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Statutory Aids To The Interpretation of Statutes
Statutory Aids To The Interpretation of Statutes
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
Extrinsic aids to interpretation consist of everything not found within the statute,
whereas intrinsic aids are those found within the statute being interpreted. The use of
extrinsic aids thus implies non-adherence to literalism.
4. The definition of terms implied by the rest of the Act - the context rule.
7. The long title and preamble (all Acts have preambles, and all Private Acts
and all old Public Acts have long titles), but they cannot prevail over clear
enacting words.
a. For example, in Fisher v. Raven 1964, the long title was used
to decide that debtors for the purposes of Act were ordinary
debtors.
INTERPRETATIVE APPROACHES
In general
1. Judicial interpretation is unregulated by Parliament, however
Parliament (usually!) drafts Acts in such a way as to minimise the
amount of interpretation that is necessary.
THE APPROACHES
The Literal Rule
The literal rule means the interpretation of Acts purely according to
their literal meaning; it has fallen out of favour since the 19 th Century. It
is, unsurprisingly, the first approach that will be taken. It means
following the literal, ordinary or natural meaning of words.
On the other hand, the court that tries to enforce Parliament's will is
more likely to succeed than the court that does not; but it may severely
compromise justice and certainty in doing so - the person following the
statute should not have to speculate as to what the law is (this is only
relevant in the criminal law).
The problem with the literal rule is that although it sounds simple, there
is not always a prescribed meaning for words - the ordinary meaning may
not be so ordinary at all - problems finding the natural meaning of words
frequently occur, e.g., in R. v. Maginnis 1987, did temporarily holding
drugs on someone else's behalf (i.e. taking the drugs from them to return
them at a later date) amount to an "intent to supply"- Held, "Yes" (4-1,
but both sides claimed that their meaning of supply was the ordinary one,
even though the minority definition came from a dictionary).
R. v. Harris 1836, Harris bit someone's nose off; it was unlawful to " stab,
cut or wound" (this is also an example of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, and indeed the two approaches are complimentary). This implied
that some instrument must be used - this may be criticised as
symptomatic of the irrelevance and absurdity of the law, but it is not
wholly indefensible, since for the law to develop as a science, it is
essential for it to follow logical rules.
"We no longer construe Acts according to their literal meaning. We
construe them according to their object and intent. " - Lord Denning
Clear words must be applied - even if the result is absurd per Lord
Edmund-Davies in Stock (above), i.e. the judges' only role is in
determining what unclear words mean.
"If the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, in our judgment we
are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense, even though it does
lead to an absurdity or manifest injustice"- Jervis CJ in Abley v. Dale
1851.
"We can only take the intention of Parliament from the words which they
have used in the Act" - Lord Reid in I. R. C. v. Hinchy 1960 (note Pepper v.
Hart 1992)
"If the words of an Act are clear, you must follow them, even though
they lead to a manifest absurdity. The court has nothing to do with the
question whether the legislature has committed an absurdity. [However]
If the words of an Act admit two interpretations, and if one
interpretation leads to an absurdity, and the other does not, the Court
will conclude the legislature did not intend the absurdity and adopt the
other interpretation" R. v. City of London Court Judge [1892] 1 QB 273
Lord Esher
"It is a cardinal principle in all statutes that you may not attach to a
statutory provision a meaning that the words of that provision cannot
reasonably bear. If they are capable of more than one meaning, then you
can choose between those meanings, but beyond that you must not go. "
Lord Reid, Jones v. DPP 1962
Golden Rule
It was defined in Grey v. Pearson (1857) 6 HL Cas 1, "the ordinary sense
of the words is to be adhered to, unless it would lead to absurdity, when
the ordinary sense may be modified to avoid the absurdity but no
further."
Luke v. I.R.C. 1963 - Lord Reid "It is only where the words are absolutely
incapable of a construction that will accord with the apparent intention
of the provision and will avoid a wholly unreasonable result that the words
of the enactment must prevail."
R. v. Allen 1872. It was held that bigamy meant go through ceremony even
though the Act provided it was illegal to be married twice, even though
the second marriage was void, so they had not literally broken the law.
If the words used are plain, unless the consequences are so absurd that
Parliament must have made a drafting mistake" then the meaning must be
used.
Adler v. George; it was an offence to obstruct the Forces "in the vicinity
of", this was modified to avoid the absurdity of it not including "in",
hence the Act as changed to "in or in the vicinity of"
Sussex Peerage Case 1844, only use mischief rule when the statute is
ambiguous. "Acts should be construed according to the intent of
Parliament. If the words are clear no more can be done than to use their
natural meaning. The words alone do declare the intention of the
lawgiver."
Corkery v. Carpenter 1951, a bicycle was held to be a "carriage" for drunk
in charge of carriage laws, to stop the mischief of drunks on the highway
2. What was the mischief for which the existing law did not
provide?
"To apply the words literally is to defeat the obvious intent of the
legislature. To achieve the intent and produce a reasonable result
we must do some violence to the words" Lord Reid
"The days have passed when the courts adopted a literal approach.
The courts use a purposive approach, which seeks to give effect
to the purpose of legislation." Lord Griffiths - Pepper v. Hart
"And" has been substituted for "or" in Federal Steam Navigation
Co. Ltd. v. DTI 1974 and R. v. Oakes
i. In Wood v. Commissioner of
Police of the Metropolis 1986 it
was held that an accidentally
broken glass was not ejusdem
generis with "any gun, pistol,
hanger, cutlass, bludgeon or
other offensive weapon"
a. In R. v. Inhabitant of Sedgley it
was held that "lands and
coalmines" implicitly excluded
other types of mines from the
scope of 'lands'.
EXTRINSIC AIDS
Royal/Law Commission reports
and White Papers
These have been admissible since the case of Davis
v. Johnson [1978] AC 264, which said that "the
report may be used to identify the mischief the
legislation is intended to remedy but not to
construe the enacting words") and other travaux
préparatoires providing (Fothergill v. Monarch
Airlines Ltd. [1980] 3 WLR 209) that it is material
in the public domain clearly intended to be the first
stage in the legislative process and, if the document
is a treaty, that a literal construction is in conflict
with the purpose of the treaty, or if the legislation
is ambiguous.
Hansard
Hansard has been officially used (judges used it
before this case unofficially) since the case of
Pepper v. Hart, in which the question was whether
the taxable benefit of providing the children of
teachers with free education should be taxed at the
nominal extra cost to the school, or at the normal
cost of the school's fees. It was decided using
Hansard that it should be taxed at the lower cost.
Other aids
1. Dictionary definitions - this implies a
literalist construction of statutes,
since a purposive approach would seek
to enforce what Parliament intended,
rather than enforce the meaning of
what it said.
2. Legal textbooks
4. EU directives