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BS 8010
BS 8010
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PUBLISHED DOCUMENT
© BSI 2008
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Publication history
First published December 2008
Contents
Foreword iii
Introduction 1
1 Scope 3
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2 Normative references 3
3 Abbreviations 3
4 Risk assessment of buried pipelines – Overview 4
5 Failure of hazardous gas or liquid pipelines 5
6 Individual risk assessment 13
7 Societal risk assessment 15
8 Factors affecting risk levels 19
Annexes
Annex A (informative) Summary of HSE methodology for provision
of advice on planning developments in the vicinity of major accident
hazard pipelines in the UK 28
Annex B (informative) Failure frequencies for UK pipelines 33
Annex C (informative) Example of a site-specific risk assessment 47
Bibliography 53
List of figures
Figure 1 – Overview of PD 8010-3 2
Figure 2 – Event tree for the failure of a hazardous pipeline 6
Figure 3 – Risk calculation flowchart for flammable substances 8
Figure 4 – Calculation of pipeline length affecting an individual in the
vicinity of a pipeline 14
Figure 5 – Framework for the tolerability of individual risk 15
Figure 6 – Societal risk FN criterion line applicable to 1 km of
pipeline 17
Figure 7 – Site-specific pipeline interaction distance 18
Figure 8 – Reduction in external interference total failure frequency
due to design factor 22
Figure 9 – Reduction in external interference total failure frequency
due to wall thickness 23
Figure 10 – Reduction in external interference total failure frequency
due to depth of cover 24
Figure 11 – Indicative reduction in external interference total failure
frequency due to surveillance frequency (dependent on frequency and
duration of unauthorized excavations) 24
Figure A.1 – Planning application process and need for site-specific
risk assessment 30
Figure B.1 – Generic predicted pipeline failure frequencies for
third‑party interference 35
Figure B.2 – FFREQ predictions of total external interference failure
frequency for UKOPA pipe cases 39
Figure B.3 – FFREQ predictions of external interference rupture
frequency for UKOPA pipe cases 40
Figure B.4 – FFREQ predictions for external interference rupture
and leak frequencies for specific diameter and wall thickness cases
(per 1 000 km·y) 41
Figure C.1 – Proposed development 47
Figure C.2 – Risk for outside exposure 50
Figure C.3 Societal risk FN curves and PD 8010-3 FN criterion line –
proposed development before and after slabbing 50
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List of tables
Table 1 – Range of applicability of reduction factor for design factor,
Rdf, and reduction factor due to wall thickness, Rwt 23
Table 2 – Failure frequency reduction factors, Rp, for pipeline
protection 25
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Table A.1 – Typical (1 × 10−6) and (0.3 × 10−6) risk distances for ethylene,
spiked crude and natural gas liquids (NGLs) 31
Table B.1 – Failure rates for UK pipelines based on UKOPA data 33
Table B.2 – Failure frequency due to external interference vs.
diameter 34
Table B.3 – Failure frequency due to external interference vs. wall
thickness 34
Table B.4 – Comparison of external interference failure frequency
estimates for example 1 with FFREQ predictions 36
Table B.5 – Comparison of external interference failure frequency
estimates for example 2 with FFREQ predictions 37
Table B.6 – Comparison of external interference failure frequency
estimates for example 3 with FFREQ predictions 37
Table B.7 – UKOPA pipe cases 38
Table B.8 – FFREQ predictions for total external interference failure
frequency for pipe cases defined in Table B.7 (per 1 000 km·y) 39
Table B.9 – FFREQ predictions for external interference rupture
frequency for pipe cases defined in Table B.7 (per 1 000 km·y) 40
Table B.10 – FFREQ predictions for external interference rupture
and leak frequencies for pipe cases defined in Table B.7 (per
1 000 km·y) 41
Table B.11 – Comparison of external interference failure frequency
estimates for example 5 with FFREQ predictions 43
Table B.12 – Critical defect lengths and equivalent hole diameters for
UKOPA pipeline cases operating at a design factor of 0.72 44
Table B.13 – Failure frequency due to external corrosion 44
Table B.14 – Material and construction failure frequency vs. wall
thickness 45
Table B.15 – Pipeline rupture failure frequency due to due to ground
movement caused by natural landsliding 46
Summary of pages
This document comprises a front cover, an inside front cover,
pages i to iv, pages 1 to 56, an inside back cover and a back cover.
Foreword
Publishing information
This part of PD 8010 was published by BSI and came into effect
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Presentational conventions
The provisions in this Published Document are presented in roman
(i.e. upright) type. Its recommendations are expressed in sentences in
which the principal auxiliary verb is “should”.
Commentary, explanation and general informative material is presented
in smaller italic type, and does not constitute a normative element.
legal obligations.
Attention is particularly drawn to the Pipelines Safety
Regulations 1996 [1] and to the requirements for risk assessments in
UK health and safety legislation, in particular:
• the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 [2];
• the Management of Health & Safety at Work Regulations 1992,
amended 1999 [3].
Introduction
PD 8010‑1:2004, Clause 5 and Annex F provide guidance on the
route selection and location of new pipelines in populated areas
in terms of the acceptable proximity to significant inhabited areas.
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© BSI 2008 • 1
PD 8010-3:2009 published document
Scope Clause 1
Safety risks caused
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by flammable
substances only
Calculation of
risk and risk
criteria
Individual Clause 6
Societal Clause 7
Supporting annexes:
Summary of HSE methodology for the Annex A
provision of land use planning advice in the
vicinity of UK MAHPs
Failure frequencies for UK pipelines Annex B
Example of a site-specific risk assessment Annex C
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published document PD 8010-3:2009
1 Scope
This part of PD 8010 provides a recommended framework for carrying
out an assessment of the acute safety risks associated with a major
accident hazard pipeline (MAHP) containing flammable substances. It
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2 Normative references
The following referenced documents are indispensable for the
application of this document. For dated references, only the edition
cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the
referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
PD 8010-1:2004, Code of practice for pipelines – Part 1: Steel pipelines
on land
IGE/TD/1 Edition 4:2001, Steel pipelines for high pressure gas
transmission1)
3 Abbreviations
For the purposes of this part of PD 8010, the following abbreviations
apply.
ALARP as low as reasonably practicable
FFREQ methodology recommended by UKOPA for prediction of
pipeline failure frequencies due to external interference
HSE Health and Safety Executive
LFG liquefied flammable gases, including liquefied petroleum
gases (LPG), liquefied natural gas (LNG), and natural gas
liquids (NGL)
MAHP major accident hazard pipeline
MAOP maximum allowable operating pressure
MDOB minimum distance to occupied building
PoF probability of failure
SMYS specified minimum yield strength
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4 • © BSI 2008
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into account for the specific pipeline design and operating conditions
to obtain the failure rate to be applied.
NOTE Predictive models can be generated for all damage types and
failure modes depending on the data available. In the UK, third-party
interference is the dominant mode, and predictive models based on
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5.1 General
Failure of a hazardous gas or liquid pipeline has the potential to cause
damage to the surrounding population, property and the environment.
Failure can occur due to a range of potential causes, including
accidental damage, corrosion, fatigue and ground movement. The
consequences of failure are primarily due to the thermal radiation
that is produced if the release ignites. This can be caused directly, or
indirectly by igniting secondary fires. Illustrative event trees for the
failure of a hazardous pipeline are shown in Figure 2.
NOTE 1 For detailed explanation of some of the consequence models
which have been applied by HSE to derive existing Land Use Planning
zones, see [11] to [14].
Failure of a high pressure pipeline can occur as a leak or rupture.
Leaks are defined as fluid loss through a stable defect; ruptures are
defined as fluid loss through an unstable defect which extends during
failure, so the release area is normally equivalent to two open ends.
The escaping fluid can ignite, resulting in a fireball, crater fire or jet
fire which generates thermal radiation. Typical event trees for the
failure of gas and liquid pipelines are shown in Figure 2.
NOTE 2 Spray fire is equivalent to a jet fire from a liquid line. Fireballs
are technically not possible but vapour cloud explosions (VCEs) can occur
where the liquid in the pipeline produces heavier-than-air vapour.
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Y
Spray + pool fire
Puncture Y
Pool fire A)
Y
N Running fire C)
N
Ground/water pollutionC)
N
a) Event tree for a liquid pipeline failure
Y Fireball +
jet fires F)
Y
N Jet fires D), F)
Y Flash fires B), E) +
N
N jet fires
No ignition
Pipe failure N
Y Impacted jet
(crater) fire
Y
Y Impacted jet
(crater) fire D)
N No ignition
N
Puncture
Y
Jet fire
Y
N Jet fire
N No ignition
N
b) Event tree for a gas pipeline failure
A) D)
Ground/water pollution is also likely to occur. There will be a limited flash fire which is not
B) normally considered separately.
If the vapour cloud could engulf any confined or
E)
congested region, the possibility of a VCE should be Only credible for heavier than air gases.
considered. F)
It is also possible for the release from one pipe end is
C)
Extent/distance will depend on ground permeability. obstructed and the other unobstructed.
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directed out of the crater and are unobstructed. Such releases can
produce directional effects, making their assessment more complex.
Where such a location or pipe is being assessed, the standard case
would normally be assessed, then the sensitivity of the location to
directional releases reviewed. A more detailed assessment might
then be required which would go beyond the standard methodology
described in this part of PD 8010.
NOTE 3 For large diameter pipelines (i.e. >300 mm) this is a standard
assumption.
If immediate ignition of a fluid release occurs, a fireball can be
produced which lasts for up to 30 s and is followed by a crater fire. If
ignition is delayed by 30 s or more, it is assumed that only a crater fire
(jet obstructed) or a jet fire (jet unobstructed) will occur.
For gases or vapours that are heavier than air, or form cold
heavier‑than-air gas clouds when released, the possibility of a flash
fire or VCE should be taken into account. The extent of such gas
clouds depends on prevailing weather conditions at the time of
release, the location of possible sources of ignition, and areas of
congestion or confinement. The modelling of the consequences and
effects of VCEs are not discussed in detail in this part of PD 8010.
NOTE 4 In the case of natural gas, this scenario is not usually considered,
as the release has a large momentum flux at the source and this normally
has a significant vertical component. For the duration of the release
relevant to the risk analysis, the transition to a low momentum (passive)
release does not occur until the released natural gas has dispersed (is
diluted) below the lower flammability limit.
The stages of pipeline risk assessment are represented in Figure 3.
In general terms, a quantified risk assessment of a hazardous gas or
liquid pipeline consists of four stages:
a) input of data (pipeline and its location, meteorological
conditions, physical properties of the substance, population);
b) prediction of failure mode and frequency;
c) prediction of consequences:
• calculation of release flow rate;
• determination of ignition probability;
• calculation of thermal radiation emitted by fire in an ignited
release;
• quantification of the effects of thermal radiation on the
surrounding population;
d) calculation of risks.
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Fluid properties
Meteorological conditions
Determine failure rate data for leaks and ruptures due to:
Failure
frequency Calculate failure frequency
Release Type of
Dispersion Ignition
rate + + + fire
Consequences
Thermal
radiation
Individual Effects of
risk thermal
Risk radiation
calculations
Societal
risk
The first stage of the risk assessment process is to gather the required
data to characterize the pipeline, its contents and the surrounding
environment. These data are used at various stages of the analysis.
The data should be obtained from engineering records, operating
data, the pipeline operating limits in the pipeline notification and an
examination of the pipeline surroundings. The principal input data
required for a pipeline quantified risk analysis are:
• pipeline geometry – outside diameter, wall thickness;
• pipeline material properties – e.g. grade (SMYS, TS), toughness
(or Charpy impact value), and any other data required to apply a
fracture mechanics model or to calculate the design factor;
• pipeline operational parameters – maximum allowable operating
pressure, temperature, pipeline shutdown period;
• location details, including:
• length and route of the pipeline to be assessed;
• topographical information in any region of interest (e.g.
ground slope direction, location of drainage channels and
ditches);
• location classification (class 1, class 2);
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• depth of cover;
• additional protection measures for the pipeline (e.g. concrete
slabbing);
• details of any above- and below-ground pipeline marking;
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The thermal radiation effect from crater fires and jet fires is generally
calculated by assuming that all persons outdoors, and indoors within
the piloted ignition distance, try to escape. The cumulative thermal
dose is then calculated, and the distance from the fire at which escape
is possible without exceeding a threshold dose. The thermal dose unit
(tdu), is defined as:
tdu = W 4/3t
where:
t is time, in seconds (s);
W is the intensity of thermal radiation, in kilowatts per square
metre (kW/m2).
NOTE 1 W is not independent of time for a transient release, and is
normally summed over exposure until safe shelter, the dose limit or a
cut-off thermal radiation level of, for example, 1 kW/m2 is reached.
Experimental and other data indicate that thermal radiation dose
levels can have differing effects on a population depending on
individual tolerance to such effects. The variation of effects has been
estimated from burn data for human beings which suggests that the
radiation level causing a significant likelihood of fatal injury in an
average population is 1 800 tdu. This level of thermal dose is often
used in risk assessments.
NOTE 2 Due to the uncertainties in the effects of thermal radiation, a
value of 1% lethality, equivalent to 1 000 tdu to 1 050 tdu as a threshold
of dangerous dose or worse, is sometimes associated with such predictions
(see Annex A).
In order to assess safe escape distance, a number of factors should be
taken into account, including escape speed for people outside running
away from the fire, location and types of buildings, populations
indoors and outdoors, daytime or night-time, etc.
The progression of a fire through the different stages of the event can
be complex. The prediction of the thermal radiation effects is required
to be summed through the event. This can prove difficult to achieve in
a continuous way, hence the event might need to be subdivided into
its stages and the effects summed later.
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1
1
2 2
4 4
a) Interaction distance = 2 × radius of circle = length of pipeline that could affect observer
R R
D
b) Interaction distance = 2 × R2 − D2
Key
1 Location of observer, at distance D from the pipeline
2 Circular effect distance/consequence distance, radius R
3 Pipeline
4 Interaction distance for observer at location 1
Criteria for individual risk levels have been determined by the HSE
in the UK. The framework for the tolerability of risk which gives
individual risk values for the defined regions, published by HSE [17], is
shown in Figure 5.
HSE sets land use planning zones for major hazard sites, including
high-pressure pipelines transporting defined hazardous substances
based on individual risk levels. Land use planning zones applied
to major accident hazard pipelines in the UK defined by HSE are
discussed in Annex A.
Unacceptable
region
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-3
Increasing individual risks and societal concerns
1 x 10 (Worker)
-4
1 x 10 (Public)
Tolerable if ALARP
region
-6
1 x 10 (All)
Broadly acceptable
region
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1.E-02
Frequency (per year) of N or more casualties
1.E-03
1.E-04
1.E-05 B
1.E-06
A
1.E-07
1.E-08
1.E-09
1.E-10
1 10 100 1 000
Number of casualties
Key
A Broadly acceptable
B Tolerable if ALARP
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The accident scenarios which are relevant for the pipeline section
within the site interaction distance should be listed, and the actual
population density within the area defined by the pipeline section
and the interaction distance (see Figure 7) determined. The frequency,
f, and effect area for each accident scenario should then be assessed
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along the site interaction distance, and the number of people, N, who
would be affected, is determined for each scenario at each specific
location. This provides a number of fN pairs, which are then ordered
with respect to increasing number of casualties, N, and the cumulative
frequency, F, of N or more people being affected is determined, giving
a site-specific FN curve.
2
3
Key
1 Maximum hazard range within which population is to be assessed
2 Pipeline
3 Site interaction distance
Existing buildings
New buildings
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Figure 8 Reduction in external interference total failure frequency due to design factor
1.0
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0.8
Reduction factor
0.6
0.4
0.2
= e 0.97 (f -0.72)
0.0
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
Design factor
NOTE Figure 8 relates to a pipe wall thickness of 5 mm, and can be used to assess the influence of design
factor on failure frequencies due to external interference for pipelines with wall thickness equal to or
greater than 5 mm.
Figures 8 and 9 show simple reduction factors for design factor and
wall thickness which can be used in estimating the failure frequency
due to external interference. These two reduction factors have
been derived from the results of comprehensive parametric studies
[20, 21, 22] carried out using models which describe the failure of
a pipeline due to gouge and dent-gouge damage [23, 24, 25], and
damage statistics for such damage derived from the UKOPA pipeline
database [9]. The reduction factors take the form of a factor for the
design factor and a factor for wall thickness, which are applied either
to a predicted pipeline PoF or to a failure frequency predicted for a
specific pipeline using a specific damage incidence rate. The range of
pipeline parameters over which the reduction factors are applicable is
given in Table 1.
The reduction factors given in Figures 8 and 9 are based on a
conservative interpretation of the parametric study results. They may
be applied separately to modify existing risk assessment results (i.e.
to modify existing risk assessment results taking into account local
changes in wall thickness), or may be used more comprehensively to
estimate the failure frequency in screening risk assessments, using both
reduction factors in conjunction with the generic failure frequency
curve in Annex B as an alternative to using more complex structural
reliability based methods. Further details are given in Annex B.
Figure 9 Reduction in external interference total failure frequency due to wall thickness
1.0
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0.8
0.4
0.2
0.0
4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
NOTE Figure 9 relates to design factors of 0.72, 0.5 and 0.3 and can be used to assess the influence of wall
thickness on failure frequency due to external interference for pipelines with design factor less than or equal
to these values.
Table 1 Range of applicability of reduction factor for design factor, Rdf, and
reduction factor due to wall thickness, Rwt
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Figure 10 Reduction in external interference total failure frequency due to depth of cover
1.6
1.4
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1.2
Reduction factor
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
Figure 11 Indicative reduction in external interference total failure frequency due to surveillance
frequency (dependent on frequency and duration of unauthorized excavations)
1.4
1.2
1.0
Risk reduction factor
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Surveillance interval (days)
visible warning
NOTE 1 Concrete slabbing with high visibility marker tapes has been shown to achieve significant risk
reduction factors below 0.1 [28].
NOTE 2 In order to use the reduction factor, the physical barrier mitigation measures should apply to the
whole pipeline interaction length for every failure that has to be considered.
The reduction factors given in Figure 8 and Figure 9 affect the pipeline
tolerance to defects and therefore the PoF, whereas the reduction
factors given in Figure 10, Figure 11 and Table 2 affect the damage
incident rate, I/OE.
For site-specific risk assessments, the main factors affecting failure
frequency should be given careful consideration and the appropriate
reduction factor applied as follows:
a) probability of failure, RPoF, determined using the recommended
reduction factors given in this subclause for:
• Rdf (reduction factor for design factor);
• Rwt (reduction factor for wall thickness);
NOTE 3 Rdf and Rwt have been derived from a parametric study in
which Rdf is derived for a constant wall thickness of 5 mm, and Rwt is
derived for a constant design factor of 0.72. These reduction factors
can be applied together within the limits of applicability given in
Table 1, e.g. when used in conjunction with the base pipeline failure
frequencies given in Annex B.
b) the factor reduction on number of incidents (or incident rate), RIR,
determined using the recommended reduction factors given in
this subclause for:
• Rdc (reduction factor for depth of cover);
• Rp [reduction factor for protection (slabbing and marking)].
Factors for risk control measures along the pipeline route to reduce
the number of incidents may be applied as follows for other
mitigation measures, using reduction factors assessed by the risk
analyst for specific situations:
• Rs (reduction factor for surveillance frequency);
• Rlv (reduction factor for additional liaison visits);
• Rmp (reduction factor for additional high visibility marker posts).
NOTE 4 With respect to control of risk to developments in the vicinity
of pipelines, the application of Rs , Rlv might only be applicable for short
term/temporary developments only (e.g. fairs, festivals, temporary
construction sites etc.). No recommendations are made here for values of
Rlv and Rmp. Assessment should be carried out for specific cases.
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8.3.1 General
The implementation of risk mitigation measures should be carried out
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3) The risk reduction factors given in 8.2 are not currently used in the HSE
methodology. Risk reduction factors associated with slabbing are currently
under review by HSE.
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Figure A.1 Planning application process and need for site-specific risk assessment
NOTE 2
NOTE 1 In all cases where the PADHI+ decision is “do not advise against”, the pipeline operator needs to
consider the impact of increased population within the consultation zone and the effect on the original
routing decisions made for the pipeline, especially if the development is within 1 MDOB. If significant
population increase is likely to occur if the planning development goes ahead, the pipeline operator might
need to carry out a societal risk assessment to allow comparison with the societal risk criteria in Figure 6. If
unfavourable results are obtained from the societal risk assessment, the pipeline operator might consider
objecting to the proposed development.
NOTE 2 In cases where risk mitigation measures are being considered, the land use planning individual risk
assessment and the pipeline operator’s societal risk assessment need to be carried out in parallel, so that a
common understanding using the same data and risk assessment assumptions allows the effectiveness of the
mitigation to be agreed.
Table A.1 Typical (1 × 10−6) and (0.3 × 10−6) risk distances for ethylene, spiked crude and natural gas
liquids (NGLs)
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B.1 General
In deriving the failure frequency for a specific pipeline, all credible
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Table B.3 Failure frequency due to external interference vs. wall thickness
Units in failure frequency per 1 000 km·y
Wall thickness (mm) PinA) HoleA) RuptureA) Total
<5 0 0.162 0.061 0.223
5 to 10 0.012 0.049 0.006 0.067
>10 to 15 0 0.012 0.004 0.016
>15 0 0 0 0
A)
See Table B.1 for definitions.
B.4.1 General
A generic pipeline failure frequency curve for external interference
which can be used with the failure frequency reduction factors
for design factor and wall thickness given in Figure 8 and Figure 9
respectively is derived by predicting the failure frequency for pipelines
and predicts the total probability of through wall failure, i.e. for
leaks and ruptures. A conservative assumption for the proportion of
ruptures which can be applied to the generic failure frequency curve
is 0.7. However, the leak/rupture failure mode is dependent upon the
critical length of an axial defect, which is dependent upon both the
diameter and the wall thickness, so the proportion of ruptures of 0.7
needs to be treated as an upper bound. The data presented in B.5 can
be used to select a more representative value.
NOTE 1 Predicted failure frequencies due to external or third-party
interference increase with material grade due to the consequent
reduction in wall thickness, so the generic curve given in Figure B.1 can be
conservatively applied to pipelines with material grades of X65 and lower.
NOTE 2 The generic curve given in Figure B.1 provides failure frequencies
for pipelines in R areas. Failure frequencies for pipelines in S areas can be
derived by multiplying the R area failure frequency by a factor of 4, as
recommended in 8.2.
0.225
Total failure frequency per 1 000 km .y
0.22
0.215
0.21
0.205
0.2
0.195
0.0 200.0 400.0 600.0 800.0 1 000.0
Diameter (mm)
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Table B.4 Comparison of external interference failure frequency estimates for example 1 with
FFREQ predictions
Table B.5 Comparison of external interference failure frequency estimates for example 2 with
FFREQ predictions
Table B.6 Comparison of external interference failure frequency estimates for example 3 with
FFREQ predictions
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NOTE The wall thickness values in Table B.7 represent a lower bound
of pipeline wall thickness data in the UKOPA database. These values
are generally below the minimum recommended wall thicknesses given
in IGE/TD/1.
The FFREQ failure frequency predictions given in Tables B.8, B.9 and
B.10, and Figures B.2, B.3 and B.4, are for pipelines located in R areas.
Detailed predictions, including results for pipelines located in S areas,
are published on the UKOPA website.
Table B.8 FFREQ predictions for total external interference failure frequency for pipe cases defined
in Table B.7 (per 1 000 km·y)
0.72 0.185 0.186 0.188 0.189 0.103 0.103 0.090 0.097 0.068
0.6 0.137 0.138 0.142 0.143 0.061 0.065 0.068 0.073 0.051
0.5 0.109 0.107 0.112 0.115 0.050 0.056 0.061 0.063 0.044
0.4 0.082 0.088 0.095 0.100 0.042 0.046 0.054 0.059 0.039
0.3 0.071 0.076 0.082 0.086 0.030 0.037 0.040 0.044 0.026
0.2 0.056 0.059 0.064 0.067 0.022 0.027 0.029 0.031 0.020
A)
Diameter, in millimetres (mm).
Figure B.2 FFREQ predictions of total external interference failure frequency for UKOPA pipe cases
0.200 168
Total failure frequency per 1 000 km . y
0.180 219
0.160
273
0.140
323
0.120
0.100 406
0.08 508
0.06 609
0.04
762
0.02
914
0.0
0.0 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80
Design factor
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Table B.9 FFREQ predictions for external interference rupture frequency for pipe cases defined
in Table B.7 (per 1 000 km·y)
0.72 0.139 0.138 0.135 0.130 0.064 0.060 0.049 0.047 0.027
0.6 0.093 0.091 0.089 0.087 0.031 0.030 0.029 0.028 0.014
0.5 0.065 0.064 0.062 0.060 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.017 0.008
0.4 0.043 0.042 0.041 0.039 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.004
0.3 0.026 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.001
0.2 0.013 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
A)
Diameter, in millimetres (mm).
Figure B.3 FFREQ predictions of external interference rupture frequency for UKOPA pipe cases
0.16 168
Rupture failure frequency per 1 000 km .y
0.14 219
0.12 273
0.1 323
0.08 406
0.06
508
0.04
609
0.02
762
0
914
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Design factor
Table B.10 FFREQ predictions for external interference rupture and leak
frequencies for pipe cases defined in Table B.7 (per 1 000 km·y)
Figure B.4 FFREQ predictions for external interference rupture and leak frequencies for specific diameter
and wall thickness cases (per 1 000 km·y)
0.14
Failure frequency per 1 000 km .y
0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
Design factor
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General
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B.5.2.1
The FFREQ predictions in B.5.1 provide more realistic failure frequency
predictions than the conservative estimates given in B.4 for specific
pipe cases. The FFREQ failure frequencies can be modified to produce
estimates for further pipe cases using the reduction factors for
design factor and wall thickness given in Figures 8 and 9 respectively.
Example calculations are given in B.5.2.2 and B.5.2.3.
From Figure 8, the design factor reduction factor for a design factor
of 0.4 is 0.75.
From Figure 9, the wall thickness reduction factor for a wall thickness
of 5.6 mm is 0.81.
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From Figure 9, the wall thickness reduction factor for a wall thickness
of 7.9 mm is 0.5.
The reduction factor, Rwt, for wall thickness to be applied in this case
is therefore:
Rwt = 0.5/0.81 = 0.617
The revised total failure frequency (TFF) is therefore:
TFF = 0.187 × 0.75 × 0.617 = 0.087 per 1 000 km·y
The proportion of ruptures reduces as the diameter and wall thickness
increase, so it is conservative to assume that the proportion of ruptures
for a 762 mm diameter × 7.9 mm wall thickness pipe is equivalent to
that for a 406 mm diameter × 7.9 mm wall thickness pipe.
From Table B.10 and Figure B.4, the proportion of ruptures for a 406
mm diameter pipe operating at a design factor of 0.4 is 0.286.
The revised rupture frequency is therefore:
0.087 × 0.286 = 0.025 per 1 000 km·y
The above estimates are compared with FFREQ predictions for a
762 mm diameter × 7.9 mm wall thickness pipe operating at a design
factor of 0.4 in Table B.11.
Table B.11 Comparison of external interference failure frequency estimates for example 5 with
FFREQ predictions
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PD 8010-3:2009 published document
Table B.12 Critical defect lengths and equivalent hole diameters for UKOPA pipeline cases operating at a
design factor of 0.72
Dimensions in millimetres (mm)
Diameter Wall thickness Material grade Critical defect Critical hole
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Table B.14 Material and construction failure frequency vs. wall thickness
Analysis of the UKOPA pipeline fault and failure data [35] shows that
failure frequency due to material and construction defects in the UK
is dependent upon the year of construction and hence the age, design
and construction standards, in particular the material selection controls
and welding inspection standards applied. For pipelines commissioned
after 1980, the material and construction failure frequency rate can be
assumed to reduce by a factor of 5.
B.8.1 General
There is insufficient historical data to establish a relationship between
ground movement failure data and individual pipeline parameters.
The failure frequency of a specific pipeline due to ground movement
is dependent upon the susceptibility to natural landsliding along the
route, and this needs to be assessed on a location specific basis.
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PD 8010-3:2009 published document
Table B.15 Pipeline rupture failure frequency due to due to ground movement
caused by natural landsliding
C.1 Scenario
A planning application for a housing estate consisting of 38 houses
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in a green field rural area near a village has been lodged with the
local planning authority. On checking their records, the planning
authority finds that there is an ethylene pipeline located near the
proposed site which has land use planning zones. The closest house is
75 m from the pipeline.
Details are shown in Figure C.1.
Inner zone 70 m
Pipeline
The planning authority checks pipeline risk zones against advice from
HSE, and discovers that for a larger development of more than 30
dwelling units, if more than 10% of the development is in the middle
zone, HSE advises against allowing this development to proceed.
The planning authority therefore informs the developer that they will
refuse planning permission on safety grounds.
The developer then contacts the pipeline operator to see whether
there are any special conditions associated with the pipeline that
could affect the planning application. After discussion with the
operator, the developer is able to confirm that the pipeline design
conditions are as notified to HSE and therefore the only possibility
would be to apply mitigating factors to reduce the risk zones.
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PD 8010-3:2009 published document
• steel: X42;
• maximum allowable operating pressure: 95 bar;
• depth of cover: 1 100 mm;
• area classification: class 1 (rural).
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© BSI 2008 • 49
PD 8010-3:2009 published document
Closest house
75 m
Pipeline
The operator also requests a societal risk assessment for the situation
before slabbing and after slabbing to be able to assess the risk
reduction achieved. The resulting graph is shown in Figure C.3.
Figure C.3 Societal risk FN curves and PD 8010-3 FN criterion line – proposed development before and
after slabbing
1.00E - 03
1.00E - 04
1.00E - 05 D
B
C
1.00E - 06
1.00E - 07
1 10 100 1 000
A
Key
A Number of casualties PD 8010-3 risk criterion line
B Frequency (per year) of N or more casualties Proposed development before slabbing
C Broadly acceptable Proposed development after slabbing
D Tolerable if ALARP
© BSI 2008 • 51
PD 8010-3:2009 published document
Bibliography
For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated
references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including
any amendments) applies.
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Standards publications
PD 8010-2, Code of practice for pipelines – Part 2: Subsea pipelines
ISO 3183-2:1996, Petroleum and natural gas industries – Steel
pipe for pipelines – Technical delivery conditions – Part 2: Pipes of
requirements class B
Other publications
[1] GREAT BRITAIN. Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996. London:
HMSO.
[2] GREAT BRITAIN. Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974.
London: HMSO.
[3] GREAT BRITAIN. Management of Health & Safety at Work
Regulations 1992, amended 1999. London: HMSO.
[4] CORDER, I. The application of risk techniques to the design and
operation of pipelines. Proceedings of International Conference
on Pressure Systems: Operation and Risk Management, October
1995, Paper No. C502/016/95, PP. 113-125. London: Institution of
Mechanical Engineers.
[5] CORDER, I., FEARNEHOUGH, G.D. and KNOTT, R.N. Pipeline
design using risk based criteria. Communication 1492. Institute
of Gas Engineers 129th Annual General Meeting and Spring
Conference, Eastbourne, UK, May 1992.
[6] LYONS, C., HASWELL, J.V., HOPKINS, P., ELLIS, R. and JACKSON, N.
A methodology for the prediction of pipeline failure frequency
due to external interference. International Pipeline Conference,
Calgary, Canada, 30 September – 3 October 2008.4)
[7] ACTON, M., BALDWIN, T., and JAGER, E.R. Recent developments
in the design and application of the PIPESAFE risk assessment
package for gas transmission pipelines. International Pipeline
Conference, Calgary, Canada, 29 September – 3 October 2002.
[8] LYONS, D. Western European cross country oil pipelines 30 year
performance statistics. Report 1/02. Brussels: CONCAWE, February
2002.5)
[9] ARUNAKUMAR, G. UKOPA PIPELINE FAULT DATABASE. Pipeline
product loss incidents 1962-2006 – 5th report of the UKOPA
Fault Data Management Group. Advantica Report 6957.
Loughborough: Advantica, August 2007.6)
© BSI 2008 • 53
PD 8010-3:2009 published document
© BSI 2008 • 55
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PD 8010-3:2009
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