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Political and administrative reforms

Electoral system
- Prior to 1993, Japanese electoral system follows the single non transferable
vote (SNTV) multi-member districts
o Voters have a single vote, despite a district magnitude of two to six
members
o Votes are not transferable to other candidates of the same party even if
the voter’s first choice has already made it past the post vote
division: problem of distributing the vote among its candidates in order
to win as many seats as possible.
o Such a scenario: political parties can either 1) provide cues to
supporters to divide vote, 2) allow candidates to distinguish themselves
ideologically or 3) prospect of pork to induce voters to follow party
cues.
o LDP utilizes its greatest advantage, incumbency to ‘buy votes’
- Problems with the electoral system:
o Expensive campaigning, encourages corruption
o Promotes factional struggles leading to politics of personality over
politics on policy

- Assessment: This electoral process advantages the resource-rich and the


incumbent, which can distribute the benefits of public goods to its
constituents. The resource poor opposition, as often the case in Japan, finds it
difficult to maintain campaigns. Indeed, the system is proven to be supra-
proproportional as compared to a pure Proportional Representation (PR)
system as the LDP has been able to hold a significant majority of seats without
a majority of the vote since 1963.

Electoral reforms:
- The electoral system was replaced by a mixed system of PR and SMD after a
series of compromise.
- This electoral change proves to be insubstantial as the LDP maintains a
majority of seats disproportionate with the votes it garners.
- The real issue with the electoral system that the reformers have neglected is
the malapportionment of seats between geographical districts, favouring the
rural regions. The number of seats available in a district is not proportionate to
the population of eligible voters. As a result, the LDP is able to ride on its
support from the rural population.
- Gerrymandering being unresolved thus causes the electoral reforms to fail in
their original objective: to level the playing field.

Administrative reforms
- Administrative reforms are primarily targeted at reducing the collusion among
the politicians and the bureaucrats transforming the bureaucracy to an
independent instrument of policy implementation
- Access to bureaucracy invites pork barrel politics and corruption.

- Provisional Commission on Administrative Reform (Rincho 1): 1961-1964


o Basic model for admin reform thereafter
 financial restructuring and deregulation to enable structural
economic adjustment  ie to make implementation of policy in
a more efficient, effective and economical manner
 administrative reform procedures took on political influence
 deliberation councils engage the centrist parties into reform
process
o Administrative Management and Inspection Committee
 establishment of the Cabinet Office,
 measures to ensure that the Cabinet drafted the budget (eg.
Establishing the Council on Economic and Fiscal policy),
 planning and implementation of policies separate (eg.
Establishment of incorporated administrative agencies)
 reallocation of administrative functions between central and
local government
 career civil servants were prevented from participating as
delegates in the Diet
- Rincho II 1981-83: deregulation
o Succeeded by three temporary Provinsional Administrative Reform
Promotion Councils (Gyokakushin) (1983-86) (1987-90) (1990-93)
o Streamlining admin. functions
o 1993, Hiraiwa Report prepared under Hosokawa: minimizing
regulation in line with the philosophy of “free in principle” in
economic deregulation and “personal responsibility” in social policies
 Deregulation of land and housing, distribution, agriculture,
imports and info-comm.
 Decentralisation: reduction in number of ministries
o Establishment of the Administrative Reform Commission (1994-
1997): deregulation as central pillar.  initially meant to be free of
bureaucrats so as to achieve political independence from bureaucratic
machine: failed.  admin reform cannot be successful without
bureaucratic cooperation.
o LDP under Hashimoto: shift of focus away from keeping
administration accountable to ensuring simple and efficient
government
- Administrative reforms have their political implications because of the close
association between the dominant LDP and the bureaucracy: party highly
dependent on bureaucratic power
o Postal reforms: deregulation, downsizing of administration, but with
vast ramifications threatening the power base of the LDP.

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