on the general power of the government to take property. The principal purpose of the guarantee is “to bar the Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which.” it merely relocates it. The foregoing premises show that the Ordinance is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of property and personal rights of citizens. should not be treated differently.”[100] It limits governmental discrimination. If the government takes away a person’s property to benefit society. Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing the due process clause. it qualifies as a taking without just compensation with an additional burden imposed on the owner to build another establishment solely from his coffers. art gallery or music lounge without essentially destroying its property? This is a taking of private property without due process of law.16 The Constitution expressly provides in Article III. the law may operate only on some and not all . B. but not prevented from carrying on their business. The proffered solution does not put an end to the “problem. onerous and oppressive. then society should pay.[79] The second option instructs the owners to abandon their property and build another one outside the Ermita-Malate area. The constitutional provision is about ensuring that the government does not confiscate the property of some to give it to others. The Ordinance violates Equal Protection Clause Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike. How may the respondent convert a motel into a restaurant or a coffee shop.[99] The “equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. In this regard. If the classification is reasonable. In every sense. we take a resolute stand to uphold the constitutional guarantee of the right to liberty and property. in all fairness and justice. nay. that “private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. it is unreasonable.[98] The guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances. both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects.

pension houses. to promote the economic security of the people. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance. PARAS. hotels. lodging houses or other similar establishments. The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. there are no substantial distinctions between motels. 2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law. [103] Not a valid exercise of police power: a. hotels.17 of the people without violating the equal protection clause.[104] In the Court’s view. the Director of Animal Industry or the Chairman if the National Meat Commission “may dispose of the carabaos or carabeef” confiscated for violating the executive order prohibiting the inter-provincial transport of said animals without prior permit issued by the government “to charitable agencies as he may deem fit”. not be arbitrary. IAC. This is oppressive and unreasonable since the owner of the animals is denied due process of law and the Director of Animal Industry or Chairman of the National Meat Commission is given so much discretion as the law is not complete in itself nor is there a standard to guide the official. The classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated. lodging houses or other similar establishments. 123 SCRA 569 . ERICTA. (ICHONG VS. (6%) b. 148 SCRA 659. as an indispensable requisite. 122 SCRA 759. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area. 4) It must apply equally to all members of the class. inns. DE LA CRUZ VS. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses. To be valid. The classification must. HERNANDEZ. YNOT VS. 101 Phil. By definition. all are commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. it must conform to the following requirements: 1) It must be based on substantial distinctions. SO ORDERED. c. 3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only. both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. CITY GOVERNMENT OF QC VS. 11155) f.

While the power of eminent domain often results in the appropriation of title to or possession of property. 149 SCRA 305) and initial determinations on just compensation by the executive department and Congress cannot prevail over the court’s findings. material impairment of the value of the property or prevention of the ordinary uses for which the property was intended such as the establishment of an easement. there is no compensable taking provided none of the property interests is appropriated for the use or for the benefit of the public. there should be compensable taking if it would result to public use. As such. this time. Taking may include trespass without actual eviction of the owner. 3. Likewise. The determination of just compensation. Otherwise. POWER OF TAXATION 2. hence. 485 SCRA 586 Chico-Nazario. it need not always be the case. is a judicial function (EPZA vs. Differences and similarities DIDIPIO EARTH SAVERS MULTI PURPOSE ASSOCIATION VS. Finally. Limitations in the exercise of said powers . 3. hence . ET AL. subject to the full control and supervision of the State. In such case. POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 3. no compensation shall be paid. service contracts with foreign corporations is not prohibited under the 1987 Philippine Constitution with foreign corporations or contractors would invest in and operate and manage extractive enterprises..18 B. an imposition of burden over a private property through easement (by the government) is considered taking. 2. J. however. ELISEA GOZU. In the exercise of police power. DENR SEC. health and prosperity of the state. Dulay. The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the State to condemn or to take private property for public use upon payment of just compensation while police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property without compensation. Properties condemned under police power are usually noxious or intended for noxious purpose. payment of just compensation is required. 1. however. safety measures were put in place to prevent abuses of the past regime. enjoyment of a property is restricted because the continued use thereof would be injurious to public welfare. property rights of private individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort. in the exercise of police power.

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL VS. a.R. sex physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. . AGUSTIN VS. the end does not justify the means.19 4. 1155 d. YNOT VS. VELASCO VS. IAC. Iloilo for alleged violation of Executive Order No. MAYOR OF MANILA. EDU. no carabaos regardless of age. J. Ynot transported six carabaos by using a pumpboat from Masbate to Iloilo. 260 SCRA 319 b. Read: a. On January. 1987 Cruz. Facts: 1. The six carabaos. 148 SCRA 659 RESTITUTO YNOT VS. 1967.March 20. and to deserving farmers through the dispersal of the Director of Animal Industry. 1984. 74457. (LAWFUL SUBJECT) b. confiscated by the Police Station Commander of Baratoc Nuevo. CA. 88 SCRA 195 j. were. 2. Tests for a valid exercise of police power the interests of the public. 101 Phil. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL. 32 Phil. ICHONG VS. February 13. 85 g. 24 Phil. July 31. VILLEGAS. No.626. require the exercise of police power. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of the said law shall be subjected to confiscation and forfeiture by the government to be distributed to charitable institution and similar institutions as the Chairman of the National meat inspection Commission may see fit in the case of the carabeef. 1983 h. 626-A which prohibits the interprovincial transporting of carabaos and carabeefs which does not comply with the provisions of Executive No. JMM Promotions vs. in the case of carabaos. 471 i. the means employed is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive to individuals. THE ITERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT. 15 Phil. 46 Phil. HERNANDEZ. PEOPLE VS. c. CHURCHILL VS. 447 f. ILOILO ICE & COLD STORAGE VS. US VS. POMAR. G. RAFFERTY. 580 e. however. That Section 1 of the said law provides that "henceforth. TORIBIO. In short. 5. 13. not mere particular class. (LAWFUL MEANS).

it must meet two tests: a. subject only to review by the supreme court.20 3. While the lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional question. The petitioner appealed to the IAC but the said court upheld the decision of the Trial Court. Is Executive Order No. and b. VIII. Hence this petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court where YNOT claimed that the penalty of confiscation is INVALID the same was imposed without according the owner the right to be heard before a competent and impartial tribunal as guaranteed by due process. the Judge upheld the validity of the act of the Police Station Commander in confiscating the carabaos. After trial of the case. the subject must be lawful. reverse. Was it a valid police power measure? b.00. the court ordered the confiscation of the bond. Art. In order that a measure or law may be justified under the police power of the state. 4. Ynot was ordered to returned the carabaos but since he could not do so.000. May a lower court (like the MTC. RTC. modify or affirm on appeal" or certiorari as the rules of court may provide. Ynot filed a suit for recovery and the carabao were returned to him upon the issuance of a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersede as bond in the amount of P12. . final judgements and orders of the lower courts in all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. [2(a)]. Was there an undue delegation of legislative power? Held: 1. 2. THEY ARE NOT PREVENTED FROM RESOLVING THE SAME WHENEVER WARRANTED. This is so because under Section 5. The court refused to rule on the constitutionality of the said Executive Order on the ground of lack of authority to do so and also because of its presumed validity. This simply means that lower courts may declare whether or not a law is constitutional. 626-A constitutional? Sub-issues under this are: a. of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Supreme Court has the power to "review. revise. Issues: 1. the means employed is lawful. of the Court of Appeals) declare a law unconstitutional? 2. 5.

21 Since the prohibition of the slaughtering of carabaos except where they are at least 7 years old when male and at least 11 years old when female is in furtherance of the public interest since said carabaos are very useful to the work at the farm.it has lawful subject. with no less difficulty in one province than in the other. WHICH ALONE WOULD HAVE HAD THE AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE THE PRESCRIBED PENALTY. thus denying him the centuries-old guarantee of elementary fair play. physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. DUE PROCESS IS VIOLATED BECAUSE THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY CONFISCATED IS DENIED THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD IN HIS DEFENSE AND IS IMMEDIATELY CONDEMNED AND PUNISHED. But does the law meets the second requisite or test which is lawful method? Executive Order No. AND ONLY AFTER TRIAL AND CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED. there is no reasonable guidelines or bases of the Director of Animal Industry or the Chairman of the NATIONAL Meat Inspection Commission in the disposition of the carabaos or carabeef other than what "they may see fit" which is very dangerous and could result to opportunities for partiality and abuse. The law is unconstitutional because it struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard. WORSE IS UNDULY OPPRESSIVE. it is conceded that the Executive Order meets the first test---. providing that "no carabao regardless of age. then violation thereof should be pronounce not by the police BUT BY A COURT OF JUSTICE. Also. any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. Since the Executive Order in question is a penal law." The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the question measure is missing. We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter considering that they can be killed any where. and even graft and corruption. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughtering of carabaos BUT ON THIER MOVEMENT. sex. therefore. retaining a carabao in one province will not prevent their slaughter there. Obviously. invalid and unconstitutional and not a valid police power measure because the METHOD EMPLOYED TO CONSERVE CARABAOS IS NOT REASONABLY NECESSARY TO THE PURPOSE OF THE LAW AND. The Executive Order is. THE CONFERMENT ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES (like the police) OF THE POWER .

On May 31. S----service. 1979. 3. Motor vehicles of the following classifications are however. Also. confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of registration on owners of the above-specified found violating such letter of Instructions". 127 SCRA 329 Fernando. On June 11. T----Truck. JUINIO. k. Monday morning.m. of the holiday to 5:00 a. ROMEO EDU issued Circular No.m.22 TO ADJUDGE THE GUILT OF THE SUPPOSED OFFENDER IS A CLEAR ENCROACHMENT OF JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS AND MILITATES AGAINST THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATIION OF POWERS. The banning of H and EH vehicles is unfair. 3. discriminatory. there is undue delegation of legislative power to the officers mentioned therein (Director of Animal Industry and Head of the National Meat Commission) because they were given unlimited discretion in the distribution of the property confiscated. Saturday morning to 5:00 a.m. exempted: 1. BOT. 2. and 5. C. TAXICAB OPERATORS VS. Bautista is questioning the constitutionality of the LOI and the Implementing Circular on the grounds that: a. BAUTISTA VS. 869 prohibiting the use of private motor vehicles with H (Heavy Vehicles) and EH (Extra Heavy Vehicles) on week-ends and holidays from 12:00 a. CC---Consular Corps. 39 imposing "the penalties of fine. 4. and . and arbitrary and thus contravenes the EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. ET AL. President Marcos issued Letter of Instruction No. of the day after the holiday.m.J. 119 SCRA 597 l. the then Commissioner of Land Transportation. DPL--Diplomatic. or 1:00 a. Facts: 1. TC---Tourist Cars 2. 1979. 127 SCRA 329 MARY CONCEPCION-BAUTISTA VS. ALFREDO JUINIO.

reunions. Heavy and Extra-Heavy vehicles consume more gasoline that the other kinds of vehicles and it is but proper to regulate the use of those which consumes more gasoline. It must be pointed out that the LOI was promulgated to solve the oil crisis which was besetting the country at that time. 180 SCRA 533 o. 3. public morals. The Circular violates the prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power because the LOI does not impose the penalty of confiscation. Definitely. It was therefore a valid police power measure to ensures the country's economy as a result of spiralling fuel prices. The LOI denies the owners of H and EH vehicles of due process. 2. 1987 5-a. the latter must be given leeway. m. ERICTA. If all the owner of H and EH vehicles are treated in the same fashion. it is not valid being an "ultra vires". The petitioners' claim that their right to equal protection was violated is without basis. The police power is intended to promote public health. September 21. there is no violation of the equal protection clause. public safety and general welfare. outings on week-ends and holidays. 122 SCRA 759 CHAPTER II—DUE PROCESS . The penalty of "impounding" the vehicle as embodied in Circular No. CASTANEDA. Therefore. VILLANUEVA VS. DECS VS. 175 SCRA 343 n. 39 has no statutory basis.ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. c. more specifically of their right to use and enjoy their private property and of their freedom to travel and hold family gatherings. In the interplay of Bautista's right to due process and the exercise of police power by the State. This is so because there is a valid classification in this case. SAN DIEGO.23 b. Not a valid exercise of police power CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY VS. HELD: 1. while those not included in the prohibition are enjoying unrestricted freedom. or whatever restrictions cast on some in the group is held equally binding on the rest. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM.

a. 1998 IMELDA R. NOR SHALL ANY PERSON BE DENIED EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS. it is to determine whether it has a valid governmental objective like for the interest of the public as against mere particular class. Kinds of Due Process: a. IMELDA MARCOS VS. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and decide the matter before it. b. 1998 Purisima. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property subject of the proceedings. SANDIGANBAYAN. G. SANDIGANBAYAN. October 6. 2. October 6. BANCO ESPANOL VS. PAMARAN (the 1st case) b. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard. PALANCA. 3. 4. MARCOS VS. as Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Light Railway Transit Authority (LRTA) entered into a Lease Contract with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation (PGHFI) . GALMAN VS. Due process is a law which hears before it condemns. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing. LIBERTY OR PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. J. No. In short. 126995. On June 8. Procedural due process---one which hears before it condemns as pointed out by Daniel Webster. liberty or property. a. 1984.24 Section 1---NO PERSON SHALL BE DEPRIVED OF LIFE. 37 Phil. IMELDA MARCOS and JOSE DANS. 921 Requisites: 1. Requisites of “judicial due process”. which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial (Per Daniel Webster in the DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE) 1. substantive due process---requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to life. Facts: 1.R.

a Decision was rendered convicting the petitioner and Dans of violation of Sec. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and at the same time prayed that her Motion be heard by the Supreme Court en banc claiming that her right to due process of law. 3. Justice Garchitorena dissolved the division of 5 allegedly because he and Justice Balajadia had agreed to the opinion of Justice del Rosario. 5.00 per month to the Transnational Construction Corporation represented by one Ignacio Jumenez. and b. . Justice Garchitorena as Presiding Justice issued Administrative Order No. the First Division convicted her after Justice Garchitorena dissolved the Special Division of 5 after a lunch in a Quezon City restaurant where they agreed to convict her in one case and acquit her in her other cases.760. The said meeting was attended by another justice who is not a member of the First Division or the Special Division in violation of the Rules of the Sandiganbayan which requires that sessions of the court shall be done only in its principal office in Manila and that only justices belonging to the division should join the deliberations.00 per month for 25 years. the Third Division of the Supreme Court by a vote of 3-2 affirmed the conviction of the petitioner but acquitted DANS. 1998. otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan.25 2. Justice Amores wrote Justice Garchitorena that he be given 15 days his Manifestation. After petitioner’s husband was deposed as President of the Philippines. the PGHFI subleased the said property for P734. 7. On June 27. both substantive and procedural. On September 24. After trial . however. she and Dans were charged of alleged violation of Section 3 [g] of RA 3019.000. involving an LRTA property in Pasay City for P102. 1993. On September 21. On the same date. Held: The petitioner is hereby acquitted. 3 [g] of RA 3019. was violated: a. On June 29. 288-93 constituting a Special Division of five and designating Justices Augusto Amores and Cipriano del Rosario. the First Division of the Sandiganbayan failed to comply with the legal requirement that all the 3 justices must be unanimous in its Decision because Justice Garchitorena and Justice Jose Balajadia voted for the conviction of both accused while Justice Narciso Atienza voted to acquit them. 4. Thereafter. 1993.1984. 9. 6. as a result of the fact that she was convicted as a result of the alleged disparity of the rentals agreed upon with PGHFI and the subsequent sub-lease contract between PGHFI and Transnational Construction Corporation. 8.

000. CUERVO. witness for the petitioner.760. Romero. e.00 per month) does not necessarily render the monthly rate of P102. CJ Narvasa. CA. misleading and baseless hypothetical questions of said justice to RAMON F. 263 SCRA 490 PEOPLE VS. September 22.R. 1986 FACTS: 1. Said number of questions could no longer be described as “clarificatory questions”. Said justice asked 179 questions to the witness as against the prosecutor who cross-examined the witness which was 73. NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER WAS PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION REGARDING THE RENTAL RATE OF ADJACENT PROPERTIES. COMELEC.760. 144 SCRA 194 JAVIER VS. COMELEC G. and Panganiban voted for conviction while Justice Vitug was the only Justice who voted for the return of the case to the Sandiganbayan “to allow the corrections of the perceived ‘irregularities’ in the proceedings below. Justices Regalado. f. This is one reason why the case could no longer be remanded to the Sandiganbayan especially so that the other Sandiganbayan Justices in the Special Division of 5 have retired. d. The petitioner Evelio Javier and the private respondent Arturo Pacificador were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa election in May 1984..00 per month) and the sub-lease rental (P734. Another ground therefore for the acquittal of the petitioner is that she was denied IMPARTIAL TRIAL before the Sandiganbayan.. No. There is therefore no compelling reason why the case should still be remanded to the lower court when all the evidence are already with the Supreme Court. the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the petitioner reasonable doubt. Davide. 262 SCRA 452 JAVIER VS. . 1999 MATUGUINA VS. The court notes likewise the bias and prejudice of Presiding Justice Garchitorena against the petitioner as shown by his leading. As such. (NOTE: The vote was 9-5 for Acquittal.) c.26 1.00 manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government in the absence of any evidence using rentals of adjacent properties showing that the rentals in the property subject of the lease agreement is indeed very low.L. Jr. CA. DBP VS. 2. CA. The great disparity between the rental price of the lease agreement signed by the petitioner (P102. January 29.68379-812.

returns and qualifications of all members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials. which shall be heard and decided en banc. On certiorari with the S. 5. 1984 the Second Division itself proclaimed Pacificador the elected assemblyman of Antique.day period of appeal. On June 7. On May 18. which provide: "Section 2. All election cases may be heard and decided by divisions except contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa. 1984. 4. 1984.C. 6. Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election. Alleging serious anomalies in the conduct of the elections and the canvass of the election returns.27 2. having been made before the lapse of the 5 . Javier went to the COMELEC to prevent the impending proclamation of his rival. which the petitioner seasonably made. 3. the Second Division of the COMELEC directed the provincial board of canvassers to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. XII-C." CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES: Petitioner: The proclamation made by the Second Division is invalid because all contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa come under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections en banc. Unless otherwise provided by law. . The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. secs." "Section 3. On July 23. ISSUE: Was the Second Division of the COMELEC. the proclamation made by the Board of Canvassers was set aside as premature. the same Second Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the petition filed by Javier with the COMELEC. 1984 proclaiming Pacificador the winner in the election ? APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSITUTION: The applicable provisions of the 1973 Constitution are Art. all election cases shall be decided within ninety days from the date of their submission for decision. 2 and 3. authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23.

filed with and decided only by any of the three divisions. . 175 of the 1978 Election Code. The pre-proclamation controversy between the petitioner and the private respondent was not yet a contest at the time and therefore could be validly heard by a mere division of the Commission on elections. should be . Thus it said: "The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the government.C. not only for the vindication of the outraged right.28 Respondents: Only "contests" need to be heard and decided en banc. Justice demands that we act. 3. c.C. and even if Javier had already died in the meantime. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice. The S. the Constitution intended to give it full authority to hear and decide these cases from beginning to end and on all matter related thereto. then. held on the main issue that in making the COMELEC the sole judge of all contests involving the election. Pre-proclamation controversies became known and designated as such only because of Sec. but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future. But there are also times when although the dispute has disappeared. The two are not always the same. There are times when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible according to law. consonant with Sec. it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. though gone." b. The 1973 Constitution could not have therefore been intended to have divided contests between pre and post proclamation when that Constitution was written in 1973. The S. decided to resolve the case even if the Batasang Pambansa had already been abolished by the Aquino government. returns and qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials. The case should have been decided en banc. all other cases can be . There is a difference between "contests" and "cases" and also a difference between "pre-proclamation controversies" and "election protests". HELD: a. as in this case. The decision rendered by the Second Division alone was therefore set aside as violative of the Constitution. The issue at that stage was still administrative and could be resolved by a division. including those arising before the proclamation of the winners. This was because of its desire for this case to serve as a guidance for the future.in fact.

Commissioner Jaime Opinion was a law partner of Pacificador. 273 SCRA 258 n. made before or after the proclamation of the winner. 94 SCRA 261 l. To bolster that requirement we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. j. However. CA. ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING VS.29 d. it should receive the widest possible scope conformably to the rule that the words used in the Constitution should be interpreted liberally. Laguna was charged of rape before Branch 25. whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute. CLAVE. the term should be understood as referring to any matter involving the title or claim of title to an elective office. ANZALDO VS. JUDGE SAVELLANO. 94 SCRA 707 LORENZANA VS. CAYETANO. 133 SCRA 271 PADERANGA VS. The word "contests" should not be given a restrictive meaning. JUDGE SAVELLANO. RTC of Laguna. After the petitioner’s arraignment. 119 SCRA 353 o. One of the members of the Second Division. on the contrary. He denied the motion to disqualify him from hearing the case. as a result of a petition for a transfer of venue filed by the prosecution and granted by the SC. 287 SCRA 245 Vitug. . AQUILIZAN. h. Manila. 287 SCRA 245 MAYOR BAYANI ALONTE VS. presided over by the respondent judge. i. CLAVE. As employed in the 1973 Constitution.SINGSON VS. ANZALDO VS. 119 SCRA 353 m. the prosecution submitted an AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE signed by the private complainant JUVIE-LYN PUNONGBAYAN where she prayed for the withdrawal of the case because she is no longer interested in pursuing the same with no intention of re-filing the said case in the future. his case was transferred to RTC Branch 53. J. The Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. g. AZURA. There was also a denial of due process. 136 SCRA 266 DAVID VS. NLRC. 78 SCRA 485 (respondent was not a party to the ejectment case) so to enforce the decision on her violates her right to due process of law k. AZUL VS. e. CASTRO. Mayor Alonte of Binan. MAYOR ALONTE VS.

On December 17. the court or tribunal trying the case is clothed with jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter before it. that jurisdiction was lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused. that the accused is given the opportunity to be heard.30 Pending resolution of the said motion to withdraw. The Decision rendered is NULL AND VOID for want of due process. Procedural due process before administrative bodies a. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was denied his right to due process of law. 3. 635 Requisites: a. 1997. the right to a hearing which includes the right to present evidence. 197 SCRA 378) The act of the respondent judge in rendering a decision without even giving the petitioner the right to adduce evidence in his behalf is a gross violation of his right to due process of law. DAPITAN. 69 Phil. ATTY. CA. that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing (PEOPLE VS. January 29. On December 18. 1997. and 4. 1999 2. CIR. received a notice from the respondent judge notifying him of the promulgation of the decision in this case despite the fact that the prosecution and the defense have not presented their evidence in court. counsel for the petitioner. DBP VS. the respondent judge issued a Decision convicting the petitioner of rape and sentenced to suffer a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. 2. . TIBAY VS. the following requisites must be complied with before a decision is rendered: 1. The same was not resolved despite several motions filed by the petitioner to resolve the same. PHILIP SIGFRID FORTUN. the petitioner filed a motion for bail. Held: In order that an accused in a criminal proceedings is deemed to have been given the right to due process of law. p.

d. December 19. e. COURT OF APPEALS. Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes. THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE AND SPORTS. 2007 REYES. the decision must have something to support itself. REYES. James Paul Bungubung. DIRECTOR. November 10. 127980. the decision must be based on the evidence presented during the hearing. RICHARD REVERENTE and ROBERTO VALDES. J..R. 263 SCRA 531 d. the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. G. 67 SCRA 287 c. HON. ALVIN AGUILAR. g. The victims. the tribunal or body must act on its own independent consideration of the law or facts. CA. c. Jr. DELGADO VS. 1986 If an accused was represented by a non-lawyer during the trial (though he thought that he was a lawyer). his right to due process was violated and therefore entitled to a new trial. the evidence must be substantial. R. The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. NLRC. render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceedings can know the various issues involved. in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 36. Ericson Cano. b. JR. 3.WILFREDO D. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the De La Salle University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde (CSB) Joint Discipline Board because of their involvement in an offensive action causing injuries to petitioner James Yap and three other student members of Domino Lux Fraternity. AMERICAN TOBACCO VS. due process in disciplinary actions involving students DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY VS. JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. No. and .. Procedural due process in disciplinary actions against students Academic freedom. THE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION. Regional Trial Court of Manila. namely: petitioner James Yap and Dennis Pascual.T. the board or body shall in all controversial questions. f.: THE FACTS: PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar.31 b.

petitioner Yap lodged a complaint with the Discipline Board of DLSU charging private respondents with “direct assault. are members of the “Domino Lux Fraternity. Alvin Aguilar (AB-BSM/9152105). Jr. Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes.m. (BS-BS-APM/9235086). Jr. Private respondents filed their respective answers.” a rival fraternity. March 30. are members of “Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity. The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to private respondents Aguilar. 4. Papio (AB-MGT/9251227)” were docketed as Discipline Case No. 1995. On May 3.” while the alleged assailants. Robert R. considering all the foregoing. Cano. Said notices issued by De La Salle Discipline Board uniformly stated as follows: Please be informed that a joint and expanded Discipline Board had been constituted to hear and deliberate the charge against you for violation of CHED Order No. 4 arising from the written complaints of James Yap. private respondents Alvin Aguilar. James Paul Bungubung. Thus. No fullblown hearing was conducted nor the students allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them. You are directed to appear at the hearing of the Board scheduled on April 19. The dispositive part of the resolution reads: WHEREFORE. Connon Hall for you and your witnesses to give testimony and present evidence in your behalf. JAMES PAUL . 1995 at 9:00 a. 1995. Jr. Bungubung and Valdes. They were meted the supreme penalty of automatic expulsion pursuant to CHED Order No. Valdes. Benilde v. the Board finds respondents ALVIN AGUILAR (AB-BSM/9152105). Dennis C. 9495-3-25121. The next day. the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a Resolution finding private respondents guilty. and Ericson Y. During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28. and Reverente informing them of the complaints and requiring them to answer.32 Michael Perez. You may be assisted by a lawyer when you give your testimony or those of your witnesses. Richard Reverente (AB-MGT/9153837) and Malvin A. Alvin Lee (EDD/9462325). cases entitled “De La Salle University and College of St. James Paul Bungubung (AB-PSM/9234403). Pascual. private respondents interposed the common defense of alibi. 1995.” Similar complaints were also filed by Dennis Pascual and Ericson Cano against Alvin Lee and private respondents Valdes and Reverente. at the Bro.

(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process.33 BUNGUBUNG (AB-PSM/9234403). In the case of respondent MALVIN A. PAPIO (AB-MGT/9251227). if desired. it cannot be said that there was denial of due process. A formal trial-type hearing is not. I SSUE Were private respondents accorded due process of law because there was no full-blown hearing nor were they allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them? H E L D: Private respondents’ right to due process of law was not violated. he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. or as applied to administrative proceedings. the Board acquits him of the charge. ALVIN LEE (EDD/94623250) and RICHARD V. essential to due process – it is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based. and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them and with the assistance if counsel. In administrative cases. at all times and in all instances. . an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf. the right to which is among the primary rights that must be respected even in administrative proceedings. So long as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course. REVERENTE (AB-MGT/9153837) guilty of having violated CHED Order No. 4 and thereby orders their automatic expulsion. there is no denial of due process. such as investigations of students found violating school discipline. “To be heard” does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court – one may also be heard through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded.” Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so. “[t]here are withal minimum standards which must be met before to satisfy the demands of procedural due process and these are: that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them.

And it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. the fact is that it had never conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-students had indeed led or participated "in activities within the university premises. private respondents were given the right to adduce evidence on their behalf and they did. L-68288. in fact. and cross examination is not. the Discipline Board considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the parties before rendering its resolution in Discipline Case No. No. July 11. NATIONAL UNIVERSITY G. They were also informed of the evidence presented against them as they attended all the hearings before the Board. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary. Moreover. Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process when they were not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them. Lastly. . submitted their respective answers. that disturbed or disrupted classes therein".34 Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board through petitioner Sales.R. 1986 FACTS: Petitioners who are students of the National University were barred from enrolment. 9495-325121. Also apparent is the omission of respondents to cite any duly published rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic standing. It is apparent that despite the accusations of alleged violations hurled by the school against the petitioners. The school claims that their scholastic standing is poor and that they have been involved in activities that have disrupted classes and had conducted mass actions without the required permits. conducted without prior permit from school authorities. x x x an essential part thereof. They were given the opportunity to answer the charges against them as they. National University] where this Court held that “x x x the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process. This argument was already rejected in Guzman v.” GUZMAN VS. HELD: a.

c. and were being disciplined without due process. all schools have the power to adopt and enforce its rules. Philippine Maritime Institute. need not entail proceedings and hearing similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in court of justice.C. b. c. EXCEPT in case of academic deficiency. The imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process. It has already been held in Berina vs. in violation of the admonition in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools that "no penalty shall be imposed upon any student except for cause as defined in *** (the) Manuel and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted. Due process in disciplinary cases involving students : a. Schools shall have the authority and prerogative to promulgate such rules and regulations as they may deem necessary from time to time effective as of the date of their promulgation unless otherwise specified. But the S. that it is illegal of a school to impose sanctions on students without conducting due investigation. the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them." The petitioner were denied of this right. or violation of disciplinary regulations. the proceedings may be summary. Of course." d. said that the following minimum standards must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process: 1. students have the right "to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation. 117 SCRA 581.35 b. . The Manual of Regulations for Private Schools provides that: "* * The school rules governing discipline and the corresponding sanctions therefor must be clearly specified and defined in writing and made known to the students and/or their parents or guardians. cross-examination is not an essential part thereof. Under the Education Act of 1982. In fact the maintenance of good school discipline is a duty specifically enjoined on every private school.

3. EXENEA. 259 SCRA 664 Philippine Savings Bank vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY. NLRC. does due process require that [1] a party be assisted by counsel and [2] be able to cross-examine the witnesses? LUMIQUED VS. whether the Civil Service Act or the Administrative Code of 1987.36 2. Not only. NLRC. e. and 2. 5. Hearing a. MGG Marine Services vs. b. g. that. 261 SCRA 409 RAYCOR AIR CONTROL VS. the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. which provides that a respondent in an administrative case should be assisted by counsel in order that the proceedings therein is considered valid. 276 SCRA 652 5. BERINA VS. In administrative proceedings. petitioner herein was given the opportunity several times to engage the services of a lawyer to assist him but he confidently informed the investigators that he could protect himself. 264 SCRA 261 4. NLRC. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf. 265 SCRA 788 STOLT-NIELSEN VS. 264 SCRA 307 GARCIA VS. NLRC. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN. f. with the assistance of counsel. 1982 Due process in the dismissal of employees Requisites of Due Process before the NLRC 1. d. they shall be informed of the evidence against them. NLRC. 282 SCRA 125 There is no law. PMI. Notice. NLRC. Administrative Due Process before the Civil Service Commission . CORDENILLO VS. they shall have the right to answer the charges against them. 276 SCRA 635 b. a. September 30. 263 SCRA 174 SAMILLANO VS. 4. 261 SCRA 589 WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES VS. Effect of a Motion for Reconsideration to violation of the right to due process a. c. CASUELA VS. NLRC.

That despite the regular receipt of Erece of his monthly Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA) in the amount of P4. LYN MACALINGAY. you are hereby directed to immediately transfer to any of your staff. he did. No. 166809. Respondent filed his answer denying the allegations against him. 99-1360 dated July 1. when in fact. ET AL.’ 3. 2008 THE FACTS: Petitioner is the Regional Director of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) Region I. After a fact-finding investigation. G. Pertinent portions of the formal charge read: 1. The foregoing facts and circumstances indicate that government service has been prejudiced by the acts of Erece. the memorandum receipt of the vehicle(s) now still in your name. 1998 against petitioner alleging that he denied them the use of the office vehicle assigned to petitioner. whose office is located in San Fernando City.000. 1999 charged petitioner with Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct for using a government vehicle in spite of his receipt of the monthly transportation allowance and for certifying that he did not use any government vehicle.. in order to collect transportation allowance. . when in fact he did. as follows: ‘to regularize your receipt of the transportation allowance component of the RATA to which you are entitled monthly. That he certified in his monthly liquidation of his RATA that he did not use any government vehicle for the corresponding month. April 22. which is not true because he is the regular user of the government vehicle issued to CHR-Region I. La Union. in order to receive the transportation allowance. the CSC Proper in CSC Resolution No. That Erece did not comply with the directive of the Central Office addressed to all Regional Human Rights Directors. ROMEO ERECE VS. and that he certified that he did not use any government vehicle. preferably one of your lawyers.00.R. that petitioner still claimed transportation allowance even if he was using the said vehicle.37 ATTY. 2. he still prioritizes himself in the use of the office vehicle (Tamaraw FX) in spite of the directive from the Central Office that he cannot use the service vehicle for official purposes and at the same time receive his transportation allowance. Respondent employees of the CHR Region I filed an AffidavitComplaint dated October 2.

In the Decision promulgated on January 7. He stated that at his instance. Hence. request for clarification or Bills of Particulars shall not be entertained by the Commission. the CSC issued Resolution No. he is advised of his right to the assistance of counsel of his choice. this petition. Any of these pleadings interposed by the respondent shall be considered as an Answer and shall be evaluated as such. 020124. Petitioner filed a petition for review of the CSC Resolution with the CA. respondents did not present their evidence. the CA upheld the CSC Resolution. 32[4] Id. Accordingly. 2002. 2005. the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE. to the Civil Service Commission-Cordillera Administrative Region (CSC-CAR). After he rested his case. On his Answer. Any Motion to Dismiss. but moved to submit their position paper and formal offer of evidence.38 WHEREFORE. the petition is DENIED and the assailed Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are hereby AFFIRMED. at 35-36. H E L D: Petitioner contends that he was denied due process as he was not afforded the right to cross-examine his accusers and their witnesses. in order to prevent delay in the disposition of the case.32[4] After a formal investigation of the case. dated January 24. he should indicate whether he elects a formal investigation or waives his right thereto. finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and penalizing him with dismissal from the service. Erece is hereby formally charged with Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct. in view of the foregoing. . Romeo L. if any. Likewise. which motion was granted by the CSC over his (petitioner’s) objection. he was allowed to present evidence first to support the allegations in his Counter-Affidavit. he is given five (5) days from receipt hereof to submit his Answer under oath and affidavits of his witnesses. Respondents then submitted their Position Paper and Formal Offer of Exhibits. I S S U E: Petitioner raised the issue of violation of his right to due process because he was denied the right to cross-examine the respondents on their affidavit-complaint.

. In administrative proceedings. . still petitioner should not be deemed to have lost his right to cross-examine his accusers and their witnesses. it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon different principles. G. the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side. in certain proceedings of administrative character. it should not be construed as a waiver of his right to crossexamine the complainants. The Court agrees with the CA that petitioner was not denied due process when he failed to cross-examine the complainants and their witnesses since he was given the opportunity to be heard and present his evidence. there is available trial and tribunal before which all objections and defenses to the making of such determination may be raised and considered. 2008 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO. Velez v. Montilla (private respondent) were congressional candidates for the First District of Sultan Kudarat during the May 14. the right to a notice or hearing are not essential to due process of law.451 votes and was proclaimed on May 22.: Datu Pax Pakung S. It is not essential that hearings be had before the making of a determination if thereafter.39 Petitioner submits that although he was allowed to present evidence first. Mangudadatu (petitioner) and Angelo O. De Vera it was held that : Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with “judicial process” for a trial in court is not always essential to due process. . Thus. One adequate hearing is all that due process requires. The due process clause guarantees no particular form of procedure and its requirements are not technical. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings. Nor is an actual hearing always essential. J. 2007 national elections. 2007 by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Representative of .R. 179813. No. The dismissal of the petitioner from the government is valid. The constitutional requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly established administrative agency or tribunal. DATUPAX MANGUDADATU VS. This may be allowed only if he expressly waived said right. . The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process. Petitioner won by 17. Although the order of presentation of evidence was not in conformity with the procedure. December 18. . . HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET).

a general denial shall be deemed to have been entered. Effect. Meanwhile. p. 07-17938[9] which noted the aforementioned Registry Return Receipt Card and that despite the fact that 43 days from June 27. Lutayan. the Secretary of the HRET caused the service of summons34[5] upon petitioner through registered mail at Purok Losaria. 78. In his affidavit41[12] attached to the motion. 2007. Sultan Kudarat. [10] RULE 27. showing that a certain Aileen R. 2007.m. [11] Rollo. pp. or the petition for quo warranto within the period fixed in these Rules. Failure to Answer. alleging that he never received the summons issued by the HRET. Id. 26-37. 2007 at 11:00 a. [6] The assailed Resolutions state “Loria” but the Summons and Registry Return Receipt Card correctly state “Losaria. 2007. petitioner filed a Motion to Reconsider40[11] Resolution No. prompting petitioner to request his lawyers to verify the same from the records of the HRET. 41-76. counter-protest. p. – If no answer is filed to the protest. 30. 36[7] On August 16. 07-179 and Motion to Admit Answer with CounterProtest. . 2007 and requested that they be furnished with copies of the petition of protest as well as notices. p. In an Order dated August 17. On May 31.40 the said congressional district. pp. 2007. the HRET considered petitioner to have entered a general denial of the allegations of the protest. [12] Id.. In the same Resolution. the HRET issued Resolution No. the HRET set the preliminary conference on September 27. Thereafter. [9] See Note 2. [8] The assailed Resolutions state “Baldena”. 2007.. his lawyers entered their appearance on September 4. orders and resolutions pertaining to the protest. 2007. petitioner denied that Baldenas 33 34 35 [4] [5] 36 37 38 39 40 41 Id. petitioner informally learned of respondent’s protest. requiring petitioner to file an Answer to the protest within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. the HRET received the Registry Return Receipt Card. respondent filed with the HRET a Petition of Protest (Ad Cautelam)33[4] contesting the results of the elections and the proclamation of petitioner. it should be “Baldenas” based on the Registry Return Receipt Card. petitioner had not filed an answer in accordance with Rule 2739[10] of the 2004 HRET Rules. 2007. On July 11.. 2007 had passed since Baldenas received the summons. On June 14. 77. On September 10.” [7] Rollo. Baldenas37[8] (Baldenas) received the summons on June 27.35 [6] Tamnag (Poblacion).

service of summons on petitioner through registered mail did not violate Rule 22 of the 2004 HRET Rules. . respondent countered that the HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution Nos. 07300 denying for lack of merit. Sections 6 and 7 of the Rules of Court were inconsistent with Rule 22 of the 2004 HRET Rules and therefore should not be given suppletory application to HRET proceedings. respondent claimed that Rule 14. In his comment. the HRET issued Resolution No. Further. On September 19. the summons received by her was never brought to his attention. He further claimed that she was not authorized to receive any important documents addressed to him. He also prayed for a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction for this Court to enjoin the HRET from further proceeding with HRET Case No. Rollo. Petitioner filed the instant petition imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the HRET for issuing Resolution Nos. He argued that a substitute service of summons is made only “when the defendant cannot be served personally at a reasonable time after efforts to locate him have failed. 2007.12. this petition. HELD: Rule 22 of the 2004 HRET Rules provides: 42 43[14] [13] See Note 3. as the case may be. He argued that Rule 22 of the 2004 HRET Rules merely states that “the Secretary of the Tribunal shall issue the corresponding summons to the protestee or respondent.41 was a member of his household or his employee.” He posited then that the intent of the HRET in not expressly specifying personal service of summons on the protestee or respondent was to give it a reasonable discretion or leeway in serving the summons by other means such as registered mail. 2007 and 07-300 dated September 19. 07-179 and 07-300. since the process server’s return failed to show on its face the impossibility of personal service. And assuming that he had authorized her.07-021. p. Petitioner contended that the HRET never acquired jurisdiction over his person because of the absence of a valid service of summons.”43[14] In his case. then the substituted service was improper and invalid. 07-179 dated August 16. 2007. Thus. 42[13] Hence.

– The following shall be applicable by analogy or in suppletory character and effect in so far as they may be applicable and are not inconsistent with these Rules and with the orders. as the case may be.42 RULE 22. (3) Decisions of the Electoral Tribunals. for justifiable causes. which is not among the allowed modes of service under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. – If the petition is not summarily dismissed in accordance with Rule 21 of these Rules. the Secretary of the Tribunal shall issue the corresponding summons to the protestee or respondent. the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section. Applicability. if he refuses to receive and sign for it. Indeed. resolutions and decisions of the Tribunal. or. In view of the failure of the HRET Rules to specify the authorized modes of service of summons. 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. or (b) by leaving copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. Summons. Service in person on defendant. namely: (1) The Rules of Court. requiring him within ten (10) days from receipt thereof to file his answer. resort then is necessary to Sections 6 and 7. together with a copy of the petition. – If. SEC. . resolutions and decisions of the HRET. The 2004 HRET Rules on summons is silent on how the summons should be served on the protestee. by tendering it to him. the service of the summons was made through registered mail. service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein. (2) Decisions of the Supreme Court. with more reason should election cases (which involve public 44 [15] RULE 80. 6. – Whenever practicable. if in ordinary civil cases (which involve only private and proprietary interests) personal service of summons is preferred and service by registered mail is not allowed on jurisdictional and due process grounds. the summons shall be served handling a copy thereof to the defendant in person. which state: SEC. Rule 14. Rule 8044[15] of the 2004 HRET Rules provides that the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure applies by analogy or suppletorily in so far as the latter may be applicable and not inconsistent therewith as well as with the orders. Significantly. 7. Substituted service. In the case at bar.

at the expense of the petitioner/protestant.43 interest and the will of the electorate) strictly follow the hierarchy of modes of service of summons under the Rules of Court. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION VS. WHEREFORE. III Regional Director Vilma L. III). delegate the matter to the process server of a court with territorial jurisdiction over the place of residence of the respondent/protestee in the election case. Labrador constituted an Investigating Committee. we find that the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in considering petitioner to have entered a general denial of the allegations in respondent’s petition of protest and in denying his motion to reconsider as well as his motion to admit answer with counter-protest. Regional Director Labrador concurred in the findings of the Investigating Committee 45 46 47 . then Principal of Lawang Kupang Elementary School in San Antonio. we cannot allow service of summons by a method not sanctioned by the HRET Rules in relation to the Rules of Court. December 16. III (DECS-RO No. to conduct a formal investigation. the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. two separate administrative complaints45[3] for Sexual Harassment and Conduct Unbecoming a Public Officer against Cuanan. The Court sees no reason why the HRET cannot make use of its own process servers to personally serve the summons. Nueva Ecija. Cabanatuan City. DECS-RO No. filed before the Department of Education. Mangudadatu. the Investigating Committee submitted its Investigation Report46[4] dated December 14. on behalf of their respective minor daughters.Regional Office No. Luzviminda Borja and Juliana Castro. 1996. In view of the foregoing. 169013. HRET is directed to admit the Answer with Counter-Protest of petitioner Datu Pax Pakung S. Culture and Sports . No. In a Decision47[5] dated January 28. finding Cuanan guilty of sexual harassment and recommending his forced resignation without prejudice to benefits. Lily Borja and Charo Castro. 1999. Acting on the complaints. or alternatively. Considering that the proper service of summons on the respondent/protestee is a jurisdictional requirement and goes to heart of due process. 2008 The factual background of the case is as follows: On March 11.R. Following the investigation. 2000. G. composed of three DepEd officials from the province. GODOFREDO CUANAN.

2003. Sibug informed the Superintendent that Cuanan could not be immediately reinstated to the service until an order of implementation was received from the Department Secretary. The DepEd received said reference copy on March 28.52 [10] Cuanan received a copy of Resolution No.56[14] In a Letter57[15] dated February 10. 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 . On May 30. then DepEd Secretary Edilberto C. 2003. the CSC informed the DepEd that a copy of the requested resolution was duly sent to it on January 23. On January 20. including the DepEd. Sometime in March 2003. the District Supervisor recommended appropriate action. 030069 dated January 20.54[12] In a 1st Indorsement. 2003. then DepEd Secretary Andrew Gonzales affirmed the Decision of Regional Director Labrador. 2003. Nonetheless. 2003. Secretary De Jesus filed a Supplemental Petition for Review/Reconsideration61[19] reiterating the prayer for reversal of the resolution. Regional Director Ricardo T. Schools Division Superintendent Dioscorides D. 2003. 2003. 2003. On July 29. Lusung (Superintendent) recommended that Cuanan be reinstated to duty as School Principal of San Antonio District upon finality of the decision of the CSC. 030069. Cuanan elevated his case to the CSC.51[9] which set aside the June 19. but the same was denied for lack of merit by Secretary Gonzales in a Resolution50[8] dated June 19. In a Letter58[16] dated March 25. de Jesus filed a Petition for Review/Reconsideration60[18] with the CSC. Again.55[13] In a 2nd Indorsement dated February 4. In an Order48[6] dated April 13. 2003. 2000. 2003. Gascon sent a letter to the CSC requesting a copy of CSC Resolution No. the CSC sent another copy of the resolution to the DepEd for its reference. Cuanan filed a Petition for Reconsideration49[7] thereof. No copy of the pleading was served upon Cuanan. 030069 on January 31. 2000 Resolution of Secretary Gonzales and exonerated Cuanan from the charge of sexual harassment. 2003. copies of the resolution were duly sent to the parties. no copy of the pleading was served upon Cuanan. Cuanan requested his reinstatement as Elementary School Principal I. DepEd Undersecretary Jose Luis Martin C.53[11] In a Letter dated February 3.59[17] On April 11. On January 23. 2000. the CSC issued Resolution No. 2003. 2000.44 and meted out the penalty of forced resignation to Cuanan without prejudice to benefits.

2003. since he was not duly notified of the petition for review/reconsideration. nor was he required by the CSC to file a comment thereon. It found Cuanan guilty of Sexual Harassment. the CA rendered a Decision68[26] granting the petition for certiorari and setting aside CSC Resolution No. Cuanan received a copy of the Resolution on November 9. on October 22. The CA held that while a motion for reconsideration and a petition for review under Rule 43 were available remedies. since the act complained of was patently illegal.45 Subsequently. and that Cuanan was not furnished copies of the pleadings filed by the DepEd in violation of procedural due process. 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 . 285. that the petition for review/reconsideration was filed out of time. 2004.63[21] Based thereon. pursuant to Division Special Order No. The DepEd sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper remedy. that the DepEd failed to establish that the resolution was not yet final and executory when it filed its petition for review/reconsideration. series of 2003 dated July 8. or on November 22. Grave Misconduct and Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits. Cuanan was reinstated to his former position as school principal effective April 30. that the CSC gravely abused its discretion in granting the petition for review/reconsideration filed by the DepEd without regard for Cuanan's fundamental right to due process.64[22] However. 2004. 2004. Cuanan filed a petition for certiorari67[25] with the CA seeking to annul Resolution No. alleging that the CSC should not have entertained the petition for review/reconsideration since the DepEd was not the complainant or the party adversely affected by the resolution. Cuanan's recourse to a petition for certiorari was warranted. 041147. 2003. 2003.62[20] In Division Special Order No. and perpetual disqualification from holding public office. 2003. which the Division School Superintendent of Nueva Ecija duly endorsed on November 7. 001 series of 2003 dated June 18. 2005. 04114765[23] setting aside CSC Resolution No. 2004. much less. 041147 dated October 12. Cuanan was directed to return to duty. Cuanan requested payment of salaries and his inclusion in the payroll. 030069 dated January 20.66[24] Thirteen days later. 2003. cancellation of his service eligibility. On May 16. the CSC issued Resolution No. given a copy of the said petition. the mode of review from a decision of the CSC being a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

69[27] but the CA denied the same in Hence. The Court finds it necessary.73[31] the Court has maintained that the disciplining authority qualifies as a party adversely affected by the judgment. that Cuanan failed to prove that the CSC's petition for review/reconsideration was not seasonably filed. Jr. Dacoycoy. beginning with Civil Service Commission v. the present petition on the following grounds: I WITH DUE RESPECT.46 DepEd filed a Motion for Reconsideration. before delving on the grounds relied upon by the DepEd in support of the petition. SP NO. that the filing of a motion for reconsideration was a precondition to the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. and that Cuanan’s right to due process was violated when he was not given a copy of the pleadings filed by the DepEd or given the opportunity to comment thereon. may question the resolution of the CSC. that the DepEd. 87499.71 [29] DepEd contends that the CA should have dismissed outright the petition for certiorari because CSC decisions are appealable to the CA by petition for review under Rule 43. Garcia. to first resolve the question of whether the DepEd can seek reconsideration of the CSC Resolution exonerating Cuanan. the petition for review/reconsideration was filed out of time. In a long line of cases. its Resolution70[28] dated July 18. 041147 DATED OCTOBER 22. 2005.R.72 [30] and reiterated in Philippine National Bank v. contends that the DepEd cannot file a motion for reconsideration from the CSC Resolution exonerating him. 041147 DATED OCTOBER 22. THE SAME NOT BEING THE PROPER REMEDY IN ASSAILING CSC RESOLUTION NO.. who can file an appeal of a judgment of exoneration in an administrative 69 70 71 72 73 . even if not the complainant. 2004. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN ADJUDGING CSC AS HAVING COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING RESOLUTION NO. that even if Cuanan was not served a copy of the pleadings filed by the DepEd. on the other hand. II WITH DUE RESPECT. that even if DepEd may seek reconsideration of the CSC Resolution. Cuanan. since it is not the complainant in the administrative case and therefore not a party adversely affected by the decision therein. 2004. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE PETITION IN CA-G. the CSC was not bound by procedural rules.

2004. 021600 allows the disciplining authority to appeal from a decision exonerating an erring employee. Recourse to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 renders the petition dismissible for being the wrong remedy. Now. (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires. (Emphasis supplied) Hence. Furthermore. CSC Resolution No. thus: Section 2. Nonetheless. where the proceeding was ex parte or one in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object.79[37] Furthermore. – x x x (l) PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the respondent against whom a decision in a disciplinary case has been rendered or to the disciplining authority in an appeal from a decision exonerating the said employee. The remedy of an aggrieved party from a resolution issued by the CSC is to file a petition for review thereof under Rule 4375[33] of the Rules of Court within fifteen days from notice of the resolution. as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction. 030069 may be subject to a motion for reconsideration by the DepEd which. Cuanan's petition for certiorari before the CA could be treated as a petition for review. where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process. CSC Resolution No.47 case. At any rate.76[34] As will be shown forthwith. while a motion for reconsideration is a condition precedent to the filing of a petition for certiorari. or thirteen (13) days from receipt on November 9. clearly within the 15-day reglementary period for the filing of a petition for review. (c) when the writs issued are null and void.78[36] Such move would be in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice. the petition having been filed on November 22. immediate recourse to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is warranted where the order is a patent nullity. where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief. or (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. Coverage and Definition of Terms. 030069 has long become final and executory. to wit: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates.77[35] These exceptions find application to Cuanan's petition for certiorari in the CA. 041147. as the appointing and disciplining authority. is a real party in interest. It must be noted that the records show that copies of CSC Resolution No. the Court finds none. as to the merits of DepEd's arguments. 2004 of CSC Resolution No. 030069 74 75 76 77 78 79 74[32] . exception (c) applies to the present case. there are exceptions to this rule. Cuanan's exoneration under CSC Resolution No.

which in the present case clearly failed to discharge the same. The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice. final orders or resolutions. unless contradicted. It may no longer be modified in any respect. 2003 had already become final and executory when the DepEd filed its Petition for Review/Reconsideration on April 11. In Gallardo-Corro v. non-receipt of the duly sent copy of CSC Resolution No. or about two months later. even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law. at the risk of occasional errors. it becomes immutable and can no longer be amended or modified. and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. otherwise. while the DepEd requested a copy sometime in March 2003. while it is true that administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions are free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements.is on the part of the DepEd. 2003. 030069 dated January 20. they are bound by law and practice to observe the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented before them. the burden of proving the irregularity in official conduct -. more than two months later. Court of Industrial 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 80[38] . and that.that is. including DepEd. there would be no end to litigations. Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period. the judgments or orders of courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law. thus setting to naught the main role of courts of justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality. on January 23. Under the Rules of Evidence.84[42] this Court held: Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable.85[43] Moreover. the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case. Consequently.86[44] The relative freedom of the CSC from the rigidities of procedure cannot be invoked to evade what was clearly emphasized in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. It is elementary that once judgment has become final and executory.83[41] Thus. it is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed. the presumption stands that CSC Resolution No. Cuanan 81[39] received a copy thereof on January 31. 2003. 030069 -.82[40] This presumption includes that of regularity of service of judgments. Gallardo. 2003.48 were duly sent to the parties.

Considering that pleadings filed by the DepEd were not served upon Cuanan. nor was he even required by the CSC to file his comments thereon. the petition is DENIED. since no copy of the pleadings filed by the DepEd were served upon him or his counsel. 87 88 420 . Any supplemental pleading to supply deficiencies in aid of an original pleading but which should not entirely substitute the latter can be filed only upon a favorable action by the Commission on the motion of a party to the case. 13 SCRA 266 3. The scope of the equal protection clause.(Emphasis supplied) Cuanan undoubtedly was denied procedural due process.A. 12 a. they may be treated as mere scraps of paper which should not have merited the attention or consideration of the CSC. 1. Equal protection of the law. People vs.R. 68 Phil. Requisites for a valid classificationRead: 1. 87[45] CHAPTER III . .All pleadings filed by the parties with the Commission.THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE …nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. WHEREFORE. Furthermore. SP No.49 Relations: that all administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. Cayat.88[46] of the Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides: Section 43. The said motion should be submitted within five (5) days from receipt of a copy of the original pleading and it is discretionary upon the Commission to allow the same or not or even to consider the averments therein. He had no opportunity to participate in the proceedings for the petition for review/ reconsideration filed by the DepEd. Section 43. Filing of Supplemental Pleadings. 95 SCRA 2. 87499 are AFFIRMED.A. There must be real and substantial distinctions. shall be copy furnished the other party with proof of service filed with the Commission.

HIMAGAN VS. 2-A Gumabon vs. 1989 4. 1991 No violation of the equal protection clause if Congress would legalize cock-fighting and horse racing since police power could regulate gambling. IMELDA MARCOS VS. R. It must be germane tot he purposes of the law. Sec. PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS. 1997 . PEOPLE. It must apply equally to all members of the same class. Association of Small Landowners vs. November 5. 124360. 2. Read again. c. 56 2. May 14. 1994 The fact that policemen charged with a criminal offense punishable by more than 6 years are to be suspended during the entire duration of the case unlike other government employees is valid since it rests on valid classification because policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them. BASCO VS. 65 Phil. Director of Prisons. No. PANFILO LACSON VS. 278 SCRA 843 4. Loss of revenue is not a valid ground unless it would be withdrawn to all government offices. and d. October 7. 37 SCRA 420 2-b. FRANCISCO TATAD vs. 301 SCRA 278 (There is real and substantial distinction between business inside the Subic Special Economic Zone and outside wherein those inside are exempt from other taxes as a result of the policy of the government to accelerate the development of the portion of Subic left by the Americans) 3. January 20. CA. G. P. November 11. TIU VS. Vera. 3. SANDIGANBAYAN. PRADO. July 14. vs. It must not be limited to existing conditions only. PAGCOR. Equal protection in generalRead: 1. of Agrarian reform.50 b. 1993 There is no valid distinction for a law removing the franking privilege of the judiciary while leaving the same to the Executive and Legislative despite the fact that there is considerable volume of mails from the courts. CA. 1999 2-b-1. THE SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY.

In May. The facts: 1. 4. refining. FILIPINAS SHELL and CALTEX PHILIPPINES. there was a Filipino presence in the Philippine oil market. 6. no government agency was regulating the oil industry. 172 creating the ENERGY REULATORY BOARD to regulate the business of importing. JOKER ARROYO. the OIL INDUSTRY COMMISSION ACT was enacted REGULATING the oil industry . The Board was empowered to “fix and regulate the prices of petroleum products and other related merchandise. November 5. exporting. G. HON. marketing and distributing energy resources “WHEN WARRANTED AND ONLY WHEN PUBLIC NECESSITY REQUIRES”. In 1971. WIGBERTO TANADA. 1997. PNOC then operated under the business name PETRON CORPORATION and for the first time. No. On November 9. Pres. BATAAN REFINING COMPANY and FILOIL MARKETING and six (6) petroleum marketing companies: ESSO. CALTEX. Prior to 1971. transporting.R. J. It acquired ownership of ESSO Philippines and Filoil and likewise bought controlling shares of the Bataan Refining Corporation. the country was driven to its knees by the crippling oil crisis and in order to remedy the same. In 1984. FILOIL. then President Marcos created the Philippine national Oil Corporation (PNOC) t break the control of the foreigners to the oil industry. 1973. HON. Pres. only three (3) oil companies were left operating in the country. SHELL. PUNO. There were four (4) refining companies at that time. New players were free to enter the oil market without any government interference. shipping. 3. These are: CALTEX. processing. By 1985. Corazon Aquino signed Executive Order No. RUBEN TORRES. 8180 entitled “An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and for Other Purposes”. FLAG HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION vs. Marcos through section 8 of PD 1956 created the OIL PRICE STABILIZATION FUND (OPSF) to cushion the effects of frequent changes in the price of oil caused by the exchange rate adjustments or increase of the world market prices crude oil and imported petroleum products. RA 8180 seeks to end 26 years of government regulation of the downstream oil industry. 5. 2. ENRIQUE GARCIA. FILIPINAS SHELL and PNOC.51 EDCEL LAGMAN. . CALTEX. 127867. MOBIL and SHELL. These petitions challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. GETTY. FRANCISCO VIRAY. PETRON. 1987.

52 7. IS STABLE.” xxx . 8. The provisions of the law being questioned as unconstitutional are Section 5 [b] and Section 15 which provide: “Section 5 [b] Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this Act. Executive Order No. EO 392 implementing the full deregulation of the oil industry is unconstitutional since it is arbitrary and unreasonable since it was enacted due to the alleged depletion of the OPSF fund. The law requires that the implementation of the regulation. 9. 372 was issued by President Fidel Ramos implementing full deregulation ON THE GROUND THAT THE OPSF FUND HAS BEEN DEPLETED. b. The imposition of different tariff rates does not deregulate the oil industry and even bars the entry of other players in the oil industry but instead effectively protects the interest of the oil companies with existing refineries. Section 15 of RA 8180 is unconstitutional for it allows the formation of a de facto cartel among three existing oil companies in violation of the Constitution prohibiting against monopolies. 1997. that this provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress. VI of the 1987 Constitution which requires every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in the title thereof. 1997. tariff duty shall be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of 3% and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven (7%) percent. combination in restraint of trade and unfair competition. 8180. Provided. Thus. c. 5 [b] providing for tariff differential violates Section 26 [1] of Art. except fuel oil and LPG. The petitioners questioned the constitutionality of RA 8180 on the following grounds: a. 392 are unconstitutional for undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the Secretary of Energy. a condition which is not found in RA No. Congress enacted RA 8180 deregulating the Oil Industry not later than March. d. further. Section 5 of RA 8180 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Provided. it runs counter to the objective of the law “to foster a truly competitive market”. 1996. 2004. shall as far as practicable be made at a time WHEN THE PRICES OF CRUDE OIL AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN THE WORLD ARE DECLINING AND WHEN THE EXCHANGE RATE OF THE PESO IN RELATION TO THE US DOLLAR. e. The inclusion of Sec. the rate for which shall be the same. Section 15 of RA 8180 and EO No. that beginning on January 1. the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the same. In March. On February 8.

in the main procedural matters. As held in KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAGLILINGKOD SA PAMAHALAAN NG PILIPINAS. Whether section 15 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of legislative power. Whether or not RA 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition against monopolies. the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Whether or not Section 5 of RA 8180 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Pursuant to Section 5 [e] of RA 7638. AND IN KEEPING WITH THE COURT’S DUTY TO DETERMINE WHETHER . Whether or not the petitioners have the standing to question the validity of the subject law and executive order. Implementation of full deregulation. 1997. as guardians of the Constitution. it is not only the right of the judiciary to declare such act as unconstitutional and void. As far as practicable. and b. have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. 2. Substantive Issues: a. standing. it was held that: “Objections to taxpayer’s suit for lack of sufficient personality. Whether or not Section 5 of RA 8180 violates the one title—one subject requirement of the Constitution. d. or interest are . VS. The question of locus standi must likewise fall . HELD: 1. the DOE. CONSIDERING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CASES TO THE PUBLIC. Whether or not the petitions raise justiciable controversy. Whether or not EO 392 is arbitrary and unreasonable. implement full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March. When the statute violates the Constitution. The courts.53 “Section 15. INC. b. TAN.” The issues are: Procedural Issues: a. combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition. Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle controversies involving rights but also the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any agency or branch of the government. however. c. and e. upon approval of the President.

” There is no disagreement on the part of the parties as to the far-reaching importance of the validity of RA 8180. The petitioners claim that the phrases “as far as practicable”. and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject. We have consistently ruled that the title need not mirror. THE BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONERS WHERE IT WAS HELD THAT: “The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law . no valid objection can be made. The first cannot be done. and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution. which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be. 3. unclear and inconcrete in meaning and could not therefore provide the “determinate or determinable standards” which can guide the President in his decision to fully deregulate the oil industry. Thus. We do not concur with this contention. to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. THE COURT HAS BRUSHED ASIDE TECHNICALITIES OF PROCEDURE AND HAS TAKEN COGNIZANCE OF THESE PETITIONS. fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. The power of Congress to delegate the execution of laws has long been settled by this Court in 1916 in the case of COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINA VS. We hold that Section 5 providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of RA 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. the Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one title---one subject rule. A law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain a number of provisions. As a policy. It is contended that Section 5[b[ of RA 8180 on tariff differentials violates the Constitutional prohibition requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title. to the latter.54 OR NOT THE OTHER BRANCHEDS OF GOVERNMENT HAVE KEPT THEMSELVES WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAWS AND THAT THEY HAVE NOT ABUSE THE DISCRETION GIVEN TO THEM. The contention that there is undue delegation of legislative power when it authorized the President to determine when deregulation starts is without merit. there is no good sense in being hyper-technical on the standing of the petitioners for they pose issues which are significant to our people and which deserve our forthright resolution.” Two tests have been developed to determine whether the delegation of the power to execute laws does not involve the abdication of the power . “decline of crude oil prices in the world market” and “stability of the peso exchange rate to the US dollar” are ambivalent. no matter how diverse they may be. 4. so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject.

in the form of contract. On the other hand.” The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in our constitutional landscape because such has become an inevitability in light of the increasing complexity of the task of government. IF IT CAN. the only thing he will do is enforce it.” A monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more persons or companies. consisting of the exclusive right or power to carry on a particular business or trade. THE COURTS WILL BEND BACKWARD TO LOCATE THE SAME ELSEWHERE IN ORDER TO SPARE THE STATUTE. The executive is bereft of any right to alter either by addition or subtraction the standards set by RA 8180 for it has no power to make laws. in HIRABAYASHI VS. UNITED STATES. viz: the completeness test and the sufficiency of standard test. Under the sufficient standard test. trust. Section 19 of Article XII of the Constitution provides: “The state shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interests so requires. the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate. manufacture a particular article or control the sale or the whole market structure in which one or only a few firms dominate the total sales of a product or service. We delineated the metes and bounds of these tests in EASTERM SHIPPING LINES VS.” 5. The exercise of delegated power is given a strict scrutiny by courts for the delegate is a mere agent whose action cannot infringe the terms of the agency. WHO IS NOT ALLOWED TO STEP INTO THE SHOES OF THE LEGISLATURE AND EXERCISE A POWER ESSENTIALLY LEGISLATIVE. FROM CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITY. 6. Under the first test. BOTH TESTS ARE INTENDED TO PREVENT A TOTAL TRANSFERENCE OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY TO THE DELEGATE. EO No.55 to make law itself. there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed. pool. In fact. holding . 392 failed to follow faithfully the standards set by RA 8180 when it considered the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF Fund. The misapplication of this extra factor cannot be justified. To cede to the executive the power to make laws would invite tyranny and to transgress the separation of powers. a combination in restraint of trade is an agreement or understanding between two or more persons. thus: There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power . the Supreme Court through Justice ISAGANI CRUZ held that “even if the law does not expressly pinpoint the standard. POEA.

THE OTHER EDGE CUTS AND CUTS DEEP IN THE HEART OF THEIR COMPETITORS. The validity of the assailed provisions of RA 8180 has to be decided in the light of the letter and spirit of Section 19. Art. be regulated in the public interest. As the dominant players. controlling its production. income and wealth. They also claim that the prohibition against predatory pricing is intended to protect prospective entrants. a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for all. for the purpose of unduly restricting competition. While the Constitution embraced free enterprise as an economic creed. In the case at bar. and to have big inventories. The tariff differential of 4% works to their immense advantage. This would effectively prevent new players. They stress that the inventory requirement is meant to guaranty continuous domestic supply of petroleum and to discourage fly-by-night operators. It also calls for the State to protect Filipino enterprises against unfair and trades practices. This is so because it would take billions for new players to construct refineries. Those without refineries had to compete with a higher cost of 4%. IT ERECTS HIGH BARRIERS TO NE PLAYERS. This distinct free enterprise system is dictated by the need to achieve the goals of our national economy as defined under Section 1. The provision on inventory widens the advantage of PETRON. Art. The provisions on 4% tariff differential.They will be competing on an uneven field. Respondents aver that the 4% tariff differential is designed to encourage new entrants to invest in refineries. Combination in restraint of trade refers to means while monopoly refers to the end. this is only one edge on tariff differential. especially the underprivileged . monopolizing trade and commerce in a certain commodity. predatory pricing and inventory requirement blocks the entry of other players and give undue advantage to the 3 oil companies resulting to monopolies or unfair competition. New players in order to equalize must build their refineries worth billions of pesos. XII of the Constitution which are: more equitable distribution of opportunities. XII of the Constitution. Yet. it did not prohibit per se the operation of monopolies which can. it cannot be denied that our oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly (dominated by a handful of players) and a foreign oligopoly at that. Prospective competitors again find compliance oft his requirement difficult because of prohibitive cost in constructing new . distribution and price or otherwise interfering with freedom of trade without statutory authority. SHELL. SHELL AND CALTEX against prospective new players.56 company. The three (3) could easily comply with the inventory requirement in view of their numerous storage facilities. CALTEX & PETRON boast of existing refineries of various capacities. however.

The raiding team seized several imported medicines. however. a duly registered sole proprietorship of petitioner Romeo Rodriguez (Rodriguez) operating a drug store located at San Matias.R.” Coupled with the 4% tariff differential and the inventory requirement. 2009 TINGA.57 storage facilities. The raid was conducted pursuant to a search warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). the predatory pricing is a significant barrier which discourage new players to enter the oil market thereby promoting unfair competition. which were manufactured by SmithKline. Orbenin (500mg. Branch 57. According to HOVENKAMP: “The rationale for predatory pricing is the sustaining of losses today that will give a firm monopoly profits in the future. ROMA DRUG and ROMEO RODRIGUEZ vs.) capsules and Ampiclox (500mg. the Regional trial Court of Guagua.). April 16. Predatory pricing will be profitable only if the market contains significant barriers to new entry. Pampanga vs. monopoly and restraint of trade which are prohibited by the Constitution. Now comes the prohibition on predatory pricing or “selling or offering to sell any product at a price unreasonably below the industry average cost so as to attract customers to the detriment of the competitors”. G. including Augmentin (375mg. J. PAMPANGA. BFAD & GLAXO. if the market is flooded with new entrants as soon as the successful predator attempts to raise its price. a duly registered corporation which is the local distributor of pharmaceutical products manufactured by its parent London-based corporation.) capsules. No. Inc to form Glaxo SmithKline. Pampanga. The monopoly profits will never materialize. 149907. Guagua.) tablets. The local SmithKline has since merged with Glaxo Wellcome Phil. The seized medicines. RTC OF GUAGUA.: On 14 August 2000. a team composed of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) operatives and inspectors of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) conducted a raid on petitioner Roma Drug. the authorized Philippine distributor of these products. The net effect would be to effectively prohibit the entrance of new players. . Angeles City. It appears that Roma Drug is one of six drug stores which were raided on or around the same time upon the request of SmithKline Beecham Research Limited (SmithKline). & THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR OF PAMPANGA. Amoxil (250mg. private respondent in this case. were imported directly from abroad and not purchased through the local SmithKline.

Article XIII “are not self-executing provisions. The two other provisions are Section 11.” The term “unregistered” signifies the lack of registration with the Bureau of Patent. In this case. the latter in behalf of public respondents RTC. the present Petition for Prohibition questing the RTC-Guagua Pampanga and the Provincial Prosecutor to desist from further prosecuting Rodriguez.” It adds that Section 11. On the constitutional issue.” and Section 15. and that Sections 3(b)(3). Their classification as “counterfeit” is based solely on the fact that they were imported from abroad and not purchased from the Philippine-registered owner of the patent or trademark of the drugs. Provincial Prosecutor and Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD).” Glaxo Smithkline further claims that the SLCD does not in fact conflict with the aforementioned constitutional provisions and in fact are in accord with constitutional precepts in favor of the people’s right to health. 8203. Pampanga. Hence. the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the RTC from proceeding with the trial against Rodriguez. Article XIII. the process of which is governed under Part III of the Intellectual Property Code.58 The NBI subsequently filed a complaint against Rodriguez for violation of Section 4 (in relation to Sections 3 and 5) of Republic Act No. . there is no doubt that the subject seized drugs are identical in content with their Philippine-registered counterparts. In gist. with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in San Fernando. 4 and 5 of the SLCD be declared unconstitutional.” Through its Resolution dated 15 October 2001. Glaxo Smithkline and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) have opposed the petition. importers or distributors. the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. and the BFAD. who take pains in having imported drug products registered before the BFAD. Article II and Section 11. Rodriguez asserts that the challenged provisions contravene three provisions of the Constitution. includes “an unregistered imported drug product. The first is the equal protection clause of the Bill of Rights. health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. Article XIII in particular cannot be work “to the oppression and unlawful of the property rights of the legitimate manufacturers. Trademark and Technology Transfer of a trademark. The section prohibits the sale of counterfeit drugs. which under Section 3(b)(3). tradename or other identification mark of a drug in the name of a natural or juridical person. which states that it is the policy of the State “to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them. the NBI and Glaxo Smithkline from prosecuting the petitioners. arguing that both Section 15. which mandates that the State make “essential goods. Article II. also known as the Special Law on Counterfeit Drugs (SLCD). There is no claim that they were adulterated in any way or mislabeled at least. Glaxo Smithkline asserts the rule that the SLCD is presumed constitutional.

the acts referred to in Section 71 of the IP Code as enumerated hereunder: (i) Introduction in the Philippines or Anywhere Else in the World. (72. or by any party authorized to use the invention: Provided. 9502” promulgated on 4 November 2008. That. Using a patented product which has been put on the market in the Philippines by the owner of the product. The constitutional aspect of this petition raises obviously interesting questions. the limitation on patent rights shall apply after a drug or medicine has been introduced in the Philippines or anywhere else in the world by the patent owner. Using a patented product which has been put on the market in the Philippines by the owner of the product. or with his express consent. insofar as such use is performed after that product has been so put on the said market: Provided. such questions have in fact been mooted with the passage in 2008 of Republic Act No.59 II. However. further. The owner of a patent has no right to prevent third parties from performing. That. 9502 amends Section 72 of the Intellectual Property Code in that the later law unequivocally grants third persons the right to import drugs or medicines whose patent were registered in the Philippines by the owner of the product: “72. further. Section 7 of Rep. insofar as such use is performed after that product has been so put on the said market: Provided. with regard to drugs and medicines. That the right to import the drugs and medicines contemplated in this section shall be available to any government agency or any private third party.1. or with his express consent. or by any party authorized to use the invention: Provided. That the right to import the drugs and medicines contemplated in this section shall be available to any government agency or any private third party. 9502. Act No. the limitation on patent rights shall apply after a drug or medicine has been introduced in the Philippines or anywhere else in the world by the patent owner. The relevant provisions thereof read: Rule 9.1) . Limitations on Patent Rights. with regard to drugs and medicines. The unqualified right of private third parties such as petitioner to import or possess “unregistered imported drugs” in the Philippines is further confirmed by the “Implementing Rules to Republic Act No. also known as the “Universally Accessible Cheaper and Quality Medicines Act of 2008”. without his authorization.

so that the latter loses all meaning and function. Act No. 9502 since the latter indubitably grants private third persons the unqualified right to import or otherwise use such drugs. However. it deprives Filipinos to choose a less expensive regime for their health care by denying them a plausible and safe means of purchasing medicines at a cheaper cost. 9502 did not expressly repeal any provision of the SLCD. It discriminates. such as Rep. siblings. The law would make criminals of doctors from abroad on medical missions of such humanitarian organizations such as the International Red Cross. Irreconcilable inconsistency between two laws embracing the same subject may exist when the later law nullifies the reason or purpose of the earlier act. 9502.60 The drugs and medicines are deemed introduced when they have been sold or offered for sale anywhere else in the world. It does not accommodate the situation where the drug is out of stock in the Philippines. the law makes a criminal of any person who imports an unregistered drug regardless of the purpose. the International Red Crescent. Legis posteriors priores contrarias abrogant. After all. Act No. even if the medicine can spell life or death for someone in the Philippines. Had the Court proceeded to directly confront the constitutionality of the assailed provisions of the SLCD. children. against poor Filipinos without means to travel abroad to purchase less expensive medicines in favor of their wealthier brethren able to do so. For the reasons above-stated. but still within the range of constitutionally protected behavior. it is apparent that it would have at least placed in doubt the validity of the provisions. Medicin Sans Frontieres.” and of corresponding criminal penalties therefore are irreconcilably in the imposition conflict with Rep. When a subsequent enactment covering a field of operation coterminus with a prior statute cannot by any reasonable construction be given effect while the prior law remains in operative existence because of irreconcilable conflict between the two acts. parents to import the drug in behalf of their loved ones too physically ill to travel and avail of the meager personal use exemption allotted by the law. Act No. at the expense of health. and other like-minded groups who necessarily bring their own pharmaceutical drugs when they embark on their missions of mercy. wives. As written. Where a statute of later date. Less urgently perhaps. it is clear that the SLCO’s classification of “unregistered imported drugs” as “counterfeit drugs. the latest legislative expression prevails and the prior law yields to the extent of the conflict. It does not allow husbands. (n) It may be that Rep. . beyond the reach of a patient who urgently depends on it. the prosecution of petitioner is no longer warranted and the quested writ of prohibition should accordingly be issued. clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject that intention must be given effect. III. The absurd results from this far-reaching ban extends to implications that deny the basic decencies of humanity.

104 SCRA 38 9. Citizens Surety vs. Puno. Approved on March 6. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Hiu. Even worse is the fact that the law is not content with simply banning. UNIDO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN. 86 SCRA 270 7. Flores vs. 2007 and effective on July 15. 119 SCRA 216 12. Sandiganbayan. COMELEC. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 2007 (This Law shall be automatically suspended one (1) month before and two (2) months after the holding of any election) .127 SCRA 329 5. For a law that is intended to help save lives. many of whom motivated to do so out of altruism or basic human love. Nunez vs. with the malevolents who would alter or counterfeit pharmaceutical drugs for reasons of profit at the expense of public safety. Ormoc City. Hawaiian-Phil. Ormoc Sugar Co. 130 SCRA 654 11.THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROVISION Section 2. 82 SCRA 30 13. 184 SCRA 484 CHAPTER IV . and the traditional treatment of penal provisions of special laws is that of malum prohibitum–or punishable regardless of motive or criminal intent. COMELEC.LACSON VS. COMELEC. Dumlao vs. Republic Act No. Sison vs. houses. Ancheta. vs. Villegas vs.l982 4. Note that the SLCD is a special law. 9372. 111 SCRA 433(Read also the dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar 10. Taxicab Operators vs. It equates the importers of such drugs.61 they are disabled from invoking the bare “personal use” exemption afforded by the SLCD. soulless legislative piece. September 30. Ceniza vs. 151 SCRA 306 14. the SLCD has revealed itself as a heartless. 95 SCRA 763 8. vs. BOT. COMELEC. Co. 22 SCRA 603 15. The right of the people to be secure in their persons. NOTE: Applicable provisions of the Human Security Act/Anti-Terrorism Law. 2-d. 1999 3. 95 SCRA 392 6. at civil costs. COMELEC. Asociacion. Juinio. the importation of unregistered drugs. papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. Bautista vs. Peralta vs. January 20.

Period of detention without judicial warrant of arrest. The police or law enforcement personnel concerned shall.. The judge shall then submit a written report of what he/she had observed when the subject was brought before him to the proper court that has jurisdiction over the case of the person thus arrested. having been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council has taken custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall.. and taken into custody by the said police. present him or her before any judge at the latter’s residence or office nearest the place where the arrest took place at any time of the day or night. holidays or after office hours. or law enforcement personnel: Provided. Period of Detention in the event of an actual or imminent terrorist attack.. That the arrest of those suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism must result from the surveillance under Section 7 and examination of bank deposits under Section 27 pf this Act. It shall be the duty of the judge. to inquire of them the reasons why they have arrested the person and determine by questioning and personal observation whether or not the subject has been subjected to any physical. The penalty of 10 years and 1 day to 12 years imprisonment shall be imposed upon the police or law enforcement personnel who fails to notify any judge as provided in the preceding paragraph. provided. suspects may not be detained for more than three days without the . That where the arrest is made during Saturdays. Section 19. detained. the written notice shall be served at the residence of the judge nearest the place where the accused was arrested. Immediately after taking custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism. who. the police or law enforcement personnel shall notify in writing the judge of the court nearest the place of apprehension or arrest. before detaining the person suspected of the crime of terrorism. WITHOUT INCURRING ANY CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS TO THE PROPER JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES. DELIVER SAID CHARGED OR SUSPECTED PERSON TO THE PROPER JUDICIAL AUTHORITY WITHIN A PERIOD OF THREE (3) DAYS counted from the moment said charged or suspected person has been apprehended or arrested.In the vent of an actual or imminent terrorist attack. The judge shall forthwith submit his report within 3 calendar days from the time the suspect was brought to his/her residence or office. moral or psychological torture by whom and why. any police or law enforcement personnel.62 Sec. notwithstanding. to ascertain the identity of the police or law enforcement personnel and the person or persons they have arrested and presented before him or her. Sundays. among other things.The provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. 18.

assets. That within three days after the detention the suspects whose connection with the terror attack or threat is not established. and/or • Prohibited from using any cellular phones. or after office hours. placements. trust accounts. transportation and communication equipment. and records in any bank or financial institution. and frozen in order to prevent their use. -shall be seized. transfer or conveyance for purposes that are inimical to the safety and security of the people or injurious to the interest of the State. He or she may also use any of his property that is under seizure or sequestration or frozen because of his/her indictment as a terrorist upon permission of the court for any legitimate reason. • to a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization or group of persons.63 written approval of a municipal.. If the arrest is made during Saturdays. • Restricted from traveling.The deposits and their outstanding balances. shall be released immediately. Seizure and Sequestration. moneys. and property of whatever kind and nature belonging: • To any person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism. the arresting police of law enforcement personnel shall bring the person thus arrested to the residence of any of the officials mentioned above that is nearest the place where the accused was arrested. association or group of persons. Section 26 provides that persons who have been charged with terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism---even if they have been granted bail because evidence of guilt is not strong—can be: • Detained under house arrest. businesses. regional trial court. or other means of communications with people outside their residence. . Sundays or holidays. sequestered. supplies and other implements. • to a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization. the Sandiganbayan or a justice of the Court of Appeals nearest the place of arrest. provincial or regional official of a Human Rights Commission. The accused or suspect may withdraw such sums as are reasonably needed by his family including the services of his counsel and his family’s medical needs upon approval of the court. however. or judge of the municipal. The approval in writing of any of the said officials shall be secured by the police or law enforcement personnel concerned within five days after the date of the detention of the persons concerned. Provided. computers. Section 39. city.

NOT WHAT THE APPLICANTS HAD IN THEIR THOUGHTS.145 SCRA 739 b. AND WAS NOT WHAT WAS ULTIMATELY DESCRIBED IN THE SEARCH WARRANT. The place to be searched as indicated in the warrant is controlling PEOPLE VS. If the person suspected as terrorist is acquitted after arraignment or his case dismissed before his arraignment by a competent court. c. CA. the police officers had in their mind the first four (4) separate apartment units at the rear of ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE in Quezon City to be the subject of their search. The seized. 291 SCRA 400 Narvasa. sequestered and frozen bank deposits…shall be deemed property held in trust by the bank or financial institution and that their use or disposition while the case is pending shall be subject to the approval of the court before which the case or cases are pending. Validity of a search warrant and the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation thereof. The filing of an appeal or motion for reconsideration shall not stay the release of said funds from seizure. OR HAD REPRESENTED IN THE PROOFS THEY SUBMITTED TO THE . said seized. Requisites of a valid search warrant Read: a. This is so because it is neither licit nor fair to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched---although not that specified in the search warrant---is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence.64 Section 40. however. the seizure…shall be lifted by the investigating body or the competent court and restored to him without delay. any evidence obtained from the place searched which is different from that indicated in the search warrant is inadmissible in evidence for any purpose and in any proceeding. sequestered and frozen assets shall automatically forfeited in favor of the government. The same was not. sequestration and freezing. what the Judge who issued the warrant had in mind. WHAT IS MATERIAL IN DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF A SEARCH IS THE PLACE STATED IN THE WARRANT ITSELF. If convicted. Section 41. Essentials of a valid search warrant. As such. CJ In applying for a search warrant.

it was not just a case of “obvious typographical error”.65 COURT ISSUING THE WARRANT. search incidental to a lawful arrest. 4. IT IS NOT THE RULE THAT A MOTION TO QUASH THE WARRANT (or to retrieve the things seized) MAY BE FILED ONLY IN THE ISSUING COURT---SUCH A MOTION MAY BE FILED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN EITHER THE ISSUING COURT OR THAT IN WHICH THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDING IS PENDING. Abello of the Olongapo PNP was tipped off by an informer that Aling Rosa would be arriving from Baguio City the following day with a large volume of marijuana. She was carrying a traveling bag at that time. she was pointed to by the informer. The bag allegedly contained 8. Held: Warrantless search is allowed in the following instances: 1. ARUTA. After trial. Note the two (2) conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court. NOTE: Very Important: Where a search warrant is issued by one court and the criminal action base don the results of the search is afterwards commenced in another court. seizure of evidence in plain view. searches of moving vehicle. consented searches. 6. d. As such. Validity of a warrantless search and seizure as a result of an informer’s tip. should not become unbridled licenses for law enforcement . 288 SCRA 626 On December 13. near Rizal Ave. PEOPLE VS. however. She was arrested without a warrant. Issue: Whether or not the marijuana allegedly taken from the accused is admissible in evidence. the policemen waited for a Victory Bus from Baguio City near the PNB Olongapo. She was not acting suspiciously. 1988. 2. P/Lt. she was convicted and imposed a penalty of life imprisonment. When the accused got off. and stop and frisk measures. 5. customs searches.5 kilos of marijuana. The above exceptions to the requirement of a search warrant. but a clear case of a search of a place different from that clearly and without ambiguity identified in the search warrant. 3. As a result of the tip.

Since there was no valid warrantless arrest. This case is similar tot he case of PEOPLE VS. and an arrest effected based on the evidence produced by the search. it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. from Baguio City. The marijuana obtained as a result of a warrantless search is inadmissible as evidence for the following reasons: a. Dasmarinas. Dasmarinas. the appellant was arrested by the above-named police officers while alighting from a passenger jeepney near a waiting shed in Salitran.m. c. ENCINADA.. MONTILLA. d. the accused was not acting suspiciously. The arresting officers do not have personal knowledge that the accused was committing a crime at that time. Cavite. 284 SCRA 703 On June 19. there being no probable cause and the accused’s not having been legally arrested. the accused’s identity was previously ascertained so applying for a warrant should have been easy. PEOPLE VS. In order that the information received by the police officers may be sufficient to be the basis of probable cause. the accused in this case was searched while innocently crossing a street Consequently.66 officers to trample upon the conditionally guaranteed and more fundamental right of persons against unreasonable search and seizures. at about 2 p. . Cavite. with an undetermined amount of marijuana. and PEOPLE VS. The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. The arrest was made only after the accused was pointed to by the informant at a time when she was not doing anything suspicious. This is so because if a search is first undertaken. 1994. 1994. AMINNUDIN. for being contrary to law. both such search and arrest would be unlawful. the policemen had sufficient time to apply for a search warrant but they failed to do so. The informer likewise informed them that he could recognize said person. SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin of the Dasmarinas. Cavite PNP were informed by an INFORMER that a drug courier would be arriving in Barangay Salitran. At about 4 in the morning of June 20. there was no legal basis for the police to effect a warrantless search of the accused’s bag. it must be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief a crime has been committed or is about to be committed. b. it logically follows that the subsequent search is similarly illegal.

67 upon being pointed to by the informer. In short. warrantless search is allowed in the following instances: 1. Since the accused was arrested for transporting marijuana. The arrest was without warrant. 5. the subsequent search on his person is justified. customs searches. consented searches. The said contention is without merit considering that the information given by the informer is too sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the corresponding arrest or search warrant. 6. 2. and stop and frisk measures. search incidental to a lawful arrest. Issue: Was the warrantless arrest valid? Held: The accused claims that the warrantless search and seizure is illegal because the alleged information was received by the police on June 19. While there is indication that the informer knows the courier. An arresting officer has the right to validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous weapons. upon being pointed to by the informer as the drug courier. the policemen requested the accused to open and show them the contents of his bag and the cartoon he was carrying and he voluntarily opened the same and upon cursory inspection. On bare information. Furthermore. In the case at bar. the records do not show that he knew his name. they could have applied for a search warrant. . 3. it was found out that it contains marijuana. there was no probable cause for this policemen to think that he was committing a crime. The trial court convicted the appellant for transporting marijuana based on the testimonies of the Above-named police officers without presenting the alleged informer. The policemen recovered 28 kilos of dried marijuana leaves. The accused insists that it is normal for a person traveling with a bag and cartoon which should not elicit the slightest suspicion that he was committing a crime. 4. searches of moving vehicle. 1994 and therefore. seizure of evidence in plain view. and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. Hence the arrest. the police could not have secured a warrant from a judge.

PEOPLE VS. He is merely a corroborative witness to the arresting officers.68 The said contention was considered without merit by the Supreme Court considering the fact that he consented to the search as well as the fact that the informer was a reliable one who had supplied similar information to the police in the past which proved positive. (NOTE: The SC held that the non-presentation of the informer does not affect the case for the prosecution because he is not even the best witness. On Appeal. AMINNUDIN. Are the things admissible in evidence? Can they be sued for damages as a result of the said warrantless search and seizure? Held: . MENGOTE. Thereafter. May 27. 1997. October 2.000. ELI LUI. 220 SCRA). Encimada where the appellant was searched without a warrant while disembarking from a ship on the strength of a tip from an informer received by the police the previous afternoon that the appellant would be transporting prohibited drugs. 144 SCRA 1. the SC reversed the decision of conviction and held that Encinada did not manifest any suspicious behavior that would necessarily and reasonably invite the attention of the police.00 owned by the employer. they confiscated different personal properties therein which were allegedly part of those stolen from the employer. PEOPLE VS. PEOPLE VS. The case is similar to the case of People vs. In search of the allegedly missing amount of P45. ENCINADA. ET AL. The search yielded a plastic package containing marijuana. 2004 Right against unreasonable searches and seizures. ) JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: To say that “reliable tips” from informers constitute probable cause for a warrantless arrest or search IS A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT AND PLACES IN GREAT JEOPARDY THE DOCTRINES LAID DOWN IN MANY DECISIONS MADE BY THIS COURT. the residence of a relative of the suspect was forcibly open by the authorities by kicking the kitchen door to gain entry into the house. 163 SCRA 402. They were in possession of a mission order but later on claimed that the owner of the house gave his consent to the warrantless search. (PEOPLE VS. Mission Order does not authorize an illegal search. Waiver of the right against an unreasonable search and seizure. VS. BURGOS. MATILLANO.

Finally. either constructive or actual. the waiver must be made voluntarily. that the person involved had knowledge. directing the peace officer to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices.1967 Concepcion. Stonehill vs. books and things to be seized. c. BUT A WAIVER BY IMPLICATION CANNOT BE PRESUMED. that the right exists. Diokno. There must be proof of the following: a. warehouses and to seize and take possession of the following personal property. The search warrants did not particularly describe the documents. TARIFF AND CUSTOMS LAWS. of the existence of said right. The search was therefore held illegal and the members of the searching party held liable for damages in accordance with the doctrine laid down in Lim vs.June 19. knowingly and intelligently in order that the said is to be valid. to wit: "Books of accounts. The petitioners are questioning the validity of a total of 42 search warrants issued on different dates against them and the corporations in which they are officers.69 The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived expressly or impliedly. ledgers. Ponce de Leon and MHP Garments vs. balance sheets and profit and loss statements" since they are the subject of the offense of violating the CENTRAL BANK LAWS. . C. receipts. financial records. General or roving warrants Read: 1. vouchers. b. CA. e.J. that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE AND THE REVISED PENAL CODE. There must be clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right. typewriters and other documents or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts. journals. The petitioners claim that the search warrants are void being violative of the Constitutional provision on search and seizure on the ground that: a. correspondence.

AND MAY NOT BE INVOKED BY THE CORPORATE OFFICERS IN PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THEM IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY. the things seized were not delivered to the court to be disposed of in a manner provided for by law. The warrants were issued to fish evidence in the deportation cases against them. cash money not mentioned in the warrant were actually seized. that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE JUDGE WHO ISSUED THE WARRANTS TO HAVE FOUND . that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. Tariff and Customs Laws. IN OTHER WORDS. CONSEQUENTLY. they could not question the same in their personal capacities because the corporations have a personality separate and distinct with its officers. AS A CONSEQUENCE. NO SPECIFIC OFFENSE HAD BEEN ALLEGED IN SAID APPLICATIONS.70 b. Issue: Were the searches and seizures made in the offices and residences of the petitioners valid? a. the same may not be used in evidence against them because the warrants issued were in the nature of a general warrant for failure to comply with the constitutional requirement that: 1. As to the searches made on their offices. THE AVERMENTS THEREOF WITH RESPECT TO THE OFFENSE COMMITTED WERE ABSTRACT. to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision. d. the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner. PAPERS AND THINGS SEIZED FROM THE OFFICES AND PREMISES OF THE CORPORATIONS. They were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical persons therein named had committed a violation of Central bank Laws. THE PETITIONERS MAY NOT VALIDLY OBJECT TO THE USE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THEM OF THE DOCUMENTS. TO WHOM THE SEIZED EFFECTS BELONG. b. Internal revenue Code and Revised Penal Code. None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. An objection to an unlawful search and seizure IS PURELY PERSONAL AND CANNOT BE AVAILED OF BY THIRD PARTIES. As to the documents seized in the residences of the petitioners. c. and 2. e.

SR. JR. They were initially charged. AND MAYOR SUSANA LIM VS. Bail was fixed at P200.R. TAMBASEN VS. Sr. VIOLATING A GIVEN PROVISION OF OUR CRIMINAL LAWS. 48 Phil. 1989. and three of his security escorts and the wounding of another. 1989. 1995. “A SCATTER-SHOT WARRANT is a search warrant issued for more than one specific offense like one for estafa. 76 SCRA 301 4. with the crime of multiple murder with frustrated murder. 169 10. Pabalan. July 14. a warrant of arrest was issued on July 31. People vs. Viduya vs. 1985 9. CA. 99054-57) EN BANC GUTIERREZ. Castro vs. PEOPLE VS. Secretary vs. ROBERTS VS. CA. tax evasion and insurance fraud is a general warrant and therefore not valid) 6. On September 22. Ruiz.71 THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE. designated to review the case. After conducting a preliminary investigation. with three others. Marcos. Castro. Who determines probable cause? a. N. Dizon vs. Veloso. NO.1976 7. April 12.000. J.HON. Verdiago. Villaluz. PEOPLE. Herrera. 37 SCRA 823 3.l976 5. 2. Fiscal Alfane. Define probable cause. theft and qualified theft”) f. Bache vs. issued a Resolution affirming the finding of a prima facie case against the petitioners but ruled that a case of Murder for each of the . OR COMMITTED SPECIFIC OMISSIONS. DE LOS SANTOS VS. Facts: -------Petitioners are suspects of the slaying of Congressman Moises Espinosa. 254 SCRA 307 b. April 30. Asian Surety vs. June 18. 54 SCRA 312 (A search warrant for estafa. robbery. 247 SCRA 85 VICENTE LIM. 73 SCRA 553 8. 216 SCRA 101. FOR THE SAME PRESUPPOSES THE INTRODUCTION OF COMPETENT PROOF THAT THE PARTY AGAINST WHOM IT IS SOUGHT HAS PERFORMED PARTICULAR ACTS. falsification. Collector vs. MONTESA. FELIX (G.

Ocampo and Amarga vs. the Court noted that the addition of the word personally after the word determined and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 . the certification does not bind the judge to come out with the warrant of arrest. Thereafter. The judge committed a grave abuse of discretion. They likewise filed a motion to order the transmittal of initial records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the municipal judge of Barsaga of Masbate. This decision interpreted the "search and seizure" provision of the 1973 Constitution. These motions were however denied by the court because the prosecution had declared the existence of probable cause.S vs. Abbas. If on the face of information. issue a warrant of arrest. 2. Villanueva. four separate informations to that effect were filed with the RTC of Masbate with no bail recommended. Makasiar. Under this provision. However. On November 21. In the case of Placer vs. he may disregard the fiscal's certification and require the submission of the affidavits of witness to aid him at arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause. Hence it found it just and proper to rely on the prosecutors certification in each information. and there was no defect on its face. the judge finds no probable cause.72 killing of the four victims and a physical injuries case for inflicting gunshot wound on the survivor be filled instead against the suspects. the sc ruled that a judge may rely upon the fiscal's certification of the existence of a probable cause and on the basis thereof. filed by the petitioners was granted by the SC. Petitioners then moved that another hearing ba conducted to determine if there really exists a prima facie case against them in the light of documents showing recantations of some witnesses in the preliminary investigation. 1989. the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of order of arrest. informations were complete in form in substance . In the case of Soliven vs. It ordered that the case may be transferred from the RTC of Masbate to the RTC of Makati. This has been the rule since U. ISSUE: ---------Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecutions certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists? Held: ----1. decided under the 1987 Constitution. a motion for change of venue.

certification of the prosecutor. Honorable Enrique B. In the present case. It merely assist him to make the determination of probable cause. Only the judge alone makes this detemination. investigation are in Masbate. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Inting reiterates the following doctrines: (1) The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge. 3. 4. (2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause. the transcripts of stenographic notes. While the former seeks to determine probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest. effective on January 1. (2) The preliminary inquiry made by the prosecutor does not bind the judge. existence of probable cause. the respondent judge relies solely on Considering that all the records of he has not personally determined The determination was made by the the the the .What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. The case of People vs. Villaluz. he shall: (1) personally evaluate the reports and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and. In the case of Castillo vs. the latter ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. the affidavits. 5. the court ruled that judges of RTC no longer have authority to conduct preliminary investigations: This authority was removed from them by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. 4. on the basis thereof. 1985. By itself. issue a warrant of arrest. It is the report. Following established doctrine and procedures. the prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual.73 Constitution to issue warrants to other respondent officers as to may be authorized by law does not require the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witness in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. and all other supporting documents behind the prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the judge to make his determination. (3) Preliminary inquiry should be distinguished from the preliminary investigation proper. The judge does not have to follow what the prosecutor's present to him.

There was no basis for the respondent judge to make his personal determination regarding the existence of probable cause from the issuance of warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. As such. 83578. 1990 with the Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration in November. vs. P. GR No. MAKASIAR. 126 SCRA 463 (Only a judge has the power to determine probable insofar as the issuance of a warrant of arrest is concerned) 3. Ramos. July 9. Villaluz. Olaes vs. 1. Umil vs. 1991 2. March 16. 1990 1-g. He could not have possibly known what has transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification. Pendon vs.. The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrant of arrest against the petitioners. 136 SCRA 435 . Nov. Drilon. there is no need to examine the complainant and his witnesses face to face.1987 4. CA. 162 SCRA 467 1-c. et al.July 27. The constitutional requirement had not been satisfied. Gatan. July 25. All of these should be before the judge. GR No. Inting. 1990 1-f. vs. Abbas. Quintero vs. 167 SCRA 393 The word “personally” after the word determined does not necessarily mean that the judge should examine the complainant and his witnesses personally before issuing the search warrant or warrant of arrest but the exclusive responsibility on the part of said judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. 1991 1-h.74 provincial prosecutor. 85289. CA. Villanueva. 20th Century Fox vs. CA. Inc. 16. NBI. Placer vs.. 739 1-a. April 19. P. 1989 SOLIVEN VS. February 20. 164 SCRA 655 1-b. Although the judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses (for the prosecutor can perform the same functions as commissioner for taking of evidence) there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal's bare certification. The Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. Tolentino vs. Amarga vs.. Department of Health vs. Sy Chi Siong. 1989 2-a. 1-e. Cruz vs. Villanueva. 155 SCRA 486 7. 74 SCRA 226 5. P. Paderanga vs. Ramos. 110 SCRA 465 2-b. 98 Phil. Geronimo vs. It is sufficient if the judge is convinced of the existence of probable cause upon reading the affidavits or deposition of the complainant and his witnesses.

probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest (Note: This might be useful also in your Criminal Law) Narvasa. charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted. and d. On February 27. Regional trial Court. petitioner through counsel filed a petition for Habeas Corpus alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being. Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by NBI Director Alfredo Lim on the strength of a warrant of arrest issued by the respondent judge. and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10. G. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI Headquarters on Taft Ave. c.. 90-10941. he was denied due process. arrested or detained on the strength of warrant issued without the judge who issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause. June 5. JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR. 1990. 1990. On February 28. WITHOUT BAIL. the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio.NO. J. denied the right to bail. 92163.R. HELD: The parties' oral and written arguments presented the following options: . NONE HAVING BEEN RECOMMENDED IN THE INFORMATION AND NONE FIXED IN THE WARRANT OF ARREST.. b. or having been: a.75 JUAN PONCE ENRILE VS. Quezon City in Criminal Case No. 1990. 1990 Due process. HON. Manila. The warrant was issued on an information signed and filed earlier in the day by Senior State Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE charging Senator Enrile. hence. JAIME SALAZAR. held to answer for a criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books. right to bail. Branch 103. ET AL.

Hold Hernandez Doctrine applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance. of rebellion. particularly Art. On the second option. absent any sufficiently powerful reason against so doing. 942 which added a new provision of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioner's contention that he was charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books. Maintain Hernandez Doctrine as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in its course. or as necessary means for the commission. BUT NOT TO ACTS COMMITTED IN THE COURSE OF A REBELLION WHICH ALSO CONSTITUTE COMMON CRIMES OF GRAVE OR LESS GRAVE CHARACTER. With the rejection of the first two options. 11 justices voted AGAINST abandoning Hernandez. This is so because of the fact that the incumbent President (exercising legislative powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution) repealed PD No. 1. either as a means necessary to its commission or as unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion. Abandon the Hernandez Doctrine and adopt the dissenting opinion of Justice Montemayor that "rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes". 2. Two members felt that the doctrine should be re-examined.76 1. that indictment is to be read as charging SIMPLE REBELLION. 2. On the issues raised by the petitioner: a. In thus acting. THE RULING REMAINS GOOD LAW. By a vote of 11-3. whether or not necessary to its commission or in furtherance thereof. 3. the Supreme Court was unanimous in voting to reject the same though four justices believe that the arguments in support thereof is not entirely devoid of merit. 142-A which sought to nullify if not repealed the Hernandez Doctrine. the President in effect by legislative fiat reinstated the Hernandez as a binding doctrine with the effect of law. The Court can do no less than accord it the same recognition. In view of the majority. ITS SUBSTANTIVE AND LEGAL BASES HAVE WITHSTOOD ALL SUBSEQUENT CHALLENGES AND NO NEW ONES ARE PRESENTED HERE PERSUASIVE ENOUGH TO WARRANT A COMPLETE REVERSAL. the Hernandez Doctrine remains a binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof. the Court ruled that the information filed against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense despite the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. 3. WHILE TECHNICALLY . On the first option.

IF WARRANTED BY THE EVIDENCE DEVELOPED DURING THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. and of the logical and necessary corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion which is bailable before conviction. III. MUST THEREFORE BE DISMISSED AS A MERE FLIGHT OF RHETORIC. This Court has already ruled that it is not unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal examination. Also. b. The petitioner claims that the warrant issued is void because it was issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled to the respondent judge which could hardly gave him sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary investigation. SO COMPLIED. MEREBY BECAUSE SAID RESPONDENT JUDGE HAD WHAT SOME MIGHT CONSIDER ONLY A RELATIVELY BRIEF PERIOD WITHIN WHICH TO COMPLY WITH THAT DUTY . Petitioner also claims that he is denied of his constitutional right to bail. GIVES NO REASON TO ASSUME THAT HE HAD NOT. c. Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary investigation conducted? The record shows that a complaint for simple rebellion against petitioner was filed by the NBI Director and that based on the strength of said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent prosecutors culminating in the filing of the questioned information. d. the petitioner claims that the respondent judge issued the warrant for his arrest without first personally determining the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and his witnesses. THAT MUST NOW BE ACCEPTED AS A CORRECT PROPOSITION. In the light of the Court's affirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case. Read in the context of Hernandez. OR COULD NOT HAVE. NOR DOES THAT SINGLE CIRCUMSTANCE SUFFICE TO OVERCOME THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION THAT OFFICIAL DUTY HAS BEEN REGULARLY PERFORMED. in violation of Art. the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: SIMPLE REBELLION.77 CORRECT SO FAR AS THE COURT RULED THAT REBELLION MAY NOT BE COMPLEXED WITH OTHER OFFENSES COMMITTED ON THE OCCASION THEREOF. THERE IS NOTHING INHERENTLY IRREGULAR OR CONTRARY TO LAW IN FILING AGAINST A RESPONDENT AN INDUCTMENT FOR AN OFFENSE DIFFERENT FROM WHAT IS CHARGED IN THE INITIATORY COMPLAINT. Section 2. . it being sufficient that he follows established procedure by PERSONALLY EVALUATING THE REPORT AND THE SUPPORTING DOCUMENT SUBMITTED BY THE PROSECUTOR. of the Constitution.

The correct course was for the petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail. claiming a right to bail per se or by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. in Tondo. On August 8.. Under either hypothesis. Warrantless searches and seizures--when valid or not. 87059. They approched these persons and identified themselves as policement that is why they . 1992. When the surveilance team arrived therein. the Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Blvd. Was a petition for Habeas Corpus before the Supreme Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial? The Supreme Court held that the criminal case before the respondent judge is the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. No. Manila. June. NOT WITHOUT FIRST APPLYING TO THE COURT OF APPEALS IF APPROPRIATE RELIEF WAS ALSO AVAILABLE THERE. they saw the accused "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen". ONLY AFTER THAT REMEDY WAS DENIED BY THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD THE REVIEW JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT BE INVOKED.R. Is "Operation Kapkap" valid? Read: PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE. G. 2. Facts| -----1. AND EVEN THEN. 210 SCRA 174 Warrantless search and seizure Cruz.78 NOTES: This might be useful also in your Remedial Law. Even assuming that the petitioner's premise that the information charges a non-existent crime would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. the obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the respondent judge. 1987. g. J.

79 tried to ran away because of the other lawmen. without warrant. when lawful. and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. After their arrest. . an information for violation of PD 1866 was filed against him.38 cal. (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed..A peace officer or private person may. This is the celebrated exclusionary rule based on the justification given by Justice Learned Hand that "only in case the prosecution." Section 5. Hence this automatic appeal. of the Constitution. is actually committing. Section 3 [2]. 3. Mengote was convicted of having violated PD 1866 and was sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua based on the alleged gun as the principal evidence. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. x x x We have carefully examined the wording of this Rule and cannot see how we we can agree with the prosecution. Issue: -----Was there a valid warrantless search and seizure? Held: ----There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose. After trial. and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending. 4. arrest a person: (a) When. Arrest without warrant. a . the person to be arrested has committed. 5. which itself controls the seizing officials. or is attempting to commit an offense. Article 113 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. in his presence. they were unable to escape. knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will the wrong be repressed. That is the absolute prohibition of Article III. Smith and Wessor revolver was confiscated from the accused and several days later.

if at all. But he was arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a crowded street shortly after alighting from a passenger jeep with his companion. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense. all of them innoent." according to the arresting officers themselves. (b) of this Section. it has nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion was all about.80 Par. These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made them less so. the accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen. like a darkened alley at 3 o'clock in the morning. By no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in thie presence. At the time of the arrest in question. These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. (2) in the presence of the arresting officer. Par.He was not skulking in the shadows but walking in the clear light of day. or was . What offense? What offense could possibly have been suggested by a person "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen" and in aplace not exactly forsaken. We therefore confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness of his arrest under either Par. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an escapee from a penal institution when he was arrested. xxx The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicion other than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. It might have been different if Mengote had been apprehended at an unholy hour and in a place where he had no reason to be. (a) or Par. The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was not necessary as long as Mengote's acts created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an offense had been committed and that accusedappellant had committed it". There was nothing clandestine about his being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze of the noonday sun. why hiseyes were darting from side to sideand he was holding his abdomen. On the other hand. there could have been a number of reasons. as the prosecution suggests. The question is.

this Court declared: Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113. of the Rules of Court in connection with a crime about to be committed. there was no probable cause that. Par. Castro. and about a crime that had yet to bem committed. however. in their This is similar to PEOPLE vs. dispensed with the constitutional requirement of a warrant. as the prosecution incorrectly suggested. He had not committed nor was actually committing or attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the arresting officers. 144 SCRA 1. 859). CHIEF OF POLICE. thus: If the arrest was made under Rule 113. is committing. or is about to commit an offense must have personalknowledge of that fact. being committed. to all appearances no less innocent than the other disembarking passengers. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. All they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller. (SAYO vs. 80 Phil. or just committed. Theprosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact been committed and that the arresting officers had personal knowldge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. He was not even acting suspiciously. AMMINUIDIN. 163 SCRA 402 where the Court held that a warrantless arrest of the accused was unconstitutional. Section 5. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. Burgos. the officer arresting a person who has just committed. This doctrine was affirmed in Alih vs.81 actually being committed. what was that crime? There is no . it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. xxx In the landmark case of People vs. In short.. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. This was effected while he was coming down the vessel. or was at least being attempted presence. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. 151 SCRA 279. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been satisfied. xxx In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b).

worse. escaping the clutches of the law. his arrest without a warrant cannot be justified. GALVEZ. It would be a sad day. Parenthetically. because. the prosecution of the accusedappellant might have succeeded. This is not a police state where order is exalted over liberty or. resulting in their disregard of the requirements of a valid search and seizure that rendered inadmissible the evidence they had invalidly seized. or if a peace officer could clamp handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act is actually committing or attempting it. ironically enough. the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People vs. it has not been observed by those who are supposed to enforce it. Indeed. they allowed their over zealousness to get the better of them. even if it be possibly because of a stomach-ache. Considering that the accused-appellant was not committing a crime at the time he was arrested nor did the arresting officer have any personal knowledge of facts indicating that accused-appellant committed a crime. Warrantless arrest. Section 5(b). xxx The court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the provisions of the Bill of Rights. This should be a lesson to other peace officers. indeed. the prosecution admitted that there was no warrant of arrest issued against accusedappellant when the latter was taken into custody. Burgos. Their impulsiveness may be the very cause of the acquittal of persons who deserve to be convicted. When illegal arrest is deemed waived. it may be observed that under the Revised Rule 113.82 allegation in the record of such a falsification. The policeman arrested the accused-appellant on the basis solely of what Reynaldo Castro had told him and not because he saw the accusedappellant commit the crime charged against him. This simply cannot be done in a free society. 355 SCRA 246 Mendoza. J. no personal knowledge of the arresting officer PEOPLE VS. As it happened. if any person could be summarily arrested and searched just because he is holding his abdomen. . personal malice on the part ofthe arresting officer may be justified in the name of security.

In the morning of January 11. An information for violation of the dangerous drugs act was filed against the respondent before the RTC of Manila which acquitted them on the ground that the search conducted was illegal since it was warrantless and without consent by the respondents. 482 SCRA 660 Carpio-Morales. The same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. They arrived at the said conclusion through surveillance. and prostitution. by entering a plea of not guilty during the arraignment. MENDOZA. PEOPLE VS.. SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL. the accused-appellant waived his right to raise the issue of illegality of his arrest. 301 SCRA 66 Warrantless searches and seizures by private individuals 2. ET AL. INC. Once inside the union office they started to make searches which resulted in the confiscation of a plastic bag of marijuana. VS. After their acquittal. the Regional Trial Court held that petitioners are liable for damages as a result of an illegal search. Warrantless Search and seizure by a private person. security officers of the plaintiff entered the union office despite objections thereto by forcibly opening the same. 32 of the Civil Code. when it is not valid) Read: 1. J. OTHERWISE. 1988. while the respondent union officer was opening the Union Office. THE OBJECTION IS DEEMED WAIVED. After trial. IT IS NOW SETTLED THAT OBJECTION TO A WARRANT OF ARREST OR THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH A COURT ACQUIRES JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF AN ACCUSED MUST BE MADE BEFORE HE ENTERS HIS PLEA. (Valid since the constitutional provision is not applicable to him.83 However. g-1. the respondents filed a case for Malicious Prosecution against the petitioner for violation of Art. The petitioner suspects that the respondents who are officers of the Silahis International Hotel Union were using the Union Office located inside the hotel in the sale or use of marijuana. THE FACT THAT THE ARREST WAS ILLEGAL DOES NOT RENDER THE SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS VOID AND DEPRIVE THE STATE OF ITS RIGHT TO CONVICT THE GUILTY WHEN ALL THE FACTS POINT TO THE CULPABILITY OF THE ACCUSED. Issue: . ROGELIO SOLUTA. dollar smuggling.

In the presence . a criminal case.84 Whether the warrantless search conducted by the petitioners (private individual and corporation) on the union office of the private respondents is valid. Anita Reyes. 81561.R. Job Reyes then brought samples to the NBI. 1991 Warrantless Search and seizure by a private person Bidin. NO. The alleged reports that the said union office is being used by the union officers for illegal activities does not justify their acts of barging into the said office without the consent of the union officers and without a search warrant. is admissible. The fact that the union office is part of the hotel owned by the petitioners does not justify the warrantless search. received said goods and asked if she could examine and inspect it. the issue was whether an act of a private individual. a peculiar odor emanated from the box that was supposed to contain gloves. 32 of the Civil Code. ANDRE MARTI G. Held: The search is not valid and they are civilly liable under Art. J. Upon opening. Upon further perusal. FACTS: Andre Marti and his common-law wife. then they should have applied for a search warrant. If indeed there was surveillance made. Andre Marti is not applicable here because in Marti. before delivering it to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts. 3. January 18. Job Reyes. the issue in Marti is whether the evidence obtained by a private person acting in his private capacity without the participation of the State. allegedly in violation of one’s constitutional rights may be invoked against the State. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. Switzerland. owner of the place (no relation to Shirley). following standard operating procedure. he told them that the boxes to be shipped were still in his office. In other words. he felt and saw a dried leaves inside the box. co-owner and husband of Anita opened the boxes for final inspection. The ruling in People vs. Shirley Reyes went to Manila Packaging and Export Forwarders to send four (4) packages to Zurich. However later. Marti refused.

the constitutional provision against unreasomable searches and seizure was intended as a restraint upon the activities of the sovereign authority and NOT intended against private persons. The Special Criminal Court of Manila convicted accused Marti of violating sec.85 of the NBI agents.2 of the 1987 constitution is almost verbatim from the United States constitution. III. violate accused's right against unreasonable searches seizures and invocable against the state? 2. . Was the evidence procured from the search admissible? Held: -------1. SC cases as likewise doctrinal in this jurisdiction. Did the search conducted by a private person. This did not convert it to a search as contemplated by the constitution. Since Art.marked as containing books and tabacalera cigars. in US cases. Marti was later invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the dried leaves. This view is supported by the deliberations by the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Thereafter an information was filed against the appellant for violating RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. Case at bar will show that it was Job Reyes` initiative that perpetrated the search. No. constitutional protection on search and seizure is imposable only against the state and not to private persons. Two other boxes. ISSUES: -----------1. He opened the packages and took the samples to NBI. also revealed bricks or case-like marijuana leaves and dried marijuana leaves respectively. If a search was initiated by a private person the provision does not apply since it only proscribes government action. All the NBI agents did was to observe and look in plain sight. Reyes opened the box and discovered that the odor came from the fact that the dried leaves were actually those of the marijuana flowering tops. In short. the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts comitted by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion.21(b) of said RA. Hence. the SC may consider US Fed.

III [2]. ANG CHUN KIT. Barnes v. there is no valid search incidental to a valid arrest if she will be brought to her residence and thereafter search the said place) f. the evidence from therein is admissible evidence. CA. state v. As such. d. Art. b. cases cited: Burdeau v. c. Yes. ESPANO VS. 354 SCRA 338 Where the gun tucked in a person’s waist is plainly visible to the police. state (429 s. 288 SCRA 588 (If the accused was arrested in the street during a buy-bust operation. Rule 126. McDowell (256 us 465 [1921]. Bryan (457 p 2d 661 [1968]. As a consequence of the accused’s valid warrantless arrest inside the nightclub. PANO.86 2. 256 SCRA 539 PEOPLE VS. 248 SCRA 679 NOLASCO VS. likewise applies only to the government and its agencies and not to private persons. on the admissibility of evidence in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. state (329 sw 2d 135). LUA. the search of his house nearby is not a valid search incidental to a valid arrest) PEOPLE VS. Walker v. 439 PEOPLE VS. the subsequent discovery in his car which was parked in a distant place from where the illegal possession of firearm was committed [after he requested that he will bring his car to the Police Station after his .w 2d 121 [1969]). since the search was valid. without a search warrant in accordance with Section 12. 251 SCRA 660 PEOPLE VS. us (373 F 2d 517 [1967]). e. Figueroa. No warrant is necessary in such a situation. he may be lawfully searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. GO. In fact. it being one of the recognized exceptions under the Rules. Moreno vs. Search made incidental to a valid arrest a. VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE: 1. if accused was arrested while inside a jeepney. Ago Chi. no search warrant is necessary and in the absence of any license for said firearm. he may be arrested at once as he is in effect committing a crime in the presence of the police officers.S. 12 Phil. 139 SCRA 541 (A search incidental to a valid arrest must be done at the place where the accused is arrested. Chadwick v. This is a valid search incidental to a lawful arrest. (U.

they went to Lo Ho Wing's room and he saw two other men with him. Later. 257 SCRA 430 d. Tia was introduced to Peter Lo (alias of accused/appellant Lo Ho Wing). As an agent. LO HO WING. PEOPLE VS. Search of moving vehicles a. of a drug paraphernalia and shabu. the two proceeded to Guangzhou in mainland China. drug paraphernalia and the shabu. Appellant Lo Ho Wing joined the second man and sniffed the smoke emitted by the burning substance. the later turning out to be Tia's intended companion. US. et al. the Special Operations Group of the CIS received a tip from one of its informers about an organized group engaged in importation of illegal drugs and smuggling of contraband items. As such. head of oplan sharon 887. No. the items do not fall under the exclusionary rule and the unlicensed firearms. in turned informed the Dan gerous Drugs Board of Tia's activities. R. 1987. From Hongkong. Palmera that they would return to the Philippines on October 6. One such agent was Reynaldo Tia (the dicharged/accused). 101 SCRA 86 e. Carrol vs. That evening. PEOPLE VS. Tia was introduced to his co-accused Lim Cheng Huat by another agent named George. Appellant Lo Ho Wing and Tia left for Hongkong on October 4. There. One was fixing the tea bags. 193 SCRA 122 FACTS: ----------In July 1987. MUSTANG LUMBER VS. To infiltrate the crime syndicate. Tia offered his services and was hired by Lim. PEOPLE VS. 88017) January 21. MALMSTEDT198 SCRA 401 f. LO HO WING. 2. When Tia asked Lo Ho Wing what cargo they would . 267 US 132 b. CFI. (G. appeallant Lo Ho Wing bought six (6) cans of tea. can be used as evidence against the accused.87 warrantless arrest) . they recruited confidential men and "deep penetration agents" under OPLAN SHARON 887. CAPTAIN PALMERA. he submitted regular reports of undercover activities of suspected syndicates. Tia telephoned Capt. Lim wanted a male travelling companion for his business trips abroad. 1991 c. CA. CANNOT BE SAID TO HAVE BEEN MADE DURING AN ILLEGAL SEARCH. PEOPLE VS. while the other was burning a substance on a piece of aluminum foil using a lighter.Tia saw these 6 bags when they were opened for examination.

the CIS car overtook the taxi ridden by Lo Ho Wing and Tia . ISSUES: ---------1. The CIS team asked the taxi driver to open the baggage compartment. sec.88 bring to Manila. In Manila. Since the bags were not closely examined. Along Imelda Avenue. To stilol get a search warrant from a judge would allow the accused go scotfree. The next day en route to Manila. Lim Cheng Huat followed them in another taxi. Are the effects taken admissible as evidence? HELD: ----1. Cayabyab of the CIS pried the lid open and pressed it in the middle to pull out the contents. They were met by Lim Cheng Huat. Appellant Lo Ho Wing and Lim Cheng Huat were sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P25. customs examiners inspected the bags containing the tin cans of tea. Meanwhile. The trial court gave full credence to the testimonies of government agents since the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties were in their favor. Suspecting the crystalline powder to be a dangerous drug. they were later captured. All the bags threshed out a total of six tin cans. he had the three travelling bags opened for inspection. the latter replied that they would be bringing Chinese drugs. Tia and appellant were taken to the CIS headquarters for questioning.000 each. Samples from the bag tested positive for metamphetamine. Was the warrantless search valid? 2. Crystalline white powder resmbling crushed alum came out. Sgt. The CIS team asked permission to search their luggage. . Palmera positioned themselves in strategic areas around the airport. However. Appelant Lo Ho Wing and Tia boarded a taxi from the airport and loaded their luggage in the taxi's compartment. The three suspects were indicted for violating Art. appellant Lo Ho Wing and Tia were cleared. Meamwhile. This is a case of search on a moving vehicle which is one of the well-known exceptions to the valid warrantless search and seizure. The CIS men who first saw Lo Ho and Tia followed them.15 of the Dangerous Drug Act. a team composed by Capt. A tin can of tea was taken out of the compartment. III. forcing the taxi driver to stop his vehicle. Reynaldo Tia was discharged as a state witness. the second taxi carrying Lim Cheng Huat sped in attempt to escape.

the waiver or consent should be given by the person affected. DAMASO. Mago. DAMASO. d. Example: The landlady could not give a valid consent to the search of a room occupied by a tenant. (The policemen saw several suspicious looking men at dawn who ran when they went near them. Harris vs. Commissioner to the effect that it could be given by any occupant of a hotel room being rented by the respondent is deemed abandoned) d. 188 SCRA 288 c. 22 SCRA 857 Pacis vs. 1997. The doctrine in Lopez vs. c. De Garcia vs. not just anybody. 56 SCRA 16 HIZON VS. Seizure of goods concealed to avoid duties/taxes (Valid) a. they instead seized an unlicensed firearm. 252 SCRA 135 PEOPLE VS. the evidence obtained is admissible as evidence in any proceeding. VEROY VS. 65 Phil. Seize of evidence in plain view a. 1992 b. June. 390 US 234 PEOPLE VS. As the policemen ran after them. CA. 3. PEOPLE. b. CA. MANALILI VS. October 9. 283 SCRA 159. VELOSO. c. Pamaran. Since the search and seizure are valid. 210 SCRA 97. 65 SCRA 336 c. 689 b. (If the owner of the house allowed the policemen to enter his house because they are searching for rebel soldiers but when inside the house.89 2. POSADAS. 212 SCRA 547 PEOPLE VS. Papa vs. 265 SCRA 721 4. The search is valid) d. b. (Mere suspicions not sufficient to validate warrantless arrest) . People vs. Lopez vs. US. QUE. d. PEOPLE VS. 252 SCRA 213 5. Locsin. Said tenant himself should give the consent in order to be valid. 265 SCRA 517 PEOPLE VS. PEOPLE VS. an unlicensed firearm was confiscated. STOP AND FRISK. When there is waiver of right or gives his consent. a. Commissioner. there is no consent to a warrantless search) 6. LESANGIN. a. LAYAGUE. 212 SCRA (In order that there is a valid waiver to a warrantless search. MALACAT VS. Mengote.

GEN. VII. that while examination of the bodies of the men are being conducted.90 6. . 1990 Warrantless searches. 17 of the Constitution which provides: The respondents would want to justify said military operation on the following constitutional provisions: The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary. The 41 petitioners claim that the saturation drives conducted by the military is in violation of their human rights because with no specific target house in mind. Jr. The respondents claim that they have legal authority to conduct saturation drives under Art. MAJ. in the dead of the night or early morning hours. EDDIE GUAZON. the other military men conduct search and seizures to each and every house without civilian witnesses from the neighbors. some victims complained that their money and other valuables were lost as a result of these illegal operations. VS. Sec. 80508. ET AL. the residents are herded like cows at the point of high powered guns. invasion or rebellion x x x xxxx The President shall have control of all the executive departments. shouting. police and military officers without any search warrant cordon an area of more than one residence and sometimes the whole barangay. Art. that the raiders rudely rouse residents from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their homes. GR NO. "zonings" and "saturation drives" Section 17. Most of them are in civilian clothes and w/o nameplates or identification cards. RENATO DE VILLA. Facts: This is a petition for Prohibition with preliminary injunction to prohibit military and police officers from conducting "Areal target zonings" or "saturation drive" in Metro Manila particularly in places where they suspect that the subversives are hiding. he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. ordered to strip down to their briefs and examined for tattoo marks. bureaus and offices. kicking their doors open (destroying some) and ordering the residents to come out.. J. He shall ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. ET AL. VII of the Constitution Gutierrez. January 30..

TOLENTINO VS. The government cannot adopt the same reprehensible methods of authoritarian systems both of the right and of the left. California. However. In the meantime. the police action of the nature described by the petitioners would be illegal and blatantly violative of the Bill of Rights. 603. ******************** Cruz. EDU VS. Court of Appeals. nowhere in the Constitution can we see a provision which prohibits the Chief Executive from ordering the military to stop unabated criminality. 92 PHIL. However. GONZALES VS. JJ. III. The problem is appropriate for the Commission of Human Rights. rising lawlessness and alarming communist activities. PHILCONSA VS. COMELEC. the acts violative of human rights alleged by the petitioners as committed during the police actions are ENJOINED until such time as permanent rules to govern such actions are promulgated. ALBA. It is basically for the executive department and the trial courts. Also. Malabon and Pasay City where the petitioners may present evidence supporting their allegations so that the erring parties may be pinpointed and prosecuted. LAGUNZAD VS.91 Held: There can be no question that under ordinary circumstances. We have held that technical objections may be brushed aside where there are constitutional questions that must be met (RODRIGUEZ VS. it must be pointed out that police actions should not be characterized by methods that offend one's sense of justice (Rochin vs. Dissenting The ruling of the majority that the petitioners are not proper parties is a specious pretext for inaction. ERICTA. But the remedy is not to stop all police actions. 41 SCRA 702. all police actions are governed by the limitations of the Bill of Rights. Padilla and Sarmiento. 35 SCRA 481.148 SCRA 208). 27 SCRA 835. . DEMETRIA VS. including the essential and legitimate ones. 145 SCRA 687 and Century Fox vs. This is so because Art. If the military wants to flush out subversive and criminal elements. COMELEC. GELLA. However. The Court believes it highly probable that some violations were actually committed. CA. . the same must be consistent with the constitutional and statutory rights of the people. 154 SCRA 199. Lozada was in fact an aberration. 342 US 165). Gonzales. A show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of people are protected and not violated. 65 SCRA 479. JIMENEZ. the remedy of the petitioners is not an original action for prohibition since not one victim complains and not one violator is properly charged. Section 3 of the Constitution is very clear as explained in Roan vs. 164 SCRA 655. The petition was therefore remanded to the Regional Trial Courts of Manila.

81567. must he issue a warrant of arrest as a matter of course? See the distinctions. G. then he may not issue said warrant. 1990 (An NPA may be arrested without warrant while sleeping or being treated in a hospital because his being a communist rebel is a continuing crime) h. 1988 (No because a warrant is issued in order to have jurisdiction of the court over the person of an accused and to assure the court of his presence whenever his case is called in court. Searching questions Read: . 7. 2. Each of us has a duty to protect liberty and that alone makes him a proper party. Saturation drives are NOT AMONG THE ACCEPTED INSTANCES WHEN A SEARCH OR AN ARREST MAY BE MADE WITHOUT A WARRANT. 300 SCRA 265. the Court should also make it clear that Metro Manila is not such a battleground.92 Where liberty is involved. every person is a proper party even if he may not be directly injured. TAC-AN. No. Art. SALVANI. Section 2.R. SEPTEMBER 26. if the court believes that the presence of the accused could be had even without a warrant of arrest. Note: This case involves a minor offense) GOZO VS. As such. While they may be allowed in the actual theater of military operations against the insurgents. Read: 1. THEY COME UNDER THE CONCEPT OF THE FISHING EXPEDITIONS STIGMATIZED BY LAW AND DOCTRINE X X X I submit that this court should instead categorically and emphatically that these saturation drives are violative of human rights and individual liberty and should be stopped immediately. If the offense committed is a serious one like that obtaining in this case for murder. July 9. If the judge finds that there's probable cause. MANOLITA UMIL and NICANOR DURAL. ET AL. FIDEL RAMOS. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL. ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA. FELICITAS SESE VS. the Judge must issue a warrant of arrest after determining the existence of probable cause) i. and companion cases. SAMULDE VS. III of the constitution is very clear: Unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for whatever purpose is prohibited. It is not only the owner of a burning house who has the right to call the firemen.

RTC 33. 1989 (En Banc) Search and seizure. P/Lt. J. searching questions Padilla. Edgar Dula Torre and Major Maganto. That the undersigned has verified the report and found it to be a fact x x x ". 82870. explosives. 3. 1987. 8714 as well as its Order denying the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. On October 31. On November 1. 1987. a Sunday and All Saints Day. 1987. 4. On November 2. Prudente's office a bulging brown . EXECUTIVE JUDGE ABELARDO M. That he has been informed and has good and sufficient reasons to believe that NEMESIO PRUDENTE who may be found at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines x x x has in his control or possession firearms. GR No. 1987 . NEMESIO PRUDENTE VS. THE HON. "2. In his application for search warrant. This is a petition to annul and set aside the Order of respondent Judge DENYING the motion of the petitioner to quash Search Warrant No. Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Western Police District (WPD) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. the search warrant was enforced by some 200 WPD operatives led by Col. P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw. hand grenades and ammunition intended to be used as the means of committing an offense x x x. Florencio Angeles executed a "Deposition of Witness dated October 31. P/Major Dimagmaliw alleged that: "1. 2. an application for the issuance of a Search Warrant for violation of PD 1866 against the petitioner. DAYRIT. presided by the respondent Judge. a member of the searching team executed an affidavit alleging that he found in the drawer of a cabinet inside the wash room of Dr. Manila & People of the Philippines. requirements/requisites of a valid search warrant. December 14. Ricardo Abando. Facts: 1.93 DR. Branch 33. In support of said application.

Hence this petition. c. Lt. after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. 1986. has been defined "as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed. the same judge denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. there must be probable cause. (Quintero vs. VS. for the reason that it did not particularly describe the place to be searched and that it failed to charge one specific offense. b. 5. 1988). before issuing the warrant. On November 6. the petitioner moved to quash the search warrant on the grounds that: a. The probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense and the judge must. SY . 6. The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant. 1987. Angeles had no personal knowledge of the facts which formed the basis for the issuance of the search warrant. and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched". the warrant was issued in violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday was urgent. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. the examination of said witness was not in the form of searching questions and answers. and d. June 23. the complainant's lone witness. NBI. On March 9. the search warrant was a general warrant. For a valid search warrant to issue.94 envelope with three live fragmentation hand grenades separately with old newspapers. on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted. (P. This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay. which is to be determined by the judge. personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers. in writing and under oath. Issue: Was the Search Warrant issued by the respondent judge valid? Was there probable cause? Held: a. the respondent judge denied the motion to quash and on April 20. the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. 1988.

Besides. ALVAREZ VS. but there were none. not of the facts merely reported by a person whom one considers to be reliable. they "gathered information’s from verified sources" that the holders of said firearms and explosives are not licensed t possess them. it was held that the following test must be complied with in an application for search warrant or in a supporting deposition based on personal knowledge or not"The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it was drawn in a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and the affiant be held liable for damage caused. Lt. "mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus insufficient. Angeles. 28 PHIL. In his affidavit. do not come up to the level of facts based on his personal knowledge so much so that he cannot be held liable for perjury for such allegations in causing the issuance of the questioned search warrant. Major Dimagmaliw declared that "he has been informed" that Nemesio Prudente "has in his control and possession" the firearms and explosivees described therein.95 JUCO. CFI. YET THERE IS NOTHING IN THE RECORD TO SHOW OR INDICATE HOW AND WHEN SAID APPLICANT VERIFIED THE EARLIER INFORMATION ACQUIRED BY HIM AS TO JUSTIFY HIS CONCLUSION. The examining judge has to take the depositions in writing of ." On the other hand. 145 SCRA 694. He might have clarified this point if there had been searching questions and answers. the records yield no questions and answers. Gonzales. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant of a search warrant and/or his witnesses. whether searching or not. Despite the fact that Major Dimagmaliw stated in his affidavit that "he verified the information he had earlier received and found it to be a fact. In ALVAREZ VS. 33. In fact. ADDISON. It is clear from the foregoing that the applicant and his witness HAD NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES which became the basis for issuing the questioned search warrant. but acquired knowledge thereof only through information from other sources or persons. 64 PHIL. 566)." Tested by the above standards. US VS. 64 PHIL. 667. As held in Roan vs. Lt. CFI. vis-a-vis the said applicant. and that he "has verified the report and found it to be a fact. the allegation of the witness. respondent judge did not take the deposition of the applicant as required by the Rules of Court. 64 PHIL. Angeles declared that as a result of continuous surveillance for several days. 33.

33 (When the applicant is basing his knowledge from an informant. his questions were too brief and short and did not examine the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. departure from which would not necessarily affect the validity of the search warrant provided the constitutional requirements are complied with. 180). 104 SCRA 423 5. Nemesio Prudente. As held in Quintero vs. Luna vs. June 23. d. The rule is. Alvarez vs. Plaza. In the case at bar. c. 145 687 . this requirements are stringent but the purpose is to assure that the constitutional right of the individual against unreasonable search and seizure shall remain both meaningful and effective. the same is not valid) 2. There was also no searching questions asked by the respondent judge because as shown by the record. 19 OF THE SUPREME COURT merely provides for a guideline." b. 247 SCRA 650 Read also: 1. "the questions propounded are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. True. Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant and conducting of examination in a general manner would not satisfy the requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant. a. Roan vs. VELOSO. De Mulata vs. the warrant described the place to be searched as the premises of the PUP.96 the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record. HUBERT WEBB VS. Gonzales. DE LEON. NBI. that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended (P VS. Marinas vs. 26 SCRA 313 3. Irizari. Siochi. the questions asked were leading as they called for a simple "yes" or "no" answer. 64 Phil. more particularly the offices of the Department of Science and Tactics as well as the Office of the President. 48 PHIL. 62 SCRA 210 4. There is also no violation of the "one specific offense" requirement considering that the application for a search warrant explicitly described the offense: illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under PD 1866. On the contrary. 1988." The Court avails of this decision to reiterate the strict requirements for determination of probable cause in the valid issuance of a search warrant as enunciated in earlier cases. CFI. CIRCULAR NO.

(When the questions asked to the applicant for a search warrant was pre-typed. MM are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary. validity of checkpoints Padilla. July 31.1988 12.1987 (When the statements in the affidavits of witnesses are mere generalities. September 14. without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. and not positive statements of particular acts. RICARDO VALMONTE VS. Chief of Staff. the residents of Valenzuela. mere conclusions of law. Aminnudin Y Ahni. September 29. April 15. On January 20. vs. PENDON VS. Ignalaga. . Ver. Panganiban vs. Petitioners claim that because of these checkpoints.97 6. CA. Read: 1. Corro vs. 1990. Metro Manila. Lising. Burgos. 137 SCRA 541 8. Aberca vs. Burgos vs. Ponsica vs. the same is not valid since there could have been no searching questions) j. 128 SCRA 388 (Depositions of the applicants and witnesses should be attached to the record of the case) 7. GEN RENATO DE VILLA. Cesar.1988 2. Warrantless searches and seizures--when valid or not. 1989 Warrantless searches and seizures. November 16. 83988. the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela. P. 1987. GR No. especially at night or dawn. the warrant is not valid) 13. 159 SCRA 599 3. Nolasco vs Pano. vs.1986 11. J. Bayona. July 6. 133 SCRA 800 10. capricious and whimsical disposition of the military authorities manning the checkpoints considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups. P. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order. 147 SCRA 509 9. Mata vs. the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility for the purpose of maintaining peace and order. Facts: 1.

Commonwealth. The setting up of checkpoints in Valenzuela. in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible to abuse. Where. BUT . 259 SW 33). BETWEEN THE INHERENT RIGHT OF THE STATE TO PROTECT ITS EXISTENCE AND PROMOTE PUBLIC WELFARE AND AN INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT AGAINST A WARRANTLESS SEARCH WHICH IS HOWEVER REASONABLY CONDUCTED. the apprehensions of the residents of Valenzuela increased because Benjamin Parpon. 97 SE 62). Issue: Whether or not the existence of said checkpoints as well as the periodic searches and seizures made by the military authorities without search warrant valid? Held: Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se illegal. Gaina. the manning of these checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform. the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on a public fair grounds (People vs. so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA's "sparrow units. these do not constitute unreasonable search.98 2. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. True. for example. the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement. AT THE COST OF OCCASIONAL INCONVENIENCE. Metro Manila may be considered as security measure to effectively maintain peace and order and to thwart plots to destabilize the government. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. THE FORMER SHALL PREVAIL. Case. or simply looks into a vehicle (State vs. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case." not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms. the supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela was gunned down in cold blood by the military men manning the checkpoints for ignoring or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspite of several warning shots fired in the air. On July 9. In this connection. or flashes a light therein (Rowland vs. 1988 at dawn. DISCOMFORT AND EVEN IRRITATION TO . 190 MW 289).

160 SCRA 646 (There is a valid warrantless search if a NARCOM officer arrests the person who owns a bag which contains marijuana THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. P vs. 56 SCRA 16 6. August 6. dissenting: The bland declaration by the majority that individual rights must yield to the demands of national security ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit the authority of the State even if asserted on the ground of national security. Cruz. or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril. 1988. held that military and police checkpoints are not illegal as these measures to protect the government and safeguards the lives of the people. 1990 Very Important: The Supreme Court in its Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration dated 15 June. Pamaran. Castro. vs. Nolasco vs. Roldan vs. vs. 1990 1-c.. 165 SCRA 135 8. P. 65 SCRA 336 4.1987 1-b. Olaes. P s. Commisioner. 1990. Pano. THE CHECKPOINTS DURING THESE ABNORMAL TIMES ARE PART OF THE PRICE WE PAY FOR AN ORDERLY SOCIETY AND PEACEFUL COMMUNITY. NOT BODILY SEARCH. Gen. the Supreme Court held further that the military officers manning the checkpoints may conduct VISUAL SEARCH ONLY. Papa vs. Cendana. Read also the RESOLUTION ON THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION dated JUNE 15. June 23. Claudio. it must be emphasized that on July 17. JJ. Rizal Alih vs. 185 SCRA 665 Read also: 1-a. Finally. Arca. 1990 2. Cruz and Sarmiento. the military checkpoints in Metro Manila were temporarily lifted and a review and refinement of the rules in the conduct of the police and military manning the checkpoints upon order of the NCRDC Chief. Lopez vs. Castiller. However. 22 SCRA 857 3. Pacis vs. vs. October 17. P vs. Mago. CFI.99 THE CITIZEN. 147 SCRA 509 & 139 SCRA 152 9. RESOLUTION ON JUNE 15. P. 101 SCRA 86 5. 1990. . July 30. 1990 1-d. P. 65 SCRA 336 7. The checkpoints are legal as where the survival of the organized government is on the balance.

121 SCRA 47 & 137 SCRA 647 1-c. the policemen went to arrest the accused without warrant. an unlicensed firearm was seized instead. March 16. CA. P. CA. 66 SCRA 299 HORTENCIA SALAZAR VS. 2. Manuel et al.00. Harvey vs. Rolito Go vs. he went to buy marijuana from the accused then return to the police headquarters with said article. P. P. January 18. GR No. 1990 1-g. July 6. Dec. Here . Feb. De la Cruz 1-f. k. August 27. vs. 1989 l. 11. People vs. Aminnudin. 1989 1-b. February 9. Maspil.. ortiz. Properties subject to seizure Read: 1 1. vs. June 26. 2. 1994. Sec. vs. 1990 (En banc) 5. ESPANO VS. Judge Tirso Velasco.R. 81510. there is a probable cause since he was personal knowledge due to his expertise on drugs) 11. 1992 1-h. 121 SCRA 538 2-a. P. 288 SCRA 558 m. 1990 1-e. Thereafter. 20 SCRA 562 Lim vs. CA. NO. as amended 2. vs. HON TOMAS ACHACOSO. Presidential Anti_Dollar Salting Task Force vs. Mati. Posadas vs. Ponce de Leon. after securing a search warrant authorizing the seizure of shabu and its paraphernalia and instead.1985 Rules on Crimial Procedure. 1990 1-a. May a non-judicial officer issue a warrant of arrest? (NO) Read: 1. March 14. Bati. vs. vs. Miriam Defensor-Santiago. 1990 (Compare with P.100 which he found out when he smelled the same. Morales vs. Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile. P vs. August 20. 1988. 1991 2. Ponce Enrile. 2. July 10. 84666. Burgos. PEOPLE VS. Warrantless searches and arrests Read: 1. (After the informant was given by the police the amount of P100. 3. The arrest is not valid since it does not fall under Section 5 Rule 113) Likewise.. CA. supra) 1-d.1988 Moreno vs. 4. Rule 126. Vivo. Jr. 144 SCRA 1 . 3. said gun is inadmissible in evidence. Aug. G. DEL ROSARIO.

(The alleged illegality of the arrest is deemed waived upon posting of the bond by the accused) PEOPLE VS. The policeman arrested the accused-appellant on the basis solely of what Reynaldo Castro had told him and not because he saw the accusedappellant commit the crime charged against him. 258 SCRA 188 2-i. 355 SCRA 246 Mendoza. SANDIGANBAYAN. People vs. IT IS NOW SETTLED THAT OBJECTION TO A WARRANT OF ARREST OR THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH A COURT ACQUIRES JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF AN ACCUSED MUST BE MADE BEFORE HE ENTERS HIS PLEA. Board. Callanta vs. Indeed. his arrest without a warrant cannot be justified. 1991 2-e.101 2-b. Sec. 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Effect posting bail or entering a plea during the arraignment. However. 184 SCRA 416 2-c. 262 SCRA 255 2-f. 212 SCRA 547 2-h. NAZARENO. PEOPLE VS. de la Cruz. by entering a plea of not guilty during the arraignment. Sucro. PEOPLE VS. the accused-appellant waived his right to raise the issue of illegality of his arrest. as amended n. the prosecution admitted that there was no warrant of arrest issued against accusedappellant when the latter was taken into custody. 6. OTHERWISE. Gatchalian vs. PEOPLE VS. PEOPLE VS. DAMASO. JUATAN. 256 SCRA 325 2-g. OPOSADAS VS. March 18. People vs. Read: 1. CUISON. Considering that the accused-appellant was not committing a crime at the time he was arrested nor did the arresting officer have any personal knowledge of facts indicating that accused-appellant committed a crime. THE OBJECTION IS DEEMED WAIVED. GALVEZ. FILOTEO VS. SOLAYAO. J. 260 SCRA 256 3. 77 SCRA 377 2. PEOPLE VS. 263 SCRA 222 . 260 SCRA 532 (Buy-bust operation) 3. THE FACT THAT THE ARREST WAS ILLEGAL DOES NOT RENDER THE SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS VOID AND DEPRIVE THE STATE OF ITS RIGHT TO CONVICT THE GUILTY WHEN ALL THE FACTS POINT TO THE CULPABILITY OF THE ACCUSED. Villanueva. CA. if the arrest was illegal. Rule 113. 1991 2-d. May 31.

The probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by applicant or any other person. 254 SCRA 491 o . Nov. In determining probable cause.155 SCRA 494 n. Office of the Tanodbayan. COLUMBIA PICTURES VS. Search warrant for pirated video tapes 1. Pros.102 4. with reasonable effort. 255 SCRA 85 6. 3. NAZARENO. the judge must examine under oath and affirmation the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce. Search warrants are not issued on loose. nor on mere suspicion or belief. 106 SCRA 336 . CA. 1989 p. Judicial pronouncements on illegally seized q. CA. NAPOLCOM. and 4. A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can. PEOPLE VS. PEOPLE VS. The warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized. most of the items listed in the warrants fail to meet the test of particularity. 27. 2. LAPURA. SILAN. The exclusionary rule. 344 SCRA 36 The following are the requisites of a valid search warrant: 1. May 28. 1990 r.. vague or doubtful basis of fact. In this case. ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. 261 SCRA 144 LATEST CASES ON SEARCH AND SEIZURES UY VS. The warrant must be issued upon probable cause. 164 SCRA 655 (The master copy of the allegedly pirated tape should be presented before the judge in order to convince him of the existence of probable cause) 2. What is the status of a document obtained through subpoena? Read: Dianalan vs. PEOPLE VS. Penalty for illegal arrest Read: Palon vs. 260 SCRA 256 5. Century Fox vs. BIR. especially since the witness had furnished evidence.

The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court. of the existence of such right. THE PERSONS INVOLVED HAD KNOWLEDGE. (PEOPLE VS. July 6. BUT INADVERTENTLY COMES ACROSS AN INCRIMINATING OBJECT. AND ZEAL IN THE PURSUIT OF CRIMINALS CANNOT ENNOBLE THE USE OF ARBITRARY METHODS THAT THE CONSTITUTION ITSELF ABHORS. CHAPTER IV THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY Section 3. or when public . IT MUST APPEAR THAT THE RIGHT EXISTS. papers and other possessions. The “plain view” doctrine. PEOPLE VS. within a fenced yard or private place. The right against unreasonable search and seizure is the immunity of one’s person. THE PRESUMPTION BY ITSELF. which may justify a search without warrant. THE SEARCH WARRANT IS SEPARABLE. CANNOT PREVAIL AGAINST THE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS OF AN INDIVIDUAL. BAULA. EITHER ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE. which includes his residence. The third condition did not exist in the instant case.103 the judge photocopies of the documents sought to be seized. VALDEZ. it is fundamental that to constitute waiver. 341 SCRA 25 The protection against unreasonable search and seizure covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of highhandedness of law enforces. FIFUEROA. APPLIES ONLY WHERE THE POLICE OFFICER IS NOT SEARCHING FOR EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED. For a person to be immune against unreasonable searches and seizures. Just because the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does nor prevent the appellant from invoking the protection afforded by the Constitution. PEOPLE VS. he need not be in his home or office. 344 SCRA 663 In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches. Neither was the search incidental to a valid warrantless arrest. AND THOSE ITEMS NOT PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED MAY BE CUT OFF WITHOUT DESTROYING THE WHOLE WARRANT. 2000) An alleged consent to a warrantless search and seizure cannot be based merely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.

conversation. association. message. 9372. or group of persons or of any person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism. 2007 and effective on July 15. listen. listen to. intercept. 2007 (This Law shall be automatically suspended one (1) month before and two (2) months after the holding of any election) Please observe the procedure in obtaining the “The Warrant [or Order] of Surveillance”. a police or law enforcement official and the members of his team may. form or kind or type of electronic or other surveillance equipment or intercepting and tracking devices. journalists and their sources and confidential business correspondence shall not be authorized. Republic Act No. Surveillance of suspects and interception and recording of communications. SURVEILLANCE OF SUSPECTS AND INTERCEPTION AND RECORDING OF COMMUNICATIONS OF SUSPECTS OR CHARGED OF TERRORISM Section 7. intercept and record. Provided. shall only be granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals UPON AN EX-PARTE written application of a police or law . The provisions of RA 4200 (Anti-Wiretapping Law) to the contrary notwithstanding. or spoken or written words of any person suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism. and record communications. upon a written order of the Court of Appeals. Approved on March 6. requires otherwise as Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.The written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals to track down. with the use of any mode. Formal Application for Judicial Authorization. messages. or spoken or written words between members of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization. tap. discussions. any communication. discussion. doctors and patients. That surveillance. Section 8.104 safety or order prescribed by law.. conversations. interception and recording of communications between lawyers and clients. or with the use of any other suitable ways or means for that purpose. Read: Read: NOTE: Applicable provisions of the Human Security Act/Anti-Terrorism Law. not found in the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

or to the solution or prevention of any such crimes. tapped. messages. spoken or written words and effects have been monitored. if he or she intends to do so. or telephone (whether wireless or otherwise) communications. intercepted or recorded and. the legality of the interference before the Court of Appeals which issued said written order. if any. such as name and address. discussions. or spoken or written words are to be tracked down. and the written authorizations of the Anti-Terrorism Council shall be deemed and are hereby declared as classified information: Provided. if any. and recorded and their locations if the person suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is not fully known. listened to. The written order granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals as well as its order. the original application of the applicant. will be obtained. conversations. discussions. or spoken or written words. or spoken or written words. and • That there is no other effective means readily available for acquiring such evidence. intercepted. messages. conversations. • The identity (name and address. the electronic transmission systems or the telephone numbers to be tracked down. discussions. intercept. or is being committed. to extend or renew the same. in case of radio. tap. such person shall be subject to continuous surveillance provided there is reasonable ground to do so. listened to. letters.105 enforcement official who has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council created in Section 53 of this Act to file such exparte application. listen to. tapped. discussions. • That there is probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that evidence which is essential to the conviction of any charged or suspected person for. and record the communications. listened to. or is about to be committed. conversations. That the person being surveilled or whose communications. and the police or law enforcement organization) of the members of his team judicially authorized to track down. including his application to extend or renew. bugged or recorded by law enforcement authorities has the right to be informed of the acts done by the law enforcement authorities in the premises or to challenge. conversations. Classification and Contents of the Order of the Court. messages. The written order of the authorizing division of the court of Appeals shall specify the following: • The identity. 9. if known. and upon examination under oath and affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses who may produce to establish: • That there is probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the said crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism has been committed. of the charged of suspected persons whose communications. . Sec. electronic. messages. papers.

intercepted. interception. OR HEARING. If no case is filed within the 30-day period. INQUIRY. accounts and records.106 • The offense or offenses committed. or being committed. or sought to be prevented. which shall not exceed 30 days from the expiration of the original period…The ex-parte application for renewal has been duly authorized by the Anti-terrorism Council in writing. Evidentiary Value of Deposited Materials. and recorded communications. and recording of the termination of the said surveillance. interception and recording shall be penalized to 10 years and 1 day to 12 years. OR ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION. ACCOUNTS. LEGISLATIVE. PROCEEDING. Section 15. and • The length of time which the authorization shall be used or carried out. Effective Period of Judicial Authorization. interception and recording. judicial authorization required to examine bank deposits. [Penalty to be imposed on the police official who fails to inform the person subject of surveillance of the termination of the surveillance. Any listened to. The justices of CA designated as special court to handle antiterrorism cases after satisfying themselves of the existence of probable cause in a hearing called for that purpose that: . conversations… WHICH HAVE BEEN SECURED IN VIOLATION OF THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THIS ACT. QUASI-JUDICIAL. messages. SHALL ABSOLUTELY NOT BE ADMISSIBLE AND USABLE AS EVIDENCE AGAINST ANYBODY IN ANY JUDICIAL. which shall not exceed 30 days from the date of receipt of the written order of the authorizing division of the court of Appeals by the applicant police or law enforcement official. Section. the applicant police or law enforcement official shall immediately notify the person subject of the surveillance. monitoring. 10. Any authorization granted by the authorizing division of the court of Appeals…shall only be effective for the length of time specified in the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals. The CA may extend or renew the said authorization for another nonextendible period. AND RECORDS OF SUSPECTED OR CHARGED TERRORISTS Section 27. JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION TO EXAMINE BANK DEPOSITS.

Any information. assets and records: • Of A person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism. trust accounts. Section 35. placements. • Of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization. • Of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization. may authorize in writing any police or law enforcement officer and the members of his team duly authorized in writing by the anti-terrorism council to: 1. placements. and 2. The bank or financial institution shall not refuse to allow such examination or to provide the desired information. accounts and records. and records in a bank or financial institution. trust accounts. • Of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization or group of persons.107 • A person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism. when so ordered by and served with the written order of the Court of Appeals. • Of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization or group of persons. data. assets and records: • A person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism. • Of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization. Evidentiary value of deposited bank materials. trust accounts. and records from a bank or financial institution. memoranda. . • Of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization or group of persons. trust accounts. Application to examine deposits. association or group of persons. placements. notes. gather or cause the gathering of any relevant information about such deposits. assets. summaries. association or group of persons. placements. in a bank or financial institution-SHALL ONLY BE GRANTED BY THE AUTHORIZING DIVISION OF THE CA UPON AN EX-PARTE APPLICATION TO THAT EFFECT OF A POLICE OR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIAL who has been duly authorized by the Anti-Terrorism Council to file such ex-parte application and upon examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses he may produce to establish the facts that will justify the need and urgency of examining and freezing the bank deposits. work sheets. examine or cause the examination of. excerpts. association or group of persons. 28. the deposits.. assets. Sec. The written order of the CA authorizing the examination of bank deposits.

OPLE VS. RAMOS issued Administrative Order No. assets and records of: • A person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism. 308 entitled “ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM”. Facts: On December 12. This is so because the intimacies of husband and wife does not justify the breaking of cabinets to determine marital infidelity. J. legislative or administrative investigation. -which have been secured in violation of the provisions of this Act. 2006. • Of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization or group of persons. 1. 2. trust accounts. TORRES. quasi-judicial. July 23. 1996.108 reports or documents acquired from the examination of the bank deposits. association or group of persons. checks and greeting cards of his alleged paramours. Thereafter. she used the same in their legal separation case. then President FIDEL V. inquiry. • Of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization. September 19. 502 SCRA 419 2. CA. and . ZULUETA VS. February 10. The establishment of the PRN without any law is an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of the Congress of the Philippines. The appropriation of public funds for the implementation of the said AO is unconstitutional since Congress has the exclusive authority to appropriate funds for such expenditure. 1996 The wife forcibly opened the drawers at the clinic of her doctor-husband and took diaries. 1998 Puno. placements. 3. proceeding or hearing. Said documents are inadmissible in evidence. shall absolutely not be admissible and usable as evidence against anybody in any judicial. CABALQUINTO. The AO seeks to have all Filipino citizens and foreign residents to have a Population Reference Number (PRN) generated by the National Statistics Office (NSO) through the use of BIOMETRICS TECHNOLOGY . PEOPLE VS. The AO was questioned by Senator Ople on the following grounds: 1.

The AO violates the citizen’s right to privacy protected by the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. AO 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an Administrative Order. Prescinding from the foregoing precepts. WITHOUT FEAR OF SANCTION OR PENALTY. not by an Administrative Order issued by the President. Biometry is the science of the application of statistical methods to biological facts. AN INTRUDER. Administrative Power. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. The AO establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope. It does not provide who shall control and access the data and under what circumstances and for what purpose. affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizens and foreign residents and therefore. YET. it is supposed to be a law passed by Congress that implements it. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. Held: 1. a mathematical analysis of a biological data. however. but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse. Further. 2. Through the PRN. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of the government. may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes. which is supposed to be exercised by the President. THERE ARE NO CONTROLS TO GUARD AGAINST LEAKAGE OF INFORMATIONS. The subject of AO 308 therefore is beyond the power of the President to issue and it is a usurpation of legislative power.109 3. hand geometry or facial features. a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist. is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. WHEN THE ACCESS CODE OF THE CONTROL PROGRAMS OF THE PARTICULAR COMPUTER SYSTEM IS BROKEN. The AO likewise violates the right to privacy since its main purpose is to provide a “common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies through the use of BIOMETRICS TECHNOLOGY. retinal scan. CAN MAKE USE OF THE DATA FOR WHATEVER . the AO does not even tells us in clear and unequivocal terms how these informations gathered shall be handled. the government offices has the chance of building a huge and formidable information base through the electronic linkage of the files of every citizen. The computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the information. It is the confirmation of an individual’s identity through a fingerprint. The data.

2006 & June 20. 308 is unconstitutional since it falls short of assuring that personal information gathered about our people will be used only for specified purposes thereby violating the citizen’s right to privacy. AO No. OR WORSE. MANIPULATE THE DATA STORED WITHIN THE SYSTEM. and b. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA. The Supreme Court likewise held that EO 308 as unconstitutional for it violates the citizen’s right to privacy. J. 2006. 504 SCRA 704 . 420 that mandates the Adoption of a Unified. G. ET AL. KILUSANG MAYO UNO VS. CAMILO L. where none existed before”. it infringes on the citizen’s right to privacy Held: The said Executive Order No. 308[National computerized Identification Reference System] issued by then President Fidel V.110 PURPOSE. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation No. 2006 & June 20. the petitioners claimed that Proclamation No. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA. SABIO vs. No. Only those dealing or employed with the said government entities who are required to provide the required information for the issuance of the said ID. 2006 Carpio. usurpation of legislative powers. Ramos that the same is unconstitutional because “a national ID card system requires legislation because it creates a new national data collection and card issuance system. 420 does not violate the citizen’s right to privacy since it does not require all the citizens to be issued a national ID as what happened in AO 308. ET AL. Multi-purpose Identification System by all Government Agencies in the Executive Department.R.. 420 is unconstitutional on two (2) grounds: a. Based on the Ople ruling. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RUBEN TORRES Administrative Order No. October 17. 174340.. 2006 BAYAN MUNA VS. GORDON. April 19. This is so despite the fact that the Supreme Court held in an En Banc decision in 1998 OPLE VS. April 19.

90[6] On May 9. Arroyo and Members. Senators Richard Gordon and Joker P. Chairman Sabio and other commissioners of the PCGG declined the invitation because of prior commitment. Major General Balajadia arrested Chairman Sabio in his office at IRC Building.” On May 8. No.R. On September 12. Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. their Chairmen. No. Annex “F” of the Petition in G.89 [4] “directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC).. 1 earlier quoted. Sabio of the PCGG.O. 455. Hence. Inocencio. 82 EDSA. wrote Chairman Camilo L. Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Senate premises where he was detained. 455). Gordon. 174318. Chief of Staff Rio C. one of the herein petitioners. and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.m. 2006. Chairman Sabio filed with the Supreme Court a petition for habeas corpus against the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services.91[7] At the same time. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT). No. No. 2006.R. under the authority of Senator Richard J. Annex “G” of the Petition in G. . J. 174318.111 Sandoval-Gutierrez. No. The purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res.R. The Facts: On February 20. at around 10:45 a. No. 2006. 2006. No. 174318. they invoked Section 4(b) of E. I S S U E S: Is the investigation conducted on the petitioners violative of their right to privacy? 89[4] 90[6] 91[7] Annex “E” of the Petition in G. inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services.

92[46] Within these zones. Academy of ASEAN Law and Jurisprudence. at 221. 455. 364. The Constitutional Foundations of Privacy. 350-352. Krivda (1971) 5 Cal. INSERT Herrera’s Handbook on Arrest. did the government violate such expectation? The answers are in the negative. Ct. 62. It highlights a person’s “right to be let alone” or the “right to determine what. 504 P. See Katz v. United states (1967). 1968. 507. 7 (1970). Sison. No. No. the important inquiries are: first. . 347. papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. L-20387. if so. provides at least two guarantees that explicitly create zones of privacy. Search and Seizure. 3d 357. See Morfe v. to whom and when information about himself shall be disclosed. June 27.”94[48] Our Bill of Rights. [50] 96 Burrows v. “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy” and “everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.105 Cal.112 H E L D: The claim of immunity is without merit.R. 389 U. See also Article 17 (1) and (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” Section 3 renders inviolable the “privacy of communication and correspondence” and further cautions that “any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.”95[49] Section 2 guarantees “the right of the people to be secure in their persons. 359 SCRA 772. 88 S. any form of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a “constitutional right” and “the right most valued by civilized men.” In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy.S. 2001. how much. 135882. [48] Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. enshrined in Article III of the Constitution. citing I. 2d 1262. 2d 457. People v. 8 Cal. 529 P 2d 590 (1974). did the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation exhibit a reasonable expectation of privacy?. 2d 576. whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion. and second. Cortes.96[50] Applying this determination to these cases. a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and. 486 P. 3d 623-624. 22 SCRA 424. Ed. G. January 31. 3d 238. particularly 92[46] 93[47] 94 Marquez v.”93[47] but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that. houses. Petitioners were invited in the Senate’s public hearing to deliberate on Senate Res.R. Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Rptr. 521. 19 L. Rptr. 1990. [49] 95 Constitutional and Legal Systems of ASEAN Countries. Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Desierto. Mutuc No. 96 Cal. 13 Cal.

in line with Whalen v. 60.” Obviously. Under the present circumstances. No. they have no reasonable expectation of privacy over matters involving their offices in a corporation where the government has interest. and their actions are subject to closer scrutiny. Justice Puno. and promote morality in public administration. 455. In Morfe v. particularly Philcomsat Holdings Corporation. i. Taking this into consideration. the Court ruled that the right of the people to access information on matters of public concern prevails over the right to privacy of financial transactions.98[52] employed the rational basis relationship test when it held that there was no infringement of the individual’s right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose. will be 97[51] 98[52] 99[53] 100[54] Supra. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT). Let it be stressed at this point that so long as the constitutional rights of witnesses.99[53] In Valmonte v. ranging in millions of pesos. such matters are of public concern and over which the people have the right to information. There being no reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of those directors and officers over the subject covered by Senate Res. like Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners. Consequently. 429 U. maintain a standard of honesty in public service. 170 SCRA 256 (1989) . and the conspiratorial participation of the PCGG and its officials are compelling reasons for the Senate to exact vital information from the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporations. 589 (1977). Belmonte. the Members of the former Batasang Pambansa enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals. the alleged anomalies in the PHILCOMSAT.e.. PHC and POTC. the inquiry focus on petitioners’ acts committed in the discharge of their duties as officers and directors of the said corporations. as well as from Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners to aid it in crafting the necessary legislation to prevent corruption and formulate remedial measures and policy determination regarding PCGG’s efficacy.97[51] the Court. Lecture on Legislative Inquiry and Right to Privacy. Roe.S. and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in the operations by their respective board of directors.113 “on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC). to curtail and minimize the opportunities for official corruption. Certainly.100 [54] the Court remarked that as public figures. This goes to show that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest. p. Mutuc. it follows that their right to privacy has not been violated by respondent Senate Committees.

to respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees. 9372. must comply with the Subpoenae Ad Testificandum issued by respondent Senate Committees directing them to appear and testify in public hearings relative to Senate Resolution No. NOTE: Applicable provisions of the Human Security Act/Anti-Terrorism Law. In fine.114 respected by respondent Senate Committees. and Tereso Javier. Republic Act No. Approved on March 6. 2007 (This Law shall be automatically suspended one (1) month before and two (2) months after the holding of any election) Section 26 provides that persons who have been charged with terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism---even if they have been granted bail because evidence of guilt is not strong—can be: • • Detained under house arrest. Rule on criticisms against acts of public officers Read: 1. CHAPTER V . EXPRESSION. PCGG Chairman Camilo Sabio and Commissioners Ricardo Abcede. it their duty to cooperate with them in their efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. Espuelas vs.FREEDOM OF SPEECH. Narciso Nario. or of the press. 90 Phil. and Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni. as well as its directors and officers. 524 . Section 4. People. or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for the redress of their grievances. PRESS. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech. 1. Restricted from traveling. PCGG’s nominees to Philcomsat Holdings Corporation. or other means of communications with people outside their residence. of expression. The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae. etc. Nicasio Conti. and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation. computers. and/or • Prohibited from using any cellular phones. 2007 and effective on July 15. 455.

115 2. In the January 3. Since he is donating millions he should also settle his small debts like the reportedly insignificant amount of P27. In the same column. P. 116 SCRA 93 2. People would ask: “can he read and write”? Why is he always talking about his Japanese father-in-law? Is he really a Japanes Senator or a barrio Kapitan? Is it true that he will send P18M aid to Baguio? Somebody wanted to put an advertisement of Labo in the Midland Courier but was refused because he has not yet paid his account of the last time he was a candidate for Congress. CFI.000 only. in general Read: BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER & CECILLE AFABLE VS. 45 Phil. in her column “In and Out of Baguio” made the following comments: “Of all the candidates for Mayor of Baguio City).” 2. 731 (A public official should not be onionskinned with reference to comments upon his official acts. 599 4. Ramon Labor. filed a complaint for Damages before the regional trial Court of Baguio City as he claimed said articles were libelous.” 3. US vs. . Perez. 2004] Freedom of Expression. 1988 column at the Courier: “I heard that the ‘Dumpty in the Egg’ is campaigning for Cortes. Labo has the most imponderables about him. Bustos. Not fair. several teachers were signifying to resign and leave Baguio forever. 444 SCRA 28 [November 25. JR. Jr. 37 Phil. the public has the right to be informed on the mental. He likewise filed a separate criminal complaint before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio but was dismissed. 1988 issue of the Baguio Midland Courier (BMC). Some real doctors are also busy campaigning against Labo because he has not also paid their medical services with them. We will accept all advertisements for him if he pays his old account first. The interest of the government and the society demands full discussion of public affairs) 3. vs.. If he wins. the Editor-in-Chief. Mercado vs. Freedom of the press. Cecille Afable wrote the following comments in her January 10. Cecille Afable. COURT OF APPEALS & RAMON LABO. FACTS: 1. moral and physical fitness of candidates for public office. and Pangasinan will be the franca-liqua of Baguio. As a result of the above articles.

5. 6. 2.415. WERE THE ARTICLES SUBJECT OF THE CASE LIBELOUS OR PRIVILEGED/ HELD: The Court of Appeals is wrong when it held that Labo is the “Dumpty in the Egg” in the questioned article. Branch 6. it is doubtful whether he could have won as City Mayor of Baguio in the 1988 elections. which he actually did.00 for the ads placed by his campaigners for the 1984 Batasang Pambansa elections. Jr.116 4. This is so because the article stated that “The Dumpty in the Egg is campaigning for Cortes”. In line with the doctrine in BORJAL VS. 7. Labo claimed that the said articles were tainted with malice because he was allegedly described as “Dumpty in the Egg” or one “who is a failure in his business” which is false because he is a very successful businessman or to mean “zero or a big lie”. Labo claims that the petitioners could not invoke “public interest” to justify the publication since he was not yet a public official at that time. another candidate for mayor and opponent of Labo himself. that ‘it is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed. . ISSUES: A. On January 7. Hence. the Petition to the Supreme Court. Although such gracious attitude on the part of Labo would have been commendable. WAS LABO THE “DUMPTY IN THE EGG” DESCRIBED IN THE QUESTIONED ARTICLE/ B. however. had he done that. reputation and honesty of private respondent Labo who was a candidate for Mayor of Baguio City. that he is a “balasubas” due to his alleged failure to pay his medical expenses. This 1. Baguio City. 310 SCRA 1. CA. in its Decision dated June 14. As pointed out by the petitioners. damages in the total amount of P350. 1990 dismissed Labo’s complaint for damages on the ground that the article of petitioner Afable was privileged and constituted fair comment on matters of public interest as it dealt with the integrity. It is unbelievable that Labo campaigned for his opponent and against himself.000. 1992. The petitioners. were able to prove that Labo has an unpaid obligation to the Courier in the amount of P27. it is contrary to common human experience. but it must be shown that at least a 3rd person could identify him as the object of the libelous publication’.00 after concluding that the “Dumpty in the Egg” refers to no one but Labo himself. the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision and ordered the petitioners to pay Ramon Labo. The Regional Trial Court. the case should be dismissed since Labo utterly failed to dispose of this responsibility.

entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law. and the advantages derived so great. 376 U. RA 6766. NO. COMELEC. the City of Baguio and Provinces of Benguet. the article is still within the mantle of protection guaranteed by the freedom of expression provided in the Constitution since it is the public’s right to be informed of the mental.R. 2. all comprising the autonomous region shall take part in a plebiscite originally scheduled for December 27. 338 [1909] and the case of NEW YORK TIMES VS. 1989. 254 where the US Supreme Court held: “…it is of the utmost consequence that the people should discuss the character and qualifications of candidates for their suffrages. SANIDAD VS. Province. “ Clearly. SULLIVAN. By virtue of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881). although at times such injury may be great. The public benefit from publicity is so great and the chance of injury to private character so small. The importance to the State and to society of such discussions is so vast. Facts: 1. PABLITO V. that such discussion must be privileged.117 argument is without merit since he was already a candidate for City mayor of Baguio. 3. the Comelec issued Comelec Resolution No. SEDANO. 2167. and occasional injury to the reputations of individuals must yield to the public welfare. 90878. As such. 2. G. 1990 specifically for the ratification or rejection of the said act. Section 19 of which provides: . Abra. January 29. the questioned articles constitute fair comment on a matter of public interest as it dealt with the character of the private respondent who was running for the top elective post in Baguio City at that time. Pursuant to said law. moral and physical fitness of candidates for public office. 1990 Freedom of expression and of the press (Note: Unanimous en banc decision) Medialdea. J. Mt. Ifugao and Kalinga-Apayao. 1989 but was reset to January 30.S. that they more than counterbalance the inconvenience of private persons whose conduct may be involved. On October 23. 14 Phil. This was recognized as early as the case of US VS.

The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising time and space." 4. On November 20. 1990. 2167. IX-C of the Constitution to the Comelec is the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises. 1989.118 "Section 19. a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras. and the right to reply. 2167 does not absolutely bar the petitioner from expressing his views because under Section 90 and 92 of BP 881. OF RA 6646 CAN BE CONSTRUED TO MEAN THAT THE COMELEC HAS ALSO BEEN GRANTED THE RIGHT TO SUPERVISE AND REGULATE THE EXERCISE BY MEDIA PRACTITIONERS THEMSELVES OF THEIR RIGHT TO . SANIDAD who is a columnist ("OVERVIEW") for the Baguio Midland Courier.During the plebiscite campaign period. including reasonable. 1989. 6. equal rates therefor. 2167. for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are insured. petitioner PABLITO V. Prohibition on columnist. filed a petition for Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction against the Comelec to enjoin the latter from enforcing Section 19 of resolution No. 5. On November 28. announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues. on the day before and on plebiscite day. no mass media columnist. Comelec through the Solicitor General filed its Comment and moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that Section 19 of Resolution No. commentator. On January 9. the Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent from enforcing Section 19 of Resolution No. NEITHER ARTICLE IX-C OF THE CONSTITUTION NOR SECTION 11(B). HOWEVER. Held: What is granted by Art. commentators or announcers. permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities to the end that equal opportunity. he may still express his views or campaign for or against the act through the Comelec space and airtime. commentator or announcer is required to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period if he is a candidate. time and space. 2ND PAR. This is also the reason why a columnist. Petitioner claims that the said provision is violative of his constitutional freedom of expression and of the press and it also constitutes a prior restraint because it imposes subsequent punishment for those who violate the same.

489 SCRA 160. NIB. In fact. Emil Jurado. Chief of Staff.254 10. Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. 34 SCRA 116 9. Comelec. said fact does not cure the constitutional infirmity of Section 19. 1990 Burgos vs. 199 In re: Atty. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during the plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. 5. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised. 132 SCRA 316 6. 5 SCRA 148 8. Sullivan. 1992 (putting of decals and stickers in one’s car is within the protected freedom of expression) 3. 2006. 133 SCRA 800 Corro vs. 1992. INCLUDING THE FORUM. PCGG. Freedom of expression in general Read: 1. ACCORDINGLY. The people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues. 2167 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 3. Real also the dissenting and separate opinions of the justices. (Preventing . [b] must be done in good faith. Comelec. April 15. 2. CA. In re: Ramon Tulfo. New York Times vs.76 SCRA 448 (In order that any news item relating to a judicial proceeding will not be actionable.March 19. 2. Lising. Gutierrez. there are no candidates in a plebiscite. Comelec Resolution No. Liwayway Publishing vs. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 7.S. 4. July 12. National Press Club vs. RANDY DAVID VS. 2167. March 31. Adiong vs. Elizalde vs. ARROYO. the same must be [a] a true and fair report of the actual proceedings. and [c] no comments nor remarks shall be made by the writer.376 U. March 5. Read also: 1. This is so because IT IS STILL A RESTRICTION ON HIS CHOICE OF THE FORUM WHERE HE MAY EXPRESS HIS VIEW.l988 3.119 EXPRESSION DURING THE PLEBISCITE PERIODS. Lopez vs. Manila Times. May 3. 137 SCRA 448 Babst vs. Policarpio vs. While it is true that the petitioner is not absolutely barred from campaigning for or against the Organic Act.

c. test ofRead: a. February 1. supra b. political or scientific value. Ed. Tipon.120 campaigns through radio. 178 SCRA 362 (A City Mayor may not order the warrantless seizure of magazines which he believes to be obscene. California. otherwise. Dans. August 8.137 SCRA 628 6. Ginsberg vs. Pita vs. May 23. CA. Eastern Broadcasting vs.1988 10. 11 SCRA 477 8. TV and newspapers is valid in order to even the playing field between rich and poor candidates) 4. He should obtain a search warrant from a judge) 2. December 6. Newsweek vs. Gonzales. 352 b. Whether the work depicts or describes a patently offensive sexual conduct. test of Read: a. 7960-707 & Zaldivar vs. Lacsa vs. Cases undersub-judice Read: expression clause of the . P. 45 Phil. IAC. Whether the average person applying to contemporary community standards would find the work appeals to prurient interest. IAC. 142 SCRA 171 7. 80578.S. artistic. GR No. Sandiganbayan. Obscenity. 37 L. 629 e. 1988 4. GO PIN. he will become the complainant. Kottinger. Miller vs. Camara Shoes. 510 3. prosecutor and judge at the same time. 1955 Tests: a. IN RE: Atty. Lopez and Manila Times cases. New York. 96 Phil. Not within the protection of the freedom of Constitution 1. Quisumbing vs. Kapunan vs. 1989 5. Zaldivar vs.390 U. GR No. Lopez. vs. P vs. De Villa. 79 SCRA 372 9. b. Kapisanan vs. 2d 419 d. c. Whether the work as a whole lacks serious literary . Libel or slander.

Thus. 276 SCRA 619) . The right of government employees to organize IS LIMITED TO THE FORMATIONS OF UNIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS ONLY. 1990 was a strike or not has been decided in the case of MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION VS. WILL BE DEEMED CONTROLLING. 69 Phil. They claimed that they were merely exercising their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of their grievances. 1990 which temporarily disrupted classes in Metro Manila but they claimed that they were not on strike. vs. they may not be penalized administratively. employees in the public service may not engage in strikes. SINCE THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SITUATION. right of public school teachers to form union. AND NOT ITS APPEARANCE. or absence from. mass leaves. The fact that the conventional term “strike” was not used by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential. 444 SCRA 51 Freedom of public school teachers to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. (Bangalisan vs. The petitioners admitted that they participated in concerted mass actions in Metro Manila from September to the first half of October. CA. walkouts and other forms of mass actions that will lead to temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of.121 a. COURT OF APPEALS. undertaken for essentially economic reasons.” It is undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that petitioners’ purpose was to realize their demands by withholding their services. 265 5. LAGUIO. Alarcon. WITHOUT INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO STRIKE. work which it was the teachers’ duty to perform. Freedom of assembly and to petition the government grievances for redress of GESITE et al. P. vs. Despite the constitutional right to form associations under the Constitution. HELD: The issue of whether or not the mass action launched by the public school teachers during the period from September up to the 1st half of October. 200 SCRA 323 where it was held that “these mass actions were to all intents and purposes a strike.

in G. 169881. 880 and the policy of “Calibrated Preemptive Response” (CPR) being followed to implement it. 169838. who allege that they were injured. ARTURO M. 880.: The Facts: Petitioners come in three groups. The third group. NCRPO Chief Maj. No. J. are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 2005. Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU). and the protest was likewise dispersed violently and many among them were arrested and suffered injuries. specifically the right to peaceful assembly. May.R.P. allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6.R. . 2005 was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP). put the country under an “undeclared” martial rule. KARAPATAN. No. BAYAN. a group they participated in marched to Malacañang to protest issuances of the Palace which. The first petitioners. VIDAL QUEROL. G..R. Gen.) No. LOMIBAO. 169848.R. Chief of the Philippine National Police. No.. 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.. allege that they conduct peaceful mass actions and that their rights as organizations and those of their individual members as citizens. Manila City Mayor LITO ATIENZA. et al. EDUARDO ERMITA. et al. petitioners in G. and Western Police District Chief Gen. Bayan. et al. The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners. arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they held on September 26. they claim. 2006 AZCUNA.122 The petitioners are not therefore entitled to their salaries during their suspension because the general proposition is that a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he had not rendered any service. in his capacity as Executive Secretary. and GABRIELA vs. No. Jess del Prado. PEDRO BULAONG. in G. 169848. Gen. They further assert that on October 5.

They further allege that on October 6. causing injuries to several of their members. as well as the policy of CPR. liberty and equal protection of the law. B. No. et al. – For purposes of this Act: (b) “Public place” shall include any highway. a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C. 2. and 14(a).123 KMU. .. plaza square. Definition of terms. 12. SEC. 6. road. street. claim that on October 4.P. the State shall ensure the free exercise of such right without prejudice to the rights of others to life. They were then forcibly dispersed. (c) “Maximum tolerance” means the highest degree of restraint that the military. Three other rallyists were arrested. some of them in toto and others only Sections 4. 880. – This Act shall be known as “The Public Assembly Act of 1985. 880 An Act Ensuring The Free Exercise By The People Of Their Right Peaceably To Assemble And Petition The Government [And] For Other Purposes Be it enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in session assembled: SECTION 1. causing injuries on one of them. no rally” policy and the CPR policy recently announced. 2005. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them. Declaration of policy. To this end. 5. police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the “no permit. Title . boulevard.” provides: Batas Pambansa Blg. “The Public Assembly Act of 1985. a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge.M. – The constitutional right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances is essential and vital to the strength and stability of the State. 13(a). park. avenue.” SEC. and/or any open space of public ownership where the people are allowed access. 880. 2005. 3. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. bridge or other thoroughfare. All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No.

the date. failing which. time and duration thereof. no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property. It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order. which must be duly acknowledged in writing. the duty and 3. The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or organizers. the purpose of such public assembly. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in . SEC.A written permit shall be required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required.124 SEC. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by this Act. and place or streets to be used for the intended activity. Application requirements. and the probable number of persons participating. 4. the permit shall be deemed granted.All applications for a permit shall comply with the following guidelines: 1.-. Upon receipt of the application. SEC. The application shall incorporate responsibility of applicant under Section 8 hereof. 6. However. The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days from the date the application was filed. or in the campus of a government-owned and operated educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution. Permit when required and when not required. public convenience. Action to be taken on the application. the office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building.-. – 1. the transport and the public address systems to be used. 4. 5. 2. public morals or public health. at least five (5) working days before the scheduled public assembly. public safety. The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held. 2.

2005 STATEMENT OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA On Unlawful Mass Actions . 2 Official NEWS September 21. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. 169848. is a policy set forth in a press release by Malacañang dated September 21. The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applica[nt] within twenty-four hours. 5. 7. thus: Malacañang Manila. the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. said application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed. or the Intermediate Appellate court. the Municipal Trial Court. 6.R. All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. shown in Annex “A” to the Petition in G. No. If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit. A decision granting such permit or modifying if in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall be immediately executory. 8.125 his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit. 4. Philippines Release No. 3. on the other hand. the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or. 2005. in his absence. CPR. In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court. In all cases. to the next in rank. the Regional Trial Court. any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court. its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within fortyeight (48) hours after receipt of the same. If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit. he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.

No. Unlawful mass actions will be dispersed. and the peace of mind of the national community. They argue that B. we have instructed the PNP as well as the local government units to strictly enforce a “no permit. Petitioners Bayan. The President’s call for unity and reconciliation stands. sow disorder and incite people against the duty constituted authorities. it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. . Furthermore. The authorities will not stand aside while those with ill intent are herding a witting or unwitting mass of people and inciting them into actions that are inimical to public order.P.. et al. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought. The two standards stated in the laws (clear and present danger and imminent and grave danger) are inconsistent. disperse groups that run afoul of this standard and arrest all persons violating the laws of the land as well as ordinances on the proper conduct of mass actions and demonstrations. Furthermore. The words “lawful cause. it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The majority of lawabiding citizens have the right to be protected by a vigilant and proactive government. based on the rule of law. As a content-based legislation.” “protesting or influencing” suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. contend that Batas Pambansa No. in lieu of maximum tolerance. We appeal to the detractors of the government to engage in lawful and peaceful conduct befitting of a democratic society. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. The rule of calibrated preemptive response is now in force. no rally” policy. the phrase “maximum tolerance” shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear standards.126 In view of intelligence reports pointing to credible plans of anti-government groups to inflame the political situation.” “opinion. Also.

3. Furthermore.P. allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. they argue that it is preemptive. it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B. As to the CPR policy. Is the policy void on its face or due to vagueness? Is it void for lack of publication? Is the policy of CPR void as applied to the rallies of September 26 and October 4.P. Second. On the constitutionality and legality of the policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR): 1. 880. 5 and 6. it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B. et al. specifically Sections 4. and that no law. 2. On the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 2. 12 13(a) and 14(a) thereof. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right. No. 2005? H e l d: .127 Regarding the CPR policy.P. Are these content-neutral or content-based regulations? Are they void on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness? Do they constitute prior restraint? Are they undue delegations of powers to Mayors? Do they violate international human rights treaties and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? 5.. I s s u e s: 4. 3. that the government takes action even before the rallyists can perform their act. 5. 880. 6. ordinance or executive order supports the policy. argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B. petitioners KMU. otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane. 7160: 1. No. and Republic Act No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. the limits provided are unreasonable: First. No. the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant public assembly. aside from being void for being vague and for lack of publication. 4. 5. Finally.

of expression. and Section 3 of Article XIII. particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights. Apurado already upheld the right to assembly and petition. CA. as follows: There is no question as to the petitioners’ rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances and. the less perfect. the grievance and the more intense the feeling. and the greater. But if the prosecution be permitted to seize upon every . 4. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition. as a rule will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. vs. on the other hand. as early as the onset of this century. Apurado. As stated in Jacinto v. as guaranteed by the Constitution.S. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech. of expression. already upheld the right to assembly and petition and even went as far as to acknowledge: “It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary. For these rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic polity.S. without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected. v. These rights are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution. have challenged such action as contrary to law and dispersed the public assemblies held without the permit. a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. As early as the onset of this century. and of the press. Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution provides: SEC. or of the press. They have. as well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities. the Court. 880 which requires a permit for all who would publicly assemble in the nation’s streets and parks. in fact. for that matter. or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.128 Petitioners’ standing cannot be seriously challenged. No. Respondents. is directly affected by B. in U. The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances is. purposely engaged in public assemblies without the required permits to press their claim that no such permit can be validly required without violating the Constitutional guarantee. this Court in U. because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement.P. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed pronouncements defending and promoting the people’s exercise of these rights. together with freedom of speech. to organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to law. Section 2(5) of Article IX.

if the purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. but the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly and seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising. peace. while sacrosanct. it must be remembered that the right. education. as follows: 1. nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. morals. But it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign “police power. or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. The Constitution is quite explicit: “No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech. to promote the health. municipalities and cities by authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal and city councils enact ordinances for purpose Reyes v. however. This sovereign police power is exercised by the government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights. is not absolute. In Primicias. the Court likewise sustained the primacy of freedom of speech and to assembly and petition over comfort and convenience in the use of streets and parks. such as towns.” Again. then the right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would expose all those who took part therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment.129 instance of such disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities. and general welfare of the people. Next. in Primicias v. arising from the denial of a permit. good order or safety. the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefor. If instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions. and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. It is thus clear that the Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the cognate rights to free speech and peaceful assembly.” Free speech. and it may be delegated to political subdivisions. or of the press.” which is the power to prescribe regulations. . Bagatsing further expounded on the right and its limits. Fugoso. are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. this Court said: The right to freedom of speech.

of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. For if the . the utterance. All these rights. There is to be then no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits. the judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged governmental actuation. It must always be remembered that this right likewise provides for a safety valve. or any other legitimate public interest. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution.” What was rightfully stressed is the abandonment of reason. Nowhere is the rationale that underlies the freedom of expression and peaceable assembly better expressed than in this excerpt from an opinion of Justice Frankfurter: “It must never be forgotten. while not identical. however. except on a showing. speaking for the majority of the American Supreme Court in Thomas v. 2. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it is a necessary consequence of our republican institutions and complements the right of free speech. therefore. Back of the guaranty of free speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful means for gaining access to the mind. But utterance in a context of violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of force. of a character both grave and imminent. public morals. is the danger. It was in order to avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon rational modes of communication that the guaranty of free speech was given a generous scope.” Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. much less denied. It is not to be limited. or action for damages. or contempt proceedings unless there be a “clear and present danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent. Collins. where there is a limitation placed on the exercise of this right. In every case. of a serious evil to public safety. being in a context of violence. prosecution for sedition. may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. public health. so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions. it was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. are inseparable. as is the case with freedom of expression. To paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge. Such utterance was not meant to be sheltered by the Constitution. whether verbal or printed. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right.130 like free press. even if contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion. allowing parties the opportunity to give vent to their views. that the Bill of Rights was the child of the Enlightenment.

Such use of the streets and public places has. time out of mind. That is to ensure a true ferment of ideas. There are. in the guise of respondents. have been used for purposes of assembly. because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement. well-defined limits. it is not absolute. of 1939 vintage of. a 1915 decision.” The above excerpt was quoted with approval in Primicias v. rights and liberties of citizens. and discussing public questions. will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. be abridged or denied. As pointed out in an early Philippine case. One may not advocate disorder in the name of protest. Nor is this the sole reason for the expression of dissent. but must not. on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. as a rule. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all.” It bears repeating that for the constitutional right to be invoked. Resort to force is ruled out and outbreaks of violence to be avoided. and acts of vandalism must be avoided. penned in 1907 to be precise. immunities. Primicias made explicit what was implicit in Municipality of Cavite v. Fugoso. Its value may lie in the fact that there may be something worth hearing from the dissenter. absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil. . much less preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent. United States v. resort to non-peaceful means may be the only alternative. What is guaranteed is peaceable assembly. and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience. they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and. Apurado: “It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary. It means more than just the right to be heard of the person who feels aggrieved or who is dissatisfied with things as they are. and in consonance with peace and good order. the less perfect. from ancient times. where this Court categorically affirmed that plazas or parks and streets are outside the commerce of man and thus nullified a contract that leased Plaza Soledad of plaintiff-municipality. injury to property. but relative. and the greater the grievance and the more intense the feeling. communicating thoughts between citizens. been a part of the privileges. CIO: “Whenever the title of streets and parks may rest. The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a rally or assembly. Justice Roberts in Hague v. of course. It is to make a mockery of the high estate occupied by intellectual liberty in our scheme of values. riotous conduct. Rojas. There can be no legal objection. The utmost calm though is not required. The Philippines is committed to the view expressed in the plurality opinion.131 peaceful means of communication cannot be availed of. To give free rein to one’s destructive urges is to call for condemnation.

” which certainly is not the only purpose that it could serve. as guaranteed by the Constitution. in the issuance of licenses. and manner of the parade or procession. In holding that the then Mayor Fugoso of the City of Manila should grant a permit for a public meeting at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo. To repeat. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend. as the statute is construed by the state courts.. section 2. where. to a consideration of the time.” xxx . it cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to protection. imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestricted abuses. with a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing. The control of travel on the streets of cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. place.S. there can be no valid reason why a permit should not be granted for the proposed march and rally starting from a public park that is the Luneta. the statute of New Hampshire P. hardly two blocks away at the Roxas Boulevard. in its decision (1941) penned by Chief Justice Hughes affirming the judgment of the State Supreme Court. 145. * * *. shall be permitted unless a special license therefor shall first be obtained from the selectmen of the town or from licensing committee. held that ‘a statute requiring persons using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgment of the rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press. In that case. Where a restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all. providing that no parade or procession upon any ground abutting thereon. Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets to the gates of the US embassy. “Nor should the point made by Chief Justice Hughes in a subsequent portion of the opinion be ignored: “Civil liberties.’ was construed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as not conferring upon the licensing board unfettered discretion to refuse to grant the license. 4. chap.132 Reference was made to such plaza “being a promenade for public use. Fugoso has resolved any lurking doubt on the matter. State of New Hampshire. the licensing authorities are strictly limited. And the Supreme Court of the United States.L. Primicias v. 312 U. and held valid. and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license. 569. this Court categorically declared: “Our conclusion finds support in the decision in the case of Willis Cox v.

Thereafter. no sanctifying phrase can. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary. the presumption . but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects.even more so than on the other departments – rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached.133 6. his decision. however. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date. the public place where and the time when it will take place. x x x The principle under American doctrines was given utterance by Chief Justice Hughes in these words: “The question. unfettered discretion. given all the relevant circumstances. Free speech and peaceable assembly. they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. still the assumption – especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place – is that the permit must be for the assembly being held there. in the language of Justice Roberts.” Nonetheless. It is not. only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. not as to the relations of the speakers. of course. dispense with what has been so felicitiously termed by Justice Holmes “as the sovereign prerogative of judgment. That would deprive it of its peaceful character. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil.” xxx 8. speaking for the American Supreme Court. By way of a summary. along with the other intellectual freedoms. -. is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a permit would be granted. whether favorable or adverse. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. No verbal formula. is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose. If it were a private place.” There could be danger to public peace and safety if such a gathering were marked by turbulence. must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. if the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved. are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. The exercise of such a right. is not to be “abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place. It is true that the licensing official. the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thus if so minded. here respondent Mayor. While prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably occur.

November 9. in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. x x x.P. 569) 8. 125 SCRA 553. No. only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required.P. The provisions of B. No.A written permit shall be required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. Permit when required and when not required. no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property. B. must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. SEC. 880 practically codify the ruling in Reyes: Reyes v. By way of a summary. they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. No. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by this Act.134 must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights. No.R. or in the campus of a governmentowned and operated educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date. whether favorable or adverse.-All applications for a permit shall comply with the following guidelines: (a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the . his decision. enjoying as they do precedence and primacy. 5. Thus if so minded. However. Application requirements. L-65366. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. Thereafter. 880 SEC. 1983. B. the applicants must be heard on the matter. 4.P. If it were a private place. Bagatsing (G. the public place where and the time when it will take place. 880 was enacted after this Court rendered its decision in Reyes. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil.-.

the transport and the public address systems to be used. and the probable number of persons participating. (d) Upon receipt of the application. the office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building. the date. time and duration thereof. (c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held. Action to be taken on the application. public convenience. public safety. at least five (5) working days before the scheduled public assembly. public morals or public health. (b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days from the date the application was filed. – (a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order. SEC. which must be duly acknowledged in writing. the purpose of such public assembly. failing .135 names of the leaders or organizers. 6. (b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant under Section 8 hereof. and place or streets to be used for the intended activity.

Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit. he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter. the permit shall be deemed granted. said application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed. the Regional Trial Court. its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within fortyeight (48) hours after receipt of the same. (e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit. (g) All cases filed in court under this section shall be . A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall be immediately executory.136 which. or the Intermediate Appellate Court. (c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit. the Municipal Trial Court. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. (f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court. (d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applica[nt] within twenty-four hours. the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law. the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.

public safety.” “protesting” and “influencing” in the definition of public assembly content based. any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court. Neither is the law overbroad. so its use cannot be avoided. otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and entitled to protection. Comelec.P. Except picketing and other concerted action in strike areas by workers and employees resulting from a labor dispute. and public assemblies in the campus of a government-owned and operated educational institution.101 where the Court referred to it as a “content-neutral” regulation of the time. political meeting or rallies held during any election campaign period. No. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 880). and manner of holding public assemblies. Neither are the words “opinion. (h) In all cases. public convenience.137 decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a 101 102 103 G. public morals or public health. which are governed by the Election Code and other election related laws. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies103 that would use public places. 3[a] and Sec. 288 SCRA 447. place. Furthermore. (Sec. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time. The reference to “lawful cause” does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes. Finally. Ibid.P.P. which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or. This was adverted to in Osmeña v. March 31.102 A fair and impartial reading of B. therefore. the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order. which are governed by the Labor Code and other labor laws. to the next in rank. 4 of B. The words “petitioning the government for redress of grievances” come from the wording of the Constitution. 478. No. since they can refer to any subject. 1998. No. in his absence. It is very clear. that B. 132231. (i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed. .R. place and manner of the assemblies. No. p.

appropriate. No. Section 15 of the law provides for an alternative forum through the creation of freedom parks where no prior permit is needed for peaceful assembly and petition at any time: SEC. those necessarily implied therefrom. police and other peacekeeping 104 The Local Government Code. . likewise. 6(a). local government units shall ensure and support among other things. As to the delegation of powers to the mayor. as well as powers necessary. 6(c) substantially means the same thing and is not an inconsistent standard. or incidental for its efficient and effective governance. submitted by the Solicitor General. – Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable “freedom park” or mall in their respective jurisdictions which. General Welfare. promote health and safety. Section 16 stating the general welfare clause. since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation. no prior restraint.138 clear and present danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent. the Solicitor General has conceded that the use of the term should now be discontinued. 15. the law provides a precise and sufficient standard – the clear and present danger test stated in Sec. enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. This is stated in the Affidavit of respondent Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita. Blg. Freedom parks. maintain peace and order. which is the “highest degree of restraint that the military.P. improve public morals. The reference to “imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil” in Sec. As stated earlier. As to whether respondent Mayor has the same power independently under Republic Act No. – Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted. Specifically. and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions. promote full employment among their residents. encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities. There is.P. 2 The Court now comes to the matter of the CPR. shall be centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need of any prior permit. for those who cannot wait. the respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks within the period of six months from the effectivity this Act. 7160104 is thus not necessary to resolve in these proceedings. and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. 880. enhance economic prosperity and social justice. thus: SEC. the preservation and enrichment of culture. In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila. as far as practicable. Finally. thus: The truth of the matter is the policy of “calibrated preemptive response” is in consonance with the legal definition of “maximum tolerance” under Section 3 (c) of B. and was not pursued by the parties in their arguments. 16. 880. since it does not mean anything other than the maximum tolerance policy set forth in B.

this Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the fundamental rights of our people.P. the popular connotation of “maximum tolerance” has departed from its real essence under B. the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. I wanted to send a message that we would no longer be lax in enforcing the law but would henceforth follow it to the letter. which allows the dispersal of rallies without a permit. unlawful mass actions will be dispersed. “maximum tolerance” is for the benefit of rallyists. I only wanted to disabuse the minds of the public from the notion that law enforcers would shirk their responsibility of keeping the peace even when confronted with dangerously threatening behavior. the phrase “maximum tolerance” has acquired a different meaning over the years. arrest all persons violating the laws of the land . . when I stated that calibrated preemptive response is being enforced in lieu of maximum tolerance I clearly was not referring to its legal definition but to the distorted and much abused definition that it has now acquired. In sum.” Unfortunately. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional. This could only mean that “maximum tolerance” is not in conflict with a “no permit. “we have instructed the PNP as well as the local government units to strictly enforce a no permit. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. Thus. Our law enforcers should calibrate their response based on the circumstances on the ground with the view to preempting the outbreak of violence. On the other hand.” None of these is at loggerheads with the letter and spirit of Batas Pambansa Blg. . . It is thus absurd for complainants to even claim that I ordered my co-respondents to violate any law. 880. however. the maximum amount of tolerance required is dependent on how peaceful or unruly a mass action is. 880. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally “permits” is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound “clear and present danger” standard. place and manner of assemblies. Thus I said.139 authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same. not the government. no rally policy . Many have taken it to mean inaction on the part of law enforcers even in the face of mayhem and serious threats to public order. Blg. For this reason. No. especially freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. and which recognizes certain instances when water cannons may be used. It should be emphasized that the policy of maximum tolerance is provided under the same law which requires all pubic assemblies to have a permit. it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms. other felt that they need not bother secure a permit when holding rallies thinking this would be “tolerated.” Clearly. B. More so.P. . it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time. no rally policy” or with the dispersal and use of water cannons under certain circumstances for indeed. . Far from being insidious.

TIP.see guidelines 8.: Bombo Radyo Philippines (“Bombo Radyo”) operates several radio stations under the AM and FM band throughout the Philippines. FELICISIMO G. airing on the FM band. Primicias vs. 346 5. Gordon. The service areas of DZNC and Star FM extend from the province of Isabela . Malabanan vs. 125 SCRA 553. 2009 TINGA. Earnshaw. particularly petitioners Newsounds Broadcasting Network. G. Right of assembly. Bagatsing. insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance. MEER. 31 SCRA 731 6. Reyes vs.HON. in turn. INC. CBS.. runs Star FM DWIT Cauayan (“Star FM”). Sanchez. Carpio vs.R. 126 SCRA 233 9. Navarro vs. (“Newsounds”) and Consolidated Broadcasting System. Freedom from prior restraint Closing a radio station is definitely prior restraint NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING NETWORK INC. Evangelista vs. Isabela. April 2. Fuguso. vs. Among the stations run by Newsounds is Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC). DY. Ruiz vs. Philippine Blooming Mills Case. and Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR). 135 SCRA 705 10. Araneta University Foundation.31 SCRA 734 and 742 2. J. Inc. 99 Phil. RACMA FERNANDEZ-GARCIA and THE CITY OF CAUAYAN. is NULL and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of maximum tolerance. Inc. BAGNOS MAXIMO. Villegas. Arreza vs. 57 Phil 255 3. also operating out of Cauayan City. 71 4. Villar vs.51 SCRA 189 7. These stations are operated by corporations organized and incorporated by Bombo Radyo. 80 Phil. Nestle' Phils. Ramento. 106 SCRA 685 12. Guevara. Ela. Read: 1. (“CBS”).140 WHEREFORE. Nos. an AM radio broadcast station operating out of Cauayan City. 170270 &179411. De la Cruz vs. 137 SCRA 94 6. 154 SCRA 542 13. CEASAR G. the petitions are GRANTED in part. and CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING SYSTEM. 129 SCRA 359 11.

No. noting as well that the location “is classified as a Commercial area. Id.”113[14] On 28 January. DZNC and Star FM operated as radio stations. petitioners applied for the renewal of the mayor’s permit. Both stations successfully secured all necessary operating documents.112[13] All that changed beginning in 2002. On 15 January of that year. Isabela. an affiliate corporation under the Bombo Radyo network which holds title over the properties used by Bombo Radyo stations throughout the country. Newsounds commenced relocation of its broadcasting stations. 179411). including mayor’s permits from 1997 to 2001. the City Assessor’s Office in Cauayan City noted on CDC’s Declaration of Real Property filed for 2002 confirmed that based on the existing file. Id.107[8] On 5 July 1996.141 to throughout Region II and the Cordillera region. Id. and therefrom. ISABELA. however.”109[10] Similar certifications would be issued by OMPDC from 1997 to 2001. required 105 [6] 106 [7] 107 [8] 105[6] Rollo (G. Id. CDC was issued by the then municipal government of Cauayan a building permit authorizing the construction of a commercial establishment on the property. CDC paid real property taxes on the property based on the classification of the land as commercial.108[9] That same day. at 93-97. CDC’s property was classified as “commercial.110[11] A building was consequently erected on the property. 108[9] 109 [10] 110 [11] 111 [12] 112 [13] 113 [14] 114 [15] Id.114[15] Maximo.106[7] On 28 June 1996. Id. at 92. at 98-102. Id. at 103-110. representatives of petitioners formally requested then City Zoning Administrator-Designate Bagnos Maximo (Maximo) to issue a zoning clearance for the property. The property is owned by CBS Development Corporation (CDC). . at 111. p. 13. the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) issued a Zoning Decision certifying the property as commercial. In 1996. at 90. management office and transmitters on property located in Minante 2. the Office of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator (OMPDC) of Cauayan affirmed that the commercial structure to be constructed by CDC conformed to local zoning regulations.111[12] During that period. at 103. The following day.R. Cauayan City. Id. is owned by the family of respondent Mayor Dy. at 91. Id. THE ONLY OTHER STATION OPERATING IN CAUAYAN CITY.

Article 3. 4. The petition was accompanied by an application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction. Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus. or an approved resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang Panglungsod authorizing the re-classification of the property from agricultural to commercial land. this case before the Supreme Court. Thereafter. 471. THE MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS PADLOCKED THE RADIO STATIONS BASED ON THE GROUND THAT THE PETITIONERS FAILED TO SUBMIT THE requisite zoning clearance needed for the issuance of the mayor’s permit because there was allegedly no DAR Decision converting said land from agricultural to commercial. Gonzales v. both provisional reliefs being denied by the RTC through an Order dated 20 April 2004. with the RTC of Cauayan City. of expression or the press.142 petitioners to submit “either an approved land conversion papers from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) showing that the property was converted from prime agricultural land to commercial land. at 18-19. or action for damages. Branch 20 to compel the municipality to allow the radio stations to operate. . the OMPDC had consistently certified that the property had been classified as commercial. prosecution for sedition. THEREAFTER. and from 1996 to 2001. Sec. docketed as SCA No. I S S U E: Is the closure of the petitioners’ radio stations constitutional? HELD: The closure constitutes prior restraint. 492 (1969). 20171.116[32] Free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship and punishment.117[33] 115 [16] 116 [32] 117 [33] Id. 137 Phil.”115[16] Petitioners had never been required to submit such papers before. The fundamental constitutional principle that informs our analysis of both petitions is the freedom of speech. COMELEC. or contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. Hence. There is to be no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits. the petition was dismissed by the RTC as well as the Court of Appeals.

492. No. . 15 February 2008. They admit that in 2001. a former assistant station manager at petitioners’ own DZNC Bombo Radyo. 168338. p.122[38] While any system of prior restraint comes to court bearing a heavy burden against its constitutionality. In their tale.143 Petitioners have taken great pains to depict their struggle as a textbook case of denial of the right to free speech and of the press.124 [40] 118 [34] 119 Rollo (G. 2d 822. citing New York Times v. An elementary school child with a basic understanding of civics lessons will recognize that free speech animates these cases. No. we can identify the bare acts of closing the radio stations or preventing their operations as an act of prior restraint against speech. 713. 170270). governor of Isabela from 2001 until he was defeated in his re-election bid in 2004 by Grace Padaca. G. No. 545 SCRA 441. 179411).inquirer. p..S.net/inquireropinion/letterstotheeditor/view /20080801-151950/Isabela-gov-who-ended-a-dynasty-winsRM-prize 120 [36] 121 [37] 122 [38] 123 [35] Rollo (G. 585 (2001). COMELEC. 168335. 17. United States. there is undeniable political color.R. 29 L.R. Without taking into account any extenuating circumstances that may favor the respondents.R. and had been doing so for some years undisturbed by local authorities.120[36] Petitioners likewise direct our attention to a 20 February 2004 article printed in the Philippine Daily Inquirer where Dy is quoted as intending “to file disenfranchisement proceedings against DZNCAM.R.119[35] A rival AM radio station in Cauayan City. 714. 142.” Philippine Daily Inquirer (1 August 2008). expression or of the press. 124 [40] [39] Chavez v.123[39] not all prior restraints on speech are invalid. Rollo (G. Inc. 545 SCRA 441. While once petitioners were able to broadcast freely. 170270). if not broadcast at all. respondents in their official capacities have taken actions. DWDY. Jr. at http://opinion. Social Weather Stations. Petitioners are authorized by law to operate radio stations in Cauayan City. Chavez v. No. G. the weight of government has since bore down upon them to silence their voices on the airwaves. “Isabela gov who ended a dynasty wins RM prize. 409 Phil. These actions have ranged from withholding permits to operate to the physical closure of those stations under color of legal authority.”118[34] Respondent Ceasar Dy is the brother of Faustino Dy. Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. v. No. Gonzales. 491. p. 27. 403 U. See TJ Burgonio.R. Gonzales. that have impeded the ability of petitioners to freely broadcast. 571. 824 (1971). Beginning in 2002.”121[37] The following undisputed facts bring the issue of free expression to fore. is owned and operated by the Dy family. whatever may be the motive. 15 February 2008. Ed. Bombo Radyo “was aggressive in exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela that appear to have favored respondent Dy and other members of the Dy political dynasty.

petitioners make the following relevant allegations: 6. et al. . jurisprudence distinguishes between a contentneutral regulation.’ There is thus a reversal of the normal presumption of validity that inheres in every legislation.. . et al. Gonzales. meaning that governmental action directed at expression must satisfy a greater burden of justification than governmental action directed at most other forms of behavior. There is a long-standing tradition of special judicial solicitude for free speech. G. COMELEC. In their petition for mandamus filed with the RTC. at 957. such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity. as content-neutral since such a regulation would presumably apply to any other radio station or business enterprise within the LGU. at 964. However. the conduct of public officials that are 125 [41] 126 [42] 127 [43] 128 [44] 129 [45] GUNTHER.128[44] Content-neutral regulations of speech or of conduct that may amount to speech. Newsounds. . is engaged in discussing public issues that include.e. are subject to lesser but still heightened scrutiny. to this date. Chavez v. when applied to a radio station.. Indeed. the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.144 That the acts imputed against respondents constitute a prior restraint on the freedom of expression of respondents who happen to be members of the press is clear enough. Id.129[45] Ostensibly. The Government 'thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such restraint.”126[42] At the same time. With specific reference to DZNC. and the press.e. . or one that merely controls the time. and a content-based restraint or censorship. merely concerned with the incidents of the speech. supra note 39. GUNTHER. 168338. 15 February 2008.127[43] Content-based laws are generally treated as more suspect than content-neutral laws because of judicial concern with discrimination in the regulation of expression.R. COMELEC: “Because of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech. supra note 44.1. i. and under well defined standards. i. SWS v. 493. 2001). 545 SCRA 441... No. expression. the circumstances of this case dictate that we view the action of the respondents as a content-based restraint. among others. the act of an LGU requiring a business of proof that the property from which it operates has been zoned for commercial use can be argued.125[41] We had said in SWS v. ‘any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. place or manner. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (14th ed..

3.145 detrimental to the constituents of Isabela. is owned and operated by the family of respondent Dy. Newsound’s only rival AM station in Cauayan and the rest of Isabela.. 35. including Cauayan City. It is just too coincidental that it was only after the 2001 elections (i. p. DZNC has always been at the forefront of the struggle to maintain and uphold freedom of the press. 2002) that the Mayor’s Office started questioning petitioners’ applications for renewal of their mayor’s permits. Respondents closure of petitioners’ radio stations is clearly tainted with ill motives.131[47] All those circumstances lead us to believe that the steps employed by respondents to ultimately shut down petitioner’s radio station were 130 [46] 131 [47] Rollo (G. In view of its wide coverage. and the people’s corollary right to freedom of speech. 35.2. 179411). 6. No. In an article found in the Philippine Daily inquirer dated 20 February 2004. DZNC has been a primary medium for the exercise of the people of Isabela of their constitutional right to free speech.1. at 178-179.130[46] xxxx 35.2. respondent Dy was quoted as saying that he will “disenfranchise the radio station. This is a blatant violation of the petitioners’ constitutional right to press freedom. Id.R. DWDY. Bombo Radyo was aggressive in exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela that appear to have favored respondent Dy and other members of the Dy political dynasty. The closure comes at a most critical time when the people are set to exercise their right of suffrage. . expression and petition the government for redress of grievances. Such timing emphasizes the ill motives of respondents.e.” Such statement manifests and confirms that respondents’ denial of petitioners’ renewal applications on the ground that the Property is commercial is merely a pretext and that their real agenda is to remove petitioners from Cauayan City and suppress the latter’s voice. It must be pointed out that in the 2001 elections. 35. 170. Corollarily. The timing of respondents’ closure of petitioners’ radio stations is also very telling.

133[54] The immediate implication of the application of the “strict scrutiny” test is that the burden falls upon respondents as agents of government to prove that their actions do not infringe upon petitioners’ constitutional rights. 351 Phil. supra note 44.146 ultimately content-based. The United States Supreme Court generally treats restriction of the expression of a particular point of view as the paradigm violation of the First Amendment.” That requirement. 692. 122846. and P1 Million in attorney’s fees. The Court is of the position that the actions of the respondents warrant heightened or strict scrutiny from the Court. It is thus evident that respondents had no valid cause at all to even require petitioners to secure “approved land conversion papers from the DAR showing that the property was converted from prime agricultural land to commercial land. or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. of laws dealing with the regulation of speech. See White Light v. As content regulation cannot be done in the absence of any compelling reason. the test which we have deemed appropriate in assessing content-based restrictions on free speech. 20 January 2009. COMELEC.132[53] The facts confronting us now could have easily been drawn up by a constitutional law professor eager to provide a plain example on how free speech may be violated. al.. should only obtain upon clear proof that the property from where the business would operate was classified as agricultural under the LGU’s land use plan or zoning ordinances and other relevant laws. Given respondents’ clear violation of petitioners’ constitutional guarantee of free expression. which provides: 132 [53] 133 [54] 134 [55] GUNTHER et. as well as for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process. No. .R. or to the courts. Petitioners had sought to recover from respondents P8 Million in temperate damages. No evidence to that effect was presented by the respondents either to the petitioners.134[55] the burden lies with the government to establish such compelling reason to infringe the right to free expression. gender. Court of Appeals. Having established that respondents had violated petitioners’ legal and constitutional rights. G. 711 (1998). let us now turn to the appropriate reliefs that should be granted. the right to damages from respondents is squarely assured by Article 32 (2) of the Civil Code. Osmeña v. We turn to the issue of damages. assuming that it can be demanded by a local government in the context of approving mayor’s permits. P1 Million in exemplary damages.

991. but the actions of respondents led to the closure of their radio stations from June 2004 until this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction in January 2006. the amount of which nevertheless being difficult to prove. See http://www. Any public officer or employee. who directly or indirectly obstructs.138[88] The lost potential income during that one and a half year of closure can only be presumed as substantial enough. The said amount is “reasonable under the circumstances. from the nature of the case. Court of Appeals. 179411).bomboradyo. Public officers who violate the Constitution they are sworn to uphold embody “a poison of wickedness that may not run 135 160 Phil. Art. 183. Petitioners had no way of knowing it when they filed their petition. 32. No. .htm (last visited. defeats. 86720. v. Inc. petitioners have maintained before this Court the same amount.”139[89] Exemplary damages can be awarded herein. or any private individual. Art. 136 [86] 137 [87] 138 [85] Rollo (G. DZNC accordingly resumed broadcast on 8 February 2006. According to an article posted on the official website of Bombo Radyo. possibly unanticipated when the original amount for claimed temperate damages was calculated.136 [86] Temperate damages avail when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not. 235. since temperate damages are available. despite that fact. p. be proved with certainty. 2 September 1994. G.com/archive/ new/stationprofile /bombocauayan/index. 2224. P8 Million.R. violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: x x x x (2) Freedom of speech. it likewise serves notice to public officers and employees that any violation on their part of any person’s guarantees under the Bill of Rights will meet with final reckoning.R.147 Art. See also MHP Garments. Ponce de Leon that “[p]ublic officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties… [and] the object of [Article 32 of the Civil Code] is to put an end to official abuse by plea of the good faith. 236 SCRA 227. See CIVIL CODE.137[87] The existence of pecuniary injury at bar cannot be denied. We noted in Lim v. 2225. for temperate damages. No. 1001 (1975). The present prayer for temperate damages is premised on the existence of pecuniary injury to petitioner due to the actions of respondents. Still.”135[85] The application of Article 32 not only serves as a measure of pecuniary recovery to mitigate the injury to constitutional rights. 6 March 2009) 139 [89] [88] See CIVIL CODE..

Branch 24. ELISEO SORIANO VS. Private Respondents’ Memorandum. NO. 76.142[92] and the sought for amount of P1 Million is more than appropriate. at 85. supra note 87. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito. G. et al. The assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan City. . J. G. CA. oppressive or malevolent manner. was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan. 26 April 1989.143[3] Forthwith. 2004. all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC).: On August 10. citing Ong Yiu v. masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas. oppressive and malevolent manner. 2009 VELASCO. Leviste. JR. masahol pa sa putang babae yan.141[91] The amount of exemplary damages need not be proved where it is shown that plaintiff is entitled to temperate damages.. Ybañez. Respondent Michael M. WHEREFORE.R. No. Id. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba. o di ba! O. who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark.R.” Octot v. separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L.” Octot v.” Respondents. fraudulent. 142 [92] 143 [3] [91] Patricio v. Galapon and seven other private respondents. the MTRCB sent petitioner a notice of the hearing on August 16. We likewise deem the prayer for P1 Million in attorney’s fees as suitable under the circumstances. sinungaling. at 924. 2004 in relation 140 [Exemplary damages] are an antidote so that the poison of wickedness may not run through the body politic. etc. against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Prior restraint on a TV Program 140[90] BRO. as host of the program Ang Dating Daan. by purposely denying the commercial character of the property in order to deny petitioners’ the exercise of their constitutional rights and their business.. 141 [90] “[The award of exemplary damages] would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton. 82 (1982). manifested bad faith in a wanton. are hereby reversed and set aside. Hon. MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD. made the following remarks: Lehitimong anak ng demonyo.m. before the MTRCB. APRIL 29. at around 10:00 p. the petitions are GRANTED. Gago ka talaga Michael. 197 Phil. petitioner. fraudulent. Sandoval.. aired on UNTV 37. 91 SCRA 223.. L-51832. reckless. Ybañez. 164785. Two days after.148 through the body politic.

at 110. 7. at 112-113. “Ang Dating Daan”. No. in relation to Sec.149[9] Petitioner then filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief. 164785.144[4] After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared. docketed as G. In G. petitioner sought to withdraw147[7] his motion for reconsideration. 2004 episode of Ang Dating Daan. a Decision is hereby rendered. however. at 378. 165636. Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. disposing as follows: WHEREFORE. On September 27. Id. [8] Id. Laguardia and two other members of the adjudication board recuse themselves from hearing the case. at 141-151. petitioner sought reconsideration of the preventive suspension order. No.R. 2004.149 to the alleged use of some cuss words in the August 10. at 152-154. 3. SO ORDERED. the MTRCB issued a decision. 2004. 144 145 146 147 148 149 [4] [5] Id. 164785. Rules of Procedure in the Conduct of Hearing for Violations of PD 1986 and the IRR. Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure. in Adm. Case No. finding respondent Soriano liable for his utterances and thereby imposing on him a penalty of three (3) months suspension from his program.148[8] docketed as G. the MTRCB.R. [9] Id. . followed by the filing with this Court of a petition for certiorari and prohibition. [6] Id.145[5] The same order also set the case for preliminary investigation. 01-04. praying that Chairperson Consoliza P. creating the MTRCB. in accordance with Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree No. by Order of August 16. petitioner raises the following issues: THE ORDER OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION PROMULGATED BY RESPONDENT [MTRCB] DATED 16 AUGUST 2004 AGAINST THE TELEVISION PROGRAM ANG DATING DAAN x x x IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION (A) BY REASON THAT THE [IRR] IS INVALID INSOFAR AS IT PROVIDES FOR THE ISSUANCE OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ORDERS.146[6] Two days after. at 166-252.R. in view of all the foregoing. No. to nullify the preventive suspension order thus issued. The following day. preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days. [7] Id. (PD) 1986.

. IS PATENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ENACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION x x x CONSIDERING THAT: I SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986. DECISION DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 2004 AND ORDER DATED 19 OCTOBER 2004. petitioner relies on the following grounds: SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986. THE [IRR].R. RULES OF PROCEDURE. UNDULY INFRINGES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW. AND III [PD] 1986 IS NOT COMPLETE IN ITSELF AND DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR A SUFFICIENT STANDARD FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION THEREBY RESULTING IN AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY REASON THAT IT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR THE PENALTIES FOR 150 [10] Id.E. SPEECH. No. AND (E) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION. (C) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW.E. ARE LIKEWISE CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AS APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BENCH.150 (B) BY REASON OF LACK OF DUE HEARING IN THE CASE AT BENCH. AND OFFICIAL ACTS OF THE MTRCB PURSUANT THERETO. THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS. CONSEQUENTLY. AS APPLIED TO PETITIONER.. ARE LIKEWISE CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AS APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BENCH. DECISION DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 2004 AND ORDER DATED 19 OCTOBER 2004. II SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986. I. RULES OF PROCEDURE. (D) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION. at 182.150[10] In G. AND EXPRESSION AS IT PARTAKES OF THE NATURE OF A SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT CURTAILING THE SAME. UNDULY INFRINGES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION. CONSEQUENTLY. 165636. AND OFFICIAL ACTS OF THE MTRCB PURSUANT THERETO. AS APPLIED TO PETITIONER. I.

Powers and Functions. although its implementability had already been overtaken and veritably been rendered moot by the equally assailed September 27. 101 SCRA 769. Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative.R. And this authority stems naturally from.R. regulatory. the authority given should be liberally construed. DECISION DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 2004 AND ORDER DATED 19 OCTOBER 2004.E. Petitioner’s contention is untenable. [12] [11] . L-53581-83. as may be conferred by the Constitution or by statute. June 8. and is necessary for the exercise of. the inquiry should be from the law itself. 2004 decision. It is petitioner’s threshold posture that the preventive suspension imposed against him and the relevant IRR provision authorizing it are invalid inasmuch as PD 1986 does not expressly authorize the MTRCB to issue preventive suspension. Sandiganbayan.R. citing Matienzon v. G. But once ascertained as existing. albeit impliedly. 268 SCRA 747.152[12] They have in fine only such powers or authority as are granted or delegated. regarding the assailed order of preventive suspension. 153 [13] Pimentel v.154[14] A perusal of the MTRCB’s basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by the agency of the authority. investigatory. 1988.151 VIOLATIONS OF ITS PROVISIONS. 162 SCRA 1. I. December 19. 164785 We shall first dispose of the issues in G. No.153[13] And in determining whether an agency has certain powers. RULES OF PROCEDURE. 1997. by law. ARE LIKEWISE CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AS APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BENCH151[11] G. Azarcon v. G. delete objectionable portions from and/or prohibit the x x x production. CONSEQUENTLY. at 46. Sec. expressly or impliedly.R. to issue the challenged order of preventive suspension.—The have the following functions. Nos. its power of regulation and supervision. 3 of PD 1986 pertinently provides the following: Section 3. No. x x x exhibition and/or 151 152 BOARD shall Id. COMELEC. Abellera. No. quasi-legislative. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2005). or a mix of the five. powers and duties: xxxx c) To approve or disapprove. THE [IRR]. 164785. 1980. or quasi-judicial. 116033. 77632. 154 [14] Agpalo. No. February 26. AND OFFICIAL ACTS OF THE MTRCB PURSUANT THERETO.

or discipline illusory. and grant. xxxx (d) To supervise. regulate. are objectionable for being immoral. in the judgment of the board applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard. deny or cancel. sale. to the end that no such pictures. reproduced. and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures. the power to issue preventive suspension forms part of the MTRCB’s express regulatory and supervisory statutory mandate and its investigatory and disciplinary authority subsumed in or implied from such mandate. (Emphasis added. television programs and publicity materials subject of the preceding paragraph. programs and materials as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be x x x produced. permits for the x x x exhibition. distributed. xxxx k) To exercise such powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of the purposes and objectives of this Act x x x. supervise. leased. to the end that no such pictures. copying. and grant. regulate. television programs and publicity materials.152 television broadcast of the motion pictures. as quoted above. exhibition. deny or cancel. which empowers the MTRCB to “supervise. . more particularly under its Sec. programs and materials as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be x x x exhibited and/or broadcast by television.) The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within the scope of the MTRCB’s authority and functions expressly set forth in PD 1986. lease. distribution. television programs and publicity materials. or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of wrong or crime such as but not limited to: xxxx vi) Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good name and reputation of any person. Any other construal would render its power to regulate. indecent. permits for the x x x production. 3(d). injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people. which. exhibited and/or broadcast by television. sold. and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures. copied.” Surely. contrary to law and/or good customs. whether living or dead.

Court of Appeals.155[15] And the power to discipline and impose penalties. without more. to prevent further violations as it investigates. Petitioner’s restrictive reading of PD 1986. Chapter XIII of the 2004 IRR merely formalized a power which PD 1986 bestowed.R. would give the agency little leeway to operate. Alonzo v. 97149. 3. Vasquez. such as preventive suspension. limiting the MTRCB to functions within the literal confines of the law. it ought to be noted. would not work to deprive the MTRCB a basic disciplinary tool. being merely a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. the aforequoted Sec. March 31. G. carries with it the power to investigate administrative complaints and. Far from it. the Chairman of the Board may issue a Preventive Suspension Order mandating the preventive x x x suspension of the permit/permits involved. G. PREVENTION SUSPENSION ORDER. No.R. as petitioner insinuates. 116801. Neither did the MTRCB. 3(c) and (d) of PD 1986 finds application to the present case. corollarily. during such investigation. 3(k). Recall that the MTRCB is expressly empowered by statute to regulate and supervise television programs to obviate the exhibition or broadcast of. to the MTRCB’s duty of regulating or supervising television programs. outrun its authority under the law. April 6. The MTRCB did not. when Sec. we reiterate. if granted. G. pending a determination of whether or not there has actually been a violation.––Any time during the pendency of the case.156[16] To reiterate. to preventively suspend the person subject of the complaint. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion. May 10. [16] [15] . No. 244 SCRA 80. 3. 3(k) of PD 1986 clearly intends to grant the MTRCB a wide room for flexibility in its operation. 155 156 Lastimoso v. indecent or immoral materials and to impose sanctions for violations and. imposed pursuant. It is true that the matter of imposing preventive suspension is embodied only in the IRR of PD 1986. 1995. But the mere absence of a provision on preventive suspension in PD 1986. Chapter XIII of the IRR provides: Sec. to repeat. 243 SCRA 497. empower itself to impose preventive suspension through the medium of the IRR of PD 1986. 3 of the IRR neither amended PD 1986 nor extended the effect of the law. is not a penalty by itself. by imposing the assailed preventive suspension.153 Preventive suspension. Sec. Sec. 3. 207 SCRA 689. cable TV station x x x provided that the temporary/preventive order thus issued shall have a life of not more than twenty (20) days from the date of issuance. Sec. stifling and rendering it inutile.R. and in order to prevent or stop further violations or for the interest and welfare of the public. sufficient to authorize the MTRCB’s assailed action. 1992. and/or closure of the x x x television network. among others. on MTRCB. 1995. preventive suspension authority of the MTRCB springs from its powers conferred under PD 1986. Capulong. The preventive suspension was actually done in furtherance of the law. albeit impliedly. 110590. In the final analysis. Beja v. No. Sec.

Espiritu v. supra note 16. preventive suspension shall issue “[a]ny time during the pendency of the case. the power to impose preventive suspension is one of the implied powers of MTRCB. G. in response to a written notice.159[19] proving that he had already appeared before the MTRCB.” Indeed. We cannot agree with petitioner’s assertion that the aforequoted IRR provision on preventive suspension is applicable only to motion pictures and publicity materials. 2007. 164785).R. the suspension of a television program is a far less punitive measure that can be undertaken. 58 SCRA 493. p. February 13. Chapter XIII of the IRR of PD 1986. [17] . Under Sec. Electoral Commission.154 provides. appeared before that Board for a hearing on private respondents’ complaint. Just as untenable is petitioner’s argument on the nullity of the preventive suspension order on the ground of lack of hearing. at 94. 162 [22] Beja. As it were. the MTRCB would regretfully be rendered ineffective should it be subject to the restrictions petitioner envisages. that preventive suspension can validly be meted out even without a hearing. No less than petitioner admitted that the order was issued after the adjournment of the hearing. 158 [18] 63 Phil. What the acronym MTRCB stands for would suggest as much.” In this particular case. Again. he was unable to answer the criticisms coming from the INC ministers. 206 SCRA 256. 12. 161 [21] Id. v.R. 177 (1936).162[22] Petitioner next faults the MTRCB for denying him his right to the equal protection of the law. 497.R. at 761.161[21] At any event. owing to the preventive suspension order. citing Azarcon. No.157[17] As we held in Angara v. Inc. As distinguished from express powers. with the purpose of stopping further violations of PD 1986. 164527. 1974. 1992. National Housing Authority. 295-296. August 21. 160 [20] Id. at 95. “To exercise such powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of the purposes and objectives of this Act x x x. Radio Communications of the Philippines. 530 SCRA 235. arguing that. Melgar. Santiago. 159 [19] Rollo (G. No. 3. every particular power necessary for the exercise of one or the performance of the other is also conferred by necessary implication. 157 Chavez v. it was done after MTRCB duly apprised petitioner of his having possibly violated PD 1986160[20] and of administrative complaints that had been filed against him for such violation. implied powers are those that can be inferred or are implicit in the wordings or conferred by necessary or fair implication of the enabling act. supra note 12. The scope of the MTRCB’s authority extends beyond motion pictures. August 15. G.158[18] Clearly. Nos. when a general grant of power is conferred or a duty enjoined. L-29236 & 29247. No. the power to impose preventive suspension pending investigation is one of the implied or inherent powers of MTRCB. 100874. And while the law makes specific reference to the closure of a television network. 139. the MTRCB handed out the assailed order after petitioner.

R. The equal protection clause demands that “all persons subject to legislation should be treated alike. use language similar to that which he used in his own. The fact that he came out with his statements in a televised bible exposition program does not automatically accord them the character of a religious discourse. No. G. G. shall forever be allowed. 5. 1155 (1957) and other cases. he offers no proof that the said ministers. as hosts of Ang Tamang Daan. nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. Article III of the 1987 Constitution on religious freedom. place himself in the same shoes as the INC ministers.R. who.164[24] Surely. 101 Phil. If the immediate result of the preventive suspension order is that petitioner remains temporarily gagged and is unable to answer his critics. 301 SCRA 278. adding that words like “putang babae” were said in exercise of his religious freedom. The argument has no merit. Petitioner next injects the notion of religious freedom. 127410. citing Ichong v. are. The section reads as follows: No law shall be made respecting the establishment of a religion. PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 274 (2003).155 Petitioner’s position does not persuade. petitioner cannot. [24] [23] . The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship. without discrimination or preference. are not facing administrative complaints before the MTRCB. Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. necessitating the MTRCB’s disciplinary action. in their TV programs. submitting that what he uttered was religious speech. simply too different to even consider whether or not there is a prima facie indication of oppressive inequality. There is nothing in petitioner’s statements subject of the complaints expressing any particular religious belief. and the INC ministers. under like circumstances and conditions both in the privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. this does not become a deprivation of the equal protection guarantee. The Court is at a loss to understand how petitioner’s utterances in question can come within the pale of Sec. Guingona. under the premises. Tiu v. For another. January 20. The Court need not belabor the fact that the circumstances of petitioner. or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. No. 1999. 165636 Petitioner urges the striking down of the decision suspending him from hosting Ang Dating Daan for three months on the main ground that the decision 163 164 1 De Leon.”163[23] It guards against undue favor and individual privilege as well as hostile discrimination. as host of Ang Dating Daan. on the other. Hernandez. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. within the purview of this case. for one. on one hand.

It may be regulated to some extent to serve important public interests. 170 [30] G. It is settled that expressions by means of newspapers. 3(c) in particular. Kalaw Katigbak. Art. Gonzales v. unconstitutional for reasons articulated in this petition. 490. L-69500.167[27] The freedom of expression. or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievance.S..S. some forms of speech are not protected by the Constitution. or subsequent liability. however. Dans. 334 U.” In net effect. enjoying a lesser degree of protection. Eastern Broadcasting Corporation v. Jr. 92 SCRA 476. e. 137 SCRA 628. 165[25] .166[26] Just as settled is the rule that restrictions. 438 U.R. apart from his religious freedom. whether in libel and damage suits. Prior restraint means official government restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. State of New Hampshire. some forms of speech not being protected. 1985. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY 205 (1996). be it in the form of prior restraint. Jr. are anathema to the freedom of expression. No. citing FCC v. 1985. 137 SCRA 717. United States. De Gonzales. cited in Bernas. the constitutional guarantee “obviously was not intended to give immunity for every possible use of language. 168 [28] Lagunsad v.G.171[31] “there are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech that are harmful. 2000. Royo comes this line: “[T]he freedom to express one’s sentiments and belief does not grant one the license to vilify in public the honor and integrity of another. No. 1979. tends to present its own problems in the area of free speech protection. the limits of the freedom of expression are reached when the expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern.. meaning that restrictions on unprotected speech may be US v. 249 U. radio. No. supra note 25. October 30. the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problems. 4. As has been held. which reads: No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech. of all forms of communication. prosecution for sedition. because of its dissimilar presence in the lives of people and accessibility to children. III of the Constitution. L-32066. with broadcast media. his freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Sec. Any sentiments must be expressed within the proper forum and with proper regard for the rights of others. 136185. as with the other freedoms encased in the Bill of Rights. L-59329. 204 (1919). No. August 6. 167 [27] J. of expression.168[28] In the oft-quoted expression of Justice Holmes. television. Bernas. 171[31] 315 U. and motion pictures come within the broad protection of the free speech and expression clause.S. 344 SCRA 481. or of the press. as noted in Chaplinsky v.156 violates. is. Dans. Pacifica Foundation. 568 (1942). 169 [29] Trohwerk v. Paramount Pictures. 726. S.J.”170[30] Indeed.165[25] Each method though. supra at 218.. July 22. 131. 166 [26] Eastern Broadcasting Corporation v. July 19. He would also have the Court declare PD 1986. Soto vda.g. or contempt proceedings.”169[29] From Lucas v. not absolute.S.. its Sec. judicial injunction against publication or threat of cancellation of license/franchise.

taken as a whole. in a patently offensive way. in that context. obscenity or pornography. determining which of the clashing interests should be advanced. December 6. with like effect. political. i. false or misleading advertisement. cited in Bernas. supra note 27. insulting or “fighting words”. no imperative call for the application of the clear and present danger rule or the balancing-of-interest test. In Fernando v. it is.R. . in dealing with or regulating them. The Court rules otherwise. 510 SCRA 351. unprotected speech. artistic. and (c) whether the work. PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 358 (2006). 15. Court of Appeals. and are of such slight social value as a step of truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.157 decreed without running afoul of the freedom of speech clause. Chaplinsky. The Court finds that petitioner’s statement can be treated as obscene. 360-361. at least with respect to the average child. it would be a serious misreading of Miller to conclude that the trier of facts has the unbridled discretion in determining what is “patently offensive. California which established basic guidelines. 159751. Petitioner asserts that his utterance in question is a protected form of speech. to wit: (a) whether to the average person. at 248. Hence. No. applying contemporary standards would find the work. 175 [35] 172[32] Following the contextual lessons of the cited case of Miller v.176[36] a patently offensive utterance would come within the pale of 172[32] 173[33] 175 176 Agpalo. appeals to the prurient interest. supra note 31.”173[33] Being of little or no value..” x x x What remains clear is that obscenity is an issue proper for judicial determination and should be treated on a case to case basis and on the judge’s sound discretion. It has been established in this jurisdiction that unprotected speech or low-value expression refers to libelous statements. [36] 413 U. supra note 27. those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression endangering national security. lacks serious literary.S.174[34] or. 174[34] Bernas. there is. at 248. the Court expressed difficulty in formulating a definition of obscenity that would apply to all cases. sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law. or scientific value. taken as a whole. 2006. [35] G. A speech would fall under the unprotected type if the utterances involved are “no essential part of any exposition of ideas. they being essentially modes of weighing competing values. but nonetheless stated the ensuing observations on the matter: There is no perfect definition of “obscenity” but the latest word is that of Miller v. California. But. (b) whether the work depicts or describes.e.

also without placing the phrase in context. In this particular case. The problem with the challenged statements is that they were uttered in a TV program that is rated “G” or for general viewership. masahol ka pa sa putang babae x x x. then stating that Sandoval was worse than that by using his mouth in a similar manner. o di ba!” may not constitute obscene but merely indecent utterances. they may not appeal to the prurient interests of an adult. missing the context within which it was used. young minds. But while a jurisprudential pattern involving certain offensive utterances . The term “putang babae” means “a female prostitute. the utterances “Gago ka talaga x x x. Even if we concede that petitioner’s remarks are not obscene but merely indecent speech. from their end. we are speaking of the average child. No doubt what petitioner said constitutes indecent or offensive utterances. children could hardly be expected to have the same discernment. and in a time slot that would likely reach even the eyes and ears of children. Children could be motivated by curiosity and ask the meaning of what petitioner said.” making reference to the female sexual organ and how a female prostitute uses it in her trade. “ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba. who could look it up in a dictionary and just get the literal meaning. Without parental guidance. if they take these words literally and use them in their own speech or form their own ideas on the matter. may. when speaking of the average person in the test for obscenity. still the Court rules that petitioner cannot avail himself of the constitutional protection of free speech. While adults may have understood that the terms thus used were not to be taken literally. In this sense. view this kind of indecent speech as obscene. Petitioner further used the terms. the unbridled use of such language as that of petitioner in a television broadcast could corrupt impressionable young minds. where children had the opportunity to hear petitioner’s words. without the guidance of an adult.” a term wholly inappropriate for children. They may be inquisitive as to why Sandoval is different from a female prostitute and the reasons for the dissimilarity. With respect to the young minds. They can be viewed as figures of speech or merely a play on words. not the average adult. we find petitioner’s utterances obscene and not entitled to protection under the umbrella of freedom of speech. Said statements were made in a medium easily accessible to children. and words may convey more than the literal meaning. said utterances are to be treated as unprotected speech. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba. And upon learning the meanings of the words used.158 the term obscenity should it appeal to the prurient interest of an average listener applying contemporary standards. In the context they were used. and may lack the understanding that language may be colorful. Undeniably the subject speech is very suggestive of a female sexual organ and its function as such. The average child may not have the adult’s grasp of figures of speech. [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas. A cursory examination of the utterances complained of and the circumstances of the case reveal that to an average adult.

without restraint on the message of the expression. owing to two special features of the broadcast medium. this case is veritably one of first impression. the broadcast was aired at the time of the day when there was a reasonable risk that children might be in the 177 178 179 180 181 182 [37] [38] 438 U. made the focal point. FCC declared the language used as “patently offensive” and “indecent” under a prohibiting law. Kalaw Katigbak. . in one perspective. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) v. a pervasive medium that. FCC added. Pacifica Foundation. the suspension MTRCB imposed under the premises was. No. second. that its declaratory order was issued in a “special factual context. the US Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. 545 SCRA 441. albeit it did not expound and identify a compelling state interest in putting FCC’s content-based regulatory action under scrutiny. however.159 conveyed in different mediums has emerged.” [41] Supra note 39. A content-based restraint is aimed at the contents or idea of the expression. in gist. Upon the complaint of a man who heard the pre-recorded monologue while driving with his son. within a particular context.S. [39] G. In FCC. place. irresistibly suggesting that. etc. We make this disposition against the backdrop of the following interplaying factors: First. The Court in Chavez181[41] elucidated on the distinction between regulation or restriction of protected speech that is content-based and that which is content-neutral. 2008. to borrow from Gonzales v. and manner of the expression under well-defined standards tailored to serve a compelling state interest. fuck. whereas a content-neutral restraint intends to regulate the time.182[42] easily “reaches every home where there is a set [and where] [c]hildren will likely be among the avid viewers of the programs therein shown”. Acting on the question of whether the FCC could regulate the subject utterance.178[38] and Chavez v. [40] “Shit.R. though not necessarily obscene. Gonzales. tits.177[37] a 1978 American landmark case cited in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation v. piss. Jr. to wit: (1) radio is a pervasive medium and (2) broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children. Dans. With the view we take of the case. it being the first time that indecent speech communicated via television and the applicable norm for its regulation are. [42] Supra note 26. February 15. 168338. to an afternoon radio broadcast when children were undoubtedly in the audience. seven of what were considered “filthy” words180[40] earlier recorded in a monologue by a satiric humorist later aired in the afternoon over a radio station owned by Pacifica Foundation. such indecent speech may validly be categorized as unprotected. Courts subject content-based restraint to strict scrutiny. susceptible to restriction.” referring. ergo. hastened to add that the monologue would be protected speech in other contexts. Supra note 25. permissible restriction. 726. Foremost of these relates to indecent speech without prurient appeal component coming under the category of protected speech depending on the context within which it was made. the indecent speech was made via television. The US Court. in this jurisdiction.179[39] is a rich source of persuasive lessons. however.

488 SCRA 226. by any civilized norm.184[44] advocacy of imminent lawless action. 2d Constitutional Law Sec. L-27833. petitioner’s utterances can be subjected to restraint or regulation. arguably the most permissive of speech tests. Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. as in petitioner’s utterances on a general-patronage rated TV program.R. petitioner uttered his speech on a “G” or “for general patronage” rated program. 169838. said doctrine evolved in the context of prosecutions for rebellion and other crimes involving the overthrow of government.186[46] Under the doctrine. 173034. it may be stated without fear of contradiction that US decisional law goes beyond the aforesaid general exceptions. No. supra. United States. G. would not avail him any relief.160 audience. The doctrine. exclusive or carved in stone. October 9. Kalaw Katigbak. clearly not suitable for children.187[47] It was originally designed to determine the latitude which should be given to speech that espouses anti-government action.S. 27 SCRA 835. No. 188[48] Gonzales v. Schenck v. it may be readily proscribed as unprotected speech.R. supra note 27. as some members of the Court would submit. 249 U.” The words petitioner used were. 493. 1969.188[48] The clear and present danger rule has been Gonzales v. first formulated by Justice Holmes. G. another instance of unprotected speech. 2006. accords protection for utterances so that the printed or spoken words may not be subject to prior restraint or subsequent punishment unless its expression creates a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantial evil which the government has the power to prohibit. and third. 187[47] Bernas.183[43] false or misleading advertisement.” meaning that the “material for television x x x in the judgment of the BOARD. created by the necessity of protecting the welfare of our children. does not contain anything unsuitable for children and minors. No. 47. 2007. 186[46] 16A Am Jur. 184[44] 183[43] .185[45] Petitioner’s invocation of the clear and present danger doctrine. petitioner asserts that his utterances must present a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantive evil the State has a right and duty to prevent and such danger must be grave and imminent. a show for general patronage is “[s]uitable for all ages. Where a language is categorized as indecent. or to have serious and substantial deleterious consequences on the security and public order of the community. and may be viewed without adult guidance or supervision. Ermita. But this list is not. 185 [45] Bayan v. April 18. Health Secretary Francisco T. As it were. A view has been advanced that unprotected speech refers only to pornography. for the application of said test is uncalled for under the premises. Under Sec. As the Court has been impelled to recognize exceptions to the rule against censorship in the past. 535 SCRA 265. Despite the settled ruling in FCC which has remained undisturbed since 1978. and expression endangering national security. As unprotected speech. Without going into specifics. at 219-220. 2(A) of Chapter IV of the IRR of the MTRCB. COMELEC. Duque III. April 25. freedom of speech and of press is susceptible of restriction when and only when necessary to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the government may lawfully protect. this particular case constitutes yet another exception.

undertake the “delicate and difficult task x x x to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of rights x x x. in several cases—Ayer Productions v. In enunciating standard premised on a judicial balancing of the conflicting social values and individual interests competing for ascendancy in legislation which restricts expression. Capulong192[52] and Gonzales v. Supreme Court. G. March 31. at 635. April 29. Since not all evils can be measured in terms of “proximity and degree” the Court. 160 SCRA 861. 2000. G. the clear and present danger test is not a magic incantation that wipes out all problems and does away with analysis and judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims to free speech and which compels a court to release a defendant from liability the moment the doctrine is invoked. therefore. Adiong v. the duty of the courts is to determine which of the two conflicting interests demands the greater protection under the particular circumstances presented. 79690-707 & 80578. 103956. 1992. however. Nos. 1989. February 1. said doctrine is applied to cases involving the overthrow of the government and even other evils which do not clearly undermine national security. elucidated in his Separate Opinion that “where the legislation under constitutional attack interferes with the freedom of speech and assembly in a more generalized way and where the effect of the speech and assembly in terms of the probability of realization of a specific danger is not susceptible even of impressionistic calculation. the clear and present danger doctrine is not the only test which has been applied by the courts. Generally. 170 SCRA 1. January 28. 194 [54] Supra at 898. 191[51] Supra note 25. v. G. the ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. x x x We must. 323 SCRA 811. L-82380. the clear and present danger test “does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums. 190[50] Zaldivar v. 1988. COMELEC.”194[54] then the “balancing of interests” test can be applied. COMELEC. Former Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro.S. 207 SCRA 712.”191[51] To be sure. Briefly stated. 189[49] 189[49] .193[53] applied the balancing of interests test. absent proof of imminent catastrophic disaster. As a standard of limitation on free speech and press. Sandiganbayan.R. No. conditional.161 applied to this jurisdiction.190[50] As we observed in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation. however. 133486.R. The Court explained also in Gonzales v. the court in Douds laid the basis for what has been called the “balancingof-interests” test which has found application in more recent decisions of the U. 192[52] No. and the regulation results in an indirect. No. partial abridgment of speech. 193 [53] Supra note 48.R. COMELEC. COMELEC the “balancing of interests” test: When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order. in Gonzales v. COMELEC.

the balance-of-interests theory rests on the basis that constitutional freedoms are not absolute. “are to be judged in the concrete. whether the restriction is direct or indirect.” a wide range of factors are necessarily relevant in ascertaining the point or line of equilibrium. the assertion by petitioner of his enjoyment of his freedom of speech is ranged against the duty of the government to protect and promote the development and welfare of the youth.J.. to balance one against the other and arrive at a judgment where the greater weight shall be placed. not even those stated in the free speech and expression clause.e. petitioner used indecent and obscene language and a three (3)-month suspension was slapped on him for breach of MTRCB rules. and the social importance and value of the freedom so restricted.162 “balancing” test requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation. on the one hand. Bernas. xxxx Although the urgency of the public interest sought to be secured by Congressional power restricting the individual’s freedom. also cited in J. If.. whether or not the persons affected are few.G. 197 [57] Id. In short. then the court will find the legislation valid. COMELEC.195[55] This balancing of interest test. Among these are (a) the social value and importance of the specific aspect of the particular freedom restricted by the legislation. In this setting. on the other. and the free expression clause affected by it. Supra at 899-900. cited in Gonzales v. the balancing of interest doctrine is the more appropriate test to follow.197[57] To the mind of the Court. THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY (2003). (c) the value and importance of the public interest sought to be secured by the legislation––the reference here is to the nature and gravity of the evil which Congress seeks to prevent. supra note 48. CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 113 (1966). (b) the specific thrust of the restriction. not on the basis of abstractions. on balance. (d) whether the specific restriction decreed by Congress is reasonably appropriate and necessary for the protection of such public interest. Kauper. i. and that they may be abridged to some extent to serve appropriate and important interests. to borrow from Professor Kauper. S. it appears that the public interest served by restrictive legislation is of such nature that it outweighs the abridgment of freedom. In the case at bar. 196[56] 195[55] . and (e) whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.196[56] rests on the theory that it is the court’s function in a case before it when it finds public interests served by legislation.

stable. no less. Moreover. as earlier indicated. imposed the sacred obligation and responsibility on the State to provide protection to the youth against illegal or improper activities which may prejudice their general well-being. the welfare of children and the State’s mandate to protect and care for them. effective.”198[58] Indisputably. the State has a compelling interest in extending social protection to minors against all forms of neglect. at 81. Sec. intellectual. II of the 1987 Constitution. moral. As such. spiritual. one of the fundamental and most vital rights granted to citizens of a State is the freedom of speech or expression. Arrayed against the freedom of speech is the right of the youth to their moral. immorality. It has a compelling interest in helping parents. id.199[59] In the same way. cruelty. and progressive democratic state would be difficult to attain. 13. His statements could have exposed children to a language that is unacceptable in everyday use. [61] Id. No doubt. the Court rules that the government’s interest to protect and promote the interests and welfare of the children adequately buttresses the reasonable curtailment and valid restraint on petitioner’s prayer to continue as program host of Ang Dating Daan during the suspension period. exploitation.201[61] constitute a substantial and compelling government interest in regulating petitioner’s utterances in TV broadcast as provided in PD 1986. Sec. as parens patriae. and social being which the State is constitutionally tasked to promote and protect.163 After a careful examination of the factual milieu and the arguments raised by petitioner in support of his claim to free speech. religious or other forms of discrimination.. a free. 12. exploitation. 13. II. the State is mandated to support parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character. intellectual. explained that the State shall “extend social protection to minors against all forms of neglect. approved on second reading by the Constitutional Commission. to promote and protect the physical. spiritual. Art. and practices which may foster racial.. Art. CONSTITUTION. The Constitution has. without doubt. The Constitution. was easily accessible to the children. in fact enjoins the State. and social well-being of the youth to better prepare them fulfill their role in the field of nationbuilding. 198 199 200 201 [58] [59] Bernas. for without the enjoyment of such right. and immorality which may pollute innocent minds. the State is also mandated to recognize and support the vital role of the youth in nation building as laid down in Sec. The Article on youth. through regulatory mechanisms. protect their children’s minds from exposure to undesirable materials and corrupting experiences. supra note 27. .200[60] Petitioner’s offensive and obscene language uttered in a television broadcast. therefore. [60] Id.

for example. thus: [B]roadcasting is uniquely accessible to children. or a telecast of an Elizabethan comedy. Moreover. Kalaw Katigbak likewise stressed the duty of the State to attend to the welfare of the young: x x x It is the consensus of this Court that where television is concerned. [“Fuck the Draft”]. Other forms of offensive expression may be withheld from the young without restricting the expression at its source. television reaches every home where there is a set. to emphasize the narrowness of our holding. the court takes stock of and cites with approval the following excerpts from FCC: It is appropriate. Children then will likely will be among the avid viewers of the programs therein shown. We have not decided that an occasional 202 [62] Supra note 26. To reiterate. This is so because unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way. We held in Ginsberg v. . might have been incomprehensible to a first grader. a less liberal approach calls for observance. Pacifica’s broadcast could have enlarged a child’s vocabulary in an instant.202[62] The compelling need to protect the young impels us to sustain the regulatory action MTRCB took in the narrow confines of the case. in conclusion. at 729. amply justify special treatment of indecent broadcasting. as a medium of broadcast of a patently offensive speech. it is hardly the concern of the law to deal with the sexual fantasies of the adult population. and (3) the “G” rating of the Ang Dating Daan program. may be prohibited from making indecent material available to children. New York that the government’s interest in the “well-being of its youth” and in supporting “parents’ claim to authority in their own household” justified the regulation of otherwise protected expression. (2) the time of broadcast. The ease with which children may obtain access to broadcast material. It cannot be denied though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young. because of age or interest capacity. Although Cohen’s written message. This case does not involve a two-way radio conversation between a cab driver and a dispatcher. As was observed by Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Jerome Frank. FCC justified the restraint on the TV broadcast grounded on the following considerations: (1) the use of television with its unique accessibility to children. And in agreeing with MTRCB.164 FCC explains the duty of the government to act as parens patriae to protect the children who. Bookstores and motion picture theaters. even those too young to read. are susceptible of being corrupted or prejudiced by offensive language. Gonzales v. coupled with the concerns recognized in Ginsberg.

The time of day was emphasized by the [FFC].) There can be no quibbling that the remarks in question petitioner uttered on prime-time television are blatantly indecent if not outright obscene. The exceptions to prior restraint are movies.” Public interest would be served if the “pig” is reasonably restrained or even removed from the “parlor. One who utters indecent. a “pig in the parlor.” Ergo. It is the kind of speech that PD 1986 proscribes necessitating the exercise by MTRCB of statutory disciplinary powers. After a review of the facts. in the graphic language of FCC. like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard. The concept requires consideration of a host of variables. PD 1986 was passed creating the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television (now MTRCB) and which requires prior permit or license before showing a motion picture or broadcasting a TV program. As Mr. The content of the program in which the language is used will affect the composition of the audience x x x. petitioner’s offensive and indecent language can be subjected to prior restraint. insulting. and radio broadcast censorship in view of its access to numerous people. The power of MTRCB to regulate and even impose some prior restraint on radio and television shows. or offensive words on television when unsuspecting children are in the audience is. the Court finds that what MTRCB imposed on petitioner is an administrative sanction or subsequent punishment for his offensive and obscene language in Ang Dating Daan. albeit indirectly. It is the kind of speech that the State has the inherent prerogative.165 expletive in either setting would justify any sanction. the exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene. to regulate and prevent should such action served and further compelling state interests. To clarify. including the young who must be insulated from the prejudicial effects of unprotected speech. statutes imposing prior restraints on speech are generally illegal and presumed unconstitutional breaches of the freedom of speech. even religious programs. television.’ We simply hold that when the [FCC] finds that a pig has entered the parlor. nay duty. The Board can classify movies and television programs and can cancel permits for exhibition of films or television broadcast. includes prior restraint. x x x The [FFC’s] decision rested entirely on a nuisance rationale under which context is all important. Justice Sutherland wrote a ‘nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place. (Citation omitted. however. Petitioner theorizes that the three (3)-month suspension is either prior restraint or subsequent punishment that. was upheld in Iglesia .

205[65] it was held that the power of review and prior approval of MTRCB extends to all television programs and is valid despite the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution. we are not ready to hold that [PD 1986] is unconstitutional for Congress to grant an administrative body quasi-judicial power to preview and classify TV programs and enforce its decision subject to review by our courts. 544. contrary to law and/or good customs. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. the Court wrote: We thus reject petitioner’s postulate that its religious program is per se beyond review by the respondent Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health. or public welfare. we upheld this setup in Sotto vs. As far back as 1921.”203[63] Bernas adds: Under the decree a movie classification board is made the arbiter of what movies and television programs or parts of either are fit for public consumption. at 235. Supra note 56.” etc. xxx xxxx While the thesis has a lot to commend itself. regardless of its character. insurrection. i. 119673. Persons possess no absolute right to put into the mail anything they please. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation. No. public morals. injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people. all broadcast networks are regulated by the MTRCB since they are required to get a permit before they air their television programs. It decides what movies are “immoral. [65] G. Speaking through Chief Justice Reynato S.. January 17. Moreover. 552. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent.204[64] Moreover.” or “tend to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government and/or duly constituted authorities.e. Court of Appeals. Thus. its decisions are executory unless stopped by a court. 155282. 1996.R. 448 SCRA 575.R. rebellion or sedition. Consequently. July 26. viz: “The use of the mails by private persons is in the nature of a privilege which can be regulated in order to avoid its abuse. No. indecent. . Puno. 259 SCRA 529. their right to enjoy their freedom of speech is subject to that 203 204 205 [63] [64] G.” and what “tend to incite subversion. Ruiz. in MTRCB v.166 Ni Cristo v. 2005.

in MTRCB. among others. the Court. it does not bar future speech of petitioner in other television programs. . 2004 in his television program. It is a sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose under its charter without running afoul of the free speech clause. but for the indecent contents of his utterances in a “G” rated TV program. As FCC teaches. It is definitely a lesser punishment than the permissible cancellation of exhibition or broadcast permit or license. Rather. Tinga. In this scheme. Viewed in its proper context. the suspension meted was simply part of the duties of the MTRCB in the enforcement and administration of the law which it is tasked to implement. the imposition of sanctions on broadcasters who indulge in profane or indecent broadcasting does not constitute forbidden censorship. While not on all fours. chaos would result in the television broadcast industry as competing broadcasters will interfere or co-opt each other’s signals. And the imposition is separate and distinct from the criminal action the Board may take pursuant to Sec.167 requirement. station owners and broadcasters in effect waived their right to the full enjoyment of their right to freedom of speech in radio and television programs and impliedly agreed that said right may be subject to prior restraint—denial of permit or subsequent punishment. it is a permissible subsequent administrative sanction. More importantly.206[66] sustained the power of the MTRCB to penalize a broadcast company for exhibiting/airing a pre206 [66] Supra note 65. program producers. Ang Dating Daan. like suspension or cancellation of permit. the sanction imposed is not per se for petitioner’s exercise of his freedom of speech via television. the suspension is in the nature of an intermediate penalty for uttering an unprotected form of speech. petitioner is deemed to have yielded his right to his full enjoyment of his freedom of speech to regulation under PD 1986 and its IRR as television station owners. the suspension sought to penalize past speech made on prime-time “G” rated TV program. As lucidly explained by Justice Dante O. it should not be confused with a prior restraint on speech. Neither can petitioner’s virtual inability to speak in his program during the period of suspension be plausibly treated as prior restraint on future speech. Lest it be overlooked. if applicable. The three (3) months suspension in this case is not a prior restraint on the right of petitioner to continue with the broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as a permit was already issued to him by MTRCB for such broadcast. The stations explicitly agreed to this regulatory scheme. otherwise. 3(i) of PD 1986 and the remedies that may be availed of by the aggrieved private party under the provisions on libel or tort. government regulations through the MTRCB became “a necessary evil” with the government taking the role of assigning bandwidth to individual broadcasters. and hosts have impliedly accepted the power of MTRCB to regulate the broadcast industry. In fine. For viewed in its proper perspective. the suspension is in the form of permissible administrative sanction or subsequent punishment for the offensive and obscene remarks he uttered on the evening of August 10.

A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be. and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance . petitioner argues that there has been undue delegation of legislative power.” The MTRCB. as PD 1986 does not provide for the range of imposable penalties that may be applied with respect to violations of the provisions of the law. must have the wherewithal to enforce its mandate. the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. the Court discussed the matter of undue delegation of legislative power in the following wise: It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government. In Edu v. who is to do it. Finally. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power. It behooves the Court to respond to the needs of the changing times. considering the ease with which they can be accessed. that the MTRCB would be crossing the limits of its authority were it to regulate and even restrain the prime-time television broadcast of indecent or obscene speech in a “G” rated program is not acceptable. Ericta. and what is the scope of his authority. and does not constitute prohibited prior restraint. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them. which would not be effective if its punitive actions would be limited to mere fines.168 taped TV episode without Board authorization in violation of Sec. The argument is without merit. that may indeed be the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. however. subject to the exception that local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. which constitutionally may not be done. “the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media. as a regulatory agency. For a complex economy. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done. Any simplistic suggestion. The prevention of the broadcast of petitioner’s television program is justified. and violations of the regulations must be met with appropriate and proportional disciplinary action. and craft jurisprudence to reflect these times. The suspension of a violating television program would be a sufficient punishment and serve as a deterrent for those responsible. As made clear in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation. 7 of PD 1986. Television broadcasts should be subject to some form of regulation.

prescribing a schedule of penalties for violation of the provisions of the decree. or canceling permits for the exhibition and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures. and disciplinary power would surely be a meaningless grant if it did not carry with it the power to penalize the supervised or the regulated as may be proportionate to the offense committed. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability. penalties for violators of PD 1986. and publicity materials to the end that no such objectionable pictures. 35 SCRA 481. and proved. the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.” As earlier explained. His thesis is that MTRCB. is charged with supervising and regulating. by express and direct conferment of power and functions. Thereafter. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. and materials shall be exhibited and/or broadcast by television. maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. marks its limits. the investiture of supervisory. the MTRCB. Otherwise. the first assumption being that PD 1986 does not prescribe the imposition of.207[67] Based on the foregoing pronouncements and analyzing the law in question. charged. to which no valid objection can be made. 3(k) of the decree authorizing the MTRCB “to exercise such powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of the purpose and objectives of [the law]. programs. Complementing this provision is Sec. denying. there must be a standard. As earlier indicated. regulatory. granting. As the Court said in Chavez v. October 24. which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation. went beyond the terms of the law. L-32096. every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. television programs. National Housing Authority: x x x [W]hen a general grant of power is conferred or duty enjoined. or authorize the MTRCB to impose. however. . 496-497. the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. x x x [W]hen the statute does not specify the particular method to be followed or used by a government agency in the exercise of the power vested in 207 [67] No. petitioner’s protestation about undue delegation of legislative power for the sole reason that PD 1986 does not provide for a range of penalties for violation of the law is untenable. 1970.169 of the law. Petitioner’s posture is flawed by the erroneous assumptions holding it together. in promulgating the IRR of PD 1986.

92285. In Sec. contrary to law and/or good customs.] x x x” and apply the sanctions it deems proper. [68] . The MTRCB cannot shirk its responsibility to regulate the public airwaves and employ such means as it can as a guardian of the public. citing Angara v. and publicity materials “applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard. said agency has the authority to adopt any reasonable method to carry out its function.––Without prejudice to the immediate filing of the appropriate criminal action and the immediate seizure of the pertinent articles pursuant to Section 13. in the final analysis.R. Inc. Jr. The MTRCB may evaluate motion pictures. Batario. 1 of the IRR providing: Section 1. 1994.” And Chapter XIII. any violation of PD 1986 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations governing motion pictures. Contrary to what petitioner implies. In the meantime the existing revised Table of Administrative Penalties shall be enforced. along with the standards to be applied to determine whether there have been statutory breaches. provides that agency with the power “[to] promulgate such rules and regulations as are necessary or proper for the implementation of this Act. 63 Phil. television programs. determine whether these audio and video materials “are objectionable for being immoral. VIOLATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS. March 28. And would it not be logical too to say that the power to deny or cancel a permit for the exhibition of a TV program or broadcast necessarily includes the lesser power to suspend? The MTRCB promulgated the IRR of PD 1986 in accordance with Sec. 3(c). and related promotional materials shall be penalized with suspension or cancellation of permits and/or licenses issued by the Board and/or with the imposition of fines and other administrative penalty/penalties.170 it by law. 139 (1936). [etc. 3(a) which. no more than a measure to specifically implement the aforequoted provisions of Sec. The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the enforcement 208 Supra note 17. No. it stands to reason that the power of the MTRCB to regulate and supervise the exhibition of TV programs carries with it or necessarily implies the authority to take effective punitive action for violation of the law sought to be enforced.) This is.” and. Electoral Commission. television programs. The Board recognizes the existing Table of Administrative Penalties attached without prejudice to the power of the Board to amend it when the need arises.. Provident Tree Farms. (Emphasis added. for reference. 3(d) and (k). Sec. G. and the accomplishment of its purposes and objectives x x x. from there.208[68] Given the foregoing perspective. v. one can already find the permissible actions of the MTRCB. indecent. 231 SCRA 463. the IRR does not expand the mandate of the MTRCB under the law or partake of the nature of an unauthorized administrative legislation.

and indicates the necessity to carefully scrutinize acts that may restrain or regulate speech. its decision to suspend petitioner must be modified. 3 nor in the MTRCB Schedule of Administrative Penalties effective January 1. for nowhere in that issuance. the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations. does not lend itself to acceptance in this jurisdiction. particularly the power-defining Sec. 1999 is the Board empowered to suspend the program host or even to prevent certain people from appearing in television programs. to be sure. what petitioner obviously advocates is an unrestricted speech paradigm in which absolute permissiveness is the norm. The MTRCB cannot extend its exercise of regulation beyond what the law provides. but it may not suspend television personalities. No. To say “any act that restrains speech should be greeted with furrowed brows” is not to say that any act that restrains or regulates speech or expression is per se invalid. 209[69] 209 210 211 [69] [70] People v. by way of an appropriate issuance. 79 SCRA 450. 1977. In ending. L-32166. administrative penalties with due regard for the severity of the offense and attending mitigating or aggravating circumstances. under the guise of free speech. But even as we uphold the power of the MTRCB to review and impose sanctions for violations of PD 1986. for such would be beyond its jurisdiction. [71] Id. . Thus. would be consistent with its mandate to effectively and efficiently regulate the movie and television industry.”211[71] Allowing the MTRCB some reasonable elbow-room in its operations and. The suspension should cover only the television program on which petitioner appeared and uttered the offensive and obscene language. the reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the person charged with violating the statute and for whom the penalty is sought. which sanction is what the law and the facts obtaining call for. Only persons. according it ample latitude in fixing. and penalties clearly falling clearly within the letter and spirit of PD 1986 will be considered to be within the decree’s penal or disciplinary operation. October 18. Petitioner’s flawed belief that he may simply utter gutter profanity on television without adverse consequences. offenses. 01-04 dated September 27. This only recognizes the importance of freedoms of speech and expression. And when it exists. as the case may be. Maceren. in the exercise of its statutory disciplinary functions. and the increased difficulty of administering the law. Id.210[70] Administrative regulations or “subordinate legislation” calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of “the growing complexity of modern life. 2004 and the subsequent order issued pursuant to said decision must be modified. may prohibit the broadcast of such television programs or cancel permits for exhibition. the MTRCB’s decision in Administrative Case No. We repeat: freedoms of speech and expression are not absolute freedoms. 458. The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the non-delegation of legislative powers.171 of a particular statute. The MTRCB.

imprisonment or damages libelous language already uttered or published. of expression. in view of all the foregoing. imposing a penalty of THREE (3) MONTHS SUSPENSION on the television program. Indeed. both our libel and tort laws never impose a gag order on future expression because that will constitute prior restraint or censorship. subject of the instant petition.”212[1] The remedy of any aggrieved person is to file a libel or tort case after the utterance or publication of such cusswords. I dissent because the three-month suspension of petitioner’s TV program Ang Dating Daan constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on freedom of expression. or as a punishment for past libelous utterance or publication. 2004 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION of limiting the suspension to the program Ang Dating Daan.172 WHEREFORE.213[2] Our tort laws also allow recovery of damages for tortious speech already uttered or published. Article 33. or anyone else. Civil Code. The suspension prevents petitioner from even reciting the Lord’s Prayer. or even saying “hello” to viewers. Revised Penal Code. Article III. Such suspension is the censorship that the Constitution outlaws when it states that “[n]o law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech. Constitution.” This is also similar to suspending for three months the column of a newspaper columnist for using the expletive “putang ina mo” in his column. wishes to discuss in petitioner’s TV program. many of the radio and TV political programs will have to be banned for the frequent use of 212 [1] Section 4. a Decision is hereby rendered. the fallo of the MTRCB shall read as follows: WHEREFORE. 01-04 dated September 27. or of the press x x x. Case No.214[3] However. 214 [3] Article 26. our libel and tort laws do not allow the filing of a suit to enjoin or punish an expression that has yet to be uttered or written. Justice Antonio Carpio. . Thus. Our libels laws punish with fine. As thus modified. whether for fear of possible libelous utterance or publication. The suspension bars the public airing of petitioner’s TV program regardless of whatever subject matter petitioner. 213 [2] Article 353-359. in his TV program. Civil Code. DISSENTING OPINION. Otherwise. Ang Dating Daan. This is like suspending the publication of the Philippine Daily Inquirer for three months if its editorial describes a private person as “masahol pa sa putang babae. there can never be a prior restraint on future expression. the decision of the MTRCB in Adm.

216 [5] Gonzales v. Prior Restraint on Expression The well-settled rule is there can be no prior restraint on expression. The Government has no power under the Constitution to so brazenly suppress freedom of expression. In the present case.R. Kalaw-Katigbak. 173034. such prior restraint must hurdle a high barrier. Although pornography. The public airing of the entire TV program. or even from talking about nothingness. 535 SCRA 265.217[6] advocacy of imminent lawless action. or of the press x x x. namely: pornography. 222 Phil.” The history of freedom of expression has been a constant struggle against the censor’s prior restraint on expression.219[8] Only in these instances may expression be subject to prior restraint. or from talking about the birds and the bees. Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. in his TV program. advocacy of imminent lawless action. 222 Phil. because politicians often use cusswords and other profanities during political rallies. is totally suppressed for three months. however. This Court should never give its imprimatur to such a blatant violation of a fundamental constitutional right. 697 (1931). false or misleading advertisement. and expression endangering national security may be subject to prior restraint. or the rallies themselves will have to be banned.173 cusswords and other libelous language. 218 [7] Eastern Broadcasting Corporation v.S.216[5] false or misleading advertisement. 219 [8] Id. In this jurisdiction.218[7] and danger to national security. 225 (1985). such prior restraint is strongly presumed as 215 [4] 283 U. The leading American case of Near v. No. No. This well-settled rule. the three-month preventive suspension of petitioner’s TV program bars petitioner from talking about the weather. 151 (1985). human and political rights possible. which has been described as the one basic right that makes all other civil. First. Even politicians will have to be barred from addressing political rallies. All other expression is not subject to prior restraint. we recognize only four exceptions. Minnesota215[4] teaches us that the primordial purpose of the Free Expression Clause is to prevent prior restraint on expression. 217 [6] 9 October 2007. is subject to exceptions narrowly carved out by courts over time because of necessity. . This rule emanates from the constitutional command that “[n]o law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech. G. regardless of its content. of expression. Dans. Duque III.

” However. 221 [10] Bayan v. 222 [11] Section 11(2). Nos. the government bears a heavy burden of justifying such prior restraint. The expression subject to prior restraint must present a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantive evil the State has a right and duty to prevent. Revised Penal Code.221[10] The power of Congress to impose prior restraint on false or misleading advertisements emanates from the constitutional provision that the “advertising industry is impressed with public interest. No.”222[11] Prior restraint on expression may be either content-based or contentneutral. United States. Ermita.223[12] false or misleading advertisement. 25 April 2006. of expression.220[9] The test to determine the constitutionality of prior restraint on pornography. 259 SCRA 529. Constitution. Thus. advocacy of imminent lawless action. and such danger must be grave and imminent.224[13] advocacy of 220 [9] New York Times v. or of the press x x x. acts of pornography. 169848 and 169881. . Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) v. 26 July 1996. 403 U. Courts subject content-based restraint to strict scrutiny. G. 224 [13] Section 6(a). If a certain expression is subject to prior restraint. 223 [12] Article 201. place or manner of expression in public places without any restraint on the content of the expression.174 unconstitutional. its utterance or publication in violation of the lawful restraint naturally subjects the person responsible to subsequent punishment. courts again have carved out narrow exceptions to this rule out of necessity.S. 488 SCRA 226. Article XVI. 119673. and expression endangering national security is the clear and present danger test. 713 (1971). This rule also emanates from the constitutional command that “[n]o law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech.R.R. Subsequent Punishment of Expression The rule is also well-settled that expression cannot be subject to subsequent punishment. Content-based prior restraint is aimed at suppressing the message or idea contained in the expression. and shall be regulated by law for the protection of consumers and the promotion of the general welfare. The exceptions start with the four types of expression that may be subject to prior restraint. G. Content-neutral restraint on expression is restraint that regulates the time. Milk Code. 169838. Courts subject contentneutral restraint to intermediate scrutiny. Court of Appeals. Second.

Revised Penal Code.” when not directed at any particular person. has far graver ramifications than any possible subsequent punishment of petitioner. Fighting words refer to profane or vulgar words that are likely to provoke a violent response from an audience. and endangering national security. are all punishable under the law. Prior restraint is more deleterious to freedom of expression than subsequent punishment. Thus. Profane or vulgar words like “Fuck the draft.S. Prior restraint prevents even the dissemination of ideas to the public. 226 [15] Article 138. Revised Penal Code. being a prior restraint on expression. and tortious speech. may be subject to subsequent punishment. still the ideas are disseminated to the public. civilly or criminally. however. per se. the threemonth suspension of petitioner’s TV program. 403 U.”231[20] If profane or vulgar language like “Fuck the draft” is not subject to subsequent punishment.227[16] which includes libel and slander. then it may be subject to prior restraint because it is seditious229[18] but not because it is defamatory or tortious. 15 (1971). an expression cannot be subject to prior restraint because such expression is not unlawful or illegal. ethnic or religious group. 229 [18] Articles 138 and 142. “one man’s vulgarity may be another man’s lyric. . 227 [16] See note 2. are not subject to prior restraint because by definition they do not constitute a clear and present danger to the State that is grave and imminent. 230 [19] Cohen v. Although subsequent punishment also deters expression. then with more reason it cannot be subject to prior restraint.imminent lawless action. Revised Penal Code. 231 [20] Id. Fighting words are not subject to subsequent punishment unless they are defamatory or tortious. Defamation and tortious conduct. Without a law punishing the actual utterance or publication of an expression. 228 [17] See note 3.228[17] Defamatory and tortious speech. are not subject to subsequent punishment. Three-Month Suspension is a Prohibited Prior Restraint 225 [14] Article 142. Once defamatory or tortuous speech rises to the level of advocacy of imminent lawless action. California. 225[14] 226[15] 175 Two other exceptions are defamation.230[19] As aptly stated.

Obviously. The respondents have not presented any credible justification to overcome the strong presumption of unconstitutionality accorded to the three-month suspension order. which imposes a prior restraint on expression. Thus. false or misleading advertisement. The three-month suspension cannot be passed off merely as a preventive suspension that does not partake of a penalty. namely. masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. advocacy of imminent lawless action. is totally bereft of any discussion that petitioner’s ranting poses a clear and present danger to the State that is grave and imminent. Even Congress cannot validly pass a 232 [21] See note 9. false or misleading advertisement. During the three-month suspension. Any prior restraint is strongly presumed to be unconstitutional and the government bears a heavy burden of justifying such prior restraint. advocacy of imminent lawless action. What respondents assail is the following ranting of petitioner: Lehitimong anak ng demonyo. sinungaling. A prior restraint may be justified only if the expression falls under any of the four types of expression that may be subject to prior restraint.232[21] Such prior restraint must pass the clear and present danger test. or danger to national security. they do not constitute pornography. masahol pa sa putang babae yan. [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas. The majority opinion. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. what petitioner uttered does not fall under any of the four types of expression that may be subject to prior restraint. pornography. and danger to national security. profane or vulgar petitioner’s words may be. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito… No matter how offensive. petitioner’s offensive. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba. The actual and real effect of the three-month suspension is a prior restraint on expression in violation of a fundamental constitutional right. Gago ka talaga Michael. . o di ba! O.176 The three-month suspension of petitioner’s TV program is indisputably a prior restraint on expression. petitioner cannot utter a single word in his TV program because the program is totally suppressed. profane or vulgar language cannot be subject to prior restraint but may be subject to subsequent punishment if defamatory or tortious.

Freedman vs. GR No. or of the press. of expression. partial abridgment of speech. supra 3. such law would be “abridging the freedom of speech. Maryland. neither can respondent MTRCB promulgate a rule or a decision suspending for three months petitioner’s constitutional right to freedom of expression. and the regulation results in an indirect.) Read: . the duty of the courts is to determine which of the 2 conflicting interests demand greater protection under the circumstances presented. Gonzales vs. Cabansag vs. Read again Zaldivar vs. 380 U. 102 Phil. Congress may pass a law punishing defamation or tortious speech but the punishment cannot be the suspension or suppression of the constitutional right to freedom of expression. In short. 697 4. The balancing-of-interest test (When a particular conduct is regulated in the interest of the public order. 51 8. City of Chicago. 365 U. Congress may punish such offensive or vulgar language. 80578. Read: 1. Otherwise. U.S. Zaldivar vs. Dangerous tendency rule (If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the State has the right to prevent. Minnesota.177 law imposing a three-month preventive suspension on freedom of expression for offensive or vulgar language uttered in the past. Gonzales. 152 2. conditional.S.S. after their utterance. 137 SCRA 717 2. Clear and present danger and dangerous tendency rule (whether the words used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the State has the right to prevent) 7-a. And of course. fine or imprisonment but Congress has no power to suspend or suppress the people’s right to speak freely because of such past utterances. 403 U. Times Film vs. then such words are punishable) Read: 1. 283 U. Sandiganbayan. February 1. with damages. Read again the Reyes and Ruiz cases.S. 43 5. 1989 7960-707& 8. Near vs. 713 (Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its validity) 3. GR No..S.” If Congress cannot pass such a law. Kalaw Katigbak. New York Times vs. neither can this Court give its stamp of imprimatur to such an unconstitutional MTRCB rule or decision. Fernandez.

492 SCRA 1 (Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration). New York. Respondent is the Court interpreter of RTC Branch 253. Lagunzad vs. Las Pinas City.S. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship. J. Gitlow vs. No law shall be made respecting the establishment of religion. SOLEDAD ESCRITOR. JUAN PONCE ENRILE. without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed. Complainant requested for an investigation of respondent for living with a man not her husband while she was still legally married and having borne a child within this live-in arrangement. Jr. 160 SCRA 861 Read also: 1.. ESTRADA VS. ET AL. 268 U. 92 SCRA 476 2.THE NON-ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION CLAUSE Section 5. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. Estrada believes that Escritor is committing a grossly immoral act which tarnishes the image of the judiciary. 652. 408 SCRA 1 Puno. including test by Justice Holmes 3.178 AYER PRODUCTION VS. . more than 20 years ago when her husband was still alive but living with another woman. She likewise admitted having a son with Quilapio but denies any liability for alleged grossly immoral conduct because: • She is a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower Society. Respondent admitted she started living with Luciano Quilapio. Gonzales. See also Zaldivar case above the criticism on this CHAPTER VI . thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. • That the conjugal arrangement was in conformity with their religious beliefs. JUDGE CAPULONG. or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.

man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite. -A profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator. and so the stateinterest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. “Strong fences make good neighbors”. the Buddhists espouses a way of life without reference to an omnipotent God.179 • That the conjugal arrangement with Quilapio has the approval of her congregation. Escritor likewise claimed that she had executed a “DECLARATION OF PLEDGING FAITHFULNESS” in accordance with her religion which allows members of the Jehovah’s witnesses who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations. worship or conduct. often involving a code of ethics and philosophy. the Church is likewise barred from meddling in purely secular matters. HELD: Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to religion. FREEDOM OF RELIGION -any specific system of belief. In the absence of a showing that the state interest exists. The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms---including religious freedom---may be enjoyed. The Declaration thus makes the resulting union moral and binding within the congregation all over the world except in countries where divorce is allowed. Escritor was therefore held not administratively liable for grossly immoral conduct. The idea is to delineate the boundaries between two institutions and prevent encroachments by one against the other. It is not only the State that is prohibited from interfering in purely ecclesiastical affairs. The doctrine cuts both ways. NON-STABLISHMENT CLAUSE: . MAN STANDS ACCOUNTABLE TO AN AUTHORITY HIGHER THAN THE STATE. IN THE AREA OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISE AS A PREFERRED FREEDOM. HOWEVER. The existence of a Divine being is not necessarily inherent in religion.

(LEMON VS. that the State cannot openly or secretly participate in the affairs of any religious organization or group and vice versa” (EVERSON VS. 403 US 602) The government is neutral and while protecting all. 374 US 203 It is unconstitutional for a law to require that at least 10 verses from the Holy Bible be read daily without comment because the same constitute a religious exercise which violates the non-establishment clause. FREEDOM OF RELIGION INCLUDES FREEDOM FROM RELIGION. its principal or primary effect is one that neither advances nor inhibits religion. 392 US 236 A law requiring the Board of Education to lend textbooks free of charge to all students from grades 7-12 of parochial school. “All” here applies both to the believer and the non-believer. nor pass laws which aids one religion. VITALE. SCHOOL PRAYER CASE (ENGEL VS. “It is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American People. 370 US 421) It is unconstitutional for a school to require the students to recite a prayer composed by the Board of Regents at the starts of the day’s class. it prefers none and disparages none. aid all religion. 330 US 1) This clause seeks to protect: Voluntarism---must come into existence through the voluntary support of its members. BOARD OF EDUCATION VS. . Insulation from political process—growth through voluntary support of its members will not take place if there is intervention from the State. THE RIGHT TO WORHIP INCLUDES THE RIGHT NOT TO WORSHIP. and it does not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. BOARD OF EDUCATION.” SCHOOL DISTRICT OF ABINGTON VS. or prefer one religion over another nor force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his will. KURTZMAN. or force him to profess a belief or disbelief. There will be no violation of the non-establishment clause if: the statute has a secular legislative purpose.180 It simply means “that the State cannot set up a church. ALLEN. This is constitutional since it is not the parochial school which gets the benefits but the parents. SCHEMPP.

1676 Avoiding military duties based on religious grounds is not allowed in the Philippines because of Section 4. In the second. the State may call all citizens to render military or civil service. such freedom is absolute. Read: 1. 64 Phil. Freedom to believe. This is so because religious freedom can be exercised only with due regard to the rights of others. He may indulge in his own theories about life and death. or none at all. He may not be punished even if he cannot prove what he believes. Estenzo. Freedom to act. Aglipay vs. 330 US 1 The law authorizing reimbursement of transportation expenses of school children going to and from parochial schools is not violative of the nonestablishment clause because it will be the parents who get benefits. BOARD OF EDUCATION. 106 SCRA 1 contracts and the . Religious freedom in relation to impairment of right to join associations. worship any god he chooses. 38 O. INK vs. IN the first. 325 US 561 The act of the Illinois Supreme Court denying admission to the bar because of his refusal to take in good faith an oath to support the Constitution of the State of Illinois which requires mandatory service in the military in times of war was reversed by the US Supreme Court stating that this constitutes a violation of the 1st Amendment which guarantees religious freedom. 104 SCRA 510 3. if the individual externalizes what he believes. 201 2. Gironella. Example: “Go forth and multiply---cannot marry several times just to comply. not the parochial school.G. RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS PROFESSION AND WORSHIP HAS TWO ASPECTS: a. Article II—The state is the protector of the people and it is the prime duty of the people to defend the State and in the fulfillment of this duty. Ruiz. PEOPLE VS. his freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State. and b.181 EVERSON VS.36 SCRA 445 2. IN RE SUMMERS. Garces vs. LAGMAN & ZOSA. 1.

Pamil vs. City of Manila. 1955 of the DECS making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions. 1978 7. March 1. Facts: -----1. 150 (1960) where the SC held that: . 101 5. 11 6. Secretary of Education. The petitioners are high school and grade schools students enrolled in the different public schools of the Province of Cebu and who belong to the religious group known as the Jehovah's Witnesses. November 20. Secretary of Education. 110 Phil. 106 Phil. saluting the Philippine Flag and reciting the patriotic pledge because they considered the flag as an image and they should not worship it except GOD. Gerona vs. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU. Hence this petition. Issue: -----May the petitioners be expelled for refusing to salute the flag. 59 SCRA 54 7. That because of their refusal to perform the foregoing acts as required by RA 1265 of July 11. recite the patriotic pledge or sing the national anthem in order to follow their religious beliefs? Held: The same issue was raised in Gerona vs. 8 dated July 21. J.182 4. 1993 Grino--Aquino. of Education. 398 ROEL EBRALINAG. Sec. 135 SCRA 514 Phil. 1955 and by Department Order No. 3. Barangan. they were expelled by the respondent school authorities. 2 (1959) and Balbuna vs. 2. That they rrefused to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing by a band or singing the Philippine National Anthem. 106 Phil. Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope. ET AL VS. American Bible Society vs. German vs. Teleron.

135 SCRA 530). vis. RA 1265 was likewise incorporated in Executive Order No. III. of a serious evil to public safety. an emblem of national sovereignty. that the State has the right and duty to presvent. the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Baranagan) is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent. we upheld the exemption of the members of the Iglesia ni Kristo from the . Barangan.. Absent such a threat to public safety. 1987 Constitution). public health or any other legitimate public interest. of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. during flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one's job or be expelled in school. 297. IS ALIEN TO THE CONSCIENCE OF THE PRESENT GENERATION OF FILIPINOS WHO CUT THEIR TEETH ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS WHICH GUARANTEES THEIR RIGHTS TO FREE SPEECH AND THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGIOUS PROFESSION AND WORSHIP (Section 5. 59 SCRA 54. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights. for it involves the relationship of man and his Creator (Chief Justice Fernando's separate opinion in German vs. Our task is extremely difficult for the 30-year old decision of this Court in GERONA upholding the salute law and approving the expulsion of students who refuse to obey it. Art. September 21. and recite the patriotic pledge. Elizalde Rope Workers Union. In Victoriano vs. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.183 The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines. freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom (according the Former Chief justice Teehankee in his dissenting opinion in German vs. is not lightly to be trifled with. The right to religious profession has a two-fold aspect. The law. the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified since they are not doing anything that could warrant their expulsion since during flag ceremonies. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of the thought. The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag. sing the national anthem. Under a system of complete separation of church and state in the government. 1988. they just quietly stand at attention to show their respect for the rights of others who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. public morals.

public safety. however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others CHAPTER VII . and/or • Prohibited from using any cellular phones. We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect to their religious beliefs. The constitutional as well as human right to travel. as may be provided by law. or other means of communications with people outside their residence.184 coverage of the closed-shop agreement between the labor union and the company because it would violate the teaching of their church not to join any labor group.THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TRAVEL Section 6. without the authorization of the court. Upon application of the prosecutor. or the dismissal of the case filed against him. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. shall be deemed a violation of the terms and conditions of the bail which shall then be forfeited as provided in the Rules of Court. the suspect’s right to travel shall be limited to the municipality or city where he resides or where the case is pending. Travel outside of said municipality or city. computers. • Restricted from traveling. NOTE: THE APPLICABLE PROVISION OF THE HUMAN SECURITY ACT ON THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL Section 26 provides that persons who have been charged with terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism---even if they have been granted bail because evidence of guilt is not strong—can be: • Detained under house arrest. in the interest of national security and public safety. These restrictions shall be terminated upon acquittal of the accused. or public health. 1. or earlier upon the discretion of the court or upon motion of the prosecutor. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security. 129 SCRA .

Nor may the President impair the right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except in the interest of national security. NO. G. VS. 88211. No person shall be deprived of life liberty or property without due process of law. AND TO RETURN TO HIS COUNTRY. This is a petition for mandamus and prohibition asking the Supreme Court to Order the respondents to issue travel documents to the petitioners and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Read: FERDINAND MARCOS. 1989 and the Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration dated October 27. HON. public safety or public health.185 2. 13 (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state. RAUL MANGLAPUS. September 15. . liberty of abode and "right to return" En banc Cortes. as may be provided by law. 1989 right to travel..R. the petitioners claim that under international law. The case for the petitioners is founded on the assertion that their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed by the following provisions of the Constitution: Section 1. The petitioners contend that the President has no power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only the Courts may do so "within the limits prescribed by law". particularly the Universal Declaration of Humjan Rights guaranteed the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines. Thus: Art. J. ET AL. (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country. nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws. including his own. ET AL. Also. Section 6.

Issue: Whether or not. Furthermore. a totally distinct right under international law. they argue that the right of the state to national security prevails over individual rights. the right to return to one's country. the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Essentially. though related to the right to travel. the right to leave a country and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines. public welfare or public health. in the exercise of the powers granted in the Constitution. And if she has made that finding. The sub-issues. citing Section 4. Assuming that the President has the power to bar former Pres. These are what the right to travel connote. public safety or public health. under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. . The respondents argue that the issue in this case involves a political question which is therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the Court.186 Likewise. II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Is this a political question? 2. Art. Does the President have the power to bar the Marcoses to return to the Philippines? a. which had been ratified by the Philippines. even the Universal declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of the state. are: 1. independent from. have the requirements of due process been complied with in making such finding? Has there been prior notice to the petitioners? Held: It must be emphasized that the individual right involved in this case is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. Thus. 12 4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country. provides: Art. in the interest of national security. has the President made a finding that the return of the petitioners to the Philippines is a clear and present danger to national security. which could help in the determination of the main issue.

etc. . If he comes home. Feliciano. separatist movement in Mindanao. the issue involved in the case at bar is not political in nature since under Section 1. Narvasa. UNDER OUR CONSTITUTION. Gancayco. Seven justices filed separate dissenting opinions (Gutierrez. BUT IT IS OUR WELL-CONSIDERED VIEW THAT THE RIGHT TO RETURN MAY BE CONSIDERED AS A GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. Jr. With these before her. Grino-Aquino. The court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged by the insurgency. Art. Paras. The power involved is the President's RESIDUAL POWER to protect the general welfare of the people. Lastly. Cruz. To the President. Melencio-Herrera.. With all due respect for the majority in the Court that the main issue in this case is not one of power but one on RIGHTS.187 THE RIGHT TO RETURN TO ONE'S COUNTRY IS NOT AMONG THE RIGHTS SPECIFICALLY GUARANTEED BY THE BILL OF RIGHTS. *********************** Gutierrez. capriciously and whimsically. Bidin and Sarmiento). J. WHICH TREATS ONLY OF THE LIBERTY OF ABODE AND THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL." NOTE: The main opinion was concurred in by 7 justices (CJ Fernan. Jr. VIII of the Constitution. BUT THE DENIAL OF TRAVEL PAPERS IS NOT ONE OF THOSE POWERS BECAUSE THE BILL OF RIGHTS SAY SO. rightist conspiracies to grab power.. the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily. Padilla. the government has the power to arrest and punish him but does it have the power to deny him his right to come home and die among familiar surroundings? x x x The government has more than ample powers under existing laws to deal with a person who transgresses the peace and imperils public safety. the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. Medialdea and Regalado) or a total of 8 justices in voting in favor of DISMISSING the petition.. IS PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND. THERE IS NO LAW PRESCRIBING EXILE IN FOREIGN LAND AS THE PENALTY FOR HURTING THE NATION. judicial power now includes the duty to "determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. dissenting.

1991 Read also: 1.188 . 2.l987 3. 142 SCRA 149 1. April 8. 3. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. "relative to his business transactions and opportunities". 2. PCGG. has 6 criminal cases for estafa pending against him. HELD: Petition denied. 851 2. CA. a. In said cases he was admitted to bail with the FGU Insurance Corporation as surety. December 7. That is not my recollection of the impressions of the Court after the hearing. however.C. Amazingly. He is also involved in a case pending before the Securities and Exchange Commission. Petitioner Ricardo Manotoc. Manotoc vs. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and . 82 Phil. The fears expressed by its representatives were based on mere conjectures of political and economic destabilization without any single piece of concrete evidence to back up their apprehensions. Petitioner brings the matter to the S. Silverio vs. The SEC requested the Commissioner on Immigration not to clear petitioner for departure pending disposition of the case involving him. Jr. Caunca vs. CA. Petitioner subsequently filed before the trial courts a motion entitled "motion for permission to leave the country" stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States. The same was granted by the Commissioner. neither the courts which granted him bail nor the SEC would have jurisdiction over his liberty. Kwong vs. 4. The motion was denied by the lower courts and the matter was elevated to the Court of Appeals which also denied the same. the majority has come to the conclusion that there exist "factual bases for the President's decision" to bar Marcos's return. claiming his constitutional right to travel and also contending that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right. Salazar.

said orders and processes will be nugatory. was to prohibit the accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines.R."(People vs. 13.189 function of a bail bond.THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION Section 7. No. 404 (l935) c. and that his sureties are willing to undertake the responsibility of allowing him to travel.A. the duration thereof. Villavicencio vs. 1980) as authority for his claim that he could travel. 1989 CHAPTER VIII . Shepherd (C. and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction. 39 Phil.-G. 23505-R. Roan vs. 97 SCRA 121 7. Lukban. 778 5. 61 Phil. It may thus be inferred that the fact that a criminal case is pending against an accused does not automatically bar him from travelling abroad. To allow the petitioner to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason would place him beyond the reach of the courts. otherwise. supra. as well as the consent of his surety to the proposed travel. 6. Feb. b. held however that said case is not squarely on all fours with the case at bar. Salonga vs. e. Read: Right to Privacy. He must however convince the courts of the urgency of his travel. The S. the duration thereof. Access to official records…shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.C. Gonzales. . Hermoso. because. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. d. 1. right to information on matters of public concern. petitioner has failed to satisfy the courts of the urgency of his travel. Petitioner cites the Court of Appeals case of People vs. Uy Tuising. Unlike the Shepherd case. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. "x x x the result of the obligation assumed by appellee to hold the accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court. 4. Read also the Ferdinand Marcos Cases of August & October.

504 SCRA 704 Sandoval-Gutierrez. (TCI). J. 2006. WHEREAS.R. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT). . Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT). and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in the operations by their respective board of directors. inviting him to be one of the 233[4] Annex “E” of the Petition in G. where PHC funds are allegedly siphoned. under the authority of Senator Richard J. WHEREFORE. over P73 million had been allegedly advanced to TCI without any accountability report given to PHC and PHILCOMSAT. Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. one of the herein petitioners.25 million in 2004.190 CAMILO L. and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors. No. G. on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC). in the last quarter of 2005. the Philippine Star. in its 12 February 2002 issue reported that the executive committee of Philcomsat has precipitately released P265 million and granted P125 million loan to a relative of an executive committee member.” The pertinent portions of the Resolution read: WHEREAS. On May 8. WHEREAS. The Facts: On February 20. 2006. 174340. Inocencio. to date there have been no payments given. be it resolved that the proper Senate Committee shall conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation. 455 (Senate Res. No. No.R. as compared to the previous year’s mere P106 thousand. Chief of Staff Rio C. some board members established wholly owned PHC subsidiary called Telecommunications Center. October 17. 455). Sabio of the PCGG.3 million. SABIO vs. 174318.233 [4] “directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC). Inc. wrote Chairman Camilo L. the representation and entertainment expense of the PHC skyrocketed to P4. GORDON. Gordon. 2006. in 18 months. subjecting the company to an estimated interest income loss of P11.

Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Senate premises where he was detained. legislative or administrative proceeding. 174318. their Chairmen.R. I S S U E S: Is the refusal of the petitioners to testify in Congress by virtue of EO No. 455. No. The purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. 174340. Such provision of EO No. Major General Balajadia arrested Chairman Sabio in his office at IRC Building. at around 10:45 a.1 which was invoked by the petitioners in support of their refusal to testify in the Senate limits the power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial. 1 is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional provision ensuring the people’s access to information on matters of public 234[6] 235[7] Annex “F” of the Petition in G. Senators Richard Gordon and Joker P.m. Section 4 [b] violates the constitutional provision on information on matters of public concern? H E L D: Yes. 2006. 82 EDSA. Hence.191 resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services.234[6] On May 9. Annex “G” of the Petition in G. No. No.R. No.O. 174318. Chairman Sabio filed with the Supreme Court a petition for habeas corpus against the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment.O..R. 2006. 1 earlier quoted. No. Arroyo and Members. On September 12. Section 4(b) of E. 1. thus: No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial. . he invoked Section 4(b) of E. No. No.235[7] At the same time. legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance. The case was docketed as G.

523 SCRA 1 The petitioner requested the COMELEC to publish the individual nominees of all the party-list groups in order that they will be guided on what party-list group shall be supported by them. Held: The COMELEC should publish the list of nominees of all the party-list groups. J. FEBRUARY 13. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the documents sought in accordance with their constitutional right to information? Held: the the the the . 1986. petitioner Valmonte wrote the respondent asking the latter to furnish him copies of former members of the Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a "clean loan" from the GSIS prior to the February 7. COMELEC. 2007. respondent through counsel refused to give petitioner a list of said lawmakers who obtained "clean loans" from GSIS on the ground that there is a confidential relationship between GSIS and its borrowers and it would be proper for them to preserve same. such list of nominees is confidential and should not be published. 1986 elections. GR NO. 1986. the petitioners filed this instant petition. VALMONTE VS. The COMELEC held that under the Party-list Act. On July 19. 74930.192 1-A. 2. 1986. BELMONTE. Facts: 1. 3. 1989 in relation to the Right to Privacy Cortes. On June 4. Whether or not the case should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies? 2. Issues: 1. This is in accordance with the right to information on matters of public concern which shall be accorded to every citizen. On June 17. BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT VS. MAY 4.

This is not the first time that the court is confronted with a case involving the right to information. The postulate of public office is a public trust as institutionalized in the Constitution (Sec. subject to such limitations as may be provided for by law. 466. As such. the right to information is not absolute. Aguilar vs. In Tanada vs. and papers pertaining to official acts. 40 SCRA 210. Provincial Board. The right to information goes hand in hand with the constitutional policies of "full public disclosure" and "honesty in the public service". Ramento. III which provides: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. It is subject to limitations provided for by law and the people's right to information is limited to "matters of public concern". 106 Phil. the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable when only questions of law is involved. we upheld the citizen's right to information as well as in Legaspi vs. Access to official records. Yet. 150 SCRA 530 and ordered the government officers involved to act as prayed for by the petitioners. Malabanan vs. 136 SCRA 27. CSC. and to documents. 1. Petitioners are members of the media. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that before a party can be allowed to resort to the courts. the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public interest" and subject to "reasonable conditions prescribed by law. The pertinent provision of the Constitution is Section 7. (Pascual vs. But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the freedom of speech and of the press. Art. XI) to protect the people from abuse of governmental power. In the case at bar. Valencia. 129 SCRA 359." . transactions x x x shall be afforded the citizen. the decision of the General Manager of the GSIS is appealable/reviewable by the GSIS Board of Trustees.193 1. However. like all the constitutional guarantees. Far from it. Similarly. Tuvera. he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress available under the law. they have both the right to gather and the obligation to check the accuracy of the information they disseminate x x x The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. Petitioners did not ask the Board of Trustees to review the decision of the respondent. would certainly be empty words if access to information of public concern is denied except under limitations prescribed by law. Art.

The funds of the GSIS assume a public character and that its obligations are guaranteed by the government. April 20. and the Philippine National Police (PNP). 383] he petitioners. The respondent is therefore ordered to allow petitioners access to documents and records evidencing loans granted to members of the Batasang Pambansa. bureaus. the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). 16977. summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.. supra. The petitioners are entitled to access to documents sought subject to reasonable regulations that the respondent may impose relating to manner and hours of examination. abstracts. On September 21 to 23. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Ozaeta. ET AL. Marcos and the First Lady.194 The information sought to be obtained by the petitioners affect public interest since the GSIS is the trustee of contributions from the government and its employees. J. are not entitled to be furnished copies of list of alleged members of the Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure clean loans through the intercessions of Pres. the Senate of the Philippines. ET AL. the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department . however. as petitioners may specify.R..: The Facts: In the exercise of its legislative power. that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured [Legaspi vs. 2005. through its various Senate Committees. 80 Phil. subject to reasonable rules and regulations as the GSIS may deem necessary. No. This is so because access to public records does not include the right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists. and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations. EXEC. Subido vs. inter alia. SEC. represented by SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON. CSC. EDUARDO ERMITA. VS. the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department. conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for. G. to the end that damage or loss of the records may be avoided. 2006 CARPIO MORALES.

the President of the Philippines issued E. Further. took effect immediately. On September 28. G. the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. 2. ADHERENCE TO THE RULE ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS APPEARING IN LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government. Nature. The salient provisions of the Order are as follows: SECTION 1. (b) Who are covered. Republic Act No. SECTION. No.The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez. – (a) Nature and Scope. all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the public interest.” which. The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project. . – In accordance with Article VI. 23 May 1995). 95367.O.195 for them to appear on September 29. . Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. 464. 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. pursuant to Section 6 thereof.R. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing. 1. – The following are covered by this executive order: Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege. “ENSURING OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS. 2005.

These powers belong only to Congress and not to an individual citizen. I S S U E S: 1. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access .O 464 likewise violates the constitutional provision on the right to information on matters of public concern. any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which. 4. Such other officers as may be determined by the President.196 Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege. is presumed to be a matter of public concern. For one. 2. 3. and 5. There are clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege.O. Whether E. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. however. To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public. Belmonte: It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people’s will. Yet. Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege. the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress — opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives and other government officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression. Thus holds Valmonte v. and H E L D: E. being presumed to be in aid of legislation.

THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 390 employees. 170 SCRA 256. 1-a. 383 CHAPTER IX . February 13. vs.O.THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO FORM AND JOIN ASSOCIATIONS Section 8. 1990 1-d.R. July 3. Dimaano. underscoring supplied) 236 (Emphasis and The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E. Villar vs. Manuel Morato. Ferrer. societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Chang. 80 Phil. The right of self-organization of managerial 4.197 to information relating thereto can such bear fruit. Aquino-Sarmiento vs. No. in the sense explained above. 108 SCRA 381 4. EDILLON.47 SCRA 434 236 G. The fundamental right of self-organization. 146 SCRA 44 3. P. Baldoza vs. 14. to form unions. Vazquez. April 20. 100 SCRA 93 3. Canlas vs. therefore. Samahan ng Manggagawa vs. The right of the people.l983 5. Ozaeta. Tanada vs. Subido vs. 1. 1989. 1991 2. Tarnate vs. Tuvera. P. 48 SCRA 382 6. Aug. November 13. including those employed in the public and private sectors. Lllamas. 71 SCRA 14 4. vs. CSC. 1990 1-c. 464 is. 108 SCRA 502 5. just as direct as its violation of the legislature’s power of inquiry. Inciong. associations. Noriel. Legaspi vs. Read: 1. 74930. Lantaco vs. Freedom of Association. 84 SCRA 554 2. 100 SCRA 100 2. Noriel.108 SCRA 3. . In re: ATTY. 56 SCRA 793 (Read the dissenting opinion of Justice FERNANDO in both cases) CHAPTER X . Ferrer. Brilliantes vs. 150 SCRA 530 1-b.

Facts: In 2003. full payment of just compensation before government takes over. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation 1. however. Read: 1. 148 SCRA 83 2. Elbinias. (PIATCO) as well as the amendments thereto is void for being contrary to law and public policy. IT HAS TO COMPENSATE RESPONDENT PIATCO AS BUILDER OF THE SAID STRUCTURES. the Supreme Court held in AGAN VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.93 SCRA 663 2. J. Value of property expropriated for national projects.. when Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and when RA 8974 shall apply. Extent of payment to be made before writ of possession shall be issued in favor of the government. PIATCO. JUDGE GINGOYON. Inc. The inherent power of eminent domain. Who may exercise it? How about a barangay? Yes with the President’s approval. Procedure for the exercise of said power. Writ of possession when it shall be issued by the court. is not unmindful of the reality that the structures comprising the NAIA IPT III facility are almost complete and that funds have been spent by PIATCO in their construction. the Supreme Court held that: “This Court. On Motion for Reconsideration (420 SCRA 420). 402 SCRA 612 that the CONCESSION AGREEMENT FOR THE BUILD OPERATE TRANSFER ARRANGEMENT OF THE NINOY AQUINO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT PASSENGER TERMINAL II between the Philippine Government and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co.198 Section 9. THE COMPENSATION MUST BE JUST AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND EQUITY FOR THE GOVERNMENT CAN NOT UNJUSTLY ENRICH ITSELF AT THE EXPENSE OF PIATCO AND ITS INVESTORS. 478 SCRA 474 Tinga. For the government to take over the said facility. Barangay Matictic vs.” .

On January 7. On the same day. It held that it is the ministerial duty of the government to issue writ of possession upon deposit of the assessed value of the property subject of expropriation. Judge Gingoyon issued another Order directing the appointment of three (3) Commissioners to determine just compensation for the NAIA 3 Complex. the Government filed a complaint for expropriation with the RTC of Pasay City seeking a writ of possession authorizing to take immediate possession and control over NAIA 3 facilities and deposited the amount of P3. Judge Gingoyon issued another Order supplementing the December 21. PIATCO would be enjoined from receiving the just compensation even if the government takes over the NAIA 3 facility. HELD: 1. If Section 2. . Both Orders were questioned by the government as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. If RA 8974 will be used. It pointed out that the earlier orderas to the amount to be deposited by the government was based on Section 2. What law is applicable in this expropriation case: Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or RA 8974? 2. Rule 67 will be applied. ISSUES: 1.199 On December 21. It would violate the proscription in the AGAN Decision that the government must pay first the just compensation before taking over the facilities. on January 4. Judge Gingoyon issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of possession to the government to “take or enter upon the possession of the NAIA 3 facilities”. However. 2004 Order. Rule 67 when what should be applicable is RA 8974 and therefore ordered that the amount of US$62.175. may the court used the provision of Rule 67 on the 3 commissioners to determine just compensation. 2004. IT HAS TO COMPENSATE RESPONDENT PIATCO AS BUILDER OF THE SAID STRUCTURES”. It is sufficient that the government deposits the amount equal to the assessed value of the facilities.77 be released to PIATCO instead of the amount in the December 21. 2004 Order. 2005.0B in cash with Land Bank of the Philippines representing the assessed value of the terminal’s assessed value for taxation purposes.343. 2005. Application of Rule 67 would violate the AGAN Doctrine which provides that “for the government to take over the said NAIA 3 facility.

April 14. represented by the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB). as in this case. Amount to be deposited in court before a Writ of Possession may be issued by the court in favor of the government. there can be writ of possession even if the owner of the property has not received a single centavo while under RA 8974. Who owns the interest of the initial amount deposited for the purpose of issuing writ of possession REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. 2 Rule 67 on the appointment of three (3) commissioners to determine just compensation may be used since RA 8974 does not provide for such procedure.R. petitioner Republic of the Philippines. 8974. 2008 THE FACTS: On 29 December 2000. The rest. RA 8974. filed with the RTC a . Under Rule 67. No. Under Rule 67. Differences between the two laws on expropriation: a. the government “merely deposits” the assessed value of the property subject of expropriation and can have a writ of possession over the same while under RA 8974. like those covered by the “Build-Operate-Transfer”. Rule 67 shall apply. The just compensation to be paid by the government shall be determined within 60 days from the finality of the decision based on Section 4. however. When to apply Rule 67 and when to apply RA No. RA 8974 shall be followed. Writ of Possession may not be issued in favor of the government UNTIL ACTUAL RECEIPT by PIATCO of the proferred value of just compensation. Just Compensation. G. Upon issuance of the writ in favor of the government. the scheme of immediate payment (100%) shall be followed. it could already exercise acts of ownership over the NAIA 3 facilities. 172410. HOLY TRINITY REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. b.200 So when shall Rule 67 be used in expropriation cases and when shall RA 8974 be used? In all “National government projects” or “national infrastructure projects”.

the RTC allowed the release of the principal amount together with the interest to the respondent but on Motion for Reconsideration of the TRB. including the interest which accrued thereon. an Order for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession. I S S U E: Who has the right over the interest of the amount deposited representing the zonal value of the property sought to be expropriated? The expropriator or the landowner? HELD: The petition is without merit.00 with LBP-South Harbor. TRB filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the issuance of a Writ of Possession. that is. the determination of just compensation. The RTC issued. 869-M-2000 and raffled to Branch 85. it disallowed the withdrawal of the interest reasoning out that the said issue will be included in the second stage of expropriation. Thereafter. with the Land Bank of the Philippines.201 Consolidated Complaint for Expropriation against landowners whose properties would be affected by the construction.968. On 3 March 2003. in the total amount of P28.406. Malolos.700. 237 . HTRDC filed with the RTC a Motion to Withdraw Deposit.00. an authorized government depository. on 19 March 2002.000. On 18 March 2002. the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial on the part of the RTC. Hence. this petition of the government before the Supreme Court. The suit was docketed as Civil Case No. 8974237[5] in relation to Section 2 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Bulacan. manifesting that it deposited a sufficient amount to cover the payment of 100% of the zonal value of the affected properties.406. praying that the respondent or its duly authorized representative be allowed to withdraw the amount of P22. rehabilitation and expansion of the North Luzon Expressway. The private respondent elevated the issue to the Court of Appeals which ruled that the respondent is entitled to the interest by way of accession. Respondent Holy Trinity Realty and Development Corporation (HTRDC) was one of the affected landowners. South Harbor Branch (LBP-South Harbor). TRB maintained that since it had already complied with the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No.700.00. out of TRB’s advance deposit of P28.

And then there is Rep. 238 239 240 241 . 8974 which provides.241[14] we held: There are at least two crucial differences between the respective procedures under Rep. The said argument is without merit because it failed to distinguish between the expropriation procedures under Republic Act No. 8974 and Rule 67 of the Rules of Court speak of different procedures. and the value of the improvements and/or structures using the replacement cost method. the determination of the authority to exercise eminent domain and the determination of just compensation. Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation. xxxx Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the Government. and does not exclusively belong to respondent. The TRB argues that it is only during the second stage when the court will appoint commissioners and determine claims for entitlement to interest. Moreover. Yet by no means does it serve at present as the solitary guideline through which the State may expropriate private property. Thus.240[13] The TRB further points out that the expropriation account with LBP-South Harbor is not in the name of HTRDC. For example. Republic Act No. with the former specifically governing expropriation proceedings for national government infrastructure projects. as the relevant standard for initial compensation. Section 19 of the Local Government Code governs as to the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain through an enabling ordinance. Wycoco239[12] and National Power Corporation v. citing Land Bank of the Philippines v. Gingoyon. the Government is required only to make an initial deposit with an authorized government depositary. in Republic v. the market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration or the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). the Government is required to make immediate payment to the property owner upon the filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession. Act No. Thus. Act No. the said expropriation account includes the compensation for the other landowners named defendants in Civil Case No. 8974 and Rule 67. whichever is higher. but of DPWH. unlike Rep. Act No. whereas in Rule 67.202 The TRB claims that there are two stages238[11] in expropriation proceedings. 8974 and Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. 869-M-2000. Under the statute. Angas.

it is deemed to be a “constructive delivery” of the amount corresponding to the 100% zonal valuation of the expropriated property.00 total deposit. by requiring the deposit of the amount equivalent to 100% of the zonal value of the properties sought to be expropriated before the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the Republic. which covers expropriation proceedings intended for national government infrastructure projects. The Court of Appeals further recognized that the deposit of the amount was already deemed a constructive delivery thereof to HTRDC: When the [herein petitioner] TRB deposited the money as advance payment for the expropriated property with an authorized government depositary bank for purposes of obtaining a writ of possession. 8974. if expropriation is engaged in by the national government for purposes other than national infrastructure projects.000.” Thus.406. the right of accession is conferred by ownership of the principal property: Art. arises not from the amount of the deposit. The ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby. 8974. the RTC correctly applied the procedure laid out in Republic Act No. Therefore. which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable to the property owner than Rule 67. Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the interest earned by the deposited amount in the expropriation account would accrue to HRTDC by virtue of accession.968. Such amount. under Article 440 of the Civil Code.203 8974. The controversy. but as to the ownership of the interest that had since accrued on the deposited amount. though. There is no question that the proceedings in this case deal with the expropriation of properties intended for a national government infrastructure project. 440. hinges on the determination of who actually owns the deposited amount.00 of the P28.700. determined to be P22. inescapably applies in instances when the national government expropriates property “for national government infrastructure projects. either naturally or artificially. since. the assessed value standard and the deposit mode prescribed in Rule 67 continues to apply. The principal property in the case at bar is part of the deposited amount in the expropriation account of DPWH which pertains particularly to HTRDC. was already ordered by the RTC to be released to HTRDC or its authorized representative. or which is incorporated or attached thereto. Rep. Since [HTRDC] is entitled thereto and undisputably the owner of the principal amount . Act No.

TRB only asserts that HTRDC is “entitled only to an amount equivalent to the zonal value of the expropriated property. TRB did not object to HTRDC’s Motion to Withdraw Deposit with the RTC. an amount equivalent to 100% of the zonal value of the expropriated properties.242[15] Since the Court of Appeals found that the HTRDC is the owner of the deposited amount. 8974. The amount earned interest after the deposit.204 deposited by [herein petitioner] TRB. The deposit was made in order to comply with Section 4 of Republic Act No. so that it could already secure a writ of possession over the properties subject of the expropriation and commence implementation of the project. TRB is already considered to have paid the same to HTRDC.. i. which requires nothing less than the immediate payment of 100% of the value of the property. the interest should pertain to the owner of the principal who is 242 243 244 245 . hence. Gingoyon243[16]: It is the plain intent of Rep. as accession. 8974 to supersede the system of deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme of “immediate payment” in cases involving national government infrastructure projects. nothing more and nothing less.244[17] The intention of the TRB in depositing such amount through DPWH was clearly to comply with the requirement of immediate payment in Republic Act No. in a bank deposit should likewise pertain to the owner of the money deposited. conversely. By depositing the said amount. 8974.245[18] A close scrutiny of TRB’s arguments would further reveal that it does not directly challenge the Court of Appeals’ determinative pronouncement that the interest earned by the amount deposited in the expropriation account accrues to HTRDC by virtue of accession. based on the current zonal valuation of the BIR. TRB already complied therewith by depositing the required amount in the expropriation account of DPWH with LBP-South Harbor. and HTRDC became the owner thereof. In fact. However. 8974. Act No. the interest yield. for as long as HTRDC shows (1) that the property is free from any lien or encumbrance and (2) that respondent is the absolute owner thereof.” We agree in TRB’s statement since it is exactly how the amount of the immediate payment shall be determined in accordance with Section 4 of Republic Act No. Thus.e. going back to our ruling in Republic v. then the latter should also be entitled to the interest which accrued thereon. The critical factor in the different modes of effecting delivery which gives legal effect to the act is the actual intention to deliver on the part of the party making such delivery. to the property owner.

we clarified that interests in the form of damages cannot be applied where there is prompt and valid payment of just compensation. TRB does not object to HTRDC’s withdrawal of the amount of P22. the applicable law is Article 2209 of the Civil Code which prescribes a 6% legal interest rate. and (2) when the decision of the court in the determination of just compensation becomes final and executory. does not involve interest as damages for delay in payment of just compensation. In Wycoco.00 from the expropriation account.00. We ruled in Angas that since the kind of interest involved therein is interest by way of damages for delay in the payment thereof. on the other hand. Article 2209 of the Civil Code prescribing the 6% interest shall apply. Wycoco. in the computation of the legal rate of interest on just compensation for expropriated lands. We are not persuaded by TRB’s citation of National Power Corporation v. where the implementing agency shall pay the owner the difference between the amount already paid and the just compensation as determined by the court (final payment).246[19] As a final note.000.968. Angas and Land Bank of the Philippines v. in support of its argument that the issue on interest is merely part and parcel of the determination of just compensation which should be determined in the second stage of the proceedings only. Article 246 247 .968. and not as earnings from loans or forbearances of money. it is entitled by right of accession to the interest that had accrued to the said amount only.247[21] The said conditions do not put in abeyance the constructive delivery of the said amount to HTRDC pending the latter’s compliance therewith. It concerns interest earned by the amount deposited in the expropriation account.205 already determined as HTRDC. 416 which fixed the legal rate at 12% per annum. where the amount to be paid is 100% of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR (initial payment). provided that it is able to show (1) that the property is free from any lien or encumbrance and (2) that it is the absolute owner thereof. The case at bar. 8974.000. Under Section 4 of Republic Act No. Since the respondent is the owner of P22. The interest is paid by LBP-South Harbor on the deposit. The issue in Angas is whether or not. the implementing agency of the government pays just compensation twice: (1) immediately upon the filing of the complaint. and the TRB cannot claim that it paid an amount more than what it is required to do so by law. or Central Bank Circular No. however. We find that neither case is applicable herein.

RTC 22.206 1187 of the Civil Code provides that the “effects of a conditional obligation to give.” Hence. Complaint sufficient in form and substance. 354 SCRA 562 PURSUANT TO SECTION 2. Requisites before immediate possession or writ of possession may be issued in expropriation cases. the making of a deposit equivalent to the ASSESSED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY SUBJECT TO EXPROPRIATION. RULE 67 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN THE ROBERN DEVELOPMENT CASE. and b. involving local government units as the expropriating agency: 1. as determined by the RTC in its Order249[23] dated 21 April 2003. THE CITY OF ILOILO VS. when HTRDC complied with the given conditions. shall retroact to the day of the constitution of the obligation. JUDGE LEGASPI. once the condition has been fulfilled. Payment of 15% of the Market value as appearing in the latest Tax Declaration. the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance. ILOILO CITY. 248 249 . 444 SCRA 269 Requisites before the expropriator is allowed immediate entry on the property subject of expropriation if the expropriator is a local government unit. 248[22] BIGLANG-AWA VS. the effects of the constructive delivery retroacted to the actual date of the deposit of the amount in the expropriation account of DPWH. The owners of the expropriated land are entitled to legal interest on the compensation eventually adjudged from the date the condemnor takes possession of the land until the full compensation is paid to them or deposited in court. JUDGE BACALLA. and 2. THE ONLY REQUISITES FOR THE IMMEDIATE ENTRY BY THE GOVERNMENT IN EXPROPRIATION CASES ARE: a.

Market value is that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy. NPC vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES. it is the value of the land at the time of the taking. WHICHEVER COMES FIRST. value of the property when? Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. 1990 b. in computing the just compensation. and 2. the expropriator must deposit the amount equivalent to 15% of the fair market value of the property to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration. Oct. would agree on as a price to be given and received therefore. but the owner’s loss. Mun. The just compensation is determined as of the date of taking of the property or the filing of the complaint for expropriation. CA. of Makati vs. 3. The measure is not the taker’s gain. 444 SCRA 176 What is the basis of the just compensation for expropriation proceedings in connection with the agrarian reform program of the government. the complaint for expropriation filed in court is sufficient in form and substance. 1. Basis of just compensation Read: a. 1992 a-1. Aug. As such.207 The expropriator may immediately enter the property subject of expropriation proceedings if the following requisites are present: 1. COURT OF APPEALS. 1990 . GABATIN VS. 4. Held: The taking of private lands under the agrarian reform program of the government partakes of the nature of an expropriation proceedings. Ansaldo vs. not at the time of the rendition of the judgment. February 25. and an owner willing but not compelled to sell. Jocson. 441 SCRA 637 Just compensation in expropriation cases. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. Tantuico. which should be taken into consideration.

IAC. 1992 Cruz. proceedings. Batangas. 4. VS.640 square meters for its 5-year expansion program. Reublic vs. of Talisay vs. That the petitioner expressed willingness to sell at P50. however. Mun.00 per square meter in its reply. Viray then wrote the petitioner and expressed willingness to buy the latter's property at P32. the Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint for the expropriation of the petitioner's property and invoked the assessment made by the Provincial Appraisal Committee of the Provincial Assessor of Batangas in the amount of P32. a government institution in Nasugbu.00. then President of Apolinario Apacible School of Fisheries. Later on. COURT OF APPEALS AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. 3. Viray then requested the Office of the Provincial Assessor of the Province of Batangas to appraise the land and the latter fixed its market value at P32. Vicente Viray. Maddumba vs. 183 SCRA 528 e. On October 28. December 14. On June 18. sent the petitioner a written offer to buy the property of the latter with an area of 10. J. 5. 1983.00 per square meter. 1982. CA. 29 . INC. stuck to its original valuation. 182 SCRA 281 Read also: 1. 2.208 c. it said that its property had in fact appreciated to as much as P100.00 per square meter. The government likewise sought immediate possession of the property upon deposit of 10% of the total assessment in accordance with PD 48. GSIS. 185 SCRA 572 d. 129 SCRA 665 f.00 per square meter. The petitioner. Facts: -----1. Meaning of just compensation in eminent domain SCRA 868 Basis of just compensation (Exceptional case) BERKENKOTTER. NPC vs. Ramirez.

squaremeter as the fair b. ection 5. 7. the complaint itself prays that the market value be pegged at P32. Berkenkotter originally questioned the purpose of the expropriation but later abandoned this objection and concentrated only on what it called the "underappraisal" of the subject land. However.18 per square meter. The government appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals which rendered a decision REVERSING THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION and declaring that the fair market value which should be the basis in computing the amount to be paid by the government to the petitioner shall be P19. Issue: ------ .18. to determine the just compensation to be paid for the land.18 per square meter should be the basis of the computation for the just compensation of its property because: a.00 per square meter was the appraised value made by the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Batangas. in its second report dated April 1.00 for the entire area sought to be expropriated. 11. The trial court acting on this recommendation rendered judgment requiring the Republic to pay the petitioner the amount of P904. 1987. the panel of commissioners submitted its report to the trial court and pegged the market value at P85. the panel reiterated its original recommendation of P85. The petitioner was therefore constrained to file this instant petition claiming that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that P19.00 per square meter. The court directed the commissioners to convene anew and to receive additional evidence.400. The RTC then appointed a panel of commissioners in accordance with Rule 67. On September 23. m.00 per square meter. 9. the market value according set by the petitioner if we follow the three (3) deeds of sale it executed in favor of three (3) different individuals. 1985. or a total of P904. 8. 10. that P32.209 6. 12.00/sq. of the Rules of Court.00 per market value. Viray even offered the amount of P32.400.00 for the entire area sought to be expropriated. The Republic of the Philippines objected and pointed to three (3) contracts of sale executed by the petitioner in 1985 whereby it sold three (3) tracts of land similar in topography and adjacent to the property in question for the unit price of only P19. and c.

it impliedly admitted that the price for the latter should be the same as the former. IN ACCORANCE WITH THE APPRAISAL OF THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR. P100. they were ordinary buyers who bought the land for their own private purposes only and not for the public purpose invoked by the government. The fact that the petitioner sold the 3 other parcels of land at P19. If this was the purpose of the petitioner when it executed the 3 deeds of sale. M.18.18 per square meter which are admittedly of the same topography as that subject of this case. surely not unknown to the petitioner. The Court is disappointed that the petitioner should demand a higher price from the republic. when it was willing to accept less from the three individual buyers who had only their private interests to serve. THAT WHAT IS SAUCE FOR THE GOOSE IS ALSO SAUCE FOR THE GANDER.210 WHAT SHOULD BE THE BASIS IN THE COMPUTATION OF THE JUST COMPENSATION: P32. This rule of consistency is best expressed in the familiar saying. The petitioner's claim that the value as appearing in the deeds of sale in the three other parcels is not a reliable index of just compensation "because owners usually undervalue the selling price of the property to lower the expenses they would have to pay for capital gains tax and documentary stamps tax" is practically an admission that it did not indicate the actual consideration in the three transactions where it was made to appear that the price per square meter was only P19. M. P85. FOR IT CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM ITS OWN DECEPTION AND CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY SHOULD BE ASSESSED AT THE HIGHER RATE IT CLANDESTINELY AGREED UPON WITH THE BUYERS.18 PER SQUARE METER WHICH WAS THE SELLING PRICE IN AN ADJACENT LOT SOLD BY THE PETITIONER TO THREE PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS. OR P19. ----The basis in the computation of just compensation shall be P19. which needs the land for a public purpose. To all appearances.18 per square meter or the price which the petitioner sold its other lots to other individuals.M. then IT IS SURELY HOIST NOW BY ITS OWN PETARD.00/SQ. AS CLAIMED BY THE OWNER. This is so because there is no showing that the petitioner had any special reason for granting each of the individual vendees the extraordinary discount amounting to as much as 75% of its claimed real value of the land.00/SQ. .00/SQ. Held. AS RECOMMENDED BY THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED BY THE COURT TO EVALUATE THE SAME. AND RIGHTLY SO.

their size. EPZA vs. 164 SCRA 393 5. 123 SCRA 245 3. the market value as recommended by the board of commissioners appointed by the court were at best only ADVISORY AND PERSUASIVE AND BY NO MEANS FINAL OR BINDING. must be fair not only to the owner but also to the taker. Manotok vs. vs. to be just. The market value of the property is the price that may be agreed upon by the parties willing but not compelled to enter into a contract of sale. to which should be added the consequential benefits which may arise from the expropriation. May 21. Santos. 175 SCRA 378).1987 4. 58 SCRA 336 Requisites of taking: a. 5. the trial court should first ascertain the market value of the property. Rep. To determine just compensation. Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Requisite of "taking" in eminent domain cases Read: 1. particular case of lands. Dulay. its actual or potential uses. 154 SCRA 199 When it is considered for "public use": 6. cost of acquisition. The measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. the current value of like proerties.l987 5. 2. Castellvi. CA. 2. 154 SCRA 461 7. Republic vs. he compensation. Finally. CA. Reyes. 154 SCRA 428 8. 141 SCRA 30. note that as held in the case of Republic vs. April 29. 4. Guererro. NHA vs. Lagunzad vs. the tax declarations thereon. the expropriator must enter the property. Among the factors to be considered in arriving at the fair market value are: 1. 3. and 6. CA. . location. CA.Cosculluela vs. shape.211 Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the proerty sought to be expropriated (Association of Small Landowners vs. Sumulong vs.

On October 30. 87335. Bautista. February 12. 1979. 1979. 349 ( A private property which is devoted to public use may not be expropriated for another public purpose. 7001-P. 100 SCRA 660 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. Ignacio vs. 102 SCRA 597 6. 1989 Expropriation Gancayco. De Knecht vs. J. among them Cristina de Knecht together with Concepcion Cabarrus. 1979. that on June 14.212 b. Garcia vs. CA. Chinese Community. the Rep. 1980. the Republic of the Philippines prayed for the issuance of a writ of possession of the property to be expropriated on the ground that it had already deposited with the PNB 10% of the amount of compensation stated in the complaint. of the Philippines initiated an expropriation proceedings against the owners of the houses standing along Fernando ReinDel Pan streets. the Supreme Court rendered its decision granting the petition for certiorari and prohibition and directing that the Order of the . 40 Phil. and some other fifteen defendants in Civil Case No. the Lower Court issued a writ of possession authorizing the Republic to enter into the properties condemned and created a committee to determine just compensation. 150 SCRA 369 3. 1979 order of the lower court. 2. City of Manila vs. and the owner must be ousted from beneficial use of his land. 3. the entrance must not be for just a momentary period. 2. On February 20. Facts: 1. c. NO. In June. 1979. 4.) 2. CRISTINA DE KNECHT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS. On July 16. e. Guererro. d. G. De Knecht went to the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari and prohibition directed against the June 14.R. Not a valid exercise of eminent domain Read: 1. the entry must be under warrant of color or title. the property must be devoted for public use.

However. Issue: Whether or not the legislature could still pass a law expropriating the lots of the private respondents despite the existence of a final decision of the Supreme Court which held that choice of their lot to be used as an extension of EDSA is arbitrary? Held: It is true that there is already a final decision of the Supreme Court to the effect that the choice of the Fernando Rein-Del Pan Streets is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval. The defendants moved for a reconsideration which the Court denied. When on February 17. IT APPEARS THAT THE SAME WAS BASED ON SUPERVENING EVENTS THAT OCCURRED after the decision of the SC in De Knecht vs. 1979 be SET ASIDE and the respondent Judge is permanently enjoined from taking any further action on Civil Case No. the Court dismissed the case. 1983. 1988 issued its decision setting aside the Order appealed from and dismissing the expropriation proceedings before the lower court on the ground that the choice of the above-mentioned streets as the line through which the EDSA should be extended is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval. The Republic of the Philippines filed a Petition for Review with the Supreme Court. 7001. the Republic moved for the dismissal of the case due to the encatment of BP 340 expropriating the same properties for the same purpose. 5. 7001-P. On September 2. 8. BP Bilang 340 THEREFORE EFFECTIVELY SUPERSEDED THE AFORESAID FINAL AND EXECUTORY DECISION OF THE SUPREME . De Knecht appealed the Order dismissing the case to the Court of Appeals who on December 28. 1983. On August 8. The social impact factor which persuaded the Court to consider this extension has disappeared because of the fact that the residents of the area have been relocated and duly compensated and only DE KNECHT now is left while her property is only about 5% of the area to be expropriated. the defendants in Civil Case No. Bautista in 1980. 7.213 respondent Judge dated June 14.moved for the dismissal of said case since the decision of the Supreme Court is already final. 6. The Republic could continue it expropriation proceedings considering the supervening events after the decision was rendered. On the same date. 1981. it is equally true that the Constitution and our laws may expropriate private properties after the payment of just compensation. the Batasang Pambansa passed BP 340 expropriating the same properties for the same purpose.

93 SCRA 503 4. the present expropriation is no longer arbitrary. 1989 3-a. Eminent domain cases. 96 Phil. City of Baguio vs. 106 Phil. CA. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. Arce vs. Emilia. Dimayuga.. vs. ************************ Cruz. 3. Burgos. Limitations of the power of expropriation. in general Read: 1. CA. Valdellon. THUS THE ANTERIOR DECISION OF THIS COURT MUST YIELD TO THIS SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATIVE FIAT. WHICH WAS DECIDED UNDER A DIFFERENT SET OF FACTS.214 COURT. NAWASA. Commissioner vs. Haguisan vs. February 12. Baylosis. Guido vs. Heirs of Ardona vs. 102 SCRA 620 3. 130 SCRA 30 9. Garcia vs. NO. RPA. 46 SCRA 734 5. concurring Supervening events have changed the factual basis of the SC's decision to justify the subsequent enactment of the statute. San Diego vs. 131 SCRA 517 11. 125 SCRA 220 12.R. Mataas na Lupa vs. 461 8. Juan. When shall we base the computation of the value of the property expropriated: at the time of taking or at the time of the institution of the expropriation proceedings? 8. I MUST ADD THAT THIS DECISION IS NOT A REVERSAL OF THE ORIGINAL DE KNECHT CASE. it is not because we concede that the lawmakers can nullify the findings of the Court in the exercise of its discretion. Republic vs. Municipality of Daet vs. 84 Phil. Genito. CRISTINA DE KNECHT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS. 3 SCRA 706 7. 847 7. 80 SCRA 305 10. Salas vs. 92 SCRA 29 . X x x THE COURT AGREES IN THE WISDOM AND NECESSITY OF ENACTING BP 340. It is simply because we ourselves have found that under the changed situation.1980 13. Reyes. 27. J. March 31. 87335. G. Rep. Jarencio. 1976 6. Feb. If we are sustaining the legislation. 144 2.

94 SCRA 533 8. 42 Phil. 68 6.RIGHTS DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION Section 11. NLRC.THE NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE Section 10. Read: 1. Lozano vs. Insierto. force. he must be provided with one.. 1968 10. 123 SCRA 713 9. De los Santos. Nolting.93 Phil. Rutter vs. Abella vs. solitary.l987 2. Esteban. Ilusorio vs. threat. 152 SCRA 140 11. Del Rosario vs. 17 SCRA 25 7. violence. 189 SCRA 14 CHAPTER XII . (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. December 18. Section 12. intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Martinez. Co vs. 702 3. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel. vs.146 SCRA 323 5. PNB. or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. incommunicado. PVBEU vs. PVB. Kabiling. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. . Clements vs. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 114 SCRA 842 4. Secret detention places. CAR. 1. NHA. et al.215 CHAPTER XI . March 21. (2) No torture. Ganzon vs. Feati Bank. Ortigas vs.

If the person cannot afford the services of counsel of his or her choice. and 5. allowed freely to avail of the services of a physician or physicians of choice. 2007 and effective on July 15. NOTE: Applicable provisions of the Human Security Act/Anti-Terrorism Law. Republic Act No. he shall forthwith be informed by the arresting police or law enforcement officers to whose custody the person concerned is brought. Rights of a person under custodial detention. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of the counsel of choice. Rights of a person under “custodial detention” for one suspected or arrested as a terrorist. allowed to communicate freely with his legal counsel and to confer with them at any time without restriction.. which is hereby declared as public document and opened and made available for inspection and scrutiny of the lawyer or lawyers of the person under custody or any member of his family or relative by consanguinity within the fourth civil . 2. to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.. informed of the cause or causes of his detention in the presence of his legal counsel. of his or her right: 1. Requirement for an official custodial logbook and its contents. 2007 (This Law shall be automatically suspended one (1) month before and two (2) months after the holding of any election) Section 21. 4.The police or other law enforcement custodial unit in whose care and control the person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism has been placed under custodial arrest and detention shall keep a securely and orderly maintained official logbook. Approved on March 6. to be informed of the nature and cause of his arrest. It shall be the duty of the free legal assistance unit of the IBP or the PAO’s thus contacted to immediately visit the person detained and provide him with legal assistance. allowed to communicate freely and privately without restrictions with the members of his family or with his nearest relatives and be visited by them. Section 23. 9372.The moment a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism is apprehended or arrested and detained. the police or law enforcement officers concerned shall immediately contact the free legal assistance unit of the IBP or the Public attorney’s office (PAO). 3.216 (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

obligations of the arresting officers and investigators during and after arrest. description. or administrative investigation. intimidation. name. The summary of the rights of an accused during custodial investigation (from the time of arrest) under the Constitution. 4. names and addresses of the members of his family and relatives. absolutely not admissible and usable as evidence in any judicial. 3. date and time when the detained person requested to communicate or confer with his lawyer. No torture or coercion in Investigation and interrogation. 12. quasi-judicial. or coercion. legislative. the date and time of his return to his cell. No threat. the date and time of visits by his legal counsel and the date and time of departure. 10. the name and address of the physician/s who examined him physically and medically. Section 24. 7. the evidence obtained from said detained person …shall be in its entirety.217 degree or his physician at any time of the day without any form of restriction. and address of the detained person. moral. summary of the physical and medical findings after each interrogation. otherwise. 9. or psychological pressure on the detained person which shall vitiate his free will shall be employed in his investigation and interrogation. 8. 5. date and time of such visits. Rights of the accused during custodial investigation. the date and time of each removal of the detained person from his cell for interrogation or for any purpose. effect of non-compliance by the investigators . and no act which will inflict any form of physical pain or torment. proceeding or hearing. 2. the state of his health and his physical condition a the time of his initial admission for custodial detention. laws and jurisprudence. 6. The logbook shall contain a clear and concise record of: 1. date and exact time of his initial admission for custodial arrest and detention. 13. 11. or mental. name and address of the physician who examined him physically and medically. and 14. names and addresses of the persons who visited him. inquiry. all other important events bearing on all relevant details regarding the treatment of the detained person while under custodial arrest or detention.

It is high time to educate our law enforcement agencies who neglect either by ignorance or indifference the so-called Miranda rights which had become insufficient and which the court must update in the light of new legal developments. He must be warned that he has the right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him. he has the right to communicate or confer by the most expedient means--- . 2. he must be informed that no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver has been made. 4. 1. The person arrested must be informed that. as guardian of the rights of the people. DETAINING. GUIDELINES. AND DUTIES WHICH THE ARRESTING. INVITING OR INVESTIGATING OFFICER OR HIS COMPANIONS MUST OBSERVE AT THE TIME OF MAKING THE ARREST AND AGAIN AT AND DURING THE TIME OF THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION OR INTERROGATION IN ACCORDANCE with the Constitution. one will be provided for him. preferably of his own choice. . detained.218 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES MAHINAY. Every other warnings. No. 122485. 3. 1999 En Banc Per Curiam: VS. jurisprudence and Republic Act No. 5. G. and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf. or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting in his behalf. February 1. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer.R. invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown a copy of the warrant of arrest. The person arrested. if any. lays down the PROCEDURE. information or communication must be in a language known to and understood by said person. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an independent and competent lawyer. at any time. 7438. Considering the heavy penalty of death and in order to ensure that evidence against an accused were obtained through lawful means. 6. the Court.

11. LATEST CASES ON THE RIGHTS OF A PERSON DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION Rights during custodial investigation. priest or minister chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by his counsel. otherwise. or any medical doctor. the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced. 8. the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any other time during the process. or the interrogation has begun. knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same. right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. whether inculpatory or exculpatory. when custodial investigation is deemed to have started. . or be visited by/confer with duly accredited national or international non-governmental organization. IT SHALL BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE OFFICER TO ENSURE THAT THIS IS ACCOMPLISHED. He must be informed that any statement OR EVIDENCE. (NOTE: Any violation of the foregoing rights of the accused shall entitle him to sue for damages against the arresting or investigating officers in accordance with RA7438. 10. 9. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent. radio. if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer. he must be informed that it must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel. any member of his immediate family. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made voluntarily. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time or state of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with the warning that once he makes such indication.219 telephone. not to mention the possible criminal liability of said persons under existing laws). 7. as the case may be. letter or messenger---with his lawyer (either retained or appointed). in whole or in part. regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or volunteered some information or statements. he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak. obtained in violation of any of the foregoing. SHALL BE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE. In addition.

Facts: For allegedly diverting and collecting funds of the National Power Corporation intended for the purchase of US Dollars from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). (Diaz vs. While the Information charged the accused of willful and intentional commission of the acts complained of while the Decision found the accused guilty of inexcusable negligence. The “investigation” under said provision refers to “custodial investigation where a suspect has already been taken into police custody and that the investigating officers begin to ask questions to elicit information and confessions or admissions from the suspect. 475 SCRA 248 Ynares-Santiago. J.. 426 SCRA 666). After trial. JOSE TING LAN UY. custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has began to focus on a particular person as a suspect (People vs.. 103 Phil. 217 and 171 [8] in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. therefore. He maintains that he signed the sworn statement while confined a the Philippine heart center and upon assurance that it would not be used against him. 2. all accused were convicted by the Sandiganbayan. This was the doctrine laid down in the case of Samson vs. JR. 302 SCRA 118). 277. the accused-appellants were charged of Malversation through Falsification of Commercial Documents as defined and penalized under Arts. Sandiganbayan. The claim that his affidavit is inadmissible in evidence in accordance with section 12 [1] of the Bill of Rights is not tenable. He was not assisted by counsel nor he was apprised of his constitutional rights when he executed the affidavit. He likewise claimed that his constitutional rights to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against and due process were violated. Duenas. Court of appeals. conviction for malversation through negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves that mode of commission of the offense. Clearly.220 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. et al. Jr. Accused Ochoa interposed an appeal and claimed that his conviction was based on his alleged sworn statement and the transcript of stenographic notes of a supposed interview with an NPC personnel and the report of the NBI. Held: 1. the rights enumerated by the accused are not available . Succinctly stated.. Even if the information charges willful malversation.

2000) It is always incumbent on the prosecution to prove at the trial that. accused-appellant was given no more than a perfunctory recitation of his rights.221 BEFORE GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATORS ENTER THE PICTURE. III. 334 SCRA 673). a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. the confession before a Municipal Mayor was held admissible as wvidence). made during the custodial investigation. article III does not apply to administrative investigations (People vs. warned that anything he says can be and will be used against him. informed of his right to remain silent. 2. (People vs. In this case. Clearly. PEOPLE VS. may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on television (People vs. the confession of the accused was obtained during an administrative investigation by NPC and therefore. and that if he is indigent. CA. a suspect in custodial investigation must be: 1. 232 SCRA 53). Zuela. prior to in-custody questioning. are inadmissible not only against the DECLARANT but . the confessant was informed of his constitutional rights. with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners. Hence. signifying nothing more than a feigned compliance with the constitutional requirements. the same was not covered by Section 12. extrajudicial statements. (NOTE: In People vs. even a videotaped interview where the accused willingly admit his guilt in the presence of newsmen is not covered by the said provision though the trial courts were warned by the supreme Court to take extreme caution in admitting similar confessions because of the distinct possibility that the police. told that he has the right to counsel. verbal admission made to a radio announcer who was not a part of the investigation (People vs. Andam. The presumption of regularity of official acts does not prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence. III of the Constitution. The protective mantle of section 12. whether inculpatory or exculpatory. 335 SCRA 349 Under Art. 3. July 31. Judge Ayson. Ordono. in the absence of proof that the arresting officers complied with the above constitutional safeguards. Samolde. FIGUEROA. 175 SCRA 216). Endino. or even to a Mayor approached as a personal confidante and not in his official capacity (People vs. Section 12 [1] of the Constitution. confession to a private individual (Kimpo vs. In fact. Art. 323 SCRA 589). 353 SCRA 307).

NO. THE PLACE OF INTERROGATION IS NOT DETERMINATIVE OF THE EXISTENCE OR ABSENCE OF CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION BUT THE TONE AND MANNER OF QUESTIONING BY THE POLICE AUTHORITIES.222 with more so against 3 persons. Such statements are useless EXCEPT AS EVIDENCE AGAINST THE VERY POLICE AUTHORITIES WHO VIOLATED THE SUSPECT’S RIGHTS. even while they were still walking along the highway on their way to the police station. PEOPLE VS. or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the crime. rd .R. Art. III of the Constitution begins when a person is taken into custody for investigation of his possible participation in the commission of a crime. even without the assistance of a lawyer. 135405. i. SEPT.R.e. Such admission. upon their arrest of some of the accused. do not fall under custodial investigation. The protection under Section 12 .. Custodial investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect. G. 2000. 339 SCRA 515. NO. immediately asked them regarding their participation in the commission of the crime . THIS IS SO EVEN IF SUCH STATEMENTS ARE GOSPEL TRUTH AND VOLUNTARILY GIVEN. does not violate appellant’s constitutional rights AND THEREFORE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE. PEOPLE VS. BARIQUIT. when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense. spontaneous statements voluntarily given. G. Thus. 2000. NOVEMBER 29. 346 SCRA 458. PEOPLE VS. MAYORGA. DANO. This is line with the provisions of RA 7438 which makes it applicable even when a person is merely invited for questioning. although not yet in custody. 117690. as where appellant orally admitted killing the victim before the barangay captain (who is neither a police officer nor a law enforcement agent). there was custodial investigation when the police authorities. 1. However. 341 SCRA 600 When custodial investigation is deemed to have started.

Constitutional right to remain silent. 122 SCRA 312 3. 1990 1-a. 117690. 104 SCRA 379 2-a. 142 SCRA 100 3. P vs. 95 SCRA 2 4. P vs. G. P. DANO. NO. P vs. 2000. Duero. G. Marcos Jimenez. regardless of the absence of coercion or the fact that it had been voluntarily given. 339 SCRA 515. Nicandro. Matos-Viduya. an extrajudicial confession must be: (i) voluntary. 1991 Extrajudicial confession. vs. 128551. A suspect’s confession. whether verbal or non-verbal.R. Duhan. P. 2000. Duties of the Police or Arresting Officers Read: 1. and (iv) in writing. 141 SCRA 289 2. PEOPLE VS. Arizona.104 SCRA 1-a. SEPT. People vs. P vs.Escobedo vs.R. counsel of choice Right to counsel during custodial investigation. Ramos. Caguioa. SAMOLDE. is inadmissible in evidence. Dec. 2. To be admissible in evidence. while making an extrajudicial confession 391 in particular . cases Read: 1.223 PEOPLE VS. 1. even if appellant’s confession were gospel truth. Sept. (ii) made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel. without a valid waiver of such assistance. JUL. 31. Guidelines for police investigation Read: 1. 378 US 478 2. (iii) express. 11. Miranda vs. when taken without the assistance of counsel. vs. 384 US 436 3. 10. NO. 336 SCRA 632. Illinois. To be informed of the Right to remain silent.

82604. August 13. but upon his return. the son of the deceased Pelagio Jimenez told his mother that his father had not come home the previous night: that the search for the deceased. Not only was the accused subjected to custodial investigation without counsel. the bathing at the artisian well "as if washing away stains of blood". Marcos and Robert. A lawyer who could just hear the investigation going on while working on another case hardly satisfies the minimum requirements of effective assistance of counsel. commenced a day earlier but it was not until the morning of the following day.No. Marcos agreed to come back and sign his statement. the deceased's violent quarrels with his children and occasions that he had been boxed and hit by his children. such as. December 10. Subsequently. 354 SCRA 413 The accused was under coercive and uncounselled custodial investigation by the police without a lawyer for 2 and a half days . 1991 NARVASA. A draft of the confession was prepared by the investigating officer but Marcos was not able to sign the same due to the absence of the judge before whom it is supposed to be sworn and signed. JIMENEZ G. The police had invited the deceased's widow and her sons for questioning about the killing. vigilant and independent. J.: FACTS: ----------On August 13. came upon the corpse of Pelagio Jimenez below a cliff near a balite tree. an . acting upon a report. We are inclined to believe that when he was brought to the IBP Office. he was brought to the IBP Office where a lawyer assisted him in his extrajudicial confession. refused to sign his statement. In fact. that deceased Pelagio was finally found dead. They also learned from the persons they interviewed of circumstances that drew their suspicion to the son. The police investigators learned that Marcos.R. Then. he. 1985. he was likewise denied effective assistance of counsel during the taking of his extra-judicial confession. who was living separately from them. his body and his will were in no position to raise any objection much less to complaint to the IBP lawyer about what he has gone through. police authorities. PATUNGAN. PEOPLE V. the IBP lawyer was working on an appeal in another case while the extrajudicial confession was being taken.224 PEOPLE VS. The mere presence of a lawyer is not sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement of assistance of counsel. Assistance of counsel must be effective. assisted by a former judge whose presence was requested by the police authorities. 1985.

the trial court absolved the widow and Wilkins of any participation in the filling for lack of proof. In this case. not only because it was obtained in violation of the constitution but also because of the principle of res inter alios acta. ISSUE: ---------Is the extrajudicial confession of Marcos admissible in evidence? HELD: --------No. the supposed waiver made therein of his constitutional right to counsel of his own choice. not one foisted on him by the police investigators or other parties. While she asked him if he had voluntarily given the statements contained in the typewritten document. The lawyer who assists the suspect under custodial interrogation should be of the latter's own choice. and Wilkins. among others. Decision reversed. Section 12 (1). his brother Robert. 1986. Both accused contest such ruling. noting that the unsigned confession is admissible in evidence inasmuch as evidence aliunde corroborated such confession. Neither can the confession prejudice his co-accused. she was the police officers' own choice. the former judge was not present when Marcos was being interrogated by the police. On December 12. Hence this appeal. Marcos. and that (2) said right cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (1) to have a competent and independent counsel of his own choice and if he cannot afford the services of counsel. Hence. This is not the mode of solicitation of legal assistance contemplated by the constitution.225 information for parricide was filed against the widow and her sons. Furthermore. the trial court found Marcos and Robert guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide. Article III OF THE 1987 Constitution declares that a person being investigated by the police as a suspect in an offense has the right. In an order dated July 21. 1986. he must be provided with one. this is far from being substantial compliance with the constitutional duty of police investigators during custodial interrogation. Robert. . The typewritten confession is unsigned and was in fact expressly rejected by Marcos. the former judge whose assistance was requested by the police was evidently not of Marcos Jimenez' own choice. she did not ask Marcos if was is willing to have her represent him.

This was the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of PEOPLE VS. not only the confession but also any admissible obtained in the course thereof are inadmissible against him or his co accused. PANFILO CABILES. and . b. the confession must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel. OBRERO.226 The interrogation of Marcos Jimenez having been conducted without the assistance of counsel. 286 SCRA 207 Melo. In order that a confession is admissible. March 3. if it was made without the assistance of counsel. and d. 284 SCRA 199. BUT GIVEN IN AN ORDINARY MANNER WHEREBY THE ACCUSED ORALLY ADMITTED HAVING COMMITTED THE CRIME. PEOPLE VS. the confession must be in writing. III. inadmissible as evidence. 332 SCRA 190 Mendoza. In view of the inadmissibility in evidence of the confession. intimidation. the confession must be voluntary. As such. exception PEOPLE VS. force. These are: a. violence. the confession must be express. confession which are the product of third degree methods such as torture. J. Section 12 of the Constitution. it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it was voluntarily given. J. are not applicable when the suspect makes an spontaneous statement. threat. There are two (2) kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions under Art. Extrajudicial confession without the assistance of counsel. however. the following requisites must be present: a. PEOPLE VS. the rest of the evidence of the prosecution is inadequate to overcome the presumption of innocence raised by the fundamental law in favor of both the accused. his uncounselled confession is admissible in evidence. The above requirements. ANDAN. Even if the confession of the accused speaks of the truth. not elicited through questioning by the authorities. 1997 when the accused made a voluntary and verbal confession to the Municipal Mayor that he committed the crime imputed to him. and no valid waiver of such right to counsel have been made. TAN. c.

GR No. June 29. P vs. P. 165 SCRA 675 1-e. In fact. Atty. 157 SCRA 261 2. vs.l983 6. PEOPLE VS. P. 183 SCRA 196 3-b. Judge Cruz. Galit. Gamboa vs. There is no compliance of the constitutional requirement of competent and independent counsel to assist an accused during custodial investigation when the accused was assisted by the Station Commander of the WPD. P vs. Art. 1990 1-c. P vs. P. DE LA TORRE VS. Aspili. Alegre. 77116. vs. while being investigated by other policemen of the same police station because the interest of the police is naturally adverse to the accused. January 31. How about if the accused gives an spontaneous statement before he could be advised of his right to remain silent? Read: Aballe vs. the SC in the case of PEOPLE VS.. 1-b. 162 SCRA 675 2. Usman Hassan. People. 294 SCRA 196 4. Waiver of the right to counsel/exceptions/requisites accused as mentioned above . 162 SCRA 642 2 3.227 b. Loveria. November 21. Camalog. 135 SCRA 465 3. 85 SCRA 266 5. P vs. People vs. 1989 (Including the duty of Police Officers in connection with said right) 7. vs. Judge Cruz. Judge Ayson. Jr. Cui. III of the Constitution) 1-d. P. HATTON 4. Draculan vs. 267 SCRA 608 held that a lawyer applying for a position in the NBI could not validly assist an accused being investigated then by the NBI. those which are given without the benefit of Miranda Warnings. JANUARIO. When shall the constitutional rights of the demandable? During police line-up? Read: 1. 175 SCRA 216 (Confession made to the officials of Philippine Airlines during an investigation is admissible in evidence despite the fact that he was not informed of his rights during custodial investigations since said officials are not bound by the requirements of Section 12. Gamboa vs. 187 SCRA 47 1-f. The right to counsel. Borromeo. CA. Pinlac. vs. 94 SCRA 109 4. Donato. 162 SCRA 220 3-a. De los Reyes. People vs.

said lawyer was appointed by the NBI as one of its agents. San Jose del Monte. (NOTE: In the case of PEOPLE VS. ET AL. G. on July 16. March 17.. at Sitio Lambakin. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court.R. 1999. . Alvin Arnaldo y Avena and Joselito Flores y Victorio of the crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.) The next case is very important. RIGHT TO A COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT COUNSEL OF HIS OWN CHOICE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. Bulacan.m. 42-43. the SC held that a lawyer who was at the NBI Office applying for a position therein and who was appointed as counsel for a suspect being then investigated by the NBI could not be considered as the competent and independent counsel referred to in the Constitution especially so that later on. The accusatory portion of the information reads: The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice hereby accuses Domingo Reyes y Paje. Cristo. J. February 7. the above-named accused conspiring. Juanerio ruling. JUANERIO. 1997. JEREZ. barangay Sto. as amended. It diminishes the right to counsel during custodial investigation and makes the work of the investigator easier to make the confession of a suspect admissible as evidence. 178300. No.228 PEOPLE VS. committed as follows: That on or about 11:00 p. pp. 2009 CHICO-NAZARIO. 285 SCRA 393 A lawyer provided by the investigators to the accused during the custodial investigation is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection against the former’s appointment during the course of the investigation AND THE ACCUSED THEREAFTER SUBSCRIBES TO THE VERACITY OF HIS STATEMENT BEFORE THE SWEARING OFFICER. It is obviously a reversal of the People vs. DOMINGO REYES. an Information250[4] was filed before the RTC charging appellants with the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide. confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping themselves together with Juanito Pataray y Cayaban.: On 11 August 1999. Federico Pataray y Cabayan and Rommel 250[4] Records.

Raymond and Jona Abagatnan (Abagatnan) stepped out of the van with appellants Reyes and Arnaldo. 3-7. the van stopped. 26 October 1999. Ronald Matthew Yao. who are still at large. 11 August 2000. said accused with intent to kill. Robert and Raymond (children). wife of Robert). Rous) and Atty. 26 October 1999. Cristo. 3-14. poked their guns at Yao San. Uminga).253[8] Later. San Jose del Monte. The Yao family owns and operates a poultry farm in Barangay Santo Cristo. taken together.000. TSN. and Jona Abagatnan and Josephine Ortea (housemaids). 16-17. by means of force and intimidation and with use of firearms. Yao San alighted from the van to open the gate of the farm. Appellant Reyes and Pataray also boarded the van. Charlene Yao. On 16 July 1999.m. that during the detention of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymong Yao. Records. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and their cohorts then blindfolded each member of the Yao family inside the van with packaging tape. PO3 Roberto Jabien.000. Appellant Flores and his male companion told Yao San to produce the amount of five million pesos (P5. TSN. Their testimonies. Matthew and Charlene (grandchildren). . the Yao family. Appellant Flores took the driver’s seat and drove the van. appellant Reyes and a certain Juanito Pataray (Pataray) approached. pp. Bulacan. Carlo Uminga (Atty. unlawfully and feloniously. Lenny (daughter-in-law.229 Libarnes y Acejo. pp. all armed with guns. 34. p. on board a Mazda MVP van. carry away and deprive Robert Yao. at about 11:00 p. Thereupon. Florimond Rous (Atty. pp. drove the van with the remaining members of the Yao family inside the vehicle.00) as 251[6] 252[7] 253[8] TSN. Yao San.000. did then and there willfully. 21 September 2000. appellants Arnaldo and Flores.251[6] After about 30 minutes of traveling on the road.000. Chua Ong Ping Sim. 2.00). willfully and unlawfully strangled Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond Yao to death to the damage and prejudice of their heirs in such amount as may be awarded to them by this Honorable Court. with two male companions. arrived and immediately boarded the van. Bulacan. the van stopped again. Pataray and one of their male companions. Jona Abagatnan ang Josephine Ortea against their will and consent on board their Mazda MVP van for the purpose of extorting money in the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5. TSN. pp. San Jose del Monte. Robert. Chua Ong Ping Sim. At this juncture. Atty. TSN. Robert Yao (Robert).. 7. p. Raymond Yao. and dragged him inside the van. attest to the following: The Yao family is composed of Yao San (father). Police Officer 3 (PO3) Alex Alberto. arrived at the their poultry farm in Barangay Sto. Yao San. The prosecution presented as witnesses Jona Abagatnan (Abagatnan). Lennie Yao. 11 August 2000.252[7] Appellant Flores. Per order of appellants and their cohorts. with the other male companion. Chua Ong Ping Sim (mother).8.

4-7. Robert and appellants left the safehouse. but the latter could not be reached. TSN. Bulacan where they spent the whole night.. 10-12. . at around 4:00 a. 7 December 1999. Raymond and Abagatnan were taken on foot by appellants Reyes and Arnaldo. Litex Road. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and one male companion escorted Abagatnan in proceeding to the poultry farm. but the latter could not be found. Yao San clarified to appellants that he did not report the incident to the police and also pleaded with them to spare the life of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond. 16-23. Upon arriving at the poultry farm. 7 December 1999. Robert. Appellants then instructed Yao San to appear and bring with him the ransom of P5 million at 3:00 p. 8. Yao San drove the van towards the poultry farm and sought the help of relatives. Abagatnan searched for Yao San. p.255[10] On the morning of the following day.230 ransom in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim.m. TSN. in the Usan dumpsite. Thereafter. appellants instructed Abagatnan to look for Yao San in the poultry farm. appellants abandoned Robert. and after 30 minutes of trekking. Robert. appellants again called Yao San via a cellular phone and threatened to kill Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond because of newspaper and radio reports regarding the incident. pp. appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and their male companion left Abagatnan in the poultry farm and went back to the safehouse. but none of the 254[9] 255[10] 256[11] 257[12] 258[13] Id.257[12] On 18 July 1999. Records. Robert also told Yao San that Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were still held by appellants and their cohorts. while Yao San. Fairview. appellants and their cohorts tried to contact Yao San regarding the ransom demanded. appellants called Yao San through a cellular phone and demanded the ransom of P5 million for Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond. Robert found Yao San and informed him about the ransom demanded by the appellants. Robert then ran towards the poultry farm. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo told Abagatnan to remind Yao San about the ransom demanded. 11 August 2000. Charlene and Josephine remained inside the van. pp. TSN. pp. at 7-8..258[13] On the morning of 19 July 1999. pp. Yao San acceded to appellants’ demand. Upon sensing that the kidnappers had already left. Upon arriving therein.m. Matthew. Chua Ong Ping Sim. TSN.256[11] In the safe-house. Lenny. 2-5.m. Raymond and Abagatnan. pp. Quezon City. appellant Flores and his male companion left the van and fled. 11 August 2000. appellants told Robert that they would release him so he could help Abagatnan in locating Yao San. 35. Appellants allowed Yao San to talk with Chua Ong Ping Sim. Thereafter. 26 October 1999.9. Pataray and one male companion to a safe-house situated in the mountainous part of San Jose Del Monte.254[9] Meanwhile. Id. TSN. Yao San arrived at the designated place of the pay-off at 4:00 p. Thus.

at 13-14 & 33. Wilfredo Celestino. Thereafter. He accepted the invitation. 8-9. p. Pataray and a certain Tata and Akey as his co-participants in the incident. Jr. and Isidro Arnaldo. with the assistance of Atty. Yao San waited for appellant’s call. while he was at the tricycle terminal of Brgy. Records. Robert and Abagatnan as their kidnappers. at 5.262 [17] Subsequently. Id. Batangas. . appellant Arnaldo. agents of the PAOCTF arrested appellant Flores in Balayan. Their testimonies. He narrated that on 25 July 1999. appellant Reyes was arrested in Sto. 7 December 1999. Yao San left. Appellant Arnaldo identified appellants Reyes and Flores. Thereupon. Appellant Flores identified appellants Reyes and Arnaldo. Rachel C. Rous. pp. Ramos. Records. but none came. appellant Arnaldo surrendered to the Presidential AntiOrganized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) at Camp Crame. executed a written extra-judicial confession detailing his participation in the incident.263[18] On 10 August 1999. 14-15. Colonel Mancao told him that the PAOCTF would arrest Brgy. the defense presented the testimonies of appellants. Appellants denied any liability and interposed alibis and the defense of frame-up.260[15] Both died of asphyxia by strangulation. & 38. 63-64 & 302-306. Irene Flores Celestino. 12. Thus. Appellant Arnaldo also described the physical features of his cohorts and revealed their whereabouts. Sto. Colonel Mancao instructed him to identify 259[14] 260[15] 261[16] 262[17] 263[18] 264[19] Id. & 24-28. Novaliches.. appellant Flores. Bulacan. a police officer named Liwanag of the PAOCTF approached and invited him to go to Camp Crame to shed light on a kidnapping case allegedly committed by a certain Brgy. TSN. with the assistance of Atty. 8. Pataray and a certain Tata and Akey as his co-participants in the incident. Quezon City. Marina Reyes. appellants Arnaldo and Reyes were identified in a police line-up by Yao San. Id. Cristo. at 46-48. Id. pp.231 appellants or their cohorts showed up. Afterwards. 35. 11 August 2000. Robert and Abagatnan as one of their kidnappers. pp. pp. Uminga. Capt. Ramos and certain persons named Gerry Bautista and Dadie Bautista. 15-17. he proceeded to Camp Crame and met therein Colonel Cesar Mancao III (Colonel Mancao) of the PAOCTF.259[14] On 23 July 1999. Appellant Flores was subsequently identified in a police line-up by Yao San. 35.261[16] On 26 July 1999. the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were found at the La Mesa Dam. San Jose del Monte. as corroborated by their witnesses. are as follows: Appellant Arnaldo testified that he was an “asset” of the PAOCTF. TSN. executed a written extra-judicial confession narrating his participation in the incident. Subsequently. TSN. Quezon City. Captain Ramos and by members of the Aguirre and Bautista families. Bulacan.264[19] For its part. Cristo. 12-14. San Jose del Monte. 11 August 2000.

and that appellant Arnaldo implicated him in the kidnapping of the family because appellant Arnaldo held a grudge against him. Cristo. 7 June 2001. TSN. a certain Major Paulino utilized him as a drug pusher. and that appellant Arnaldo 265[31] 266[32] 267[33] 268[34] TSN.266[32] He denied having met with Atty. 3-10. that he never met nor did he know Atty.m. since the two had previously mauled him after he sold their fighting cocks and failed to give them the proceeds of the sale. where he was beaten up by policemen for refusing to admit involvement in the kidnapping of the Yao family. TSN.000. he was forced to sign a document which he later found out to be a written extra-judicial confession. that he had no involvement in the kidnapping of the family. Upon arriving thereat. Colonel Mancao gave him P30.232 said persons as responsible for the kidnapping of the Yao family. He refused to do so because he feared Brgy.00. where he was subsequently tortured.267[33] On the other hand. Upon failing to remit the proceeds of the drug sale. that he knew the Yao family because he lived near the family’s poultry farm. five policemen barged into his house and arrested him. He was not assisted by the latter when he was forced by the PAOCTF to make a written extra-judicial confession on the kidnapping of the Yao family. The day after. Bulacan.265[31] Subsequently. Ramos. He accepted Yao San’s offer under the condition that he would identify a different set of suspects. Later. Uminga. pp. pp. of 16 July 1999 until the morning of the next day. San Jose del Monte. he claimed that while he was under the custody of PAOCTF. that after three days of beating. 6 March 2001. Sto. appellant Reyes testified that he slept in his house with his family from 6:00 p. at 10-16. appellant Flores testified that he stayed in his sister’s house at Antipolo City from 12 July 1999 up to 30 July 1999. 3-14. . he pointed to appellants Reyes and Flores as his cohorts in kidnapping the Yao family. TSN. Colonel Mancao called appellant Arnaldo to his office. that the policemen forcibly brought him to Camp Crame. 10 July 2001.000. pp. Further. the latter saw Yao San. that he had no participation in the kidnapping of the family.00. 3-6. that the policemen told him that he was a suspect in the kidnapping of the Yao family. that he knew the Yao family because he worked as a carpenter in the family’s poultry farm at Brgy. pp. Rous. that he was arrested in Batangas and thereafter brought to Camp Crame. Id. he would give him P500. He implicated appellants Reyes and Flores to get even with them. that he worked as a construction worker during his stay in his sister’s house. Capt.268[34] For his part. he was beaten up by PAOCTF agents and thereafter included as accused with appellants Reyes and Flores for the kidnapping of the Yao family. that he went to her house on 12 July 1999 because it was the birthday of her child. 21 August 2001. and he used to work therein as a welder. that on the early morning of 26 July 1999. Yao San promised him that if their kidnappers would be apprehended through his cooperation. 3-21. that he was mauled by the policemen outside his house.

the RTC rendered a Decision dated 26 February 2002 convicting appellants of the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide and sentencing each of them to suffer the supreme penalty of death. 61. Records.233 implicated him in the kidnapping of the family because he and appellant Reyes had mauled appellant Arnaldo several years ago. 357.000.272 [38] After trial. Appellants were also ordered to pay jointly and severally the Yao family P150.000.000. to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of deceased Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond Yao in the amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150. p. It also decreased the amount of civil indemnity from P150. On 14 August 2006.00 as civil indemnity. including the heirs of the deceased. in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500. pursuant to our ruling in People v. and to pay the costs of the proceedings.R. it directed appellants to pay jointly and severally the Yao family P100. and JOSELITO FLORES y VICTORIO guilty as principals beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH (DOUBLE) HOMICIDE as charged. CA rollo. Further. ALVIN ARNALDO y AVENA. 24 May 2001.00 as moral damages and the costs of the proceedings.00 as exemplary damages. However. the instant case was elevated to us for automatic review. Nos.269[35] The defense proffered documentary and object evidence to buttress their foregoing claims.000.000. and all the private offended parties or victims. they are hereby sentenced each to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH as mandated by law. to wit: (1) prayer booklet of appellant Arnaldo (Exhibit 1 for appellant Arnaldo). The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads: WHEREFORE. subject to the corresponding filing fee as a first lien.000. G.00) as moral damages.271[37] and (3) pictures allegedly showing appellant Flores working as a carpenter in Antipolo City (Exhibits 1 & 2 for appellant Flores). p. The appellate court reduced the penalty imposed by the RTC on each of the appellants from death penalty to reclusion perpetua without the possibility of parole.270[36] (2) calling card of Colonel Mancao (Exhibit 2 for appellant Arnaldo). Index of Exhibits. P500. .273[39] By reason of the death penalty imposed on each of the appellants. The fallo of the Court of Appeals’ decision states: 269[35] 270[36] 271[37] 272[38] 273[39] 274[40] TSN. 7 July 2004. pp. 2-9. 433 SCRA 640.000.274[40] we remanded the instant case to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition.00 to P100. 147678-87. Id. Volume VI. Records. the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming with modifications the RTC Decision.00).00. Mateo. finding herein three (3) accused DOMINGO REYES y PAJE.

dated February 26. that the agents of the PAOCTF suggested the availability of Atty. because they were obtained in violation of his co-appellants’ constitutional right to have an independent counsel of their own choice during custodial investigation. One of the main issues raised is: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF APPELLANT ARNALDO AND APPELLANT FLORES. Appellant Reyes alleges that the agents of the PAOCTF did not ask his co-appellants during the custodial investigation whether they had a lawyer of their own choice. 1611-M-99 convicting accused-appellants of the crime of Kidnapping For Ransom with (Double) Homicide. Rous to his co-appellants.234 WHEREFORE. 2002. . premises considered. because it was obtained in violation of his constitutional right to have an independent counsel of his own choice during custodial investigation. and 3) accused-appellants are further ordered to pay private complainants the amount of P100. He maintains. that said extra-judicial confessions are inadmissible in evidence. however. Uminga and Atty. Appellant Reyes also asseverates that the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores cannot be utilized against him. 2) the award of civil indemnity ex delicto is hereby reduced to P100. in Criminal Case No.275 [41] Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ Decision but this was denied. He avers that he was not assisted by any lawyer from the time he was arrested until he 275[41] Rollo. Bulacan. and whether they could afford to hire a lawyer. Appellant Reyes claims that his alleged participation in the kidnapping of the Yao family was based solely on the written extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores. Rous were associates of the PAOCTF. 34.000. torture and without the assistance of a lawyer. Uminga and Atty.000. is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that: 1) accused-appellants are instead sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He insists that his written extra-judicial confession was elicited through force.00 as exemplary damages. and that Atty. the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos. appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on 25 August 2006. Appellant Flores argues that his written extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence. Hence. Branch 12. p.

(3) it must be express. . People v. 612 (1995). when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the accused. and that the agents of the PAOCTF suggested the availability of Atty. Cruz. 251 SCRA 626. that he was forced to sign it because he could not anymore endure the beatings he suffered at the hands of the PAOCTF agents. Gamboa v. Base. L-56291. G. 803. 29 December 1995.278 [70] The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. 454 Phil. G. Appellant Arnaldo contends that his written extra-judicial confession should be excluded as evidence. and (4) it must be in writing. People v.279[71] The right to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation. Uminga to him. 839 (2004). the choice of the accused.277[69] Such right contemplates effective communication which results in the subject understanding what is conveyed. (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel. 282[74] 276[67] 277[69] 278[70] 279[71] 280[72] 281[73] 282[74] People v.R.235 was coerced to sign the purported confession.R. 162 SCRA 642. had assisted him during the custodial investigation. 119 (2002). 103499. 102. 147. 594. that the agents of the PAOCTF did not ask him during the custodial investigation whether he had a lawyer of his own choice. No. the lawyer should ascertain that the confession was made voluntarily. No. Thus.280[72] The lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be. 464 Phil. 653.281[73] A competent and independent counsel is logically required to be present and able to advice and assist his client from the time the latter answers the first question asked by the investigator until the signing of the confession. 434 Phil. People v. People v. and that he never met or knew Atty. and that the person under investigation fully understood the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession vis-a-vis his constitutional rights. 310 Phil. He claims that he was not given freedom to choose his counsel. according to the PAOCTF. People v. he should be competent and independent. Olermo.e. 815 (2000). 27 June 1988. If the lawyer is one furnished in behalf of accused. Agustin. 824. as far as reasonably possible. Deniega. 385 Phil. 637.. Velarde. we have held that an extra-judicial confession is admissible in evidence if the following requisites have been satisfied: (1) it must be voluntary. and whether he could afford to hire a lawyer. 276 [67] The right of an accused to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. Rous who. Moreover. he must be willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused. that is. Sayaboc. as it was procured in violation of his constitutional right to have an independent counsel of his own choice during custodial investigation. i. 165 (2003).

Rous attested to the veracity of the afore-cited facts in their respective court testimonies. As regards appellant Arnaldo. the foregoing rule is not intended to deter to the accused from confessing guilt if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires. Appellants Arnaldo and Flores and their respective counsels. 25 September 2001 and 27 September 2001. After the PAOCTF investigators 283[75] 284[76] 285[77] People v.285[77] Indeed. Uminga. TSN. the PAOCTF agents explained to them that they had a constitutional right to remain silent. To be an effective counsel. Thereafter. When asked if they had a lawyer of their own. 312-318. exercised their fundamental rights after being informed thereof. pp. while appellant Flores agreed to be represented by Atty. so that they could freely converse. They were also told that they were entitled to a counsel of their own choice. because it appeared certain that appellants had understood and. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him. Atty. Atty. Atty. Records reflect that appellants Arnaldo and Reyes were likewise accorded their right to competent and independent counsel during their respective custodial investigations. The Pasubali284[76] of appellants Arnaldo and Flores’s written extrajudicial confessions clearly shows that before they made their respective confessions. a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. The counsel should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. the PAOCTF investigators had informed them that the interrogation about to be conducted on them referred to the kidnapping of the Yao family. Rous. the language spoken and understood by them. and that anything they would say may be used against them in a court of law. it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion on the accused to admit something false. also signed and thumbmarked the extra-judicial confessions. . rather. Atty. Base. Thereafter. they replied in the affirmative. appellant Arnaldo replied that he would be assisted by Atty. in fact. and that they would be provided with one if they had none. but. Uminga testified that prior to the questioning of appellant Arnaldo about the incident. Uminga and Atty. Rous. the appraisal of appellants’ constitutional rights was not merely perfunctory. Uminga told the PAOCTF investigators and agents to give him and appellant Arnaldo space and privacy. when asked if they understood their said rights. The appraisal of their constitutional rights was done in the presence of their respective lawyers and in the Tagalog dialect. supra note 67. Records. Uminga and Atty.236 However.283[75] We have gone over the records and found that the PAOCTF investigators have duly apprised appellants Arnaldo and Flores of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel of their own choice during their respective custodial investigations. but to protect him from admitting what he is being coerced to admit although untrue.

5-9. He requested appellant Arnaldo to remove his shirt for him to check if there were torture marks on his body.237 and agents left them. He warned appellant Arnaldo that he might be sentenced to death if he confessed involvement in the incident. Appellant Arnaldo answered that he would face the consequences because he was bothered by his conscience. Appellant Arnaldo answered in the negative. His conference with appellant Arnaldo lasted for 15 minutes or more. After the taking of appellant Arnaldo’s confession. He asked appellant Flores why he wanted to give such confession.286[78] Further. Atty. Thereafter. He also observed that appellant Arnaldo’s appearance and movements were normal. Appellant Flores replied that he was a suspect in the kidnapping of the Yao family. He instructed appellant Arnaldo to read and comprehend the same carefully. He told appellant Arnaldo to ask him for clarification and comment if he did not agree or understand any part of his written confession. . He asked appellant Flores whether he would accept his assistance as his lawyer. Appellant Arnaldo replied that he wanted to make a confession about his participation in the kidnapping of the Yao family. but he found none. Rous declared that before the PAOCTF investigators began questioning appellant. He asked appellant Flores about his personal circumstances. and that he was not being forced to sign. Atty. Appellant Flores told him that he wanted to 286[78] 287[79] TSN. Appellant Flores affirmed that he would. Upon obtaining such copy. Appellant Arnaldo replied in the negative. Rous warned appellant Flores that his confession would be used against him in a court of law. Uminga asked him if he had objections to it. he asked appellant Arnaldo if the latter would accept his assistance as his lawyer for purposes of his confession. he and appellant Arnaldo affixed their signatures to the written confession. He then reminded appellant Arnaldo that the latter could still change his mind. pp. Id. Appellant Arnaldo read his entire written confession and handed it to him. Uminga requested the PAOCTF investigators to give him a copy of appellant Arnaldo’s confession. he and appellant Arnaldo went to a cubicle where only the two of them were present. he read it entirely and thereafter gave it to appellant Arnaldo. where only the two of them were present. Appellant Arnaldo manifested that he would sign his written confession. 27 September 2001. Rous interviewed him in Tagalog inside a room. Atty. Appellant Flores answered that he was bothered by his conscience. Atty. He interviewed appellant Arnaldo in the Tagalog language regarding the latter’s personal circumstances and asked him why he was in the PAOCTF office and why he wanted a lawyer. at 9-15. Atty.287[79] With respect to appellant Flores. Uminga sat beside appellant Arnaldo during the inquiry and listened to the latter’s entire confession. Atty. and that the death penalty might be imposed on him. he allowed the PAOCTF investigators to question appellant Arnaldo. and he wanted to give a confession regarding his involvement in the said incident. Later. He inquired from appellant Arnaldo if he was harmed or intimidated into giving self-incriminating statements to the PAOCTF investigators. Thereupon. Appellant Arnaldo agreed.

supra note 74. 5. Although Atty. Velarde.293[85] Part of Atty. 2-14. In fact. Rous’ duty as member of the said group was to render legal assistance to the indigents including suspects under custodial investigation. TSN. he instructed appellant Flores to read and check his written confession. he. clarified that he had been separated therefrom since 1994291[83] when he went into private practice.294[86] In People v.289[81] It is true that it was the PAOCTF which contacted and suggested the availability of Atty. one who will effectively undertake his client’s defense without any intervening conflict of interest. Id. Rous to appellants Arnaldo and Flores. Nonetheless. Appellant Flores read the same and made some minor corrections.238 tell the truth and unload the burden on his mind. Uminga’s telephone number was listed on the directory of his former NBI officemates detailed at the PAOCTF. public or private 288[80] 289[81] 290[82] 291[83] 292[84] 293[85] 294[86] 295[87] TSN. 25 September 2001. at 14-19. Id. at 6. he cautioned appellant Flores about the serious consequences of his confession. He requested appellant Flores to lift his shirt for the former to verify if there were torture marks or bruises on his body. 4-5. Fabro. Rous. Uminga testified that he was a former National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent. Rous. Id. Rous stayed with appellant Flores while the latter was giving statements to the PAOCTF investigators. this does not automatically imply that their right to counsel was violated. 27 September 2001. Uminga and Atty.292[84] It appears that Atty. but the latter maintained that he wanted to tell the truth.290[82] There was no conflict of interest with regard to the legal assistance rendered by Atty. Again. but found none.288[80] Additionally. because he happened to be the lawyer manning the office when the PAOCTF called. Uminga and Atty. Atty. Both counsels had no interest adverse to appellants Arnaldo and Flores. Rous had organizational or personal links to the PAOCTF. Uminga declared under oath that he was a private practitioner when he assisted appellant Arnaldo during the custodial investigation. respectively. nevertheless.295[87] we stated: The Constitution further requires that the counsel be independent. Atty. He also read appellant Flores’ written confession. thus. Supra note 65 at 726. p. Atty. What the Constitution requires is the presence of competent and independent counsel. on the other hand. he cannot be a special counsel. After the taking of appellant Flores’ statements. he proceeded to the PAOCTF office to assist appellant Flores. TSN. . Quezon City at the time he rendered legal assistance to appellant Flores. Thereafter. pp. People v. Uminga was called by the PAOCTF to assist appellant Arnaldo. There was no evidence showing that Atty. was a member of the Free Legal Aid Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. because Atty. he permitted the PAOCTF investigators to question appellant Flores. he and appellant Flores signed the latter’s written confession. pp. Afterwards. 25 September 2001.

651. is not available to protect his interest.297[89] Appellants Arnaldo and Flores did not object to the appointment of Atty. People v.R. respectively. supra note 67. as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. Since the prosecution has sufficiently established that the respective extrajudicial confessions of appellant Arnaldo and appellant Flores were obtained in accordance with the constitutional guarantees. Nor is there any evidence that he had any interest adverse to that of the accused. Rous countersigned the written extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores. Uminga and Atty. an accused is entitled to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.299[91] 296[88] 297[89] 298[90] 299[91] People v. 428 SCRA 633. Rous as their lawyers. Prior to their questioning. Jungco does not fall under any of said enumeration. for one reason or another. . Rous. respectively. 468 Phil. 944. 20 May 2004. supra note 65. Mojello. as earlier stated. They are evidence of a high order because of the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime. 954 (2004). G. and not a lackey of the lawmen. People v. under Section 12(1). Further. Appellant Arnaldo manifested that he would be assisted by Atty. while appellant Flores agreed to be counseled by Atty. Rous. counsel of the police. and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer. Nos. The phrase “preferably of his own choice” does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense. nay. The indelible fact is that he was president of the Zambales Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. the burden of proving that undue pressure or duress was used to procure the confessions rests on appellants Arnaldo and Flores. Bagnate. or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to that of the accused. Uminga and Atty. obstruct. Hence. the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who. People v. Article III of the 1987 Constitution.296 [88] While the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under custodial interrogation cannot afford the services of counsel – or where the preferred lawyer is not available – is naturally lodged in the police investigators. Atty. appellants Arnaldo and Flores conferred with Atty. 133685-86. Atty. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise any objection to the counsel’s appointment during the course of the investigation.239 prosecutor. Rous. Base. Otherwise.298[90] Consequently. Fabro. Uminga and Atty. respectively. during their custodial investigation. the tempo of custodial investigation would be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede. appellants Arnaldo and Flores are deemed to have engaged the services of Atty. the suspect has the final choice. Uminga. these confessions are admissible. Uminga and Atty. unless prompted by truth and conscience.

(2) where they failed to complain to the officers who administered the oaths. we have ruled that although an extra-judicial confession is admissible only against the confessant. 582 (1986). Records also bear out that they were physically examined by doctors before they made their confessions. They did not submit any medical report showing that their bodies were subjected to violence or torture. appellants Arnaldo and Flores declared in their respective confessions that they were not forced or harmed in giving their sworn statements. Pia. they did not present any plausible proof to substantiate their claims. . 377. and that they were not promised or given any award in consideration of the same. the confession exhibits no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity. appellants Arnaldo and Flores failed to discharge their burden of proving that they were forced or coerced to make their respective confessions. supra note 90. at 19. Id. Alvarez. People v. Bagnate. 88451. it being replete with details which could only be supplied by the accused. G. 201 SCRA 364.R. upon its face. Appellants Arnaldo and Flores averred that they informed their family members/relatives of the alleged maltreatment.302[94] we held that the following factors indicate voluntariness of an extra-judicial confession: (1) where the accused failed to present credible evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on their persons. (4) where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies. Other than their self-serving statements that they were maltreated by the PAOCTF officers/agents.301[93] In People v. p. that 300[92] 301[93] 302[94] 303[95] 304[96] 305[97] Records. Santos v. jurisprudence makes it admissible as corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to establish the guilt of his co-accused. and (5) where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim. during and after its occurrence. It should also be noted that the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores are replete with details on the manner in which the kidnapping was committed.240 In the case at bar.305[97] we ruled that where the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation by the co-conspirator. On the contrary.304[96] In People v.300[92] Their physical examination reports certify that no external signs of physical injury or any form of trauma were noted during their examination. 1175. Sandiganbayan. No. 229 Phil. Their extra-judicial confessions clearly state how appellants and their cohorts planned the kidnapping as well as the sequence of events before. 5 September 1991. (3) where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment. 577. 18. The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language if. 400 Phil.303[95] With respect to appellant Reyes’s claim that the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores cannot be used in evidence against him. Neither did they file complaints against the persons who had allegedly beaten or forced them to execute their respective confessions despite several opportunities to do so. but the latter did not report such allegations to proper authorities. 1206 (2000). thereby ruling out the possibility that these were involuntarily made.

an examination of the records shows that while accused-appellant was represented by Atty. Thereafter.” during the early stages of trial. admissible as corroborative and circumstantial evidence to prove appellant Reyes’ guilt. the latter withdrew her appearance with the conformity of the former as early as July 28. p. approved by the RTC in its Order dated August 4. it being clear from other facts and circumstances presented that persons other than the declarants themselves participated in the commission of the crime charged and proved. Reyes. Appellants Arnaldo and Flores stated in their respective confessions that appellant Reyes participated in their kidnapping of the Yao family. PEOPLE. Jocelyn P. also admissible as circumstantial evidence against their co-accused implicated therein to show the probability of the latter’s actual participation in the commission of the crime. therefore. 2000. They are what is commonly known as interlocking confession and constitute an exception to the general rule that extrajudicial confessions/admissions are admissible in evidence only against the declarants thereof. J. PEDRO CONSULTA VS. These statements are. Rollo. No. Paggao from the Public Defender’s (Attorney’s) Office of Makati City.307[3] (Underscoring supplied) 306[98] 307 [3] 230 Phil. 560.R. February 12. Since the accused-appellant was already represented by a member of the Philippine Bar who principally handled his defense. 574 (1986). In People v. are identical with each other in their material respects and confirmatory of the other. accused-appellant was represented by Atty. albeit unsuccessfully. They are also admissible as corroborative evidence against the others. G. They are.241 confession is receivable as evidence against a co-accused. who “seems not a lawyer. 2000 and subsequently. RIGHT TO COUNSEL The person who assisted him in court during his arraignment and pre-trial is not a lawyer. 169 . 2009 CARPIO MORALES. then he cannot now be heard to complain about having been denied of due process. 17942. Encipido306[98] we elucidated as follows: It is also to be noted that APPELLANTS’ extrajudicial confessions were independently made without collusion.: On the matter of accused-appellant’s claim of having been denied due process. Rainald C. therefore.

Tampus. Marcos. July 4. P. 1990 1-d. May 9.R. 249. Lasac. Buenaflor. Nolasco. . 181 SCRA 225 2. 148 SCRA 624 13. P vs. 183 SCRA 12 1-g. 144 SCRA 516 decision is widely How about if the lawyer who assisted him during custodial investigation is a public attorney who was not chosen by the accused himself but given to him free of charge? The extrajudicial confession is inadmissible as evidence. 163 SCRA 623 1-b. P vs. 96 SCRA 624 3. P vs. August 20. P vs. 1989. 57 SCRA 481 1-a. P vs. Jara. Estacio vs. 153 SCRA 471 8. P. 173 SCRA 243. P. Sandiganbayan. Pecardal. 80 SCRA 589 14. 162 SCRA 422 1-c. P vs. P vs. January 17.242 That appellant’s first counsel may not have been a member of the bar does not dent the proven fact that appellant prevented Nelia and company from proceeding to their destination. The right to counsel. Ampo-an. 153 SCRA 700 9. 1990 1-e. Kidagan. 108 SCRA 373 4. vs. P vs. vs. No. Tawat. People v. Hernandez. 150 SCRA 113 7. who prepared the petition for habeas corpus and the appellant’s brief. P vs. 147 SCRA 204 (Note that this criticized by constitutionalists) 6. Pena. Taylaran. P. July 31. 1980 ll. Saludar. At any rate.” (Underscoring supplied) Read also: 1. Ladrera. Elesterio308[4] enlightens: “As for the circumstance that the defense counsel turned out later to be a non-lawyer. P vs. Marquez. Nulla. vs. P vs. Caguioa. it is observed that he was chosen by the accused himself and that his representation does not change the fact that Elesterio was undeniably carrying an unlicensed firearm when he was arrested. 63971. P vs. 154 SCRA 513 10. P vs. Olvis. P. Further. 129 SCRA 431 5. P vs. 1990 1-f. he has since been represented by a member of the Philippine bar. 145 SCRA 624 12. vs. appellant was afforded competent representation by the Public Attorneys’ Office during the presentation by the prosecution of the medico-legal officer and during the presentation of his evidence. Read: 308 [4] G.

vs. 149 SCRA 496 5-a. Abano. Enrile. 133 SCRA 651 . P vs. Nera vs.1987 6. vs. Duero.. September 28. 121 SCRA 538 4. l987 5. Hizon. P vs. Diokno vs. 133 SCRA 426 7. Read: P. P vs. Cruz. Alegria. 164 SCRA 1 6. cases in general/when does these rights demandable? Effect of its nonobservance by the investigator Read: 1. 144 SCRA 516 3. P vs.243 P. January 7. 152 SCRA 27 1-b. Tolentino. Auditor Genral. Salig. P vs. 154 SCRA 513 1-c. Albofera. Morales vs. Matos-Viduaya. P vs. Jara. 1990 5. 145 SCRA 597 5. 133 SCRA 59 6. P vs. Capitin. Rojas. P vs. September 11. Decierdo. Prudente. January 8. P vs. P vs. P vs. The Fiscal is the counsel for the State. P vs. Gamboa vs. 162 SCRA 642 1-b. 1990 Could the Fiscal also represent the accused during custodial investigation to satisfy the requirement of the Constitution that the accused is assisted by counsel? No. Ponce Enrile. P vs. 145 SCRA 555 4. 152 SCRA 123 1-a. P vs. Presumptions on extrajudicial confessions(that official acts were regularly performed as against the presumption against waiver of constitutional rights) Read: 1. Cruz. 165 SCRA 47 1-a. Velasco. not the accused or the suspect. 110 SCRA 319 2. Lasanas. Right to remain silent and to counsel and the right to be informed of such rights. Santiago. P vs. Olvis. Is the right to counsel indispensable in non-criminal proceedings? Read: 1. 163 SCRA 760 1-c. 110 SCRA 140 3. P vs. 104 SCRA 379 2.

Pangasinan.. 4. supra 2. of the same day. 2002 En Banc Facts: 1. tree" presumption of extrajudicial confession? PEOPLE VS. 162 SCRA 714. accused-appellant and his cousin went to look for 6-year old Maria Lourdes Galinato. 144 SCRA 576 3. carrying Tisay who was crying and struggling. in the poblacion and noticed that they smelled liquor when they greeted her. RONNIE GARCIA were drinking gin in a canteen in Urdaneta. Who can object to the admissibility of an Read: 1. accused-appellant and his cousin. accused still held guilty by the Supreme Court.m. July 2. ROLANDO FELIXMINIA y CAMACHO GR No. In the morning of September 19. 3. Inadmissible as evidence a. P vs. . 2. also known as Tisay and found her playing inside a jeepney and took her. In the early afternoon of the same day. of the same day.m. Jara. 1990 8.. Stonehill vs. 1995. Mangunay again saw the accused-appellant walking along Ambrosio St. At around 2:45 p. Trinidad. At around 10 a. loveria. P.244 8 P vs. The doctrine of the "fruit of the poisoned Even if the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible as evidence. March 20. Diokno. vs. when the regularity does not apply 7. Rosita Mangunay saw both persons walking along Ambrosio St. She claimed that she clearly saw the accused-appellant since they were walking towards each other coming from opposite directions. 125333.

11. The court admitted as evidence the extrajudicial confession of the accusedappellant and used the same as one of the grounds in support of the judgment of conviction. After trial. accused-appellant was brought to the Urdaneta Police Station where he admitted that he raped.m. 9. The police authorities gave chase and finally caught him after twenty (20) exhausting hours. 7. After his arrest. INDEED. Meanwhile. A. By 5 p. 6.. saw accused-appellant pass their house carrying a child who looked about 5-6 years old. proceeded to the house of the accused-appellant. 10. At about the same time. killed and buried Maria Lourdes near the Macalong River in Barangay San Vicente. Whether the lower court erred in convicting in convicting the accused-appellant? Held: . of that same day.m. Upon receipt of the information that the child was last seen with the accused-appellant. Pangasinan. 12. the police together with the Barangay Captains of Camantiles and Bayaoas. to 6:30 p. Urdaneta. Pangasinan. Before 3 to 4 p. the trial court (RTC 45 presided over by JUDGE JOVEN COSTALES) rendered a judgment of conviction and imposing the penalty of death to the accused-appellant. Is the extrajudicial confession of the accused –appellant admissible in evidence? 2. THE BODY OF TISAY WAS FOUND IN THE PLACE WHICH HE DESCRIBED DURING HIS CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.m. while UNDER INVESTIGATION WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF A LAWYER. 8. the accused-appellant jumped out of the window carrying a black bag. Urdaneta. I S S U E S 1. witness Leah Magno saw the accused-appellant carrying a child was seen heading towards the wooded area in the Macalong River. As they approached the house. they reported the matter to the Barangay Captain and to the Police.245 5. the parents of Tisay were frantically searching for their child and when their search proved futile. Magno saw accusedappellant walking alone to town coming from the direction of the Macalong River. prosecution witness Natividad Bernardo.

136 SCRA 74 3. Any information or admission given by a person while in custody which may appear harmless or innocuous at the time without the competent assistance or an independent counsel should be struck down as inadmissible.246 1 The alleged extrajudicial confession of the accused while under custodial investigation and without the assistance of counsel is inadmissible in evidence despite the fact that he was allegedly appraised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. in accordance with the doctrine of the ‘fruit of the poisoned tree’. the same is inadmissible in evidence. The exclusionary rule. Alcaraz.000. and [c] the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. As such. In People vs.00 to P125. This is so because [1] the compromising circumstances were duly proven which were consistent with each other and which lead with moral certainty to the conclusion that he was guilty of the crime charged. his conviction by the trial court is correct. P vs. 144 SCRA 516 2. Does it also include the confession of a witness.000. may surpass direct evidence in its effect upon the Supreme Court. Mahinay. 2 Though the extrajudicial confession of the accused-appellant is inadmissible as evidence.00. not the accused? . it was held that conviction may be had on circumstantial evidence provided the following requisites are present: [a] there is more than one circumstance. The evidence in this case are more than sufficient to prove the accusedappellant’s beyond reasonable doubt. [b] the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven. P vs. 145 SCRA 700 Read: 1. and [2] the totality of such circumstances eliminated beyond doubt the possibility of his innocence. The said indemnity shall also be applicable where the death penalty is authorized by applicable amendatory laws)) b. This is so because under the 1987 Constitution. Circumstantial evidence is not a weaker form of evidence vis-à-vis direct evidence and cases have recognized that circumstantial evidence in its weight and probative force. the said rights could not be waived except in the presence of counsel. (NOTE: The indemnification for the death of a person in a rape with Homicide cases was increased from P50. Burgos.

Capulong. P vs. Abejero. P vs. Olvis. Caramonte. Dino. January 31.1988 3. vs. 1988 10. P. 186 SCRA 184 5-m. Quizon. Enciso. P vs. December 8. May 17. Abano. 160 SCRA 197 5-d. Sec. Bagano. The admissibility of an extrajudicial prosecution. 154 SCRA 513 5-g. vs. Eligino. vs. 12(2) Read: 1. Flores. 164 SCRA 260 5-i. Robles. when admissible or Read: 1. vs. 160 SCRA 533 5-b.l980 5-j. 186 SCRA 184 5-l. P. Admissibility of an extrajudicial 10 SCRA 520 confession in a criminal SCRA 419 and force. Lagahan. P.1988 2. 104 SCRA 450 5-h. P vs. Bombesa. Contado vs.247 Read: 1. 1989 5-a. 114 SCRA SCRA 637 inadmissible confession. 160 SCRA 728 5-d. 1988 5-c. Ramos. April 15. P vs. P vs. P. 186 SCRA 303 5-n. P vs. P vs. 186 SCRA 714 . vs. P vs. P vs. Jungco. May 3. P vs. Gen. Extrajudicial confession. Inadmissibility of an admission obtained by 234 4.142 SCRA 110 2. 142 SCRA 362 5-f. P vs. Tan. vs. Eduardo.135 3. P vs. August 11. 96 Read: 5. July 26. Estevan. Camalog. 145 SCRA 565 5-e. 1990 9. Dizon vs. 162 SCRA 402 2. P vs. 181 SCRA 34 5-k. p. 94 SCRA 150 5-e. Eligino. Confession as evidence against the accused. P. Yutuc.

147 SCRA 178 18. P. P vs. 63 SCRA 4 16. P vs. 145 SCRA 581 20. Arsenio. Dy. be bailable by sufficient sureties. 184 SCRA 205 6. P vs. 145 SCRA 521 19. 158 SCRA 111 CHAPTER XIII . 131 SCRA 418 13. vs. Magtoto vs. Natipravat. 145 SCRA 178 17. De Jesus. 130 SCRA 625 10. Pizarro. 128 SCRA 488 7. shall before conviction. P. P vs. Canumay. except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. 127 SCRA 207 11. P vs. P vs. 130 SCRA 301 22. The alleged oral confession of . 130 SCRA 595 23.248 5-o. Abayon. Pia. Palo. Evidence of lack of cvoluntariness Read: 1. P vs. P vs. P vs. 114 SCRA 197 12. P vs. Cruz. or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. Jara. Sanchez. 132 SCRA 103 12. 145 SCRA 483 24. All persons. Encipiado. 129 SCRA 576 8. P vs. Veloso. De La Cruz. Tuvera. 144 SCRA 516 2. Nilos. Manguera.THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BAIL Section 13. P vs. 146 SCRA 478 21. Maternal. P vs. P vs. 130 SCRA 169 9. P vs. Dejaresco. Gapasin. P. Villanueva. Sabilano. 132 SCRA 83 14. P vs. P vs. P vs. Is the testimony of the arresting officer on the the accused admissible? Read: 1. Marino. P vs. vs. 133 SCRa 426--when confession is valid 25. 183 SCRA 763---when confession is inadmissible but accused is still liable 11. vs. 148 SCRA 60 15. P vs.

He started serving his sentence and subsequently. when not applicable. Rule 114 provides that there shall no bail for a convict after final judgment. Bail. The only exception is when the convict applies for Probation before he commences . He likewise justified the same based on the rule that “bail is discretionary upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death. Recognizance/bail for a convict ATTY. Held: Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for ordering the release of Bagaporo pending the approval of his application for parole and before the completion of the minimum period of the sentence imposed upon him. JUDGE ARNULFO BUGTAS. By virtue of the above certifications. Excessive bail shall not be required.249 right to be bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. respondent judge ordered the release of Bagaporo upon recognizance of the Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar. 1996 and is already entitled to parole. Facts: Manuel Bagaporo. It is patently erroneous to release a convict on recognizance. 475 SCRA 175 Austria-Martinez. Jr. Section 24. the Provincial Jail Warden issued a certification that Bagaoporo has been confined at the Provincial Jail since February 9. SAMAR. J. reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. 81 SCRA 188 Kinds of bail. 1. In support of his application. JULIANA ADALIM-WHITE VS. RTC 2 BORONGAN. 104 SCRA 372 2. was convicted of frustrated murder and was sentenced four years and two months to eight years and one day of imprisonment. he filed an application for release on recognizance. The right to bail. Another certification was issued by the Supervising Parole and Probation Officer showing that Bagaporo applied for parole in lieu of the DOJ’s Maagang Paglaya Program.

Enage. 41 SCRA 1 ***************************************************** 1-a. 66 SCRA 38 3. Pestano vs.00 for gross ignorance of the law and sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. July 3. Abano. 1990 ****************************************************** Waiver of the right to bail: 1-b. Rule 114. Judge Bugtas was therefore fined P40. Procedure when prosecutor does not object to the petition for bail in capital offenses: PEOPLE VS. De la Camara vs. Domingo. P. Donato. Almeda vs. 52 SCRA 143 8. Villaluz. 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure 3 a. 1991 ***************************************************** 2.1986 7. AGBAYANI. 284 SCRA 315 Bail in Extradition cases.250 to serve his sentence and that the offense and the penalty for the offense is within the purview of the Probation Law. San Diego. May 30. UNITED STATES VS. Sections 5 and 16 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court (on the different kinds of bail) APPLIES ONLY TO AN ACCUSED UNDERGOING PREVENTIVE IMPRISONMENT DURING TRIAL OR ON APPEAL. Cruz. P vs. JUDGE PURUGGANAN & MARK JUMENEZ November. 4. IAC. June 5.000. P vs. THEY DO NOT APPLY TO A PERSON CONVICTED BY FINAL JUSGMENT AND ALREADY SERVING SENTENCE. January 10. Villasenor vs. Manotoc vs. 147 SCRA 219 6. Judge Velasco. 21 SCRA 312 5. 26 SCRA 522 4.1987. Garcia vs. vs. Marcos vs. See Section 10. 2002 . Read: ****************************************************** Excessive bail: 1. CA. 3. 67 and 70 Phil.

RTC 17. 389 SCRA 623). III of the 1987 Constitution applies only to criminal cases. 103 SCRA 321 . MANILA. Otherwise. in a 9-6 decision.DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS ************************************************** 1. J. the extraditee was allowed bail. on Motion for Reconsideration in the same case. the Supreme Court held that the prospective extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing while his case is still under evaluation because this would defeat the purpose of the arrest warrant since it could give warning that respondents would be arrested and even encourage them to flee but entitled to notice and hearing if the case is already filed in court. not in extradition proceedings. the Supreme Court on a 9-6 vote held that the extraditee is entitled to notice and hearing even when a request for extradition by another country is still being evaluated. Terrobias. P vs. In general: 1. 483 SCRA 290 Quisumbing. This is so because the constitutional provision on the right to bail under Art. JUDGE LANTION. THE PRESIDING JUDGE.) *************************************************** CHAPTER XIV . It is a different matter if at first. However. the Supreme Court held that the extraditee is not entitled to post a bond even if the crime he was charged of abroad is a bailable offense. his right to due process of law will be violated. 322 SCRA 160 (The Mark Jimenez Case) . (NOTE: In the case of US vs.251 A person facing extradition proceedings is not entitled to bail even if the crime he was charged of in a foreign country is bailable. The cancellation of his bail bond may be made only after notice and hearing. This is so because of the possibility of flight. ********************************* Right to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest in extradition case EDUARDO RODRIGUEZ VS. Judge Purugganan. In SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS.

pp. Id. Jr. VS. a dangerous drug.02 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet. 9165) or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. 6. . No.04 gram of white crystalline substance contained in two (2) heat-sealed plastic sachets which gave positive result to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu). did then and there willfully. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession direct custody and control 0. 9165 (R. without being authorized by law to possess or otherwise use any dangerous drugs. G. in violation of the above-cited law. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. feloniously and knowingly sell to poseur buyer 0.311[3] (Underscoring supplied) He was likewise charged for violation of Section 11. paragraph 2(3). allegedly committed as follows:310[2] That on or about the 29th day of January 2004. Philippines. No. p. Article II also of R. EDecember 10. y Burac (appellant) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City309[1] for violation of Section 5. 2 .. without being authorized by law.A. in the City of Marikina. unlawfully. 2004. PEOPLE. the above-named accused. p. par. Records.312[4] (Underscoring supplied) 309 310 311 312 [1] [2] [3] [4] Rollo. Article II of Republic Act No. in violation of the above-cited law. JR. No.252 Presumption of innocence prevails over the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties of the police authorities and Presumption of innocence resulting in acquittal as a result on conflicting and inconsistent testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses: 1 ELPIDIO BONDAD. Records. 2(3). at p. did then and there willfully. 2008 CARPIO MORALES. which is a dangerous drug. 173804. 2. allegedly committed as follows: That on or about the 29th day of January 2004.R. 73-74. J. in the City of Marikina. 9165.: Elpidio Bondad.Information dated February 2.A. the above-named accused.

appellant drew out one sachet in exchange for which PO2 Dano gave the marked one hundred peso bill. Marikina City. and apprised appellant of his constitutional rights. The buy-bust team. PO2 Dano removed his cap. Q487945 to be used as buy-bust money. Insp. PO2 Dano was given a one hundred peso bill bearing Serial No.” Appellant at once took out a “Vicks” container from his right front pocket313[5] which. Still at the place of arrest. PO2 Ramiel Soriano and PO2 Dano who was designated as the poseur-buyer. and PO1 Roberto Muega were at the Station Anti Illegal Drug Special Operations Task Force (SAIDSOTF). . Jr. The buy-bust team thereupon brought appellant and the seized items to the Marikina City Police Station where a memorandum dated January 313 [5] No specification if it was a pocket of the shirt or of the pants. identified himself. proceeded to 3 C’s billiard hall at the corner of M. POS 1 and 2. PO2 Nelson Arribay arrived together with a confidential informant. appellant returned the buybust money. among others. to which PO2 Dano answered “piso lang. From the container. 2004. appellant approached PO2 Dano and asked him if he wanted to buy shabu. the confidential informant pointed to appellant who was then holding a cue stick beside the billiard table as the alias “Jun. while PO2 Ferdinand Brubio. As the back-up police officers were closing-in. of January 29.253 At around 7:05 p. at once formed a buy-bust team composed of. The Chief of the SAIDSOTF. Within minutes..” The confidential informant approached appellant and talked to him.m. Marikina City and named a certain alias “Jun” as the vendor. Barangka. Jr. Upon PO2 Dano’s order. PO1 Christopher Anos. Ramchrisen Haveria. PO2 Dano grabbed appellant’s arm. It was agreed that PO2 Dano’s removal of his cap would signal that the buy-bust was consummated. about the rampant sale of shabu in a billiard hall along Bonifacio Avenue. The confidential informant reported. when opened. and gave his name as Elpidio Burac Bondad. among other things. Cruz St. 01/29/04” on the sachets that remained inside the “Vicks” container. The conduct of a buy-bust operation was recorded in the police blotter and was coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) which gave it control number NOC-012904-28. PO2 Dano placed the markings “EBB-ED BUYBUST 01/29/04” on the substance-filled sachet sold to him. and “EBB-ED. P/Sr. together with the confidential informant. Office of the Marikina City Police Station. On entering the hall. yielded heat-sealed plastic sachets containing substances suspected to be shabu. and Bonifacio Avenue in Barangka. handed the “Vicks” container. At that instant.

a dangerous drug.02 gram “EBB-ED POSS 1 01/29/04” C = 0. claimed that he was framed up and gave the following version: On January 29. 2004. requesting for the conduct of laboratory examination on the seized items to determine the presence of dangerous drugs and their weight. x-x-x C O N C L U S I O N: Specimens A through C contain Methamphetamine Hydrochloride. Forro. Jr. her findings and conclusion as follows: SPECIMEN SUBMITTED: Three (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets with markings marked as A through C respectively. each containing white crystalline substance with following recorded net weights and markings: A = 0. who. in Physical Science Report No.. the specimen submitted. at p. among other things. 41 Records.254 29. appellant. p.. Forensic Chemical Officer of the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory Office. 2004. a former police officer. Insp. addressed to the Chief of the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory Office. a laboratory examination was conducted thereon by Police Senior Inspector Annalee R. PO2 Dano also requested that appellant be subjected to a drug test. PO2 Brubio. 2004 was prepared by P/Sr. recorded. 2 . folder of exhibits. whom he knew was a policeman. After greeting PO2 Brubio in Bicolano. 2004.315[7] The following day or on January 30. 317[9] (Italics and emphasis in the original) Denying the charges against him. Chief Haveria. a dangerous drug. 17 Exhibit “C”. upon receipt of three sachets.02 gram “EBB-ED POSS 2 01/29/04” x-x-x F I N D I N G S: x-x-x x x x x-x-x 314[6] Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the tests for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride. p. 15 TSN. D-0094-04E316[8]. while he was playing inside 3 C’s billiard hall.02 gram “EBB-ED BUYBUST 01/29/04” B = 0. he continued playing but 314 315 316 317 [6] [7] [8] [9] x-x-x x-x-x Id. entered the billiard hall.M. June 15. p. at 3:00 P.

in the light of the foregoing. p. [11] .A. II of RA 9165 the methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) is ordered confiscated in favor of the government for proper destruction by the proper agency. 9165 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY and to pay the fine of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP300. JR. appellant summoned and handed him his wallet containing P2. The accused is likewise found guilty of the crime of Violation of Sec. Bondad. 2(3). the trial court convicted appellant in both charges.318[10] drawing him to restrain the hand of PO2 Brubio.000. Appellant’s defense was corroborated by his son Christian Jeffrey C. II of R. Art. II of RA 9165 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP500. took the wallet from his son. Art.00. telling him “pera ko yan!” Aware that his son was inside the billiard hall. CA rollo. 5 Art. SO ORDERED.” Another person who was at his back pushed him out of the billiard hall in the course of which he felt PO2 Brubio reaching his (appellant’s) right front pocket.E. 124. 2006.255 PO2 Brubio suddenly handcuffed him and asked him “Sumama ka muna.000. Finding for the prosecution. 11 par. the Court finds the accused ELPIDIO BONDAD. Mata who was a “spotter” (referee) at the billiard hall at the time appellant was arrested.00) pursuant to Sec. PO2 Brubio. however. disposing as follows: WHEREFORE.319[11] (Underscoring supplied) By Decision of February 8. The assailed decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the accused318[10] 319 320 There is also no specification if it was a pocket of the shirt or the pants CA rollo. II of RA 9165. the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.320[12] the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification. Art. y BURAC guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. [12] Penned by Justice Amelita G. 2(3). and Roberto U. Veloso.” He was then made to board a car and taken to the Office of the SAIDSOTF at the police station. disposing as follows: WHEREFORE. pp. 11 par. telling him “Huwag ka makialam dito. Tolentino with the concurrence of Justices Portia Aliño Hormachuelos and Vicente S. 232-254. 5.00) as provided for in Sec. foregoing premises considered.

Par. it shall early on be passed upon.00). the present Petition for Review on Certiorari. 9165. 9165. . hence. appellant faulting the appellate court: II. 68. Under Section 11. Appellant claims that there was failure to follow the requirements of Sec. Id. upon laboratory examination. (b) such possession is not authorized by law and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed said drug. . the mere act of possessing any dangerous drug consummates the crime..000. As the resolution of the second assignment of error is determinative of whether there is still necessity of segueing to the first and third assignments of error.321[13] (Underscoring supplied) Specifically with respect to the charge of possession of shabu. namely. 321 322 [13] [14] Rollo.322[14] (Italics in the original. . p. 2 [3] of R.A. No. were positively identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. the appellate court held: The evidence for the prosecution fully proved beyond reasonable doubt the elements necessary to successfully prosecute a case for illegal possession of a prohibited drug. 66 (citations omitted).A. . at p. 9165. There is no doubt that the charge of illegal possession of shabu was proven beyond reasonable doubt since the accusedappellant knowingly possessed plastic sachets with white crystalline granules. to thirteen (13) years. 21 of R. it compromised the integrity and evidentiary value of the allegedly seized items. as minimum. underscoring supplied) Hence. IN ADMITTING THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION DESPITE CLEAR VIOLATION OF SECTION 21 (1) OF R. (a) the accused is in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or a regulated drug. as maximum and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300. SO ORDERED. The white crystalline granules found in his possession.A. without legal authority at the time he was caught during the buy-bust operation. a dangerous drug.256 appellant is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day.

for proper disposition in the following manner: The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall. Atty. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs. 21 of R. Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs. Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. it was there that the items taken from him were inventoried. sir.A. a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ). Puentebella: When you brought him to the police. Puentebella: . immediately after seizure and confiscation. controlled precursors and essential chemicals. seized and or surrendered. Puentebella: You also did not take photographs of the items taken from the accused? Witness: Yes. is it not? Witness: We did not make inventory because we simply brought the evidence confiscated. A reading of the testimony of the poseur-buyer.257 Sec. physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the persons/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized. and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs. or his/her representative or counsel. xxxx Atty. Seized. PO2 Dano indeed confirms appellant’s claim. viz: Atty. and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. plant sources or dangerous drugs. as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated. No 9165 provides: Section 21. Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) (1) Appellant claims that no physical inventory and photographing of the drugs took place.

258 And you know for a fact that under the new drugs law. No. an elective official. Puentebella: Since you did not make any inventory.323[16] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Clearly then. are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. 2004. the apprehending police officers failed to comply with the above-quoted provision of Section 21 of R. that’s very clear? Witness: Yes.A. June 15. or the media. pp. . Witness that at the time you apprehended the accused. Pringas holds. Puentebella: So it is very clear now Mr. and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items. it follows that you did not require them to sign your inventory as required by law? Witness: Yes. People v. sir. sir. xxxx Atty. Gapuzan: Counsel is asking for a conclusion of law. Court: Witness may answer the question. you did not make an inventory in the presence of the accused nor you did not [sic] make a photograph of the items seized in the presence of the accused. 9165. 80-87. however: Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor. I will object. Its noncompliance will not render an accused's arrest illegal or the 323 [16] TSN. sir. Witness: Yes. is it not? Pros. a representative from the Department of Justice. this is a requirement for the apprehending team to do. Atty.

viz: x x x Provided. despite PO2 Dano’s awareness of such requirements. No. 6-7.327[20] (emphasis supplied) 324 [17] 325[18] 326 327 [19] [20] G. that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds. 531 SCRA 828. Vide TSN. “B-2” and “B-3” are objected to for being product of irregular functions of police and therefore fruit of poisonous thinking [sic] and they are not admissible and they were not photographed in the presence of the accused as provided for by Sec.324[17] (Citation omitted. 2002. by PO2 Dano’s claim. Puentebella: xxxx Exhibits “B” which is the brown envelope. Parenthetically. as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team.R. thus: Atty. 2004. he did not conduct an inventory of the items seized. unlike in Pringas. as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. italics and underscoring supplied) The Court’s pronouncement in Pringas is based on the provision of Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations325[18] of R. he immediately marked the seized items which were brought to the Crime Laboratory for examination. R.A. 81-85. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) In the present case. par. no photograph of the items was taken. 9165.259 items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. June 15. shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. however. pp. emphasis. 9165. And the defense raised it again during the offer of evidence by the prosecution. further. the failure of the apprehending officers to comply with the inventory and photographing requirements of Section 21 of R. No. By his admission. 2004. TSN. 2007.1. There was thus failure to faithfully follow the requirements of the law. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items. pp. Worse. 21. August 10. 842-843 Took effect on November 27. during the cross examination of PO2 Dano. 9165326[19]. the defense in the present case questioned early on. . “B-1”. 175928.A. August 31. No.A.

WHEREFORE. trade. The assailed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and appellant.329[1] He was allegedly caught in a buy-bust operation by elements of the Manila Western Police District (MWPD) while offering to sell methylamphetamine hydrochloride. did then and there willfully. December 16. a dangerous drug locally known as shabu. deliver or give away to another any dangerous drug. not having been authorized by law to sell. Branch 2330[2] accused him as follows: That on or about May 18. The criminal information filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. unlawfully and knowingly attempt to sell or offer for sale one (1) transparent plastic sachet containing TWO POINT EIGHT ZERO ZERO (2. in the City of Manila. both the prosecution and the defense stipulated on the qualification of Forensic Chemist Elisa Reyes and.) No.A. 170 (2001) citing People v. both parties dispensed with her testimony. Contrary to law. 329 330 331 . 414 Phil. Laxa. Philippines. 2004.328[21] his acquittal is in order.800) grams of white crystalline substance known as “SHABU” containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride. which is the corpus delicti of each of the crimes charged against appellant. the Petition is GRANTED.. G. Elpidio Bondad Jr. Rigodon.: This is an appeal filed by Samuel Obmiranis y Oreta (appellant) who was charged with violation of Section 5 in relation to Section 26 of Republic Act (R. No.R. is ACQUITED of the crimes charged. 2 PEOPLE VS. 238 SCRA 27 (1994). a dangerous drug. y Burac. the said accused. The prosecution further admitted that the forensic chemist who analyzed the seized the 328 [21] People v. as the failure to comply with the aforesaid requirements of the law compromised the identity of the items seized. thus.331[3] At the pre-trial. This leaves it unnecessary to still dwell on the first and third assignments of error. 156. 181492. J. 9165. SAMUEL OBMIRANIS. 2008 TINGA.260 IN FINE.

336[8] Pedrozo gave the team a marked 500-peso bill to be used as buy-bust money which was placed on top of a deck of boodle money.340[12] 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 .334[6] 333[5] The narrative woven by Velasco established the following facts: On 17 May 2004. The team informed the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) of the impending operation. Velasco was the alleged leader of the raiding team that apprehended appellant on 18 May 2004 at the corner of G. took the item and brought it to Velasco. Appellant went back to his car.Tuazon Street just before 12 a. he was arrested just as he was trying to get back to his car.” At that point. appellant on board a car arrived at the scene and seeing the informant he approached the latter. Edgardo Palabay.Tuazon and Jhocson Streets in Sampaloc.m. and they awaited the arrival of appellant at the corner of G. The informant joined Velasco in his car. of 18 May 2004— the appointed time and date that the confidential informant and appellant had agreed to meet. The informant introduced Velasco to appellant and said that Velasco would like to buy one-half “bulto” of shabu.339[11] At around 12:30 a. Police Superintendent Marcelino Pedrozo (Pedrozo) of the MWPD organized a buy-bust team on the information of a confidential informant that the latter was able to place an order for half a “bulto” of shabu with appellant. Velasco then insisted that he must first see the merchandise. When appellant asked for payment. with Police Officers Wilfredo Cinco. Velasco readily recognized the item as a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance. The prosecution then proceeded to prove the charge against him through the lone testimony of police officer Jerry Velasco (Velasco). Manila.m. he seemed to have recognized Velasco’s co-officer because he uttered the words.332[4] Appellant was brought to trial after having entered a negative plea.337[9] entered the same in the blotter338[10] and proceeded to Bambang in G.261 confiscated substance—which yielded positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride content—did not have personal knowledge of the ultimate source of the drug. Velasco negotiated with appellant to lower the price but the latter refused.Tuazon and Jhocson Streets. Velasco was designated as the team leader and the poseur-buyer. Roberto Benitez and one335[7]confidential informant as members. “May pulis yata..

He further stated that immediately after the arrest. Velasco. that they cuffed his hands at the back and the driver. he was the one who effected the arrest but it was Cinco who seized the plastic sachet from appellant. and strongly denied having transacted the alleged sale of shabu with Velasco and the confidential informant.” At the trial. that Cinco put the item in his pocket after the same was recovered and did not mark it on the spot and that the markings made on the buy-bust money had not been entered in the blotter. that when he was arrested by two men in civilian clothes. that because he said he did not know anyone who was into selling drugs. kicked him and uttered.m. he identified the plastic sachet as that seized from appellant as well as the marking made by Cinco on it. Furthermore.342[14] Taking the stand. yuko!”.00. that he asked them why they were arresting him but neither of them gave an answer and instead one of them grabbed him by his shoulder and ushered him inside a police car. that he answered he did not have that much money. he and his team brought the seized item to the police headquarters and there. iyong malakihan ha!”). that he asked them why they were doing that to him when in fact he merely told them to park their car properly on the street.00 from him. one of the men pulled out a gun with which he hit his neck. that once inside the car. along Santa Teresita Street. Sampaloc. he was not committing any crime. He claimed that he was taken by Velasco and his team not on 18 May 2004 but rather on 17 May 2004 at 7:00 p. asked if he could give them P200.N. Avenue police headquarters. Manila.000. appellant boldly asserted that he was merely framed up by the buy-bust team. that the demand was then 341 342 343 . that he was not detained at the headquarters but rather. Cinco marked the same with the initials “SOO. that they drove the car around and told him that if he could not give them the money then he must just find for them someone who sells drugs in large-scale (“Magturo ka ng nagbebenta ng droga.000. he admitted on cross-examination that there was no evidence custodian designated and that he could not remember if the seized item had been inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused. in his presence.341[13] The chemistry report issued at the instance of Pedrozo and signed by Forensic Chemical Officer Maritess Mariano of the PNP Crime Laboratory revealed that the specimen supposedly seized from appellant yielded positive of methylamphetamine hydrochloride content. he was brought to the second floor where the two arresting officers demanded P50. he was taken to the U. “Makulit ka ha.343[15] that he was there to see his girlfriend who was residing in that area.262 According to Velasco.

posited that the fact that all the essential elements of a consummated sale of dangerous drug had not been completely shown was immaterial because the charge involved a mere attempt or offer to sell which had been duly established by the prosecution. 1. fundamental is the requirement that the elemental acts constituting the offense be established with moral certainty as this is the critical and only requisite to a finding of guilt.352[27] It is therefore of prime importance that in these cases.000.000.348[20] It also maintained that the chain of custody of the seized shabu had been duly established because the requirements in taking custody of seized narcotics provided for in Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No.347[19] For its part. series of 2002349[21] admit of liberal interpretation. The appeal has to be granted.263 reduced to P30.346[18] Appellant interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals in which he reiterated that the prosecution was unable to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt in view of the failure to establish the chain of custody of the illegal drugs and that it was likewise unable to establish the consummation of the alleged sale of drugs.345[17] In its 23 February 2006 Decision.351[23] the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court’s decision. the People. In criminal prosecutions. the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.00 fine without subsidiary imprisonment as well as the costs. the identity of the dangerous drug be likewise 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 .344[16] Olivia Ismael. and to pay a P500.350[22] In its 4 September 2007 Decision. In prosecutions involving narcotics. the narcotic substance itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. corroborated the material points of appellant’s testimony. another defense witness who introduced herself as a friend of appellant’s girlfriend and who admitted having witnessed appellant’s arrest.00 in exchange for the mitigation of his case. through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.354[29] Board Regulation No. Cinco. where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession.264 established beyond reasonable doubt. the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. does not suffice to afford such assurance. Of all the people who came into direct contact with the sachet of shabu purportedly seized from appellant. such that every person who handled the same would admit how and from whom it was received. The same witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. according to Velasco.355[30] It would thus include testimony about every link in the chain.” As a method of authenticating evidence. from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. The same is true with respect to the laboratory personnel who could have but nevertheless failed to testify on the circumstances under which he received the specimen at the laboratory for analysis and testing. from the moment the item was seized to the time it is offered in court as evidence. however. more importantly. who. 1. the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of the exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. only Velasco was able to observe the uniqueness thereof in court. it must be established with unwavering exactitude that the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same as that seized from him in the first place. series of 2002 defines chain of custody as “the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage.356[31] It is from the testimony of every witness who handled the evidence from which a reliable assurance can be derived that the evidence presented in court is one and the same as that seized from the accused. took initial custody of the plastic sachet at the time of arrest and who allegedly marked the same with the initials “SOO” at the police station. to acknowledge the marking as his own. was not even presented in court to directly observe the uniqueness of the specimen and. as well as on the conduct of the examination which was administered on the specimen and what he did with it at the time it 353 354 355 356 353[28] . In other words. The prosecution evidence in the case at bar.

In view of these loopholes in the evidence adduced against appellant.357[32] And because they cannot be readily and properly distinguished visually from other substances of the same physical and/or chemical nature.358[33] substitution and exchange—359[34] whether the alteration. these stipulations and admission pertain only to a certain Elisa G. substitution and exchange be inadvertent or otherwise not. in authenticating narcotic specimens. A unique characteristic of narcotic substances such as shabu is that they are not distinctive and are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. dispensed with his testimony and admitted that said forensic chemist had no personal knowledge of the ultimate source of the drug submitted for examination.362[37] The Court certainly cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the possibility of substitution. Reyes and not to Forensic Chemical Officer Maritess Mariano who. tampering. Be that as it may. based on the chemistry report.361[36] Hence. contamination. Aside from that. tampering. it was not reasonably explained why these same witnesses were not able to testify in court. was the one who examined the contents of the plastic sachet at the crime laboratory. an unbroken chain of custody indeed becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is a narcotic substance. a standard more stringent than that applied to objects which are readily identifiable must be applied—a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or contaminated or tampered with. they are susceptible to alteration. although testimony about a perfect chain does not always have to be the standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain. While indeed the prosecution and the defense had stipulated on the qualification of the forensic chemist. nevertheless. alteration or contamination—whether intentional or unintentional—of narcotic substances at any of the links in the chain of custody thereof especially because practically 357 358 359 360 361 362 . it can be reasonably concluded that the prosecution was unable to establish the identity of the dangerous drug and in effect failed to obliterate the hypothesis of appellant’s guiltlessness. contamination.265 was in his possession and custody.360[35] It is by reason of this distinctive quality that the condition of the exhibit at the time of testing and trial is critical.

placed it in his pocket and brought the same together with 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 . 9165 materially requires the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs to. Cinco had taken custody of the plastic sachet of shabu. or his/her representative or counsel. [2] physically inventory and [3] photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized. it was handled by two police officers who. did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the time it was in their possession. In that case. State364[39] in fact acknowledged this danger. and nothing on record suggests that they had extended reasonable efforts to comply with the statutory requirements in handling the evidence. The court in that case pointed out that the white powder seized could have been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or baking powder.A. series of 2002.266 such possibility is great where the item of real evidence is small and is similar in form to other substances to which people are familiar in their daily lives. [1] immediately after seizure and confiscation.370[45] These guidelines. were not shown to have been complied with by the members of the buy-bust team.365[40] Reasonable safeguards are provided for in our drugs laws to protect the identity and integrity of narcotic substances and dangerous drugs seized and/or recovered from drug offenders. 1. the leader of the raiding team. It thus declared that the state must be able to show by records or testimony the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into the possession of police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition. No. Section 21366[41] of R. himself admitted that as soon as appellant was arrested. The same requirements are also found in Section 2367[42] of its implementing rules368[43] as well as in Section 2369[44] of the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. and any elected public official who [4] shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. however. a substance later shown to be heroin was excluded from the prosecution evidence because prior to examination. a representative from the media and the Department of Justice. however. Velasco.363[38] Graham v.

372[48] There is indeed merit in the contention that where no ill motives to make false charges was successfully attributed to the members of the buy-bust team. no evidence custodian had been designated by the raiding team to safeguard the identity and integrity of the evidence supposedly seized from appellant. Velasco never even mentioned that the identifying mark on the specimen was placed in appellant’s presence. where the official act in question is irregular on its face. in other words.267 appellant to the police station. as elicited from Velasco himself during his cross-examination. taken together with the failure of the key persons who handled the same to testify on the whereabouts of the exhibit before it was offered in evidence in court. an adverse presumption arises as a matter of course. but the theory is correct only where there is no showing that the conduct of police duty was irregular. It needs no elucidation that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty must be seen in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. the claim of regularity in the conduct of official police operation. The presumption. he could not even remember whether or not the specimen had been properly inventoried and photographed at least in appellant’s presence. It was at the police station—and not at the place where the item was seized from appellant—where according to him (Velasco). Dulay373[49] and People v. Even more telling is the fact that. Ganenas374[50] in fact both suggest that the presumption of regularity is disputed 371 372 373 374 .371[46] All these aforementioned flaws in the conduct of the postseizure custody of the dangerous drug allegedly recovered from appellant. People v. What we can fairly assume is that the Court of Appeals had overlooked the significance of these glaring details in the records of the case as it placed blind reliance right away on the credibility of Velasco’s testimony and on the presumption of regularity and thereby it failed to properly account for the missing substantial links in the chain of custody of the evidence. militates against the prosecution’s cause because it not only casts doubt on the identity of the corpus delicti but also tends to discredit. Cinco had placed the initials “SOO” on the specimen. Otherwise. if not totally negate. the presumption prevails that said police operatives had regularly performed their duty. obtains only where nothing in the records is suggestive of the fact that the law enforcers involved deviated from the standard conduct of official duty as provided for in the law.

In no uncertain terms must it be stressed that basic and elementary is the presupposition that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused rests on the prosecution which must 375 376 377 378 . The Court cannot indulge in the presumption of regularity of official duty if only to obliterate the obvious infirmity of the evidence advanced to support appellant’s conviction. Even granting that we must blindly rely on the credibility of Velasco’s testimony.378[54] we categorically declared that the failure of the prosecution to offer in court the testimony of key witnesses for the basic purpose of establishing a sufficiently complete chain of custody of a specimen of shabu and the irregularity which characterized the handling of the evidence before the same was finally offered in court. there is no way to presume that the members thereof had performed their duties regularly. we will not hesitate to reverse the judgment of conviction in the present appeal. One final word.376[52] Velasco can be reasonably presumed to be adept in and mindful of the proper procedure in apprehending drug offenders. in view of the deviation by the buy-bust team from the mandated conduct of taking post-seizure custody of the dangerous drug in this case. for reasons as obvious as intimated above. All told. Suffice it to say at this point that the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is merely just that—a mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth. For the same plain but consequential reason. People. A member of the antinarcotics division of the police since 1997.375[51] It must be emphasized at this juncture that what can reasonably be presumed based on the records of this case is that Velasco is aware of his duties and responsibilities as an agent of the government in its anti-narcotics campaign. securing and taking custody of the evidence obtained in police operations such as this one and preserving the integrity of the evidence by protecting the chain of custody thereof. the prosecution evidence would fall short of satisfying the quantum of evidence required to arrive at a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt inasmuch as the evidence chain failed to solidly connect appellant with the seized drug in a way that would establish that the specimen is one and the same as that seized in the first place and offered in court as evidence.377[53] However. In Mallillin v.268 where there is deviation from the regular performance of duty. even this presumption is unworthy of credit. still. materially conflict with every proposition as to the culpability of the accused.

Branch 2. 02158 affirming the judgment of conviction rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Manila. is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Norma—allegedly yielded two (2) plastic sachets of shabu and five (5) empty plastic sachets containing residual morsels of the said substance.379[55] WHEREFORE. CR. The search—conducted in the presence of barangay kagawad Delfin Licup as well as petitioner himself. April 30. Article II of Republic Act No.C. 2008 THE FACTS: On the strength of a warrant of search and seizure issued by the RTC of Sorsogon City. a team of five police officers raided the residence of petitioner in Barangay Tugos. custody and control two (2) plastic sachets of methamphetamine hydrochloride [or] “shabu” with an aggregate weight of 0. No. 172953 . acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right. Branch 52. PEOPLE. 9165. unless he is lawfully confined for another offense. SPO1 Danilo Lasala and SPO2 Romeo Gallinera (Gallinera) as members. When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance. without having been previously authorized by law to possess the same. G. That on or about the 4th day of February 2003. with PO3 Roberto Esternon (Esternon). Sorsogon City on 4 February 2003.0743 gram. LOPEZ VS. otherwise known as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11. SPO1 Pedro Docot. Accordingly. Sorsogon City.269 draw strength from its own evidence and not from the weakness of the defense. in a constitutional system like ours. his wife Sheila and his mother. the said accused did then and there willfully.R. the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. and four empty sachets containing “shabu” residue.R.-H. The team was headed by P/Insp. is invariable regardless of the reputation of the accused because the law presumes his innocence until the contrary is shown. unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession. The rule. Appellant Samuel Obmiranis y Oreta is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and is thus accordingly ordered released immediately from confinement. No. In dubio pro reo. JUNIE MALLILLIN Y. 379 . Philippines. at about 8:45 in the morning in Barangay Tugos. Catalino Bolanos (Bolanos).

he was explaining its progress to petitioner’s mother. 6-7.270 CONTRARY TO LAW. 23 July 2003. Petitioner entered a negative plea. Id. Id. that upon entering the premises. pp. 13-15. the leader of the raiding team. which included the pillow in which the two sachets of shabu were kept. 380 [10] TSN. he admitted that it was he alone who conducted the search because Bolanos was standing behind him in the living room portion of the house and that petitioner handed to him the things to be searched. pp. that he then found the two filled sachets under a pillow on the bed and forthwith called on Gallinera to have the items recorded and marked. but that at the same time his eyes were fixed on the search being conducted by Esternon. at 16-17.” then to the trial court383[14] and thereafter to the laboratory.384[15] Supt. testified on the circumstances surrounding the search as follows: that he and his men were allowed entry into the house by petitioner after the latter was shown the search warrant. 381 [12] 382[13] 383[14] 384[15] . that the search conducted inside the bedroom of petitioner yielded five empty plastic sachets with suspected shabu residue contained in a denim bag and kept in one of the cabinets. TSN. he ordered Esternon and barangay kagawad Licup. Esternon testified that the denim bag containing the empty plastic sachets was found “behind” the door of the bedroom and not inside the cabinet. Norma. Bolanos admitted that during the search. Lorlie Arroyo (Arroyo). 22 April 2003. whose assistance had previously been requested in executing the warrant.382[13] that he brought the seized items to the Balogo Police Station for a “true inventory. the prosecution presented Bolanos. that he was observing the conduct of the search from about a meter away. 10. 23 July 2003. that the rest of the police team positioned themselves outside the house to make sure that nobody flees. At the ensuing trial. at 9. Arroyo and Esternon as witnesses. TSN. and two plastic sachets containing shabu which fell off from one of the pillows searched by Esternon—a discovery that was made in the presence of petitioner. the forensic chemist who administered the examination on the seized items. to conduct the search.381[12] On cross.380[10] On cross examination. 6-9. was presented as an expert witness to identify the items submitted to the laboratory. Bolanos. pp. Taking the witness stand.

four were positive of containing residue of the same substance. barangay kagawad Licup and Sheila in their testimonies. Id. Norma and Sheila positively declared that petitioner was not in the house for the entire duration of the search because at one point he was sent by Esternon to the store to buy cigarettes while Sheila was being searched by the lady officer. Esternon stopped him and ordered him to lift the portion of the headboard.271 She revealed that the two filled sachets were positive of shabu and that of the five empty sachets. it was in his presence that Sheila was searched by the lady officer. In that instant. Esternon showed him “sachet of shabu” which according to him came from a pillow on the bed. Petitioner asserted that on his return from the errand. Licup for his part testified on the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the plastic sachets.] The evidence for the defense focused on the irregularity of the search and seizure conducted by the police operatives. pp. Esternon. at 11-12. At that point. was tucking something inside her underwear. a lady officer arrived to conduct the search of Sheila’s body inside the same bedroom.386[18] Sheila was ordered to transfer to the other bedroom together with her children. who was left inside the bedroom. Petitioner was then asked by a police officer to buy cigarettes at a nearby store and when he returned from the errand. everyone except Esternon was asked to step out of the room. D-037-03. See records. p.385[16] She further admitted that all seven sachets were delivered to the laboratory by Esternon in the afternoon of the same day that the warrant was executed except that it was not she but rather a certain Mrs. 2 December 2003. the officer closed the door and asked him to lift the mattress on the bed. exclaimed that he had just found two filled sachets. 387[20] . So.] 385 [16] TSN. However. 6-10. And as he was doing as told. Ofelia Garcia who received the items from Esternon at the laboratory . he was told that nothing was found on Sheila’s body. 386 [18] TSN. he went out of the bedroom and into the living room and after about three minutes. 14. p. 28 May 2003. it was momentarily interrupted when one of the police officers declared to Bolanos that petitioner’s wife. He recounted that after the five empty sachets were found. Petitioner testified that Esternon began the search of the bedroom with Licup and petitioner himself inside. Sheila.387[20] Petitioner’s account in its entirety was corroborated in its material respects by Norma. The results of the chemical analysis are embodied in Chemistry Report No. Forthwith. he was summoned by Esternon to the bedroom and once inside. 18.

Petitioner was condemned to prison for twelve years (12) and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and to pay a fine of P300. this Appeal. the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. Be that as it may. Hence. As a method of authenticating evidence.00. HELD: Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty. in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received. together with the fact that the same is not authorized by law. the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be.272 On 20 June 2004 the trial court rendered its Decision declaring petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. More than just the fact of possession.000. It would include testimony about every link in the chain. the fact that the substance illegally possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. . It also noted petitioner’s failure to ascribe ill motives to the police officers to fabricate charges against him. Essential therefore in these cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt . where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession. The trial court reasoned that the fact that shabu was found in the house of petitioner was prima facie evidence of petitioner’s animus possidendi sufficient to convict him of the charge inasmuch as things which a person possesses or over which he exercises acts of ownership are presumptively owned by him. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. the mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt.

255 N. In that case where a substance later analyzed as heroin—was handled by two police officers prior to examination who however did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the time it was in their possession—was excluded from the prosecution evidence. alteration or substitution of substances from other cases—by accident or otherwise—in which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. only Esternon and Arroyo testified for the specific purpose of establishing the identity of the evidence. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood. a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied. It ruled that unless the state can show by records or testimony. State.390[43] A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. State. . 389[42] 390 [43] Graham v. the court pointing out that the white powder seized could have been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or baking powder. Of the people who came into direct contact with the seized objects. 255 N. the person to whom Esternon directly handed over the seized items for chemical analysis at the crime laboratory. as well as Garcia. that at any of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering. loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives. State389[42] positively acknowledged this danger. the likelihood of tampering.388[41] Graham vs. were not presented in court to establish the 388[41] Graham v. 655. Graham v. Gallinera.E2d 652.273 Indeed. State. a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with. to whom Esternon supposedly handed over the confiscated sachets for recording and marking. 255 N. A mere fleeting glance at the records readily raises significant doubts as to the identity of the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner. the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into the possession of police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition.E2d 652. Hence. 655.E2d 652. in authenticating the same. testimony of the state as to the laboratory’s findings is inadmissible. or at least the possibility.

what she did with them during the time they were in her possession until before she delivered the same to Arroyo for analysis. Any reasonable mind might then ask the question: Are the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner the very same objects laboratory tested and offered in court as evidence? The prosecution’s evidence is incomplete to provide an affirmative answer.R. Ambrosio. 427 SCRA 312. Ambrosio. 135378. When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance. his testimony in court is crucial to affirm whether the exhibits were the same items handed over to him by Esternon at the place of seizure and acknowledge the initials marked thereon as his own. . In our constitutional system. basic and elementary is the presupposition that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. 14 April 2004. acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right. 427 SCRA 312. for the law presumes his innocence unless and until the contrary is shown. the blind reliance by the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is manifestly misplaced. The rule is invariable whatever may be the reputation of the accused. Considering that it was Gallinera who recorded and marked the seized items. 14 April 2004. to testify on the circumstances under which she received the items from Esternon. The Equipoise Rule. Tan.R. 382 SCRA 419 (2002). Given the foregoing deviations of police officer Esternon from the standard and normal procedure in the implementation of the warrant and in taking post-seizure custody of the evidence. Evidence of guilt and evidence of innocence are about even. People v. G. The presumption of regularity is merely just that—a mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth.392[53] In the present case the lack of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from petitioner. Tan. strongly militates a finding of guilt. 391[52] People v.393[54] In dubio pro reo. No. 382 SCRA 419 (2002). Laxa. 318 citing People v. No.391[52] Suffice it to say that this presumption cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt. coupled with the irregularity in the manner by which the same were placed under police custody before offered in court. id.274 circumstances under which they handled the subject items. 392[53] 393 [54] People v. but nevertheless failed. G. 318 citing People v. 135378. The same is true of Garcia who could have.

394[1] Rollo. for the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500. J. . deliver and give away to a poseur-buyer.R. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MONALYN CERVANTES. @ Tisoy.C. 15. 2004 Decision in Criminal Case No. and P/Sr. the prosecution presented in evidence the oral testimonies of William Todavia. Article III of Republic Act No. 2009 VELASCO. Philippines. Inspector Lorna Tria. Philippine Currency. Art.00) PESOS. 6-7. CR-H. (RA) 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The records show the following facts: In an Information dated April 7. commonly known as shabu.76) GRAMS OF METHAMPHETAMINE [HYDROCHLORIDE]. accused ISIDRO ARGUSON y ARENDELA. 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. unlawfully and feloniously. did then and there. MONALYN [CERVANTES] y SOLAR @ Mona.000. on or about April 5. March 17. The RTC found accusedappellant Monalyn Cervantes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 15. 2000. Branch 53 in Manila.. without authority of law or the corresponding license therefor. WILSON DEL MONTE @ Wilson and RICHARD REQUIZ @ Richard. 2000. a forensic chemical officer of the same regional office. III of RA 6425 (selling or distributing a regulated drug). G.: This is an appeal from the Decision dated July 19. PO3 Reynaldo Ramos of the Philippine National Police Regional Office IV (PNP R-IV). CONTRARY TO LAW. sell. accused-appellant and three others were charged with violation of Sec. confederating and mutually helping one another. conspiring. in the City of Manila. FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE POINT SEVENTY SIX (473. No. 00-181929 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). No. 181494. acting in common accord. allegedly committed as follows: That. a regulated drug. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. 00476 which affirmed the April 23.394[1] Accused-appellant and her co-accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. willfully. pp. JR.275 effect of non-presentation of forensic chemist who examined the shabu or marijuana—ground for acquittal. In the ensuing trial. as amended.

accused-appellant left. The McDonald’s branch in P. After being shown the money bundle. and Richard Requiz. and handed it to PO2 Balosbalos..395[2] Upon arriving at the rest house. Ocampo St. accused-appellant emerged from Estrella St. and approached PO3 Ramos to check if he still had the money. based at Camp Vicente Lim in Calamba. 2000. the Regional Special Operations Group IV (RSOG-IV). later found to contain 473. he hired a vehicle owned by Todavia.000 worth of shabu. Cavite. 2000. as summarized by the CA in the decision now on appeal. acting as poseur-buyers. Finally. For the purpose. Tanza.396[3] Arguson instructed the would-be-buyers to wait for someone who will come out from the nearby Estrella St. he instructed the would-be-buyers to follow him to Pasay City. The black plastic bag containing the six small self-sealing bags of white crystalline substance was likewise taken to Camp Vicente Lim where PO3 Ramos prepared the booking sheets and arrest reports and the request for a qualitative analysis of the seized items. Accused-appellant and her scampering companions were later arrested and brought to and booked at Camp Vicente Lim. . who in turn gave him the bundle of boodle money. PO3 Ramos gave the pre-arranged signal to indicate the consummation of the drug deal and introduced himself as policeman. At about three o’clock in the afternoon of that day. and PO2 Emerson Balosbalos arranged a buy-bust operation to be conducted at Arguson’s rest house in Barangay Lambingan. only to return a few minutes later this time with Arguson. was later determined to be in Manila. Wilson Del Monte. Regional Crime Laboratory Office IV Chief Inspector (C/I) Mary Jean Geronimo then conducted the standard physical and chemical examinations on the specimen referred to her. were introduced by the DPA to Arguson as the buyers of PhP 500. in front of the McDonald’s branch in P. PO3 Ramos. Ocampo St. PO3 Ramos and PO2 Balosbalos. a team led by SPO2 Geronimo Pastrana. received a tip from a deep penetration agent (DPA) about a group of drug traffickers led by Isidro Arguson operating in Cavite. Arguson then took from Del Monte the bag. C/I Geronimo prepared and completed Chemistry Report No. simultaneously showing him a bundle of money. Acting on this bit of information. D-115800 on the crystalline substance. 395[2] 396 [3] Id. Laguna. the substance tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Pasay City. Per her report. at 5. Since Arguson did not have enough supply of shabu in the premises. who was holding a black plastic bag.276 The People’s version of the incident. is as follows: On April 5. Very much later.76 grams of shabu packed in six small self-sealing transparent bags. On April 6.

D-115800 prepared by C/I Geronimo.. Vito Cruz branch. and six (6) self-sealing transparent bags allegedly containing the confiscated shabu.397[4] inclusive of its sub markings. which. whom he did not know prior to that incident. As he moved backward from where he stood. They were taken to a cemetery where another vehicle came and took them to Camp Vicente Lim. when he bumped a parked van. were also boarded into the same van. 2002. Thereafter. her youngest child asked her to go to [McDonald’s]. whom she later came to know as DEL MONTE and REQUIZ. accused CERVANTES was 397 [4] Records. Vito Cruz branch. 2000 to the Chief. Laboratory Service. and (d) Exhibit “F” – Receipt of property seized signed by PO2 Balosbalos and by Todavia and PO3 Ramos as witnesses. the prosecution. requesting for qualitative analysis of the contents of the six transparent plastic bags. On the other hand. 2000. 185-187. saying “pulis ako wag kang aalis dyan[!] ” The man left and when he returned. a commotion happened near his post. he was riding a borrowed bicycle on his way to the Cultural Center. . Harrison on April 4. to buy ice cream. one of whom [was] an old man boarded her inside the van causing her to lose hold of her child.B. accused DEL MONTE testified that he was a parking boy around Vito Cruz and that on the day in question. passing by F. were objected to by the defense: (a) Exhibit “B” – Chemistry Report No. When they arrived thereat at about 4:30 in the afternoon. where she allegedly met ARGUSON for the first time. he was suddenly approached by a policeman who arrested him and boarded him inside a vehicle together with CERVANTES and REQUIZ. For his part.277 Apart from the witnesses’ affidavits and other documents. The CA decision likewise summarized the defense’s account of what purportedly transpired. as may be expected. accused REQUIZ testified that on the date and time in question.B. two (2) younger male persons. She then saw a woman who alighted from a nearby van and pointed her out to her companions. there was a commotion going on in front of the restaurant. (b) Exhibit “C” – Memorandum of RSOG-IV dated April 5. to wit: Accused-appellant testified that after she did laundry works at her house in Estrella Street near F. wherefrom a man alighted and cursed him. while he was watching a vehicle near [McDonald’s]. (c) Exhibits “D” and “D-1” to “D-6” – Black plastic bag with markings. Harrison St. pp. offered in evidence the following exhibits. in the hearing of March 4.

in view of the foregoing. the RTC rendered judgment acquitting Del Monte and Requiz but finding accused-appellant guilty as charged and meting upon her the penalty of reclusion perpetua. like accused-appellant. 6425 as amended. Mateo. Del Monte testified. pp. Thereafter. p. 147678-87. judgment is hereby rendered: Finding accused MONALYN CERVANTES Y SOLAR GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 15.278 with him. January 20. Nos. Finding the prosecution’s evidence insufficient to prove the guilt of accused WILSON DEL MONTE and RICHARD REQUIZ beyond reasonable doubt.” particularly stating that the “forensic chemist who actually conducted the laboratory examination on the specimens allegedly recovered from the accused was 398 399 400 401 402 [5] [6] Rollo. p. of Republic Act No. 2004. and 1.R. pursuant to which the RTC forwarded the records of the case to this Court.C. accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. 00476. 433 SCRA 640. pp. Before the appellate court. [7] Rollo. Penned by Judge Reynaldo A.00. 8. that he was taken to a cemetery somewhere in Cavite where the arresting officers lingered for an hour before bringing him to Camp Vicente Lim. 2. 2003. he was boarded into the van together with the other accused. and is sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine in the amount of Php500.000. . Article III. Conformably with People v. 2004. [9] G. July 7. No. and who are hereby ACQUITTED. 30. Alhambra.R.399[6] These testimonies remained uncontroverted. CR-H. SO ORDERED.398[5] While not stated in the CA decision. 10-11. accused-appellant urged her acquittal on the ground of “insufficiency of evidence. [8] CA rollo. Arguson died during the course of the trial resulting in the dismissal of the case against him. TSN.400[7] On April 23. 2004. The fallo of the RTC Decision reads: WHEREFORE.402[9] the Court directed the transfer of the case to the CA where it was docketed as CA-G.401[8] On May 18. 7-8.

considering certain circumstances engendering reasonable doubt as to her guilt. the People. On March 24. Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. the Court resolves to acquit accusedappellant. counters that the prosecution has established that the buy-bust transaction took place. and has presented the corpus delicti. this Court required the parties to submit supplemental briefs if they so desired. 81-82. Rollo. the CA. 405 [12] (a) identity of the buyer and the seller. Roxas and Lucas P. the object and the consideration. which on the part of accused-appellant would be: THE [CA] GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION. The Court’s Ruling After a circumspect study. accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal of the CA affirmatory decision. 403 404 CA rollo. 4-10.”403[10] By its Decision404[11] dated July 19. As the appellate court stressed. must be upheld even if she did not personally testify in court. Perlas-Bernabe and concurred in by Associate Justices Vicente Q. Bersamin.” The CA added the observation that absent any evidence overturning the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. The CA rejected accused-appellant’s lament about one Inspector Tria testifying on the chemistry report she did not prepare. who had resigned from the service. 2007. pp. On August 17. the probative value and admissibility of the forensic report prepared by C/I Geronimo. thus veritably reiterating their principal arguments raised in the CA. pp. there was no clear identification of the contents of the confiscated sachets. as evidence. 2007.279 not presented in court x x x [and] hence. C/I Geronimo’s forensic report “carries the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions [and] the entries thereon x x x are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. [11] [10] . The parties manifested their willingness to submit the case on the basis of the records already submitted. thru the Office of the Solicitor General. For its part. and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor. finding the elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs405[12] to have sufficiently been satisfied and the identification of accused-appellant having been established. has identified accused-appellant and her complicity in Arguson’s illegal trade. 2008. affirmed her conviction.

CA rollo. may we move to strike that out x x x. In the witness box. checked on the purchase money. who identified accused-appellant and described her role in the conspiracy to sell shabu. There is no suggestion that accused-appellant.406[13] As may be noted. Q: Wilson? A: Yes. Arguson. Balosbalos gave Arguson the boodle money while I flash the signal x x x then we apprehended them. Cruz: Your honor. and later re-appeared. PO3 Ramos testified that. . sir. PO3 Ramos pointed to Del Monte as the one holding the plastic bag allegedly containing the prohibited substance until Arguson took it from him and handed it over to PO2 Balosbalos. accusedappellant emerged from said street. the RTC went on to write: x x x While PO3 Ramos testified that the bag was initially held by accused Del Monte and then taken from him by accused Arguson. they were four (4). when all these accused here return with Monalyn Cervantes. there is no other evidence which can support the charge of conspiracy with Arguson and Cervantes x x x. Yet. but convicted accused-appellant. after being told by Arguson to wait for someone who will come out from the street whence Arguson would enter. the trial court acquitted Requiz and Del Monte. 28. pp. What happened next is captured by the following answers of PO3 Ramos to the prosecutor’s questions: Q: What did you see when Cervantes already returned? A: When Monalyn return the one holding the plastic bag was Wilson. accused Monalyn Cervantes’ complicity with accused Isidro Arguson in the sale of shabu has been established by the testimony of PO3 Ramos. 2001.”407[14] But two paragraphs later. ever handled the merchandise or its container. The court does not find the evidence sufficient to pass the test of moral certainty to find accused Del Monte liable as 406 407 [13] [14] TSN. Atty. while at the crime scene. stating: “Clearly. October 23. sir and handed it to Balosbalos. Without hesitation. what happen[ed]? A: Arguson took the plastic bag from Wilson. Wilson. PO3 Ramos. the testimony of the prosecution’s principal witness. Fiscal Formoso: That’s part of the answer x x x now. 12-16. asked the operatives to wait. together with Richard. sir.280 We start off with the most basic. p. PO3 Ramos categorically stated that Del Monte was among the four who emerged with Arguson from a street.

409[16] But even if we were to cast aside the foregoing equipoise rule. on the basis alone of the testimony of a witness. consisted of allegedly verifying whether the poseur-buyer still had the purchase money. . coupled with the presentation to the court of the traded prohibited 408 409 [15] [16] Id.408[15] Before us then is a situation where two persons––accusedappellant.” extended to Del Monte the “benefit of the doubt. if the inculpatory testimony is capable of two or more explanations. Implicit in these cases is first and foremost the identity and existence. when both accused are complete strangers to the policeman? To paraphrase an unyielding rule. the object and its consideration. a reversal of the appealed decision is indicated on another but more compelling ground. No. We shall explain. each testifying that they just happened to be near or passing by McDonald’s at about 4:30 in the afternoon of April 4. Del Monte came accompanying Arguson carrying the drug-containing plastic bag no less.281 charged. during the actual buy bust–– are being indicted. Any reasonable mind might ask: Why the contrasting treatment? Why consider PO3 Ramos as a highly credible eyewitness as against accused-appellant.R. Even if PO3 Ramos saw him to have held the bag for Arguson. disappearing from the scene and then coming back with the principal player. The overt acts performed by accused-appellant. 2000 when they were apprehended. But the trial court. We refer to the postulate that the prosecution. Both offered the defenses of denial and instigation. 653. but an unreliable one as against Del Monte. in its observation that “it could have been possible that [Del Monte] was merely asked by x x x Arguson to carry the bag. and the payment for it.” a benevolence denied to accused-appellant without so much of an acceptable explanation. and Del Monte. 173790. in the company of the ostensible pusher. October 11. the delivery of the thing sold. with confederating with each and several others to sell shabu. In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drug. it could have been possible that he was merely asked by Cervantes or Arguson to carry the bag. a laundry woman. a car park boy. Navarro. G. On the other hand. then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. People v. having failed to positively and convincingly prove the identity of the seized regulated substance. what is crucial is the identity of the buyer and seller. Arguson. at 28-29. 535 SCRA 644. one consistent with the innocence of the accused persons and the other consistent with their guilt. carrying the bag would relatively have the more serious implication being in itself a punishable act of possession of regulated drugs. As between the two acts performed. is deemed to have also failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt accused-appellant’s guilt. 2007. as indicia of conspiracy.

No. November 23. 413 [20] Valdez. 416 [23] In accordance with Sec. 632. the cadaver of the person murdered. in appropriate cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established with moral certainty. 137348. the fact that the substance illegally possessed and sold in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict. June 21. at 628-629.R. supra note 19. [18] [17] . supra note 20. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item.” defines “chain of custody. 432 SCRA 470.”414[21] So it is that in a slew of cases the Court has considered the prosecution’s failure to adequately prove that the specimen submitted for laboratory examination was the same one supposedly seized from the offending seller or possessor as ground for acquittal. 172953. Sr. 21. from the seizure of the prohibited drug up to 410 411 410[17] A Latin word which signifies “body. it does not refer to the actual physical evidence. the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. such as ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Sanchez. 2004. No. or the confiscated cases of blue seal cigarettes in the crime of smuggling. the accused. 415 [22] Valdez.” Literally body of the crime. People. the “chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. April 30. this object evidence being an integral part of the corpus delicti411[18] of the crime of possession or selling of regulated/prohibited drug. or the “Guidelines on the Custody and Disposition of Seized Dangerous Drugs. v. G. October 10. II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 in relation to Sec. therefore. This means that on top of the key elements of possession or sale. G. 175832. G. Ong. 553 SCRA 619. In context. citing People v. 414 [21] G. People. No. 146481. supra.415[22] Sec. See Rimorin. 402 SCRA 393. or sold by. No. this would ideally include testimony about every link in the chain. People.412[19] There can be no such crime when nagging doubts persist on whether the specimen submitted for examination and presented in court was what was recovered from. and Laboratory Equipment.R.416[23] As a mode of authenticating evidence. Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. 81(b). 2008. Art. 1.R. April 30. and the final disposition. 1(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. Art. G. Ong.413[20] Essential. 2003. 170180. 400. citing American jurisprudence. No.282 substance.R.” thusly: “Chain of Custody” means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals x x x from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. IX of RA 9165. 2007. And as we stressed in Malillin v. Series of 2002.R. in the legal sense. citing Valdez v. 538 SCRA 611. 2008. the date and time when such transfer of custody [was] made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence. 412 [19] People v. corpus delicti as referring to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the substance of the crime.

) As the Court distinctly notes in this case. . in authenticating the same. supra note 21. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration. xxxx A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. or at least the possibility. in such a way that everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received. tampering. an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not really identifiable. of the individuals who came into direct contact with or had physical custody of the seized 417 418 [24] [25] Malillin. contamination and even substitution and exchange. and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. at 633-634. a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood. In other words. Hence. the condition in which it was received.418[25] (Emphasis added. or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical. alteration or tampering––without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not––dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule. or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with. that at any of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering. Id. the exhibit’s level of susceptibility to fungibility.417[24] The need for the punctilious observance of the chain-of-custody process in drug-related cases is explained in Malillin in the following wise: While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain. where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession. alteration or substitution of substances from other cases––by accident or otherwise–– in which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing.283 the time it is offered into evidence.

is a memorandum419[26] PO3 Ramos prepared420[27] dated April 5. the analyzing forensic chemist. testify on whether or not the specimen turned over for analysis and eventually offered in court as exhibit was the same substance received from Arguson. October 23. no one testified on how the specimen was cared after following the chemical analysis. and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. As the Court observed aptly in People v. too. What is on record is Exhibit “C. however. shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.e.”421[28] It cannot be overemphasized that Inspector Tria was really not part of the custodial chain. at 490. it is fairly evident that the police operatives trifled with the procedures in the custody of seized prohibited drugs in a buy-bust operation. “non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds. a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ). 2001. II of RA 9165. even if she wanted to. submitting for qualitative analysis the white crystalline substance confiscated by the buy-bust group. as embodied in Sec. Art. He did not name the duty desk officer at Camp Vicente Lim to whom he specifically turned over the confiscated bag and sachets at least for recording. as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. Given the foregoing perspective. the unnamed person who delivered the suspected shabu and the recipient of it at the laboratory were no-show in court to testify on the circumstances under which they handled the specimen or whether other persons had access to the specimen before actual testing. p. the apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drug shall: immediately after seizure and confiscation. In the witness box. 20. 21(1). Otherwise. he did not indicate how he and his companions. was not also presented. TSN. Then. physically inventory and photograph the [drug] in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized. the prosecution cannot maintain that it was able to prove the guilt of appellants beyond reasonable doubt..” which. as earlier described. And C/I Geronimo. right after the buy bust. only PO3 Ramos testified for the specific purpose of identifying the evidence. p.284 regulated items. handled the seized plastic bag and its contents. Ong. 2000 from the RSOG-IV Director to the Chief. “[T]hese questions should be answered satisfactorily to determine whether the integrity of the evidence was compromised in any way. or his/her representative or counsel. i. Needless to stress. 422[29] The IRR of RA 9165 provides further.422[29] 419 420 Records. And she did not as she could not. 421 [28] Supra note 20. 33.” [27] [26] . PNP R-IV Crime Laboratory Service.

when you reach your office. after their arrest.285 In this case. Bandang. . While Inspector Tria can plausibly testify on the fact that C/I Geronimo prepared the chemical report in the regular course of her duties. was incompetent to state that the specimen her former colleague analyzed was in fact shabu and was the same specimen delivered to the laboratory for chemical analysis. Adding a negative dimension to the prosecution’s case is the nonpresentation of C/I Geronimo and the presentation in her stead of Inspector Tria to testify on the chemical report C/I Geronimo prepared. Thus. she. In it.423[30] Just as clear is the fact that the exacting chain of custody rule was not observed. a heavy cloud of doubt hangs over the integrity and necessarily the evidentiary value of the seized items. who was in possession of this Shabu x x x when you left the place and proceeded to Canlubang? A. pp. Withal. In net effect. Now. thus. 18-19. xxxx Q. you were able to arrest all the accused here. sir. PO3 Ramos admitted as much. has held that the non-presentation of the forensic chemist in illegal drug cases is an insufficient cause for acquittal. After informing their rights and the reason why we arrest them we brought them immediately to our office in Canlubang. rightfully assert that the six sachets seized from Arguson were the very same objects tested by C/I Geronimo and offered in court in proving the corpus delicti. xxxx Q. The prosecution cannot. what did you do? A. Now. October 23. what about this Shabu. there is no reasonable assurance that no tampering or substitution occurred between the time the police seized the black bag in P. no physical inventory was made and no photograph taken nor markings made on the seized articles at the crime scene. in Manila until its contents were tested in the laboratory of the PNP R-IV headquarters in Canlubang. Laguna. the accused persons were convicted of illegal sale of shabu even if the forensic chemist who prepared the corresponding laboratory report was not presented. 2001. thus: Q. the Court. Inspector Tria. notably in People v. I made the booking sheet and I requested for their medical/physical examination x x x. what did you do there? A. PO2 Balosbalos. Ocampo St. Now. To be sure. we wrote: 423 [30] TSN.

He should have objected to their admissibility at the time they were being offered. (2) there was a compelling reason for not presenting the examining forensic chemist. 586-587. the Court in effect stated in Malillin that unless the state can show by records or testimony that the integrity of the evidence has not been compromised by accounting for the continuous whereabouts of the object evidence at least between the time it came into the possession of the 424[31] 425 [32] G. the chemistry report in question only established. due execution.) It should be pointed out. The familiar rule in this jurisdiction is that the admissibility of certain documents x x x cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. conclusive in the absence of evidence proving the contrary. 2004. and authenticity of the results of the chemistry analysis. at best. No. Inspector Tria’s testimony on. Sanchez.424[31] (Emphasis added. In this regard. supra note 19.286 x x x In People vs. therefore.425 [32] It does not prove compliance with the requisite chain of custody over the confiscated substance from the time of seizure of the evidence.e. Corollarily. the objection shall be considered waived and such evidence will form part of the records of the case as competent and admissible evidence. as in this case. D-1585-00 only now. it must be stressed that Atty. Otherwise. Enriquez raises his objection to the Initial Laboratory Report and Chemistry Report No. a justifying factor for the prosecution to dispense with her testimony. C/I Geronimo’s resignation from the service is not. and the presentation of. In this case. implying that the identity and integrity of prohibited drug was safeguarded throughout. Uy. i. standing alone. 151314. At any rate. 430 SCRA 570. a circumstance not obtaining in this case. et al. the parties stipulated that the confiscated seven plastic bags have been identified and examined and that the chemist stated in his report that the substance is positive for shabu.R. . June 3. Omero’s reports that the seven sachets of white crystalline substance were “positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride” or shabu are. did not raise any objection to the chemical report during trial. his report carries the presumption of regularity in the performance of his function and duties.. unlike here where accused-appellant objected to Inspector Tria’s competency to testify on the Geronimo chemical report. Second. we ruled that a forensic chemist is a public officer and as such. and (3) accused Bandang. x x x entries in official records made in the performance of official duty are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. that the Bandang ruling was cast against a different backdrop where: (1) the seized crystalline substance was the same item examined and tested positive for shabu and presented in court. under Section 44 of Rule 130. the existence. however.

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police officers until it was tested in the laboratory, then the prosecution cannot maintain that it was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. So it was that in People v. Kimura the Court said that in establishing the corpus delicti, proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that “unwavering exactitude”427[34] be observed, a demand which may be addressed by hewing to the chain-of-custody rule. Evidently, the prosecution has not proved that the substance seized in front of the McDonald’s was the same substance adduced in evidence as an indispensable element of corpus delicti of the crime, which failure produces a serious doubt as to accused-appellant’s guilt.428[35] Both the trial and appellate courts made much of the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions both with respect to the acts of PO3 Ramos and other PNP personnel at Camp Vicente Lim. To a point, the reliance on the presumptive regularity is tenable. This presumption is, however, disputable and may be overturned by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty;429[36] any taint of irregularity vitiates the performance and negates the presumption. And as earlier discussed, the buy bust team committed serious lapses in the handling of the prohibited item from the very start of its operation, the error of which the PNP R-IV command later compounded. The Court need not belabor this matter anew. Lest it be overlooked, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty always yields to the presumption of innocence and does not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt.430[37] We held in one case: The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used as basis for affirming accused-appellant’s conviction because, “[f]irst, the presumption is precisely just that—a mere presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, x x x [it] cannot be regarded as binding truth. Second, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.”431[38] For failure then of the prosecution to establish the guilt of accusedappellant beyond reasonable doubt, she must perforce be exonerated from criminal liability. The facts and the law of the case call for this kind of disposition.
426 427

426[33]

Supra note 21, at 634. G.R. No. 130805, April 27, 2004, 428 SCRA 51, 70. 428 [35] Id. 429 [36] Sevilla v. Cardenas, G.R. No. 167684, July 31, 2006, 497 SCRA 428, 443; citing Mabsucang v. Judge Balgos, 446 Phil. 217, 224 (2003). 430 [37] People v. Cañete, G.R. No. 138400, July 11, 2002, 384 SCRA 411, 424. 431 [38] People v. Tan, G.R. No. 129376, May 29, 2002, 382 SCRA 419, 444.
[34]

[33]

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But a final consideration. The Court is cognizant of the campaign of the police and other drug enforcement agencies against the growing drug menace in the country. Unfortunately, their best efforts, particularly successful honest-to-goodness buy-bust operations, sometimes still end up in the acquittal of illegal drug manufacturers, distributors, pushers and/or lesser players, even when nabbed in flagrante, simply because drug enforcement operatives tend to compromise the integrity and evidentiary worth of the seized illegal items. This aberration is oftentimes in turn attributable to the unfamiliarity of police operatives of extant rules and procedures governing the custody, control, and handling of seized drugs. This is, thus, an opportune time to remind all concerned about these rules and procedures and the guiding jurisprudence. And to put things in the proper perspective, non-compliance with the legal prescriptions of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, is, as we made abundantly clear in People v. Sanchez, not necessarily fatal to the prosecution of drug-related cases; that police procedures may still have some lapses. These lapses, however, must be recognized, addressed, and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds, and the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved by the apprehending officer or team. To be forewarned is to be forearmed. WHEREFORE, the CA Decision dated July 19, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00476, affirming that of the RTC, Branch 53 in Manila which found her guilty of violating Sec. 15, Art. III of RA 6425 and imposed upon her the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of PhP 500,000, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Monalyn Cervantes y Solar is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt and is accordingly immediately RELEASED from custody unless she is being lawfully held for some lawful cause. Presumption of innocence leads to the accused’s acquittal due to inconsistent testimonies of prosecution’s witnesses ELY AGUSTIN VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 158788, April 30, 2008 FACTS: On October 1, 1995, at 7:20 in the evening, armed men robbed the house of spouses George and Rosemarie Gante in Barangay Pug-os, Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, forcibly taking with them several valuables, including cash amounting to P600,000.00.432[3] Forthwith, the spouses reported the
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matter to the police, who, in turn, immediately applied for a search warrant with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur.433 [4] The MTC issued Search Warrant No. 5-95,434[5] directing a search of the items stolen from the victims, as well as the firearms used by the perpetrators. One of the target premises was the residence of petitioner, named as one of the several suspects in the crime. On October 6, 1995, armed with the warrant, policemen searched the premises of petitioner's house located in Sitio Padual, Barangay Pug-os, Cabugao, Ilocos Sur. The search resulted in the recovery of a firearm and ammunitions which had no license nor authority to possess such weapon, and, consequently, the filing of a criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1651-K, for violation of P.D. No. 1866 or Illegal Possession of Firearms, against petitioner before the RTC. Thereafter, trial ensued. The prosecution presented eight witnesses namely: (1) P/Insp. Anselmo Baldovino435[7] (P/Insp. Baldovino), a police investigator and the applicant for the search warrant; (2) Rosemarie Gante (Gante), the victim of the robbery and private complainant; (3) Ignacio Yabes (Yabes), a Municipal Local Government Operations Officer of the Department of Interior and Local Government who was the civilian witness to the search; (4) P/Supt. Bonifacio Abian436[8] (P/Supt. Abian), Deputy Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police and part of the search team; (5) SPO4 Marino Peneyra (SPO4 Peneyra); (6) SPO1 Franklin Cabaya (SPO1 Cabaya); (7) SPO1 James Jara (SPO1 Jara); and (8) SPO2 Florentino Renon (SPO2 Renon). The prosecution's case centered mainly on evidence that during the enforcement of the search warrant against petitioner, a .38 caliber revolver firearm was found in the latter's house.437[9] In particular, SPO1 Cabaya testified that while poking at a closed rattan cabinet near the door, he saw a firearm on the lower shelf.438[10] The gun is a .38 caliber revolver439[11] with five live ammunitions,440[12] which he immediately turned over to his superior, P/Insp. Baldovino.441[13] Petitioner anchored his defense on denial and frame-up. The petitioner and his wife Lorna assert that petitioner does not own a gun.442 [14] Lorna testified that she saw a “military” man planting the gun.443[15]

433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443

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After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated July 7, 1999, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA, which rendered the assailed Decision445[18] dated January 22, 2003, affirming with modification the decision of the trial court, thus: WHEREFORE, except for the MODIFICATION reducing and changing the maximum of the prison term imposed to Five (5) Years Four (4) Months and Twenty (20) Days, the appealed Decision is otherwise AFFIRMED. Hence, the instant Petition for Review, on the principal ground that the CA gravely erred in finding that the guilt of petitioner has been proven beyond reasonable doubt; and more specifically, in giving weight and credence to the testimonies of the police officers who searched the house of the petitioner which are replete with material and irreconcilable contradictions and in giving SPO1 Cabaya the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty despite the claim of Lorna that the .38 caliber revolver was planted. Petitioner insists that the trial court and the CA committed reversible error in giving little credence to his defense that the firearm found in his residence was planted by the policemen. He also alleges material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the policemen as witnesses for the prosecution, which amounted to failure by the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. HELD: The petition has merit. The paramount issue in the present case is whether the prosecution established the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt; and in the determination thereof, a factual issue, that is, whether a gun was found in the house of petitioner, must necessarily be resolved. It is a well-entrenched rule that appeal in criminal cases opens the whole case wide open for review.446[20] In convicting petitioner, the RTC relied heavily on the testimony of SPO1 Cabaya, who testified that he discovered the subject firearm in a closed cabinet inside the former's house. The trial court brushed aside petitioner's defense of denial and protestations of frame-up. The RTC justified giving full credence to Cabaya's testimony on the principles that
444 445 446

444[16]

291

the latter is presumed to have performed his official duties regularly; that he had no ill motive to frame-up petitioner; and that his affirmative testimony is stronger than petitioner's negative testimony.447[21] Weighing these findings of the lower courts against the petitioner's claim that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt due to the material inconsistencies in the testimonies of its witnesses, the Court finds, after a meticulous examination of the records that the lower courts, indeed, committed a reversible error in finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime he was charged with. The RTC and the CA have overlooked certain facts and circumstances that would have interjected serious apprehensions absolutely impairing the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. The conflicting testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to who actually entered the house and conducted the search, who “discovered” the gun, and who witnessed the “discovery” are material matters because they relate directly to a fact in issue; in the present case, whether a gun has been found in the house of petitioner; or to a fact to which, by the process of logic, an inference may be made as to the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue.448[24] As held in United States v. Estraña,449[25] a material matter is the main fact which is the subject of inquiry or any circumstance which tends to prove that fact or any fact or circumstance which tends to corroborate or strengthen the testimony relative to the subject of inquiry or which legitimately affects the credit of any witness who testifies. The evidence of prosecution is severely weakened by several contradictions in the testimonies of its witnesses. Especially damaged is the credibility of SPO1 Cabaya, none of whose declarations on material points jibes with those of the other prosecution witnesses. In the face of the vehement and consistent protestations of frame-up by petitioner and his wife, the trial court and the CA erred in overlooking or misappreciating these inconsistencies. The inconsistencies are material as they delve into the very bottom of the question of whether or not SPO1 Cabaya really found a firearm in the house of petitioner. SPO1 Cabaya testified that he entered the house with four other policemen, among whom were SPO1 Jara, SPO4 Peneyra, SPO3 Bernabe Ocado (SPO3 Ocado) and another one whose name he does not remember.450[26] While searching, he discovered the firearm in the kitchen, inside a closed cabinet near the door.451[27] He said that SPO1 Jara was standing right behind him, at a distance of just one meter, when he
447 448 449 450 451

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(Cabaya) saw the firearm; and that he picked up the gun, held it 453[29] and showed it to SPO1 Jara. He asserted that SPO2 Renon was not one of those who went inside the house.454[30] However, SPO1 Jara, the best witness who could have corroborated SPO1 Cabaya's testimony, related a different story as to the circumstances of the firearm's discovery. SPO1 Jara testified that he merely conducted perimeter security during the search and did not enter or participate in searching the house.455[32] SPO1 Jara testified that he remained outside the house throughout the search, and when SPO1 Cabaya shouted and showed a gun, he was seven to eight meters away from him.456[33] He could not see the inside of the house and could see Cabaya only from his chest up.457[34] He did not see the firearm at the place where it was found, but saw it only when Cabaya raised his arm to show the gun, which was a revolver.458[35] He is certain that he was not with Cabaya at the time the latter discovered the firearm.459[36] He further testified that SPO3 Ocado, who, according to SPO1 Cabaya was one of those near him when he (Cabaya) discovered the firearm, stayed outside and did not enter or search the house.460[37] P/Insp. Baldovino testified that only SPO2 Renon conducted the search and entered the house together with SPO1 Cabaya,461[38] directly contradicting SPO1 Cabaya's testimony that he, together with SPO1 Jara, SPO4 Peneyra, SPO3 Ocado, and another one whose name he cannot recall, were inside the house when he discovered the gun462[39] and that SPO2 Renon did not enter the house of petitioner.463[40] The testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses further muddled the prosecution evidence with more inconsistencies as to matters material to the determination of whether a gun had in fact been found in the house of petitioner. SPO4 Peneyra testified that Yabes stayed outside of the during the search;464[59] whereas SPO1 Jara testified that Yabes was inside, at the sala, but the latter saw the gun only when SPO1 Cabaya raised it.465
[60]

452[28]

Although the Court has held that frame-up is inherently one of the

452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465

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weakest defenses, in the present the lower courts the weakness of the prosecution's evidence and its failure to case, seriously erred in ignoring prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The rule requiring a claim of frame-up to be supported by clear and convincing evidence468[63] was never intended to shift to the accused the burden of proof in a criminal case. As the Court held in People of the Philippines v. Ambih:469[64] [W]hile the lone defense of the accused that he was the victim of a frameup is easily fabricated, this claim assumes importance when faced with the rather shaky nature of the prosecution evidence. It is well to remember that the prosecution must rely, not on the weakness of the defense evidence, but rather on its own proof which must be strong enough to convince this Court that the prisoner in the dock deserves to be punished. The constitutional presumption is that the accused is innocent even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.470[65] (Emphasis supplied) In People of the Philippines v. Gonzales,471[66] the Court held that where there was material and unexplained inconsistency between the testimonies of two principal prosecution witnesses relating not to inconsequential details but to the alleged transaction itself which is subject of the case, the inherent improbable character of the testimony given by one of the two principal prosecution witnesses had the effect of vitiating the testimony given by the other principal prosecution witness. The Court ruled that it cannot just discard the improbable testimony of one officer and adopt the testimony of the other that is more plausible. In such a situation, both testimonies lose their probative value. The Court further held: Why should two (2) police officers give two (2) contradictory descriptions of the same sale transaction, which allegedly took place before their very eyes, on the same physical location and on the same occasion? We must conclude that a reasonable doubt was generated as to whether or not the "buy-bust" operation ever took place.472[69] In the present case, to repeat, the glaring contradictory testimonies of the prosecution witnesses generate serious doubt as to whether a firearm was really found in the house of petitioner. The prosecution utterly failed to discharge its burden of proving that petitioner is guilty of illegal possession of firearms beyond reasonable doubt. The constitutional presumption of innocence of petitioner has not been demolished and therefore petitioner should be acquitted of the crime he was with. Read also:
466 467 468 469 470 471 472

466[61] as it is both easily concocted and difficult to prove,467[62]

355 SCRA 415 PEOPLE VS. No objection was interposed by the accused or his counsel. Alejandro vs.July 10. Sacay vs. P. the testimony of the prosecution witnesses was interrupted when the accused. Pepito.R. 355 SCRA 578 What is the EQUIPOISE RULE? A. L-66497-98. If the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced. 184 SCRA 287 1-d. then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. IAC. P vs. vs. P vs. vs. 1986 FACTS: 1. Aguirre vs. vs. Dumlao vs. Sandiganbayan. 151 SCRA 552 3. 37 SCRA 450 6. Poblador. SATURNO. admitted that he shot the deceased but claimed that it was done in self-defense and fulfillment of duty. P. P. January 28. July 10.294 P. Bernardino. P vs.l986 SACAY VS. . Solis. 155 SCRA 337 1-c. At the initial hearing. 78 SCRA 513 5. the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the scale of justice in favor of the accused and he should be acquitted from the crime charged. Comelec. Where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more interpretations one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt. 76 SCRA 634 7. Alonso vs. Presumption of innocence in general and in the order of trial PEOPLE VS. Capilitan. Guinto. 182 SCRA 313 2. P vs. Read: 1. vs.. Quiason. 74 SCRA 205 4. SANDIGANBAYAN G. 96 SCRA 322 3. No. The prosecution then moved that the reverse procedure be adopted in view of the admission that the accused shot the deceased. Jose. Flores. DE LOS SANTOS. 1991 1-a. P vs. 165 SCRA 71 1-b. Lopez. 95 SCRA 392 3. 182 SCRA 182 1-e. P. through counsel.

1986 3.C. the orderly course of procedure requires that the prosecution should go forward and present all of its proof in the first instance. Gaoiran. 145 SCRA 597 6. ruled that : "It behooved the respondent Judge to have followed the sequence of trial set forth x x x the form of a trial is also a matter of public order and interest.C. Drammayo. Fernando. the order of trial may be modified accordingly. however. On appeal with the S. Dumlao vs. P vs.1983 7. 145 SCRA 151 5. relied upon by the prosecution and the trial Court. since in that case no objection was entered in the Court below to the procedure followed in the presentation of proof. 3(3). P vs. 3." In fact it should be noted that under the newly adopted 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure (Sec. Right to counsel-during trial Procedure ." HELD: The case of Alejandro vs. 3e). P vs. 404 (l910). vs. wherein the S. 4. the defense has produced its proofs before the prosecution presented its case. There is one radical difference.295 2. Castillo vs. after he was convicted the accused later claims that there was a violation of the order of trial provided for in Sec. as . Tolentino. 17 Phil. Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. Filtex. the Court also stated: "It is true that in the case of U. Other cases Read: 1. P vs. 42 SCRA 59 4. Opida. when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense. Pepito is not applicable inasmuch as the accused in the case at bar did not object to the procedure followed. Thus: "However. September 30.S. 1985 Rules on Criminal amended.1986 2. Tempongko." 3. In this case. supra 5. He also cites the case of Alejandro vs. In fact in the said Alejandro case.Sec. Pepito. 96 SCRA 322. the change in the order of trial made by respondent Judge was promptly and timely objected to by the defense. COMELEC. P vs. Rule 119)the said procedure is now expressly sanctioned. October 2. Rule 119 . and it was held that no substantial rights of the accused were prejudiced. June 13.

The accusatory portion of the Information against appellant reads: That on or about the 7th day of June. in the City of Makati. and by means of force.296 1. belonging to said complainant. 166-176. Bersamin. Holgado. Perlas-Bernabe. 179462. CA rollo.00. did then and there willfully.: The Court of Appeals having. steal and carry away complainant’s NELIA R. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. 145 SCRA 357 3.R. unlawfully and feloniously take. violence and intimidation.00. (Also important in your criminal law as to the distinctions between robbery and grave coercion) PEDRO CONSULTA VS. PEOPLE. .500. 2007. The right to be heard by himself and counsel during trial Effect of the fact that accused was represented by a NON-LAWYER at the early part of the trial but a full-pledged lawyer took over as his counsel when he presented his evidence. with the concurrence of Associate Justices Marina L. CA. pp. Buzon and Lucas P. P vs. No. 2009 appears in court without a CARPIO MORALES. Reason behind the requirement 2.500. by Decision of April 23. 473 [1] Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. with intent of gain. 193 Phil. February 12. Cuison. to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in the aforementioned amount of P3.85 Phil. 752 2. Obligation of the judge to an accused who lawyer to assist him Read: 1. J. Consulta (appellant) of Robbery with Intimidation of Persons.473[1] affirmed the December 9. 1999. 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. 296 5-a. SILVESTRE gold necklace worth P3. the above-named accused. Branch 139 convicting Pedro C. G. Delgado vs. appellant filed the present petition. P vs.

boarded a tricycle on their way to Pembo. and which was worth P3. They then proceeded to Camp Crame where they were advised to return in a few days when any injuries they suffered were expected to manifest. according to an “alajera” in the province. however. Denying the charge. the following version is gathered: At about 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of June 7. They. wala kang kadala dala. Because of the perception of the parents of Nelia that his family was partial towards her. underscoring supplied) 474[2] (Emphasis in the original. papatayin ka namin.297 CONTRARY TO LAW. Nelia is his godmother. mga nurses lang kayo. repaired to the Police Station. Appellant and Edwin at once shouted invectives at Nelia. The adjacent house was occupied by Nelia’s parents with whom she often quarreled as to whom the rental payments should be remitted. p. together with Maria Viovicente (Maria) and Veronica Amar (Veronica). 1999. the driver alighted and left. kapal ng mukha mo. private complainant Nelia R. was of 18k gold.” Appellant thereafter grabbed Nelia’s 18K gold necklace with a crucifix pendant which. sinabihan na kita na kahit saan kita matiempuhan. Silvestre (Nelia). From the evidence for the prosecution. Kami. on learning of the maltreatment charge. Nelia ordered him and his family to move out of their house and filed a case 474 [2] Records. Nine days after the incident or on June 16. . 1999. Makati City and reported the incident.” Appellant added “Putang ina kang matanda ka.500. kicked the tricycle and left saying “Putang ina kang matanda ka! Kayo mga nurses lang. Hindi niyo kami maipapakulong kahit kailan!” Nelia and her companions immediately went to the Pembo barangay hall where they were advised to undergo medical examination. Nelia’s father even filed a case for maltreatment against him which was dismissed and. Nelia submitted a medico-legal report and gave her statement before a police investigator. Upon reaching Ambel Street. appellant branded it as fabricated to spite him and his family in light of the following antecedent facts: He and his family used to rent the ground floor of Nelia’s house in Pateros. 1. saying “Putang ina mong matanda ka. walanghiya ka. marami kaming mga abogado. papatayin kita. Precinct 8 in Comembo. Makati City. her parents disliked his family. anong ipinagmamalaki niyo. appellant and his brother Edwin Consulta (Edwin) blocked the tricycle and under their threats.

Appellant went on to claim that despite frequent transfers of residence to avoid Nelia. together with her two companions. (Italics in the original. holding that intent to gain on appellant’s part “is presumed from the unlawful taking” of the necklace. as maximum. there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances which attended the commission of the said crime. and brushing aside appellant’s denial and claim of harassment. this Court finds accused PEDRO C. appellant. disposing as follows: WHEREFORE. in relation to Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from one (1) year. The said accused is further ordered to pay unto the complainant Nelia Silvestre the amount of P3. The trial court. to which he acceded. as principal of the felony of Robbery with Intimidation of Persons defined and penalized under Article 294. hindi ko kayo titigilan. Thelma Vuesa.” Another defense witness. as minimum. Appellant’s witness Darius Pacaña testified that on the date of the alleged robbery. paragraph No. to eight (8) years. 5. she would track his whereabouts and cause scandal. eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor. applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law. told them to go away so as not to cause trouble. and asked him (Pacaña) if he knew a bald man who is big/stout with a big tummy and with a sister named Maria. seven (7) months and eleven (11) days of arresto mayor. on his (Pacaña’s) call. CONSULTA guilty beyond reasonable doubt. corroborated Pacaña’s account. As soon as the group reached appellant’s house.298 against him for grave threats and another for light threats which were dismissed or in which he was acquitted. emerged and on seeing the group. Nelia uttered “Mga hayop kayo. underscoring supplied) . SO ORDERED. Retorting. convicted appellant of Robbery.00 representing the value of her necklace taken by him and to pay the costs of this suit. Nelia. As he replied in the affirmative.500. Nelia at once asked him to accompany them to appellant’s house. approached him while he was at Ambel Street in the company of Michael Fontanilla and Jimmy Sembrano. premises considered.

173 SCRA 243. Reyes. appellant was afforded competent representation by the Public Attorneys’ Office during the presentation by the prosecution of the medico-legal officer and during the presentation of his evidence. (Underscoring supplied) The first two issues.475[3] (Underscoring supplied) That appellant’s first counsel may not have been a member of the bar does not dent the proven fact that appellant prevented Nelia and company from proceeding to their destination.299 The appellate court affirmed appellant’s conviction with modification on the penalty. (3) Whether or not appellant has committed the crime of which he was charged. then he cannot now be heard to complain about having been denied of due process. 2000 and subsequently.” during the early stages of trial. p. Rainald C. were resolved in the negative in this wise: On the matter of accused-appellant’s claim of having been denied due process. and (4) Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. No. Since the accused-appellant was already represented by a member of the Philippine Bar who principally handled his defense. who “seems not a lawyer. Further. approved by the RTC in its Order dated August 4. appellant raises the following issues: (1) Whether or not appellant was validly arraigned. 249. 2000. an examination of the records shows that while accused-appellant was represented by Atty. . pre-trial and presentation of principal witnesses for the prosecution. May 9. 63971. which appellant raised before the appellate court only when he filed his Motion for Reconsideration of said court’s decision.R. accused-appellant was represented by Atty. Paggao from the Public Defender’s (Attorney’s) Office of Makati City. 169 G. Jocelyn P. Thereafter. Elesterio476[4] enlightens: 475 476 [3] [4] Rollo. albeit unsuccessfully. People v. the latter withdrew her appearance with the conformity of the former as early as July 28. In his present appeal. 1989. (2) Whether or not appellant was denied due process having been represented by a fake lawyer during arraignment.

and 4) the taking is with violence against or intimidation of persons or with force upon things. paragraph 5. Who are guilty of robbery. italics in the original. shall be guilt of robbery. it is observed that he was chosen by the accused himself and that his representation does not change the fact that Elesterio was undeniably carrying an unlicensed firearm when he was arrested. G. (Italics in the original. – Any person who. 2003. 399 SCRA 528 . 477 [5] People v. unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. or using force upon anything. 135682. who prepared the petition for habeas corpus and the appellant’s brief. 3) the taking is with animus lucrandi. It may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another. underscoring supplied) Article 294. Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal act which can be established through the overt acts of the offender. under which appellant was penalized provides: Art. 293. shall take any personal property belonging to another. x x x (Citations omitted.” (Underscoring supplied) On the third and fourth issues. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties.R. March 26. – Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer: xxxx 5.477[5] The Court finds that under the above-mentioned circumstances surrounding the incidental encounter of the parties. he has since been represented by a member of the Philippine bar. Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code under which appellant was charged provides: Art. underscoring supplied) The elements of robbery are thus: 1) there is a taking of personal property. 294. At any rate. Reyes. by means of violence against or intimidation of any person. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period in other cases. with intent to gain.300 “As for the circumstance that the defense counsel turned out later to be a non-lawyer. 2) the personal property belongs to another. the taking of Nelia’s necklace does not indicate presence of intent to gain on appellant’s part.

prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law or compel him to do something against his will. among other things. at Section 5 . When an offense includes or is included in another.”480[8] SEC. Grave coercions. constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved. 5.301 That intent to gain on appellant’s part is difficult to appreciate gains light given his undenied claim that his relationship with Nelia is rife with ill-feelings. manifested by. – An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former. Exhibit “4” – Light Threats. and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved. He is not necessarily scot-free. as alleged in the complaint or information. the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged. folder 1. by means of violence. – The penalty of prision correccional and a fine not exceeding six thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who. From the pre-existing sour relations between Nelia and her family on one hand. the filing of complaints478[6] against him by Nelia and her family which were subsequently dismissed or ended in his acquittal. when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter. or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved. criminally liable. however. whether it be right or wrong. records. Exhibit “5” – Grave Threats. robbery does not lie against him. 478 479 [6] [7] 480[8] 481 Exhibit “2” – Information for Maltreatment. 202-203. and under the circumstances related above attendant to the incidental encounter of the parties. like robbery. without authority of law.481[9] (Italics in the original. RULES OF COURT. Thus Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code provides: “Art. Appellant is.479[7] Absent intent to gain on the part of appellant. appellant’s taking of Nelia’s necklace could not have been animated with animus lucrandi. has violence for one of its elements. Rule 120. For “[w]hen there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved. however. 286. Exhibit “4” – Order dismissing the information for Light Threats. pp. threats or intimidation. and appellant and family on the other. just the same. shall. underscoring supplied) Grave coercion. Section 4. [9] Id. Vide Exhibit “3” – Order granting Supplemental Motion to Quash (Malicious Mischief).

809 (1917).302 If the coercion be committed in violation of the exercise of the right of suffrage or for the purpose of compelling another to perform any religious act or to prevent him from exercising such right or from doing such act. conviction for coercion under Article 497 of the Penal Code. 807. the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed. 482[10] United States v. underscoring supplied) The Court finds that by appellant’s employment of threats. and from two (2) years.”482[10] (Italics in the original. four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional. as minimum. but a man who had fought bitterly for title to his ancestral estate. The motives of the accused are the prime criterion. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law. to compel another to do something against his will and to seize property? Then. underscoring supplied) The difference in robbery and grave coercion lies in the intent in the commission of the act. Consulta. intimidation and violence consisting of. inter alia.000. the penalty shall be imposed in its medium term. Was the purpose with intent to gain to take the property of another by use of force or intimidation? Then. is deemed to be the intention of the accused. without authority of law but still believing himself the owner or the creditor. citations omitted. The motives of the accused are the prime criterion: “The distinction between the two lines of decisions. Was the purpose. taking the law into his own hands and attempting to collect what he thought was due him.” (Italics in the original. as maximum. the minimum that may be imposed is anywhere from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months of arresto mayor. . Animus furandi was lacking. driving away of the tricycle driver. uttering of invectives. Villa Abrille. Appellant is thus guilty of grave coercion which carries the penalty of prision correccional and a fine not exceeding P6. WHEREFORE. 36 Phil. and kicking of the tricycle. Pedro C. to three (3) years and six (6) months of prision correccional medium as maximum. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Grave Coercion and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum. the one holding to robbery and the other to coercion. the Court SETS ASIDE the challenged Court of Appeals Decision and another is rendered finding appellant. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance. conviction for robbery. Nelia was prevented from proceeding to her destination. And there was no common robber in the present case.

36-52. assisted by counsel de parte. and that the RTC Decision showed that it 483 484 485 [3] [4] [5] Docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Palawan. he instructed his representative to get a copy of the notice of appeal from the RTC. 161070. No. that no notice of appeal was filed by his lawyer in defiance of his clear instructions. Raul Rivera of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). at 53-60. pleaded not guilty. the RTC rendered its Decision484[4] finding petitioner and his co-accused Alijid guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and sentencing them to suffer imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal in each count. 2001 together with an affidavit of merit. Quezon City to which petitioner. that he had instructed his lawyer to file the necessary motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal. THE CASE MAY STILL BE RE-OPENED IF THERE IS GROSS-NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF ACCUSED’S COUNSEL THEREBY VIOLATING HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS/COUNSEL. 2002. Atty. On May 10. JOHN HILARIO VS. that he had no way of personally filing the notice of appeal thus he instructed his lawyer to file it on his behalf. pp. Branch 76.R. Id. petitioner contended that at the time of the promulgation of the judgment. he was already incarcerated at the New Bilibid Prisons. rollo. . he was already confined at Quezon City Jail and was directed to be committed to the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. Q-00-91647-48. On December 5. that he had no choice but to repose his full trust and confidence to his lawyer. During trial. 2002. 2001. was charged with two counts483[3] of Murder in the Regional Trial Court (RTC). this time unassisted by counsel. 2008 THE FACTS: Petitioner. 2001 from becoming final to warrant his transfer. April 14. In his petition. that on May 2. that believing that the notice of appeal filed by his counsel prevented the Decision dated December 5. Zenarosa. Muntinlupa City and learned from the grapevine of his impending transfer to the Iwahig Penal Colony. together with one Gilbert Alijid (Alijid). filed with the RTC a Petition for Relief485[5] from the Decision dated December 5.303 EVEN IF THE DECISION OF CONVICTION IS ALREADY FINAL AND EXECUTORY. Penned by Judge Monina A. petitioner. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G. counsel of Alijid. took over representing petitioner in view of the death of the latter's counsel.

that this breach of trust cannot easily be concocted in this situation considering that it was a counsel de oficio. Court of Appeals. and that petitioner's appeal after the finality of judgment of conviction is an exercise in futility. . who broke the fiduciary relationship. We grant the petition. 1991. the mere invocation of justice warrants the review of a final and executory judgment? HELD: Petitioner contends that the negligence of his counsel de oficio cannot be binding on him for the latter's defiance of his instruction to appeal automatically breaks the fiduciary relationship between counsel-client and cannot be against the client who was prejudiced. 2002 and yet the counsel did not inform him of any action taken thereon. A litigant who is not a lawyer is not expected to know the rules of procedure. a lawyer from PAO. The OSG further claims that notice to counsel is notice to clients and failure of counsel to notify his client of an adverse judgment would not constitute excusable negligence and therefore binding on the client. that the assailed CA Resolutions both harped on technicalities to uphold the dismissal by the RTC of his petition for relief. 541. thus the RTC properly dismissed petitioner's petition for relief from judgment. In fact. I S S U E: Whether or not the delay in appealing the instant case due to the defiance or failure of the petitioner's counsel de oficio to seasonably file a Notice of Appeal. constitutes excusable negligence to entitle the undersigned detention prisoner/ petitioner to pursue his appeal? Whether or not pro hac vice.304 was received by his counsel on February 1. and that it would have been for the best interest of justice for the CA to have directed the petitioner to complete the records instead of dismissing the petition outright. that reliance on technicalities to the prejudice of petitioner who is serving 14 years imprisonment for a crime he did not commit is an affront to the policy promulgated by this Court that dismissal purely on technical grounds is frowned upon especially if it will result to unfairness. G. 202 SCRA 534.486[12] We have held in a civil case that to demand as much from ordinary citizens whose only compelle intrare is their sense of right would turn the legal system into an intimidating monstrosity where 486 [12] See Telan v. even the most experienced lawyers get tangled in the web of procedure.R. 95026. that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional and failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment sought to be reviewed final and not appealable. No. the OSG argues that the mere invocation of justice does not warrant the review of an appeal from a final and executory judgment. October 4. In his Comment.

even if the judgment had become final and executory.488[14] (Emphasis supplied) To repeat the ruling in Telan. specially so when as a consequence. As we held in Telan v. with the lawyer faithfully keeping his client company. it is a right that must be exercised at every step of the way.489[15] It is even more important to note that petitioner was not assisted by counsel when he filed his petition for relief from judgment with the RTC. Otherwise. In criminal cases. Thus. Id. and the accused afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel. the ends of justice would be served 487 488[14] 489 [15] [13] Id. Id. . More so. liberty. at 541. the right ceases in the pursuit of the appeal. there would be a grave denial of due process. otherwise. The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all times. in the case of an on-going litigation. life. In that way. it may still be recalled. rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. xxxx Even the most experienced lawyers get tangled in the web of procedure. the right ceases in the pursuit of the appeal. No arrangement or interpretation of law could be as absurd as the position that the right to counsel exists only in the trial courts and that thereafter.487[13] This finds application specially if the liberty of a person is at stake. or property is subjected to restraint or in danger of loss. as held in Telan. the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar is immutable. at 540-541. that in criminal cases. the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar is immutable. The demand as much from ordinary citizens whose only compelle intrare is their sense of right would turn the legal system into an intimidating monstrosity where an individual may be stripped of his property rights not because he has no right to the property but because he does not know how to establish such right. there would be a grave denial of due process. no arrangement or interpretation of law could be as absurd as the position that the right to counsel exists only in the trial courts and that thereafter. It cannot be overstressed therefore. Cases should be determined on the merits after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses. Court of Appeals: The right to counsel in civil cases exists just as forcefully as in criminal cases.305 an individual may be stripped of his property rights not because he has no right to the property but because he does not know how to establish such right.

at 781. Id.R. In De Guzman v. . 439 SCRA 675. in the appropriate language of Justice Makalintal. Francisco. this Court. supra note 11. speaking through the late Justice Ricardo J. honor or property. Sandiganbayan. shorn of judicial discretion.306 better. the emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause. Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a) matters of life. (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances. (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory. which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. we have on some occasions relaxed this rule. as they ought to be guided by the norm that when on the balance. September 30. Philippine Airlines. had occasion to state: The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it. the failure of petitioner to file his motion for reconsideration within the 15-day reglementary period fixed by law rendered the resolution final and executory. Their strict and rigid application. for otherwise. must always be eschewed. Indeed. 490[16] While as a general rule.. and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Invariably. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared to be final. Padilla491[17] we held: However. free from the constraints of technicalities. and not the other way around. in Barnes v. technicalities. Truly then. G. 2004. That is precisely why courts in rendering justice have always been. courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules. (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules. "should give way to the realities of the situation. A strict and rigid 490 491 492 [16] [17] [18] Garcia v.492[18] Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the decision or resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. No. liberty. Inc. at 686-687. 160753. Thus. (c) the merits of the case. technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights.

Court of Appeals. Spouses Diaz. the importance of finding out whether petitioner's loss of the right to appeal was due to the PAO lawyer's negligence and not at all attributed to petitioner. 179 Phil. Manolo Brotonel of the PAO cannot go unnoticed. 756-757 (1950). if he desires.493[21] Even if the judgment had become final and executory. 495 . and [c] his failure not only to present evidence for the accused but to inform the accused of his right to do so. however. Court of Appeals495[27] where we ruled that an appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and trial courts are advised to proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal and instructed that every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause. It may be so that the defense counsel really found Oleby’s testimony to be believable.. its suppression would be a violation of due process. especially that of a defense counsel. 1245. 229 Phil. NADERA. the accused shall have the right to appeal in the manner prescribed by law. It is discernible in [a] his refusal to cross-examine Oleby Nadera (the complainant for RAPE). 351. Holgado. a right guaranteed by the Constitution. freed from the constraints of technicalities. once it is granted by law.307 application of rules that would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must be avoided. It must be performed with all the zeal and vigor at his command to protect and safeguard the accused’s fundamental rights. Only the faithful performance by counsel of his duty towards his client can give meaning and substance to the accused’s right to due process and to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise. PEOPLE VS. Telan v. 1252 (2000). Judge Ruiz. a lawyer’s duty. Nonetheless. The importance and real purpose of the remedy of appeal has been emphasized in Castro v. instead of remanding the case to the CA for a decision on the merits. 752. 390 Phil. it may still be recalled. Court of Appeals. at 540-541. 362. People of the Philippines v. 85 Phil. The cavalier attitude of Atty. Flores v. must not be taken lightly. we opt to resolve the same so as not to further delay the final disposition of this case. supra note 12. Hence. Thus. [b] the manner in which he conducted Maricris Nadera’s cross-examination. J. 366 (1986). Delgado v. While this right is statutory. 355 (1979). 324 SCRA 490 Mendoza. and the accused afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel. In all criminal prosecutions. he had the bounden duty to scrutinize private complainant’s testimony to ensure that the accused’s constitutional right to confront and examine the witnesses against him 493 494 [21] [22] Cusi-Hernandez v. JR.494[22] However.

For unless proven otherwise to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt. YAMBOT. 96 SCRA 957 2. In this case. G. This is in consonance with the doctrine that everyone has a right to waive the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity. (NOTE: For your Legal & Judicial Ethics) Atty. Read: 1. 25. NO. 120350. 132045. This is so because the complainant’s testimony cannot be accepted with precipitate credulity without denying the accused’s constitutional right to be presumed innocent. the non-appearance of counsel for the accused on the scheduled hearing was not construed as waiver by the accused of his right to present evidence for his defense. expose falsehoods or half-truths. Right to be Heard by himself and counsel and to present evidence for his defense. It bears pointing out that in rape cases. 339 SCRA 86. the accused-appellant validly waived his right to present evidence. had the duty to defend his client and protect his rights. no matter how guilty or evil he perceives accusedappellant to be. it is often the words of the complainant against the accused.R. .308 was not rendered for naught. BANIHIT. The performance of this duty was all the more imperative because the life of the accused-appellant hangs in the balance. Denial of due process can be successfully invoked where no valid waiver of rights had been made as in this case. and demonstrate inconsistencies in substantial matters which create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and thus give substance to the constitutional right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him. His duty was no less because he was counsel de oficio. 30. the two being the only persons present during the commission of the crime. OCT. Read also: PEOPLE VS. 343 SCRA 20. 2000. Brotonel as counsel de oficio. In another case. uncover the truth which rehearsed direct examination testimonies may successfully suppress. This is where cross-examination becomes essential to test the credibility of the witnesses.R. AUG. PEOPLE VS. NO. and without detriment to the community at large. G. The Decision of the RTC convicting the accused is SET ASIDE and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision. Dischoso. the accused is presumed innocent. if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right. 2000. P vs.

119830498[3] pertains to allegations that petitioner employed manipulative devises in the purchase of Best World Resources 496 [1] 497 Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta with Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Sesinando E.R.” Criminal Case No. No. “People of the Philippines v. Judge. G. 119830. PEOPLE. No. Briccio C. Hon. at 102-112. in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 153. not a case of. Id. Tan (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. Waiver of the defendant's presence in a criminal prosecution. 498[3] . 90-100. Regional Trial Court. J. a Panel of Prosecutors of the Department of Justice (DOJ). rollo. Tan’s right to speedy trial. Villon. 119832.R. 2009 CHICO-NAZARIO.309 6. at 228-230. 63 SCRA 546 2. Dante Tan. The factual and procedural antecedents of the instant petition are as follows: On 19 December 2000. “People of the Philippines v. filed three Informations against Dante T. 83068 entitled. 173637. Requisites of double jeopardy.77 SCRA 430 The right to a speedy trial.: Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision496[1] dated 22 February 2006 and Resolution497[2] dated 17 July 2006 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G. concurring. Aquino vs. 119830. Ygana. pp. [2] Id. 119831 and No. Military Commission.” The assailed Decision reinstated Criminal Case No. earlier dismissed by the trial court due to an alleged violation of petitioner Dante T. Pasig City and Dante Tan. DANTE TAN VS. The right to be present during trial Read: 1. all entitled. The assailed Resolution denied his Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Inhibit. P vs. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. April 21. SP No. 125 SCRA 269 3. on behalf of the People of the Philippines (People).

No. On 21 December 2000.310 Corporation (BW) shares. 119831 and No.. Sigfrid Fortun for Eduardo Lim. 119832. In two other related cases. at 253-259. two Informations were filed against a certain Jimmy Juan and Eduardo G. the pre-trial was concluded. p. 119830. 119828 and No. at 233-235.501[6] On 6 February 2001. 119832500[5] involve the alleged failure of petitioner to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a sworn statement of his beneficial ownership of BW shares. 119828 and No. 119832 be consolidated together with Criminal Cases No. and pleaded not guilty to the charges. and a pre-trial order set. Criminal Cases No. Criminal Cases No. On the other hand. 119831 and No. 119831 and No. No. the People presented evidence for Criminal Cases No. Lim for violation of the Revised Securities Act involving BW shares of stock. Agnes Maranan for petitioner Dante Tan. . Thereafter. 119831 and No. 194. 119829 also went to the same court. Mariano. The People insists that during the pendency of the initial hearing on 27 February 2001. Rudolf Brittanico for Jimmy Juan. presided by Judge Briccio C. Celia Sandejas of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). On the same day. 119830. Jr. Criminal Cases No. On 18 September 2001. 119830. 119832 would be tried ahead of Criminal Case No. at 231-232. These were docketed as Criminal Cases No. the first date of trial on 27 February 2001. the DOJ. 119829. Records. Petitioner was arraigned on 16 January 2001. 119832 were raffled off to the Pasig RTC. 119831499[4] and No. 119829. Ygana. Branch 153. under the direct control and supervision of Public Prosecutor Nestor Lazaro. 119828 and No. Atty. and Atty. Atty. nor would the trial court disapprove it. among other things. the parties agreed that Criminal Cases No.502[7] Atty. which the trial court granted. the prosecution 499[4] 500[5] 501[6] 502[7] Id. entered her appearance for the People. filed a Motion for Consolidation praying that Criminal Cases No. and that petitioner would not interpose any objection to its manifestation. Id. Id. State Prosecutors Susan Dacanay and Edna Villanueva later on took over as lawyers for the People. through Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Nilo C.

119831-119832. in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 119830 until after that of Criminal Cases No. Reports. any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance. or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of such security. he claimed to have been substantially prejudiced by this delay.— (a) Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than ten per centum of any class of any equity security which is registered pursuant to this Act. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this Act. shall.503[8] On 2 December 2003. upon conviction.00) pesos nor more than five hundred thousand (P500. were done simultaneously.000. he was persistent in asserting his right to speedy trial. after acquiring directly or indirectly the beneficial ownership of any equity security of a class which is registered pursuant to this Act. of the amount of all equity securities of such issuer of which he is the beneficial owner. 119830 due to the People’s alleged failure to prosecute. shall file. however. is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than ten (10%) per centum of such class shall. by the use of any facility of any exchange – xxxx (b) To use or employ. Directors. which he had allegedly done on several instances. association or entity responsible for the violation. makes any untrue statement of a material fact of omits to state any material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading. as the presentation of evidence and prosecution in each of the five cases involved were to be done separately. and if such security is registered on a securities exchange. [10] Section 32. The prosecution opposed the Motion. After being granted extensions to its filing of a formal offer of evidence. It shall be unlawful for any person. or the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission under authority thereof. within ten days after such acquisition or such reasonable time as fixed by the Commission.507[12] in relation to Section 56 of said act. because they involved similar offenses of non-disclosure of beneficial ownership of stocks proscribed under Rule 36(a)-1504[9] in relation to Sections 32(a)-1505[10] and 56506[11] of Batas Pambansa Bilang 178. Finally. petitioner moved to dismiss Criminal Case No. a statement with the Commission and.” Criminal Case No.311 completed the presentation of its evidence and was ordered by the RTC to file its formal offer of evidence within thirty days. also with the exchange. or any person who. . shall file with the Commission. – (a) (1) Any person who.000. submit to the issuer of the security. directly or indirectly. partnership or association or other juridical entity. 119832 on 25 November 2003. and to the Commission a sworn statement x x x.00) pesos or imprisonment of not less than seven (7) years nor more than twenty one (21) years. or both in the discretion of the court. 503 504 [8] [9] 505 506 507 Rollo. 119831-119832. The presentation of evidence in Criminal Cases No. director. in a registration statement filed under this Act. If the offender is a corporation. According to petitioner. 119830 pertains to alleged violation of Section 27 (b). suffer a fine of not less than five thousand (P5. otherwise known as the “Revised Securities Act. Claiming violation of his right to speedy trial. to the stock exchanges where the security is traded. [12] Section 27. and if such officer is an alien. he shall. pp. in addition to the penalties prescribed. officers and principal stockholders. petitioner faults the People for failing to prosecute the case for an unreasonable length of time and without giving any excuse or justification for the delay. the penalty shall be imposed upon the officer or officers of the corporation. if such security is registered on a securities exchange. shall also file with the exchange. or officer. [11] Penalties. partnership. a statement indicating his ownership at the close of the calendar month and such changes in his ownership as have occurred during such calendar month. 247-253. and within ten days after the close of each calendar month thereafter. insisting on its claim that the parties had an earlier agreement to defer the trial of Criminal Case No. the prosecution was able to file said formal offer for Criminal Cases No. Manipulative and deceptive devices. be deported without further proceedings after service of sentence. Section 36. 119831 and No. at the time of the registration of such security on a securities exchange or by the effective date of a registration statement or within ten days after he becomes such a beneficial owner. if there has been a change in such ownership during such month.

. the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. capricious and oppressive. ruled that the delays which attended the proceedings of petitioner’s case (Criminal Case No. Setting aside the trial court’s order of dismissal. the appellate court reinstated Criminal Case No. 835-855. the prosecution insisted that the parties agreed to hold separate trials of the BW cases. On motion for reconsideration. Judge Briccio C. resulting in violation of petitioner’s right to speedy trial. the Court hereby orders Criminal Case No. In resolving the petition. ALBEIT. disposing as follows: WHEREFORE.509[14] Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the Decision and filed a motion for inhibition of the Justices who decided the case. 119830. the Court of Appeals granted the petition for certiorari in its Decision dated 22 February 2006. 119830 PENDING HEARING OF THE TWO OTHER RELATED CASES. foregoing premises duly considered and finding the motion to dismiss to be meritorious. 119830 in this wise: WHEREFORE. In an Order dated 20 January 2004. pp. 119830 is reinstated and the trial court is ordered to conduct further proceedings in said case immediately.312 On 22 December 2003. 2004 are set aside. the petition is granted and the assailed Orders dated December 22. 119830 DISMISSED. Branch 153. THE LATTER AND RESPONDENT JUDGE HIMSELF HAVE CONFORMED TO THE DEFERMENT OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. the Court of Appeals denied both motions. Ygana of the Pasig RTC. 119832 ahead of Criminal Case No. at 99-100. Criminal Case No. The RTC’s order of dismissal was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. 508 509[14] [13] Rollo. On 17 July 2006. with petitioner acquiescing to the prosecution of Criminal Cases No. 119830) were vexatious. with the People contending that: RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THE PEOPLE VIOLATED DANTE TAN’S RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL. The RTC ordered508[13] the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 119831 and No. 119830. 2003 and January 20. Id.

filed the instant petition for review on certiorari. II. III. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI VIOLATED TAN’S RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY. IV.313 Petitioner Dante Tan. We first resolve the preliminary issues. It must be stressed that the certification against forum shopping is required to be executed by the plaintiff. 729. The Court of Appeals was correct in sustaining the authority of Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas Gutierrez to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping of the petition for certiorari before said court. p. In an attempt at having the instant petition dismissed. WHETHER OR NOT CRIMINAL CASE NO. 119830 WAS CORRECTLY DISMISSED BY THE TRIAL COURT ON THE GROUND OF VIOLATION OF TAN’S RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. REMEDIAL LAW. . petitioner contends that the certificate of non-forum shopping attached to the People’s appeal before the Court of Appeals should have been signed by the Chairman of the SEC as complainant in the cases instead of Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas N. raising the following issues: I. WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MAY VALIDLY EXECUTE THE CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING ATTACHED TO THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY THE PEOPLE WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS EVEN THOUGH THE CRIMINAL ACTION WAS INSTITUTED BY A COMPLAINT SUBSCRIBED BY THE AUTHORIZED OFFICERS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION.510[15] Although the 510[15] Regalado. Gutierrez. henceforth. Petitioner’s argument is futile.

G. where the plaintiff or the party instituting the case was the People of the Philippines. Rule 110 of the Rules of Court leaves no room for doubt and establishes that criminal cases are prosecuted in the name of the People of the Philippines. 713. SP No. 466 SCRA 474. Inc. being the head of the DOJ. [20] Palon v. Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas N.R. prosecute offenders and administer the probation and correction system. Section 2. The preliminary issues having been resolved.. through its prosecutors. had the authority to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping for Criminal Case No. 881. G.514[19] However. the DOJ is best suited to attest whether a similar or related case has been filed or is pending in another court of tribunal. At the crux of the controversy is the issue of whether there was a violation of petitioner Dante Tan’s right to speedy trial. pursuant to Section 3. v. 670. 83068. subject to review by the Secretary of Justice. 388 Phil. 887 (2002). No. the Court shall proceed to discuss the main issues. Jr. Viray.515[20] Under these exceptions. Since it is the DOJ which is the government agency tasked to prosecute criminal cases before the trial court.314 complaint-affidavit was signed by the Prosecution and Enforcement Department of the SEC.R. 492. 148862. 119831-119832. 975 (2000). Petitioner Dante Tan assails the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. 11 August 2005. [19] Tad-y v. No. Moreover. Both parties concede that this issue is factual. 195 SCRA 710.513[18] The reason is that the Court is not a trier of facts. which is authorized to prosecute criminal cases on behalf of the People of the Philippines. therefore. 119830. 119830. Section 3(2).R. the DOJ is the executive arm of the government mandated to investigate the commission of crimes. paragraph (2) of the Revised Administrative Code. Court of Appeals. It is a basic rule that factual issues are beyond the province of this Court in a petition for review. Gutierrez. 440 Phil. 73647. surmises and conjectures.512[17] Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only questions of law may be raised in this Court in a petition for review on certiorari. 119830 would not be tried until after termination of Criminal Cases No. contrary to the evidence on 511[16] 512 513 514 515 Revised Administrative Code. which was filed on behalf of the People of the Philippines. [17] Centeno v. . 681 (2001). the Court may delve into and resolve factual issues. for it is not our function to review evidence all over again. v. such as in cases where the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are absurd. including the conduct of preliminary investigation. [18] Busmente. the petition before the Court of Appeals originated from Criminal Case No. the rule is subject to several exceptions. Romago Electric Co. 405 Phil. The appellate court determined that he “impliedly agreed” that Case No. National Labor Relations Commission. Nino. It is the DOJ. 964. 8 April 1991. which finding was grounded entirely on speculations.511[16] Prosecutors control and direct the prosecution of criminal offenses. the offended party in criminal cases. People.

315

record, impossible, capricious misappreciation of facts.

or

arbitrary,

or

based

on

a

In this case, the Court is convinced that the findings of the Court of Appeals on the substantial matters at hand, while conflicting with those of the RTC, are adequately supported by the evidence on record. We, therefore, find no reason to deviate from the jurisprudential holdings and treat the instant case differently. An accused’s right to “have a speedy, impartial, and public trial” is guaranteed in criminal cases by Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution. This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its “salutary objective” being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose.516[21] Intimating historical perspective on the evolution of the right to speedy trial, we reiterate the old legal maxim, “justice delayed is justice denied.” This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial.517[22] Following the policies incorporated under the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as “The Speedy Trial Act of 1998,” was enacted, with Section 6 of said act limiting the trial period to 180 days from the first day of trial.518[23] Aware of problems resulting in the clogging of court dockets, the Court implemented the law by issuing Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98, which has been incorporated in the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, Section 2 of Rule 119.519[24] In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan,520[25] the Court had occasion to state – The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution
516 517 [21] [22]

518

519

520[25]

Acebedo v. Sarmiento, 146 Phil. 820, 823 (1970). PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 14(2). [23] SECTION 6. Time Limit for Trial. – In criminal cases involving persons charged of a crime, except those subject to the Rules on Summary Procedure, or where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment, or a fine of One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, the justice or judge shall, after consultation with the public prosecutor and the counsel for the accused, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 3, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court. [24] SEC. 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements.—Trial once commenced shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It may be postponed for a reasonable period of time for good cause. The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court. The time limitations provided under this section and the preceding section shall not apply where special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court provide for a shorter period of trial. G.R. No. 162214, 11 November 2004, 442 SCRA 294, 312-313.

316

suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such right is not susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning to that intent. The Court emphasized in the same case that: A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. x x x. Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such delay. Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked by the State. x x x.521[26] Exhaustively explained in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, an accused’s right to speedy trial is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. In determining whether petitioner was deprived of this right, the factors to consider and balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay.522[27]
521[26]

Id. at 313-314.

317

From the initial hearing on 27 February 2001 until the time the prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence for Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832 on 25 November 2003, both prosecution and defense admit that no evidence was presented for Criminal Case No. 119830. Hence, for a period of almost two years and eight months, the prosecution did not present a single evidence for Criminal Case No. 119830. The question we have to answer now is whether there was vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay. To this, we apply the fourfactor test previously mentioned. We emphasize that in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts are required to do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is clearly insufficient,523[28] and particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.524[29] In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan,525[30] the Court ruled that there was no violation of the right to speedy trial and speedy disposition. The Court took into account the reasons for the delay, i.e., the frequent amendments of procedural laws by presidential decrees, the structural reorganizations in existing prosecutorial agencies and the creation of new ones by executive fiat, resulting in changes of personnel, preliminary jurisdiction, and the functions and powers of prosecuting agencies. The Court also considered the failure of the accused to assert such right, and the lack of prejudice caused by the delay to the accused. In Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan,526[31] the complexity of the issues and the failure of the accused to invoke her right to speedy disposition at the appropriate time spelled defeat for her claim to the constitutional guarantee. In Cadalin v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration’s Administrator,527[32] the Court, considering also the complexity of the cases and the conduct of the parties’ lawyers, held that the right to speedy disposition was not violated therein. Petitioner’s objection to the prosecution’s stand that he gave an implied consent to the separate trial of Criminal Case No. 119830 is belied by the records of the case. No objection was interposed by his defense counsel when this matter was discussed during the initial
522 [27]

Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, 407 Phil. 985, 999-1000 (2001); Dela Pena v. Sandiganbayan, 412 Phil. 921, 929 Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 324 Phil. 151, 170 (1996); Tai Lim v. Court of Appeals, 375 Phil. 971, 977 Santiago v. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 109266, 2 December 1993, 228 SCRA 214, 221. G.R. No. 101689, 17 March 1993, 220 SCRA 55. 408 Phil. 767 (2001). G.R. No. 104776, 5 December 1994, 238 SCRA 721.

(2001).
523 [28]

(1999).
524 525 526 527 [29] [30] [31] [32]

318

hearing. Petitioner’s conformity thereto can be deduced from his non-objection at the preliminary hearing when the prosecution manifested that the evidence to be presented would be only for Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832. His failure to object to the prosecution’s manifestation that the cases be tried separately is fatal to his case. The acts, mistakes and negligence of counsel bind his client, except only when such mistakes would result in serious injustice.529[34] In fact, petitioner’s acquiescence is evident from the transcript of stenographic notes during the initial presentation of the People’s evidence in the five BW cases on 27 February 2001, herein quoted below: COURT: Atty. Sandejas, call your witness. ATTY. SANDEJAS [SEC Prosecuting Lawyer]: May we make some manifestation first, your Honor, before we continue presenting our witness. First of all, this witness will only be testifying as to two (2) of the charges: nondisclosure of beneficial ownership of Dante Tan x x x. xxxx COURT: (to Atty. Sandejas) Call your witness. ATTY. SANDEJAS: Our witness is Mr. Wilfredo Baltazar of the Securities and Exchange Commission, your Honor. We are presenting this witness for the purpose of nondisclosure of beneficial ownership case… COURT: I would advise the counsel from the SEC to make it very clear your purpose in presenting your first witness. ATTY. SANDEJAS: Yes, your Honor. Can I borrow the file? COURT: Show it to counsel. ATTY. SANDEJAS: Crim. Case Nos. 119831 and 119832, for Violation of RA Rule 36(a)1, in relation to Sec. 32 (a)-1 of the Revised Securities Act when he failed to disclose his beneficial ownership amounting to more than 10% which requires disclosure of such fact.530[35] During the same hearing, the People manifested in open court that the parties had agreed to the separate trials of the BW Cases:
528 529 [33] [34]

528[33]

530[35]

TSN, 27 February 2001. Producers Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 430 Phil. 812, 823 (2002); People v. Hernandez, 328 Phil. 1123, 1143 (1996). TSN, 27 February 2001, pp. 3-7; CA rollo, pp. 87-91.

319

PROSECUTOR LAZARO: May we be allowed to speak, your Honor? Your Honor please, as we x x x understand, this is not a joint trial but a separate trial x x x so as manifested by the SEC lawyer, the witness is being presented insofar as 119831 and 119832 as against Dante Tan only x x x.531[36] The transcript of stenographic notes taken from the 3 April 2001 hearing further clarifies that only the two cases against Dante Tan were being prosecuted: ATTY. DE LA CRUZ [new counsel for accused Eduardo Lim, Jr.]: Your Honor, please, may I request clarification from the prosecutors regarding the purpose of the testimony of the witness in the stand. While the Private Prosecutor stated the purpose of the testimony of the witness. . . xxxx PROSECUTOR LAZARO: I was present during the last hearing. I was then going over the transcript of this case, well, I believe the testimony x x x mainly [is] on accused Dante Tan, your Honor. As a matter of fact, there was a clarification made by the parties and counsels after the witness had testified that the hearing in these cases is not a joint trial because it involves separate charges, involving different documents, your Honor. That is why the witness already testified only concerning Dante Tan. Per the query made by Atty. Fortun, because at that time, Atty. Fortun was still representing Mr. Lim, I believe, your Honor, then I understand that the testimony of this witness cannot just be adopted insofar as the other accused, your Honor. ATTY. MARANAN: We confirm that, your Honor, since x x x particularly since this is already cross, it is clear that the direct examination dealt exclusively with Mr. Dante Tan. PROS. LAZARO:
531[36]

Id. at 71-74; id. at 155-156.

320

Mr. Dante Tan, involving the 2 (two) cases.

532[37]

Moreover, although periods for trial have been stipulated, these periods are not absolute. Where periods have been set, certain exclusions are allowed by law.533[38] After all, this Court and the law recognize that it is but a fact that judicial proceedings do not exist in a vacuum and must contend with the realities of everyday life. In spite of the prescribed time limits, jurisprudence continues to adopt the view that the fundamentally recognized principle is that the concept of speedy trial is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.534[39] As to the assertion that delay in the presentation of evidence for Criminal Case No. 119830 has prejudiced petitioner because the witnesses for the defense may no longer be available at this time, suffice it to say that the burden of proving his guilt rests upon the prosecution.535[40] Should the prosecution fail for any reason to present evidence sufficient to show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, petitioner will be acquitted. It is safely entrenched in our jurisprudence that unless the prosecution discharges its burden to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt, the latter need not even offer evidence in his behalf.536[41] In the cases involving petitioner, the length of delay, complexity of the issues and his failure to invoke said right to speedy trial at the appropriate time tolled the death knell on his claim to the constitutional guarantee.537[42] More importantly, in failing to interpose a timely objection to the prosecution’s manifestation during the preliminary hearings that the cases be tried separately, one after the other, petitioner was deemed to have acquiesced and waived his objection thereto. For the reasons above-stated, there is clearly insufficient ground to conclude that the prosecution is guilty of violating petitioner’s right to speedy trial. Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but generally refers to “capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.” Any capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment in dismissing a criminal case is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. This is true in the instant case. There is also no merit to petitioner’s claim that a reversal of the RTC’s Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 119830 is a violation of his constitutional right against double jeopardy which dismissal was founded on an alleged violation of his right to speedy trial.
532
533 534 535 536 [37] [38]

537

TSN, 3 April 2001, pp. 5-10; id. at 225-230. Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Judge How, 393 Phil. 172, 184 (2000). [39] Id. [40] Republic v. Sandiganbayan and Marcos, 461 Phil. 598, 615 (2003). [41] People v. Ganguso, G.R. No 115430, 23 November 1995, 250 SCRA 268, 274-275; People v. Abellanosa, 332 Phil. 760, 788 (1996), citing People v. Baclayon, G.R. No. 110837, 29 March 1994, 231 SCRA 578, 584, citing People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 94187, 4 November 1992, 215 SCRA 349, 358-359. [42] Santiago v. Garchitorena, supra note 29.

321

The constitutional protection against double jeopardy shields one from a second or later prosecution for the same offense. Article III, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution declares that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, providing further that if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. Following the above constitutional provision, Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court found it apt to stipulate: SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. – When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. For double jeopardy to attach then, the following elements in the first criminal case must be present: (a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (b) The court had jurisdiction; (c) The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (d) He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.538[43] Among the above-cited elements, we are concerned with the fourth element, conviction or acquittal, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. This element is crucial since, as a general rule, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal, made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion, will not place the accused in double jeopardy.539[44] This rule,
538[43] 539[44]

Condrada v. People, 446 Phil. 635, 641 (2003). Id.

It must be stressed.322 however. such grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction. Bans. 8 December 1994.542[47] As this Court ruled in People v. 26 September 2005. certiorari lies from such order of dismissal and does not involve double jeopardy. this exception to the fourth element of double jeopardy – that the defendant was acquitted or convicted. x x x. 45 (1995). . Double jeopardy has not attached. G. Where the dismissal of the case was allegedly capricious. Double jeopardy does not apply to this case.. 314 Phil. 119830. G. it follows that petitioner cannot claim that double jeopardy attached when said RTC order was reversed by the Court of Appeals. 239 SCRA 48. which would otherwise put him in double jeopardy should the same charges be revived. REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM (Vol. No. 471 SCRA 94. 119830 on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial was without basis and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Regalado. or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused – was not met. p. admits of two exceptions. 104147. These cases are not applicable to the petition at bench considering that the right of the private respondents to speedy trial has not been violated by the State. 151912. Following this Court’s ruling in Almario v. the dismissal thereof was due to an alleged violation of his right to speedy trial.540[45] While indeed petitioner was in fact the one who filed the Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No. Court of Appeals. 325 Phil. Where the right of the accused to speedy trial has not been violated. Philippine Savings Bank v. Leviste. Petitioner’s situation is different. Bermoy. 525. as the petition challenges not the correctness but the validity of the order of dismissal. there is no reason to support the initial order of dismissal.544[49] where we overturned an order of dismissal by the trial court predicated on the right to speedy trial – It is true that in an unbroken line of cases. considering that the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 106. Tampal.R. 503.R.541[46] as petitioner’s right to speedy trial was not transgressed. namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to speedy trial. considering that there is no violation of petitioner’s right to speedy trial. 279 (2002). 537 (1996). we have held that dismissal of cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. 2001). From the foregoing. 540 [45] 541[46] 542[47] 543[48] 544[49] Id. 35.543[48] reiterated in People v. 55. 407 Phil. citing People v. II. however. which prevents double jeopardy from attaching. No. that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial.

R. No. for justice to prevail. 119830 is just one of the many controversial cases involving the BW shares scam where public interest is undoubtedly at stake. the scales must balance. not weapons. we concur in the conclusions reached by the Court of Appeals. vexatious. oppressive delay in the proceedings. Courts are tasked to give meaning to that intent. the task of the pillars of the criminal justice system is to preserve our democratic society under the rule of law. Dimatulac v.547 [52] Finally. and no postponements unjustifiably sought. 137. we reiterate that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields. Pasig City for further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 292. instead of unclogging dockets. There being no capricious. the petition is DISMISSED.546[51] Evidently. like any other litigant. Leviste. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals. 119830 with reasonable dispatch. 358 Phil. 328. SP No. People v. 366 (1998). SANDIGANBAYAN. PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW. where it is not a rarity for a case to drag in our courts for years and years and even decades. 145945. Criminal Case No. supra note 49.545[50] Indeed. is entitled to its day in court. [52] People v. has actually increased the workload of the justice system and unwittingly prolonged the litigation. p. JAIME BERNAT VS. G. It was this difficulty that inspired the constitutional requirement that the rules of court to be promulgated by the Supreme Court shall provide for a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy trial and disposition of cases. A hasty dismissal.R. 27 June 2006. and to a reasonable opportunity to present its case. ensuring that all those who appear before or are brought to the bar of justice are afforded a fair opportunity to present their side. Branch 153. 2004 Right to speedy disposition of case. May 20. The State. . WHEREFORE. The instant case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court. 493 SCRA 125.323 The old adage that justice delayed is justice denied has never been more valid than in our jurisdiction. Subida. The assailed 22 February 2006 Decision and 17 July 2006 Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G. Villon. Facts: 545 546 [50] [51] 547 Justice Isagani Cruz. for justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. 83068 are hereby AFFIRMED.

6. There is no violation of the right to speedy disposition of his case because petitioner failed to assert his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case. otherwise known as the Antigraft and Corrupt Practices Act. 1994 after the presentation of the parties’ evidence. On August 23. Length of the delay. Issue: Was there violation of the petitioner’s right to a speedy disposition of his case when the same was not decided for almost 8 years from the time it was “deemed submitted for decision?” Held: No. 1988 Court dated September . During the 8-year period prior to April 19. 1998. The right is violated only if the proceedings were attended by vexatious. 2. 4. petitioner did not complain about the long delay in deciding his case. capricious and oppressive delays. Particular regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Read Admin. she found out that the November 26. the petitioner and several others were charged of violation of Section 3 [e] of RA 3019. Reasons for the delay. 1993 transcript of stenographic notes. 4. as follows: 3. Assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused. certain factors shall be considered and balanced to determine if there is delay. was missing so she called the parties for a conference on April 19. particularly to Justice Godofredo Legaspi and later re-assigned to Justice Ma. As held in the case of DE LA PENA VS. In the early part of 2002 while Justice Estrada was writing the decision of the case. 2002. a. On August 14. the case was deemed submitted for decision before the 2nd Division. th 3. The Court denied the same as well as the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. 4 of the Supreme 22. Instead of attending the conference. 5. 1991. this Petition. Hence. the case was unloaded to the newly created 5 Division. Thereafter. Circular No. and Prejudiced caused by the delay.324 1. The determination of whether the delays are of said nature is relative and cannot be based on mere mathematical reckoning of time. 2002 to discuss the matter. Cristina Cortez-Estrada upon her assumption of office on November 3. which was the cross-examination of the petitioner. petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case based on the alleged violation of his right to speedy trial. SANDIGANBAYAN. 5.

Castillo. 1988 1. 140863. NO. 6. Department of Justice Circular No. 113 SCRA 284 8. Baladjay. 338 SCRA 51. 159 SCRA 70 13. Mendoza. 153 SCRA 153 e.108 SCRA 658 12. Sarmiento. 2000. NOV. 650 3. Araula. Acevedo vs. Regaspi vs.. HON. Alfonso. P vs. DUTERTE VS. Conde vs. To what proceedings is this right available Read: 1. ANGCHANGCO VS.1976 4. GEN. P vs. CA. Mil. 346 SCRA 108. G. 69 SCRA 160 10. CFI of Rizal. 337 SCRA 227. Ver. Ventura vs. P vs. 102 SCRA 56 7. INC. 2000. COURT MARTIAL. 88 SCRA 811 16. dated c. Martin vs. 113 SCRA 226 d. 161 SCRA 249 14. Salcedovs. G. Secretary. People. 289 SCRA 721 18. AUG.R. Luneta vs. Nov.R. 1983 5. NO. Caballero vs. SB. 59 Phil. such delay did . P vs. SANDIGANBAYAN. In general Read: September 16. Tatad vs. 36 SCRA 247 11. 111 SCRA 598 9. SOLAR TEAM ENTERTAINMENT. 269 SCRA 301 SUMBANG VS. 161 SCRA 327 15. July 25. NOS. Laya. 140188. SANDIGANBAYAN. Speedy Disposition of Cases. 2000. 92 SCRa 6. AUG. G.325 b. 27. When shall this right starts Read: 1. OMBUDSMAN. Orsal. 27. BLANCO VS. 22. 28 SCRA 601 2. Nepumuceno vs.R. Rivera. 136757 – 58. Com. The right to speedy trial. HOW. Bermisa vs. 3. (i) The determination of whether an accused had been denied the right to speedy trial depends on the surrounding circumstances of each case. Although it took about 8 years before the trial of this case was resumed. P vs.

his daughter. Opida. When the same is considered waived. appellant Jerry Nazareno was indicted for violation of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No. (ii) Speedy Trial Act of 1998. 167756. 7 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998.90 SCRA 16 4. 1987 3. The right to an impartial trial Read: 1. Dimacuha vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. June 13. 2. G. 1999. reasons for such delay. Tuazon. Sendaydiego. Factors to consider in determining whether or not such right has been violated: 1. P vs. P vs. Jr. P vs. July 25. Villaluz. 2008 THE FACTS: On March 17.1973 2. vs. The authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates even after an information has already been filed in court does not present an irreconcilable conflict with the 30-day period prescribed in Sec. 117 SCRA 630 9. and 3. JERRY NAZARENO. April 8. Garcia vs. assertion or failure to assert such rights by the accused and the prejudice caused by the delay. P vs. Tampus.R. 81 SCRA 120 5. 159 SCRA 317 2. May 22. March 28. Domingo. Chief of Staff. Olaguer vs. 2638 for the alleged rape of BBB.326 not amount to violation of petitioner’s right to speedy trial considering that such delay was not by attributable to the prosecution. 8. Right to a public trial Read: 1.1980 10.1986 1-a. The information reads: . The right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation. No. Concepcion. Mateo. length of delay.

550[28] 548[18] Records.548[18] After trial . this Petition before the Supreme Court. 388 (1998). the information should state the name of the accused. Catanduanes.327 That sometime and between January 1992 up to December 06. 6 and 8. Secs. feloniously and criminally repeatedly had sexual intercourse with her daughter AAA. did then and there willfully. Thus. citing Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000). Hence. the accused was found guilty of qualified rape in both cases. Vol. II. 549[27] Further. the abovenamed accused by means of force. Rule 110. then five years old up to the time when she was 15-years-old against her will. the designation given to the offense by the statute. I S S U E: Is the constitutional right of the petitioner to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him violated since the information failed to specify with certainty the approximate date of the commission of the offenses for rape which is a fatal defect. He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals in accordance with the People vs. a statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as constituting the offense. violence and intimidation did then and there willfully. municipality of San Andres. People v. the approximate time and date of the commission of the offense. it must embody the essential elements of the crime charged by setting forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused. p. H E L D: The argument is specious. 550[28] Id. and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court. CONTRARY TO LAW. 354 Phil. 549[27] . 372. so that he can properly prepare for and undertake his defense. unlawfully. An information is intended to inform an accused of the accusations against him in order that he could adequately prepare his defense. the name of the offended party. an accused cannot be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. Quitlong. being the father of the complainant. and the place where the offense has been committed. The Information is worded thus: That from sometime in January 1990 up to December 1998 in Barangay Codon. Province of Catanduanes. Philippines. feloniously and repeatedly made sexual intercourse with his daughter BBB at the age of 7 through 14 years old against her will. 18. the said accused. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. 1998. to ensure that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him is not violated. Mateo Doctrine but the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision. in Barangay Codon. Municipality of San Andres. Verily.

328

However, it is not necessary for the information to allege the date and time of the commission of the crime with exactitude unless time is an essential ingredient of the offense.551[29] In People v. Bugayong,552[30] the Court held that when the time given in the information is not the essence of the offense, the time need not be proven as alleged; and that the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed at any time within the period of the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action. In People v. Gianan,553[31] the Court ruled that the time of the commission of rape is not an element of the said crime as it is defined in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated therein, i.e.: (1) by using force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. In accordance with Rule 110, Section 11 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as long as it alleges that the offense was committed “at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed,” an information is sufficient. The doctrine was reiterated with greater firmness in People v. Salalima554[32] and in People v. Lizada.555[33] In the case under review, the information in Criminal Case No. 2638 alleged that the rape of BBB transpired “sometime and between January 1992 up to December 6, 1998 in Barangay Codon, Municipality of San Andres, Province of Catanduanes.” In Criminal Case No. 2650, the information averred that “from sometime in January 1990 up to December 1998 in Barangay Codon, Municipality of San Andres, Province of Catanduanes,” AAA was raped by appellant. To the mind of the Court, the recitals in the informations sufficiently comply with the constitutional requirement that the accused be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. In People v. Garcia,556[34] the Court upheld a conviction for ten counts of rape based on an Information which alleged that the accused committed multiple rapes “from November 1990 up to July 21, 1994.” In People v. Espejon,557[35] the Court found the appellant liable for rape under an information charging that he perpetrated the offense “sometime in the year 1982 and dates subsequent thereto” and “sometime in the year 1995 and subsequent thereto.”

551[29]

People v. Santos, 390 Phil. 150, 161 (2000); Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000), Rule 110, Sec. 11 reads: Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense. – It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. 552[30] G.R. No. 126518, December 2, 1998, 299 SCRA 528. 553[31] G.R. Nos. 135288-93, September 15, 2000, 340 SCRA 477. 554[32] G.R. Nos. 137969-71, August 15, 2001, 363 SCRA 192. 555[33] G.R. Nos. 143468-71, January 24, 2003, 396 SCRA 62. 556[34] G.R. No. 120093, November 6, 1997, 281 SCRA 463. 557[35] G.R. No. 134767, February 20, 2002, 377 SCRA 412.

329

In the case under review, the information in Criminal Case No. 2638 alleged that the rape of BBB transpired “sometime and between January 1992 up to December 6, 1998 in Barangay Codon, Municipality of San Andres, Province of Catanduanes.” In Criminal Case No. 2650, the information averred that “from sometime in January 1990 up to December 1998 in Barangay Codon, Municipality of San Andres, Province of Catanduanes,” AAA was raped by appellant. To the mind of the Court, the recitals in the informations sufficiently comply with the constitutional requirement that the accused be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Indeed, this Court has ruled that allegations that rapes were committed “before and until October 15, 1994,”558[36] “sometime in the year 1991 and the days thereafter,”559[37] and “on or about and sometime in the year 1988”560[38] constitute sufficient compliance with Rule 110, Section 11 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure. More than that, the Court notes that the matter of particularity of the dates in the information is being raised for the first time on appeal. The rule is wellentrenched in this jurisdiction that objections as to matter of form or substance in the information cannot be made for the first time on appeal.561[39] Appellant failed to raise the issue of defective informations before the trial court. He could have moved to quash the informations or at least for a bill of particulars. He did not. Clearly, he slumbered on his rights and awakened too late. Too, appellant did not object to the presentation of the evidence for the People contending that the offenses were committed “sometime and between January 1992 up to December 6, 1998” for Criminal Case No. 2632 and “sometime in January 1990, up to December 1998” in Criminal Case No. 2650. On the contrary, appellant actively participated in the trial, offering denial and alibi as his defenses. Simply put, he cannot now be heard to complain that he was unable to defend himself in view of the vagueness of the recitals in the informations. REASONS FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , G.R. No. 175929, December 16, 2008

558[36] 559[37]

People v. Bugayong, supra note 30. People v. Magbanua, G.R. No. 128888, December 3, 1999, 319 SCRA 719. 560[38] People v. Santos, G.R. Nos. 131103 & 143472, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 655. 561[39] People v. Razonable, 386 Phil. 771, 780 (2000).

330

It is true that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.562[88] The Constitution uses the word “shall,” hence, the same is mandatory. A violation of this right prevents the conviction of the accused with the crime charged in the Information. The constitutional guaranty has a three-fold purpose: First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction.563[89] Read: 1. Sales vs. CA, 164 SCRA 717 1-a. P vs. Crisologo, 150 SCRA 653 1-b. P vs. Corral, 157 SCRA 678 1-c. P vs. Resavaga, 159 SCRA 426 1-d. Formilleza vs. SB, 159 SCRA 2. P vs. Labado, 98 SCRA 730 3. Ko Bu Lin vs. CA, 118 SCRA 573 4. P. vs. Cabale, 185 SCRA 140 5. People vs. Regala, April 27, 1982 11. The right to meet witnesses face to face or the Read: 1. P. vs. Talingdan, Nov. 9, 1990 1-a. P vs. Villaluz, October 20, 1983 2. P vs. Valero, 112 SCRA 661 3. P vs. Bundalian, 117 SCRA 718 4. Talino vs. Sandiganbayan, March 16,1987 5. P vs. Seneris, 99 SCRA 92 6. Ortigas, JR. vs. Lufthansa, 64 SCRA 610 7. Toledo vs. People, 20 SCRA 54 8. P vs. Bardaje, 99 SCRA 388 9. P vs. Santos, 139 SCRA 383 10. Soliman vs. Sandiganbayan, 145 SCRA 640 11. P vs. Lacuna, 87 SCRA 364 12. P vs. Clores, 100 SCRA 227 13. Carredo vs. People, 183 SCRA 273 14. Fulgado vs. CA, 182 SCRA 81
562 563

right of confrontation

331

12. Trial in absentia Read: 1. Borja vs. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 420 2. Nolasco vs. Enrile, 139 SCRA 502 3. P vs. Salas, 143 SCRA 163; Note the purpose of this provision) 4. P vs. Judge Prieto, July 21,1978 5. Gimenez vs. Nazareno, 160 SCRA 1 6. Carredo vs. People, 183 SCRA 273 13. Right to secure witnesses and production of Read: 1. Cavili vs. Hon. Florendo, 154 SCRA 610 2. Fajardo vs. Garcia, 98 SCRA 514 ****************************************************** CHAPTER XV - HABEAS CORPUS ******************************************************* Read: 1In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Ferdinand Marcos, etc, GR No. 88079, May 18, 1989 and August & October, 1989. 1-a. Harvey vs. Santiago, supra 2. Cruz vs. Juan Ponce Enrile, April 15,1988 3. Abadilla vs. Fidel Ramos, December 1,1987 ******************************************************** CHAPTER XVI - THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION ******************************************************** 1. Self-incrimination, 24 SCRA 692 2. Read 1. Chavez vs. CA, 24 SCRA 663 evidence.

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2. Galman vs. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 294, read concurring and dissenting opinions 3. Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 4. Beltran vs. Samson, 50 Phil. 570 5. Bagadiong vs. Gonzales, 94 SCRA 906 6. BASECO vs. PCGG, supra 7. Isabela Sugar vs. Macadaeg, 98 Phil. 995 8. Fernando vs. Maglanoc, 95 Phil. 431 9. US vs. Tang Teng, 23 Phil. 145 10. P vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244 11. P vs. Olvis, 154 SCRA 513 12. P vs. Boholst-Amadore, 152 SCRA 263 13. P vs. Rosas, 148 SCRA 464 14. P vs. Ruallo, 152 SCRA 635 15. P vs. Policarpio, 158 SCRA 85( Compare with Boholst cases) 16. P vs. Lumayok, 139 SCRA 1 17. Cabal vs. Kapunan, Jr. December 29, 1962

including the

the Rosas &

PEOPLE VS. BANIHIT, G.R. NO. 132045, 339 SCRA 86, AUG. 25, 2000; PEOPLE VS. CONTINENTE, G.R. NOS. 100801- 02, 339 SCRA 1, AUG. 25, 2000. The essence of this right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion or the giving of evidence against oneself through a testimonial act. Hence, an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from a disease that was contracted by his victim without violating this right. ******************************************************** CHAPTER XVII - THE RIGHT AGAINST INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE ******************************************************** 1. Read: 1. Aclaracion vs. Gatmaitan, 64 SCRA 131 2. Caunca vs. Salazar, supra ******************************************************** CHAPTER XVIII - RIGHT AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT ********************************************************

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a. Is the Death Penalty already abolished by the Read: 1. P vs. Gavarra, 155 SCRa 327 2. P vs. Masangkay, 155 SCRA 113 3. P vs. Atencio, 156 SCRA 242 4. P vs. Intino, September 26, 1988 5. People vs. Munoz, 170 SCRA 107 b. Is death as a penalty a cruel or unuasual

1987 Constitution?

punishment?

No. Death through lethal injection is the most humane way of implementing the death Penalty (Leo Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice) Read: 1. P vs. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647 2. P vs. Villanueva,, 128 SCRA 488 3. Veniegas vs. People, 115 SCRA 79 4. P vs. Camano, 115 SCRA 688 2. On the death penalty whether it was abolished or not Read: a. P vs. Idnay, 164 SCRA 358 ******************************************************** CHAPTER XIX - RIGHT AGAINST NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT ******************************************************** 1. Read: 1. Lozano vs. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323 2. Ajeno vs. Incierto, 71 SCRA 166 ********************************************************* CHAPTER XX - THE RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY ******************************************************** 1. Requisites present before this right can be invoked

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PEOPLE VS. ALMARIO, 355 SCRA 1 There is double jeopardy when there is: [1] valid indictment; [2] before a competent court; [3] after arraignment; [4] when a valid plea has been entered; and [5] when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. If the dismissal is through the instance of the accused or with his express consent, there is no double jeopardy and the case could be reinstated. However, this rule admits of two (2) exceptions: 1) the motion to dismiss is based on insufficiency of evidence; and 2) the motion to dismiss is based on the denial of the accused’s right to speedy trial. This is so because the “dismissal” is actually an “acquittal” and therefore, all the requisites of double jeopardy are complete. JEFFREY RESO DAYAP vs. PRETZY-LOU SENDIONG, GENESA SENDIONG, ELVIE SY and DEXIE DURAN, G.R. No. 177960, January 29, 2009

The case had its origins in the filing of an Information564[4] on 29 December 2004 by the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, charging herein petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap with the crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide, Less Serious Physical Injuries, and Damage to Property. The pertinent portion of the information reads: That at about 11:55 o’clock in the evening of 28 December 2004 at Brgy. Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive in a reckless and imprudent manner a 10-wheeler cargo truck with plate number ULP-955, color blue, fully loaded with sacks of coconut shell, registered in the name of Ruben Villabeto of Sta. Agueda Pamplona, Negros Oriental, thereby hitting an automobile,
564 [4]

Records, p. 32.

55. before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sibulan. After the prosecution had rested its case. however. thus causing the instantaneous death of said Lou Gene R. Rollo. Records. Petitioner filed his Demurrer to Evidence570[10] dated 15 April 2005 grounded on the prosecution’s failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he is criminally liable for reckless imprudence. Id. he was only extracted from the car by the by-standers. An act defined and penalized by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. at 93-94.568[8] On 21 January 2003. See Order dated 10 January 2005. pp. petitioner was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to the charge.335 a Colt Galant with plate number NLD-379 driven by Lou Gene R. thus: “The driver of the 10-wheeler cargo truck abandoned the victims. Genesa Sendiong and Dexie Duran filed a motion for leave of court to file an amended information.. pp. Records. p. Sendiong and the other two offended parties above-mentioned. p. Id. to which respondents filed a Comment571[11] dated 25 April 2005. Respondents testified for the prosecution. Sendiong. 34-36.”567[7] On 21 January 2005. pp. Id. at a time when said [Lou-Gene] R. namely: Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy. The MTC found that 565 [5] 566 [6] 567 [7] Rollo. Rollo. V. to the damage of the heirs of the same Lou Gene R. Sendiong was still alive inside the car. at 41.569[9] Pre-trial and trial of the case proceeded. On 10 January 2005. Negros Oriental. Locsin St. respondents Pretzy-Lou P. the Provincial Prosecutor filed an Omnibus Motion praying that the motion to amend the information be considered withdrawn. less serious physical injuries on the bodies of Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy and extensive damage to the abovementioned Colt Galant which is registered in the name of Cristina P. 44. the MTC granted the withdrawal and the motion to amend was considered withdrawn. Sendiong who was with two female passengers. at 37. 80-92. Dumaguete City. petitioner sought leave to file a demurrer to evidence which was granted.566[6] They sought to add the allegation of abandonment of the victims by petitioner.565[5] On 17 January 2005. the MTC granted the demurrer and acquitted petitioner of the crime of reckless imprudence. 72-74. Weyer of 115 Dr. Sendiong. In the Order572[12] dated 16 May 2005. 568 [8] 569 [9] 570 [10] 571 [11] 572 [12] .

The prosecution did not even establish if indeed it was the accused who was driving the truck at the time of the incident. The mother of the victim testified only on the expenses she incurred and the shock she and her family have suffered as a result of the incident. The alleged less serious physical injuries on the bodies of Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy were not also proven as no medical certificate was presented to state the same nor was a doctor presented to establish such injuries. xxxx The defense furthermore argued that on the contrary. There was no evidence on the allegation of the death of Lou Gene R. The facts and circumstances constituting the allegations charged have not been proven. Sendiong and the injuries to Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy. The court again is inclined . The alleged damage to the [C]olt [G]alant was also not established in any manner as no witness ever testified on this aspect and no documentary evidence was also presented to state the damage. The prosecution never bothered to establish if indeed it was the accused who committed the crime or asked questions which would have proved the elements of the crime.336 the evidence presented by respondents failed to establish the allegations in the Information. It is elementary in the rules of evidence that a party must prove his own affirmative allegations. This Court could only say that the prosecution has practically bungled this case from its inception. she could not also pinpoint if it was the accused who committed the crime and be held responsible for it. Sendiong as there was no death certificate that was offered in evidence. But sad to say. The Court simply cannot find any evidence which would prove that a crime has been committed and that the accused is the person responsible for it. xxxx Nowhere in the evidence of the prosecution can this Court find that it was the accused who committed the crime as charged. including the damage to the Colt Galant. the prosecution’s [evidence] conclusively show that the swerving of vehicle 1 [the Colt Galant] to the lane of vehicle 2 [the cargo truck] is the proximate cause of the accident. Its witnesses have never identified the accused as the one who has committed the crime. The prosecution therefore failed to establish if indeed it was the accused who was responsible for the death of Lou Gene R. Pertinent portions of the order state: An examination of the allegations in the information and comparing the same with the evidence presented by the prosecution would reveal that the evidence presented has not established said allegations.

Sad to say. 32. thus hitting the latter’s inner fender and tires. SO ORDERED.. at 72 and 74.e. 11. The cutting of the differential guide cause[d] the entire housing connecting the tires to the truck body to collapse. Exhibit “7” which is a picture of vehicle 2 shows the extent of its damage which was the effect of vehicle 1’s ramming into the rear left portion of vehicle 2 causing the differential guide of vehicle 2 to be cut. and the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. xxxx WHEREFORE. 573 [13] 574 [14] Id. 3-11. not of [sic] any negligent act of the accused.573[13] Respondents thereafter filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Br. It has looked carefully into the sketch of the accident as indicated in the police blotter and can only conclude that the logical explanation of the accident is that vehicle 1 swerved into the lane of vehicle 2. its tires busted and pulled out together with their axle. premises considered. pp. the prosecution has miserably failed to prove these two things. When the prosecution fails to discharge its burden of establishing the guilt of the accused. the presence of all the elements of the crime for which the accused stands charged. Records. i. Respondents added that the MTC failed to observe the manner the trial of the case should proceed as provided in Sec.337 to agree with this argument of the defense. .574[14] alleging that the MTC’s dismissal of the case was done without considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution. the demurrer is granted and the accused JEFFREY RESO DAYAP is hereby acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental. The bail bond posted for his temporary liberty is also hereby cancelled and ordered released to the accused or his duly authorized representative. It was this accident that caused the swerving. an accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf. thus causing vehicle 2 to tilt to its left side and swerve towards the lane of vehicle 1. xxxx Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to prove two things—the fact of the crime. Rule 119 of the Rules of Court as well as failed to rule on the civil liability of the accused in spite of the evidence presented.

11. No costs. docketed as CA-G. the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of the case is determined by the fine imposable for the damage to property resulting from the reckless imprudence. The RTC however agreed that the MTC failed to rule on the accused’s civil liability. at 89-90. not by the corresponding penalty for the physical injuries charged. In so ruling. but these were denied for lack of merit in the order577[17] dated 12 September 2005.R. No.000. at 81.576[16] Both parties filed their motions for reconsideration of the RTC order. Respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals under Rule 42. . especially since the judgment of acquittal did not include a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.00. Id. The RTC ruled that the MTC’s recital of every fact in arriving at its conclusions disproved the allegation that it failed to consider the evidence presented by the prosecution. SO ORDERED. Thus. 15 April 1998. L-46934. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and the 1991 Rule 8 on Summary Procedure. 23. Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. The appellate court subsequently rendered the assailed decision and resolution. the questioned order of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan on accused’s acquittal is AFFIRMED. 01179. It also found support in Sec. No. 75-81. Rule 119. The dispositive portion of the decision states: WHEREFORE. the filing of which is allowed under Sec. which govern the summary procedure in first-level courts in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence where the imposable fine does not exceed P10. SP. pp. except that the defense no longer presented its evidence after the MTC gave due course to the accused’s demurrer to evidence. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin or its successor for further proceedings on the civil aspect of the case. the RTC declared that the aspect of civil liability was not passed upon and resolved to remand the issue to the MTC. The Court of Appeals ruled that there being no proof of the total value of the properties damaged.338 In the order dated 23 August 2005. Id. the appellate court cited Tulor v. the RTC affirmed the acquittal of petitioner but ordered the remand of the case to the MTC for further proceedings on the civil aspect of the case. The records also demonstrated that the MTC conducted the trial of the case in the manner dictated by Sec. Garcia)578[18] which ruled that in complex crimes involving reckless imprudence resulting in homicide or physical injuries and damage to property. Garcia (correct title of the case is Cuyos v. As there was no proof of the total value of the property damaged and respondents were claiming the amount 575 [15] 576 [16] 577 [17] 578 [18] 575[15] Rollo. the criminal case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC and the proceedings before the MTC are null and void. .

The Court of Appeals however declared in its decision that petitioner should have been charged with the same 579 [19] 580 [20] 581 [21] 582 [22] Entitled “AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS.582[22] which confers jurisdiction to first-level courts on offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence. Rollo. less serious physical injuries and damage to property. at 90-94. petitioner argues that the MTC had jurisdiction to hear the criminal case for reckless imprudence. Respondents are also faulted for challenging the MTC’s order acquitting petitioner through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 in lieu of an ordinary appeal under Rule 42. 129. judgment is hereby rendered by Us REMANDING the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Judicial Region. In the present petition for review. OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980. However. felonious killing as well as abandonment of the victims.500. Id. Negros Oriental for proper disposition of the merits of the case. Branch 32. owing to the enactment of Republic Act (R. Supra note 2. premises considered. 7691. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated 17 August 2006 reads: WHEREFORE. unlawful. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 can be the basis of the RTC’s jurisdiction over the case. and that neither the 1991 Rule on Summary Procedure nor Sec. p.) No.581[21] It reiterated that it is the RTC that has proper jurisdiction considering that the information alleged a willful.” which took effect on 14 April 1994.579[19] Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision. He asserts that the RTC could not have acquired jurisdiction on the basis of a legally unfiled and officially withdrawn amended information alleging abandonment. 35. . The petition has merit. the case falls within the RTC’s jurisdiction. AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BLG.339 of P1.580 [20] arguing that jurisdiction over the case is determined by the allegations in the information.000.A. MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS. the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in the Resolution dated 25 April 2007.00 as civil damages. Both the MTC and the RTC proceeded with the case on the basis of the Information dated 29 December 2004 charging petitioner only with the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. SO ORDERED. It should be granted. The first issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that jurisdiction over the offense charged pertained to the RTC.

citing Alarilla v. the same to be applied in its maximum period. Sandiganbayan. the penalty imposable upon petitioner. 407 Phil. Justice Garchitorena. 143. Court of Appeals. de los Santos.585[25] Thus.340 offense but aggravated by the circumstance of abandonment of the victims. 744 (2001. or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. 102 (1998). 7691. Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 had already been amended by R. unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof. Where a reckless. 407 Phil. with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period. imprudent. It explicitly states “that in offenses involving damage to property 583 [23] 584 [24] 585 [25] 586 See notes 8 and 9. Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any person who. were he to be found guilty. a complex crime is committed. de los Santos. 2 months and 1 day to 6 years). resulting in the death of a person attended the same article imposes upon the defendant the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties including those for civil liability. a complex crime. 155 (2000) and Escovar v. It appears from the records however that respondents’ attempt to amend the information by charging the aggravated offense was unsuccessful as the MTC had approved the Provincial Prosecutor’s motion to withdraw their motion to amend the information. it is applicable to crimes through negligence in view of the definition of felonies in Article 3 as “acts or omissions punishable by law” committed either by means of deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa). 147406. had it been intentional.A. 625. by reckless imprudence. petitioner is deemed to have been charged only with the offense alleged in the original Information without any aggravating circumstance. 724 (2001).R. 7691 extended the jurisdiction of the first-level courts over criminal cases to include all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine. Applicable as well is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action. Venancio Figueroa y Cervantes v. citing Reodica v. The information filed before the trial court had remained unamended. 724.584[24] Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies. 4 months and 1 day to 4 years) and maximum period (4 years.586[26] When this case was filed on 29 December 2004. would constitute a grave felony. No. less serious physical injuries and damage to property. The offense with which petitioner was charged is reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. No.A.583[23] Thus. the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed. 635 (2004). 14 July 2008. commits any act which. 393 Phil. People of the Philippines. People v. When such reckless imprudence the use of a motor vehicle. People v. No. [26] . 466 Phil. or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies. R. is prision correccional in its medium period (2 years. Since Article 48 speaks of felonies. 292 SCRA 87. G.

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through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.” It follows that criminal cases for reckless imprudence punishable with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods should fall within the jurisdiction of the MTC and not the RTC. Clearly, therefore, jurisdiction to hear and try the same pertained to the MTC and the RTC did not have original jurisdiction over the criminal case.587[27] Consequently, the MTC of Sibulan, Negros Oriental had properly taken cognizance of the case and the proceedings before it were valid and legal. As the records show, the MTC granted petitioner’s demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of the offense on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is “filed after the prosecution had rested its case,” and when the same is granted, it calls “for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused.”588[28] Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy.589[29] But while the dismissal order consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not subject to appeal, the same is still reviewable but only by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, in such case, the factual findings of the trial court are conclusive upon the reviewing court, and the only legal basis to reverse and set aside the order of dismissal upon demurrer to evidence is by a clear showing that the trial court, in acquitting the accused, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.590[30] Accordingly, respondents filed before the RTC the petition for certiorari alleging that the MTC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the case and failing to consider the evidence of the prosecution in resolving the same, and in allegedly failing to follow the proper procedure as mandated by the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly ruled that the MTC did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint. The MTC’s conclusions were based on facts diligently recited in the order thereby disproving that the MTC failed to consider the evidence presented by the prosecution. The records also show that the MTC correctly followed the procedure set forth in the Rules of Court. The second issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the remand of the case of the matter of civil liability for the reception of evidence.

587 [27] 588 [28]

Venancio Figueroa y Cervantes v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 147406, 14 July 2008. People v. Sandiganbayan, 488 Phil. 293, 310 (2004), citing People v. City of Silay, No. L-43790, 9 December 1976, 74 Id. People v. Uy, G.R. No. 158157, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 668.

SCRA 247.
589 [29] 590 [30]

342

We disagree with the Court of Appeals on directing the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings on the civil aspect, as well as with the RTC in directing a similar remand to the MTC. The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. 591[31] However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist592[32] or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.593[33] Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.594[34] This is because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court should do is issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused, and set the case for continuation of trial for the accused to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal. Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the case.595[35] A scrutiny of the MTC’s decision supports the conclusion that the acquittal was based on the findings that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist and that petitioner did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him; hence, petitioner’s civil liability has been extinguished by his acquittal. It should be noted that the MTC categorically stated that it cannot find any evidence which would prove that a crime had been committed and that accused was the person responsible for it. It added that the prosecution failed to establish that it was petitioner who committed the crime as charged since its witnesses never identified petitioner as the one who was driving the cargo truck at the time of the incident. Furthermore, the MTC found that the proximate cause of the accident is the damage to the rear portion of the truck caused by the swerving of the Colt Galant into the rear left portion
591 [31] 592 [32] 593 [33] 594 [34] 595 [35]

Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, G.R. No. 165496, 12 February 2007, 515 SCRA 502, 513. RULES OF COURT, Rule 111, Sec. 2, last par. Salazar v. People, 458 Phil. 504 (2003). Id. at 607. Id. at 518-519.

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of the cargo truck and not the reckless clearly establishing that petitioner is Consequently, there is no more need to proceedings on the civil aspect of the extinguished his civil liability.

driving of the truck by petitioner, not guilty of reckless imprudence. remand the case to the trial court for case, since petitioner’s acquittal has

****************** It must be pointed out, however, that in PEOPLE VS. TAMPAL, 244 SCRA 202 and PEOPLE VS. LEVISTE, 255 SCRA 238, the SC reversed the dismissal of the criminal case by the trial court based on “speedy trial” since the same was not predicated “on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial.” It is only when there is a clear violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial that the dismissal results in double jeopardy. 3. Double jeopardy, 102 SCRA 44 and 12 SCRA 561 4. When the act is punished by both a law and an ordinance: PEOPLE VS. RELOVA, 148 SCRA 292 If the accused was charged of “theft of electricity” based on the City Ordinance of Batangas and not based on the Revised Penal Code and later on the case is dismissed by the judge due to the fact that the crime has prescribed, the government can no longer charge the accused of the same crime under the Revised Penal Code since double jeopardy has set in. Read: 1. P vs. Duero, 104 SCRA 379 2. CUDIA VS. CA, 284 SCRA 173 3. CUISON VS. CA, 289 SCRA 159 2. P vs. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 3. P vs. Abano, 145 SCRA 555 4. P vs. Tolentino, 145 SCRA 597 5. P vs. Salig, 133 SCRA 59 6. P vs. Cruz, 133 SCRA 426 7. P vs. Prudente,, 133 SCRA 651 8 P vs. Trinidad, 162 SCRA 714, when the does7, 1966 2. P vs. City Court,154 SCRA 175 3. Galman vs. Pamaran, 144 SCRA 43 4. P vs. Molero, 144 SCRA 397 5. P vs. Quibate, 131 SCRA 81 6. P vs. Obania, June 29,1968 7. Dionaldo vs. Dacuycuy, 108 SCRA 736 8. P vs. Judge Hernando, 108 SCRA 121 9. Esmena vs. Judge Pogoy, 102 SCRA 861 10. Mazo vs. Mun. Court, 113 SCRA 217 11. Andres vs. Cacdac, 113 SCRA 217 12. Buerano vs. CA, 115 SCRA 82

presumption of regularity

344

13. P vs. Militante, 117 SCRA 910 14. P vs. Fuentebella, 100 SCRA 672 15. Lazaro vs. P, 112 SCRA 430 16. Flores vs. Enrile, 115 SCRA 236 17. Bernarte vs. Sec. ,116 SCRA 43 18. Ko Bu Lin vs. CA, 118 SCRA 573 19. P vs. Duran, 1075 SCRA 979 20. P vs. Cuevo, 104 SCRA 312 21. Jimenez vs. Military Commission, 102 SCRA 39 22. P vs. Liwanag, 73 SCRA 473 23. P vs. Araula, January 30, 1982 24. P vs. Baladjay, March 30, 1982 25. P vs. City Court of Silay, 74 SCRA 247 28. P vs. Pilpa, 79 SCRA 81 29. P vs. Gloria, December 29, 1977 30. P vs. Galano, 75 SCRA 193 31. Tacas vs. Cariasco, 72 SCRA 527 32. P vs. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77 33. P vs. Consulta, 70 SCRA 277 34. P vs. Inting, 70 SCRA 289 35. De Guzman vs. Escalona, 97 SCRA 619 36. P vs. Pablo, 98 SCRA 289 37. Cruz vs. Enrile, 160 SCRA 700 38. Tangan vs. P, 155 SCRA 435 39. P vs. Quezada, 160 SCRA 516 40. Canizano vs. P, 159 SCRA 599 41. Bustamante vs. Maceren, 48 SCRA 144 There is no double jeopardy in this case: PEOPLE VS. MOLERO G.R No. L-67842, September 24, 1986 FACTS: 1. Molero was charged for having raped his daughter. The original complaint was dated March 22, 1977, the complainant charged Molero of having raped her on the "13th day of February 1976". 2. Molero was arraigned and pleaded "Not Guilty"; 3. During the trial, the complainant testified that she was raped by her father on February 5, 1976 and not February 13, 1976 as alleged in the complaint; 4. The Fiscal filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint. The motion was granted but was subsequently reconsidered. The lower court

345

in its order dismissed the original complaint, but ordered the Fiscal to cause the filing of a new complaint charging the proper offense of rape committed on or before February 5, 1976; 5. A new complaint was therefore filed dated March 30, 1978 6. Molero claims that the new complaint places him in double jeopardy. HELD: There is no double jeopardy. a. Dismissal of the first case contemplated by the rule against double jeopardy presupposes a definite and unconditional dismissal which terminates the case.(Jaca vs. Blanco, 86 Phil. 452; People vs. Manlapas, 5 SCRA 883; People vs. Mogol, 131 SCRA 296) And "for dismissal to be a bar under the jeopardy clause of the Constitution, it must have the effect of acquittal.(People vs. Agoncillo, 40 SCRA 579); b. It is quite clear that the order of the trial court dismissal the original complaint was without prejudice to the filing of a new complaint and/or information charging Molero with the proper offense. The said dismissal did not therefore amount to an acquittal. c. In fact there was no need for the trial court to have adopted such a cumbersome procedure. It could have merely ordered an amendment of the complaint. Sec. 12, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court applies when there is a mistake in charging the proper offense, but not when an honest error of a few days is sought to be corrected and the change does not affect the rights of the accused. d. The precise time of the commission of the crime is not an essential element of the offense of rape. The amendment of the complaint changing the date of the commission of the crime of rape from February 13, 1976 to February 5, 1976 , a difference of 8 days was only a matter of form under the facts of this case and did not prejudice the rights of the accused. e. The reliance of the accused on the case of People vs. Opemia, 98 Phil. 698 is not well-taken. In the said case the proposed amendment was the changing of the date of the commission of the crime from June 18, 1952 to July 1947, or a difference of 5 years. The S.C. held that the amendment that would change the date of the commission of the offense from 1947 to 1952 is certainly not a matter of form. f. The dismissal of the first complaint did not amount to the appellant's acquittal. In effect, the order of dismissal does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy. (People vs. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166)

346

5. May the government appeal a judgment of acquittal or for the increase of the penalty imposed? No. PEOPLE VS. HON. VELASCO, G.R. NO. 127444, 340 SCRA 207, SEPT. 13, 2000. Double Jeopardy. Evolution of doctrine. Appeal by the Government from verdicts of acquittal. As mandated by the Constitution, statutes and cognate jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of mistrial, as in Galman vs. Sandiganbayan. 6. May the appellate court of the Supreme Court increase the pernalty imposed by the trial court on appeal by the accused? Yes. PEOPLE VS. DOMINGO, G.R. No. 184343, March 2, 2009 Appellant Jesus Domingo assails the Decision596[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 30 April 2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 30511, modifying the Decision597[2] dated 13 November 2006 of Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. The Court of Appeals found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder in Criminal Cases No. 1496-M2000 and No. 1497-M-2000, attempted murder in Criminal Cases No. 1498-M-2000 and No. 1501-M-2000, frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 1500-M-2000, and frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No. 1499-M2000. On 7 September 2000, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, was arraigned and he entered separate pleas of “Not Guilty” to the crimes charged. Thereafter, pre-trial conference was held, and trial ensued accordingly.598[4] The accused was convicted of Homicide, instead of Murder. On Appeal to the Court of Appeals, the CA held that the crime proven by the prosecution is Murder and therefore increased the penalty from Homicide to Murder.
596 [1]

597[2] 598[4]

Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta with Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 2-25. Penned by Presiding Judge Andres B. Soriano; CA rollo, pp. 11-23. Id. at 13.

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Is increase in the penalty valid? Yes because it was the accused who interposed the appeal making the court review the evidence. And it it finds the evidence sufficient for conviction of the crime of Murder, it could increase the penalty. Read: 1. Central Bank of the Philippines vs. CA, GR No. 1989 1-a. P vs. Montemayor, January 30, 1969, 26 SCRA 2. P vs. Ruiz,81 SCRA 455 3. US vs. Yam Tung Way, 21 Phil. 67 4. P vs. Ang ho Kio, 95 Phil. 475 6. The "Supervening Fact Doctrine." Read: 1. 76 SCRA 469 2. P vs. Tarok, 73 Phil. 260 3. P vs. Villasis, 46 O.G. 268 4. Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766 5. P vs. Buling, 107 Phil. 712 5-a. P vs. Adil, 76 SCRA 462 5-b. P. vs. Tac-an, 182 SCRA 601 6. P vs. City Court of Manila, 121 SCRA 637 7. Read also Sec. 7, Rule 117, 1985 Rules on 41859, March 8, 687

Criminal Procedure

******************************************************* CHAPTER XXI RIGHT AGAINST EX-POST FACTO LAW, BILL OF ATTAINER, ETC. ******************************************************* Read: 1. Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433 2-LACSON VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, January 20, 1999 PANFILO M. LACSON VS. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL. ROMEO ACOP & FRANCISCO ZUBIA, JR., Petitioners-Intervenors G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999

While the Motions for Reconsideration were pending before the Sandiganbayan. 1996.. the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City has jurisdiction to try and decide the same. the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution transferring the case to the RTC of Quezon City which has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the cases under RA 7975. paragraphs [a] and [c]. as mere accessories. Upon motion by the petitioner and his co-police officers with leave from the Sandiganbayan. On May 8. the Review Board led by Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa resulted in the filing of multiple murder cases against the petitioner and his companion where he was indicted as a principal. The new law further provides that it shall be applicable to all cases which are pending in court . 1996. 1997 entitled “AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN. 1995 at Commonwealth Avenue. particularly Section 2.” However. the accused questioned the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the 11 criminal cases since under Republic Act No. ROMEO ACOP and FRANCISCO ZUBIA. On May 17. the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a Reconsideration and insisted that the cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan which was opposed by the petitioner and his co-accused. the said court has jurisdiction only if one or more of the principal accused has a rank of Brigadier General (Chief Superintendent) or higher and since the highest PNP officer charged as a principal accused is merely Chief Inspector. PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR” which deleted the word “PRINCIPAL” in Section 2. The police officers claimed that it was a shoot-out between them and the Kuratong Baleleng Members while SPO2 Eduardo de los Reyes claimed it was a summary execution or rub-out. Quezon City. On March 5-6. AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE PD 1606. JR. 1996 charging the petitioner . Congress passed into law Republic Act No.348 The petitioner seeks to stop the Sandiganbayan from trying the multiple murder case against him and 26 other police officers for the death of 11 Kuratong Baleleng members in the early morning of May 18. 7975. 8249 which was approved by the President on February 5. The preliminary investigation conducted by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs resulted in the dismissal of the cases after finding that the incident was “a legitimate police operation. a Motion for Reconsideration was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman who AMENDED the 11 information’s on March 1. paragraphs [a] and [c] of RA 7975 thereby giving jurisdiction to the Sandiganbayan criminal cases involving police generals like the petitioners even though they are not charged as principals but merely accessories or accomplices. AS AMENDED.1996.

1997. On March 5. if their case will be tried by the Sandiganbayan. Held: 1. the Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the Office of the Special Prosecutor and ruled that it “stands pat in its Resolution dated May 8. The contention that the law violates petitioner’s right to due process and equal protection of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. it is in fact a class legislation and an ex-post facto law statute intended specifically to apply to all the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng case pending before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner questioned the said Resolution of the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court on the following grounds: 1. 1997 Resolution where it that with the passage of RA 8249. The petitioners-intervenors claimed that while the law (Sections 4 and 7) innocuously appears to have merely expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. their right to due process of law and equal protection of the law was violated as a result of the application of the new law by which restored to the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over their cases especially so that the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for 9 months the resolution of the pending incident involving the transfer of these cases to the RTC of Quezon City and waited for the passage of the law to overtake such resolution and thereby rendering their vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law moot. they will be deprived of their “twotiered” appeal to the Sandiganbayan which they acquire under RA 7975 before recourse to the Supreme Court could be made.349 before the passage of the same provided trial has not begun at the time of its approval. the retroactive application of the new law violates their constitutional right against ex-post facto law. It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable . Finally. 3. however. On the same day. 1996” ordering the transfer of the 11 criminal cases to the RTC of Quezon City. the Sandiganbayan issued an ADDENDUM to its March 5. the title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid innocuous provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather than defines the old Sandiganbayan law thereby violating the one title one subject requirement of Section 26 [1] Article VI of the Constitution. retained jurisdiction to try and decide the cases”. 2. “the court admitted the amended information’s in these cases and by the unanimous vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring nor dissenting.

c. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of the courts. d. must not be limited to existing conditions only. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court”. b. which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent when committed. examined witnesses and presented documents. and must apply equally to all members of the same class- all of which are present in this case. which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. evidence against them were not yet presented. whereas in the latter the parties have already submitted their respective proofs. b. and punishes such action. it must be germane to the purposes of the law. In order that a law is an ex post facto law. The petitioners’ argument that the retroactive application of the new law to the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law for they are deprived of their right to due process as they can no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under RA 7975 is without merit. In the 1st instance. The classification between those pending cases involving concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under RA 8249. as against those whose cases where trial has already started as of the approval of the law rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences. which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed. 2.350 classification. It just happened that the Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. those cases where trial has already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (RA 8249). namely: a. the same must be one— a. it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction necessarily affect pending cases. which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required a the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements. it must rest on real and substantial distinctions. which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed. Moreover. . d. c.

PEOPLE VS. 205 Phil. to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. RA 8249 is not a penal law. the expansion of the jurisdiction. The requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough. TAN VS. The same contention had been rejected by the court several times in the cases of RODRIGUEZ VS. they got what they want in the end because it was held that the 11 criminal information’s failed to . in employing the word “define” in the title of the law. or a proclamation of amnesty (KAY VILLEGAS KAMI. 35 SCRA 429. alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage. SANDIGANBAYAN. The other contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired under RA 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of RA 8249 is incorrect. in relation to the offense or its consequences. The Congress. f. 1982 considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. does not have to be expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary consequence of the amendments. that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful. 211 SCRA 241). the new law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. The petitioners claim that the new does not define the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but expands the same. 567. (NOTE: Though the Supreme Court rejected all the above arguments raised by the petitioner and the intervenors who are against the trial of their cases with the Sandiganbayan and prefer to have their cases be tried and decided by the RTC of Quezon City. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Ex post facto law prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws.351 e. SANDIGANBAYAN. The contention that the new Sandiganbayan law violates the one title-one subject provision of the Constitution is without merit. SANDIGANBAYAN. 190 SCRA 686. SANDIGANBAYAN. MEJIA VS. g. BARRIOS. 160 SCRA 457. NUNEZ VS. PEOPLE. ALVIAR VS. as in this case. 137 SCRA 63. every law which. But even assuming that that is true. such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal. acted within its power since Section 2. prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to “define. PAMARAN. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. December 15. 3. Moreover. 111 SCRA 433. deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled. DE GUZMAN VS.

35 SCRA 429 3. GR No. NO. Ferrer. 107 SCRA 141 4. 1988. 2001. the Quezon City RTC to whom the said cases were raffled DISMISSED the 11 murder cases as a result of the retraction made by the eyewitnesses. res judicata Unanimous en banc decision (NOTE: This is also important in your Remedial Law) Cruz. 1988. Facts: 1. On January 26. P vs. Kay Villegas Kami. Barrios. The petitioner was proclaimed mayor-elect of the City of Baguio on January 20. renunciation of. Ramon Labo. COMELEC.352 alleged that they committed the crimes in relation to their public office which is a jurisdictional requirement in order that the same be tried by the Sandiganbayan. 46 & 56 SCRA 5. COMELEC. who takes the place of a disqualified winner in an election. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND LUIS LARDIZABAL. Tan vs. RAMON LABO. Comelec. 1999. Finally. 1989 August 1. The same was revived by the DOJ in April.a. The same was returned to the QC RTC to determine if the 2year provisional rule under the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure is applicable) 2. VS. August 1. 1989 Citizenship.R. 1992 a. October 18. sometime in May. 86564. . VS. vs. July 3. J. 86564. Sevilleja vs. Jr. 2. the private respondent filed a quo warranto case against the petitioner but no filing fee was paid. Effect of naturalization in another country Read: a. JR. G.-1 RAMON LABO JR. 1990 CHAPTER XXII-CITIZENSHIP 1.

CA. LIANGA LUMBER CO. On February 10.00. HOWEVER. the petitioner claims that the petition was late because the payment of the filing fee is essential to the timeliness of an appeal. The petition was filed on time since the filing fee was paid immediately when the COMELEC treated the same as a quo warranto and not a preproclamation controversy. 98 SCRA 575. When the COMELEC treated it as a quo warranto case on February 8. However.353 3. Hence. 108 PHIL. WE SHALL DIRECTLY ADDRESS IT NOW IN THIS SAME ACTION AGAINST HIM. ALGER ELECTRIC VS. 5 SCRA 733. Issues: 1. Since the filing fee was paid beyond the reglementary period. 1988. The private respondent claimed he filed the petition on time because when he first filed the same. who shall take his place as the City Mayor? Held: 1. AND CONSIDERING THE NECESSITY FOR AN EARLY RESOLUTION OF THAT MORE IMPORTANT QUESTION CLEARLY AND URGENTLY AFFECTING THE PUBLIC INTEREST. Since the petitioner won in the election and turned out to be not qualified for said position. REPUBLIC VS. Jr. CA. it was treated by the COMELEC as a preproclamation controversy which needs no filing fee. even assuming that the filing fee was paid late. Was the petition for quo warranto filed on time? 2. is qualified for the office of the City Mayor of Baguio or not? 3. he immediately paid the filing fee on said date. 2. may the Supreme Court determine whether petitioner Ramon Labor. Normally. the private respondent paid the filing fee of P300. January 29. the filing fee was paid on time. JAYMALIN. the case should end here as the sole issue raised by the petitioner is the timeliness of the quo warranto proceedings against him. (DEL CASTILLO VS. 1988 or 21 days after the petitioner was proclaimed. 4. 112 SCRA 629. 149 SCRA 562. FRANCISCO VS. SAMSON. PAREDES. 5. . VS. CITY OF . ERICO VS. CA. AS HIS CITIZENSHIP IS THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PROCEEDING. citing Manchester vs. What is important is that the filing fee was paid. 57. HEIRS OF CHIGAS. Since the case was merely for determination on whether or not the petition was filed on time or not. SOTTO VS. 135 SCRA 37. the same was not traceable to the private respondent's fault or neglect. BEAUTIFONT VS. 1988. LIANGA TIMBER CO. 76 SCRA 197.

On May 12. The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia or at the least a stateless person to . Labo is not considered a Filipino citizen. But even assuming further that he was elected unanimously. the Commission on Immigration and Deportation held that he is not a citizen of the Philippines. Since none of these is present to show that he was able to reacquire Philippine citizenship. 74. GARCIA. Labo also claims that his naturalization in Australia was annulled since it was found out that his marriage to an Australian was bigamous. 37 SCRA 213. this is without basis because to be more accurate. US VS. As such. LEE VS. This is without merit since even assuming it to be true. 34 PHIL. with more reason that the Supreme Court shall now decide the case with finality instead of returning the same to the COMELEC. 30. COMMISSIONER. he won by just over 2. 21 SCRA 1039. 1976. 162. it was found out that RAMON LABO. CA. REPUBLIC. since the petitioner claims that the respondent COMELEC has prejudged the case against him because it adopted the private respondent's COMMENT which repeatedly asserted that he is not a Filipino citizen. GIMINEZ. 42 SCRA 561. 157 SCRA 357). CA. However. he is not even qualified to be a voter under the Constitution. COMMISSIONER. SAMAL VS. 592. In addition thereto. the same voters of Baguio City could not change the requirements of the Constitution and the Local Government Code. 1982. VALENCIA VS.354 DAVAO. Again. It must be pointed out that res judicata does not apply to questions involving citizenship (SORIA VS. 3. Labo claims further that the "futile" technicality should not frustrate the will of the electorate in Baguio City who elected him by a "resonant and thunderous majority. the COMELEC held that he is a Filipino citizen while on September 13. 122 SCRA 478). There are two administrative decisions involving the citizenship of the petitioner. and c) by repatriation. Labo claims that the petition to disqualify him because of his citizenship is already barred by res judicata because of the earlier ruling of the COMELEC that he is a Filipino citizen. the same did not automatically vest him Philippine Citizenship which could be reacquired only by: a) a direct act of Congress. GIRONELLA. LI SHIU LIAT VS. 105 PHIL. 99 PHIL. SIA REYES VS. MABILANGAN. DEPORTATION BOARD. TEJONES VS. 1988. b) by naturalization. 12 SCRA 628. much less as a candidate for the position of Mayor in the City of Baguio. 92 PHIL. FERNANDEZ VS. 159 SCRA 100 and LIANGA BAY LOGGING VS. JR. In a statement by the Australian consul in the Philippines.100 votes. was granted Australian citizenship by Sydney on July 28.

the same shall be REVERSED in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo vs. Effect on the citizenship of an alien woman married Read: 1. Read: . three dissented. 23 Phil. It is true that in SANTOS vs. Aznar vs. 3.May 30. Republic. May 31. 238. HE WAS OBVIOUSLY NOT THE CHOICE OF THE PEOPLE OF BAGUIO CITY. The Vice Mayor of the City of Baguio shall be entitled to become the City Mayor instead of the private respondent.51 SCRA 248 2. Paredes. 1991 d. Said decision was supported by 8 members of the Court. 41 SCRA 292 to a Filipino citizen children 3. 1989 c. June 23. which is the more logical and democratic rule first announced in the 1912 case of Topacio vs. Who shall take the place of the petitioner then as the City Mayor of Baguio? Is the private respondent entitled to it? HE CANNOT FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT HE OBTAINED ONLY THE SECOND HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES IN THE ELECTION AND THEREFORE. Reyes vs. Re-examining said decision. Deportation Board. Comm.355 preside over them as the City Mayor of Baguio.1983 2. COMELEC. and was supported by ten (10) members of the Court without any dissent. in effect. two reserved their votes and one on leave. COMELEC. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege. b. Frivaldo vs. the Supreme Court held that in cases like this. 185 SCRA 703 1-a. the second placer shall take the place of the disqualified candidate since the latter was considered as noncandidate and all that he received are considered stray votes. Effect of naturalization of wife and minor Read: 1. COMELEC. Board of Commissioners vs. Burca vs. 137 SCRA 740 . Effect on the citizenship of a Filipino woman on her marriage to an alien. on Immigration. won by default. The probability that many of those who voted for him may have done so in the belief that he was qualified only strengthens the conclusion that the results of the elections cannot nullify the qualifications for the office now held by him. 136 SCRA 435. De la Rosa and William Gatchalian. COMELEC. Moy Ya Lim vs. The second placer.

Chan Teck Lao vs. 23 SCRA 559 3. 377 US 163 2. Republic vs. Republic. Rep. 115 SCRA 244 ********************************* . vs. 119 SCRA 1 5. 55 SCRA 1 5. Cokeng. Procedure for repatriation Read: 1. P vs. Cancellation of certificate of naturalization Read: 1. Cokeng. Republic vs.356 1. Schneider vs. vs. Guy. Tandayag. Avengoza. 34 SCRA 668 4. 117 SCRA 637 4. Rusk. Rep.