Trialogical processes…

“TRIALOGICAL” PROCESSES OF MEDIATION

THROUGH CONCEPTUAL ARTIFACTS

SAMI PAAVOLA(1,2) and KAI HAKKARAINEN(1)

(1) Centre for Research on Networked Learning and Knowledge Building, Department of
Psychology, University of Helsinki, P.O. Box 9 (Siltavuorenpenger 20 D), SF-00014
University of Helsinki, Finland

(2) Department of Philosophy, University of Helsinki

Please do not quote without permission from the authors

Correspondence concerning this paper should be sent to

Researcher Sami Paavola

Center for Research on Networked Learning and Knowledge Building
Department of Psychology
P.O. Box 9 (Siltavuorenpenger 20D),
00014 University of Helsinki
Tel.: +358-40-836 30 68
Fax: +358-9-19129443
E-mail: sami.paavola@helsinki.fi
1. Introduction

In research reports concerning innovative knowledge communities, the present

investigators have maintained that, besides the acquisition metaphor of learning and the
participation metaphor (Sfard 1998), one has to differentiate a knowledge-creation metaphor,
which focuses on the ways that new knowledge, practices, products, and so on are developed
systematically in long-term processes (Paavola, Lipponen & Hakkarainen 2002;
Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola, & Lehtinen, 2004). A defining character of the knowledge-
creation approach is to highlight the role of mediation in epistemology. This emphasis means
that intelligent activity in general, and knowledge creation in particular, are “trialogical”
processes that are organized around shared objects of activity. In the present paper, we first
delineate the three metaphors of learning. Then we briefly review three models of innovative
knowledge communities: Carl Bereiter's knowledge-building theory, Yrjö Engeström's model
of expansive learning, and Ikujiro Nonaka & Hirotaka Takeuchi's model of knowledge-
creating communities. We especially analyze the meaning of conceptual artifacts the grasp of
which is basic to the understanding of the epistemology of the knowledge-creation approach.
We delineate the aspects of trialogical, mediated activity by analyzing Charles S. Peirce’s
pragmatist and semiotic philosophy as a background for this research programme. We
compare this Peircean approach especially to Karl Popper’s ontology of three worlds, and
analyze concisely those elements of Peirce’s system that could be used for further developing
the Popperian idea of conceptual artifacts.

2. An Outline of Three Metaphors of Learning

Anna Sfard (1998; see also Lave & Wenger 1991; Rogoff, et al. 1996; Wenger 1998)
has distinguished two core metaphors of learning, i.e., two basic ways of understanding the
area of learning, the acquisition metaphor and the participation metaphor. The division is
very profound in terms of outlining two fundamentally diverging approaches to learning, one
emphasizing individual mental processes and another examining transmission of cultural
knowledge and competence from one generation to the next. The division is also rough
because the idea is that these two basic approaches can be seen to underlie manifold, various
models and theories of learning.

As we understand metaphors of learning, they may be considered to represent “ideal

types” (as used in sociology after Max Weber), i.e., they bring forth constellations of typical
features related to learning; but the exact combination of these features, or all of them, do not
have to be involved in any individual case. Ideal types present typical combinations of
features in a simplified, schematic way. More concrete approaches to learning can combine
these features in different degrees and different ways; approaches may also combine elements
from different metaphors. For example, classics of educational thinking (by Dewey, Piaget,
Vygotsky) are probably classics just because their theories have aspects from different
metaphors of learning; or at least they can be interpreted from various perspectives. But the
benefit from the metaphors (as ideal types) is that they highlight certain basic attitudes and
approaches towards learning. They concern not only learning but have clear affinities to ideas
about human cognition in general, for example to the debate between cognitivist vs. situated
perspective on human cognition and activity (see Anderson, Reder & Simon 1996; 1997;
Greeno 1997).

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 The acquisition view relies on the idea that knowledge is a property or characteristic
of an individual mind; an individual is the basic unit of knowing and learning. One version of
the acquisition view is the traditional cognitive approach that has highlighted the role of
mental models or schemata in learning (Gardner 1985, Neisser 1976), often without
recognizing the importance of environment or context at all (cf. Fodor 1981). So this
approach is easily connected to a 'folk theory' of mind according to which the mind is a
container of knowledge, and learning is a process that fills the container, implanting
knowledge there (Bereiter 2002). On the other hand, this metaphor appears to be connected
also with active, constructivistic theories of learning, that is, individualistic versions of
constructivism. The acquisition view emphasizes propositional knowledge and conceptual
knowledge structures; basic data are conveyed to the individual mind, and its constructive
process gives rise to such knowledge . Logically organized knowledge structures and
generalizable knowledge are seen as an ideal for intelligent activity. Humans can be seen as
symbol-processors. In many ways, this is a Cartesian view of human activity and
epistemology; knowledge is something that is processed inside the human mind with logical
means, and mind is seen as separated clearly from the material world and also from the
cultural and social environment (Fodor 1981).

An alternative approach, says Sfard, is the participation metaphor of learning,

according to which learning is an interactive process of participating in various cultural
practices and shared learning activities that structure and shape cognitive activity in many
ways, rather than something that happens inside individuals’ minds (see e.g., Lave 1988;
Lave & Wenger 1991; Brown, Collins, & Duguid 1989). Accordingly, learning is seen as a
process of becoming a member of a community and acquiring the skills to communicate and
act according to its socially negotiated norms. The focus of the participation view is on
activities, i.e., on ‘knowing’, and not so much on outcomes or products (i.e., on ‘knowledge’
in the traditional sense). Generalizable rules, or conceptual knowledge as such are not seen as
so important, rather the situated nature of human knowledge and cognition is emphasized.
Human activity is indexically bound to its social and material environment. Knowledge does
not exist either in a world of its own or in individual minds, but is an aspect of participation
in cultural practices. Cognition and knowing are distributed over both individuals and their
environments, and learning is ‘located’ in these relations and networks of distributed
activities of participation. Within the participation metaphor, learning is a matter of
participation in a social process of knowledge construction, ‘enculturation’, or 'legitimate
peripheral participation' (Lave & Wenger 1991).

The division of two basic metaphors of learning is very fundamental. Neither of them,
however, appears to be sufficient when addressing processes of deliberately creating and
advancing knowledge. Yet there are theories and models related to learning, which we call
theories of innovative knowledge communities, which explicitly emphasize innovative
aspects in relationship to learning and epistemology. The acquisition approach and the
participation approach can both be developed so that they take innovative aspects into
account, but it can be argued (as these theories of innovative knowledge communities do) that
this is not where these approaches are at their best, as we shall now elaborate. The acquisition
approach presupposes pre-given structures of knowledge that an individual learner is guided
to assimilate, or to construct. Although this process may involve creativity and elicit
emergence of new meaning connections, knowledge advancement has not been the main
focus on this metaphor. Within the frames of early cognitive science, intimately linked with
this metaphor, there have been valuable attempts to model and simulate processes of
scientific discovery (starting from e.g., Simon 1977). While these investigations have been

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illuminating in their own terms, these have very often, however, been narrowly focused on
searching through conceptual structures (Boden 2004; for criticism of this view, see
McDermott 1990). The role of social communities, larger networks, and research instruments
has been left outside of these frameworks. Increasing consideration of collaborative aspects
of knowledge creation (e.g., Okada & Simon 1997; Thagard 1999) has, however, somewhat
broadened the traditional cognitive view in these respects.

The participation approach, in turn, focuses on increased mastery of a community's

knowledge without a deliberate effort for transformation. This approach originally emerged
to conceptualize educational practices in aboriginal and traditional cultures, such as the
Mayan culture of the Yucatan Peninsula and tailor’s of the Ivory Coast (Lave & Wenger,
1991). Since the model focuses on adaptation to existing cultural practices, it does not prompt
one to pay any special attention to creative changes in these practices.

The theories of innovative knowledge communities are thus a basis for a third
approach of learning which we have called a knowledge-creation metaphor of learning
(Paavola et al., 2002; Hakkarainen et al., 2004). The acquisition view represents a
“monological” view on human cognition and activity, where important things are seen to
happen within the human mind, whereas the participation view represents a “dialogical” view
where the interaction with the culture and other people, but also with the surrounding
(material) environment is emphasized. The knowledge-creation view represents a
“trialogical” approach because the emphasis is not only on individuals or on community, but
on the way people collaboratively develop mediating artifacts (see Figure 1.).

The participation
The acquisition metaphor metaphor
(monological, (dialogical,
within mind approch) interaction approch)

The
knowledge-creation
metaphor (”trialogical”,
developing collaborative
shared objects and artifacts)

Figure 1. Three metaphors of learning

There are several models that depict learning and inquiry as a process of creating or
articulating knowledge rather than just assimilating existing knowledge or participating in
prevailing practices. Learning may be understood as a process of innovative inquiry where
the aim is progressively to expand one's knowledge and skills based on previous knowledge.
It is characteristic of this kind of knowledge advancement that it takes place within
innovative knowledge communities rather than only within individuals (although individuals

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with different skills have an important role, supported by cultural knowledge resources). We
set out three such models that emphasize creative aspects in knowledge advancement and
learning, i.e., Bereiter's theory of knowledge building, Nonaka and Takeuchi's theory of
knowledge creation, and Engeström's theory of expansive learning. A detailed analysis of
basic characteristics of these models of innovative knowledge communities (IKCs) in relation
to communities of practices has previously been presented (Hakkarainen, Paavola, &
Lipponen in press, and Hakkarainen et al., 2004). Table 1 presents an abstract description of
some basic features of the three metaphors of learning. Each one of the metaphors has its
distinct focus, theoretical assumptions, and units of analysis.

Table 1.
An Overview of the Ideal Typical Characters of the Three Metaphors of Learning
Knowledge Participation Knowledge creation
acquisition
Main focus A process of adopting A process of A process of creating and
or constructing subject- participating in social developing new material
matter knowledge and communities and conceptual artifacts
mental representations Enculturation, cognitive Conscious knowledge
socialization advancement, discovery,
and innovation
Norms, values, and
identities
Theoretical Theories of knowledge Situated and distributed Knowledge-creating
foundations structures and cognition organizations
schemata, Communities of practice Activity theory
Individual expertise Sociologically-oriented Knowledge-building
Traditional cognitivist epistemology theory
theories Epistemology of
Logically-oriented mediation
epistemology

Unit of Individuals Groups, communities, Individuals and groups

analysis networks, and cultures creating mediating
artifacts within cultural
settings

3. Trialogicality and Conceptual Artifacts in Models of innovative Knowledge

Communities

We maintain that one central feature in the knowledge-creation metaphor is mediation; or

“trialogicality”, which means that various models of innovative knowledge communities
depict how shared objects of activity are collaboratively formulated and developed by using
mediating tools, signs, and (conceptual and material) artifacts. Innovative knowledge
communities do not serve only individual learning or only social interaction; they are
organized around common objects of activity whose creation and development defines their
purpose. In the following, we analyze briefly three such models, that is, Bereiter's theory of

4
knowledge building, Engeström's theory of expansive learning, and Nonaka and Takeuchi's
theory of knowledge creation. These models have different basic assumptions and starting
points, so we are not maintaining that they are similar (of these differences see e.g. Bereiter
2002, 58, 175-185, 477; Engeström 1987, 46-49; Engeström 1999). But they all analyze how
systematic creation and development of something new operates. Next we will introduce
these models and examine especially the role of conceptualization and conceptual artifacts in
these models in relationship to the “trialogical” concept of development.

Knowledge-building Approach

Carl Bereiter's (Bereiter & Scardamalia 1993; Bereiter 2002; Scardamalia & Bereiter,
1991; 1994; Scardamalia, Bereiter, & Lamon, 1996) knowledge-building approach has
emerged from cognitive studies of literacy, intentional learning, and process aspects of
expertise. It has guided cognitive research on educational practices in a wide variety of
contexts, and, in substantial ways, has given birth to and shaped the research field of
computer-supported collaborative learning (knowledge building is in a central role in recent
reviews of edited volumes of CSCL research field, e.g., Lehtinen, Hakkarainen, Lipponen,
Rahikainen, & Muukkonen, 1999; Koschmann, Miyake, & Hall, 2002; Wasson, Ludvigsen,
& Hoppe, 2003). In the background of this model are observations, according to which some
children are expert-like learners in the sense that, in learning situations, they set up
themselves similar kinds of challenging tasks as experts do, even if they do not have experts'
knowledge (Bereiter & Scardamalia, 1993). They orient themselves in learning situations in a
way that makes a problem more complex and, at the same time, maximizes their learning and
knowledge advancement. Empirical observations indicate that such knowledge-building goals
may characterize not only individuals but also communities. Bereiter (2002) characterized
knowledge-building processes that involve working at the edge of one's competence,
progressively setting up higher standards of performance, and seeking collective knowledge
advancement beyond individual learning. Relying on Whitehead's notion of disciplined
progress, Bereiter argued that setting up of a community that is deliberately focused on going
beyond the limits of existing knowledge, is essential to knowledge creation.

Bereiter's theory of knowledge building uses Karl Popper's (1972) distinction of three
basic realms as its starting point. According to Popper, besides physical and material reality
(World 1) and the reality of mental states (World 2), there is third realm (World 3) which
encompasses conceptual entities, such as theories and ideas. The important point is that
human beings do not operate only in the mental realm; within their culture, they understand
and develop objects belonging to the third realm (World 3). Although World 3 is dependent
on World 2 and World 1, it is still quite autonomous in relationship to these two. Bereiter
argues that prevalent epistemology and mainstream theories of learning are generally too
mentalistic and individualistic; they do not usually take into account the fundamental
significance of World 3. They are still based on the mind-as-a-container metaphor. Learning
is seen as an accumulation of ready-made information to the human mind, where mind is
understood as a kind of archive (this folk epistemological notion is close to the acquisition
metaphor of learning discussed above). This kind of learning, argues Bereiter, should be
replaced by deliberate activity for building knowledge together, which means collaborative
efforts to create, develop, understand, and criticize various conceptual artifacts, that is,
objects in World 3.

It is characteristic of knowledge communities to produce knowledge objects, such as

theories or designs, which have a permanent value and occupy Popper's (1972) World 3.

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Bereiter calls these objects conceptual artifacts. These artifacts are a kind of knowledge
object can be shared, articulated, and extended by relying on the cognitive resources of the
whole community. These artifacts, are conceptual in the sense of being abstract and non-
material in nature, having, simultaneously, tool-like characteristics (Ilyenkov, 1977).
Conceptual artifacts have histories; they have been created, developed, further articulated and
used to create new artifacts. Rather than providing a means to perform concrete actions, such
as drilling, hammering, or welding things, conceptual artifacts help to explain and predict
phenomena. Bereiter (2002) argued that an increasing proportion of human work focuses on
conceptual artifacts rather than physical things. Knowledge work is thus conceptualized as
work that focuses on advancing and articulating conceptual artifacts and adding to their
value. Knowledge organizations and scientific research communities produce new knowledge
and understanding through criticizing, extending, elaborating, and transforming such
knowledge objects. The central aim of these communities is not only to learn something but
to collaboratively develop new ideas, methods, theories, models, and so on, that then become
available for subsequent use. A central aspect of Bereiter’s and his colleagues' work has been
to develop collaborative “knowledgeware” technologies to facilitate building and sharing
conceptual artifacts in education and workplaces.

Expansive Learning Model

Yrjö Engeström's theory of expansive learning is strongly rooted in the tradition of

cultural-historical activity theory (see e.g., Engeström, Miettinen, & Punamäki 1999). It is not
easy to describe this model briefly because of its cross-disciplinary and multifarious nature.
Engeström forcefully criticizes mentalistic or ‘Cartesian’ approaches to learning and
expertise (e.g., Engeström 1987). Learning is one form of human activity. It is based on
actions in collective activity systems that take place within larger socio-historical contexts.
The meanings of mediating artifacts (tools and signs) and activities are emphasized. Learning
is an ‘activity-producing activity’ and ‘mastery of expansion from actions to a new activity’,
i.e., a central aim in learning is to produce new forms of activities (Engeström 1987, 125).
Learning is based on expansive cycles of development.

One way of describing this cycle in an ideal-typical way is the following scheme
focusing on organizational learning (Engeström 1999b, p. 383-4). The cycle starts by 1)
individual subjects questioning and criticizing of some accepted practices; which is followed
by 2) analyzing the situation, i.e., analysis of those (historical) causes and empirical inner
relations that are involved in the activity system in question. Then participants engage in 3)
modeling a new solution to the problematic situation. And they are 4) examining the new
model, experimenting and seeing how it works, and what potentialities and limitations it has.
Participants undertake 5) implementing the new model in practical action and applications,
and then, 6) reflecting on and evaluating the process. Finally, participants engage in 7)
consolidating the new practice into some new pattern. Knowledge-creation is addressed in the
model in the form of new practices that emerge through achieving a collective zone of
proximal development by adopting, socio-culturally, the most advanced practices within a
community.

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 7. Consolidating
the new practice

2a. Historical analysis

2b Actual-empirical analysis
6. Reflecting on
the process

1. Questioning
3. Modeling
the new solution

5. Implementing the
new model

4. Examining the new

solution

Figure 2.
Expansive learning cycle (adopted from Engeström, 1999b)

Activity theory emphasizes material artifacts and practices instead of conceptual

artifacts and meanings. But there are linkages: It is to be noted that in activity theory,
communication mediated by signs and activity mediated by tools are not in contrast with each
other, but they are both aspects of the mediated activity (Engeström 1999a, 23-24). A
dynamic approach to understanding relations between “logos” and “praxis” is involved in
Marx Wartofsky’s (1979) historical epistemology that is one of the main sources of
Engeström's activity theory. Wartofsky argued that structures that constrain and guide human
perception and action are not universal and unchangeable – as assumed by Kant – but
products of human history, being continuously created and transformed by us. He argued that
modes of cognitive praxis are subject to historical development and that "human beings
create the means of their own cognition" (p. xv). His central idea is that cognitive artifacts
profoundly change the nature of humans' epistemic activity in general, and learning in
particular, so that "artifact is to cultural evolution what the gene is to biological evolution"
(Wartofsky 1979, p. 205). Cognitive artifacts constitute means for “creating and acquiring
knowledge” (p. xv) by providing a vehicle for constructing (internal and external)
representations. A central thesis of Wartofsky's historical epistemology is that higher forms
of representation, exemplified by scientific theories or works of art, can be seen to have
evolved from those modes of representation that are related to our primary productive, social,
and linguistic practices. He stated that by producing artifacts, such as tools and weapons,
human beings transform both nature and themselves. The use of more advanced artifacts
presupposes language, as well as requiring and giving rise to specific forms of social
organization and human interaction.

Wartofsky (1979) separated several levels of artifacts from one another. Primary
artifacts are tools and practices directly used in human labor and other activities. Secondary
artifacts, in turn, are “symbolic externalizations” or “objectifications” (p. 201) of primary
artifacts. These artifacts are models or representations of types of activities involved in the
primary ones used in preserving and transmitting the acquired skills, modes of action or

7
practices of production (p. 201). He also clarified that these artifacts "are not 'in the mind' as
mental entities" (p. 202), but are externally embodied in socially shared practices, social
organizations, and culturally shared ideas, such as social representation (Moscovici, 2000) or
Bereiterian knowledge objects. Wartofsky distinguished, further, tertiary artifacts (p. 208-
209) that mediate relations between primary and secondary artifacts. The tertiary artifacts are
derived and abstracted from secondary artifacts so that they no longer have a direct
representational function; they are important sources of change and transformation because
they represent visions, anticipated changes and possibilities that may be used to change the
world.

Knowledge-creating organizations

We maintain that Ikujiro Nonaka and Hirotaka Takeuchi's (1995) model of

organizational knowledge creation is also a trialogical model that represents the knowledge-
creation metaphor of learning although mediation is not so explicit in it. This model also
describes how shared objects are collaboratively developed, and something new created.
Nonaka & Takeuchi’s book presents a model, by analyzing various cases, which depicts how
Japanese companies became so successful after World War Two. Their main interest is not in
investigation of learning or inquiry as such, yet, they are modeling very similar
epistemological processes. They start with a criticism of the dominant Western tradition in
epistemology that one-sidedly emphasizes conceptual and explicit knowledge (which can
lead to “paralysis by analysis”). This has resulted in a Cartesian split between subject and
object, and between mind and body. Processes of creating knowledge have been neglected,
because the understanding of these processes, according to Nonaka and Takeuchi's model,
requires interaction between explicit and tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge, which is of
central importance in innovation, means personal knowledge and beliefs embedded in
individual experience.

Figure 3 presents a ‘knowledge spiral’ (i.e. the spiral of knowledge creation) based on
four alternative forms of knowledge conversion (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995, p. 62-73), i.e., a)
from tacit knowledge to tacit knowledge, which Nonaka and Takeuchi call socialization
(learning to understand tacit knowledge through participating in an expert community), b)
from tacit to explicit knowledge i.e., externalization (transforming tacit knowledge in a
public form), c) from explicit to explicit knowledge, i.e., combination (synthesizing expert
knowledge), and d) from explicit to tacit knowledge, i.e., internalization (learning to master
expert knowledge through sustained practices).

Tacit Tacit

Socialization Externalization
Tacit

Explicit
Explicit
Tacit

Internalization Combination

Explicit Explicit

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 Figure 3.
Knowledge spiral (adopted from Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995)

The authors propose that such creation involves passing through several ‘ontological’
levels, i.e., individual, group, organizational, and inter-organizational levels in order to be
effective for all people and for a whole organization. According to Nonaka and Takeuchi,
knowledge is created and transformed ‘spirally’ from the individual level to the
organizational level and finally between organizations. In Table 2, the models of
innovative knowledge communities are compared.

Table 2.
Three Trialogical Models of Innovative Knowledge Communities
C. Bereiter (2002): Y. Engeström (1987): I. Nonaka & H.
Takeuchi (1995):
Knowledge building Expansive learning
Organizational
knowledge creation
(Dynamically Conceptual artifacts Activity systems; Products (cars,
developed) practices baking machines,
object of activity etc.)
Basis for External and Tools, signs, artifacts Explicit knowledge
mediated action collaboratively that is externalized
developed conceptual from tacit
artifacts knowledge
Basic process Creation and Expansive Tacit knowledge is
development of transformation of externalized to
knowledge objects disturbances and explicit knowledge
practices within the
activity system

Role of Conceptual artifacts are Conceptual artifacts Interaction between

conceptual the main focus of are developed and tacit knowledge and
artifacts and activities transformed as a part explicit, conceptual
conceptualizatio of activities and knowledge as a
n practices source of
innovation

4. A Peircean, Trialogical Approach to Mediated Activity

In the following, we would like to take a closer look at the epistemological

foundations of IKCs (i.e. innovative knowledge communities) in terms of assessing these
foundations in the light of Charles S. Peirce’s philosophy, and themes that we see as related
to Peircean philosophy of mediation. We believe that Peirce’s philosophy elicits deeper
understanding of trialogical processes that, accordingly to our interpretation, can be seen in
the background of these models. It may also guide one to overcome certain epistemological
and ontological problems involved in conceptual mediation. A Peircean/Popperian approach
to mediation was also distinguished by Yrjö Engeström (1987, 37-73) as one lineage parallel

9
to cultural-historical activity theory, although he interpreted it to be more individualistic in
nature than we would like to assume. Due to the complexity of Peirce’s approach we cannot
go into detail, but only give a few preliminary suggestions of how his system and these
themes assist in understanding mediated, trialogical processes.

We have structured our analysis as follows. Firstly, we will examine connections of

Peirce’s and Popper’s philosophy to Engelbart’s “augmentationist” movement relying on
Skagestad’s (1993; 1999) thought-provoking articles. After that, we will explore the
distinctive character of those (trialogical) entities, development of which is the main focus on
the models of IKC. Thirdly, we will analyze the role of material and conceptual aspects of
artifacts. The fourth aspect of our analysis is to examine implications of Peirce theory of
abduction for models of IKCs. Finally, we will discuss educational implication of the
trialogical approach in relation to models of IKCs.

External Artifacts and Technological Augmentation of Knowledge Creation

Skagestad (1993) pointed out that philosophers have mainly been interested in the
artificial-intelligence (AI) revolution while revolutions concerning personal (and we would
like to add collective) computing that promise to amplify human thinking have been ignored.
A starting point of Skagestad’s analysis concerning analogies between Popper’s and Peirce’s
philosophies is Engelbart’s (1962, Rheingold, 1985) augmentationist framework according to
which human intelligence develops through the evolution of external symbolic artifacts rather
than within a human head (Skagestad 1993, see Donald 1991; 2001 for similar argument
concerning cognitive evolution). In a similar manner, Peirce attributed mind to various
external artifacts, and he considered artifacts to amplify human thought. It is not difficult to
see how relevant Popper’s evolutionarily motivated analyses are in this regard

“Human evolution proceeds, largely, by developing new organs outside our bodies and
persons: ’exosomatically’, as biologist call it, or ‘extra-personally’. These new organs are
tools, or weapon, or machines, or houses.” (Popper, 1972, p. 238, quoted by Skagestad,
1993).

It is also interesting that years before the rise of personal computers, Popper gave a
distinctive value to pencils and computers as specialized tools for deliberate manipulation of
World 3 objects (Skagestad, 1993). The augmentationist programme goes well with
Wartofsky’s (1979) historical epistemology (see above) where the role of artifacts and
representations in human evolution is emphasized, and more generally, with the Vygotskyan
tradition which emphasizes the mediated nature of human activity with tools and signs.

For present day learning researchers, Engelbart’s visionary image concerning

augmentation of human cognition through information and communication technologies
(ICTs) represents “business as usual”; yet what is striking, in our view, is that he had the
ability to see so far, more that 40 years ago, without either personal computers nor knowledge
of Vygotskian nor Popperian traditions (as far as we know). Moreover, we could distinguish
between first-generation augmentionist approaches that focus on facilitating personal
computing and second-generation approaches that aim at revolutionarizing collective
computing in terms of networking and knowledge sharing. It is unclear to what extent
Engelbart considered computers as collaborative tools; it appears, however, that he
emphasized more personal than collective augmentation (see Skagestad, 1993; 1999).

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 The knowledge-building approach reviewed above emerged from Marlene
Scardamalia and Carl Bereiter’s (1991; 1992; 1994) pioneering efforts to apply cognitive-
science research on learning to implement a second-generation augmentationist program in
education and workplaces. Their approach did not become feasible before the emergence of
network technology in 80s. A great deal of their effort was invested to develop sophisticated
collaborative tools that supported agents and their communities in joint working for building
and sharing of their knowledge. Knowledge Forum (www.learn.motion.com) and
corresponding knowledge-building technologies provide tools for scaffolding students in
creation or elaboration of their shared ideas and thoughts within networked databases,
thereby making these ‘knowledge objects’ available for others to work on and further
articulate. These environments appear to involve a trialogical element in respect of
organizing activity around advancement and further elaboration of the shared knowledge
objects. Actually, observations concerning the trialogical nature of learning processes
supported by technology were the initial, empirical foundation for the development of
knowledge-building approach (see Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1991). When skillfully used,
sophisticated knowledge-building environments tend to move students’ own ideas into the
center rather than the periphery of discussion with valuable educational implications
(Scardamalia, 1999). These technologies engage students in long-standing work to develop
their shared ideas and thoughts; this engagement appears to have revolutionary educational
implications whose fruitfulness are independent from ultimate epistemological justification of
Popperian philosophy.

Re-interpretable Nature of Knowledge Objects

All models of IKC highlight the role of mediating artifacts in knowledge creation.
While interpretations concerning the nature of these objects varies from one model to
another, all of them appear to acknowledge dynamic processes of creating, developing and
further articulating these objects. This constantly transforming aspect of conceptual artifacts
was something that Bereiter (2002) highlighted.

Skagestad (1993; 1999) proposed that in terms of being subject to iterative

articulation, the entities of Popper’s World 3 come rather close to Peirce’s notion of sign.
There is not necessarily an exact match here, but that Popperian knowledge objects share
essential characteristics with signs. A central feature of signs, according to Peirce, is that they
are something capable of being (re)interpreted. Similar to signs, the entities in Popper’s
World 3 are human made and external (in relationship to human mind) and at the same time
carriers of meaning. The constant process of re-interpretation was the basis of Peirce’s
dynamic theory of meaning:

“Finally, no present actual thought (which is a mere feeling) has any meaning, any intellectual
value; for this lies not in what is actually thought, but in what this thought may be connected
with in representation by subsequent thoughts; so that the meaning of a thought is altogether
something virtual. … At no one instant in my state of mind is there cognition or
representation, but in the relation of my states of mind at different instants there is. (Peirce
CP, 5.289; Skagestad, 1999, 554)

In this regard collaborative technologies that store various steps of one’s inquiries for latter
individual and collective reflection provide valuable amplification of knowledge creation.

A basic assumption of trialogicality is an assumption that IKCs are communities

organized around systematic advancement of shared objects. A central basis for

11
”trialogicality” is Peirce’s model of three-placed sign relations. Even conceptual
representations need to be in an indexical relation to their object in order to be
understandable. In Peirce’s theory of signs, these indexical objects are some sort of common
ground that makes interaction possible (in order to understand signs created by others, we
have to understand to what shared objects those are referring). In models of IKC, these
objects are artifact-like; i.e., these objects have been shaped by human activity (whether they
are conceptual artifacts, practices, institutions or material entities) (cf. Wartofsky 1979, p.
206). Simultaneously, the concept of artifact implies that these objects have thing-like
characteristics: People cannot, in utter freedom, shape and transform these objects; but they
exist as ”things” that constrain and simultaneously enable human activity. Vygotsky said of
this kind of dialectical approach, “while admitting the influence of nature on man, [it] asserts
that man, in turn, affects nature and creates through his changes in nature, new natural
conditions for his existence” (Vygotsky 1978, 60; see also Miettinen 2001, 301; Skagestad
1993). A central aspect of the knowledge-creation metaphor is that approaches involved are
focused on modelling how collaborative advancement of such artifact-like objects and
mediating artifacts actually takes place.

According to Peirce’s semiotics, signs are interpreted within social, future-oriented

processes. Peircean signs might be simplistically interpreted, so that they are processed by
individuals; but this would not be in accordance with his profound emphasis on the social
character of inquiry. These concepts of Peirce harmonize with those of Skagestad's (1993)
program. Skagestad emphasized that signs have the character of external artifacts and may be
materially embodied. Peircean sign theory holds that all thinking is dialogical and has its
basis on communication (Ransdell 2003, see also Cunningham 1998). The collective nature
of re-interpretability of signs stems from the fact they usually are in form of external artifacts.
This implies an assumption, shared by models of IKCs, that human thinking does not merely
happen in the brain, but involves use of external objects and tools, which include conceptual
artifacts and other signs. Peirce explicitly resisted the reduction of mind to processes
happening in the brain:

“ … the psychologists undertake to locate various mental powers in the brain; and above all
consider it as quite certain that the faculty of language resides in a certain lobe; but I believe it
comes decidedly nearer the truth (though not really true) that language resides in the tongue.
In my opinion it is much more true that the thoughts of a living writer are in any printed copy
of his book than that they are in his brain.” (Peirce CP 7.364)

This statement follows from Peirce’s semiotic model of mind, “in which cognition is
construed as the development of internal or external signs, and not as a succession of
conscious states of mind” (Skagestad 1999, 554).

Relations Between Material and Conceptual Aspects of Cultural Entities

While re-interpretability of cultural entities being subject to knowledge creation (i.e.,

trialogical entities) is something that is clearly similar across models of IKCs, there is
considerably more controversy concerning the role of conceptual and material dimensions of
artifacts. While Peirce’s approach has important similarities to Popper’s idea of three worlds,
his approach is a way to alleviating Popper’s overemphasis of conceptual realm. Popperian
ontology separates conceptual and material aspects of inquiry too strictly from each other;
conceptual entities appear to completely command their own territory that is isolated from the
“matrix of materiality”. For instance, investigators working within the frames of actor-
network theory (ANT, Latour, 1993; 1999; Tuomi, 2002) has problematized a strict dividing

12
line between material and conceptual entities. They argue that natural kinds are being
domestigated through genetic manipulation and artificial breeding. Moreover, nature and
culture are intermixed in terms of gene synthesizers, ozone holes or databanks. Artifacts are
not only material, but knowledge-laden entities that embody more and more intelligence, self-
organize, and are becoming ever more autonomous in nature so that it even does not sound
wierd to talk about “artificial life” (cf., Stutt & Motta, 1998). Such a process of integration of
conceptual and material aspects in artifacts is called hybridization. It appears that knowledge-
building technology, in itself, is a child of hybridization. Communities of students are not
only playing with Platonic ideas but creating, interacting with, sharing, and discussing digital
artifacts (with certain physical embodiments determining their visual-symbolic appearance).

We propose that Peirce’s philosophy provides epistemological and ontological tools

for dealing with hybridization and returning conceptual artifacts to the sphere of materiality
to an appropriate degree. In terms of his universal categories, Peirce identified three aspects
of reality that are simultaneously always present; “Firstness”, i.e. things in themselves
(representing for example raw feelings and vague impressions), “Secondness”, i.e. things
related to some other things (like reactions and actuality), and “Thirdness”, i.e. things
mediating between some other things (for example symbolic generalizations and abstractions)
(see e.g., Peirce, CP 8.328). Whereas Popperian ontology, we argue, separates various aspects
of reality too strictly from each other; the interaction of them is emphasized by Peirce and
Wartofsky. The argument below is that transitions and transformations between these levels
(across material and conceptual entities) have an essential role in knowledge creation.

These rather abstract categories show their strengths when connected with a very
versatile theory of signs by Peirce. He separates three types of signs, i.e., icons, indices, and
symbols. Signification through resembling the object is characteristic of icons. Firstness is
dominant in icons; they represent in themselves important aspects of the object (like
footprints can represent the characteristics of the sole of the shoe). Indices, in turn, are signs
representing actual spatio-temporal physical connections with the object; secondness is
dominant in them (like footprints are indices of those creatures or things which have caused
them). Signification through generalizing interpretations is distinctive for symbols. Symbols
require Thirdness due to the existence of mediating rules that determine interpretation of
them (the talk about footprints and clues can be signs that we are referring to traditional
detective novels). Signs in themselves are typical examples of Thirdness (where mediation is
essential).

According to Peirce, signs themselves are related to “interpretants” (which are

second-order signs, or sign effects) but also to “objects” (to which signs refer or which they
represent). In this sense, signs do not constitute a separate conceptual realm, but are
connected, from the start, to the (material) world. Peirce also maintained that in order to
understand symbolic (or conceptual) signs, the utterer and the interpreter have to refer
(indexically) to some common ground. So, as an example; if someone shouts “There is a
fire!”, it is not understandable if we do not know where this utterance points to (to the real
world around us, to the fictional world, or to somewhere else) (see Peirce CP 2.305; Bergman
2004, 416-429). The triadic character of signs (in Peirce’s theory) is one important source for
our notion or idea of “trialogue”; according to which mediated activity within innovative
knowledge communities is related, both towards shared objects of activity and towards
collaborative activities and interpretations.

According to Peirce’s famous maxim of pragmatism (Peirce CP 5.402; CP 5.9; CP

5.212; CP 6.490), the meaning of concepts is essentially connected to the practical

13
consequences of the concept. Signs can have different kinds of effects; emotional
interpretants (i.e., feelings that the sign brings about), energetic interpretants (i.e., actions), or
logical interpretants (i.e., rational meanings) (see Bergman 2000, 62-66). So according to
Peirce’s theory, signs do not just have logical and conceptual meanings and consequences but
also connection to our practical activities. But not simply practical activities as such, but
activities that are guided by iteration, that are repeated, forming routines and patterns:

“According to that logical doctrine which the present writer [Peirce] first formulated in 1873
and named Pragmatism, the true meaning of any product of the intellect lies in whatever
unitary determination it would impart to practical conduct under any and every conceivable
circumstance.” (Peirce CP 6.490)

We maintain that this means trialogicality; within the Peircean framework, practical action is
important when it is guided by (collaborative) reflection and development.

The above analysis indicated that conceptual aspects of artifacts cannot be separated
from material ones; in this regard all artifacts are hybrids and involve, in parallel, all levels of
knowing, as identified by Peirce’s universal categories. So it can be maintained that the
Popperian approach does not provide a sufficiently rich theory of meaning to understand
trialogical entities that models of IKCs are focusing on. While acknowledging the
weaknesses of Popper’s worlds, it may be appropriate to point out that somewhat fashionable
criticism of Popperian ontology only seldom relies on in-depth scholarship concerning
Popper’s own thinking. In this regard we found Skagestad’s (1993) interpretation of Popper’s
World 3 notable. According to his reading of Popper, World 3 does not only involve
“objective thought contents” but also journals and books as physical objects; i.e., media
considered as “autonomous carriers of meaning.” An interpretation according to which
Popperian knowledge objects are merely ideal in nature may be a simplification.

What is missing from Popper’s approach is an analysis of the epistemic role of

physical embodiment of World 3 entities that appears to have non-trivial implications for
knowledge creation (Skagestad, 1993). This is apparent, for instance, in the difference
between Arabic and Roman numbers in doing complex calculations. In a Peircean
framework, physical embodiments of conceptual artifacts have essential epistemological
implications, not only their conceptual content (Skagestad 1993, 1999; see also Wartofsky
1979, 209). Peirce and many other researchers, such as Richard Feynman (see Gruber &
Wallace, 1999, p. 94), went through great pains to develop visual-graphical notations that
would better amplify their reasoning. Scardamalia and Bereiter (1992) have themselves
explicitly addressed affordances provided by various knowledge media for creative cognitive
efforts in learning and knowledge advancement.

Abductive Generation of Novel Ideas

Epistemology of cultural entities has significant implications for understanding how

novel ideas and new knowledge come about. It appears that knowledge and innovations
cannot be created out of conceptual knowledge alone. Peirce’s epistemology does not rely on
a ”closed” rationalist system or mere conceptual reality, but guides one to search for
symbolic connections with ”weaker” sign relations (i.e., indexical and iconic sign relations,
and also connections with reasoning modes that are “weaker” than deduction (i.e., inductive
reasoning and especially abduction) (discussed in Nesher, 2001). While conceptual artifacts
have an essential role in knowledge creation, knowledge cannot be advanced merely through
elaborating conceptual ideas. In many cases, new ideas emerge through articulating fuzzy

14
intuitions (Firstness) or trying something out at practical level (Secondness), so that there is
continuous interaction between the levels of knowing. These ideas are strongly underscored
in Engeström's activity theory that draws attention to how "object-oriented actions are
always, explicitly or implicitly, characterized by ambiguity, surprise, interpretation, sense
making, and potential for change" (2001, p. 135).

Knowledge creation relies on human interaction with environments through which

emerge elements that guide the quest for novelty. Peirce emphasizes reason and
conceptualization in human thinking but not one-sidedly; beyond reasoning, basic elements
of Peircean epistemology are perception and activity (or practices). Perception and activity,
iconic and indexical sign relations and abductive reasoning provide elements that constitute
the basis for expanding prevailing conceptions and models. This is in accordance with
Vygotsky’s (1978, 26) thinking: “this unity of perception, speech, and action … constitutes
the central subject matter for any analysis of the origin of uniquely human forms of
behavior.”

Peirce’s abduction is a form of inference where new ideas and hypotheses are
searched for on the basis of clue-like signs and phenomena (see Paavola, in press a; b). The
starting point for abduction is a set of puzzling or anomalous phenomena (clues for the
detective) and the inquirer’s aim is to find an idea or a solution that is congruent with the
overall pattern of information (Hanson, 1965, 1972; Paavola, in press). And the solution need
not come at once; various clues and pieces of information can help to delimit the search
before a satisfactory solution is reached. Abduction is a form of ampliative inference because
the aim is to transcend the existing data by finding an idea that explains these data. Abduction
may also be described as reasoning backwards, because in its basic form one starts from some
effects (puzzling phenomena) and searches for a cause or explanation for these effects.
Typical examples are, besides a detective searching for an explanation for mysterious
phenomena, a physician searching for the cause of a set of symptoms, or a scientist seeking a
theory to explain her data. Peirce (1931-1958, Volume 5, § 145) even claimed that all the
ideas of science have come through abduction, because deduction and induction cannot
originate any idea.

These abductive processes can be interpreted so that they happen inside the human
mind, but, in more realistic models concerning actual practices of inquiry, they are part of
collaborative knowledge building on the basis of externally represented signs and conceptual
artifacts. In a Peircean framework, conceptions refer, simultaneously, indexically to reality
independent from us as well as collaborative interpretations of these conceptions. Our
conceptions are not only in dialogue with fellow inquirers or with the object of inquiry but
always in relation to both of these poles. Accordingly, conceptions refer to the reality of an
object in parallel with being in relation of shared interpretions of these conceptions.

Individual-community Dialectics in Knowledge Creation

We would like to note one more point that does not directly emerge from Peirce’s
philosophy. This concerns the agents of knowledge creations. All models of IKCs include the
notion that knowledge creation is a fundamentally social process in nature. Innovations are
co-constructed and emerge among rather than within people. This process, however,
presupposes highly developed cognitive competencies of the participants as well as a
complex system of supporting artifacts (Hakkarainen, 2003; Hakkarainen et al., 2004).
Participation in this kind of process is also likely to produce corresponding competencies.
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) argued that the individual is at the heart of the knowledge

15
creation process because new ideas emerge only through cognitive efforts of individual
persons. An individual is, however, a black box for Nonaka and Takeuchi. They emphasized
the almost unlimited creative capacity of human beings, but did not have anything to say
about the role of an individual person's expertise in the process of knowledge creation.
Because a fundamental cornerstone of knowledge creation is to enrich and deepen the
knowledge of participating agents, it is important to know how they can develop tacit
knowledge that would facilitate the creation of new explicit knowledge (Bereiter, 2002).
Nonaka and colleagues do not answer this question, one that is very essential from the
educational viewpoint. They arguably give too little attention to the fact that an adequate
conceptual understanding is needed in order to make full use of the human capacity to
generate new ideas from bodily experiences or fuzzy feelings.

Bereiter and Scardamalia (in press) have an articulated theory of knowledge-creating

individuals. They argue that knowledge creation requires participants to move from belief
mode to design mode. The belief mode indicates an orientation in which an agent considers
whether beliefs he or she is dealing with are sufficiently plausible and well-justified to be
believed in. These beliefs are, however, taken as given entities. Design mode, in contrast,
involves active relation to knowledge objects as entities that can be used for certain purpose
and that can be further articulated an improved. Knowledge creation, further, calls for special
kind of agency, i.e. epistemic agency (Scardamalia, 2002). Distinctive in this kind of agency
is the assumption of responsibility for advancing collective knowledge rather than mere
pursuit of personal learning agenda. Epistemic agency develops through working at the edge
of one’s competence and overcoming emerging challenges. It involves co-evolution between
individuals and collectives (Hakkarainen, 2003; Hakkarainen et al, 2004).

Conclusion

Each model of IKC is intended to answer, in its own way, to the challenge of
organizing collaborative work for developing a shared object. These approaches try to model
how to search for something that does not yet exist, i.e., how earlier knowledge can be
progressively surpassed, how prevailing knowledge may be transformed to corresponding
requirements of changed environment, and how novelty and innovations can be pursued.
IKCs focus both on developing mediating artifacts and reflecting their own activities. Models
of IKC intend in various ways to overcome Cartesian dualism by emphasizing mediation and
mediated artifacts as the basis of human activity. Activity theory, stemming from Vygotsky
has emphasized the role of cultural artifacts as a unit of analysis for overcoming Cartesian
boundaries:

“the basic unit of analysis now overcame the split between the Cartesian individual and the
untouchable societal structure. The individual could no longer be understood without his or
her cultural means; and the society could no longer be understood without the agency of
individuals who use and produce artifacts” (Engeström 1999b; see also 1999a).

An essential aspect of the quest of novelty is that the object of activity changes and gets
specified only in the process of activity (see Engeström 1999b, 381; Fleck 1935). The
knowledge-creation metaphor aims at grasping learning in which tools, objects, and processes
may be transformed during the course of activity and become substantially developed.

The above analysis is a basis for our argument according to which Peircean
pragmatism and semiotics highlight the fundamental role of mediation in human activity in a
way that fits relatively well together with the Vygotskian tradition. Peirce’s approach

16
provides auxiliary conceptual tools for understanding foundations of trialogical models of
knowledge creation. So it appears important to further develop Peircean epistemology toward
emphasizing mediation and collaboration and apply tools provided by it to understand and
develop trialogical models of knowledge-creation. In this enterprise, interaction and
comparison between the models of IKCs appear to provide a heuristic support.

The above examination indicates that Popper’s ontology emphasizes conceptual

entities, but without sufficient connections to material realm. As we see it, Peirce’s
metaphysics could be a way of developing Popper’s distinction further. We believe that
through Peircean re-interpretation it is possible to save the rational core of Popper world of
cultural knowledge, break the boundaries of conceptual knowledge, appreciate weaker forms
of rationality together with conceptualization, as well as connect these with social practices.
We believe that this project will help transform psychology according to the intentions of the
Bereiterian knowledge-building approach: Popper said,

“I suggest that one day we will have to revolutionarize psychology by looking at the human mind as
an organ for interacting with the objects of the third world [World 3]; for understanding them.
Contributing to them, participating in them; and for bringing them to bear on the first world [World
1].” (Popper 1972, 156)

The paradigm-shifting implications concerning cognitive sciences are there regardless of

scholarly disputes concerning the ontological status of Popperian entities.

We may compress the above arguments into the following central features that
characterize trialogical epistemology of the models of IKCs:

1. IKCs are organized around shared objects of activity (trialogical entities) that can
be conceptual artifacts, practices, or concrete products;

2. While objects of inquiry have conceptual aspects, these are always hybrids in
nature in being physically embodied (e.g., in visual-symbolic form or as a
knowledge-laden artifact, or in activities);

3. Objects of (trialogical) activity can be endlessly re-interpreted and articulated

iteratively in many ways. Digital technologies in this regard provide valuable new
resources;

4. Knowledge creation takes place across extended time scales and requires
sustained and long-standing working for the advancement of the objects of
inquiry;

5. Objects of inquiry have thing-like characteristics that constrain and guide their
elaboration and articulation; i.e., the objects cannot be developed freely but have
properties or affordances that support certain uses and purposes;

6. Knowledge-creation does not only involve symbolic processes (Thirdness) but

also fuzzy and vague feelings (Firstness) and resistance encountered in practical
experimentation (Secondness) that may, in turn, bring new conceptualizations
about. Novel ideas emerge through interaction and transformations across these
levels of knowing;

17
 7. Knowledge creation involves, in parallel, both dialogue with nature (in the form of
exploration and practical experimentation) and dialogue with research collective
(shared, collaborative interpretations guiding and constraining inquiries);

8. Knowledge creation relies on knowledge-laden tools and instruments,

representing in a compressed form knowledge and experience of other IKCs, that
can be productively utilized as resources without detailed knowledge of processed
involved in their creation (Tuomi, 2002);

9. Collaborative “knowledgeware” technologies are specifically designed for

amplifying trialogical processes of working with shared objects of inquiry. This
may take place through creating environments that are structured around shared
spaces for creating and storing, sharing and discussing digital artifacts.

10. The physical embodiment of artifacts has non-trivial psychological implications in

respect of providing certain affordances and scaffolding certain types of thinking
processes.

The present inquiry not only serves theoretical purposes but is closely connected with
our intention to elicit processes of learning and knowledge-creation in education and
workplaces. In this regard, trialogicality appears to provide valuable resources for
understanding learning from a novel perspective. When adequately supported, learning is not
a mental process for storing knowledge within human mind, but happens within the frame of
progressive inquiry involving collaborative processes for advancing shared objects
(Hakkarainen et al., 2004). These objects may be concrete artifacts, but significant learning
gains presuppose, also, processes of advancing conceptual artifacts. Progressive inquiry is not
a group working method in the spirit of social constructivism; various methods (e.g., a
thought provoking lecture as well as participation in group activities) may be used to support
trialogical processes involved. The defining attribute of this kind of a process is sustained
object-oriented work for developing shared knowledge objects or other artifacts across
learning processes.

Even if the objects of such inquiry, i.e., problems and working theories, have
conceptual content, those represent, simultaneously, a community’s shared social practices
(Hakkarainen, in press). In Peircean terms, they connect processes related to Thirdness with
those of Firstness and Secondness. Accordingly, questioning and explanation not only take
place through a conceptual space or involve dialogue with artifacts, but define genuinely
trialogical interactive relations within an inquiry community; i.e., agent A is explaining issue
C for agent B (agent could be an individual or team). Consequently, knowledge building
appears to presuppose social practices that help the participants to channel their limited
cognitive resources for advancement of shared knowledge objects. Skillful teachers know that
they need to create activity structures that guide and constrain students’ activity in a way that
facilitates learning and knowledge creation. Moreover, trialogical activity focused on
advancing collaborative objects of inquiry requires specific supporting technology. As
mentioned above, affordances of available representational tools and physical embodiment of
ideas (on paper or in a digitalized form) are likely to have significant implications for
advancement of inquiry.

18
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