and Wheels The 1st Aero Squadron, Truck Transport, and the Punitive Expedition of 1916(vere late tck the it ere Sharon fovsuh-ono atte Sin dniono uinton ena ding wr ot ta1s1016 (Prove Courtesy on Fert Sam Houston seu) THE 1ST AERO SQUADRON PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN PERSHING’S PUNITIVE EXPEDITION Roger G. Miller is an historian with the Air Foree History and Museums Program whose articles have appeared in The Indiana Magazine of History, Miliary Affairs, Prologue, and Air Power History. He tecently edited a book, Seeing Off the Bear: Anglo-American Air Power Cooperation During the Cold War, and is currently writing an official history, Keep ‘Em Flying: Air Force Logisties from the Mexican Border to the Persian Gulf. Foulois and the 1st Aero Squadron steamed into Columbus, New Mexico, on the morn: ing of March 15, 1916, it brought with it two ted nological innovations that would cause a revolu- tion in the mobility and striking power of the US. ‘Army, The first of these was, perhaps, the most dramatic, Off the train came eight wood, wire, and fabrie Curtiss JN-3 biplanes, virtually every airplane owned by the army save those at the Signal Corps Aviation School at San Diego, California, For the first time, America’s “air force"—consisting entirely of the Ist Aero Squadron—had deployed for an active campaign. Teas dramatic but more immediate, was the see- ond piece of technology. In addition to the air- We the train carrying Captain Benjamin D. planes, the train carried the 1st Aero Squadron's organic transportation: ten four-wheel drive ‘motor trucks, oddities in an army still wedded to the horse and mule.' When they arrived at Columbus, Captain Foulois and his men expected to join Brig, Gen. John J. Pershing's mobile cohimns in Mexico immediately: Instead, they found themselves caught up in the practical prob- lems of army logistics. The Ist Aero Squadron played a significant role in Pershing’s Punitive Expedition in a way totally unexpected by its air minded officors and men. Because of its expertise with the truck, the squadron became the initial key to the Expedition’s logistical support. ‘The call to action for the 1st Aero Squadron came because of longstanding trouble along the Mexican border. Revolt had broken out in late 1910 against the old dictator, Porfirio Diaz, and since then Mexico had experienced the attentions of a series of patriots, militarists, insurrection- ists, revolutionaries, and outright bandits fight- ing for political and economic control of the coun- try—or at least for access to its wealth. The United States’ extensive investment in Mexico's economy and regrettable tendency to meddle in its neighbor's affairs ensured that the unsettled conditions would eventually spill onto American territory, By early 1916, most of the US. Army's field forces were arrayed along the border from Brownsville, Texas, to San Diego, California, ‘Among these units was the 13th Cavalry, head- quartered at Columbus with outposts covering the border three miles to the south.? Columbus, population about three hundred, was a typical Southwestern town of adobe and ‘rame buildings bisected by the railroad that con- nected it with El Paso, Texas, seventy-five miles to the east. It sprang to national attention partly because President Woodrow Wilson rocognized the de facto government of Venustiano Carranza late in 1915, Shortly afterward United States offi- cials allowed Carrancista troops to cross ‘American territory on American railroads to strengthen the garrison at Agua Prieta then under siege by Carranza’s fierce rival, Pancho Villa, Reinforced, the Carrancistas broke the back of Villa's army on November 1, 1915. Villa swore revenge on the United States. Shortly after midnight on Mareh 9, 1916, he led some five hun- dred men into Columbus, burned part of the town, and killed eighteen Americans including eight soldiers, The 13th Cavalry reacted quickly, however, forcing the raiders out of Columbus and. chasing them several miles into Mexico. In the bitter fighting, Villa lost over sixty men} ‘Over the next few days the telegraph wires between Columbus and Washington, D.C,, flashed im power 2istory /yareR 586airy inte, ‘riage Pura xpdion. Preto cntey abe tonal ces) IT WAS OBVIOUS FROM THE OUTSET THAT TRANS- PORTATION AND SUPPLY WOULD. PROVE THE MAJOR CHALLENGE TO PERSHING’S FORCE reports, requests, and instructions. Within hours of the attack, President Wilson and his eabinet agroed that Villa must be brought to account. At the same time, Maj. Gen, Frederick Funston, commander of the army's Southern Department, notified Washington that Villa's force was at Boca Grande and proposed sending troops after it President Wilson authorized the expedition. “Black Jack” Pershing, a strict diseiplinarian with a growing reputation, was appointed to com- mand, For the most part, Funston and Pershing assembled what, would be called the Punitive Expedition from forees already near the border the 7th, 10th, Lith, and 13th Cavalry, 6th and 16th Infantry, and two batteries from the 6th Field Artillery. Supporting units included two companies of engineers, an ambulanee company, a field hospital, and two mule-drawn wagon sup- ply companies. And someone, the record is lunclear as to whom, remembered the Ist Aero Squadron, then at its post near San Antonio, ‘Texas, The Expedition initially comprised 4,800 men and 4,175 animals 1 was obvious from the outset that trans- portation and supply would prove the major chal- lenge to Pershing’s force, and that his ability to deal with these factors might determine the suc- cess or failure of the campaign. Mexico was a logistician’s nightmare. The state of Chihuahua covered more than 94,000 square miles divided into two geographic regions. To the east, a plateau section occupied four-fifths of the state and consisted of alkaline flats and sandy plains intersected by ranges of barren hills. To the west, the Sierra Madre mountains rose above 10,000 feet and proved passable only through jagged, wind-swept canyons. Weather could include any- thing from dust storms to sudden blizzards, and the temperature ranged from burning hot to freezing cold, sometimes veering ninety degrees mrownn History / woe 1955 in a single day. Few adequate roads crossed the region, and those that existed were little more than unpaved tracks—erusted, rock-hard ruts in the dry season that changed to rivers of mud dur- ing the rainy. Subsistence was available—mostly beef, corn, and beans—and forage could be found, but even under ideal conditions the region would wear down horses and men quickly. And condi- tions were far from ideal. Northern Chihuahua ‘was grazing country, but the lack of rain since the previous July had rendered the grass dry and unnourishing, and if the campaign extended into the summer, the heat would evaporate the avail- able water and burn off the forage.® ‘The impact of these conditions would be mini: mized if Pershing could properly exploit the resources available in Moxico. Since the American Civil War, armies had operated on rail roads where possible, and General Funston pro- posed using the rail lines in northern Mexico. The Northwestern Railroad connected the major city of Chihuahua with Juarez, across the border from El Paso, Equipped with American rolling stock, it would provide an ideal method for moving troops quickly to areas frequented by Villa's forces and for keeping widely dispersed columns supplied, though the rails were in poor condition and the tracks might have proven vulnerable to Villista raiders, Likewise, the army's standard practice was to procure food and forage locally where pos- sible, and enough villages and towns existed in the region to greatly reduce the expedition’ dependence on its line of supplies. Early on March 10, the new Secretary of War Newton D, Baker, asked General Funston for an analysis of the force required to subdue Villa and fof the support that foree would require. ‘Addressing the latter point, Funston recom: mended an immediate advance from Columbus to Casas Grandes, Mexico, then to points south as 15Tse side enoy dng fate cours of favor ares) THE U.S. ARMY HAD BEGUN EXPERI- MENTING WITH MOTOR VEHICLES ABOUT 1900 AND TRUCKS AS EARLY AS 1902 16 the situation dictated. He suggested that this ini tial advance could be supplied temporarily by truck from the rail head at Columbus. After the expedition secured Casas Grandes as its advanced base, El Paso would beeome the main base and supplies could then be sent by train over the Northwestern Railroad, Other factors quickly intervened, however. War Department orders to General Pershing stated explicitly that use of the railroads required the permission of Mexican offi- cials, But the Carranza government—with long memories of the Mexican War and gringo inter- ference—proved obdurate, and the State Department failed to gain permission for the use of the Mexican railroads.” Facing @ harsh and extensive terrain with inadequate roads and for: biden the use of the railroad, Pershing deter. mined to rely upon the unproven motor truck as his basie means of supply: What Funston had pro: posed as a temporary measure, Pershing decided ‘would be the logistical engine of his campaign. ‘There was a minor problem. The army had lit tle experience with trucks, especially under field conditions. ‘The US. Army had begun experimenting with motor vehicles about 1900 and trucks as early as 1902, It soon had a small number of primitive vehicles in use, primarily at arsenals and depots. In 1911 the General Staff began a systematic study of truck transport at posts and during maneuvers, Of particular note was a cross-coun try test in 1912 featuring one F.W.D., one Sampson, one Autocar, and two White trucks. The vehicles left Washington, D.C., on February 8, traveled to Atlanta and then north, reaching Fe Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, on March 28. The results of these experiments were generally posi- tive despite the unreliability of commercial trucks and the fact that most were designed for uuse on paved surfaces. Based upon this experi- ence army leaders accepted, in principle, the value of motorized transportation in the field. Nevertheless, limited peacetime funding, lack of a sense of urgency, and the military's innate cor servatism prevented immediate application. As of the beginning of 1916, the army had purchased about one hundred trucks from at Jeast twenty different companies. The majority of these were in use at depots and posts, though a few were delivering supplies to outlying detachments along the Mexican border. The Quartermaster Corps had also set specifications for a field truck and had proposed a tentative organization for ‘motor truck supply companies and repair shops. However, the Corps had yet to adopt a standard truck. More significantly, army personnel were neither trained nor experienced in the manage- ment, operation, and maintenance of motor vehi- cles.* Fortunately for Pershing and the Punitive Expedition, however, one small unit had been experimenting with trucks and had developed some expertise, That unit was the Ist Aero Squadron. Aviation personnel in the Signal Corps had ‘become interested in trucks almost as early as in. airplanes, Lieutenant Foulois, for example, who tested the army's first airplane at Fort’ Sam Houston near San Antonio, Texas, in 1910, ineluded a requirement for ten “aero trucks” and ten “auto trucks” for an aero company in the pro- visional regulations that he wrote early in 1911 fas a result of his experience. At least one truck was in use at the Signal Corps’s first aviation school at College Park, Maryland, in August of that year, and Lts. Henry H. Arnold and Thomas DeW. Milling drove one to Fort Riley, Kansas, when they tested an airplane there in October 1912.9 Beyond their own limited experience, aviation personnel locked to developments abroad for inspiration, During its field maneuvers in 1911, for example, the French army fielded twenty air: craft supporting two army corps, and provided that foree, army aviators noted, with an extensive truck-based supply and transport system orga nized into three echelons. The first echelon included the airplanes and enough trucks to carry the crew, hangar tents, repair tools, spare parts, first aid materials, gasoline, and oil. The second echelon comprised “freight automobiles” with “complete spares and reserve supplies” including extra motors, wings, frames, controls, and materials for complete airplane repairs. The third echelon consisted of a workshop on wheels, carrying a forge, special tools, additional repair materials, and an electrical light plant for work at night? US. Army aviators viewed the French with envy! ‘An American aviation deployment was muci less impressive. From August 10 through 17, 1912, two mismatched aireraft, a radio-equipped Burgess-Wright and a dual-control Curtiss, par- ticipated in maneuvers held in Connecticut sup- ported by a White Motor Company truck operated by the Quartermaster Department, Surprisingly, the airplanes—despite their limited capabilities and the difficult flying conditions—performed am powen History J wae 095valuable reconnaissance and communications missions that earned compliments from army leaders. But the support effort proved inade- quate, especially the truck. Captain Frederick Hennessy, the senior aviator at the maneuvers, called for an establishment of one truck for each aircraft in the field to haul fuel, spare parts, and equipment. These needed, he specified, to be 60 horse power (h.p.) four-wheel drive trucks rather than the 80 h.p, vehicle used during the maneu- vers. He recommended that they have standard army escort wagon beds covered with removable bows and a canvas cover, much like the covered CAPTAIN wagons of the Old West, and that at least one be FOULOIS equipped as a mobile workshop complete with a SELECTED ‘ge lathe mills and other machinery fe AS THE was indmatel edt the orgniaton oan er cea ae aller wa oc lactis TRUCK (FOR following year. On Fobruary 22, 1918, Gon RRO GRON te days nine auplans ana thar sopporting THE CHASSIS ipa ofthe amy’ tm vin Bie Oxy George P. Scriven, the Chief Signal Officer, seized THE JEFFERY this opportunity, arguing in a memorandum to COMPANY Mei. Gen, Hugh’ L Seote, the Chie of staff on March 3 that “the presont concentration of aro: haute material at Galveston presonts the fret, opportunity to officially recognize a squadron. ae result, the group wo organized two days Intar an the let Aero. Squadron (Provisional) Ey ea al by ‘ra ry, etre Sauseron persone ta: (ere ted wings ‘sot etary aks 3 Cokmogn New Amn power History under Captain Charles deF. Chandler. On December 4, 1913, the army officially specified that the squadron would comprise twenty off cers, ninety enlisted men, and eight airplanes organized into s headquarters and two aero com- panies, The orders authorized the squadron six teen trucks to enable it to cooperate with the army in the field.” Tnadeguate funding meant that establishing the authorization was easier than getting vehi cles. When Foulois and one company of the 1st ‘Aero Squadron went to Texas in April 1914, two ‘weary, underpowered school vehicles were al that was available. They soon wore out. The Quartermaster Corps was responsible for all army transport, and was supposed to purchase vehicles to meet Signal Corps requirements. On May 8, Foulois requested that the Quartermaster Corps purchase four trucks ta replace his two. ‘The Quartermaster General's Office combined this request with several others into the army’s first major motor vehicle purchase. On June 11, the Corps bought twenty-one trucks: seven White, five Velie, three Lippard-Stewart, two Mack, and one each from Kelly-Sprinafield, Driges-Seabury, Federal, and Lord Baltimore Despite Fouloiss request for four trucks, the Ist Aero Squadron unit apparently received only two White trucks in exchange for its old vehicles." Later that yeur, Captain Foulois selected as the standard truck for the Ist Aero Squadron the one-and-one-half ton, four-wheel drive chassis built by the Thomas B. Jeffery Company, equip- ped with an escort wagon body designed by him Self The Jeffery Quad, as it was known, featured a 87 hp, engine and four-wheel steering and braking The Quartermaster Corps purchased six of these on December 29, 1914, and the Ist Aero Squadron had received them by April 1916. Foulois subsequently requisitioned ten more to replace the two Whites and to bring the squadron to its authorized complement with one standard type truck, thus simplifying squadron supply and maintenance."* The shortage of funds, however, remained a persistent prablem. In response to Foulois's request, Lt, Col, Samuel Reber, head of the ‘Aviation Section, reported that the Quartermas-8 pans blog iow ous Counts New Meco, tye steve hon ty tacks CONGRESS APPROPRI- ATED ONLY $301,000 FOR MILITARY AERONAU- TICS IN FISCAL YEAR 1916 FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE 1ST AERO SQUADRON TRAVELED ACROSS COUNTRY UNDER ITS OWN POWER 18 ter General had “practically robbed us of $17,500 for truck purchases.” Fiscal year 1915 funding hhad authorized $32,500 for trucks for the Signal Corps, and the Quartermaster General had bought the original Jeffery trucks using a portion of the money, When Reber requested the addi- tional trucks, however, the Quartermaster General reported that, at the direction of the President, the remaining money had been placed in a general transportation fund owing to the tur- mail on the Mexican border. Further, Reber had asked the Quartermaster Corps to include $54,000 for motor transportation in its annual estimates for fiscal year 1916. The Corps, how. over, failed to include that request, Subsequently, Colonel Reber made a deal with the Quartermas- ter General that allowed the Signal Corps to pur chase transport for the air arm. Unfortunately, Congress appropriated only $301,000 for military aeronautics in fiscal year 1916 instead of the $500,000 the Aviation Section wanted. As a result, there was no money in the near future for ground transportation and precious little for avi- ‘ation in general beyond operating costs. Ten new trucks were out of the question. All was not lost, however. Someone squeezed a little money out of the budget for the Ist Aero Squadron shortly after the new fiscal year began, In August 1915, the squadron received three Jeffery trucks, bring- ing the squadron total to nine Jefferys and two Whites, still well below the sixteen trucks autho- rized in the December 1913 table of equipment." While Foulois sought a full complement of trucks, another pilot, Lt. Townsend F. Dodd, developed one of those on hand into mobile ‘machine shop. Dodd began by preparing a list of equipment and machinery required by a mobile squadron, including lathes, mills, grinders, and other power tools, He designed the machine truck with a separate power plant so that the tools could be operated even if the truck engine was disabled, Further, he organized the shop so that it could be broken down into standard loads for pack mules if the truck could no longer operate, Construction of the machine shop truck began on April 8, 1915, and squadron personnel finished it by early summer. The machine shop track vastly inereased the 1st Aero Squadron's ability to support itself in the field and greatly enhanced the unit's mobility. From duly through November 1915, the Ist ‘Aero Squadron conducted tests with the army's artillery fire control school at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. During these months, the squadron operated under near-field conditions. The squadron equipment experienced extreme heat, ‘and cold, high winds, and heavy rain. The air planes and trucks also suffered severely from Supply shortages, Truck parts proved almost impossible to obtain. As late as October 3, Foulois, still waiting for some parts ordered in June, expressed the hope “that we get them hhefore the trucks go to pieces.”!® On a positive note, the squadron organization paid off in increased flexibility coon after its arrival at Fort Sill. On August 21, Captain Foulois received orders to send one airplane to Brownsville, Texas. Within two hours, he reported, the airplane, crew, and equipment were ready to entrain, Before that section could depart, however, the War Depart- ‘ment ordered a second airplane to join the first. Within three hours, Foulois and his crew had the second section on the train heading south. The captain boasted that “all I had to do was to detach two complete sections, assign one truck, one motoreyele, and sufficient spare parts and they are ready to go." ‘In November, the Ist Aero Squadron trans- ferred from Fort Sill to its new permanent home, the Signal Corps Aviation Center, under con- struction near Fort Sam Houston. For the first time, the Ist Aero Squadron traveled across coun- try under its own power. The aircraft flew the 400 miles while the trucks followed by road carrying ‘as much of the tools, parts, supplies, and equip- ‘ment as they could hold, The ten trucks remained ‘well below the squadron's authorized strength, however, and Foulois borrowed two one-and-one- half ton “trailmobile” trailers from the Sechler Company of Cincinnati, Ohio, to increase his car- rying eapacity, Even this was insufficient, how: fever, and much of the squadron equipment still had to go by train, Pulled by the trucks, the trail- ers proved extremely useful, especially when one of the Jeffery trucks caught fire and burned near Fort Worth. The trip was otherwise uneventful, am vownn History / wasn 185PRESIDENT WILSON AND SECRETARY BAKER APPROVED GENERAL FUNSTON’S: BASIC PLAN FOR THE PUNITIVE EXPEDITION ain fereage Fem ‘Columbus, New Wesco amr PowER History and the experience enabled Foulois to identify a number of problems and shortages. Among these, Foulois concluded, was that even sixteen trucks were too few. A mobile squadron of eight aircraft required, he believed, at least twenty-one trucks.” But even keeping ten was a challenge. Soon after the squadron's arrival, the army tried to take away Foulois's vehicles. Citing “Changes No. to the standard Tables of Organization for 1914, Col. Omar Bundy, Adjutant of the Southern Department, decreed that the 1st Aero Squadron was authorized only one truck and one “sergeant chauffeur” He was, Colonel Bundy told Captain Foulois, working on getting a chauffeur for the squadron, but in the meantime would Foulois please provide a date upon which he would turn in his nine excess trucks! Foulois telegraphed Washington immediately, and within a few days the Quartermaster General affirmed that the money for the trucks had been appropriated Specifically for the Ist Acro Squadron before ‘anges No. 6” had been published. Accordingly, the trucks should be considered the permanent property of the Signal Corps.”® "At the end of 1915, then, the Ist Aero Squadron had developed valuable, practical expertise in maintaining and operating trucks under field conditions. The squadron that reached San Antonio, however, was tired and worn and should have immediately turned its attention to refurbishing and upgrading its equipment. Instead, Foulois found that the Quartermaster Corps had failed to finish build- ing the aviation center. While some work on air- planes and trucks was accomplished, the Squadron had to devote much of its time and effort to building buildings, roads, and sidewalks, ‘and clearing and preparing the flying field, They were still at this task on March 9, 1916, when Pancho Villa attacked Columbus. President Wilson and Secretary Baker approved General Funston’s basic plan for the Punitive Expedition on March 10 and directed him to employ any transportation the force required, including motor transport. Accordingly, ‘on March 11, General Funston requested the immediate purchase of twenty-seven Jeffery one- and-one-half ton trucks and twenty-seven White one-and-one-hall ton trucks, and asked that these be sent—along with drivers, mechanics, tools, and spare parts—by special train to El Paso. The Quartermaster Corps responded quickly, inviting bids for a total of fifty-four Jeffery and twenty- seven White trucks on March 14, 79 meet Pershing’s immediate neec first. twenty. seven Jefferys wore shipped from the factory in Wisconsin aboard a special train before daylight on the Mareh 16, In the meantime, Brig. Gen. Henry G. Sharpe, the Acting Quartermaster General, advocated renting commercial trucks temporarily until the new trucks reached the Expedition.” Ti was at this juncture that the Ist Aero Squadron and its organic transport entered the picture, ‘The Ist Aero Squadron left Fort Sam Houston for Columbus at noon on Mareh 13 with cight airplanes, ten motor trucks, and six motor tyeles, Also on board the train were three trucks hired by the quartermaster at Fort Sam Houston: a five ton Peerless, a three-quarter ton Republic, and a one-and-one-half ton Wichita. The train arrived late on March 14 at El Paso, where it picked up a pair of one-and-one-half ton Reo trucks leased by the quartermaster at Fort Bliss. ‘The squadron reached Columbus at mid-morning on March 15 just as Pershing’s columns moved south, The men immediately detrained and assembled their aircraft. ‘Instead of joining the advancing columns or reconnoitering ahead of them, however, the Ist ‘Aero Squadton remained at Columbus with little aviation work at hand, At this point the Squadron's experience with motor vehicles came to the fore. The motley assortment of rented com: mercial trucks assembled at Columbus proved useless for field work, and Foulois made the 1st ‘Aero Squadron trucks and their drivers available to the base quartermaster, Major John F. Madden, to haul supplies and personnel to the Punitive Expedition’s southbound columns.°“On the night of March 15,” according to pilot Lt. Edgar 8. Gorrell: