A Purely Topological Form of Non-Aristotelian Logic

Author(s): Carl G. Hempel

Source: The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Sep., 1937), pp. 97-112
Published by: Association for Symbolic Logic
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TEE JOURNAL OF SYxBOLIC LOGIC
Volume 2, Number 3, September 1937

A PURELY TOPOLOGICAL FORM OF NON-ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC'

CARL G. HEMPEL

1. The problem. The aim of the following considerations is to introduce a

new type of non-Aristotelian logic by generalizing the truth-table methods so
far employed for establishing non-Aristotelian sentential calculi. We shall ex-
pound the intended generalization by applying it to the particular set of pluri-
valued systems introduced by J. Lukasiewicz.2 One will remark that the points
of view illustrated by this example may serve to generalize quite analogously
any other plurivalued systems, such as those originated by E. L. Post,3 by H.
Reichenbach,4 and by others.
2. J. Lukasiewicz's plurivalued systems of sentential logic. First of all, we
consider briefly the structure of the Lukasiewicz systems themselves.
As to the symbolic notation in which to represent those systems, we make the
following agreements: For representing the expressions of the (two- or pluri-
valued) calculus of sentences, we make use of the Principia mathematics sym-
bolism; however, we employ brackets instead of dots. We call the small italic
letters rp", " "t", i sentential variables or elementary sentences, and
employ the term "sentence" as a general designation of both elementary sen-
tences and the composites made up of elementary sentences and connective
symbols ("a", vV ",", " = B i-).
Now, the different possible sentences (or, properly speaking, the different
possible shapes of sentences, such as "p", "p v q", "--p.(q v r)", etc.) are the
objects to which truth-values are ascribed; and just as in every other case one
wants a designation for an object in order to be able to speak of it, we want now
a system of designations for the sentences with which we are going to deal in our
truth-table considerations. We might choose as designation of a sentence the

Received October 8, 1936.

1 The basic ideas of this paper have been set forth by the author at the Second International
Congress for the Unity of Science, held in June 1936 in Copenhagen. A short synopsis of that com-
munication appeared in the Proceedings of the Congress, published in Erkenntnis, vol. 6.
2See (a) J. Lukasiewicz and A. Tarski, Untersuchungen lber den Aussagenkalkal, Comptes
rendus des seances de la Soc. des Sciences et des Lettres de Varsovie, cl. iii, vol 23 (1930), pp.
1-21; (b) J. Lukasiewicz, PhilosophischeBermerkungenzu mehrwertigenSystemn des Aussagenkalkids,
ibid. pp. 51-77. A very clear and illustrative account of these systems and of the matrix-method
in general is given in C. I. Lewis, Alternativesystems of logic, The moist, 1932, pp. 481-507, and in
C. I. Lewis and C. H. Langford, Symbolic Logic, ch. vii, Truth-wlue systems and the matrix
method.
3E. L. Post, Introduction to a general theory of elementary propositions. American journal
of mathematics, vol. 43 (1921), pp. 163-185.
'H. Reichenbach (a) Wakrschwinlichkeitslogik, Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie
der Wissenschaften, phys.-math. Klasse, 1932, pp. 476488; (b) Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre, A. W.
Sijthoff, Leiden 1935.

97
98 CARL G. HEMPEL

sentence itself, put between quotation marks, as we have done so far. But this
would be too cumbersome for our purposes. Therefore we agree to designate
(1) (a) small italic letters, representing sentential variables, by the corre-
sponding capital letters,
(b) the connective symbols of negation, disjunction, conjunction, implica-
tion, and equivalence by the following small italic letters: "n", "a",
"k", "i", "e", respectively,
(c) every bracket by a bracket of the same shape, and
(d) every compound sentence by the set of the designations of its single
members.
Thus, for example the designation of the sentence "pm {(p.q) v (p. }"
will be "Pi I (PkQ)a(PknQ) } ".
The symbols introduced by the stipulations (1) do not belong to the senten-
tial calculus, but to its syntax language, with respect to which the sentential
calculus is the object language.5 Thus, whilst the first of the two symbol-series
just considered is a sentence of the sentential calculus, the second one does not
belong to that calculus, but to its syntax language, and it is not a sentence itself,
but the designation of a sentence, i.e. of one of the objects to which truth-values
are ascribed.
Now we come to consider the general truth-tables by which Lukasiewicz
determines his plurivalued systems. According to traditional Aristotelian logic,
every proposition is either true or false, and correspondingly the truth-tables of
the usual sentential calculus (e.g. that of Principia mathematica) admit only
of two truth-values, 0 and 1, for every elementary sentence; Lukasiewicz gen-
eralizes this principle, which he calls the Zweiwertigkeitssatz,6 by introducing n
different truth-values: 0, 1/n-1, 2/n-1, . . , it-2/n- 1, 1. In terms of these
values, he first erects truth-tables for negation and implication.
The general n-valued matrix of negation may be characterized by the follow-
ing formula, which belongs to the syntax language of the sentential calculus:
(2a) Tr(nX) = 1 - Tr(X).

Here, "X" is a (free) variable, the constant values of which are sentence
designations (such as "P" or "PeQ"), and "Tr( . )" is a syntactical functor
which indicates the truth-value of the expression designated by its argument.
The general implication matrix is determined by the following stipulation:

(2b) Tr(Xi 17) f12if Tr(X) ? Tr(Y)

(2b) Tr{XiY) = ~4..1-Tr(X) + Tr(Y), if Tr(X) > Tr(Y).
Disjunction, conjunction, and equivalence are defined by negation and impli-
cation; the definitions imply the following, matrix-stipulations for "a,"k", "e":
6 Lukasiewicz and Tarski, in their papers (a) and (b), cited in footnote 2, differentiate very

strictly between the expressions of the sentential calculus and their syntactical (metalogical) designa-
tions; see also the explicit remark in paper (a), page 2.
As to the reasons for adhering to that distinction, see R. Carnap, Logische Syntax der Sprache,
section 42: Notwendigkeit der Untersckeidzungzwischen einem A usdruck find seiner Bezeichnung.
6 Loc. cit., footnote 2, (b), p. 63.
 A PURELY TOPOLOGICAL FORM OF NON-ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC 99

(2c) Tr(Xa Y) - Tr(Y) I if Tr(X) ? Tr(Y)

Tr(X), if Tr(X) > Tr(Y)
(2d) Tr(XkY) Tr(X), if Tr(X) ? Tr(Y)
-
Tr(Y), if Tr(X) > Tr(Y)
+ Tr(X), if Tr(X) ? Tr(Y)
(2e)
(2e) Tr(X
Tr(XeY) ={1 -Tr(Y)
I -Tr(X) + Tr(Y), if Tr(X) > Tr(Y)
In the case n=2, the Lukasiewicz matrices are identical with those of the
ordinary sentential calculus; this shows that the stipulations (2) furnish a
genuine generalization of two-valued logic.
By means of the truth-tables thus established, the valid formulae, or, as we
shall say, the tautologies of n-valued lcgic, are defined as the sentences to which
the n-valued tables ascribe the truth-value 1 for all possible truth-values of the
elementary sentences of which they are composed. The class of all the tautologies
determined by the n-valued tables is called L^.
Thus, L2 is the well known class of the tautologies of two-valued sentential
logic. It is identical with the class of those sentences which follow from the
axiom system erected in Principia mathematica.7Every tautology of Ln(n>2)
obviously is also a tautology of L2; but the converse does not hold. Thus, for
example, the formulae representing the classical "Aristotelian" principles of ex-
cluded middle-PanP-and of excluded contradiction-n(PknP)-both belong
to L2, but not to any Lo with n>2. Moreover, the systems Ln are all different
from one another; hence Lukasiewicz's generalized matrix method gives rise to
an infinite set of non-Aristotelian systems of logic.
3. The matrices of a purely topological logic of sentences. The construc-
tion of the Lukasiewicz systems is based, as we have seen, on assuming a finite
or infinite scale of different numerical truth-values. Here the question arises
whether it is not possible to erect a sentential logic on the weaker basis of a purely
topological serial order of sentences, in which the falser of two sentences precedes
the truer one and equally true sentences stand at the same place-without the
introduction of any numerical truth-value.8 We shall try to answer this question
by developing what might be called a purely topological logic of sentences."This
logic represents a generalization of classical sentential logic which lies still beyond

7 See the proof given by Post in his article cited in footnote 3.

8 This way of putting the problem was suggested by certain formally similar questions which
the author is investigating in collaboration with Dr. P. Oppenheim, and which concern the logical
significance of purely topological order for empirical science, in particular for the introduction of
"graduable" concepts possessing no numerical degrees. (See Hempel and Oppenheim, Der Typus-
begriff im Lichte der neuen Logik, Sijthoff, Leiden 1936.) In this context, Dr. Oppenheim raised
the question whether the concept of truth could not also be considered as such a graduable concept;
this induced the author to develop the present considerations, in which that concept of truth which
is employed in connection with the matrix method is supposed to be topologically graduable.
9 The expression "topological logic" has already been used by Reichenbach, but in quite a
different sense. Reichenbach (see note 4, (a) pp. 10-11, (b) p. 383) calls a plurivalued logic metrical
if all its truth-values can immediately be interpreted as probabilities in the sense of relative fre-
quencies; and he designates a certain three-valued logic topological in order to express the fact that
it does not fulfill this condition.
100 CARL G. HEMPEL

the plurivalued systems, and its construction leads to some considerations which
may be of interest for the theory of deductive systems in general and for the
theory of logic in particular.
We will now first of all formulate precisely our initial assumptions. We
consider a finite or infinite set of sentential constants "pl", "lp2", * * ,
ail

<q2X- --,"rl, "r2", . (In case the set of the sentential constants under
consideration has a greater cardinal number than So, one must introduce still
further subscripts. For the considerations of this paper, however, the cardinal
number of that set is irrelevant.) Each of these small italic letters with subscript
may be looked upon as an abbreviation of a certain constant sentence such as
"2X2=4" or "2X2=5."
Let B be the class of all the sentential constants under consideration and of
the expressions which can be derived from them by negation, implication, dis-
junction, conjunction, and equivalence. As designation for a sentential constant
occurring in B, we choose the corresponding capital italic letter with the same
subscript; thus, for instance, "P7" will designate "P7". For designating the com-
pound sentences contained in B, we adopt the conventions indicated above for
the usual calculus of sentences.
Now we suppose that the elements of B are put into a serial order, deter-
mined by two two-termed relations: being less true or preceding in truth-order,
which we designate by "<", and being just as true or standing at the same
place in truth-order, designated by " = "; according to the serial structure of the
order, these relations are supposed to satisfy the following conditions:
Standing at the same place is (3.1) symmetrical and (3.2) transitive; pre-
ceding is (3.3) irreflexive and (3.4) transitive, and the order determined by the
two relations is connected in the following sense: for any two B-elements X, Y
(3.5) if X<Y, then not X=Y; and (3.6) if not X=Y, then X<Y or Y<X
(in other words, either X= Y or X < Y or Y < X).
So we neither assume that numerical truth-values are ascribed to the B-sen-
tences nor do we introduce special assumptions concerning the structure of the
serial order under consideration (such as existence of a first or a last element,
density, etc.). We will call this order a purely topologicaltruth-orderof the sen-
tences which B contains as elements.
According to our assumptions, for every ordered pair (X, Y) of B-expressions
one and only one of the following three propositions holds: X < Y, X = Y, X> Y.
We shall also characterize these three cases by saying that the topological truth-
value of the ordered pair (X, Y) is <, =, >, respectively.
Starting from these basic assumptions, we will now erect our topologicallogic
of sentences by following the procedure of Lukasiewicz as closely as possible in
formal and in material respects; viz., we shall establish matrices and determine
them in such a manner that they become, so to speak, topological abstracts of
Lukasiewicz's general numerical matrices; that is, more precisely: if one inter-
prets the two fundamental relations (<, =) of our topological system as having
smaller numerical truth-value and having the same numerical truth-value, re-
spectively, then the content of our topological matrices is to be contained in
(is to be a logical consequence of) the five general numerical matrix-determina-
tions (2a)-(2e).
 A PURELY TOPOLOGICAL FORM OF NON-ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC- 101

We begin with the negation matrix. What can be stated of its content in our
topological terms is: the truer X, the falser nX; or, more precisely, if X stands
before, at the same place as, or after Y in the truth-order, then nX will stand
after, at the same place as, or before nY in the truth-order, respectively. We sum
this up in a "topological matrix of negation." This matrix
(X, Y) (nX, nY)

shows the essential difference between the numerical and the topological truth-
tables. We will now express this difference with respect to the tables of two-
membered combinations. Numerical tables answer questions of the following
type: Given the exact places of X and Y in the numerical truth-scale, what is
the exact place of, say, XaY in the same scale? In our topological terms, we
cannot express the position of one, but only the relative position of two sentences
in the truth-order. So, in analogy to considering single sentences as one does in
the numerical case, we now consider ordered pairs of B-elements, and the topo-
logical truth-tables of two-termed combinations answer the following question:
Given the relative position of two pairs (Xi,2 Y"), (X2, Y2) of B-expressions, what
is the relative position of X1aY1 with respect to X2aY2? And analogously for
k, i, and e.
The number of lines in each of these truth-tables will therefore be equal to
the number of the possible topologically different positions of (X1, Y1) with
respect to (X2, Y2); and this number is equal to that of the different possible
arrangements of the four expressions Xi, Y1,X2, Y2in truth-order. Each of these
arrangements can be characterized by the topological truth-values which are
taken by the following six pairs of expressions: (XI, Y1), (X2, Y2), (X1, X2),
(Y1, Y2), (X1, Y2), (X2, Y1). Take, say, the arrangement in which Y1 and Y2
stand at the same place, XI before and X2 after them; then the six topological
truth-values in question are <, >, <, =, <, >, respectively. In the same way,
every other arrangement of four B-sentences determines a certain distribution
of the topological truth-values over those six places, but not vice versa: a dis-
tribution which has for instance " < " at the first and fourth and " =Y" or "> "
at the fifth place is impossible, since preceding is transitive. A combinatorial
consideration which takes into account the serial structure of the truth-order
shows that only 75 of the 36formally possible distributions of topological truth-
values over those six places determine a possible arrangement of X1, Y1, X2, Y2
in truth-order. Thus, in general, the topological matrix of every two-membered
sentential combination will have 75 lines (corresponding to the n2 lines in an
n-valued system), 6 argument-columns (corresponding to 2 in a plurivalued
system) and one value-column for every two-termed sentential connection (just
as in the plurivalued systems).
The first line of the matrices contains the value "< " in each of the 6 argument-
places. What is the corresponding topological truth-value of (XiaYi, X2aY2)?
From (2c), one sees that in our case XiaY, = Y1and X2aY2= Y2; and as Y1< Y,,
one has XlaY,<X2aY2. Quite analogously, one finds that XlkY1<X2kY2. For
102 CARL G. HEMPEL

implication, one finds from (2b) that in the numerical case, under the conditions
of our first line, Tr(XiiYi) = Tr(X2iY2) = 1; therefore in our table, XliY1
= X2i Y2.
As to equivalence, the numerical stipulations (2e) do not allow us to infer
from the argument-indications of our first line the relative position of XieYi
with respect to X2eY2; they rather admit each of the three possible positions.
This may be seen from the following numerical example. Let Tr(Xi), Tr(YI),
Tr(X2), Tr(Y2) be 1/10, 8/10, 7/10, 9/10, respectively; then Tr(XieYi)=3/10
is smaller than Tr(X2eY2) = 8/10; if the four truth-values are 1/10, 8/10, 2/10,
9/10, then Tr(XieY,) = 3/10 is equal to Tr(X2eY2); and for the values 1/10,
5/10, 2/10, 9/10, Tr(XieYi)=6/10 is greater than Tr(X2eY2)= 3/10. We put
an interrogation mark at the first place of the value-column of equivalence in
order to indicate that the case is left indeterminate in the sense that each of the
three topological truth-values is possible.
These examples will serve to show how the complete matrices can be estab-
lished. The result of the construction is represented by the big table, p. 112.
It shows that indeterminate cases occur only for implication (6 cases) and for
equivalence (24 cases).
How are we to evaluate these topological matrices?
In the case of numerical systems, one of the truth-values, as a rule the value 1,
is selected, and by means of it the tautologies of n-valued logic are defined as the
sentences the matrix of which contains the selected truth-value in every place
of its value-column.
In our case, one might try to establish an analogous criterion by selecting
one of the topological truth-values, say <, and calling a B-sentence-say
Pii(Q5anQs)-a tautology of topological logic if the value-column of the topologi-
cal matrix for (Xii(YianYi), X2i(Y2anY2)) contains exclusively "<"-symbols.
But this criterion would not be fulfilled by any B-expression, since for X =X2,
Y1= Y2 (see the big table) the topological matrix of every formula contains "= "
in the value-column. The same reasoning holds in the case of >. And finally,
if one selects = instead, the class of tautologies thus defined is no longer empty;
it contains, amongst others, PiP, which has the form of a tautology of two- and
plurivalued logic; but at the same time, it contains n(PiP), which has the form
of a contradiction in two- and plurivalued logic; the same holds for certain other
tautologies of L2 and their negations; therefore it would not be suitable, either,
to define the tautologies of topological logic by the "= "-criterion.
Here is the point where the analogy with the construction of plurivalued
systems comes to an end. We have been able to establish matrices just as in the
numerical case, and to make their content conform to that of the general
Lukasiewicz matrices; but for evaluating the tables thus constructed, we have
to find another method.
4. Construction of language T. A suitable method of evaluation is sug-
gested by the following consideration. As recent researches have made clear,10
10 See Camap, Logische Syntax der Sprache.
 A PURELY TOPOLOGICAL FORM OF NON-ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC- 103

the logic of a given language cannot be completely characterized by a system of

tautologies or logically valid formulae of the language under consideration; it
rather is determined by the rules of logical inference which govern the language,
and which belong to its syntax language. By those rules, all the logically valid
formulae of the language are determined, but not vice versa.
Therefore instead of attempting to establish tautologies of topological logic,
we will now interpret our topological matrices as a system of inferential princi-
ples by constructing a language T in which logical inference is governedby purely
topological rules corresponding to the stipulations contained in the topological
tables.
We determine the language T by formation and transformation rules."
Theformation rules stipulate which kinds of expressions are to be called sen-
tences of T or T-sentences. Now, we are going to give the T-sentences such a
form that-putting it first in an intuitive manner-the language T does not
enable us to ascertain a single logical or empirical fact, but only to say that a
certain fact is less sure, just as sure, or more sure than another one. More
exactly: T is to have the character of a syntax language with respect to the
sentences of B, but its means of expression are to be so restricted that they only
allow the formulation of propositions which affirm either that a certain B-sen-
tence is less true or that it is just as true as another one. This idea is at the root
of the following formation rules:
(4.1) A symbol or a symbol-series is called a sentence-member with respect to
T, or briefly a T-member, if it has one of the following shapes:
a. tipl,) y P2)% cip3)), ...
iiQI)) CQ2)y "Q31 ..
D {CDas n .
.RI)AdV R"

(in other words: if it is one of the capital italic letters "P', "Q", "R", with
an integer-sign as subscript. If one supposes the cardinal number of the set B
of all sentential constants with which T deals to be greater than Ro, one has to
modify this stipulation by admitting further subscripts (see also above p.
100). But as will be seen, the cardinal number of that set-even its being finite
or infinite-is of no importance for the following considerations.) The symbols
characterized under a. will also be called elementaryT-members.
b. WI(U)" c. "(U1)i(U2)"; d. "(Ul~a(U2)";
e. "(U,)k(U2)"; f. "(U,)e(U2)",
where "U," and "U2" are T-members.
Let M be the class of all T-members, determined by this recursive definition.
(4.2) A symbol-series is called a T-sentence if it has one of the following forms:
a. "U,< U2"; b. "Ui,=U2",
where "U," and "U2" are T-members.
A T-member may be considered as a syntactical designation of a B-sentence,
31 Cf. Carnap, loc. cit., pp. 1 ff., pp. 120 if.
104 CARL G. REMPEL

and a T-sentence as a sentence saying that a certain B-sentence U1 is less true

than a certain B-sentence U2 (or that U1is just as true as U2, as the case may be).
However, the definitions (4.1) and (4.2) do not refer to the class B, and therefore
the following considerations are independent of that special interpretation.
In conformity to the initial considerations of section 4, we express the logic
of T in a system of general syntactical propositions (stipulations and conse-
quences of such) on T-members and T-sentences.12 For this purpose, we make use
of member-variables "xi", "X2", X , "yr", "ye", "ya"- ,,the value-
domain of which consists of the designations of T-members. When formulating
general propositions by means of these syntactical variables, we designate the
following symbols of the language T by themselves: "n", "i", "a",I "e",
"(",")", "<", "=". On the basis of these conventions, we can, for example,
formulate the following general statement, which is a consequence of (4.1):
For any two T-members xi, x2, the expression (nxl)a(xlix2) is again a T-member.
But the chief purpose of the notation just introduced is to express the trans-
formation rules for T.
These rules will be formulated as postulates concerning the class cs of the
closed systems of T-sentences. Intuitively put, we call a class a a closed system
(or briefly a cs), if for every two T-members xi, x2, the class a contains at least
one of the sentences xi <x2, xl=x2, x2<xl, and if further the consequences of
every set of elements of a are likewise elements of a.
In the systematic formal procedure, we shall expressly stipulate by the single
transformation rules, what further sentences are to be elements of a cs, if sen-
tences of such and such a form are contained in it; thus every transformation
rule will be a postulate concerning cs; and we shall then define the concept
"consequence (in T)" by means of "cs", saying that a T-sentence is a conse-
quence of a class a of T-sentences if it is an element of every cs which contains a
as a subclass. Designating the consequence relation by "Co", this definition can
be put as follows:
(5.1.1) Co(xi <x2, a) D (0)((e cs. aCB) D (xi <x2) e)
(5.1.2) Co(xi = x2, a)-Df (N)((3e cs * ac18) M(xi = X2)ef)

Here, "a" and "a"are variables the value-domain (range) of which consists of
the designations of the various possible classes of T-sentences.
The consequence relation is transitive in the following particular sense: if a
sentence is a consequence of a class a of sentences each of which is a consequence
of ft, then it is also a consequence of ,. This follows immediately from the above
definition of "Co".
For all transformation rules except one, it is more convenient to formulate
them, not in terms of the fundamental concept "cs", but by means of "Co".'3

12If one considers every T-member as a syntactical designation of a B-element, those general
propositions belong to a syntax language of the second order with respect to B, for they are expressed
in the syntax language of T.
13 This has also the great advantage that for the formulation of many of the transformation

rules and for drawing conclusions from them (which will be done in section 5) we shall be able to
 A PURELY TOPOLOGICALFORM OF NON-ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC 105

The transformation rules for T will be taken from the above topological
matrices and from the postulates (3.1)-(3.6) concerning the truth-order. For
the latter also can serve as a basis of inferences in T; thus, for example, "P1< P3"
can be inferred from "P1<P2" and "P2<P3" because of (3.4).
We first express those six stipulations as transformation rules:
(6.1) Co(x2 = xI, {xI = xt)b.
This formula postulates, in correspondence to (3.1), that for every two
T-members xl and x2, the T-sentence x2= xl is a consequence of the class which
contains the T-sentence xj=x2 as its only element. At first glance, it might
seem possible to express (3.1) in T itself by an axiom of the following kind:
(X= Y) z (Y= X). However, our formation rules exclude the occurrence of a
T-formula of such a form: T contains neither the implication-symbol (only its
designation "i" can occur) nor does it contain any variable, and this excludes the
possibility of formulating any (general) axiom in T.
(3.2) can be put as follows:
(6.2) Co(xI = X3, {X1 = X2, X2 = X3}).
In correspondence to (3.3), we introduce two stipulations:
(6.3.1) Co(X2 <X3, XI <XI )
(6.3.2) Co(x2 = X3, XI < xI )

This means: a class containing a T-sentence of the form xi <xi has every
T-sentence as its direct consequence ("x2" and "X3" are free variables, and by
substituting suitable constant values for them in "X2<x3" and "X2 =X3", one can
arrive at any T-sentence whatsoever). We shall also say: a class containing a
T-sentence of the form xi <xi is contravalid.14
The following formula corresponds to (3.4):
(6.4) Co(xI < X3, {X1 < X2, X2 < X3}).
(3.5) can be expressed by the following pair of postulates:
(6.5.1) Co(X3 <X4, {XI <X2, XI = x2)
(6.5.2) Co(X3 = X4, {X1 < X2, X1 = X2).
(Interpretation similar to that of (6.3.1, 6.3.2).)

make use of the general syntactical concepts and methods developed by A. Tarski (Fundamentale
Begriffe der Methodologieder deduklivenWissenschaften.I. Monatshefte f. Math. u. Physik, vol. 37,
pp. 361-404 and by R. Carnap (see above, footnote 5). It may be of interest to notice here that the
idea of these authors to take "consequence" as the fundamental concept in establishing the syntax
of a language leads to certain difficulties in its application to the syntax of T. This has been the
reason for our choosing "cs" as fundamental concept.
14 The idea of defining an inconsistent class of sentences as a class which has every sentence
(of the language under consideration) as its consequence is due to Post (see footnote 3). It does not
refer to the concept of negation and therefore is much more general than the usual definition of in-
consistency, which would not be applicable in our case, as the language T does not contain any
negation-symbol: the formation rules do not provide the possibility of symbolically negating a
T-sentence. Post's idea has been adopted and developed by Tarski and Carnap in their general
syntactical researches (see above, footnote 14).
106 CARL G. HEMPEL

Finally, we introduce the following postulate as a correlate to (3.6):

(6.6) (a e cs) D { [(xI < x2) eal] v [(Xi = X2) e a] V [(x2 < xI) e a]}
This means, that every closed system a contains, for every two T-members
xl and x2, at least one of the sentences xi <x2, xi = x2, x2 <x1.
This postulate represents a generalization of the Zweiwertigkeitssatz, which
stipulates that the truth-value of every sentence is either 0 or 1-tertium non
datur-and which, therefore, may also be called the syntactical principle of the
excluded middle. (It must be distinguished from the formula "p v '-.p" of the
sentential calculus, which is also often called the principle of -the excluded
middle.) The general Lukasiewicz systems are based on replacing this principle
by what might be called the n-Wertigkeitssatz or the syntactical principle of the
excluded (n+ 1)st (see above, p. 98); intuitively put, this principle affirms that
the possible truth values of any sentence are limited to n well determined places
in the scale of real numbers. Now (6.6) can be considered as a topological
generalization of this principle, because it affirms that of any two sentences the
first stands before or after or at the same place as the second, and consequently
every sentence has its place in the truth-order. Thus (6.6) guarantees that no
two sentences are incomparable with respect to their relative truth, and we may
therefore call it the principle of excluded incomparability.
In a similar way, one can establish a syntactical version of the principle of
excluded contradiction (",--(p.-p)"), generalize it to the n-valued case, and
then formulate a topological correlate for it which affirms that the three cases
xi < x2, xi = x2, x2 < xi mutually exclude each other, i.e. that every class containing
two sentences of the forms x1<x2 and x-=x2, or xl-x2 and x2<x1, or xi<x2 and
X2 <xI, is contravalid. This assertion need not be introduced as a new postulate;
it can be deduced from the postulates (6). The first two of them follow from
(6.5) and (6.1); the last can be proved as follows: because of (6.4), {x1<X2, X2<x1}
has xi <xi as a consequence; further {xi < XL has every T-sentence as a con-
sequence (according to (6.3)); hence {xL<x2, x2 <xL} has every T-sentence as a
consequence and is, therefore, contravalid. This generalization of the syntactical
principle of excluded contradiction might be called the principle of excluded
ambiguity.
We come now to the evaluation of the topological matrices. In principle, we
interpret every line of the five matrices as a transformation rule for T; but it
will turn out that the determinations thus resulting can be reduced to a rela-
tively small number of postulates, from which they are all deducible.
The first two lines of the negation table furnish the following formulae:
(7.1) Co(nx2 < nx,, Xl < x2
(7.2) Co(nx2 = nxL, Xl = x2)

The formula corresponding to the third line follows from (7.1) by inter-
changing "1" and "2".
The matrix of disjunction may be translated line by line as follows:
Co(xlayL < x2ay2, {Xi < yL, X2 < y2, X1 < X2, yL < Y2, X < y2, X2 < yI).
 A PURELY TOPOLOGICAL FORM OF NON-ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC 107

But the 75 formulae thus resulting can be replaced by the following three, which
correspond to the stipulations (2c):
(8.1) Co(xiax2 = x2, xi < x2 )
(8.2) Co(xiax2 = x2, xi = x2 )
(8.3) Co(xlax2 = xi, x2 < xi ).
From these formulae, together with those established under (6), one easily
deduces the 75 formulae just mentioned.
Quite similarly, the transformation rules resulting from the conjunction
matrix can be summed up by the following three formulae, which correspond
to (2d):
(9.1) Co(xlkx2 = xi, xi < x2 )
(9.2) Co(xlkx2 = xi, x= x2 )
(9.3) Co(xlkx2 = x2, x2 < xi ).
As to the implication matrix, its content can be summed up in 12 postulates:
(10.1) Co(xliyl = X2iy2, {X1 < yr, X2 < Y2 })
(10.2) Co(xliyz = x2iy2, X1 < yI, X2 = Y2 )
(10.3) Co(xliyl = X2iy2, X1 = Y1) X2 = Y2 )
(10.4) Co(x2iy2 < X1iy1, XI < Yi, Y2 < X2})
(10.5) Co(x2iy2 < X1iy1, X1 = y1, Y2 < X2 })
(10.6) Co(xliyl = x;2iy2, Yi < xl, Y2 < X2, xl = X2, Y1 = y2})
(10.7) Co(xliyl < x2iy2, y1 < x1, Y2 < X2, XI = X2, Y < y2})
(10.8) Co(x2iy2 < Xiiyb, {y < X1, Y2 < X2, X1 = X;2, Y2 < Y)
(10.9) Co(x2iy2 < X1iy1, Yi < X1, Y2 < X2, XI < X2, Yi = y2})
(10.10) CO(X2iy2 < XI iyI, Y] < XI, Y2 < X2, XI < X2, Y2 < YI D
(10.11) Co(Xliyl < X2iy2, y1 < X1, Y2 < X2, X2 < X1, y1 = Y2})

(10.12) CO(Xliyl < X2iY2,{Y1 < XI, Y2 < X-2)X2 < X1, Y1 < y21)
From these formulae one can deduce 69 theorems, corresponding to the single
lines of the implication matrix, the six lines which contain an interrogation mark
and hence do not determine any transformation principle excepted.
And finally, we can sum up the stipulations of the topological equivalence
matrix in the following seven postulates:
(11.1) Co(xley1 <x2ey2, {xI <Yi, x2 <Y2,)x<x2, Y1 = Y2 )
(11.2) Co(xiey1 < x2ey2, x1 < yi, x2 y2, Xi < x2, y2 <y })
<
(11.3) Co(x;2ey2 < xieyl, Xi < yi, X2 < Y2, X1 = X2, y1 < y2})
(11.4) Co(xieyi = x2ey2, XI < Yi, X1 = X2, y1 = y21)
(11.5) Co(xley1 < x2ey2, X1 < yl, X2 = y2})

(11.6) Co(xzeyi = x2ey2, xI < y ,x1 = Y2, X2 = yj)

(11.7) Co(xieyi = x2ey2, xi = yi, x2 = Y2}).
The formulae (6.1)-(11.7) exhaust the transformation rules of the language
T; they determine its principles of logical inference or, briefly, its logic; in this
sense, the language T is governed by a purely topological logic.
5. Some theorems of the logic of T. In order to render more explicit the
108 CARL G. HEMPEL

nature of the topological logic thus established, we now consider some charac-
teristic theorems which can be deduced from the above postulates. In the formu-
lation of some of these theorems, we shall make use of the concept of validity,"
calling a T-sentence valid if it is a consequence of the null class of T-sentences.
As a consequence of this definition and of (5.1), (5.2), a T-sentence is valid if
and only if it is an element of every closed system. Designating validity by
"VId" and the null class by "A" we state the definition and its consequence:
Vld(x1 <X2) Df Co(x1 < x2, A)
Vld(xi = X2) Df CO(X1 = x2, A)
Vld(xi < x2) (a)((a e cs (xi < X2) (a)
Vld(xi = x2) (a)(a e cs (xi = x2) e a).
Introducing axioms into a formalized system can always be interpreted as
establishing certain transformation rules for that system, namely postulating
that certain formulae (the axioms) are consequences of the null class.16 The
converse of this remark does not hold; it may be that the formation rules of a
language do not allow one to formulate the intended axioms in the language
itself, as we saw in the case of T (see remark between (6.1) and (6.2)). This
shows that the way in which T has been set up can be regarded as a generaliza-
tion of the axiomatic method, and that the T-sentences which we shall prove
to be valid play a role corresponding to that of the consequences of the axioms
in an axiomatic system, e.g. to the tautologies in the axiomatized sentential
calculus.
The first theorem expresses the reflexivity of standing at the same place in
truth-order:
(12.1) Vld(xi = xi).
The proof runs as follows. Because of the last of the four formulae just estab-
lished, (12.1) affirms that every closed system contains, for every constant value
of "xI", the T-sentence xl<xl as an element. Now, according to (6.6), every cs
contains, for any value of "xi", either xi= xi or xi<xi. But also in the second
case, it contains x-=xi, as follows from (6.3).
Similarly, the following theorems can be deduced from (6.1)-(6.6):
(12.2) Co(xI < X3, {X1 < X2, x2 = X3})

(12.3) Co(xI < X3, XI = X2, X2 < X3})

(12.4.1) Co(X3 < X4, {XI < X2, X2 < X1})
(12.4.2) CO(X3 = X4, {XI < X-2, X2 < XI}).

The two theorems (12.4) express the irreflexivity of preceding in truth-

order.
Some of these formulae are needed for proving the theorems mentioned
above, which correspond to the single lines of the topological matrices.
Let us now consider some theorems concerning negation:

15 See Carnap, Logische Syntax der Sprache, p. 126.

16 See Carnap, loc. cit., pp. 1234.
 A PURELY TOPOLOGICALFORM OF NON-ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC 109

(13.1) Co(nnxI < nnxt, xI < X2)

(13.2) Co(nnx1 = nnX2, xI = x2}.
In this context, it is interesting to notice that
Vld(nnxi = Xi)
does not follow from our stipulations (though in the syntax of each of the pluri-
valued Lukasiewicz systems "Tr(nnX)=Tr(X)"-which might be called the
syntactical version of the principle of double negation-holds). The proof will
be given in section 6.
We come now to some theorems concerning implication:
(14.1) Vld(xiixi = x2ix2)
(14.2) Vld(xii(x1ax2) = yii(yiay2))
(14.3) Vld(xlkx2)ixi) = (yiky2)iyi).
Theorems concerning disjunction:
(15.1) Vld(xiaxi = xl)
(15.2) Vld(xiax2 = x2axi)
(15.3) Vld(xia(x1ax3) = (x1ax2)ax3).
Theorems concerning conjunction:
(16.1) Vld(xlkxl = xi)
(16.2) Vld(xlkx2 = x2kxi)
(16.3) Vld(xlk(xlkx3) = (xlkx2)kx3).
(15.2), (15.3), (16.2) and (16.3) show, that the commutativity and associ-
ativity of disjunction and conjunction are guaranteed also in our topological
logic. The same is true for the associative laws:
(17.1.1) Vld(xia(x2kx3)= (x1ax2)k(xiax3))
(17.1.2) Vld((xlkx2)ax3= (xiax3)k(x2ax3))
(17.1.3) Vld(xlk(x2ax3)= (xikx2)a(x1kx3))
(17.1.4) Vld((xiax2)kx3= (xikx3)a(x2kx3)).
The following theorems may be considered as topological correlates to the
syntactical version of two of the De Morgan rules:
(18.1) Vld(n(xlax2) = nxlknx2)
(18.2) Vld(n(x,kx2) = nxlanx2).
The correlates to the other two De Morgan rules do not follow from our
stipulations; indeed, the following formulae can easily be demonstrated:
(18.3) Vld(n(nxlknx2) = nn(xlax2))
(18.4) Vld(n(nx1anx2) = nn(xlkx2)).
But since "Vld(nnx, = xl)" is not a consequence of our stipulations (as mentioned
above), one can not deduce from (18.3), (18.4) the following formulae, which
would be the correlates of the other two De Morgan rules:
110 CARL G. HEMPEL

Vld(n(nxlknx2) = X1ax2)
Vld(n(nxianx2) = xikx2).

In the syntax of the plurivalued systems, the truth-values of negation,

implication, disjunction, conjunction, and equivalence are one-many functions
of the truth-values of the component sentences. Exactly correspondingly, the
following uniqueness theorems can be proved for T:
(19.1) Co(nx1 = nx2, {xi = x2})
(19.2) Co(xliyl = X2iY2, {xI = X2, yi = y2})
(19.3) Co(xlay = x2ay2, xi = x2, y = y24)
(19.4) Co(xikyi = x2ky2, xi = x2, yi y2 )
(19.5) Co(xleyl = x2ey2, Xi = X2, Y= Y21)

6. Final remarks. The language T thus established is consistent but incom-

plete.
Here we call a language consistent if not every one of its sentences is valid;
and we call it incomplete if not every one of its sentences is either valid or contra-
valid (a sentence is said to be contravalid if the class which contains the sentence
as its only element is contravalid in the sense defined above, p. 105); a sentence
which is neither valid nor contravalid will be called indeterminate."7Therefore
an incomplete language is consistent; and for proving our assertion concerning T
it will be sufficient to show that according to our stipulations for T, not every
T-sentence is either valid or contravalid.
For this purpose, consider the case in which T contains only two elementary
members, say "Pi" and "F2". Now we define a subclass K of the class of all T-
sentences such that K is a cs. We arbitrarily ascribe to "Pi" the value V("P,") =0
and to "P2" the value V("P2") = 1, and further we attribute to every T-member
a value which is exactly the same as that defined by the Lukasiewicz stipulations
for the sentence designated by that member. Thus, we have for example,
V("PiaP2") = 1, V("PliP2") = 1, V("P2iPi") =0, etc. Now, we take as elements
of K those and only those T-sentences which fulfill one of the following con-
ditions: (a) the sentence has the form xi <x2, and its members are such that
V(x1)= 0, V(x2)= 1; (b) the sentence has the form xi = x2, and the members are
such that either V(xi) = V(x2)= 0 or V(xi) = V(x2)=1. The class K thus deter-
mined fulfills, as is easily verified, all our conditions (6.1)-(11.7) for a cs. But
because of our stipulations, the T-sentence "P2<P1" is not an element of K;
hence, this sentence is not valid.
On the other hand, let K' be the class resulting from K by replacing every
"<" by a ">". Then also K' is a cs; it is not contravalid, because it does not
contain every T-sentence (e.g. not "Pi<P2F"). Now K' contains "P2<P1" as
an element. Therefore, "P2<1Pi" is not contravalid.
Hence, we see that "P2<P1i" is indeterminate. By the same kind of reasoning,

17 These definitions are taken from Carnap, Logische Syntax der Sprache. The basic ideas of

these general definitions of consistency and completeness are due to Post; they have undergone a
further development in the researches of Tarski and of Carnap (see footnote 15).
it can be proved generally that every T-sentence of the form xl<x2 (where
xi and x2 can be highly complex T-members) is indeterminate with respect to
our transformation rules. (Hence every T-sentence that can be proved to be
valid must have the form xi = x2.)
Finally, we give in this connection the proof that every T-sentence of the
form nnx, = xi is indeterminate, a fact which was mentioned in connection with
the theorems (13).
We take the case in which T contains as many elementary members as there
are rational numbers in the closed interval <0, 1>; we will denote them by
"P"s, where r is rational and 0? r ?1. Then we introduce the following cor-
relation:

V("sP,") = r for every r;

2-V(x)=- {V(x-) } for every T-member xi.

The V-values of the other member-forms may be defined, as above, in corre-

spondence to (2b)-(2e). Then, as can easily be verified, V(nxi) is a rational
number belonging to the interval <0, I> if the same is true for V(xi); and
V(nx1) is smaller, equal to, or greater than V(nx2) if V(xi) is greater, equal to,
or smaller than V(x2), respectively; but V(nnxl)=V(xi) only in the case that
V(x1)=0 or V(xi) = 1.
Then we define a class L by stipulating that a T-sentence of the form xl <x2
is to be an element of L if and only if V(x1)<V(x2), and a sentence of the form
xi= x2 if and only if V(xi) = V(x2). Then, just like K in the above example, L
is a cs; but of all the T-sentences of the form nnxl=xl, L contains only two:
"nnPo po", and "nnPi=PF". Hence, nnxl=xl is not a valid sentence for
every xi: "Vld(nnxi =x1)" is not a consequence of our transformation rules.
And it is further seen that not a single sentence of the form nnx1= xi can be
valid in T; for, in view of the form of our transformation rules, no singular
statement can be deduced from them if the corresponding general one does not
hold.
If, on the other hand, one stipulates
V(nx) = 1 -V(x),
and maintains all the other definitions given above, then, instead of L, another
closed system L' results, which contains every T-sentence of the form nnxl=xl,
but not every T-sentence whatsoever. This proves, that the formula
"Vld(nnxi=xx)" is not incompatible with the transformation rules of T, and
that no T-sentence of the form nnxi = xi is contravalid, which, together with the
result obtained before, shows that every sentence of that form is indeterminate,
q.e.d.
112 CARL G. HEMPEL

TOPOLOGICAL
MATRCES
o0r DIsjuNmcON,CONJUNCTION,
IPLICATION,
AND EQUIVALNCE

- -
Z XX X ,. X X Xa a Z -c X 2

4 < < < < < < < - < 43 - < <
> < > < > >

6 < < < < < < < - ? 4 - > < > < - > >
7 < < S < < - < 45 > < < < < > < < < ?

10 < < > < < > < >

< 48 > > > < | > < >

< 52 > < > < < <

15 < < < < 54 > < > < > >< < <?
17 < > < < > < 56 > < - > < > >< < ?

22 < <> > < = -<

> 61 > < < > < >

12 < > < > < < > = 638 > < < < > < < ? ?

26 < >> > < > = > > 64 > < > < < > < < ? ?

28 < >< > > > > - > 66 > > <
> > > < > < >

13 < < > > > < > > > ? 68 > < > < > > >
<
31 < > > > > < > > > ? 6689 > > > > > = <
-324- < < < < > < < - < 5 > > > > >
< > > >

33 <
< < <
<
>< 7 > > > < > > > < < <
35 _ < > >< > > 74 > > > > > < > > ? ?

37 < < < > < < >

39 = > > > < > > <

8

BELGIUM
BRUXELLES-FOREST,