From dawa to jihad

The various threats from radical Islam

to the democratic legal order
From Dawa to Jihad
The various threats from radical Islam
to the democratic legal order
2
 Contents

Introduction 5
1 The importance of the democratic legal order as a starting point
for AIVD study of radical Islam 9
1.1 Counter-terrorism not the only starting point for AIVD study of 9
radical Islam
1.2 Reasoning behind AIVD study of non-violent threats 10
1.3 The necessity of permanent reflection on the interest to be
protected: the democratic legal order 10
1.4 A broad view on the democratic legal order 11
1.4.1 Analysis of the term democratic legal order 11
1.4.2 The two dimensions of the democratic legal order 11
1.4.3 Threats to the democratic legal order in the vertical and horizontal
dimension 13
1.5 Radicalism and the democratic legal order 13
1.5.1 Radicalism investigated by the AIVD 13
1.5.2 Categories of radicalism 14
1.5.3 Interim review 17

2 From Dawa to Jihad: Radical Islam as a multiform and dynamic

phenomenon involving a variety of threats 19
2.1 Unity and diversity within present-day radical Islam 19
2.2 The first type of radical Islam: radical-political Islam 21
2.2.1 Does a democratic political Islam exist? 21
2.2.2 Radical political Islam as an emerging form of totalitarianism 23
2.3 The second type of radical Islam: radical-Islamic puritanism 23
2.3.1 The 'puritanisation' of radical Islam 24
2.3.2 Radical Islamic puritanism and extreme isolationism/exclusivism/-
parallelism 24
2.3.3 The typological differences between 'traditional' radical political
Islam and radical Islamic puritanism in a diagram 26
2.3.4 Re-Islamisation of Western Muslims as main objective 27
2.4 The third type of radical Islam: radical Muslim nationalism 28
2.4.1 'Ethnicisation' of being a Muslim in the West 28
2.4.2 Radical exclusivism and parallelism in some forms of Muslim
nationalism 29

3
2.5 From Dawa to Jihad: various strategic views within radical Islam 30
2.5.1 The necessity of studying the strategic views within radical Islam 30
2.5.2 Different views within radical Islam on ends and means 30
2.5.2.1 Different views on ultimate ends and intermediate ends 31
2.5.2.2 Different views on means and activities 32
2.6 Jihadism and terrorism 32
2.7 From Dawa to Jihad: The threats from radical Islam versus the
democratic legal order 34
2.7.1 Typology of threats from radical Islam 35
2.7.2 Eight types of threat from radical Islam - a diagram 36
2.7.3 Eight types of threat from radical Islam - explanation 37

3 Counterstrategies and resistance against the various threats

from radical Islam 44
3.1 Institutions and persons embodying the democratic legal order 44
3.2 Combating the threat from radical Islam: interference and resistance 45
3.3 Present capability to resist the various threats from radical Islam 46
3.4 Counterstrategies against the various threats from radical Islam 46
3.4.1 Counterstrategies against the eight types of threat from radical
Islam - a chart 48
3.4.2 Counterstrategies against the eight types of threat from radical
Islam - explanation 50
3.4.2.1 Counterstrategies against Dawa-related types of threat 50
3.4.2.2 Counterstrategies against Jihad-related types of threat 54

4
 Introduction

The attacks of 11 September 2001 marked a turning point in international political

relations, the consequences of which have become apparent. For politicians and public
opinion in the West the attack on the United States was a serious setback or even
meant the end of the pursued pax occidentalis (i.e. the realisation of stability and peace
initiated from the democratic Western world, which, after the collapse of the Eastern
bloc, seemed to have a good chance of being successful). Western societies are
currently faced with an international threat from various radical Islamic quarters.
Europe, including the Netherlands, has been confronted with extreme violence, such as
the attacks in Madrid in March 2004 and the murder of film director Theo van Gogh
by an Islamic radical in November 2004. Recruitment for the armed radical Islamic
struggle (Jihad) among Dutch youth, in particular ethnic minorities, has proved to be a
trend rather than just an incident in the Netherlands. This has prompted the
government to put also the unsuccessful integration of certain minorities and the
radicalisation tendencies among them on the political agenda.1 The murder of Van
Gogh only demonstrated how opportune this was. In brief, the turning point in the
international political arena is clearly reflected on the situation in the Netherlands.

The 11 September 2001 attacks and their aftermath were 'only' catalysts for the global
breakthrough of a terrorist threat from radical Islam and the ensuing crumbling of the
pax occidentalis. The underlying phenomena, such as the rise of radical Islam and
international terrorism, had manifested themselves in various parts of the world for
several decades. Initially, these phenomena manifested themselves in polarisation on a
national level, but later they grew into international movements that gained a foothold
in practically all parts of the world. The spread of radical Islam and related terrorism,
like the dissemination of Western ideas worldwide, is the expression of a trend towards
globalisation that has been developing on for quite some time. Tensions between
Western and non-Western actors and interests as such are not new. It is the scale on
which these tensions manifest themselves and their impact, which increasingly set the
scene. Many conflicts in different parts of the world have their own history, dynamics
and solutions. Blowing these up to global proportions makes it seem as if they are all
part of one major conflict. All the same, however, we are indeed witnessing global
connections in radical Islam. The challenge is to properly understand these
connections in all their complexity and to develop adequate countermeasures.

1 See the AIVD report Rekrutering in Nederland voor de Jihad, van incident tot trend
5 (recruitment for the Jihad in the Netherlands, from incident to trend) (2002).
Studying the various threats emanating from radical Islam, including the terrorist
threat, should do justice to the complexity of these phenomena with all their national
and international aspects. For this reason, the AIVD is now applying a broad approach
in its study of radical Islam in the Netherlands, looking at phenomena such as poor
integration, radicalisation, recruitment and terrorism from a wider perspective.
Terrorism is the ultimate consequence of a development starting with radicalisation
processes. These processes may manifest themselves in various ways and involve also
other than terrorist threats (for example, interethnic tensions). For the AIVD combating
terrorism starts by countering radicalisation processes. Preventing, isolating or curbing
radicalisation are important means to combat terrorism with a long-lasting effect.
Simultaneously, traditional investigations into terrorist organisations and networks are
continued unabatedly. But traditional counter-terrorism without a focus on
radicalisation processes and prevention will prove to be less effective in the long run. In
addition, the AIVD emphasises the importance of enhancing society's resistance
capability and of the vital role of the Muslim minorities in this context. As concerns the
threats emanating from radical Islam and radical Islam-related terrorism, we should
firstly focus on the protection of the Dutch society and its vital infrastructure, and
secondly on strengthening the relevant communities in the Netherlands, including
Muslim communities.

Before we can decide which measures to take, we should first thoroughly analyse the
problem. At the moment, more than three years after the 11 September 2001 attacks,
the worldwide debate on how to fight radical Islamic terrorism effectively is still going
on. There is still no international public consensus on how the situation should be
assessed. Is it a conflict between civilisations? Or are socio-economic aspects of the
breeding ground for radicalisation decisive for the international threat from terrorism?
The strength of all-encompassing explanations is at the same time their weakness: the
wish for absolute clarity might easily slip into unrealistic over-simplification. This also
applies to the popular misperception of the terrorist threat from Osama bin Laden's Al
Qaeda network as a monolithic phenomenon. Thorough study has shown that we are
now confronted with a threat from fluid networks with varying international links
rather than a threat from traditional groups. The complexity of these phenomena
prompts us to give up our usual perceptions and to translate the new approach into
policy measures.

This paper provides insight into the conceptual foundation of the AIVD's study of
radical Islam. It also seeks to contribute to the debate in society on countering the

6
threats that may emanate from radical Islam.
In this report radical Islam is understood to mean:
The politico-religious pursuit of establishing - if necessary by extreme means - a society which
reflects the perceived values from the original sources of Islam as purely as possible.2

This paper starts from the premise that radical Islam is a multiform phenomenon.
Radical Islam consists of many movements and groups that, although related (in
particular concerning faith and anti-Western sentiments), may harbour very different
views on aims and means. This means that various kinds of threats can emanate from
radical Islam, one of which is terrorism. In addition to radical Islamic organisations
and networks which concentrate on the Jihad (in the sense of armed combat) against
the West, there are other groups, which principally focus on 'Dawa' (the propagation of
the radical-Islamic ideology)3, while some groups and networks combine both.

The Dawa-oriented forms of radical Islam are not necessarily violent by nature, but
nevertheless they generate important security risks. Dawa is usually interpreted as 're-
Islamisation' of Muslim minorities in the West. These minorities are seen as
'oppressed brothers' who should be liberated from the 'yoke of Western brainwashing'.
The groups focusing on Dawa follow a long-term strategy of continuous influencing
based on extreme puritanical, intolerant and anti-Western ideas. They want Muslims in
the West to reject Western values and standards, propagating extreme isolation from
Western society and often intolerance towards other groups in society. They also
encourage these Muslims to (covertly) develop parallel structures in society and to take
the law into their own hands. What they mean is that Muslims the West should turn
their backs on the non-Islamic government and instead set up their own autonomous
power structures based on specific interpretation of the Sharia.

This paper does not discuss manifest or anticipated specific threats emanating from the
various forms of radical Islam. It should rather be read as a conceptual contribution to
the broad approach to studying radical Islam and the debate on countermeasures. The
AIVD therefore prefers to give general descriptions of the various types of radical

2 In this paper we use the term 'radical Islam' as we prefer to reserve the term 'political
Islam' for those forms of radical Islam which are focused on specific political ideologies
and on establishing an Islamic form of government. The forms of radical Islam that are not
very politico-ideologically oriented and rather focused on a return to the pure Islamic
(individual) way of life from the early days of Islam have been described under 'radical-
Islamic puritanism'. Obviously, however, their activities and objectives also have political
consequences (and might therefore be interpreted as forms of 'political Islam' in a broad
sense).

7 3 The term 'Dawa' literally means 'appeal' (to become Muslim).

Islam-related threats, starting from the premise that a good perception of these various
types of threats is closely connected with a good insight into the interests to be
protected. Translated into AIVD terms: without understanding the interest to be
protected (in this case the democratic legal order) it is not possible to gain a good
insight into the threat.

In chapter 1 we have therefore presented a detailed description of the democratic legal

order. The essence is that our democratic legal order is not only a specific form of
government (a democracy based on the rule of law), but also a certain form of society
for the citizens. Hence certain forms of radical Islam that do not primarily pursue an
Islamic form of government, but nevertheless reject societies based on democracy and
the rule of law can also constitute a threat. They reject, for example, the open nature of
our society, our respect for multiformity and diversity, or our personal autonomy in the
area of ethics and ideology. Chapter 2 describes the major ideological and strategic
views within radical Islam, followed by a description of the threats that may emanate
from multiform radical Islam. Chapter 3 concerns itself with reinforcing the resistance
capability of institutions and persons embodying the democratic legal order and
interested parties in the democratic legal order.4

This paper is composed according to the usual model of AIVD risk assessments, i.e. the
threesome structure of interest-threat-resistance. Chapter 1 focuses on the interest to be
protected (the democratic legal order), chapter 2 on the threat (the various threats to the
democratic legal order posed by radical Islam) and chapter 3 on the resistance against
this threat (the counterbalance from persons and institutions embodying the
democratic legal order and interested parties).

4 The institutions and persons referred to embody the interest of - in this case - the
democratic legal order. Interested parties are those who have an interest in the continued
8 existence of this democratic legal order.
 1 The importance of the democratic legal order
as a starting point for AIVD study of radical
Islam5

1.1 Counter-terrorism not the only starting point for AIVD study of
radical Islam

Since 11 September 2001 the focus of the AIVD's investigation into and study of radical
Islam has hardly been under debate. The necessity of the investigation is widely
accepted in view of the permanent global threat of terrorist attacks by radical Islamic
groups and networks. It is evident that such attacks can have an extremely disruptive
effect on society, as was proved in the Netherlands recently. The fact that it seems
unnecessary to explicitly substantiate the AIVD investigation into radical Islam also
involves a risk. The risk is that the security aspects of radical Islam might too easily be
reduced to the terrorist threat they may involve. This could lead to both an
overestimation and an underestimation of this threat.

If too much emphasis is put on the ideological relationship between violent and non-
violent forms of radical Islam (in particular as to religious convictions and anti-Western
sentiments) this may lead to an overestimation of the threat. There are various forms of
radical Islam which pursue very far-reaching changes in society, but which do not
involve the use of violence. Those involved in combating terrorism often see these
forms of non-violent radical Islam as an indirect threat. According to them, these non-
violent versions can be a breeding ground for further radicalisation (a stepping stone to
violent forms of radical Islam). In addition, non-violent radical-Islamic groups
frequently proved to be an ideal shelter for terrorists. So, although it is often justified to
regard non-violent forms of radical Islam as an indirect threat, this may also lead to an
overestimation of the threat picture. This may give rise to, for example, unnecessary
unrest among government and public about certain forms of Islamic extreme
orthodoxy. For there are also variants which have no other political ambition than to
secure the right to isolate themselves from society as a minority group.6

5 In this chapter we discuss the question what is meant by the term 'democratic legal order'
within the Dutch context on the basis of, for example, the government policy document
Grondrechten in een pluriforme samenleving (Fundamental rights in a multiform society)
(Parliamentary Documents II 2003/04, 29 624).

6 Hereafter we will discuss the boundary between acceptable forms of extreme-orthodox

9 Islamic isolationism - with respect to the democratic legal order - and unacceptable forms
of radical-Islamic isolationism, a boundary which is sometimes difficult to define.
 A too one-sided focus on non-violent forms of radical Islam narrowed down to
terrorism (centred on the question whether these forms facilitate the development of
terrorism and provide a cover to terrorists) can also result in underestimating of even
ignoring other kinds of threats that might emanate from these forms of radical Islam.
After all, it is very well possible that in their pursuit of a society in which there is no
place for other politico-religious convictions they prefer the 'slower' (but often surer)
way of covert indoctrination of mainly young people to the brutal violence of terrorism.

1.2 Reasoning behind AIVD study of non-violent types of threats

The possible underestimation of these other kinds of potential threats from radical
Islam is also a result of the fact that these are far more difficult to identify than acute
threats of violence. They often involve insidious dangers. Also, the need for
investigating such insidious dangers is more difficult to explain. Not everyone is
immediately convinced that from the perspective of the democratic legal order certain
forms of isolationism (taking the law into one's own hands, no longer recognising the
government's authority, developing parallel social structures) may constitute a problem.
Some may wonder, referring to fundamental rights and freedoms, whether it is
justified that such phenomena are seen as a threat to the democratic legal order.

For this reason AIVD investigations into the risk of harmful effects to the democratic
legal order other than acute threats of violence, require an extra solid foundation. The
following sections will describe this foundation in detail, focusing on the key question:
what exactly is the AIVD supposed to protect? In case of the AIVD study of the various
threats to the democratic legal order (both directly violent and not directly violent
threats) this question could be translated into: What is inextricably bound up with the
democratic legal order and should therefore be protected?

1.3 The necessity of permanent reflection on the interest to be

protected: the democratic legal order

After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the AIVD, in consultation with the government and
parliament, developed a broad vision on what the activities of an intelligence service
within a democratic legal order should consist of. In addition to traditional focus areas
such as violent extremism and intelligence activity of foreign powers, the AIVD also

10
 identified new areas for special attention, for example: integrity of public
administration, conflicts of interest in community-based organisations, interethnic
tensions and radicalisation tendencies. The AIVD's interest in these subjects can partly
be explained by the politico-social climate of the past decade, during which questions
about these problems became increasingly prominent. Interpreting these issues as
subjects for AIVD investigation, however, is largely also a result of reflection within the
AIVD on 'the democratic legal order as an interest to be protected by the AIVD'.
Without a clear understanding of this interest, it is not possible to have a good idea of
what may threaten the democratic legal order.

1.4 A broad view on the democratic legal order

1.4.1 Analysis of the term democratic legal order

The term 'democratic legal order' consists of two parts: (a) what is a legal order? and (b)
what makes a legal order democratic?

A legal order is the obligatory system of rules and regulations based on the rule of law
that has been prescribed and accepted within that society (the system of principles,
procedures and institutions that regulate basic social processes: dividing scarce
resources, harmonising various interests, settling disputes, law enforcement and
reprisal, etc.).7
The obligatory order concerns the relations within society between citizens and
government (vertical) and the relations between citizens themselves (horizontal). A
legal order can be described as democratic if the citizens are involved in establishing
and judging the obligatory order in society in a regular way and based on equal political
rights. A democratic legal order can therefore never be a static order. It is dynamic in
essence and, in fact, it has to be realised again and again.

1.4.2 The two dimensions of the democratic legal order

The democratic legal order is more than a specific form of government: democracy is
only one of the conditions for the realisation of a democratic legal order. Hence a legal
order in a society can only be called democratic if both the vertical relations (the
interactions between government and citizens) and the horizontal relations (the

7 Consequently, the legal order comprises more than just the judicial system only ('the law').
11 This system is a specific component of the legal order.
interactions between citizens themselves) meet certain conditions. These conditions
can be described as follows:

• First of all, the vertical relations within society, i.e. the interactions between
government and citizens, are to be modelled according to the principles, procedures
and institutions of a democratic state under the rule of law. This refers to the (mainly)
codified elements of the democratic legal order, such as the principle of legality, the
separation of powers, decentralised powers, fundamental rights, the government
monopoly on the use of force, the public nature of the independent state under the
rule of law, a government keeping aloof from the privacy of citizens, the right to vote,
the freedom to acquire political power, political fundamental rights, a democratic say
in and control over decision-making processes, the public nature of administration,
the rights of political minorities and the majority rule in political decision-making.

• In addition, the horizontal relations within society, between citizens should meet
certain conditions. These non-codified conditions for a democratic legal order have
occupied a more and more prominent place in modern thinking on democracy. A
democratic legal order requires more than just formal recognition and compliance by
the citizens of the principles and procedures of a democracy.

• The proper functioning of the democratic legal order is at stake when several
conditions (which cannot really be embedded in legal rules) are not, or barely, met. A
democratic legal order requires a certain amount of social trust, social cohesion,
solidarity, active citizenship and loyalty.8 This involves several key values and
standards, such as respect for the open nature of society, respect for multiformity and
diversity within society, promoting social trust between citizens (or a wish to do so),
respect for diverse interests and the wish to contribute as much as possible to the
harmonisation of interests, respect for the personal privacy of fellow citizens, respect
for other ethical and ideological orientations, etc.9 It is the citizens themselves who
are primarily responsible for realising and meeting these values and standards.
Enforceability by the government is only partially possible and desirable.

8 See, for example, the publications by Robert Putnam et al (1994): Making Democracy Work;
and Francis Fukuyama (1996): Trust: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social
Order, 1996.

9 These terms are also relevant because nowadays governments, realising that political
parties can no longer be seen as the only representative bodies for groups within society,
consult with community-based organisations and groups in order to realise so-called
12 interactive policy-making.
1.4.3 Threats to the democratic legal order in the vertical and horizontal dimension

The above idea, that the democratic legal order has both a horizontal and a vertical
dimension, provides insight into the possible threats to this legal order. These threats
can affect both the relations between the government and citizens (vertical), and those
between the citizens (horizontal). Within a society in which, for example, the
government monopoly on the use of force is trampled on, the democratic legal order is
at risk (a threat to the vertical dimension). Within a society in which various groups live
as complete strangers, or where specific groups exclude other groups, a democratic
legal order - especially in the Dutch context - can only function with difficulty (threats to
the horizontal dimension).

1.5 Radicalism and the democratic legal order

1.5.1 Radicalism investigated by the AIVD

With reference to the above description of the democratic legal order, we should explain
in which diverse ways radicalism in general may pose a threat to the legal order.
Usually three components are distinguished in radicalism:
- The pursuit of far-reaching reforms of society (political, economic or regarding
important social institutions).
- The acceptance of far-reaching personal or social consequences of this pursuit of far-
reaching reforms, concerning both the use of resources and the effects.
- This pursuit of far-reaching reforms goes beyond moderate reformism, involves a
general uncompromising attitude and tendencies towards confrontation (within and
beyond the boundaries of the law) with those standing in the way.

From this general description we can derive a definition of radicalism as investigated by

the AIVD.

The AIVD defines radicalism as:

The (active) pursuit of and/or support to far-reaching changes in society which may
constitute a danger to (the continued existence of) the democratic legal order (aim), which
may involve the use of undemocratic methods (means) that may harm the functioning of the
democratic legal order (effect).

13
 In line with this, radicalisation can be interpreted as a person's (growing) willingness to
pursue and/or support such changes himself (in an undemocratic way or otherwise), or
his encouraging others to do so.10

1.5.2 Categories of radicalism

This description of radicalism and radicalisation, and the concept of democratic legal
order with a vertical and horizontal dimension as described above, enable us to
formulate different categories of radicalism which may pose a threat to the democratic
legal order.

• Antidemocratic radicalism
This type of radicalism is focused on the pursuit of a totally different interpretation of
the vertical relations (between government and citizens). This may, however, also
have a serious impact on the horizontal relations (the interaction between citizens).
The main objective is the realisation of a form of government that is different from a
democracy. Supporters of this type of radicalism are often motivated by a general
non-acceptance of the democratic form of government, or by a partial rejection of
essential elements of a democracy. This jeopardises fundamental rights such as
freedom of expression and freedom of association with others, legal equality etc.
Persons or groups adhering to these kinds of radicalism can opt for various strategies
to achieve their objective: both armed combat with the intention of rapidly
overthrowing the democratic form of government and insidiously undermining it by
gradually winning over the public by means of propaganda or covert financing and
influencing. Examples of this type of radicalism include forms of extreme right-wing

10 Radicalisation is explicitly seen here as a (one-way) process and not as a state.

In the description of the components of radicalism there is an obvious relationship with
the term 'extremism'. Reference is made to 'far-reaching reforms' and 'far-reaching
consequences'. The terms 'radicalism' and 'extremism' are related (in common parlance).
However, the latter term has an almost exclusively negative connotation, whereas this
does not always have to be the case with the former. For example, some left-wing liberal
parties and movements in several European countries call themselves 'Radicals' (but
certainly not 'Extremists').
The following terms border on the term radicalism, but are sometimes - wrongly - used as
synonyms. The terms are given in a specific order, ranging from 'harmful' to 'bad' and
'worse'.
Related terms referring to a political objective:
Ultra: an extraordinary or exaggerated form of a known, usually political capacity
(compare ultra left-wing, ultra right-wing).
Radical: see the definition used above.
Extreme: going to the limit. Description of groups operating on the fringe of the existing
14 political spectrum.
 and extreme left-wing activism, but also certain forms of radical Islam (which are
strongly focused on realising an Islamic form of government).

• Undemocratic radicalism
This type of radicalism does not primarily pursue a change in the relations between
government and citizens or between citizens themselves. However, the effects of this
type of radicalism on these relations may be substantial. A key element of this type of
radicalism is the willingness to use undemocratic means, whether violent or not,
(often without an explicit antidemocratic intention) which constitute a serious
violation of the democratic legal order. Examples are forms of violent politically-
motivated activism, such as anti-globalisation and animal rights activism. This type of
radicalism may also involve a manipulation of democratic processes (covert
influencing of interest groups via, for example, secret financing, of clandestine
attempts to acquire a monopoly position in community-based organisations, etc.).

• Radicalism undermining democracy

This type of radicalism does not have an intentionally anti-democratic or
undemocratic 'programme', but it may seriously hamper or undermine the
functioning of the democratic legal order. This type of radicalism is often neglected,
but it pursues completely different horizontal relations (between the citizens
themselves). This may affect the vertical relations (between government and citizens),
but this is not the primary objective of those involved. They rather pursue a strictly

Extremism: 'going as far as, pushing to the ultimate consequences'. In general political
terms, extremism thus is a phenomenon that considers the extreme acceptable or
pursues the extreme in its aims and/or means. Within this context the extreme may mean
violence - leading to death.
Related terms referring to a religious objective:
Orthodox: strictly upholding a traditional (mostly religious) doctrine, in accordance with
all the doctrine's precepts.
Fundamentalist: orthodox, anti-liberal (usually religious) movement, with an anti-
intellectual slant (no freedom of debate, no room for doubt).
Related terms referring to the use of means:
Militant: obviously a term with a military connotation; in general meaning combative and
aggressive, in general within the boundaries of the law.
Activist: in the means used, the focus is on action, instead of on words. In principle,
actions (campaigns) do not have to cause damage to property, but they may involve
disturbance of the public order.
Violent activist: involving damage to property, see also under activist, although this type of
activism not necessarily involves disturbance of the public order.
Terrorist: causing serious damage to property, thus disrupting social processes and/or
committing or threatening violence targeted at human lives (needless to say, from a
political or religious objective) aimed at realising social changes and/or influencing the
15 political decision-making process within the context of the democratic legal order.
 puritanical uniformity, an extensive social control of 'virtuousness' and a mono-
ethnic and mono-cultural society, emphasising the inequality between people. The
almost inevitable effect is that the open nature of society, the respect for multiformity
and diversity, and personal autonomy in the area of ethics and ideology are
abandoned, in brief: the horizontal dimension of the democratic legal order is
affected.
Within this context the AIVD previously drew attention to the security risks involved
in anti-integration tendencies among (ethnic/religious) minorities. Some anti-
integration tendencies are connected with specific forms of radicalism which can be
qualified as 'anti-integration radicalism'.11 We can distinguish three subcategories of
this type of 'anti-integration radicalism' (the second and third subcategories
embodying a further radicalisation of the first subcategory):

- Radical 'isolationism'; groups isolate themselves as much as possible from social and
political life.
- Radical 'exclusivism'; withdrawal from society, involving expressions of a strongly
discriminatory nature towards the rest of society or certain groups within society
(accusation of heresy, demonising, conspiracy theories, inciting hostility).
- Radical 'parallelism'; not only a withdrawal from society, but also the pursuit of a
parallel society within the surrounding society, which involves parallel power
structures and taking the law into one's own hands. This type of radical isolationism
transformed into radical parallelism manifests itself not only in a pursuit of changed
relations between citizens, but also in a pursuit of changed relations between
government and citizens (albeit in a different, often less developed way than
antidemocratic radicalism as described above).12

11 Anti-integration tendencies cannot always be linked to 'anti-integration radicalism'. Forces

counteracting integration can also be linked to covert attempts by the governments of
countries of origin to keep diaspora communities under their control.

12 The next chapter will show how these forms of 'anti-integration radicalism' manifest
themselves with versions of radical Islam which focus primarily on completely different
horizontal relations within society (and therefore pose a threat to the horizontal 'axis' of
the democratic legal order). Their radicalism is aimed at the realisation of completely
different human relations. In the perception of these radical Muslims, human relations
within society cannot be based on the values and standards of the 'civic culture' (which is
based on a mutual recognition among the members of society as free and equal citizens),
16 but on the ethics laid down in the Sharia.
1.5.3 Interim review

In this chapter we explained that without a clear definition of democratic legal order (as
an interest to be protected), it is not possible to gain good insight into what may
threaten the democratic legal order. Without a good understanding of what a properly
functioning democratic legal order is, it is not possible to have a good picture of the
activities of third parties and of developments and processes which may constitute a
serious danger to the democratic legal order.
In the previous sections we described that the democratic legal order has both a
horizontal and a vertical dimension. In a properly functioning democratic legal order
both the vertical and the horizontal relations should meet certain conditions. The
vertical dimension of the democratic legal order is connected with the principles,
procedures and institutions of the democratic legal order, which actually regulate the
rights and obligations of and between government and citizens. The horizontal
dimension refers to the relations between the citizens themselves, which are based on a
number of values and standards of what can be described as 'civic culture'.
From this perspective of the democratic legal order, it is clear that, in general terms, the
threats from radicalism may manifest themselves both with respect to the vertical and
the horizontal dimension of the democratic legal order. The next chapter will show that
this is also the case concerning radical Islam.

17
18
 2 From Dawa to Jihad: Radical Islam as a
multiform and dynamic phenomenon involving
a variety of threats

2.1 Unity and diversity within present-day radical Islam

This paper starts from the key premise that radical Islam is a multiform and dynamic
phenomenon involving a variety of threats. Radical Islam consists of a multitude of
movements, organisations and groups which show a certain affinity with one another,
but which may also have very different ideological and strategic views.

The various forms of present-day radical Islam share a common historical, sociological
and (in part) psychological origin. The common basis for the many movements,
organisations and groups stems from the dissatisfaction about and resistance against
the political, economic and cultural dominance of the Western world shared by many
Muslims all over the world.

The diversity within present-day radical Islam can be linked to a variety of perceptions
regarding 'the evil of the Western oppression of Islam' and different views on
alternatives for this. In this paper three types of radical Islam are distinguished (not to
be confused with the aforementioned three types of radicalism), each of which involve a
different focus on Western dominance and other ideas about alternatives for this.13

The first type of radical Islam highlights the resistance against the Western political
(and hence also economic) oppression. The focus is on the political power of the West.
This power should be broken and replaced by the political power of the Islam. A first
step to that end is the islamisation of the political system in Muslim countries. The
ultimate objective, however, is far more ambitious: the establishment of the 'universal
caliphate' (the universal Islamic state) and the 'Umma' (the Islamic global community)
as a super power capable of overruling the West. Because of its focus on the political
dimension of Western oppression and the desired political alternative, this type of radical

13 Of course it should be emphasised that this characterisation is no more than an attempt

to discover a certain 'pattern' in the complex phenomenon of radical Islam. Discussing
only three types seems to be in contradiction to the multiformity of present-day radical
Islam. However, the characterisation is only a simplification of reality allowing a trenchant
19 analysis. After all, in reality we see many 'combinations' of the various types.
Islam can be described as radical-political Islam. So this type encompasses those forms of
radical Islam which (violently or non-violently) pursue a political system based on their
own interpretation of Islam on the basis of non-acceptance of the Western democratic
government system, or a partial rejection of essential aspects of that system.14 We might
also call this type of radical Islam: radical caliphatism.

The second type of radical Islam emphasises the resistance against Western cultural
oppression. The focus is primarily on the 'baneful' Western lifestyle, which is
considered a threat to 'pure Islam'. This type of radical Islam can be described as
radical-Islamic puritanism. Its adherents loathe the way in which human relations are
given shape in Western society. They despise Western views on equal rights of men
and women (in particular the right of women to participate in public life on an equal
footing as men), freedom of speech, respect for ideological multiformity, autonomy in
privacy, the secular nature of society, et cetera. As an alternative for the 'loathsome'
Western society they propose a social order based on the Islamic 'morals' as set out in
the Sharia.15 In present-day radical Islam this radical puritanism manifests itself within
movements such as 'Salafism' and 'Wahabism', which put much emphasis on
'purifying' Islam from 'heretical' influences.16 The primary objective is the 're-
Islamisation' of Muslims who have been exposed to non-Islamic influences. Often
these re-Islamisation efforts go hand in hand with 'exclusivism': the preaching of
(religious and cultural) intolerance (Takfir: denunciation and exclusion of people who
have different faiths, including 'liberal' Muslims) and 'parallelism' (the non-recognition
or only partial recognition of non-Islamic government structures and the pursuance of
autonomous Sharia areas).

The third type of radical Islam reacts against both the political and cultural dominance
of the West, but is less religiously motivated in the proposed alternative. This type of

14 Within this context the question might be raised: is the democratic form of government
rejected because it is considered un-Islamic, or because it is of Western origin?

15 According to the French researcher O. Roy, the primary aim of these movements (which he
refers to with the term 'neo-fundamentalism') is not the introduction of the Islamic state,
but the return to the Sharia. The key objective is not a state system (l'état islamique) but
the morals (les moeurs islamiques). All Muslims are to return to the proper way of life
according to tradition (as set out in the Koran and the Sunna). See O. Roy (2002): L' Islam
Mondialisé.

16 This does not mean that within this radical puritanism the realisation of a political Islam-
based system completely disappears from view. However, the emphasis is on the
introduction of Islamic morals and hence the general islamisation of human relations in
society. According to radical-Islamic puritans, this situation will allow the development of
20 a different form of government
 radical Islam can be described as radical Muslim nationalism (or radical Muslim
communitarism). It involves the often ignored forms of radicalism which focus not
really on Islam as a religion, but rather on what it means to be a Muslim (the 'imagined
community' of the 'Muslim nation', the solidarity between Muslims all over the world).
A phenomenon such as the Arabic European League (AEL) can be seen as a form of
(radical) Muslim nationalism/communitarism. Muslim nationalism has certain aspects
in common with radical-political Islam (the objective being the emancipation of
Muslims) and radical-Islamic puritanism (with tendencies towards exclusivism and
parallelism, although often less extreme and less religiously motivated).

In addition to differences, the three above-described types of radical Islam have one
important factor in common. They all share a strongly mobilising force from the
ideology of the Umma, the (ideal of an) Islamic global community. In the Islamic world
the Umma is seen as a source of inspiration for identification and organisation, and as
a fundament for the pursuit of implementing the aims of radical Islam. The -
potentially - international Umma manifests itself as a (partly virtual) community intent
on applying radical Islamic values internationally, as yet without having the disposal of
a territorial entity.

The following sections will give more details about the ideological dimensions of the
three types of present-day radical Islam as referred to above.

2.2 The first type of radical Islam: radical-political Islam

2.2.1 Does a democratic political Islam exist?

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall radical Islam has been frequently discussed within the
context of future threats to democracy and Western standards and values. Ever since
the late 1970s (in particular since the revolution in Iran and the Rushdie affair) a
'green' danger (Islam) has been recognised in addition to the 'red' (communist) danger.
In the early 1990s, after the threat of communism had disappeared, several analysts
and politicians anticipated a new international polarisation, this time between the West
and radical Islam. Radical Islamic organisations and terrorist actions in various parts of
the world were seen as the precursors of a new era.

21
In 1998, in a public report, the AIVD drew attention to the increasing role of Islam-
based political movements.17 With respect to the Netherlands the AIVD concluded that
political Islam had many manifestations, but that it played only a limited role within
the total of Islamic communities in terms of quantity. Given the recent international
developments, the then anticipated threats for the future gained momentum after 11
September 2001. Now, at the start of the 21st century, growing support to radical
versions of Islam, polarisation between Muslims and the society in which they live,
obstacles in the progress of integration processes as well as unadulterated Islamic
terrorism are major challenges facing the Dutch democratic legal order.

Political Islam gives a political interpretation of the sources of Islam and claims to offer
a comprehensive ideology, focused on the unity of religion and state. This is at odds
with the Western government system, which postulates a separation of Church and
State. Also, contrary to what many radical Muslims claim, the unity of religion and state
cannot be linked to the Koran itself. Historically, it was the state which arrogated
religion in order to justify the levying of taxes in Islamic territories.18 In Europe the
situation was basically the other way around. Here it was the church that carried out
tasks which later became the exclusive domain of the state.

By and large, Islam and democracy are not incompatible. The original sources of Islam
include several concepts that may be associated with current democratic principles
without explicitly referring to state orders. For example, the concept of 'Shura' provides
for social consultation and the principle of 'Bajat' can be seen as a kind of social
contract. However, such principles play only a marginal role in the present-day
theological and social debate. In mainly autocratically governed countries with a
predominantly Islamic population, liberal Islamic lines of thinking hardly play a role in
political policy-development. But even in the Dutch democracy liberal Islamic
movements are hardly involved in policy-making. However, in principle it cannot be
ruled out that democratic political Islam may take shape in the Netherlands in the long
term. The way in which Christian Democratic parties have developed in Europe, shows
that a political movement based on religious grounds is viable and can contribute
substantially to the (continued) existence of the European (and also Dutch) democratic
legal order. Recently there have been several indications for such a development (albeit
in an early stage) regarding Islam in the Netherlands (for example in connection with
the Turkish Islamic Milli Görüs movement).

17 BVD (1998): De politieke islam in Nederland (Political Islam in the Netherlands).

18 Ayubi, Nazih (1991): Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World. London/New
22 York, Routledge.
2.2.2 Radical-political Islam as an emerging form of totalitarianism

Radical-political Islam is an ideology which by referring to non-existing situations (such

as a universal Islamic state) contributes to a mythologisation which is essential for the
propagation of a totalitarian ideology. The totalitarian aspect includes the presumption
that all social issues and problems can be resolved on the basis of radical-political
Islam. The radical-religious dimension covers all aspects of life. This implies that
radical-political Islam manifests itself as a totalitarian philosophy by demanding the
sovereignty of a religious political government over all aspects of life, and - in its most
extreme form- by imposing a general binding framework for thought and conduct. The
radical Islamic view has no room for a reserved attitude by the government towards the
privacy of citizens, let alone for personal autonomy with respect to ethics or philosophy.
In this perception, the sovereignty of God is at odds with the contemporary principle of
the sovereignty of the people as upheld by democratic states.19

The causes of the emergence of radical-political Islamic movements are diverse. In

many authoritarian countries in the Middle East radical-political Islam can be seen as a
socio-political vehicle for pursuing political participation. Increasing urbanisation,
difficult economic and demographic conditions, as well as failing governments all play
a role in this context. Besides the national or regional context, there is also the
influence of international aspects, such as the identification with often marginalised
Muslims in conflict zones (the Palestinian territories, Chechnya, Kashmir). The
prominent military presence of the West in predominantly Islamic countries
(Afghanistan, Iraq) is also an important factor. In essence there is, however, also a
purely religious ideological component of radical-political Islam, which plays an
increasingly important role in many countries (including the Netherlands) both on a
national level and on an international level.

19 Within radical Islam the basic principle is the concept of Hakimiyya (rule, sovereignty of
God). Within radical Islamic (theological) thinking this sovereignty of God is perceived in
a much more absolute way than within, for example, 19th and 20th century neo-orthodox
Christian or Jewish thinking. This philosophy includes ideas such as 'man as a caretaker'
and 'partnership between man and God'. Hence in this neo-orthodox Christian or Jewish
thinking there is no discrepancy between religion and politics. It is possible that there is
sovereignty of God and sovereignty of man/people at the same time (as to making the
world habitable, organising society). Among liberal Islamic thinkers we find views which
are comparable to Christian and Jewish views on man as a caretaker and partner.
Referring to the Koran, these liberal Islamic thinkers argue that man is Khalifa (caliph,
literally 'substitute') of God on earth. It should also be noted that within the Dutch
23 constitutional tradition the concept of 'popular sovereignty' is avoided.
 2.3 The second type of radical Islam: radical-Islamic puritanism

2.3.1 The 'puritanisation' of radical Islam

Within radical Islam there has been an ideological shift of emphasis, in particular
during the last two decades, which can be described as the 'puritanisation' of radical
Islam. This involves a shift in the paradigm of radical Islam as a result of which radical-
Islamic puritanism has prevailed over 'traditional' radical-political Islam. The key aim
of 'traditional' radical-political Islam (as postulated for example by the founders of the
Muslim Brotherhood) is the establishment of an Islamic state (either an Islamic state in
the Muslim world or a universal caliphate). Radical-Islamic Puritanism, on the other
hand, is not primarily focused on establishing an Islamic state, but on the return of all
Muslims to the 'purity' of the early stages of Islam before it was 'tarnished' by
'heretical' influences from, for example, Shi'ism, Hinduism or Western thinking.
According to radical-Islamic Puritanism, such influences are unacceptable forms of
'Bida' (modernisation) and 'Shirk' (idolatry) which are to be banned and combated.

Present-day radical-Islamic puritanism is in principle far more intolerant than

traditional political Islam and has a much stronger anti-Western orientation. Whereas
adherents of traditional political Islam see it as a challenge to seek alternatives to the
Western political, legal and economic system, radical Islamic puritans see the West as a
destructive enemy of Islam that is to be combated with all possible means.

2.3.2 Radical-Islamic puritanism and extreme isolationism/exclusivism/parallelism

Radical-Islamic puritans often call themselves 'Salafists': they wish to return to the pure
Islam of the Salaf (the first followers of Mohammed). Historically, Salafism should be
seen as a broad ideological movement with also liberal ramifications, which, however,
were gradually largely oppressed. The movement has its roots in the reformers of the
late 19th and first half of the 20th century, such as Afghani, Abduh and Ridah, who
saw a return to the pure Islam of the first followers of Mohammed as the solution to
the crisis in the Islamic world.20 Gradually Salafism shifted towards more conservative
and ultra-orthodox views, in particular under the influence of Saudi Wahhabism.

20 Djamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897), Mohammed Abduh (1849-1905) and Rashid Ridah
(1865-1935) sought answers to the political and cultural crisis in which they perceived the
Islamic world to be as a result of Western colonialism. Whereas Afghani and Abduh's
thinking favoured reform, Ridah tended more and more towards conservatism (thus
24 making him one of the originators of Islamic fundamentalism in the 20th century).
Today, the terms Wahhabism and Salafism are often used as synonyms.21

Present-day (radicalised) Salafism is far removed from the original Salafiyya, which was
championed by Afghani and Abduh. Present-day Salafists regard the 'return to pure
Islam' as excising everything what in their view has tarnished Islam. Consequently,
present-day Salafism has mostly a very intolerant nature. In particular Western
'modernity' is an abomination to radical Salafists. A radical Salafist leader put it as
follows: "Modernity is an invention of the West to oppress Muslims".22 For this reason
present-day radical Salafism is sometimes described as 'resentment Islam'.
Characteristic for many puritan Salafist groups in the West is not only a radical
rejection of Western society, but also branding those who do not adhere to the Salafist
principles (including other non-Salafist Muslims) as 'heretics' (takfir).

The diagram below shows several aspects of the shift in paradigm from 'traditional'
radical-political Islam to radical puritanism.

21 However, it is preferable to reserve the term 'Wahhabism' for the (mainly) Saudi variant of
Salafism. Salafism also has other variants (both historically and geographically).

25 22 See Roy, (2002), p.134.

2.3.3 The typological differences between 'traditional' radical-political Islam and
radical-Islamic puritanism in a diagram
'Traditional' radical-political Islam
Homogenous, organised
Detailed ideology; specific definitions of
the alternative society (not based on
Western principles)
The focus is on strategic thinking: there
is a clear picture of the ultimate
objectives and the paths leading to these
objectives
The (peaceful) political path is in
principle possible, but has been cut off
by the West
Jihad is a military struggle, being the
political struggle continued on the
battlefield
26
Radical-Islamic puritanism
Heterogeneous, diffuse
Hardly ideological; the alternative is a
return to the society of the early stages of
Islam (of the Salaf, the first companions
of Mohammed)
The focus is on utopian thinking: vague,
Messianic'-idealised pictures of Islamic
society; very general slogans (about the
Sharia, the universal caliphate et cetera)
predominate
The (peaceful) political path is in
principle impossible. The focus is on a
strongly dualistic world view: the world
is divided into the territory of the 'sons
of light' and the 'sons of darkness' (in
Islamic terms: Dar al Islam, the territory
of Islam, and Dar al harb, the territory of
war)
Jihad is an apocalyptic battle between the
'sons of light' and the 'sons of darkness'
2.3.4 Re-Islamisation of Western Muslims as main objective

Many radical-puritan groups in the Islamic world see the Muslim minorities in the
West as their main target group. They see these minorities not directly as potential
fighters or supporters, but rather as 'oppressed brothers' who must be liberated from
the 'yoke of Western brainwashing'. Within radical-Islamic puritanism there are
different views on how this is to be achieved.
In addition to organisations and networks concentrating on Dawa (the intensive
propagation of the radical-Islamic ideology through missionary work) there are others
who focus on the Jihad (in the sense of armed conflict). Some groups combine the two.
The choice of Dawa-oriented groups for non-violent activities does not always imply
that they are non-violent on principle. Often they simply do not yet consider armed
Jihad expedient for practical reasons (Jihad can be counterproductive or impossible
because of the other side's superiority) or for religious reasons (the Jihad against non-
believers is only possible when all Muslims have returned to the 'pure' faith).
Furthermore, Dawa-oriented groups often make ambiguous comments about the
legitimacy of the armed Jihad in areas where Muslims are oppressed and persecuted
(for example, Kashmir, Chechnya or - recently - Iraq). With the support of prominent
Mullahs they often implicitly approve of such a form of armed Jihad, although they are
careful not to explicitly incite people to it or to be associated with recruitment activities
for this struggle.23

In particular Dawa-oriented radical-Salafist organisations and networks from Pakistan,

Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states strongly emphasise 're-Islamisation' of the
Muslim minorities in the West. These organisations include missionary, socio-cultural
and finance organisations which claim not to be politically orientated or violent, but
whose activities are often based upon extreme puritan, intolerant and strongly anti-
Western ideas. Their efforts are purposefully aimed at encouraging Muslims in the
West to turn their back on Western values and standards. They preach an extreme
isolationism from Western society and propagate 'exclusivism' and parallelism. In
some cases they propagate the creation of fully Islamised districts in big cities in the
West or even pursue parallel social structures in the form of autonomous Sharia areas,
as a sort of enclaves foreshadowing the Umma. In the future the Umma is to spread
across the whole world, including the West.24

23 Q. Wiktorowicz The New Global Threat: Transnational Salafis and Jihad. In: Middle East
Policy, Vol. VIII, no. 4, December 2001, p. 18-38.

24 O. Roy (2002) states that pursuing such 'espaces islamisés' is taking the place of pursuit
27 of an 'Islamic state' (in the politico-ideological sense). Compare also the term 'non-
territorial Islamic state' of the radical-Islamic ideologue K. Siddiqui.
 Present-day radical puritanism has a strong appeal for certain segments of the Muslim
communities in the West, especially some groups of young Muslims, in particular
because it offers apparently simple solutions to the identity problems with which many
of them are faced. According to radical-Islamic Puritanism, one's identity can be found
in 'being a pure Muslim'. There is a simple recipe to achieve this: you can become a
'pure Muslim' by ban everything which is 'un-Islamic' from your life, and in certain
cases even fight against it. This sounds innocent enough if being a 'pure Muslim'
means strict compliance with the many detailed, strictly puritan rules of the Sharia
(regarding clothing, personal hygiene, eating habits, manners between men and
women, et cetera). However, in particular 'born-again Muslims' often interpret their
choice for 'being a pure Muslim' in a more radical way. They perceive the 'un-Islamic'
aspects to be banned and combated as other philosophies, views of society and, in
particular, the 'baneful' Western society.

In order to assess the strength of especially radical-Islamic puritan groups, we should

realise that most of these groups are not organised in a structured hierarchy, but rather
in diffuse networks, the coherence of which is based on a shared ideological range of
ideas. The increasing importance of the 'network strategy' is especially apparent in the
growing use of the Internet by radical-Islamic groups. It also accounts for the
increasingly prominent phenomenon of (individually operating) itinerant Imams and
other preachers.

2.4 The third type of radical Islam: radical Muslim nationalism

2.4.1 'Ethnicisation' of being a Muslim in the West

In this paper we also identify a third manifestation of radical Islam; radical Muslim
nationalism (or radical Muslim communitarism). Like radical-Islamic Puritanism, it is
rooted in dissatisfaction about the current political and cultural dominance of the West.
Although both types of radicalism share the same origin (both from a historical, social
and psychological perspective), they are essentially different. Whereas radical-Islamic
puritanism propagates a withdrawal from (Western) society, Muslim nationalism
focuses on securing a place of its own within that society. Muslim nationalism in the
West is a relatively new and often still ignored phenomenon. We must, however, take
into account the possibility that this phenomenon may become increasingly important
in the future.

28
 This new Muslim nationalism focuses rather on being a Muslim (the 'imagined
community'25 of the 'Muslim nation', the solidarity between Muslims all over the world)
than on Islam as a religion. The increasing support for this movement in the West
should be seen against the background of several factors:

- For second and third generation Muslim migrants the ties with the country of origin
has largely disappeared. The issue of identity of the second and third generations
leads to an 'ethnicisation' of 'being a Muslim'. They consider themselves as belonging
to a separate ethnic group within society: the Muslims (primarily experienced as an
ethnic category rather than a religious category).
- This 'ethnicisation' of 'being a Muslim' fits in perfectly with the debate (and until
recently often policy as well) in many Western countries on the integration of
minorities (based on a perception of society that has irreversibly been transformed
into a 'multicultural society' in which each population group is entitled to its own
'individuality').
- The rising middle classes within the Muslim minorities (linked to the emergence of
their own protest generation) are demanding a place (of their own) in the public and
political arena.

2.4.2 Radical exclusivism and parallelism in some forms of Muslim nationalism

Some forms of Muslim nationalism may demonstrate characteristics of radical

'exclusivism' as described above. In that case confirming the Muslim identity involves
discriminatory expressions towards the rest of society (demonisation, hostility). Within
some segments of Muslim communities we can distinguish a relation between rising
radical Muslim nationalism and growing anti-Semitism. We should be aware of the fact
that in the case of many other nationalist movements in the world, the nationalist myth
often has a negative character. Many forms of nationalism share a negative definition of
nation, based on a 'counter nation' which is the oppressor (for example, Serbian
nationalism). We also see this in the new radical Muslim nationalism. For many
Muslim nationalists the 'myth' of the oppression of Muslims all over the world plays a
key role. For that reason, the views of many Muslim nationalists in the West contain a
strongly militant component. They strongly identify themselves with Muslims in
conflict areas. Their militant language should, however, often be seen as part of the
myth on which the creation of a 'Muslim nation' in the West is based.

The above-described radical Muslim nationalism may, in principle, have an

emancipatory function and a positive effect on the integration of minorities into Dutch

29 25 See Benedict Anderson (1994): Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and
Spread of Nationalism.
 society. However, apart from the question whether Muslim nationalist movements
have a hidden agenda, it is possible that the role such movements play in society
undermines the social cohesion. In a homogenous society (as to composition of the
population, ideologies and lifestyles) the democratic legal order is the binding agent
between all population groups.26 In view of the radical-Islamic principles, such a central
focus on the Muslim identity and relating ideals may lead to a weakening of the values
and institutions in Dutch society which unite us. If this emphasis on the Muslim
identity involves an implicit and virulent rejection of the democratic legal order, radical
Muslim nationalism can become a fertile breeding ground for violence.

2.5 From Dawa to Jihad: Various strategic views within radical Islam

2.5.1 The necessity of studying the strategic views within radical Islam

Many analyses of present-day radical Islam fail to systematically address the question as
to the strategies employed. Partly this can be explained by the fact that those involved
play their cards close to their chests. Often we can only formulate hypotheses, as radical
Islam hardly has a tradition of explicit, well-formulated strategies (laid down in
handbooks or tracts, for example). It is, however, possible to get an idea of the strategies
on the basis of statements and comments of radical-Islamic leaders and activities
displayed by groups.

An additional problem is the frequent lack of rationally and fully shaped strategies. But
the movements do have certain strategic orientations. After all, a less coherent and
consistent strategy is still a strategy. But in studying the various strategic orientations
within radical Islam, we may not ignore the fact that various forms of radical Islam
cannot be understood on the basis of a clearly identifiable end-means rationality (i.e., a
coherent strategy). The activities displayed are not really based on clear views regarding
ends and means, but the motives can rather be associated with (extreme) ideas about
the perceived enemy, and about how to fight this enemy.

2.5.2 Different views within radical Islam on ends and means

According to general definitions, a strategy is an overall vision on the goals to be

achieved, and the means used to that end. A strategy describes the ultimate goal, the
intermediate goals to be pursued in order to reach the ultimate goal, and the means to

26 Advisory Council on Government Policy (2002): De toekomst van de nationale rechtsstaat

30 (The Future of the State under the Rule of Law). The Hague: Sdu Uitgevers.
be employed or the activities to be displayed to that end.27 A distinction should be made
between strategy and tactics. Tactics involve a more detailed plan of action ('specific
moves'). In present-day radical Islam a number of strategic varieties can be
distinguished which differ as to their ultimate ends, intermediate ends and the means
to be used.

2.5.2.1 Different views on ultimate ends and intermediate ends

It is often believed that there is a great consensus within radical Islam as to the
ultimate end to be reached. This is believed to encompass the Islamisation of the whole
world. However, it may well be that there are very different views of the ultimate goal
(and, consequently, different views of the intermediate goals that are supposed to bring
the ultimate goal closer). We have pointed out above the basic difference in goals
between 'traditional' political Islam and radical-Islamic puritanism. Whereas
'traditional' political Islam focuses primarily on an Islam-based form of government,
radical puritanism primarily seeks to convert the masses to the pure Islam. We refer to
chapter I: 'traditional' political Islam focuses primarily on far-reaching changes in the
relationship between government and citizens (i.e., a different form of government),
whereas radical puritanism mainly pursues far-reaching changes in the interaction
between citizens. As far as the threat to the Western world is concerned, this means
that 'traditional' political Islam is aimed primarily at the vertical axis of the democratic
legal order, whereas radical puritanism is aimed at the horizontal axis.

It seems that in particular in very violent radical-Islamic puritanism the Islamisation of

the entire world is not really the leitmotif, but rather the idea of an apocalypse in terms
of bringing the struggle between the world of Islam (Dar al Islam) and the heretical
world (Dar al Harb) to such a climax that the end of times (the Last Judgement) can
dawn. For groups advocating this view, the Jihad is an end in itself. Jihadists are keen
on inciting the apocalyptic fight between good and evil, thus to enable Islam to triumph
and its martyrs to enter eternal paradise.

If we consider the nature of radical Muslim nationalism as described above, this

movement is likely to foster less extremist views on what this ultimate goal entails (the
existence of a 'Muslim nation' alongside other nations). Because this manifestation of
radical Islam is only a very recent phenomenon in the Western world, it is too early for
a proper assessment.

27 One of the founders of Western strategic thinking, C. von Clausewitz, makes a distinction
between Ziel (ultimate goal), Zweck (intermediate goal) and Mittel. See his Vom Kriege,
31 1832.
 2.5.2.2 Different views on means and activities
In present-day radical Islam we can distinguish various strategic views on the means
and activities to achieve its goals. Basically, these can be found in two areas.
Firstly, some forms of radical Islam opt for not directly violent long-term strategies of
continuous influencing (Dawa). Other forms of radical Islam may primarily focus on
short-term strategies of violent activism and terrorism (Jihad). Jihad and Dawa may also
be combined as two complementary strategies which, according to circumstances, are
to be used either simultaneously or separately.
Secondly, we can make a distinction between a predominantly open and a more covert
character of the activities.28 The covert strategies involve activities such as clandestine
financing, infiltration in community-based organisations under false colours and/or
with a hidden agenda, the deliberate dissemination of false rumours and conspiracy
theories to encourage tensions between groups, and so on.

2.6 Jihadism and terrorism

In the above analysis we have shown an interaction between Dawa and Jihad that may
ultimately result in terrorism. This interaction is confirmed by analyses - also by the
AIVD - of the backgrounds of Islamic terrorist groups and networks that are posing a
serious threat to the Dutch democratic legal order as well as to the international legal
order. The network strategy, international missionary efforts and the interaction or
even interwovenness of Dawa and Jihad demonstrate the relationship between the
various forms of radical Islam and the phenomenon of radical-Islamic terrorism. The
ideological objectives of and the means actually used by the various forms of radical
Islam (in combination with the present followers and geographical scattering) strongly
add to the increasing endogenous threat (in addition to the existing exogenous threat)
from radical-Islamic terrorism.

At the beginning of the 21st century, attacks, in particular those of 11 September 2001,
have put terrorism in a different perspective than before and have shifted the
boundaries of the imaginable and predictable. The disruptive consequences of the
attacks have made citizens and authorities aware of the vulnerabilities of complex,
industrialised and open democratic societies. Effective counter-terrorism can no longer

28 In radical-Islamic circles with respect to covert activities reference is sometimes made to

the traditional concept of Takiyya ('hiding one's true religious background'). According to
this traditional concept, Muslims in a non-Muslim environment are sometimes permitted
to hide their Muslim background (for example in order to avoid persecution , but also to
32 conduct a secret fight against the nonbelievers).
be considered separately from the protection of society's vulnerable sectors, property
and prominent persons. Attacks on such targets have disruptive consequences for
society at large. Following the attacks in the United States and Spain, several measures
have been initiated in the Netherlands on the basis of extensive stock-taking, in order to
optimise the security of vulnerable property, vital sectors and specific persons.

In the War on Terrorism headed by the United States following the attacks of 11
September, several relative successes have been achieved which were decisive for the
present nature of the threat from international radical-Islamic terrorism. The
dismantling of Al Qaeda's infrastructural facilities in Afghanistan as well as the
elimination or arrest of several of its foremost leaders have resulted in a fragmentation
of Al Qaeda. As a result, its actual strength and organisational powers have been
reduced. This has caused a decentralisation of international Islamic terrorism. There
are no longer any global networks controlled by a central Al Qaeda leadership. Instead,
local networks have emerged which are related on the basis of a common Al Qaeda
ideology, rather than by organisational ties. Within the local networks in particular in
the Western world (especially in Europe) Al Qaeda's ideology is interpreted in an even
more extremist way than by the Al Qaeda's leadership itself. Often the actors in these
networks are not really driven by strategic-tactical considerations; they see themselves
as participants in a mythical, apocalyptic final battle with Evil (the Western world) in
the context of which, in principle, all exponents of Evil (in fact any Western citizen)
should be destroyed. This perception may lead to a willingness to participate in ruthless
mass destruction.

The willingness among members of local radical-Islamic networks in the Western

world to use extreme violence is mainly fuelled by the part of Al Qaeda's ideology that is
based on the ideas of one of the founders of Al Qaeda, Abdallah Azzam (1941-1989).
He contended that each Muslim individually has an obligation ('Fard ayn') to wage an
armed Jihad against the nonbelievers.29 Islam is threatened to such an extent that each
Muslim individually (independently of a higher religious authority) is fully justified to
engage in an armed Jihad. Local radical-Islamic networks in the Western world are also
characterised by a further radicalisation of ideological thinking about Takfir ('branding
as heretics'). In particular the ideas of Shukri Mustafa (1942-1978), the founder of the
Takfir wal Hidjra (literally: 'branding as heretics and leaving') movement have
contributed to this further radicalisation. According to this movement, in effect all
those who adhere to another faith (both non-Muslims and Muslims who, according to

29 According to Azzam the armed Jihad is an individual commitment and no longer a

collective commitment ('fard kifaya') which releases the individual if there is a group that
33 performs this task.
 the Takfiri, do not adhere to the proper form of Islam) are nonbelievers who are to be
combated. This means that, in effect, society as a whole is designated as a target.30

Violent radical Muslims increasingly make use of the rhetoric and means of the
asymmetrical war. Violent radical Muslims use means against powerful states that go
beyond the territorial character of states whilst selecting targets that are hard to defend
with the traditional means of defence of states. Where earlier forms of terrorism still
tried to raise sympathy among the population, radical-Islamic terrorism is heading for
uncompromising confrontation. Even restrictions to the democratic liberties as possibly
indispensable consequences of counter-terrorism strictly speaking conform to the
objectives of radical-Islamic terrorism, because these can be seen as part of the
intended revolution or even dismantling of Western societies.

2.7 From Dawa to Jihad: The threats from radical Islam versus the
democratic legal order

In chapter I the democratic legal order was shown as a model with a horizontal and a
vertical dimension. In a diagram this can be represented by means of two crossing
axes. We will use such a diagram to illustrate how the different types of radical Islam
described above affect the two dimensions of the democratic legal order.

As we mentioned before, in principle radicalism will be the subject of study for the AIVD,
a) where it concerns the willingness to pursue changes in society that are radical to
such an extent that they may harm the democratic legal order or its functioning,
and/or
b) where in the pursuit of far-reaching changes in society means or activities are
planned that violate and may harm the democratic legal order.

The questions that arise in studying the security problems of radical Islam include:
a) Which changes in society are pursued by the various forms of radical Islam, and in
what way do these pose a threat to the democratic legal order?
b) Which means are opted for in this pursuit?
c) What possible effects can be expected in the realisation of this pursuit?

30 Shukri Mustafa's view of Takfir is a further radicalisation of the views of Sayyid Qutb
(1906-1966), who argued that regimes in Muslim countries that do not observe the 'laws
of the Islam') are to be considered as renegades to be fought with arms. The fight against
the 'renegade' regimes also entails a fight against non-Islamic powers that support and
34 finance them.
2.7.1 Typology of threats from radical Islam

The diagram in section 2.7.2 contains eight types of threat posed by radical Islam,
based on the differences described in the previous sections. The subdivision is made on
the basis of three criteria:

• An orientation on the horizontal or the vertical axis of the democratic legal order.
This is the pursuit of far-reaching changes in the relations between the government
and the citizens, the pursuit of a different form of government (vertical axis), or
radical changes in the relations between the citizens in society (horizontal axis).

• An orientation on not directly violent, long-term influencing activities (Dawa), or a

short-term orientation via violent activism and terrorism (Jihad). The right-hand side
of the figure below represents the Dawa-related variants, the left-hand side the
variants arising from Jihad-oriented activities.

• An orientation on the overt or covert deployment of the above activities. The upper
half of the circle shows the variants related to the overt activities, the lower half those
relating to covert activities.

In the description of the criteria we have opted for the term 'orientation' rather than
'threat', because we prefer neutrality in this context. Only in relation to the possible
effects of the orientation-induced activities does the nature of a threat become manifest.

It is important not to consider the diagram in 2.7.2 as a definitive classification of

radical Islam. Nor is it our intention to relate various forms of radical Islam to one type
of threat only. The diagram primarily serves as a frame of reference to enable a better
understanding of the diversity and relationships between the different ideological and
strategic orientations within radical Islam. It also serves to provide a better insight into
the various types of threat as a result of the possible effects of the orientations once
these have been converted into activities.

35
 2.7.2 Eight types of threat from radical Islam

Vertical dimension of the

democratic legal order

OV
AD
8 1 ER
IH Efforts to create anti-
T
J

Efforts to create anti-democratic

DA
democratic views on the
T

views on the state by non violent

ER

state by violent means.

W
means.

A
OV

Violent anti-democratic
Non-violent anti-democratic
7 political Islam or violent
radical Muslim political Islam or non-violent 2
nationalism radical Muslim
nationalism

Pursuit of exclusivism and Overt propagation of exclusivism

parallelism via overt violent activities. and parallelism
Violent radical-Islamic Non-violent radical-Islamic
puritanism puritanism

Horizontal dimension
of the democratic
legal order
Secret encouragement of serious
Covert propagation of exclusivism
tensions among groups in society,
and parallelism using hidden agenda/
wich may lead to violence.
under false pretences.
Violent radical-Islamic puritanism
Non-violent radical-Islamic
Violent Muslim nationalism
puritanism

Covert attempts
to undermine
structures of

6
Covert pursuit of
subversion of democratic
democratic legal order.
3
legal order. Non-violent
CO

Violent anti-democratic
A

anti-democratic political Islam

AW
VE

political Islam
RT

JI H
AD 5 4 E RT
C OV

36
2.7.3 Eight types of threat from radical Islam - explanation

1. Orientation on the vertical dimension of the democratic legal

order. Forms of radical Islam that pursue a form of government
that is totally different from that of the democratic legal order,
using overt, non-violent means (overt Dawa).

Based on a rejection of the democratic legal order as a whole or on essential parts, these
forms of radical Islam pursue a completely different form of government (the Islamic
state), supposedly by democratic means only. Its adherents wish, for example, to
'introduce the Sharia via elections'. In the Netherlands such an orientation can be
found with a movement such as the Arab European League (AEL).
Assessing the security risks with regard to such forms of radical Islam we run up
against the problem of the democratic paradox: how to deal - in a democracy - with
movements that, via democratic procedures, wish to put an end to democracy? Based
on the broader view of the democratic legal order as described above, however, efforts
to destroy, via democratic procedures, the democratic legal order can indeed be
considered a threat against which action can be taken. For the democratic legal order
implies more than just the majority principle. It also covers inalienable constitutional
rights (freedom of speech, freedom of assembly), rights of political minorities (the
opposition should, in principle, be able to seize political power), a government keeping
aloof from the privacy of citizens (as opposed to a totalitarian attitude where the state
interferes in its citizens' lives in every respect). Consequently, regarding some forms of
active pursuit of antidemocratic objectives, even by democratic means, government
intervention is justified. Relevant in this context is a judgment of the European Court
of Human Rights of 2003.31 The Court ruled that a government may act against groups
that, using democratic means, seek to subvert or undermine the democratic legal order,
in particular if there is a real risk that their activities may have effective results.
Obviously, such measures should be within the boundaries of the democratic legal
order. However, on the basis of the traditional political and administrative
considerations in the Netherlands in this respect, it has been argued that non-judicial

31 This concerns a judgment of 13 February 2003 of the Enlarged Chamber of the European
Court of Human Rights confirming an earlier judgment of 31 July 2001 of the 3rd section of
the European Court. In the latter it was ruled (with a narrow majority of four out of seven
judges) that the dissolution of the Turkish Refah Party (Welfare party) by the Turkish
Constitutional Court was not in violation of article 11 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights (ECHR). The Court ruled at the time that prominent
members of the Welfare party had publicly taken positions that could imply a threat to the
37 fundamental safeguards of democracy and of the rights and freedoms as protected under
the ECHR.
forms to counterbalance non-violent antidemocratic radical groups are often more
effective as well as more democratic.

2. Orientation on the horizontal dimension of the democratic

legal order. Forms of radical Islam that pursue a type of society
that is completely different (different interpersonal
relationships) from the Western 'civic culture' using overt and
non-violent means (overt Dawa)

These forms of radical Islam pursue, via overt and non-violent means (overt Dawa),
radical social reforms (with respect to the interaction between citizens) that are at odds
with the horizontal dimension of the (present Dutch) democratic legal order. These
forms of radical Islam are primarily aimed against the cultural dominance of the
Islamic world by the Western world (and only secondly against the political
dominance). Adherents of this group primarily have objections against the Western
type of society that can be described as civic culture.32 In this type of society all
members acknowledge one another as free and equal citizens. Some forms of radical
Islam are aimed at creating totally different forms of society, based on principles that
are completely different from those of a civic culture. They wish to overturn the open
character of society, the respect for multiformity and diversity, and the personal moral
and philosophical autonomy in order to create a strictly puritan uniformity with, for
example, tight social control of people's 'virtuousness'. They oppose the ideal of
freedom as propagated in the Western world, equal rights for men and women, and so
on. The realisation of these objectives is certainly to be characterised as a threat to the
horizontal dimension of the democratic legal order.
These variants of radical Islam manifest themselves in non-violent, radical-Islamic
puritan groups, which, via overt propagation of an often isolationist message,
frequently advocate exclusivism and parallelism (for example, groups like some not
directly violent radical Salafist groups or globally operating missionary organisations
such as the Tablighi Jamaat). In the Western world the view is winning ground that
deeper study is necessary into the exclusivism and parallelism advocated by these
groups.

Dawa activities can manifest themselves in various ways. For example, Dawa may be
aimed at trying to convince Muslim communities that non-Muslim communities are
hostile towards Islam and wish to oppress or even destroy it. Dawa may also serve to
convince Muslim communities that the values and standards of non-Muslims are

32 Or also as 'civil society' (but this phrase is to be understood in a broad context, i.e. not
38 only in its sometimes common meaning of 'social midfield'.
incompatible with those of Islam and should therefore be considered as depraved. In
such a form of Dawa, Muslim communities are often encouraged to emphasise (in a
provocative way) the differences with other groups and sometimes also to express their
contempt and hatred towards standards and values and the culture of non-Muslims.

In the Netherlands the overt Dawa as described above is preached at a limited number
of mosques of a Salafist character.33 In these mosques views are propagated that are in
line with Salafism, which is often anti-Western and anti-integration, but not explicitly
Jihadist. This movement is largely linked to the Saudi clergy, which is loyal towards the
Saudi government or is tolerated by it. By propagating the Salafist doctrine the
worshippers in these mosques are presented with ideas about a far-reaching isolation
and evasion of those with different convictions, thus effectively inciting to extreme
isolationism. The resulting orientation on the own community of 'true' Muslims and
rejection of nonbelieving outsiders may lead to intolerance towards anyone who does
not adhere to the strictly puritan Islamic view of Salafism (exclusivism) and to
tendencies to consider Islamic laws as superior to Dutch legislation (parallelism).

3. Orientation on the horizontal dimension of the democratic

legal order. Forms of radical Islam that pursue a type of society
that is completely different (as to interpersonal relationships)
from the Western 'civic culture', using covert, non-violent
means (covert Dawa)

These forms of radical Islam pursue far-reaching social changes (with respect to the
interpersonal relationships between citizens) via covert, non-violent means (covert
Dawa), which are at odds with the horizontal dimension of the present Dutch
democratic legal order. These efforts include, for example, activities of the radical-
Islamic nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) from Islamic model countries, in
particular the radical-puritan Islamic missionary, socio-cultural and finance
organisations from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. These organisations often operate 'with
a hidden agenda and under false pretences', with a focus on secretly propagating and
financing exclusivism and parallelism. To the outside world, these NGOs present
themselves as legitimate humanitarian organisations and discussion partners for the
government, but in fact they advocate and propagate a highly intolerant exclusivism and
parallelism (hidden from the government's and the public's view). The realisation of
this pursuit can be characterised as a threat, all the more so because the methods to
achieve it are characterised by secrecy.

33 See the AIVD memorandum on Saudi influences in the Netherlands. Links between the
39 Salafist mission, radicalisation processes and Islamic terrorism (June 2002).
In the Netherlands, a number of Islamic missionary organisations are active. It is
important to recognise, however, that the above-described Dawa activities are not only
carried out by institutionalised (and by Islamic model countries such as Saudi Arabia
facilitated) Dawa organisations, but that in addition to this institutionalised Dawa, also
the informal Dawa is gaining influence. We refer to the Dawa activities of individual,
itinerant preachers, who may or may not have a link with religious scholars in, for
example, Egypt or Saudi Arabia, who have a strained relationship with the governments
of these countries. The 'virtual' Dawa propagated via the Internet is also a factor that
should not be neglected. Especially young people have found their way to the websites
of radical-Islamic Mullahs. These websites increasingly contribute to the radicalisation
of parts of the Muslim communities in the Netherlands. But it also important to
mention that the virtual Dawa is not only preached through web sites, but also via chat
rooms. We are witnessing a new trend in which the role of 'intermediaries' (preachers
who personally indoctrinate) in preaching the radical-Islamic Dawa is becoming less
important, whereas the importance of an intensive exchange of radical-Islamic
doctrines via the electronic highway is growing. The participants in the chat sessions
progressively infect themselves and one another with the radical-Islamic ideology. This
creates an 'autonomous' radicalisation process. This new trend of radical-Islamic 'Dawa
without preachers' may also manifest itself elsewhere (outside the Internet). 'Risk
areas' in this context are in particular prisons, some schools, and mosques.

4. Orientation on the vertical dimension of the democratic legal

order, emanating from forms of radical Islam that pursue a type
of society that is completely different from the democratic legal
order, using covert and non-violent means (covert Dawa)

These forms of radical Islam try to undermine the structures of the democratic legal
order via covert Dawa. At an international level there have been indications that in
particular the radical branches of the Muslim Brotherhood employ covert Dawa
strategies. Rather than confronting the state power with direct violence, this strategy
seeks to gradually undermine it by infiltrating and eventually taking over the civil
service, the judicature, schools, local administrations, et cetera.34 Apart from clandestine
infiltration, covert Dawa may also be aimed at inciting Muslim minorities to civil

34 We can identify such strategy in particular in the Egyptian branch of the Muslim
Brotherhood, with respect to their activities in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood can be
described as a global movement with a globally branched network. Two main movements
have dominated the organisation for decades. Firstly, there is the anti-Western, anti-
democratic but nonviolent line of Hassan al Banna (1906-1949), one of the founders of
40 the Muslim Brotherhood, and secondly, there is the much more radical and violent line of
Sayyd Qutb (1906-1966), one of the originators of modern Jihad.
disobedience, promoting parallel power structures or even inciting Muslim masses to a
revolt.

In the Netherlands some forms of covert Dawa, aiming at a clandestine infiltration of

political and social institutions, are also conceivable, for example, attempts to infiltrate
community-based organisations with the aim of monopolising them (thus obstructing
the proper functioning of 'civil society'). But in the long run, more serious forms of
such covert subversion are also conceivable, for example attempts by radical Islamic
organisations to infiltrate local administration, the judicature et cetera, whilst
concealing their actual objectives and loyalties.

Although such activities are carried out within the boundaries of what can be
considered tolerable within a healthy democracy, the effects are undesirable. Hence the
above-described activities may be qualified as somewhat threatening.

5. Orientation on the vertical dimension of the democratic legal

order. Forms of radical Islam that pursue a form of government
that is completely different from that of a democratic legal order,
using covert violent means (covert Jihad)

These forms of radical Islam pursue the subversion of the democratic legal order via
covert Jihad. Whereas variant 4 is characterised by a long-term goal, this variant seeks
to effect an assumption of power or an evident obstruction of the current legitimate
power in the short term. If such a pursuit really seems to have a chance of achieving
effective results, it obviously constitutes an evident threat. In the Western world there
are at present no examples of forms of radical Islam that employ the above-described
(currently hardly realistic) strategy.

6. Orientation on the horizontal dimension of the democratic

legal order. Forms of radical Islam that by using covert and
violent means pursue a type of society that is completely
different (as to interpersonal relationships) from the Western
civic culture, (covert Jihad)

These forms of radical-puritan Islam seek to spark violence via the covert use of
inspiration and influencing methods (hence covert Jihad; the instigators themselves do

41
not wish to openly present themselves as Jihadists or even be associated with the armed
Jihad; however, they wish to promote violence in a covert way). In this way they seek to
realise far-reaching social changes (with respect to the relationships between citizens)
that are at odds with the horizontal dimension of the (present Dutch) democratic legal
order. Obviously, this constitutes an evident threat. Modes of operation include secretly
encouraging (provoking) serious tensions between groups in society, which may lead to
violence. The radical-puritan preaching by these types of actors may result in inciting to
violence against other groups (for example, violent anti-Semitism). This incitement
may take place for example via covertly spreading conspiracy theories, false rumours,
ideas about the perceived enemy and, more generally, creating a climate in which
violence can thrive.

There are indications that, for example, the Hizb ut Tahrir, an international radical
Islamic organisation which is also active in the Netherlands, uses this strategy of covert
Jihad. Publicly, this organisation claims to be against the armed Jihad, but in a number
of European countries its followers have evidently been involved in anti-Semitic
incidents and deliberate incitement to violence.

7. Orientation on the horizontal dimension of the democratic

legal order. Forms of radical Islam that pursue a type of
society that is completely different (as to interpersonal
relationships) from the Western civic culture, using overt
and violent means (overt Jihad)

These forms of radical Islam pursue, via overt and violent means (overt Jihad), radical
social changes (with respect to the relations between citizens) which evidently conflict
with the horizontal dimension of the (present Dutch) democratic legal order. As is the
case for threat types 2 and 3, these forms of radical-puritan Islam oppose the civil
society/civic culture as it has taken shape in the Western world. Unlike the above-
described forms, they combine their resistance with a willingness to wage armed Jihad.
Hence these forms of radical puritan Islam constitute an evident threat. An example of
this violent radical-puritan Islam is the submovement within present-day Salafism,
which is described as Salafiyya Jihadiyya. This variant of Salafism should be clearly
distinguished from certain forms of Salafism based on the creed of spiritual leaders
affiliated with, or tolerated by, governments of Islamic model countries (in particular
Saudi Arabia)35 which are indeed strongly anti-Western and isolationist, but not
explicitly Jihadist.

42 35 See the previously cited AIVD memorandum Saudi influences in the Netherlands.
The above-described radical-puritan Islam also manifests itself in the Takfir ideology as
expressed in the Takfir wal Hidjra (literally: 'branding as heretics and leaving')
movement. According to the Takfir, all non-Muslims (both governments and ordinary
citizens) and all moderate Muslims are heretic and should therefore be combated (they
see moderate Muslims also as 'renegades', which makes them even more heretic). All
means are permitted in this struggle, ranging from ordinary crime to extreme and
ruthless violence.

The Jihad activities of these forms of violent radical-puritan Islam manifest themselves
rather in violence against non-Muslims and against Muslims perceived as having gone
astray than in a direct struggle against the established political power. More in
particular, this involves risks of violence against exponents and/or symbols of the
perceived depraved non-Islamic philosophies and cultures (in particular the Western
culture). We can range certain endogenous terrorist networks that have recently
manifested themselves in the Netherlands under this category of violent, radical-
puritan Islam.

8. Orientation on the vertical dimension of the democratic

legal order. Forms of radical Islam that pursue a form of
government that is totally different from that of a democratic
legal order, using overt and violent means (overt Jihad)

These forms of radical Islam pursue a completely different form of government (the
Islamic state), based on a rejection of the democratic legal order as a whole or in
essential parts. To that end, the followers of this category of radical Islam are prepared
to use violent (terrorist) means. For them the Jihad is the direct, violent struggle against
the established political power. Most of the internationally operating radical-Islamic
networks can be ranged under this form of radical Islam. Obviously, this form poses an
evident threat.

43
 3 Counter strategies and resistance against the
various threats from radical Islam

3.1 Institutions and persons embodying the democratic legal order

In risk assessments developed by the AIVD the resistance capability of parties

embodying the democratic legal order is a key issue. By resistance capability we mean
the capability of those embodying the democratic legal order and those having an
interest in the continued existence of the democratic legal order (including society as a
whole) to defend themselves against the threats they are confronted with.

The main task of a democratically controlled state power is to safeguard the vertical
relationships as these have been agreed and laid down in the democratic state under
the rule of law. This encompasses guarding the compliance with and observance of
agreements (often laid down in laws), regulations, and standards that regulate the
relationship between the government and its citizens. The responsibility for fulfilling
the conditions of the democratic legal order that enable the horizontal relations rests
primarily with the citizens, in organised forms or otherwise. The government can only
play a supportive role. So the democratic legal order has a wide range of parties
embodying this interest as well as interested parties: in fact all national, regional and
local authorities. And, as we mentioned before, society at large is, in fact, an interested
party.

From the perspective of the AIVD, the manifestations of radical Islam described in
chapter 2 constitute a security problem because they all involve specific risks to the
integrity of the democratic legal order. It is important to realise that infringements on
the democratic legal order investigated by the AIVD cannot always, or exclusively, be
dealt with by judicial means. The AIVD is not a law enforcement agency and therefore
does not collect evidence for a (possible) criminal investigation. Nevertheless, it is
possible that during the performance of its statutory tasks, the AIVD obtains reasonable
grounds for suspicion that an offence has been committed, which may form the basis
of subsequent legal action. This will always be the responsibility of the Public
Prosecutions Department. It is also the nature of the phenomena studied by the AIVD,
in particular those concerning radical Dawa activities as described above, that makes

44
 judicial interference not always possible or even desirable. The phenomena may, for
example, not always be punishable under Dutch law. It is a fact, however, that these
phenomena sometimes come close to the boundaries of what is permissible according
to constitutional freedoms of religion and speech, and the right of association, thus
posing a threat to the democratic legal order. These cases require government action
outside the judicial context, while actors like political policymakers, other national
authorities, local administration, community-based organisations, and especially the
moderate part of the Muslim community itself should provide counterbalance to the
threats. This is how we envisage the broad approach to the wide-ranging and multiform
phenomenon of radical Islam.

3.2 Combating the threat from radical Islam: interference and

resistance

When radical Islam leads to the use of undemocratic means (terrorist violence), there is
no doubt about it that government action and (in particular) judicial interference are
called for. However, within the boundaries of the democratic legal order, certain forms
of radicalism may to some extent be permissible. For example, isolationism as such
does not pose a threat to the democratic legal order. In a democratic society citizens
enjoy the freedom to choose a lifestyle in which the interaction with other citizens and
with the government - although within certain boundaries - can be shaped according to
their own wishes. However, if this isolationism threatens the freedoms and
constitutional rights of others, it is an infringement on the democratic legal order.
Forms of isolationism that are particularly threatening to the democratic legal order are
those which evolve into exclusivism of one group towards other groups (manifested in
discrimination and inciting hatred) and parallelism (meaning that the non-Islamic
government is not recognised, nor the legal system, and that a different, specifically
Sharia-based form of justice is propagated, as well as the creation of autonomous
Sharia enclaves within the non-Islamic society). The question is, however, whether
manifestations of such forms of radicalism can be combated and tackled by judicial
means (such an approach may be at odds with the constitutional rights) and whether
this will be sufficiently effective. For an effective approach to this type of radicalism it
seems that enhancing the resistance capability of national and local administrators as
well as community-based organisations is a more successful strategy.

45
3.3 Present capability to resist the various threats from radical Islam

The capability in Dutch society to resist the threats from radical Islam is low.
Recently, however, Dutch society has shown a willingness to adopt a more resistant
attitude. The low resistance capability can be explained by, among other things, the
insidious character of radicalisation processes. Processes that may initially seem
innocent, may threaten the democratic legal order in the longer term. When, for
example, there is a not immediately visible but steady increase in the number of
persons with radical-political or religious ideas, this can in due course lead to tensions
between different groups in society that are not publicly apparent yet. This applies to,
for example, the role of some radical mosques and religious Islamic leaders in
radicalisation process among Muslim communities. It is difficult for especially local
authorities to gain insight into what is going on inside these mosques. In a number of
cases it turned out that a mosque board's viewpoints expressed to the local authorities
were quite different from those propagated within smaller, more private circles.

The resistance capability within the various Islamic communities themselves is also
low, both as regards the breeding ground for radicalisation and the radicalisation
process itself. Naturally, within the Muslim communities there are also people and
organisations that are more moderate and/or moderating, but so far hey have
insufficiently been able to counterbalance the radicalising forces within their
community. Sometimes this is due to the fact that they, like the local authorities, have
insufficient insight into the effects of these forces upon their community or are unable
to assess and neutralise these effects. Consequently, one of the strategies to counter the
processes of radicalisation is to enhance the resistance capability of the moderating
forces. Attempts should be made to support and encourage them in such a way that a
successful division between radical and moderate forces within the relevant group or
community is effected. In our contact with the moderate forces we should be well
aware of the fact that their actions frequently result in a more antagonistic community
spirit within radical circles. A consequence of this is that the ranks in the more radical
part of this community will close and the moderating forces may lose their influence.

3.4 Counterstrategies against the various threats from radical Islam

In chapter 2 we presented eight types of threats constituted by radical Islam. In the

chart on the next pages we mention a number of counterstrategies and actors with

46
respect to the forms of radical Islam relating to these eight types of threat. The chart
seeks to offer a structure on the basis of which counterstrategies tailored to the
individual types of threat may be formulated methodically, in combination with the
relevant actors. The chart does not presume to be complete, but it may be used as a first
step to a more complete overview, to be extended by the various actors themselves. It
also provides insight into the connections between types of threat, countermeasures
and actors.

47
 3.4.1 Counterstrategies against the eight types of threat from radical Islam - a chart

DAWA
Overt Dawa against Overt Dawa against Covert Dawa against Covert Dawa against

Type of threat vertical dimension DLO horizontal dimension DLO horizontal dimension DLO vertical dimension DLO
(type of threat 1 in 2.7.2) (type of threat 2 in 2.7.2) (type of threat 3 in 2.7.2) (type of threat 4 in 2.7.2)
AIVD >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Level of AIVD-Police-Judicial autho
involvement
of various
actors in Civil society / Community-based organisations >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
counterstrategy National, regional, local authorities >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

Phenomenon Radicalisation>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Counterstrategy Government
continuous testing against
penal code re possible
discrimination and inciting
hatred and rebellion
Stimulating of
moderate forces
Government
continuous testing against
penal code re possible
discrimination and inciting
hatred and rebellion
Stimulating of
moderate forces
Government
continuous testing against
penal code re possible
discrimination and inciting
hatred and rebellion
Stimulating of
moderate forces
Sensibilisation of/dispersing Sensibilisation of/dispersing
information among public
and public bodies
Stopping secret flows
of funds etc.
Administrative measures
such as refusing a work or
residence permit, stopping
subsidies
Government
continuous testing against
penal code re possible
discrimination and inciting
hatred and rebellion
Stimulating of
moderate forces
information among public
and public bodies
Stopping secret flows
of funds etc.
Administrative measures
such as refusing a work or
residence permit, stopping
subsidies
Infiltrate, disrupt, block

Communities involved Communities involved Communities involved Communities involved

Developing an identity /
promoting positive role
models; Emancipation of
women
Developing a counter
ideology; Competitive
moderate offer
Society
Dialogue from the civil
society with moderate forces society with moderate forces society with moderate forces society with moderate forces
Developing an identity /
promoting positive role
models; Emancipation of
women
Developing a counter
ideology; Competitive
moderate offer
Society
Dialogue from the civil
Developing an identity /
promoting positive role
models; Emancipation of
women
Developing a counter
ideology; Competitive
moderate offer
Society
Dialogue from the civil
Developing an identity /
promoting positive role
models; Emancipation of
women
Developing a counter
ideology; Competitive
moderate offer
Society
Dialogue from the civil
 DLO = democratic legal order

JIHAD
Covert Jihad against Covert Jihad against Overt Jihad against Overt Jihad against
vertical dimension DLO horizontal dimension DLO horizontal dimension DLO vertical dimension DLO
(type of threat 5 in 2.7.2) (type of threat 6 in 2.7.2) (type of threat 7 in 2.7.2) (type of threat 8 in 2.7.2)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
authorities >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Terrorism>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Government Government Government Government
continuous testing against continuous testing against
penal code re possible penal code re possible
discrimination and inciting discrimination and inciting
hatred and rebellion hatred and rebellion
Alliances with Alliances with Alliances with Alliances with
moderate forces moderate forces moderate forces moderate forces
Making public and public Making public and public Making public and public Making public and public
bodies aware bodies aware bodies aware bodies aware

Stopping secret flows
of funds etc.
Administrative measures
such as refusing a work or
residence permit
Stopping secret flows
of funds etc.
Administrative measures
such as refusing a work or
residence permit
Stopping secret flows
of funds etc.
Administrative measures
such as refusing a work or
residence permit
Stopping secret flows
of funds etc.
Administrative measures
such as refusing a work or
residence permit

Infiltrate, disrupt, block
Judicial intervention:
prohibiting
Communities involved
Developing an identity /
promoting positive role
models; Emancipation of
women
Developing a counter
ideology; Competitive
moderate offer
Society
Dialogue from the civil
society with moderate forces society with moderate forces society with moderate forces
Infiltrate, disrupt, block
Judicial intervention:
prohibiting
Communities involved
Developing an identity /
promoting positive role
models; Emancipation of
women
Developing a counter
ideology; Competitive
moderate offer
Society
Dialogue from the civil
Infiltrate, disrupt, block Infiltrate, disrupt, block
Judicial intervention: Judicial intervention:
prohibiting and prosecution prohibiting and prosecution
Communities involved Communities involved
Developing an identity /
promoting positive role
models; Emancipation of
women
Developing a counter
ideology; Competitive
moderate offer
Society Society
Dialogue from the civil
3.4.2 Counterstrategies against the eight types of threat from radical Islam -
explanation

Below we will provide a number of proposals for possible counterstrategies against the
described phenomena of Dawa and Jihad to be implemented by the authorities, the
communities involved and society as a whole. The counterstrategies are explained
briefly, leaving aside, however, organisational aspects as well as powers and
responsibilities.

3.4.2.1 Counterstrategies against Dawa-related types of threat

1. Provision of information to government bodies and the public

National, regional and local bodies embodying the democratic legal order should be
informed continuously on the real objectives of Dawa-oriented radical-Islamic groups.
This is a task for the judicial authorities, the police, the AIVD as well as the National
Coordinator for Counter-terrorism. They should give policymakers and politicians at a
national, regional and local level general advice in relation to policies on radicalisation,
on the basis of what they know about the objectives of the above-mentioned groups.
Counterbalancing specific forms of religious radicalisation is a complicated matter,
because radical expressions by in particular Dawa-oriented radical-Islamic groups often
do not exceed the boundaries of Dutch law, but they do touch upon the boundaries of
what is permissible under the constitution, in particular with respect to freedom of
religion and freedom of expression. We suspect that certain actors in the field of
religious radicalisation are well aware of these boundaries and take care not go beyond
them in public, whereas in private circles they voice different viewpoints. Although
government bodies have their own responsibilities, in some cases the AIVD can help
them to gain insight into possible underlying intentions.

2. Cooperation with moderate forces

Cooperation with moderate forces in the communities themselves, in terms of
supporting and encouraging them, is of great importance. This is a task for all
government bodies as well as the communities themselves. The purpose of this
cooperation is to encourage the communities to voice different ideas and to help them
develop a 'self-cleaning capacity'.

3. Promotion of competitive views

It is recommended to stimulate a more moderate ideology to counterbalance the radical
range of ideas. It is important in this context to seek alliance with existing organisations

50
and initiatives and to promote these. This may help authoritative experts both within
and outside the communities to emasculate the radical-Islamic ideological arguments.
This is a task for government bodies and for the communities themselves, as well as
the media and academia (in terms of support and encouragement).

4. Identity development
In some way or other we have to help particularly the younger generations in coping
with their identity crisis. We should avoid that the often hybrid or ambiguous
perception of identity turns into a rigid identity perception tending towards radical
Islam. Stimulating a capacity for empathy and, in line with this, self-criticism, is
important. Emphasis should also be put on the individual's responsibility towards
society at large (as opposed to responsibility towards a limited group). This is a task for
both the Muslim community and educational institutes.

5. Stimulation of positive role models

In line with the previous point, it is important that the community has its own positive
role models with whom the members of the community can identify themselves and
who may stimulate positive actions. The problems involved in criminal role models
who are sometimes idolised by young people are to be solved in no uncertain terms.

6. Encouragement of the emancipation of women

Based on views held in the Netherlands on the horizontal dimension of the democratic
legal order, stimulating the emancipation of women seems natural enough. This
emancipation, which still meets with considerable resistance in Muslim communities,
due to both traditional standards and values (for example, views on honour and shame)
and the rhetoric of radical Islam, requires its own specific policy.

7. Education
The tasks of the educational sector within the context of radicalisation problems are
quite comprehensive. We may identify two distinct directions. Firstly, schools might
play a role in the identification of radicalisation and informing the competent
authorities. Secondly, they can obviously transfer and encourage the internalisation of
the Western democratic ideas on legal order.

8. Political-administrative measures
There is a wide range of possible measures to be taken at a national, regional and local
level. A detailed listing of the many options does not fit in with the character of this

51
paper. The government is currently working on these measures. We will confine
ourselves to mentioning some options.
National level: Measures under the aliens law Financial measures (including
promoting transparency) Measures relating to subsidies (granting or
withholding) Measures to stimulate integration Continuous
consultation with the communities, characterised by both
encouragement and confrontation (attention for representativeness,
loyalty and integrity of the representatives of the communities) Direct
debate with radical actors with the purpose to impress on them the
undesirability and/or unacceptability of their activities.
Regional level: Measures relating to subsidies (granting or withholding)
Municipal level: Encouraging the inter-ethnical and inter-religious debate Measures to
stimulate integration Continuous consultation with the communities,
characterised by both encouragement and confrontation (attention for
representativeness, loyalty and integrity of the representatives of the
communities) Direct debate with radical actors with the purpose to
impress on them the undesirability and/or unacceptability of their
activities.

9. Media coverage
First and foremost, the absolute independence of the media should be safeguarded at
all times. However, by publishing correct and relevant background information on
phenomena relating to radical Islam, the media can create an objective picture of the
nature, seriousness and scope of the threats from radical Islam. Thus the media can
offset any biased reports about Muslims in our Dutch society that pave the way for
xenophobia and mutual mistrust. We expect that this will also enhance the capability
within society to resist these phenomena. When these phenomena and the risks
involved are known to a wider public, they may also be identified sooner, which enables
us to counterbalance undesirable developments at an earlier stage. This is particularly a
task for political and administrative bodies.

10. Financial investigation

Financial investigation as conducted by, for example, the Financial Expertise Centre
(FEC, the co-operation group of financial auditors, tax authorities, the relevant law
enforcement agencies and the AIVD) should be continued and, where possible, result
in sanctions. In those cases in which it appears that radicalisation is supported through
financial injections (from, for example, foreign NGOs) into Dutch institutions,

52
mosques, schools etc. (and that even radical networks may be financed in this way),
blocking these flows of money may frustrate the activities of these actors in the short or
longer term.

11. Continuous testing against the Penal Code of possible cases of discrimination, or
incitement of hatred and rebellion
At present several of articles in the Penal Code (in particular the articles 131, 132, 137d
and 137e) provide the judicial authorities with tools to actively employ the Penal Code in
cases of rabble-rousing, incitement of hatred and discrimination. These articles enable
the Public Prosecutions Department to test specific Dawa preaching against the law in
terms of discovering the presence of any statements and expressions of a rabble-
rousing, discriminatory or hatred-inciting nature.

12. Cooperation with governments of motherland countries

Ideas about cooperation with governments of motherland countries and governments
of states from where radical-Islamic missionary activities are carried out are as yet of a
rudimentary nature. The constellation of interests within which this possible
cooperation might be set up is very complex. Discussions about it have not yet started.
But the outcome of such discussions may be the basis for a policy to be developed.

13. Socio-economic factors

Socio-economic deprivation is widely seen as one of the causes of radicalisation. It is
highly likely that economic deprivation impedes integration. But it is becoming
increasingly clear that there is no unambiguous connection between economic
deprivation and radicalisation among the Muslim communities. Improving the socio-
economic situation of persons is, obviously, always a good thing to pursue, but the idea
that this will create an effective barrier against radicalisation is questionable.

14. Dialogue between the civil society and moderate forces in the Muslim communities
It is important that within the civil society there is a clear internalised understanding of
the meaning and dimensions of the democratic legal order. Projects to stimulate this -
for example through dialogue, the provision of information, exchanges etc. - initiated by
community-based organisations, religious/ideological organisations or representative
bodies from the Muslim communities may play an important role in this context.

53
 3.4.2.2 Counterstrategies against Jihad-related types of threat

15. Cooperation between intelligence and security services, judicial authorities (Public
Prosecutions Department), the police and others
It goes without saying that the cooperation between the various partners in counter-
terrorism should be continued and intensified. The role of the National Coordinator for
Counter-terrorism will have to be fleshed out. Firstly, an understanding of the
complementary expertise and skills of the cooperation partners in combating terrorism
(violent Jihad) should lead to a better and more structured collection, comparison and
assessment of information on the phenomena in question. Secondly, the cooperation
should also lead to the collective development and implementation of appropriate
intervention strategies concerning terrorism and radicalisation processes, in the context
of which the various partners - each from their own specialty - will develop a broad
range of properly coordinated, complementary measures.

16. Arrests
The identification of, for example, recruiters or (suspected) attackers within terrorist
networks, and their possible prosecution by the judicial authorities (for example, legal
action against arms trade and trafficking in false passports) continues to be a
spearhead of our policy. The recently adopted, specific antiterrorist provisions in Dutch
legislation will serve as an important handle in this respect.

17. Infiltration, frustration, obstruction

Although arrests (followed, ideally, by prosecution and conviction) and possibly
dismantling, obviously disurpt the activities of radical networks, other counterstrategies
to frustrate the activities of radical Muslims are also conceivable.

18. Security and protection

The threat from radical-Islamic terrorism is currently largely aimed at disrupting
society, as well as at creating havoc (both economically/financially and to humans),
while the 'softness' or 'hardness' of the targets plays an important role. The
infrastructure of the Netherlands as such and of the Netherlands as a vital part of the
EU is a possible target of radical-Islamic terrorists. The protection of the vital
infrastructure as well as of prominent persons must therefore be guaranteed by the
Dutch government, with due observance of the provisions laid down in the System for
Security and Protection (Stelsel Bewaken en Beveiligen). The AIVD has mainly an
advisory role, involving a timely and accurately assessment of threats and drawing up

54
threat and risk analyses. Within the context of security and protection, the AIVD also
advises the National Coordinator for Security and Protection.

19. Sensibilisation
The aforementioned (government) bodies as well as the public in a wider sense should
continuously be provided with accurate information about as many aspects of terrorism
and counter-terrorism as possible. Attention should in particular be paid to the possible
contribution they can make to the combat of terrorism.

55
Colophon

Published by
General Intelligence and Security Service
P.O. Box 20010
2500 EA The Hague

Website www.aivd.nl

Lay-out
Buro van Bergenhenegouwen, The Hague

Graphic design
Van Langen Drukwerk B.V., Rijswijk

December 2004

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