Do Tanker Pools influence Market Rates?

The Case of Tankers International

D R Glen

&

B T Martin

31/07/2002

Reader
CITM
Dept of Business Studies
London Guildhall University
84 Moorgate
London EC2M 6SQ
UK
Email: glen@lgu.ac.uk, or davric_217_glen@hotmail.com

Research Director
E A Gibson Shiprokers Ltd.
16-20 Ely Place
London
EC1P 1HP
UK

Revised September 2002

1
Introduction

Whilst there have been many studies of the tanker market at the industry level, the

number of studies that explore an issue within the market are quite rare. This paper

provides an outline of the number and structure of tanker pools, and then provides

some statistical results of testing the simple hypothesis that pool members earn higher

rates than non-pool members operating on the same routes. It focuses on two pools in

particular, the Alliance and Tankers International. Both of these are ‘vehicles’ for

Frontline, a large company run by Mr. J. Frederiksen. Tankers International is of

particular interest because of its recent creation, and of its apparent success in

obtaining a significant share of tonnage of modern very large crude carriers (VLCCs).

The statistical tests focus on the possibility that Tankers International may be able to

influence market rates as a consequence.

Definition and characteristics of shipping pools

According to Packard[1]

“ A merchant shipping pool is a collection of similar vessel types

under various ownerships, place under the care of an Administration.
This Administration markets the vessels as a single, cohesive fleet
unit and collects – ‘pools’ their earnings which, in due course, are
distributed to individual owners under a pre-arranged ‘weighting’
system by which each entered vessel should receive its fair share….”
p.3.

A shipping pool acts as a single entity in the allocation of its vessels to meet the

various contracts that it has entered into. Quite often, the pool resources are used to

fulfil contracts of affreightment, and time charter commitments entered into by the

pool administration.

2
Haralambides [2] provides a list of the main characteristics of bulk shipping pools.

They were identified as

(a) Similar tonnage

(b) Central administration (pool management company)

(c) Joint marketing

(d) Negotiation of freight rates

(e) Centralization of voyage costs

(f) Freight collection

(g) Weighting system

(h) Revenue distribution

(i) Fair share

Similar tonnage is interpreted here as tonnage of similar type and size range. Pooling

together different ship types is not particularly useful, given the different market

characteristics that each type faces. Indeed, given the evidence on significant

differences in market characteristics which has emerged [3], it is likely that pools will

be more successful if their size variation is also limited.

By centralising pool management, the pool can minimise overheads and maximise the

marketing potential for the fleet. Haralambides notes that pools can be split into those

whose objectives appear to be driven by a dominant owner, (member controlled) and

those which are administration controlled. In the latter case, the pool strategy may be

to develop sufficient credibility with charterers to enable the pool to bid for contracts,

and to help individual ship owners reduce their risk exposure.

In the majority of cases, the pool management company will receive the freights and

distribute net earnings to individual owners on the basis of the agreed weighting

3
formula. It will pay all the voyage related expenses for pool activities i.e. bunker

costs, port charges, canal dues, etc., but all other costs, such as manning, insurance,

loan repayments, maintenance etc. are paid for by the owner.

The pool net earnings are split between members on the basis of a formula, which

reflects the different characteristics of the pool vessels. According to Packard [4] the

pool can employ a ‘reference vessel’ for calibrating each ship, to determine its share

of the pool’s earnings. The smaller the variation in the technical characteristics of the

owners’ vessels, the greater the chance of harmonious agreement over the weighting

system. Haralambides [5] suggests that degree of similarity of business culture

amongst members is probably more important than the technicalities, because it

reduces the chance of internal conflict between owners.

Rationale for entering a pool

Haralambides [6] identifies three broad areas, which are: obtaining access to contracts

of affreightment; risk sharing and income stabilisation; and the exploitation of massed

resources. Contracts of affreightment require the regular movement of significant

amounts of cargo to an agreed schedule with the charterer. Such contracts may be

lucrative, but impossible for a shipowner to fulfil on an independent basis. By co-

operating with owners who have similar tonnage, the pool can create a credible entity

to meet the contract terms.

Secondly, pooling resources implies that owners also pool risk. The overall volatility

of pool earnings will be less then the volatility of the earnings of each individual

vessel. Haralambides notes that income stabilisation will

4
 “mainly be the result of a careful ‘mix’ of contracts of
affreightment, spot, medium and long term charters. Of course,
this type of flexibility requires a certain fleet size and here is
found one of the advantages of pooling tonnage” [7] p. 225.

The final principal element is less to do with scale economies than to exploit

economies of massed resources. The pool management can negotiate for bunkers on

behalf of the fleet; obtain higher fleet utilisation through improved planning; greater

marketing effectiveness and better networking.

Pools and Market Power

Can a shipping pool create market leverage? Whilst the creation of a cartel is capable

of raising market rates can a pool do likewise? Haralambides [8] points out that most

pools are active in meeting contracts of affreightment, whose rates are determined by

market forces. As long as the agreed freight rates are determined by market forces,

and do not form the basis for market rates in themselves, pool arrangements will be

exempt from regulation 4056 or from Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome, which

forbids anti-competitive behaviour. Haralambides also notes that the pool agreement

itself might be viewed as anti-competitive, but emphasizes the fact that if a variable

hire charter party agreement is at the heart of the pool system, it is no different in

principle from the actions of a large independent shipowner who charters in tonnage.

Indeed, many commentators have viewed pools as a defensive mechanism, in that

they are often created by owners when market conditions are poor. But this point in

itself implies that there appears to be some grounds for assuming that the pool can

5
potentially influence market conditions, if it becomes sufficiently large enough in

terms of control of the relevant market segment tonnage.

This possibility should be seen as a separate point from the one made earlier, in that

pool operators may achieve higher earnings through better utilization of the vessels

and through lowering operating costs through pool purchases of bunkers etc. The

issue at stake is not the raising of earnings by lowering costs, but the raising of

earnings by raising rates obtainable by pool members.

Tanker Pools

There are a number of tanker pools active in the market place. Data published by E.

A. Gibson Shipbrokers Ltd. [9] provides a means of determining the size and extent of

tanker pools, as well as providing details of ship sizes, age, and ultimate owners. As

of 2002, there were 12 pools covering a range of ship size and types. They are shown

in Table 1, which provides data on the ship types, size and age range, numbers and

deadweight tonnage of vessels in the pools in 2002. The data has been organized in

ascending order of tanker size.

Two features stand out. First, as expected, tanker pool characteristics are consistent

with those observed by Haralambides in dry bulk, in that the pool members are

concentrated both terms of both ship type and ship size range. Every pool identified

has only one ship type, and the size ranges are also limited. It is also noteworthy that

the age range of the SuezMax and VLCC pools is 9 or 10 years, with all vessels in

these pools being young, the eldest being 11 and 10 in The Alliance and TI pools

respectively.

6
Second, there is a very wide variation in the proportion of the tonnage that the

different pools ‘control’ across the market segments. Dorado and Handy Tankers

pools account for approximately 5% of the relevant flee segment. Gibsons estimates

that Torm Waterfront, PDV/OSG and LR2, account for 9.6% of the available

Aframax fleet, or just 54 ships from a total fleet of 549. The OBO pool stands at

1.02mn dwt, which represents 26% of all OBO’s of 55-85,000 dwt, and 7.2 per cent

of all OBO’s as at January 2002. Thus most pools have insignificant shares of the

relevant tonnage, but two stand out in terms of their ‘market share’. They are the

Odfjell Seachem chemical tankers pool, and the Tanker International VLCC pool. The

former accounts for 45% of the relevant market.

The largest pool in dwt. terms is Tankers International, which accounted for 16.7mn

dwt of tanker tonnage. This is estimated to represent approximately 16% of all tankers

of size range 250-320,000dwt, which is a significant proportion of the tanker stock by

relative standards. Modern VLCC’s are almost entirely operated on the Arabian Gulf

Eastbound, or Arabian Gulf US Gulf-Caribbean, or West Africa US Gulf -Caribbean.

This profile is reflected in the routes operated by the TI pool members.

It is clear from the data provided in the Table that Tanker pools do indeed reflect the

model of ‘typical’ pool, with narrowly specified size ranges and specific ship types.

7
The Case of Tankers International

Tankers International was formed in February 2000 by several founder companies;

namely, Frontline, Moller, Overseas Shipholding, Euronav, and Oldendorff, R.N.K.E.

[10]. Table 2 provides the composition of the pool as at January 2002.

Insert Table 2 here

With Frontline owning nearly 40% of the tonnage in the pool, it would appear that TI

would be a ‘dominant owner’ type. But it has a partnership type agreement, and is

organized and operated from London, whilst Frontline is based in Norway [11]; the

operation of the pool is independent of the dominant player. The other members of TI

have similar tanker tonnage and age profiles to each other, with the exception of

Oldendorff, who have only two vessels in the pool.

Tankers International appeared to be very successful when it first started. The timing

of its creation was fortuitous. Two significant events made the birth of TI very

advantageous. First, the Erika had split in two and sunk off the Britanny coast in

December 1999. The sinking of the Erika led to the IMO accelerating the proposed

periods for phasing out single hulled vessels. The legal action of the French

authorities, in holding the chartering company TotalFinaElf to be potentially liable

for the incident, as well as the owner, triggered a change in market chartering

behaviour. As a consequence, charterers refused to accept ‘old’ tonnage, and

observers claimed that a ‘two tier’ market for tonnage had emerged, with new tonnage

obtaining higher rates than old.

Second, the tanker market experienced its first significant non-war related market

boom since 1970. Tanker freight rates climbed from around WS 48 for West Africa –

8
US Eastbound (VLCC) in June 1999 to WS 70 in December. By June 2000 they

averaged WS 104, before peaking in December 2000 at WS 163. Rates fell below WS

100 in April of that year, and had reached WS 65 in June 2001.

Insert Figure 1 about here

By December 2002 rates had declined to WS 37.5, before averaging around WS 40

since. Thus the creation of TI can be seen to have been very fortuitous in that their

vessels were in a position to take advantage of both the shift in chartering demand

towards new tonnage and the sharply improving rates. This second point of course,

assumes that the organisation was able to take advantage of spot chartering

opportunities, and had not already committed itself to contracts at less advantageous

rates. Indeed, Gray [12] comments that a few months after the launch of TI, Frontline

was claiming two significant advantages for its operations: reduced waiting time, and

a ‘strong backhaul position’ in the West Africa Asia trades. This presumably, should

impact on earnings.

Estimating Earnings

As has already been noted, one important rationale for entering a pool arrangement is

to stabilise income and lower operating costs, thus raising earnings to above the

market average. Haralambides [13 ] provides historic evidence for one dry bulk pool,

for the period 1982 – 1993. For most of the period annual earnings were above the

market rate time charter equivalent (TCE) . What evidence is there for Tanker pools?

9
Given that tanker owners are often private companies, it is very difficult to obtain

direct information on their earnings. There is some evidence available for Star tankers

and for Tankers International, but of a rather indirect kind. In 2001, Heidenreich

Marine, a privately-owned company, operated 39 Panamax vessel and 11 products

tankers. It placed its clean products vessels in the Dorado pool, and its Panamax

vessels in the Star Tankers pool. In the first quarter of 2000, it was reported that

average [Dorado] pool earnings were $14,057 per day, compared with a market

average of $13,773 a day. Earnings were related to age: a newbuilding earned $17,000

a day, a 1992 built vessel earned about $15,800 a day, and a 1982 vessel earned

$14,100 per day [14]. Average pool earnings in 1999 were $10,957 per day compared

to the market average of $7,805 per day.

In a study published in Marine Money [15], Saginaw provides some estimates of the

financial performance of Frontline, the dominant player in the VLCC pool, Tankers

International. Frontline also has a significant number of vessels in the Alliance pool

of SuezMax tankers. Examination of Gibsons Tanker book reveals that at January

2002, all of Frontline’s 135,000- 170,000 dwt bar 8 were in the Alliance Pool: -six of

the eight were on long term or time charters. Twenty-two of the thirty three 260 –

310,00 dwt vessels were in the Tankers International pool, the rest on long term or

bareboat time charters. Thus the earnings profile of Frontline is dominated by the

performance of the two tanker pools, Alliance (SuezMax) and Tankers International

(VLCC). Frontline generated annual average time charter equivalent earnings (TCE’s)

for its Suezmax tankers of $30,690 and $35,530 per day for 2000 and 2001

respectively. This compares with market averages of $40,300 and $32,500 per day for

the market as a whole. In other words, performance was worse than the market. For

10
VLCC’s, the situation was slightly different. In 2001, Frontline’s earnings were better

than the market average, but in 2001 they were worse. The figures are $46,300 per

day in 2000, $40,831 per day in 2001 for Frontline, compared to the market average

of $53,900 per day for 2000 and $37,400 per day in 2001.

Clearly the evidence is rather mixed, but it is certainly not categorically in favour of

the pool. The evidence of two years, may of course, be an insufficient time period to

determine the long run success or failure of a pool, but given the two years coincide

with very high tanker rates, the indicators are not particularly promising.

Tanker Pools and Freight Rates: The case of TI and Alliance

Whilst TI does not appear to control a ‘significant’ proportion of VLCC tonnage, its

effect should not be underestimated. Given the charterers’ preference for young

vessels, the relevant market share should perhaps be for vessels of 10 years of age or

less, rather than the entire stock of vessels. On this basis, TI controlled 16.68mn dwt.

out of 79.7mn dwt, or 21%. Given that some tonnage is already committed on time

charter, the effective leverage on the spot market could be seen as of potential

significance. Is there any evidence that tanker rates are affected by the existence of

the pool, as well as earnings?

This paper provides an attempt at answering this question. By employing data held on

the Gibson database, all ‘dirty’ spot transactions involving companies who had

vessels in the Alliance and Tankers International tanker pools were extracted for the

period 1st January 2000 to end June 2002. This yielded 909 fixtures, which covers the

period of the recent rise and fall in rates. Of these 909 fixtures of pool companies, 606

involved pool vessels, the remainder, non-pool vessels. It is important to note that the

11
characteristics of these vessels were very similar, whether they were in the pool or

not. This enable the comparison of freight rates, expressed in current Worldscale,

across pool and non-pool vessels, with the objective of determining the existence or

otherwise of differences in the freights paid.

Following the methodology of Tamvakis [16 ], a series of t-tests were carried out on

the sample. The data was split into route specific fixtures, to ensure comparability.

The finer the degree of disaggregation, the fewer the fixtures, so that in some cases it

proved impossible to carry out such a test, because there were too few fixtures. Table

3 provides a summary of the salient features of periods and routes employed.

Insert Table 3 about here

It is important to note that the fewness of observations means that samples are

necessarily small, and the results must therefore be treated with caution. Because of

the small numbers, the data was aggregated across all periods for each route, and a

simple t-test computed. The null of the t-test was that there is no significant difference

between the rates earned by pool and non-pool vessels on the same route, given

similar characteristics. Given that the observations are not matched, and samples t-

test formula for non-matched pairs with different variances was employed, on a one

tailed basis, given that the null is that pool members might obtain higher rates.

Table 4 provides the results of the aggregate tests.

Insert Table 4 about here

12
The results of comparing rates on five routes for the Alliance pool, and five for

Tankers International, although it should be noted that the five ‘routes’ are not

independent of each other. The Alliance routes are: Black Sea (BS) Outbound, West

Africa (WA) to US coast and Caribbean, UK Continent (UKC) Outbound, and UK

Continent to US Atlantic, US Gulf, and Caribbean (USAC/CAR/USG). The latter is

of course a subset of the UKC Outbound route. The TI routes are West Africa

Outbound, WA US Gulf, Caribbean and US East (USC/CAR/USE), Arabian Gulf to

Japan and Korea (AG JAK), Arabian Gulf to US Gulf, (AG/USG), and AG Outbound.

The results of the t-tests are unambiguous. They computed values are so low that none

of the values exceed the relevant critical values. In other words, the assumption that

the rates obtained by tanker pool members are the same as those earned by similar

non-pool vessels cannot be rejected. There appears to be no significant difference

between rates.

Do the results differ when different periods are examined? To answer this question,

the data was ‘arbitrarily’ divided into six month periods, generating four possible test

periods. Data is available from January 2000, but there were insufficient observations

to make the first six months of the period useful. The results presented are for the

period from June 2000 to June 2002. As it happens, these periods roughly coincide

with the rise, peak, shoulder, and collapse of market rates, as Figure 1 shows.

The results of the more detailed analysis are presented in Table 5. There are fewer

routes, because the disaggregation process created severe data problems, with no

fixtures or too few fixtures being recorded. There are now only four routes for each of

13
the pools, and for the Alliance pool in particular, many of the sub-periods do not

provide sufficient observations to run the test.

Insert Table 5 about here

These problems notwithstanding, it is clear that the separation of the time periods into

‘boom’ and slump makes no real difference to the outcome. Not one of the t-values

achieves a value greater than 0.5, which in itself is an extremely inconsequential, not

to say insignificant, number.

The evidence presented above supports the hypothesis that pools do not influence

rates; their raison d’etre is clearly to be found on the marketing and costs reduction

side, and in the ability to bid for contracts of affreightment. The results must be

treated with caution, because the sample sizes are too small to provide comfort to the

statistician.

Superficially, the evidence presented above supports the hypothesis that pools do not

influence rates; their raison d’etre is clearly to be found on the marketing and costs

reduction side, and in the ability to bid for contracts of affreightment. However, the

results must be treated with caution, for three reasons. First the sample sizes are too

small to provide comfort to the statistician. Second, the comparison of rates has been

limited to non-pool and pool vessels of similar characteristics owned by the same

companies. It would be useful if the tests could be recomputed using a larger number

of non-pool observations for comparison. Third, even if rates were to be found to be

similar, it is possible that the pool has raised all market rates and thus the tests are

inappropriate. A properly specified econometric model is needed to allow for this

possibility. It must therefore be stressed that the ‘T-test’ results are indicative, rather

14
than definitive, and that alternative methodologies must be applied to the data before a

final conclusion on this question can be reached.

TI fall out

In May 2002, Frontline announced its decision to withdraw its vessels from Tankers

International. This caused a certain amount of shock to the industry, especially given

the apparent success of the VLCC pool. But the evidence presented in this paper

implies that there were neither significant effects on VLCC rates received by pool

members, nor were there any significant gains in earnings. In other words, neither

market power nor organisational benefits could be discerned for Frontline. Whilst the

real reason for Frederikson’s withdrawal from Tankers International will probably

never be made public, it is the case that the company has obtained a series of time

charter fixtures with a major oil company. It appears that the company has decided

that the income stream from this source is more consistent with the company’s long

term strategy for its VLCC’s than leaving them in pool.

Concluding Comments

Using data provided by E A Gibson Ltd., the potential effect of the creation of tanker

pools on tanker freight rates has been explored. After briefly outlining the benefits

which might arise form creating a pool, the numbers and characteristics of tanker

pools were described. It was shown that they fitted the typical model of a specific ship

type or size, and in some cases, a very specific age range. Two of the tanker pools

appear to have a sufficiently large tonnage share to potentially affect market rates.

15
This possibility was explored by using data on pool members’ ships in two of the

Tanker pools, Alliance and Tankers International. In addition, data was obtained for

non –pool vessels of member companies so that simple t-tests could be carried out on

the Worldscale rates obtained by the two vessels. Data was rather limited, but what

there is decisively rejects the possibility that pool members earn higher than rates than

non pool members. It is important to note that it is of course possible that the market

rate for both pool and non-pool members might be increased by a successful pool, and

this hypothesis has not been directly tested in this paper. The case of Tankers

International was also explored. It was shown that Frontline appears to have earned no

better than the market average for the years 2000 and 2001. This fact combined with a

lack of evidence of any countervailing power effect on rates, may help to explain its

decision to leave Tankers International this year.

16
References

[1] Packard, W. V. (1995) Shipping Pools Lloyd’s of London Press. London.

[2] Haralambides, H. (1996) “The economics of bulk shipping pools” Maritime

Policy and Management 23, No. 3, pp. 222-237.

[3} See, for example, Glen, D. (1990) “The emergence of differentiation in the tanker

market, 1970-1978”, Maritime Policy and Management 17, No. 4, pp. 278-312, and

Kavussanos, M. (1997) “The dynamics of time varying volatilities in different size

second-hand ship prices of the dry-cargo sector” Applied Economics, 29, pp. 433-

444. See also chapters by Glen and Martin and Kavussanos in C. Grammenos. (ed)

Readings in Maritime Economics, Lloyds of London Press, forthcoming.

[4] Packard, W. (1995) pp 55 -71.

[5] Haralambides, H. (1996) p.223-224.

[6] Haralambides, H. (1996) p.224-226

[7] Haralambides, H. (1996) p.225.

[8] Haralambides, H. (1996) p.235.

[9] E A Gibson Shipbrokers Ltd. Tanker Book 2002 E A Gibson Shipbrokers Ltd.

London, UK.

[10] Gray, T. (2002) “Frontline defection hits VLCC pool”, May 9th. Available at

www.lloydslist.com.

[11] Lloyd’s Shipping Economist (2000) “The man on shipping’s frontline”, May,

available at www.shipecon.com

[12] Gray, T. ) “Frontline defection hits VLCC pool”, May 9th. Available at

www.lloydslist.com.

[13] Haralambides, H. (1996), p.226.

17
[14] Lloyds Shipping Economist, (2001) “The secret of success? Pooling”, May,

available at www.shipecon.com

[15] Saginaw, D. (2002) “Comparative TCE Earnings Analysis” Marine Money at

www.marinemoney.com.

[16] Tamvakis, M. (1995) “An investigation into the existence of two tier spot freight

markets for crude oil carriers” Maritime Policy and Management, vol 22, No. 1, Jan-

Mar., pp. 81-90.

18
Table 1 Tanker Pools, 2002

Pool Name Type Size Range Age Range Number Mn DWT Fleet % Fleet
000dwt years Mn DWT
Odfjell Seachem Chem/Prods 23 – 45 1– 26 60 2.08 4.63 44.9
HandyTankers Handy 27 – 38 1- 16 26 0.88 13.89 6.3
Dorado Tankers Handy 30 - 48 3 -20 8 0.33 26.62 1.2
Team Tankers Chem/Prods 40 – 48 2 -21 10 0.44 12.72 3.5
Torm/PCL Pool Prods 45 - 51 1 -17 19 0.88 13.1 6.7
Star Tankers Panamax 54 - 72 2 -23 38 2.39 10.23 23.4
Teekay OBO OBO 75 -82 19 – 21 13 1.02 14.2 7.2
Torm Waterfront Tkrs Aframax/Prods 68 – 84 12 - 17 20 1.65 52.31 3.2
The LR2 Pool Aframax/Prods 85 – 110 2 - 14 14 1.36 52.31 2.6
PDV/OSG Aframax/Prods 81 - 113 0 –22 20 1.98 52.31 3.8
Alliance SuezMax 142 - 169 2 - 11 39 5.92 37.86 15.6
Tankers International VLCC 284 –311 0 –10 56 16.68 126.53 13.2
Source E. A. Gibson Tanker Book 2002, p.135 - 143

19
Table 2

Composition of Tankers International Pool, January 2002

000 DWT % Share
Frontline 6631.034 39.8
Moller 2873.775 17.2
Overseas 2714.065 16.3
Dr Peters 2035.633 12.2
Euronav 1824.55 10.9
Oldendorff 601.82 3.6

Total 16680.877 100.0

Source: Calculated from E A Gibson Tankerbook 2002

20
Figure 1. Tanker Freight Rates 1999 – 2002

VLCC West Africa - US East

200.00
TCE WS

150.00
100.00
50.00
-
9

2
9

1
0
-9

-0

-0

-0
-9

-0

-0
n

n
n

ec

ec

ec
Ju

Ju

Ju

Ju
D

D
Date

Source: E A Gibsons Ltd.

21
Table 3 Pool Data Sample Observations

Pool dataAlliance Pool 01/07/2000 01/01/2001 01/07/2001 01/01/2002Total Obs

Routes 31/12/2000 30/06/2001 31/12/2001 30/06/2002
<175,000 BS Outbound 6 15 12 18 51
WA USC/CAR/USG 9 12 6 5 32
UKCUS 4 6 3 9 22
AG/Outbound 2 11 17 25 55

Tankers International Pool

>175,000 WA USC/CAR/USG 0 8 4 4 16
AG/JAK 4 8 2 9 23
AG/USG 0 5 5 1 11
Ag West
AG East 5 10 6 14 35
(IND SPORE/Korea/JAPAN)
210
Source: Derived from E A Gibsons Ltd Database

22
Table 4 T-Statistic Values for aggregate data for Pool vessels

Pool/Routes
Alliance Pool N Pool Obs T-Statistic
BS Outbound 53 51 0.089
WA USC/CAR/USG 39 31 0.330
UKC/USAC/CAR/USG 23 20 0.187
UKC Outbound 41 24 0.229
AG/Outbound 65 55 0.030

Tankers International
WA Outbound 66 45 0.128
WA USC/CAR/USG/USE 27 18 0.363
AG JAK 49 23 0.013
AG USG 24 11 0.024
AG Outbound 236 117 0.247
Source: Computed by authors

23
Table 5
T-Statistic Values for Individual Routes and Time Periods for
pool vessels
Periods
01/07/2000 01/01/2001 01/07/2001 01/01/2002
Pool/Routes 31/12/2000 30/06/2001 31/12/2001 30/06/2002
Alliance Pool
BS Outbound n.a. 0.088n.a. n.a.
WA USC/CAR/USG 0.026 0.269 0.245n.a.
UKC/USAC/CAR/USG n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
AG Outbound n.a. 0.108n.a n.a.

Tankers International
WA USC/CAR/USG/USE n.a. 0.265 0.205 0.259
AG JAK n.a. 0.018 0.495 0.454
AG USG n.a. 0.046 0.188n.a.
AG Outbound 0.337 0.019 0.264 0.324
Source: Computed by authors

24
 This paper is part of the

IAME Panama 2002 Conference Proceedings

The paper has been anonymously peer reviewed and accepted for presentation by the
IAME Panama 2002 International Steering Committee

The conference was held on

13 – 15 November 2002
in Panama

The complete conference proceedings are published in electronic format under

http://www.eclac.cl/Transporte/perfil/iame_papers/papers.asp
For further information contact jhoffmann_eclac@yahoo.com

25