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Guatemala: Slow Transition To Liberal Democracy
Guatemala: Slow Transition To Liberal Democracy
Democracy
Steve O’Connor
Drexel University
PSCI140
Dr. Hunold
Guatemala 2
Introduction
Guatemala has undergone significant changes since ending its 35-year civil war in
governed by military rule, which resulted in over 200,000 deaths. Since the peace accord
in 1996, Guatemala has slowly begun its shift from authoritarian rule to a partly free
human rights violations, and a huge gap in socioeconomic equality could prevent
Guatemala from becoming a completely free democracy. Guatemala still is not a free
democracy according to Freedom House (which measures political rights and civil
liberties) and exhibits several signs of a semi-authoritarian government, but it does have
the opportunity to change towards a more democratic state. This paper will argue that
society and will examine current roadblocks to determine the likely success or failure of a
truly free democratic society in Guatemala. First, I will discuss how previous regimes
maintained control over Guatemala. Then, this paper will discuss the prospects for a
long-term transition to a liberal democracy defined by Robert Dahl. The next section will
analyze recent political changes that threaten the semi-authoritarian regime. Finally, I
will conclude with discussing the prospect for Guatemala’s transition to democracy.
Ottaway argues that there are three types of semi-authoritarian regimes: semi-
states that remain stagnant. Ottaway defines this regime as one that has persisted over
time and remains in control even with economic, political, and social changes (Ottaway,
2003, pgs 20-21). This type will remain stagnant unless there is a major event that
fractures the regime. In a regime of decay, power is slowly shifting away from a
polyarchal democracy and shifts towards the government. Ottaway argues this happens
because of the lack of economic growth and a lack of openness within political
institutions, the economy and civil society (Ottaway, 2003, pg 21). Semi-Authoritarian
regimes of dynamic change are states that have the opportunity for positive political
change and democratization (Ottaway, 2003, pg 22). Dynamic change regimes often
require economic growth, free trade agreements, and developing relationships with the
democracy. Since the 1954 CIA orchestrated coup of democratic reformer Jacobo
Arbenz, Guatemala has remained an authoritarian regime with military rule (with the
support of the economic elite) and deliberately failed to transition into a fully free liberal
democratic state. In the 1960’s and 1970’s, the military (consisting of right-wing
though a democratically elected government was implemented in the 1980’s, the military
and presidents participated in election fraud, limited political competition, and violently
During the 1990’s, amid strong international influence and increasing civilian
support, the military began to lose its stranglehold on the Guatemalan government (Ruhl,
2005, pgs. 55-56). The military influenced political and social policies, and its
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democracy. The failed military coup of President Jorge Serrano in 1993 demonstrated
the fundamental shift between military rule and the institution of a democratic
government. The 1996 Peace Accords officially ended the civil war and mandated a
reduction of the military missions, size, and budget (Ruhl, 2005, pgs. 56).
formal democratic institutions, and respect for a limited sphere of civil and
14).
When the military instituted democratic elections in the 1980’s, it hoped to gain
legitimacy and free ifself from Guatemala’s economic problems, but intended to continue
its rule over the new president and his policies (Ruhl, 2005, pg 57). Also, democratic
institutions and civil liberties were almost non-existent, as evidenced by the judicial
officers. Outwardly, Guatemala may have had some of the trappings of democracy, but
Although implementing a stable democracy has been challenging, with the 2007
Guatemala currently has the opportunity to become a more stable, free democracy. What
remains to be seen is if President Colom is able to become the executive leader that
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strengthens his state towards democracy or a political figurehead who allows the military
The military regime has lost a significant amount of power since the 1996 Accord
and signs suggest Guatemala will continue to move towards a liberal democracy. The
effects of the long-standing civil war such as citizens’ lack of trust in government and
democratic ideas, will prevent a quick transition and more likely lead to a transition that
Since the transition process will be slow, one could argue that Guatemala would be
a regime in equilibrium, but for the past 5 years it has exhibited conditions that more
product (GDP) ranks 134th in the world, the GDP has increased over 50% from $18 to
$38 billion in the past five years (World Bank, 2009). The U.S. Central America Free
Trade Agreement (CAFTA) has led to increases in the foreign direct investment (FDI)
inflows from $591.6 million in 2006 to $802.8 million in 2008 (CAFTA, 2009). In 2008,
Guatemala and the United Nations began a joint operation called the International
After the democratic liberalization, the country has remained in the category of
“partially free” according to Freedom House, but it has never been considered a totally
“free” state (Freedom House, 2009). Guatemala’s political climate does seem to be in a
transition. President Colom’s victory in 2008 was the first for his political party, the
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National Unity of Hope, and is the first left of center president in Guatemala’s recent
history. Non-governmental agencies such the National Democratic Institution have been
working with the indigenous Mayan women to promote inclusion within the political
structure. The participation of this NGO and other actors led to the first Mayan woman
to run for President in Guatemala’s history in 2007. The Peace Accords developed the
framework to begin reform that respects human rights, inclusive participation, and the
stronger judicial system that is free from political alliances, a police force with limited
must be met in order for democracy to be successful within transitional states (Dahl,
1998, pgs 84-90). These include effective participation, equality in voting, enlightened
understanding, control over the agenda, and inclusion of adults. These conditions enable
control of government by elected officials, free and fair elections, freedom of expression,
1998, pgs 84-90). Since the 1996 Peace Accords, Guatemala has increased Dahl’s five
(GRNU) (Ruhl, 2005, pg 57). The guerilla groups threatened the right wing political
agenda of Guatemalan officials and challenged the regime’s legitimacy. The military
the army claimed were guerilla sympathizers. Between the huge socioeconomic disparity
and the human rights violations that were committed for over 30 years, these factors
57). The military intended to remain in control by retaining veto power of government
policy but this enabled the formation of political groups, oppositional press, and public
discussion about ongoing human rights violations and criminal activity by the military
(Ruhl, 2005, pg 26-30). Business groups sought international approval and joined the
politicians to add pressure to reduce the military’s role in political affairs. The
the constitution in 1993 and the military lost its ability to intimidate politicians because of
the economic support the government received from the CCACFA (Ruhl, 2005, pg 28).
The military rule weakened and Serrano was removed from office, which allowed for the
1996 Peace Accords that developed the framework for a democratic society in
Guatemala.
The Peace Accords ended the civil war between the semi-authoritarian Guatemala
government and the guerilla groups, specifically the GRNP. The accords focused on four
major areas – a.) strengthening civilian power and reducing the military role b.) human
rights, judicial reform, and the formation of the Commission Historical Clarification c.)
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rights of indigenous people d.) socioeconomic aspects and agrarian reforms (“Accords of
the Guatemalan Peace Process,” 1997, pg 37). Unfortunately, these have yet to
transcend into full government control, as the military and the conservatism it represents
continued to influence political matters (Deibert, 2008, pg 168). The 2003 WOLA report
argues that:
kickbacks. At the same time they manipulate the justice system in order to
The 2007 WOLA report states the legislature, customs, and other state agencies have
been affected by organized crime and has led to the deterioration of state institutions and
Secretariat for Administrative Matters and Security was involved with the death of
Vinicio Gomez, the Minister of Interior, in June 2008. Carlos Quintanilla, the SAAS,
was thought to be linked Ortega Menaldo who is the head of the military group Estado
Mayor Presidential (EMP) (Deibert, 2008, pg 170). The EMP supposedly disbanded in
2003, but has been accused of several political assassinations, including the
Constitutional Court President and other crimes such as drug trafficking. (Deibert, 2008,
pg 170). An argument between Quintanilla and Gomez was thought to be the motive
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behind the assassination. Gomez was planning to deploy anti-drug agents to the
Guatemala-Mexico border where the EMP is thought to smuggle drugs (Deibert, 2008, pg
168) and is widely suspected to have played a part in the Minister’s death.
The political party Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG) is also involved with
government corruption. Shortly after the 1996 Accords, Alfonso Portillo ran for
President and won the 1999 election under the FRG party (Deibert, 2008, pg 172). In
1993 Portillo, Ortega Menaldo, and Alfredo Molina were implicated for a corruption ring
involving a right-wing military group called the “Liversaver Group” (Deibert, 2008, pg
172). Portillo continued relationships with organized crime during his presidency and
organized crime, and violence because of the influence these groups have on Guatemalan
political parties. This corruption and the lack of a justice system that upholds the rule of
law significantly undermines the citizens views of democratic process and impedes the
process of social and economic development essential for stable democracy (USAID,
2005).
Since the FRG and other right leaning parties have been implicated in corruption
scandals, it has allowed leftist ideological parties the ability to gain more influence within
congress. In 1995, the New Guatemala Democratic Front, which was the only left
leaning political party in the congress, held only 8% of the congressional seats
politicians accounted for 68 of the 158 seats (43%) and had a 33% increase from the 2003
elections (Parliamentary Chamber, 2008). The right wing ideologies still dictate policies,
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but the increased popularity of the centrist and leftist parties present a challenge to the
status quo. The relationship between the FRG, the clandestine groups, and corruption
severely impacts their semi-authoritarian control and led to public, state, and international
scrutiny.
tends to lower the legitimacy of political institutions and the need for transparency is
Against Impunity (CICIG) in 2007 hopes to dismantle the clandestine military groups and
the corruption within the government (Donovan, 2008, pg 818). The United Nations and
2008, pg 819). The CICIG has a substantial amount of power to request reports and
cooperation from State officials, empowers the commission to file criminal complaints
with the relevant authorities, and can join relevant criminal proceedings as a private
prosecutor (Donovan, 2008, pgs 818-820). In conjunction with all of these powers, the
CICIG is also authorized to enter directly into agreements with the Office of the Public
Prosecutor, the Supreme Court, the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, the
National Civilian Police, and any other State institutions (Donovan, 2008, pgs 818-820).
The CICIG was introduced in December 2006 and was not ratified until a member
of the National Union of Hope party switched his vote to support the new commission in
August of 2007 (Donovan, 2008, pg 816). Although the CICIG specifically states it will
not investigate past human rights violations that occurred during the civil war, the
commission still faced severe opposition during its ratification. The Guatemalan
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Republican Front and the National Party for Advancement congressional political parties
continually stalled to delay the ratification. The year and a half delay from the initial bill
shows the reluctance of the FRG and other political parties. “In Will Accountability
Prevail,” Donovan argues that the resistance exhibits high levels of fear of investigating
current and future criminal behaviors and exhibits how embedded the corruption may be
In the past, the FRG was able to control political outcomes, but since reforms are
beginning to become established, the CICIG was implemented in spite of the reluctance
of the conservative political parties. With the backing of the several new left-leaning
political parties and other political elites, the CICIG is establishing itself as a fair and
For example, the arrest of nine police officers and ex-military officials for the
murder of Rodrigo Rosenberg, a Guatemalan lawyer, was due to the involvement of the
CICIG. Rodrigo Rosenburg accused the government of corrupt business deals with the
Rural Development Bank and was shot three months later, which led demonstrations and
a call for President Colom to resign the presidency (Valladares, 2008). At the President
request, the CICIG and the F.B.I. found that former National Civil Police (PNC) officer
William Gilberto Santos, PNC officer Mario Luis Paz, and former soldier Edwin Idelmo
Lcentspez were part of a conspiracy to undermine the President because of recent social
The CICIG, as shown above, has the ability to severally undercut the role of the
semi-authoritarian military regime. However, besides the concern that the CICIG would
meet reluctance from the traditional political parties, it also had the obstacle of the
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uncertainty that a new president may prevent the CICIG from being instituted (Donavan,
2008, pg 817). The election of President Colom, who supported the CICIG, along with
the external pressure from international states such as the United Nations, the European
Commission, and the United States, symbolized the importance in removing corruption
by Dahl, is slowly progressing (Dahl, 1998). Although Guatemala has not met
procedural minimum for polyarchy, the democratic elections that were implemented in
1985 coupled with the 1996 Peace Accords have drastically improved their ability to
become a democracy. As noted above, the five conditions are: effective participation,
equality in voting, enlightened understanding, control over the agenda, and inclusion of
The Guatemalan government has more control of the state than it did in the 1990’s.
authoritarian regime, but most seem to agree that the President Serrano’s failure to
suspend the constitution was the sign that a democratic transition was beginning (Jonas,
2000, pgs 18-20). This showed that the military was beginning to lose control of the
government. The first peace accord defined the militaries role in Guatemala – defense of
Guatemala’s borders and territorial integrity, along with reducing its budget and size, and
disassembling the counterinsurgency groups (Jonas, 2000, pg 16). This again expanded
the capacity for elected officials to govern. This accord also allowed for ideological
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Guatemala does have free and fair elections that are composed of the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches. The president must win an absolute majority (over
50% of the vote) or a run-off election will be held to determine the winner (Azpuru,
2008, pg 562). The 158 member unicameral congress uses a proportional representation
electoral system and the Supreme Court of Justice appoints 13 members for 5-year terms
With the 2007 election, 14 candidates from different political parties (including the
first Mayan woman to run for presidency) entered the presidential race (Azpuru, 2008, pg
562). Alvaro Colom of National Unity of Hope party defeated Otto Perez to become the
first left of center president in over 50 years (Azpuru, 2008, pg 564). The two biggest
concerns of the citizens were the high crime rates and poverty. Colom identified as a
social democrat, and campaigned on combating crime with intelligence rather than a
harsh attack on crime; as a result, he received negative attacks from his opponents
(Azpuru, 2008, pg 563). These attacks lead to the fear that even if Colom won, his
process, violence was high. The campaigns from March to October 2007 claimed the
lives of 56 people linked to political parties, but it is thought that these deaths were a
result of the negative campaigning rather than political ideologies (Azpuru, 2008, pg
563).
After Colom’s win, violence was considered minimal and the electoral process was
agreed to be free and fair by national and international observers (Azpuru, 2008, pg 563).
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Other positive aspects of the election include the grassroots organizations and 134 civic
committees that participated in the election, which had a 60% voter turnout (a 10%
The human rights violations that have been committed within Guatemala are
perhaps the most troubling concern for a strong foundation of polyarchy. Since 1950,
freedom of expression and inclusive citizenship has not been a fundamental right for
Guatemala citizens. The second accord focused on these human rights violations and
established a truth commission, which is important for the healing of the victims, the
punishment of the perpetrators, and prevention of violence (Ross, 2006, pgs 69-70). The
accountability of past human rights violations is necessary for the empowerment of the
rule of law.
This led to the creation of the Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification
(CEH). Human rights activists and representatives from civil societies received the CEH
with disappointment because it lacked the authority to punish and promise reparations,
and was charged to investigate 35 years of violence in a relatively short period of time
(Ross, 2006, pgs 69-70). Even with the public disappointment, the CEH did uncover
many secrets that were the start of a social change. In February 1999, the CEH released
its report called Memory of Silence that contained 3500 pages (Ross, 2006, pgs 79). The
report identified 600 massacres, declared the deaths genocide, and showed that the state
was responsible for 97% of the massacres (Ross, 2006, pgs 79).
shift graves of the victims, and justice in the Myrna Mack case (Ross, 2006, pgs 75).
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REMHI was a Catholic mission to document survivors of the genocide to find truth and
promote forgiveness, and they collected over 2,000 survivor accounts (Ross, 2006, pgs
75). The REMHI, along with the Center for Legal Action on Human Rights, and the
and witness testimony to prepare cases against the military (Ross, 2006, pgs 75).
Because of the work of the REMHI, specifically the open talks about the genocide, the
ruled that it was an act of random violence (Ross, 2006, pgs 75). It was later found that
four military officers assassinated Myra Mack and only one of the men was convicted.
He was member of the president’s security police force, and this event generated a
The CEH report, the REMHI, the exhumations, and the Myra Mack case allowed
Guatemalan citizens to begin their healing, but without accountably many feared human
rights violations would continue. Trust in institutions responsible for solving conflicts is a
prerequisite for civil resolution and surveys show that while trust is low (but increasing)
in Guatemala, it is significantly higher in the rural and indigenous regions (Azpuru, 2006,
pg 142, 145). The rise in national and international demand for human rights protections
and the civil society calling for judicial reforms were instrumental in the formation of the
CICIG.
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Conclusion
Guatemala has a long history of unrest. Since the end of the revolutionary era from
the 1985 constitution that allowed democratic elections, the regime changed to a semi-
authoritarian regime that was engaged in a civil war against reformers and allowed for a
political openness that furthered democratic ideas. The change continued and the Peace
Accords in 1996 ended the Civil War and the 2007 election shows that democratic
remains in control despite changes in the political, economic, and social sphere (Ottaway,
2003, pg 21). The old regime continues to influence the government and with the lack of
solidified democratic institutions, and one could argue that Guatemala would remain in
an equilibrium state. But, Guatemala does not meet this because the regime is continuing
to lose control of its influence. Guatemala has begun the process of instituting
democracy, but with the amount of conflict that has occurred, it may take some time
before Guatemala becomes a liberal democracy, but it is slowly progressing towards that
goal as trust, hope, and freedom begin to replace the negative effects of civil war.
Any transition in Guatemala will be slow. In the next ten years, Guatemala will
democratic institutions that promote the rule of law and transparency, remove the
majority of corruption from their government, and continue to move closer to Dahl’s
ideal of democracy.
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References:
Jonas, Susanne. (Winter, 2000). Democratization through Peace: The Difficult Case
of Guatemala. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 42(4), 1-38.
Ross, Amy. (January, 2006). The Creation and Conduct of the Guatemalan
Commission for Historical Clarification. Geoforum, 37(1), 69-81.
Ruhl, Mark. (2005). The Guatemalan Military Since the Accords: The Fate of Reform
Under Arzu and Portillo. Latin American Politics & Society, 47(1), 55-85.
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http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/GUATE
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