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PY4804 Philosophy of Logic Week 2: Tarski's Theory of Truth: Agust In Rayo Ar29@st-Andrews - Ac.uk October 7, 2003
PY4804 Philosophy of Logic Week 2: Tarski's Theory of Truth: Agust In Rayo Ar29@st-Andrews - Ac.uk October 7, 2003
3. Stating Tarski’s condition of material adequacy precisely is a bit tricky. One way of
doing so is as follows:
Each instance of the following schema must follow from one’s characteri-
zation of truth:
(T) s is true if and only if p
where ‘p’ is replaced by an English sentence and ‘s’ is replaced by a name
of that sentence.
Naming sentences
Consider the following English sentence as an example:
Susan runs
1. ‘Susan runs’
1
2. The sentence printed on the previous page, third line from bottom.
3. The sentence constituted by two words, the first of which consists of the 19th, 21st,
19th, 1st and 14th letters of the alphabet (in that order), and the second of which
consists of the 18th, 21st, 14th and 19th letters of the alphabet (in that order)
According to W. Quine
whose views on quotation are fine
Boston names Boston
and Boston names ‘Boston’
but 9 doesn’t designate 9
Exercise: add quotation marks so as to make every sentence in the Limerick true.
1. Susan runs
2. Tom walks
φ is true if and only if: either φ = ‘Susan runs’ and Susan runs, or φ = ‘Tom
walks’ and Tom walks.
2
But, given our definition of ‘Bill’, this must be equivalent to:
which is a contradiction.
It is possible to show, moreover, that any language strong enough to express arith-
metic has the resources for describing it’s own syntax. The result is sometimes called
Tarski’s Theorem:
(a) The object language: the language we are talking about, i.e. the language con-
taining the sentences we want our truth-predicate to apply to.
(b) The meta-language: the language we are using to talk about the object language,
i.e. the language in which a truth-predicate is given.
Question: can you think of other ways of avoiding the Liar Paradox?
3
Tarski’s characterization of truth
To make things easier, we’ll consider a toy example. Let L be the language containing:
• Walks(Susan)
(Read: Susan walks)
• ¬Runs(Susan)
(Read: It is not the case that Susan runs)
• Walks(Tom) ∨ ¬Runs(Susan)
(Read: Either Tom walks or it is not the case that Susan runs)
• δ(‘Susan’) = Susan
• δ(‘Tom’) = Tom
• δ(‘Runs’) = the set of runners
• δ(‘Walks’) = the set of walkers
4
Further Reading
1. There is a required reading for Friday’s seminar:
• Tarski, A ‘The Semantic Conception of Truth’ (1944), in Lynch, M. The Nature
of Truth, MIT Press, 2001.
2. Enthusiasts could also look at:
• Tarski, A. ‘The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages’ (1929), in Tarski,
A. Logic, Semantics and Meta-Mathematics, Hackett, 1983 , pp. 152-278.
This is a hard paper, but it’s a classic—and a paradigm of philosophical rigor. Any
philosopher who is seriously interested in the concept truth must study this paper
carefully sometime in the course of her career.
5
2. A puzzle for enthusiasts
Wait! Couldn’t one emulate the characterization of truth provided in the preceding section
to explicitly define a truth-predicate for the language of set-theory within the language of
set-theory?
Take pTrue(φ)q to be a syntactic abbreviation of the following formula:
Intuitively, ‘VA(x)’ says that x is a valuation function; formally, it is true if and only if
x is a function that takes each (set-theoretic representation of a) variable to an object.
Intuitively, ‘Sat(s)’ says that s consists of the ordered-pairs hφ, vi where v satisfies φ;
formally, we take it to be a syntactic abbreviation of the following formula:
∀θ∀v{VA(v) ⊃ [hθ, vi ∈ s ≡
[(θ = px ∈ yq ∧ v(pxq) ∈ v(pyq))∨
(θ = px = yq ∧ v(pxq) = v(pyq))∨
(θ = p¬ψq ∧ ¬ hpψq, vi ∈ s)∨
(θ = pψ ∧ ξq ∧ (hpψq, vi ∈ s ∧ hpξq, vi ∈ s))∨
(θ = pψ ∨ ξq ∧ (hpψq, vi ∈ s ∨ hpξq, vi ∈ s))∨
(θ = pψ ⊃ ξq ∧ (hpψq, vi ∈ s ⊃ hpξq, vi ∈ s))∨
(θ = pψ ≡ ξq ∧ (hpψq, vi ∈ s ≡ hpξq, vi ∈ s))∨
(θ = p∃x ψq ∧ ∃y(hpψq, v[pxq/y]i ∈ s))∨
(θ = p∀x ψq ∧ ∀y(hpψq, v[pxq/y]i ∈ s))]]}
(where v[pxq/y] is the function that is just like v except that it assigns y to pxq).
Have we shown that set-theory can define its own truth predicate? Tarski’s Theorem
tells us that, on pain of inconsistency, no sufficiently strong theory can contain its own
truth-predicate (and set-theory is certainly ‘sufficiently strong’). Should we conclude that
set-theory is inconsistent?
As far as we know, set-theory is not inconsistent. So there must be a problem some-
where. But where?
A prize of £10 for the first student to come up with the right answer.