Institutionalizing Violence Jerome

Drevon
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Institutionalizing Violence
Institutionalizing Violence
Strategies of Jihad in Egypt
JEROME DREVON
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Drevon, Jerome, author.
Title: Institutionalising violence : strategies of jihad in Egypt /
by Jerome Drevon.
Other titles: Institutionalizing violence
Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2022] |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2022005808 (print) | LCCN 2022005809 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780197643693 (hardback) | ISBN 9780197643716 (epub)
Subjects: LCSH: Radicalization—Egypt. | Jihad—Egypt.
Classification: LCC HN786. Z9 .R347 2022 (print) | LCC HN786 .Z9 (ebook) |
DDC 303. 48/40962—dc23/eng/20220330
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022005808
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022005809
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197643693.001.0001
À ma famille
 Contents

List of Illustrations
Acknowledgments
List of Abbreviations
Arabic Glossary
Arabic Transliteration

1. Introduction
1.1. How Important are Jihadi Groups’ Strategic Developments?
1.2. Jihad and Its Aftermath in Egypt
1.3. The Concepts of Radicalization and Institutionalization
1.4. The First Argument: Jihadi Groups’ Radicalization and
Institutionalization
1.5. The Second Argument: Jihadi Groups’ Institutionalization
and Long-Term Strategic Evolution
1.6. The Scope of the Model and Contribution to Existing
Research
1.7. Chapter Overview
2. Institutionalizing Violence
2.1. Jihadi Groups’ Relational Radicalization
2.2. Comparative Mechanisms of Radicalization and Beyond
2.3. Jihadi Groups’ Institutionalization
2.4. Radicalization and Institutionalization
2.5. Institutionalization and Long-Term Strategic Evolution
3. Two Trajectories to Jihad
3.1. The Seeds of Violence before and after Nasser’s Free
Officers
3.2. Religion and Politics under Sadat
3.3. Covert Jihad Group Mobilization
 3.4. From Mass Movement Proselytization to Jihad
3.5. Toward an Armed Confrontation: Killing Pharaoh
3.6. Conclusion
4. Strategy Institutionalization
4.1. Cementing the Roots of Salafi Jihadi Opposition to the
Regime in Prison
4.2. Early Institutionalization after Sadat’s Assassination Trials
4.3. Denouncing Other Islamists and Religious Institutions
4.4. A Contentious Exile to Afghanistan and Pakistan and the
Cradle of al-Qaeda
4.5. Ideological Radicalization in Exile?
4.6. A Strategic Deadlock and the Transnationalization of Jihad
4.7. Reinterpreting Salafi Jihadi Ideology
4.8. Conclusion
5. Confronting the Regime and Fighting the Far Enemy
5.1. Reacting to Repression
5.2. The Militarization of the Conflict
5.3. A Fight for Survival
5.4. Relocating Jihad Abroad
5.5. Conclusion
6. The Emergence of Non-Violent Political Alternatives
6.1. What Happened to the Other Islamists?
6.2. The Institutionalization of Jihadi Groups’ Collective
Identities
6.3. Responding to a Short-Lived Democratization
6.4. Conclusion
7. Conclusion
7.1. The Institutional Trajectories of the Islamic and Jihad
Groups
7.2. Armed Violence beyond Egypt
7.2.1. The Strategic Development of Al-Qaeda and Islamic
State
7.2.2. Political Violence and Democracy
7.2.3. The Role of Ideas
 7.3. Understanding Jihadi Groups as Groups

Annex: Methodology and Field Research

Bibliography
Index
 List of Illustrations

1.1 Jihadi groups’ mechanisms of radicalization in the contentious

politics analytical framework
1.2 The four dimensions of jihadi groups’ institutionalization
1.3 The association between mechanisms of radicalization and the
dimensions of jihadi groups’ institutionalization
2.1 The contentious politics analytical framework applied to jihadi
groups
2.2 Mechanisms and reverse mechanisms of radicalization
2.3 The comparative approach of the DR model
2.4 Dimensions of political party institutionalization
2.5 The association between mechanisms of radicalization and the
dimensions of jihadi groups’ institutionalization
2.6 The integration of mechanisms of radicalization with specific
dimensions of jihadi groups’ institutionalization
3.1 The comparative radicalization of the IG and JG in the 1970s
4.1 Comparative radicalization of the IG and JG leaderships in
prison and abroad
5.1 Changes in the number of fatalities between 1986 and 1999
5.2 Geographic location of all recorded incidents between 1986 and
1989
5.3 Fatalities between 1991 and 1992
5.4 Location of all fatalities between 1991 and 1992
5.5 Fatalities between 1993 and 1999
5.6 Fatalities between 1993 and 1999
5.7 Location of all recorded violent incidents between 1993 and
1999
5.8 Location of all recorded violent incidents between 1993 and
1999
5.9 Comparative radicalization inside Egypt in the 1990s
6.1 Changes in the Egyptian regime’s level of authoritarianism
6.2 The comparative reverse radicalization of the IG and JG after
2011
 Acknowledgments

This book results from several years of studies, travels, and

meetings. It is not easy to render justice to all of those who have, to
varying extents, contributed to the final outcome presented in these
pages. I can only try to extend my most sincere gratitude to all of
them and hope that any possible omission will be forgiven.
First, I would like to thank my parents, to whom this book is
primordially dedicated. Their unconditional support for my endeavors
was unrelenting. With great sadness, my father passed away and
will not get the chance to witness the completion of this work. My
wife whose support was constant and unwavering throughout
deserves special appreciation.
Jeroen Gunning never wavered in his assistance and
encouragement. He trusted this project from its inception and was a
pillar of support during some of its most challenging times. Jeroen’s
understanding of contentious politics and Islamist movements in the
Middle East and incisive questions have significantly contributed to
the final version of this book. Jeroen has been an encouraging and
critical reader whose help has proven invaluable.
I would like to express my gratitude to all the interviewees that I
met from the Islamic and Jihad groups, their respective political
parties, and the Egyptian salafi jihadi trend. I appreciate their
hospitality and eagerness to help me understand their personal
histories. I could not have retraced their groups’ trajectories without
their direct contributions. Although they cannot be named for
security reasons, I would especially like to thank two of my more
direct Islamic Group (IG) interlocutors for their time and for kindly
introducing me to many fellow IG members in Asyut. A prominent
member of the first IG leadership council was also instrumental in
granting me access to the group’s current leadership. Additional
assistance by Islamic Jihad (IJ) leaders introduced me to the group
and helped me organize collective and individual meetings.
The University of Durham was a very good host for the
undertaking of this research. James Piscatori and Wilf Wilde notably
acted as a catalyst for many fruitful discussions. Wilf also deserves
special thanks for helping me to secure a fellowship with the
Durham Energy Institute (DEI).
Leah Farrall, Michael Kenney, Roel Meijer, and James Piscatori
have carefully read and commented on this book and have decisively
contributed to the general argument presented in the following
chapters. Leah was particularly insightful on Egyptian jihadism and
al-Qaeda’s early developments. Lorenzo Bosi gave me the
opportunity to present the second chapter at the Scuola Normale
Superiore (SNS) and refine my main argument with other social
movement scholars, including Stefan Malthener whose help was
precious. In addition, Joas Wagemakers has commented on the
chapter on salafi jihadi ideology and Stathis Kalyvas, Elizabeth
Kendall, Jonathan Leader Maynard, Raphael Lefèvre, and Andrea
Ruggeri in Oxford as well as Tore Hamming and Emy Matesan
shared thoughts and comments.
This book would not have been possible without the generous
assistance of the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF), which
granted me a doctoral fellowship in 2012 and 2013 and three
additional fellowships in 2015, 2017, and 2018. This assistance gave
me the time to revise my research and present preliminary outcomes
in many conferences and workshops organized in Australia, Europe,
and North America.
Several chapters and papers were presented at the 2013 and
2014 Annual Conference of the European Consortium for Political
Research (ECPR), the 2013 Annual Meeting of the Middle East Study
Association (MESA), the Change and Continuity in the Middle East
and Central Asia Conference at the Australian National University
(ANU) in 2012, the Fourth Global International Studies Conference in
Frankfurt in 2014, the 2013 Middle East Dialogue Meeting in
Washington, DC, the Political Studies Association Graduate Network
Conference in Oxford in 2012, the University of Laval in 2014, and
the University of Manchester in 2013. These papers received
numerous comments and I am grateful to all the participants. This
book has also benefited from the annual summer methodological
training offered by the Institute for Qualitative and Multi-Method
Research (IQMR) and the ECPR Joint Session on the
“Institutionalization and De-Institutionalization of Political
Organizations” organized by Lars G. Svåsand and Robert Harmel.
A few additional institutions have provided assistance to
participate in international conferences: Aidan’s College at the
University of Durham, ECPR, MESA, the School of International and
Government Studies (SGIA) at the University of Durham, and SNSF.
This book, finally, benefited from many discussions with
numerous friends and colleagues. Foremost among them is Caelum
Moffatt, who shared this doctoral journey as a close friend and has
always been there to share and discuss new ideas. This research has
substantially benefited from Caelum’s critical insights and analysis.
Finally, I would like to thank Aron Lund and Mike Marcusa for sharing
ideas on Syrian and Tunisian jihadism, Patrick Haenni, Sam Heller,
and Amr Jomaa for ongoing discussions on the salafi jihadi
movement, Jean Nicolas Bitter on the nature of religious authority,
Marwa Daoudy for her early encouragements, and Thomas
Hegghammer, Brynjar Lia, and the Jihadi Document Repository for
sharing primary sources.
 List of Abbreviations

AQ Al-Qaeda
AS jamʿiyya ansar al-sunna al-muhammadiyya (association of the partisans of
Muhammad’s tradition)
BDP Building and Development Party (hizb al-bina’ wal-tanmiyya)
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
DGI Directory of General Intelligence
DR Dynamics of Radicalization research agenda (Alimi, Demetriou & Bosi, 2015)
model
GIA Groupe Islamique Armé
IG Islamic Group (al-Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya)
IP Islamic Party (hizb al-islami)
IS Islamic State
JG Jihad Group (jamaʿat al-jihad) (also known as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad or
tandhim al-jihad, the Jihad Organisation)
JM jamaʿat al-muslimun (the Group of the Muslims)
JS al-jamʿiyya al-sharʿiyya lil-taʿwun al-ʿamilin bil-kitab wal-sunna al-
Muhammadiyya (the shariʿa association for those who behave according to the
Book and Muhammad’s tradition)
MB Muslim Brotherhood (al-ikhwan al-muslimun)
RMT Resource Mobilization Theory
PIJ Palestinian Islamic Jihad
SMO Social Movement Organization
SMT Social Movement Theory
US United States of America
 Arabic Glossary

ahl al-hadith The people of hadith (the Prophet’s tradition)

ahl al-sunna wal-jamaʿa The people of the tradition and
consensus (Sunni Muslims)
amir Prince; leader
amn al-dawla From mabahith amn al-dawla: State Security
Investigations Service
al-amir al-dharir The blind leader
al-amr bil-maʿruf -wal-nahi ʿan al-munkar The promotion of
virtue and repression of vice
ʿaqida The Islamic creed
ashʿari The mainstream creed (ʿaqida) endorsed by most Muslims
ʿashwa’iyya (pl. ʿashwa’iyyat) Cairo’s informal neighborhoods
athari A religious creed (ʿaqida) embraced by salafis
azhari An al-Azhar University scholar
bidaʿ Innovation in religion (negative connotation)
daʿwa Preaching
fard A religious duty
fard ʿayn An individual religious duty
fard kifayya A communal religious duty
fatwa Religious ruling
fiqh Islamic jurisprudence
fitna Sedition
ghulu Religious extremism in Islam (negative connotation)
hadith A recorded Prophetic tradition
hakimiyya Divine sovereignty
hisba The promotion of virtue and repression of vice
hudud The limits (literal meaning); Islamic penal punishments
ijmaʿ Consensus
ijtihad Independent reasoning
istiʿana bil-kuffar Appeal to non-Muslims/the non-believers
jahiliyya Ignorance; pre-Islamic time (negative connotation)
jihad Effort; struggle; war in God’s path
jihadi A Muslim actively committed to the military dimension of
jihad
kafir (pl. kafirun) Non-believer/non-Muslim
al-khalifa The Caliph
khariji (pl. khawarij) Those who went out (literally); a heretical
Islamic sect
al-khilafa The Caliphate
khuruj ʿala al-hakim Rebellion against the (Muslim) ruler
kufr Disbelief
madhhab School of jurisprudence, differentiated in hanbali, hanafi,
maliki, and shafiʿi
madhlumin Oppressed
majlis al-shura Leadership council
manhaj The (religious) method
mubadara Initiative
mufti Jurisconsult; highest religious authority in a state or a group
mujahid (pl. mujahideen) A Muslim engaged in jihad
mukhabarat The intelligence services
murajaʿa (pl. murajaʿat) Revision
murji’ Postponer of religious judgement
al-qanun al-wadʿi Positivist Law
qiyyas Analogical deduction
rafida (pl. rawafid) The rejecters (derogatory term to describe shiʿa
Muslims)
shariʿa Islamic Law
sheikh Religious scholar; notable
sahwa Awakening
al-salaf al-salih The pious predecessors (the first three
generations of Muslims)
salafi A Muslim who identifies with salafism
al-salafiyya Salafism
al-samaʿ wal-taʿ Listen and obey
shariʿa Islamic Law
shirk Associating something with God (negative connotation)
sufi A Muslim who follows Sufism
sunna The Prophetic tradition
taghut (pl. tawaghit) Despot; idol
takfir Excommunication
takfir wal-hijra Excommunication and exile (this is a reference to a
group named jama'a al-muslimun)
takfiri A Muslim inclined to excommunicate fellow Muslims
(negative connotation)
tawheed Oneness or unicity; divided into: tawheed al-uluhiyya
(oneness of divinity), tawheed al-rububiyya (oneness of worship),
and al-asmat wal-sifat (oneness of names and attributes)
al-ʿudhr bil-jahl The excuse of ignorance
usul al-fiqh The principles of jurisprudence
ʿulamaʾ Religious scholars
al-wala wal-bara Associating with the believers and dissociating
from the infidels
 Arabic Transliteration

The transliteration of Arabic words and titles follows a simplified

pattern. Diacritics are not included; Arabic words are not capitalized;
Ayn and Hamza are differentiated; Arabic words and names
mentioned in the International Journal of Middle East Studies’ Word
List are included accordingly; accepted English spelling is used for
prominent Arabic names and figures (e.g., Gamal Abdel Nasser, not
Jamal ʿAbd al-Nasir; Ayman al-Zawahiri, not Ayman al-Dhawahiri).
 1
Introduction

In Egypt after 2011 I interviewed many leaders and members of al-

Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG) and Islamic Jihad (or Jihad
Group, JG), two of the most influential jihadi groups in the world.
After killing former Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in 1981, they
fought an insurgency against the Egyptian regime in the 1990s and
partially associated with al-Qaeda (AQ) since its inception. Many of
my interviewees had spent decades in prison, or were just returning
from exile where they often associated with networks of foreign
fighters. I joined them in their local communities, political party
meetings, sit-ins, and street demonstrations. The ethnographic
approach and breadth of interviews were important for analyzing
these groups’ realities from within. I wanted to understand individual
experiences in the two groups as much as their changing positions on
violence and non-violence. Post-2011 Egypt opened a new world to
the ex-jihadis. A popular uprising accomplished a political upheaval in
only a few days, an outcome—the removal of Egypt’s president—that
both groups had failed to achieve for more than three decades. The
IG and the JG had to adapt to a new reality, rebuild their
organizations, and reconcile new political opportunities with their
ideological commitments.
Several interviewees had very singular trajectories that illustrate
the convoluted choices made by jihadi group members, as well as
these groups’ interconnections to one another. The life-story of two
individuals were particularly illuminating. Muhammad ‘Omar ‘Abd al-
Rahman is the eldest son of the notorious Blind Sheikh, who was
accused of playing a role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.1
Muhammad ‘Omar had just been liberated by the Egyptian authorities
in 2010. He previously left Egypt in the late 1980s, when he travelled
to Afghanistan to participate in jihad against the Soviet Union. He
settled there in 1996 after travelling alongside Osama bin Laden to
live under the Taliban, although he refused to join AQ despite his
affinity for its leader. Muhammad ‘Omar was subjected to the US
rendition program after 9/11. He was arrested in Pakistan and sent to
secret jails in Afghanistan and Egypt. His brother was killed in a US
drone attack in Pakistan in November 2011, where he was fighting
with the Pakistani Taliban. Osama Qasim is another prominent
interviewee. He joined the group pejoratively known as takfir wal-
hijra (excommunication and exile) in the 1970s before participating in
the development of early JG cells. He was jailed after the
assassination of former president Anwar Sadat in 1981. Qasim
opposed JG leader Ayman al-Zawahiri’s decision to join forces with
Osama bin Laden in the late 1990s. After 2011, he co-created an
Islamist political party with several JG leaders, but left for Syria after
the 2013 Egyptian military coup, where he joined Hay’at Tahrir al-
Sham (HTS), a former AQ franchise.2 The interviewees that I met
with during my field research in Egypt helped me make sense of
these individual trajectories within armed groups’ long-term
developments.
Two elements of my field research were particularly striking. The
first is that armed groups’ ideological commitments are both enduring
and flexible. Militants who spend decades engaged in jihad to
establish an Islamic state do not easily renounce their raison d’être.
At best, they adapt their political preferences to justify new,
pragmatic positions that might be at odds with their ideological
tenets. They are “principled pragmatists” (Matesan, 2020: 3). The
most illustrative example of this is the authoring by the IG and parts
of the JG of the most comprehensive ideological revisions of the
applicability of violence in the Muslim world in the aftermath of 9/11.
The revisions did not renounce jihad nor their quest for an Islamic
state. The two groups instead argued that violence yields more
negative than positive benefits and is therefore impracticable in the
Muslim world. Similar ideological adjustments occurred after 2011.
The IG’s most senior religious authority (mufti) continued to
denounce democracy, but simply argued that the new political system
had become Islamic since it recognized the pre-eminence of Islamic
Law (shari‘a). Another JG commander argued that he still believed in
jihad and that the new political environment implied that political
parties had become the most appropriate tool of jihad.3 Generic
ideological positions on democracy, the creation of Islamic states, and
jihad cannot explain these groups’ practical political preferences in
abstraction.
The second important insight from field research is that two
groups that share similar ideological commitments can react very
differently to the same political opening. In Egypt, the IG defended a
peaceful consensual political transition after 2011. IG leaders
opposed the escalation of violent street protests against the military
authorities. When protestors attacked the US embassies in Libya and
Tunisia,4 the IG actively dissuaded local Egyptians from similarly
storming the US embassy next to the group’s Cairo-based sit-in.5 The
IG instead joined the political process with former political contenders
and became a mainstream political party that obtained thirteen seats
in the parliament despite long-standing theological opposition to
democracy and party politics. It would make sense to infer that the
IG merely adapted to the new political environment. But this
argument would not explain why the JG failed to achieve the same
outcome. JG leaders did not present a unified response to the
democratization of Egypt’s political system. Although some of them
created a marginal political party, many prominent JG figures
established the salafi jihadi trend that opposed the legitimacy of party
politics after 2011. Several ultimately settled in Syria, where they
integrated with the leadership of the AQ affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (the
Front of Support) before the group renounced AQ.6
My interviews and field research suggest that jihadi groups’
evolution is very much driven by their organizational dynamics.
Regardless of the similarity of their ideological commitments, jihadi
groups organize very differently. Field research with the IG, for
instance, revealed a notable culture of consensus and mutual respect
among its leaders, as well as a real reverence from their former foot
soldiers to their leaders. Despite internal differences of opinion, IG
leaders never blamed or denounced one another in front of me. This
was in sharp contrast to the JG, whose leaders and commanders
readily attacked one another in interviews for psychological
deficiencies, vicious tendencies, and collaboration with the security
services. Some of them even made these debates public, by claiming
that other factions never ever belonged to the group. These
divergences are critical. They shaped the IG and JG’s strategic
choices for the past four decades, from their use of violence and
association with AQ in the 1990s to their partial rejection of violence
in the 2000s. They suggest that the focus of many books on
prominent jihadi leaders overlook key internal dynamics that drive
armed groups’ long-term evolution.
The wealth of data obtained during my field research is important
theoretically, and beyond Egypt, as this book examines what drives
jihadi groups’ long-term evolution and strategic choices. Strategy is
defined here inclusively as “the relationship between (political) ends
and (military, economic, political, etc.) means” (Freedman, 2015: 32),
rather than Clausewitz’s military conception of strategy as “the use of
engagements for the object of the war” (Von Clausewitz, 1976: 178).
This research builds upon a key idea that what matters is not that
“jihadi groups” are jihadi, but that they are “groups.” The focus of
this book on the concept of “institutionalization” specifically
conceptualizes what being an armed group entails in order to analyze
how jihadi groups form, adopt violence, and transform. This book,
hence, develops an original analysis of jihadi groups’ long-term
strategic developments relevant beyond the case study of the IG and
JG.

1.1. How Important are Jihadi Groups’

Strategic Developments?
Jihadi groups’ strategic developments are associated with three
important political debates. The first debate concerns repression and
democratization. AQ’s attacks against the United States on 9/11
triggered an important debate on democratization and violence that
has yet to be settled. A major claim of President Bush’s
administration that legitimized the so-called “freedom agenda” was
that violence was at least partially rooted in despotism and
democratic deficit in the Muslim world. This policy failed to achieve its
objectives, despite the renewed (and partial) promotion of
democratization in the Arab world after 2011. But it remains
important academically. Existing research still debates whether the
absence of democracy or some other reason (including ideology)
explain jihadi groups’ resort to violence (e.g., Hafez, 2003, 2013;
Dalacoura, 2011, 2013) and if political openings can exacerbate
violence instead of pacifying these societies. The impact of repression
versus the prospects of democratization has real-world consequences
since authoritarian regimes continue to insist that they cannot
liberalize as long as jihadi groups remain committed to an allegedly
unorthodox approach to Islam as the source of violence.7
The second debate involves jihadi groups’ ideologies. These
groups often insist that they oppose democracy and vie to implement
their conception of Islamic law, which might be at odds with
international standards. Jihadi groups’ ideologies figure prominently
in Western states’ approaches to them. A common source of concern
is the persistence of their ideological commitments, as if these
groups’ ideologies necessarily explain their behavior and as if their
behavior could not change without ideological revisions.8 There is
growing research on armed groups’ ideologies and cross-factional
competition (Gade et al., 2019, Gade, Hafez & Gabbay, 2019; Hafez,
2019), effectiveness at war (Ahmad, 2016; Walter, 2017),
mobilization (Wood, 2003) and recruitment (Kalyvas, 2018; Mironova,
2019), normative change (Ahmad, 2019), organizational survival
(e.g., della Porta, 2013), support structure (Toft & Zhukov, 2015), ties
to the business community (Ahmad, 2017), and resort to repertoires
of violence such as suicide bombing (Moghadam, 2008).9 Despite a
growing consensus that ideology guides and restrains armed groups’
choices (Sanin & Wood, 2014), more research on how these groups
institutionalize their ideologies and its impact on their long-term
trajectories is still lacking.
 The last debate concerns the end of violence and jihadi groups’
potential transformation. Conflicts with jihadi groups appear to be
more likely to recur over time (Nilsson & Svensson, 2021). The
assimilation of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency after 9/11
has favored military solutions to the end of armed militancy. These
choices have informed a wide range of research, including on the
impact and effectiveness of leadership decapitation (e.g., Jordan,
2019; Price, 2019). This book conversely suggests that jihadi groups’
can transform and also become more mainstream political actors.
This is new since, despite some acknowledgment that Islamist armed
groups stemming from the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) such as Hamas
in Palestine can be pragmatic and amenable to negotiations
(Gunning, 2004), salafi armed groups are still considered more
radical and opposed to dialogue.10 Since salafi armed groups
dominate the armed opposition in countries as diverse as Libya,
Nigeria, and Syria, examining the conditions in which they change is
critical. This includes not only their renunciation of violence but also
dissociation from their more uncompromising practices during armed
conflicts (e.g., Drevon, 2021a, 2021b). Acknowledging that these
transformations are partially the outcome of structural conditions
combined with these groups’ own characteristics is important for
analyzing how salafi armed groups can be included in post-conflict
settings, including through political parties.

1.2. Jihad and Its Aftermath in Egypt

Egypt has long been the center of gravity of most Islamist
movements. The MB was established there before expanding
throughout the Muslim world and beyond in subsequent decades.
Most modern jihadi groups recognize the role historically played by
the organization, even when they oppose its political positions and
modern legacy. The Egyptian Brotherhood intellectual Sayyid Qutb
introduced many ideological concepts later used by jihadi groups. The
militants who radicalized in the post-Qutb generation shaped the
early trajectory of what was first described as jihadi salafism in the
1990s.11 The centrality of Egypt explains its wide academic coverage,
although existing research offers little analysis of jihadi groups’ long-
term evolution and its lessons for other contexts.
A key feature of research on violence in Egypt is its focus on
prominent individuals. Several ideologues and entrepreneurs of
violence take center stage to identify their main ideological concepts
or role in jihadi mobilization. One assumption of this research is that
the ideological contributions or biographies of notable figures provide
a rich understanding of the domestic and international socio-political
environments in which violence spreads.12 Notable studies examine
Sayyid Qutb in extensive biographic retrospectives, ideological
analyzes, and assessments of his ambiguous legacy on violence.13
The three main Egyptians jihadis are arguably ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj,
Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, and Ayman al-Zawahiri.14 Faraj was the main
individual behind the assassination of former president Anwar Sadat
in 1981, who presented the most recognizable articulation of a key
strategic debate between close and far enemy in modern jihadi
thought.15 Sayyid Imam was the JG ideologue, whose writings during
the war in Afghanistan arguably influenced many armed groups in the
1990s.16 Ayman al-Zawahiri remains the most public face of Egyptian
jihadi groups. Zawahiri led the JG in the 1990s before joining AQ
shortly before 9/11, which he stills leads in 2022.17 The same
extensive focus on the choices of key individuals guides most
empirical research in Arabic.18 This body of research contextualizes
major events, from the assassination of Sadat in 1981 to the joining
of AQ by Zawahiri in 2001, as well as important points of contention
between Egyptian jihadis.
The focus on prominent jihadis is both a strength, and a drawback
of this corpus. Individual biographies illustrate the influence of
prominent figures in the evolution of jihadi groups. It is justified by
the “fundamental role played by charismatic figures in influencing and
shaping the conduct and action of the movement or parts of it”
(Gerges, 2009: 36). Instead of essentializing their beliefs, it exposes
the impact of individual choices, internal disagreements, and conflicts
of personalities. This choice nonetheless raises important questions.
Would jihadi groups, including AQ, have taken a substantially
different direction without Sayyid Qutb, Osama bin Laden, and Ayman
al-Zawahiri? Is it possible that they would not even have emerged
without them? Excessive attention on prominent individuals can
exacerbate their agency and overlook the structural contexts that
made them. Moreover, if jihadi groups’ comparative trajectories are
simply the outcome of the peculiar choices of their leaders, how can
they be compared to other cases, including non-Islamists?
Other studies present three main responses to a predominant
focus on individual figures. The first is sociological. Early sociological
research examined the socio-economic profiles of the militants, their
early mode of organization, and their ideas (Ibrahim, 1980, 1988;
Ansari, 1984). This was followed by sociological studies of the
expansion of these groups in the 1990s that consider the role of
different generations of militants and local practices in the context of
changing Egyptian domestic and urban policies (Fandy, 1994;
Mubarak, 1995; Bakr, 1996; Abu al-‘Ala’, 1998; al-‘Ali, 2000, 2002;
Salah, 2001; Habib, 2002; Toth, 2003; Haenni, 2005; Ismail, 2006).
Sociological studies situate militants’ backgrounds, patterns of
mobilization, and societal impact. They were more recently
supplemented by micro-level research on the overrepresentation of
engineers in the leadership of jihadi groups (Gambetta & Hertog,
2016), cognitive mapping of individual belief systems underpinning
violence (Dornschneider, 2016), socio-economic backgrounds of
Egyptian Islamist students (Ketchley & Biggs, 2017), and the
adoption of jihadi ideology by religious scholars (Nielsen, 2017). With
the exception of a rich analysis of the IG based on extensive
interviews (al-ʿAwwa, 2006), however, these studies do not
systematically analyze armed groups’ organizational dynamics, nor
the comparative trajectories of the IG and the JG.
The second approach examines violence. Several studies insist that
the IG, for instance, was committed to an ideology that encouraged
violence and opposed political participation (Meijer, 2009b;
Dalacoura, 2011). State-centered approaches conversely contend that
repression and political exclusion explain the IG and JG’s
endorsement of violence19—a “rational calculus about tactical
efficacy” (Hafez & Wiktorowicz, 2004: 62)—and their ideological
radicalization (Hafez, 2003).20 Strategic approaches to terrorism
(Neumann & Smith, 2007) additionally dissociate violence into three
successive stages—disorientation, target response, gaining legitimacy
—to explain jihadi groups’ actions, including in Egypt. Research on
violence, despite its important conceptualization of armed groups’
strategic views and interactions with the state, often remains too
instrumentalist. These studies simplify the evolution of these groups’
rationales for violence in time and space, with limited exceptions such
as Malthaner’s (2011) micro-level analysis of the interactions between
the IG and its local environment. Moreover, they do not compare the
two groups beyond an acknowledgment of a social movement versus
avant-gardist divide, and therefore omit any study of their origins and
the consequences of these groups’ reactions to the opening of the
political system after 2011.
The third topic is these two groups’ renunciation of violence. The
most comprehensive research argues that violence and non-violence
result from jihadi groups’ assessment of their respective costs against
the backdrop of internal and external pressure to act (Matesan,
2020), which contextualize the IG’s renunciation with the excessive
costs of violence (Gerges, 2009, 2011).21 Renunciation was
comparatively facilitated, in the IG, by the existence of a charismatic
leadership, internal dialogue, interactions with outsiders, and
selective state inducements (Ashour, 2009). But these studies do not
explain why the IG’s external leadership did not join AQ, despite its
inclusion in the same networks in Afghanistan, financial difficulties,
isolation from Egyptian prisons, and friendly interactions with Osama
bin Laden.22 This failure is institutional. Gerges’s focus on jihadi
groups’ “founding charismatic emirs” unable or unwilling to “construct
formal institutions and organizations” (Gerges, 2009: 41) overlooks
these groups’ institutional dynamics. But comparative organizational
dynamics mattered, as Ashour (2009) demonstrates, although he
only explores the IG’s charismatic leadership and internal dialogue
without explaining why the group was more institutionalized to begin
with. Additional research of these groups’ written productions,
especially in Arabic23 but also in English (Jackson, 2015), tends to be
over-textual. They emphasize the reinterpretation of doctrinal texts
and theological concepts without dwelling in detail on the two groups’
comparative organizational dynamics and their consequences.
Research on jihad in Egypt provides an important retrospective of
the main figures, ideological tenets, and strategic choices of the IG
and JG over the past decades. It acknowledges the interactions
between environmental factors—especially state policies—individual
choices, and armed groups’ learning processes and strategic thinking.
But it remains unclear why the IG and JG, despite participating in the
same conflicts in Egypt and abroad, reacted very distinctively to the
same external challenges. Their diverging tactical and strategic
choices are reflected in their conflicting approach to mobilization
(elitist versus mass-movement), association with AQ, and (partial)
transformation into political parties after 2011. The origins of these
differences is not explained beyond the individual choices of their
leaders. This is not trivial. Understanding how armed groups organize
is key to explaining the context in which they embrace violence,
adapt to their environments, and transform. It yields critical lessons
beyond Egypt.

1.3. The Concepts of Radicalization and

Institutionalization
This book employs the concepts of jihadi groups’ radicalization and
institutionalization in parallel to analyze these groups’ long-term
trajectories. This approach contends that armed groups embracing
violence do not merely adopt “radical” ideas. They have to adapt
their organizational structures as well. The focus on radicalization and
institutionalization specifically seeks to explain (1) how armed groups’
adoption and use of violence impact their organizational construction
and, in turn, (2) how their organizational construction affects their
use of violence and long-term strategic choices.
Radicalization refers to the processes leading to the adoption of
violence, as well as the maintenance and intensification of violence.24
This book argues that jihadi groups’ radicalization is a relational
process. This position implies three main ideas. First, a country’s
lasting features—such as diverging state structures, economic
inequalities, and ethnic divisions—do not cause violence.
Radicalization can occur against the backdrop of social, economic, or
ethnic inequalities but the mere existence of inequalities does not
explain when and how armed groups embrace violence. Second,
mere belief in certain “radical” ideas does not cause violence either.
Many groups believe in violent ideas without actively preparing for
violence. Violent ideas might precede, accompany, or only follow
active preparation for violence. Third, radicalization is a process that
cannot be isolated from armed groups’ changing patterns of
interactions with other actors. Armed groups do not exist in a
vacuum. They interact with many actors, including state and non-
state allies and contenders. This book argues that the resort to
violence is caused by changing patterns of interactions with some of
these actors.
In practice, radicalization has behavioral and ideological
dimensions.25 Behavioral radicalization concerns armed groups’
practical behavior vis-à-vis other actors. After embracing violence,
jihadi groups further radicalize when they use increasingly
indiscriminate violence against civilians, refuse to collaborate with
other actors (from violent and non-violent Islamists to foreign states),
and implement draconian measures on their own members.
Ideological radicalization conversely refers to the evolution of their
ideological commitments. Do they excommunicate the population,
other groups, non-members? Do they legitimize the resort to
increasingly indiscriminate actions? This book analyzes behavioral and
ideological radicalization in parallel. It does not assume that
ideological radicalization precedes behavioral radicalization or vice
versa.
This book’s approach to radicalization is based on the dynamics of
radicalization (DR model) research agenda (Alimi, Demetriou, & Bosi,
2015). The DR model postulates that armed groups radicalize in
interactions with five potential actors: (1) the state and political
environment, (2) the security services, (3) the Islamist social
movement, (4) a potential counter-movement, and (5) the public.
The DR model argues that radicalization is caused by changing
patterns of interactions with any of these actors, which it synthesizes
as a specific “mechanism of radicalization.” The mechanisms of
radicalization are: upward spirals of political opportunities with the
state and political environment, outbidding with the security services,
competition for power with the Islamist social movement, object shift
with a counter-movement, and dissociation with the public.26 The
mechanisms are described in details in the second chapter of the
book. The model presented in figure 1.1 situates jihadi groups’
interactions with other actors and their associated mechanisms of
radicalization.

Figure 1.1 Jihadi groups’ mechanisms of radicalization in the contentious politics analytical
framework
 In the DR model, several mechanisms of radicalization can follow
one another. A group can radicalize in interaction with the state and
political environment and, later, with the Islamist social movement for
instance.
The second main concept used in the book is institutionalization.
Institutionalization refers to jihadi groups’ emergence and
organizational consolidation. It is “the process by which organizations
acquire value and stability” (Huntington, 1968: 12) and through
which an organization “becomes valuable in and of itself, and its
goals become inseparable and indistinguishable from it” (Panebianco,
1988: 53). This approach contrasts with mainstream approaches to
institutionalization in social movement studies (Staggenborg, 2013b),
which tend to oppose the two concepts. Existing research (Kriesi et
al., 1995; Tarrow, 2011) contends that institutionalization occurs
when social movements become more conventional and integrated
into their political systems—including through political parties (Kriesi
et al., 1995: 122; Tarrow, 2011: 207)—whereas radicalization refers
to conflict intensification, including through the use of terrorism.
These studies argue that the two processes can occur at the same
time when parts of a movement institutionalize and moderate their
goals while others seek more radical forms of action (Tarrow, 2011:
207). In this book, jihadi groups’ institutionalization refers only to
their organizational consolidation without assuming that their goals
and repertoires become more moderate and mainstream. It is closer
to what Staggenborg (2013a) defines as the formation and
professionalization of social movement organizations.
Jihadi groups’ institutionalization exists along four complementary
dimensions (figure 1.2). These dimensions are drawn from the
political party literature, which defines institutionalization as internal,
external, structural, and attitudinal.27 The internal dimension refers to
jihadi groups’ internal cohesion and control. The external dimension
is the active assertion of their existence and autonomy vis-à-vis other
actors. The attitudinal dimension reveals a logic of differentiation and
reification around a well-defined set of beliefs and values. Last, the
structural dimension uncovers the consolidation of consistent patterns
of relations inside and outside a jihadi group, between its members
and leaders as well as with other groups, states, and the public.

Figure 1.2 The four dimensions of jihadi groups’ institutionalization

1.4. The First Argument: Jihadi Groups’

Radicalization and Institutionalization
Jihadi groups can radicalize in interaction with any of the five actors
mentioned in section 1.3. Even jihadi groups that evolve in the same
environment and believe in similar ideologies do not necessarily
radicalize in interaction with the same actor. The first argument of the
book is that each mechanism of radicalization requires these groups
to institutionalize—or to already be institutionalized—along one
specific dimension to survive.
Two institutional dimensions play a prominent role in jihadi groups’
radicalization: internal and attitudinal. Jihadi groups’ internal
institutionalization refers to organizational strength, discipline, and
cohesion. Jihadi groups that radicalize with (1) the state and political
environment or (2) the security services have to institutionalize
internally since the main threats to their survival are leadership
divisions, losing control over group members, or failing to internally
legitimize their positions. On the other hand, attitudinal
institutionalization concerns jihadi groups’ ideational differentiation
around a certain set of values and beliefs. Jihadi groups that
radicalize with (1) the Islamist social movement, (2) a counter-
movement, and (3) the public need to institutionalize attitudinally
since the main threat is internal dissent in favor of other Islamist
groups or movements or a failure to fully articulate values against
other groups or potential counter-movements (see figure 1.3).
Figure 1.3 The association between mechanisms of radicalization and the dimensions of
jihadi groups’ institutionalization

The predominance of jihadi groups’ internal and attitudinal

institutionalization does not mean that external and structural
institutionalization do not matter. Chapter 2 argues that external
institutionalization occasionally occurs when armed groups franchise
with a globalist group, such as AQ or Islamic State (IS), or ally with
foreign states. External institutionalization serves the same function
of either internal or attitudinal institutionalization. Armed groups can
franchise with another group like AQ to improve their internal
structuring and organizational abilities (internal institutionalization) or
to benefit from the brand and ideological distinctiveness of globalist
groups (attitudinal institutionalization).
The first argument is important for two reasons. First, it exposes
the roots of jihadi groups’ survival or failure. Jihadi groups do not
necessarily manage to institutionalize along the right dimension to
survive. Institutional success depends on an array of factors ranging
from the peculiar choices of their leaders to the nature of their pre-
war networks. But this approach emphasizes the most important
institutional developments underpinning jihadi groups’ survival to
explain the choices of their leaders. Moreover, this focus helps to
uncover the factors that either facilitate or prevent jihadi groups’
institutionalization along these dimensions.
Second, this argument explains substantial divergences between
jihadi groups. Some groups do not dissociate themselves from the
population while others widely excommunicate the Muslim
community. Other jihadi groups build strong internal resilience while
many only exist as loose networks of individuals. The first argument
suggests that these divergences are not simply the outcome of the
idiosyncratic choices of their leaders or the inherent product of their
ideologies. These divergences are rooted in jihadi groups’
radicalization and their institutional responses.
This model recognizes that armed groups and their leaders have
agency. Jihadi groups can institutionalize independently from their
radicalization. Peculiar ideological commitments, for instance, can
inform their desire to differentiate themselves from other Islamists
(attitudinal dimension) or build strong internal discipline (internal
dimension). But this argument suggests that specific institutional
developments are required when jihadi groups radicalize regardless
of their peculiar preferences.

1.5. The Second Argument: Jihadi Groups’

Institutionalization and Long-Term Strategic
Evolution
The second argument starts with the acknowledgment that, in the
long run, armed groups can radicalize in interaction with different
actors. For instance, a jihadi group can radicalize in interaction with
the state and political environment initially. Then, as competition in
the Islamist social movement exacerbates, the same group might
further radicalize in interaction with other Islamist groups. The first
argument suggests that each phase of radicalization entails one type
of institutional development. A group can institutionalize internally, in
interaction with the state and political environment, and then
attitudinally, in interaction with the Islamist social movement.
The second argument is that the succession of several phases of
radicalization/institutionalization shapes jihadi groups’ long-term
strategic choices for two reasons. First, each phase of
radicalization/institutionalization defines these groups’ response to
the next phase. Jihadi leaders do not make choices on a whim. They
might have particular political preferences or ideological leanings, but
they are also constrained by their own institutional contexts. Each
phase of radicalization/institutionalization (1) informs whether they
will continue to radicalize, (2) affects their receptiveness to certain
mechanisms of radicalization in the next phase, and (3) shapes their
ability to institutionalize adequately in response.
Second, armed groups’ long-term institutionalization exposes how
jihadi groups make and implement new strategic choices. The
succession of several phases of radicalization and institutionalization
determines the circumstances in which their leaders’ political
preferences take shape, the nature of jihadi groups’ decision-making
processes, and their ability to enforce their choices on group
members. Diverging institutional trajectories explain cross-group
differences in terms of decision-making processes and levels of
command and control over group members. These features, in turn,
explain why two groups that believe in the same ideological tenets
might react differently to the same external developments, such as
an opening of political opportunity.
This argument posits that armed groups’ institutional trajectories
matter more than their ideological commitments per se. Jihadi
groups’ long-term trajectories inform the developments of certain
organizational structures and norms that shape the range of the
possible. Jihadi groups’ institutionalization defines how these groups’
make decisions, maintain their internal consistency and the loyalty of
their commanders and members, and transition between different
phases of radicalization. There is a lasting institutional legacy that
informs jihadi groups’ long-term choices. Path-dependent trajectories
are problematic when they predicate a pre-determined trajectory that
cannot be altered. But overlooking the impact of past developments
on a group’s subsequent evolution is similarly questionable. Without
defending a position that would overlook armed groups’ agencies, the
two arguments of the book consider the impact of past institutional
developments on armed groups’ choices but also examine when and
how trajectories can be altered (i.e., during critical junctures).
 1.6. The Scope of the Model and Contribution
to Existing Research
The book carefully develops a general argument that is relevant to
jihadi groups and applies it to the case study of Egypt. Focusing on
jihadi groups does not presume that they have intrinsic
characteristics that differentiate them from non-jihadi insurgents.28
This model applies to non-Islamist groups as well. This choice is
rather justified by the social movement approach of the book, which
examines the role of armed groups’ environments including their
social movement. Despite real internal divergences, jihadi groups
belong to a larger social movement that shares key beliefs, is
structured around overlapping networks, and mobilizes on similar
issues with violence.29 The encompassing approach of the book
therefore includes Sunni Islamist groups from Palestinian Hamas and
the Taliban to AQ and IS. This book does not assimilate these groups.
Some of these groups do excommunicate one another and reject
other groups’ belonging in the same social movement.30 They also
adopt substantially different tactical and strategic choices. But they
still share an overlapping constituency and, according to my field
research with both types of groups, observe one another closely. The
fact that they have to differentiate themselves from one another—
including through excommunication—results from social movement
dynamics that can be explained.
This book faces two challenges. The first difficulty is to construct a
theoretical argument that is sufficiently inclusive to be relevant
outside Egypt but precise enough to guide the analysis of specific
jihadi groups. The second issue is to avoid path-dependent or
deterministic arguments. Jihadi groups have agency. They develop
their own preferences and can institutionalize along specific
dimensions for idiosyncratic reasons unrelated to their radicalization
(including ideological). The model developed in the book only argues
that specific institutional developments are required when armed
groups radicalize in interaction with five types of actors. The model
therefore seeks to expose where jihadi groups’ successes and failures
lie. This model can accordingly explain important developments (for
instance why jihadi groups differentiate themselves—or not—from
mainstream Islamists) that might be unaccounted for otherwise. The
empirical study of Egypt recognizes that jihadi groups might be
unable or unwilling to institutionalize along certain dimensions. It also
acknowledges that some external factors, especially repression and
forced exile abroad, can worsen jihadi groups’ institutional crises
regardless of the intentions of their leaders.
This book underlines the centrality of armed groups’ modes of
organization. One of the risks inherent in the study of armed groups’
strategic choices is a focus only on their leaders’ idiosyncratic
preferences and ideological commitments. Focusing on these groups’
institutional dynamics repositions the analysis on the organizational
context in which armed groups’ leaders make and implement their
decisions and on the constraints imposed by it. A well-known military
adage attributed to an array of generals states that “amateurs talk
about strategy, professionals talk about logistics.” This modeling of
armed groups’ institutional dynamics is inspired by a similar logic.
Instead of analyzing armed groups’ broader strategic plans on paper,
this model posits that radicalization with specific actors necessitates
certain institutional developments that ultimately guide their long-
term trajectories. Armed groups might or not succeed in
institutionalizing along the right dimension but the two arguments of
the book specifically seek to analyze the reasons behind jihadi
groups’ institutional failures or successes.
This analytical framework raises important questions on causality.
This book differs from existing research that studies specific variables
or causal mechanisms. Studies of variables are usually associated
with quantitative research, which seeks to explain the relative impact
of specific variables on a phenomenon to be explained (such as
radicalization).31 On the other hand, the study of causal mechanisms,
such as the DR model used in this research, endeavors to retrace the
causal mechanisms explaining a certain phenomenon. In some cases,
causality can be more complex through a combination of sufficient
and necessary variables (e.g., Matesan, 2020).32 This model is
different. This book argues that radicalization with specific actors
necessitates specific institutional development without claiming that
jihadi groups necessarily institutionalize accordingly. The two
arguments developed in the book merely expose the choices that
jihadi groups have to make when they radicalize, and underline why
they manage or fail to do so.
The book focuses on two jihadi groups evolving in the same
country to examine their comparative institutionalization. Comparing
armed groups’ institutionalization is challenging. The model
developed in the book necessitates the study of jihadi groups’
institutional trajectories over several decades to examine their long-
term strategic choices. This choice requires extensive data and
primary sources, including interviews with their leaders and
members. The book therefore narrowed down the analysis to two
groups evolving in the same country to limit the breadth of
information required. Studying a single country is also important for
comparing two groups’ diverging reactions to the same
environmental changes and to reduce the impact of—unaccounted—
external variables. In practice, the IG and JG have evolved in parallel
for the past few decades. Their leaders interacted with one another
and sometimes intermarried. More importantly, they faced the same
strategic turning points in Egypt and abroad. I relied on the
theoretical model developed in the book to compare their evolution
over the years. The empirical analysis considers alternative
hypotheses drawn from civil war, political violence, social movement,
and terrorism studies to demonstrate the relevance of the two
theoretical arguments. I describe in the appendix the extensive field
research that I undertook in Egypt after 2011. I spent time with IG
and JG’s leaders and members, participated in their collective
activities, organized personal interviews, and met individuals in their
communities. Field research was complemented by rich primary
sources, public interviews, and secondary sources.
The model developed in the book is important for broader
research on jihadi groups. As mentioned in the retrospective of
existing research on Egypt, studies of jihadi groups often emphasize
the role of their prominent leaders and their ideological
commitments. The study of jihadi groups often becomes reduced to
the biographies of their most important figures. This book conversely
analyzes the centrality of jihadi groups’ organizational dynamics.
Beyond the classical debate between networked and hierarchical
modes of organization,33 there is little analysis of how jihadi groups
organize, consolidate shared ideas, and socialize their members, as
well as the impact of these processes on their long-term strategic
choices. The comparison of two groups evolving in the same
environment seeks to explain their diverging reactions to similar
changing political opportunities, up to their partial joining of the
political process after 2011.
This research contributes to ongoing research on armed groups’
organizational dynamics in civil war studies. This research agenda is a
response to cross-national macro-level analyzes (e.g., Cederman,
Gleditsch, & Buhaug, 2013) and the micro-level research agenda
(e.g., Kalyvas, 2006). It argues that insurgents have to be studied at
the meso-level, which covers their mobilizing structures and modes of
organization. Such research includes the impact of armed groups’
recruitment on their use of violence (Weinstein, 2007), the impact of
pre-war networks on groups’ organizational structures (Staniland,
2014), and cross-groups alliances (Christia, 2012).34 The main
contribution of this book is the analysis of armed groups’ long-term
trajectories. Instead of focusing on specific themes, the model
developed in this book examines jihadi groups’ long-term evolution
comprehensively by assuming that the set of issues analyzed by
organizational research is covered by armed groups’
institutionalization.
The association between institutional and strategic developments
is not new. Historical institutionalists have long argued that
institutions “provide the context in which political actors define their
strategies” (Thelen, Longstreth, & Steinmo, 1992: 7). This tradition
similarly emphasizes the study of sequential rules that structure
human behavior (Sanders, 2006: 39). This model therefore resonates
with early research in Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) on the
centrality of resource management by rational actors and the impact
of the degree of SMOs’ institutionalization of on their strategies of
contention (Oberschall, 1973; Gamson, 1975; Tilly, 1978). Gamson
(1975) specifically argued that bureaucracy, the centralization of
power, and the absence of factionalism—which are considered
internal institutionalization in this research—increases success. This
model contributes to this early research with a more advanced
conceptualization of institutionalization and its association with armed
groups’ radicalization.

1.7. Chapter Overview

The book is structured thematically. Chapter 2 presents the analytical
framework of this book in the contentious politics research agenda.
The book situates jihadi groups in a multi-level environment
constituted by their political environment, social movement, the
security services, the public, and a potential counter-movement. The
chapter argues that jihadi groups can successively radicalize in
interaction with any of these actors. The first argument of this
chapter is that radicalization requires groups to institutionalize along
one dimension. The second argument is that the succession of
several phases of radicalization and institutionalization shapes their
long-term trajectories and strategic choices.
Chapter 3 examines the comparative emergence of the IG and JG
in the 1970s. The two groups defined the main ideological precepts
of jihadi salafism around the opposition to Muslim leaders not
applying Islamic Law comprehensively. Despite this similarity, their
comparative radicalization reflected different mechanisms of
radicalization that shaped these groups’ early institutionalization. The
JG radicalized in interaction with the state and political environment
but failed to institutionalize internally because of the high-risk nature
of the group’s attempt to topple the regime. The group hence
remained an agglomeration of loosely connected cells before 1981.
The IG was conversely a proselytization movement that
institutionalized before embracing violence in response to a counter-
movement, outbidding with the security services, and political
developments. These contrasting trajectories contextualize the IG’s
relatively advanced internal institutionalization before the
assassination of Sadat in 1981.
Chapter 4 analyzes jihadi groups’ strategy institutionalization. This
chapter contends that the construction and implementation of armed
groups’ strategic views is the product of external and internal
developments. The two groups’ institutional trajectories mediated the
impact of these groups’ exile to Afghanistan and Pakistan during the
war against the Soviet Union and ultimate strategic failure to achieve
their objectives in Egypt. They explain the IG’s renunciation of the
applicability of violence in Muslim countries when the JG partially
joined AQ.
Chapter 5 examines these groups’ resort to armed violence in
Egypt and abroad. This chapter argues that jihadi groups’ internal
institutionalization accounts for the practicalities of violence beyond
stated ideological commitments and changing policing of protest.
Strongly institutionalized groups like the IG are better positioned to
use violence in line with their tactical and strategic preferences and
prevent counterproductive violence, in contrast with weakly
institutionalized groups like the JG. In both cases, institutional decay
ultimately produced increasingly indiscriminate violence disconnected
from the achievement of any long-term strategic objectives.
Chapter 6 analyzes the emergence of non-violent political
alternatives. This chapter argues that it is contingent on jihadi
groups’ interactions with the Islamist social movement and on the
credibility of non-violent political alternatives. But jihadi groups do
not necessarily join the political process when authoritarian regimes
democratize. A consensual decision to create a political party is
contingent on jihadi groups’ ability to take consensual decisions at
the leadership level while maintaining the loyalty of their members,
which in the case of the IG and JG was rooted in these groups’
institutionalized collective group identities.
The conclusion of the book discusses this case study and its
generalizability. After discussing the evolution of the IG and JG, the
conclusion examines the strategic development of AQ and IS in light
of the institutional trajectories of the IG and JG. Finally, it examines
the contribution of this book to existing debates on political violence
and democracy and on the role of ideas before presenting new
avenues for future research.
 Notes
1. ‘Omar ‘Abd al-Rahman died in a US prison in 2017.
2. On HTS in Syria, see Drevon & Haenni, 2021.
3. I reference these quotes in their contexts in chapter 6.
4. These attacks resulted in casualties in Libya and Tunisia, including the US ambassador
to Libya.
5. The family of the IG’s former religious leader, ʿOmar ʿAbd al-Rahman, organized a sit-
in next to the US embassy in Cairo to demand the liberation of the Blind Sheikh after
the 2011 uprising. According to field research, IG members actively discouraged young
protestors from using violence against the embassy when violent protests erupted on
September 11, 2012.
6. For instance, Ahmad Salama Mabruk joined the group’s leadership council while an
interviewee, Osama Qasim, became one of the group’s religious scholars.
7. A symptomatic conference that embodies this position was organized in Chechnya in
2016, when religious leaders from an array of autocracies delivered a fatwa
denouncing the salafi approach to Islam as the cause of violence in the Muslim world.
8. On the role of ideology and behavior, see Gunning & Jackson, 2011.
9. Other important research argues that ideology does not concern only abstract
principles and ideas but is also reflected in everyday relational practices (Parkinson,
2021).
10. For an exception, see Dudouet & Göldner-Ebenthal, 2020.
11. Jihadi salafism is often rooted, as an ideological trend, to the 1990s or the 2003 war in
Iraq (e.g., Maher, 2016), although its main intellectuals actually started to develop
their ideas in Egypt and Syria from the 1970s onward. See chapter 3.
12. This assumption is widely shared in research on other jihadi figures beyond Egypt,
including Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri (Lia, 2008), Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi (Warrick, 2015),
‘Abdullah Anas (Anas & Hussein, 2019), ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam (Hegghammer, 2020), and
Osama bin Laden (Scheuer, 2012). A different perspective is adopted by Wagemakers
(2012), who does not simply examine the life of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdissi but also
examines the conditions under which his ideas spread—or failed to spread—in several
countries. A similar focus on prominent individuals examines their textual production
and strategic views in details (e.g., Kepel, 2008; Ryan, 2013; Maher, 2016).
13. See for example several biographies of Qutb and his legacy (Calvert, 2010; Toth,
2013; Gerges, 2018; Šabaseviciute, 2021), as well as his ideological concepts
(Musallam, 2005; Khatab, 2006a, 2006b).
14. Other prominent characters include several figures of the 1970s, including Salih
Sirriyya, Shukri Mustafa, and the peripheral religious scholars (ʿulamaʾ). See e.g.,
Kepel, 1993; Zeghal, 1996, 1999; al-Amin, 2010. Additional biographies cover the
trajectories of prominent Egyptians, including Abul-Walid al-Masri (Hamid & Farrall,
2015), although they are primarily focused on events outside Egypt.
15. Faraj, 1982; Jansen, & Faraj, 1986.
16. Some dimensions of Imam’s productions have been examined in existing research
(e.g., Fuchs, 2013; Kamolnick, 2013).
17. The two most extensive writings on Zawahiri were by a former associate (al-Zayyat,
2002) and Zawahiri himself (2010).
18. E.g., Muru, 1990, 1998; al-Sibaʿi, 2002; Munib, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c; al-
Mesbar, 2012.
19. This argument was presented earlier by Burgat (2002) in North Africa and by Goodwin
who posits that revolutionary movements are “a response to political oppression and
violence” when they have no other way out (Goodwin, 2001: 3).
20. See also the debate between Hafez (2013) and Dalacoura (2013).
21. On the renunciation of violence, see also Blaydes & Rubin (2008) for a quick
retrospective and Gunaratna & Ali (2009) and Stein (2010, 2011) for the group’s past
and new approach to state and society.
22. Only a negligible number of IG members reportedly joined AQ, including a minor
figure, Muhammad al-Hukayma. Despite close interactions between IG members and
AQ in Afghanistan, IG members did not hold dual membership in AQ as suggested by
Sageman (2004: 63).
23. E.g., Munib 2010a, 2010b, 2010c; al-Mesbar, 2011, 2012, 2013; Abu ʿAtiyya al-
Sandbissi, 2012.
24. A fuller definition used in the theoretical model adapted in this book defines
radicalization as the “process through which a social movement organization (SMO)
shifts from predominantly nonviolent tactics of contention to tactics that include violent
means, as well as the subsequent process of contention maintaining and possibly
intensifying the newly introduced violence” (Alimi, Demetriou, & Bosi, 2015: 11).
25. See Neumann, 2003; Malthaner, 2017; Matesan, 2020.
26. These mechanisms are described on pages 25–27. In the contentious politics
analytical framework they can be further disaggregated and systematically compared.
27. Chapter 2 further differentiates each dimension and its measurement.
28. Similarly, della Porta’s (1995) comparative study of far-left violence in Germany and
Italy does not seek to address only groups affiliated to this ideological trend.
29. Chapter 2 defines social movements as “(1) informal networks, based (2) on shared
beliefs and solidarity, which mobilize about (3) conflictual issues, through (4) the
frequent use of various forms of protest” (Diani & McAdam, 2003: 6).
30. See for instance Cragin (2009) on the opposition between AQ and Hamas. We can
also note that the so-called godfather of the Arab Afghan jihad, ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam,
influenced the early mobilization of both groups in the late 1980s.
31. On some remaining issues related to data, the construction of variables, and selection
bias see Mahoney, 2018.
32. That type of approach follows a logic synthesized by Qualitative Comparative Analysis
(Ragin, 2009, 2014).
33. E.g., Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001; Sageman, 2004, 2008.
34. See also chapter 2, p 32–33.
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den, and cut her loose; so we dragged the ship away around South
of the den, taking us all the forenoon, and we could see the lions on
the rocks sunning themselves and probably talking over in lion
language what they would do to us if we got fresh, and every little
while they would cough like a case of pneumonia, and it made my
hair raise, but Pa was so cool he had to turn his collar up.
After a few hours we got the ship in the right place, about a quarter
of a mile south of the den, and Pa got the cowboy ready with his
lasso, and the German ready to yell murder in his language, and the
negro ready to throw overboard for the lions to eat, and Pa said,
“Turn her loose,” and we let go of the rope, and the ship sailed right
straight for the den, and we all climbed upon a big rock to watch the
proceedings. It was the most exciting moment of my life, except the
time the fat woman in the circus sat down in Pa’s lap, and crushed
him beyond recognition and they had to scrape him up with case
knives.
There was Pa at the wheel, his eyes staring ahead at the lions, all of
the lion family having come out of the den to see the air ship, and the
dog lion, the head of the household waving his tail and making the
air fairly tremble with his roaring.
Pretty soon the airship was right over the den, the lasso was thrown
over the dog lion’s neck, and drawn tight, and he coughed and
strangled like a negro being lynched, and then he turned tail and ran
down into the den in the rocks, with all the other lions after him,
dragging the ship back into the entrance of the den, and closing the
hole completely, and we all rushed up and tied the rope to trees, so
the gas bag was right over the hole, tight as a drum, and Pa got
down off the frame, and as Mr. Hagenbach came up in a perspiration
Pa said, “There’s your lions, about a dozen of them captured down in
that hole; help yourselves,” and Pa sat down on the ground like a
man who had conquered the world, and was waiting for the
applause. Mr. Hagenbach said that was all right, so far as it had
gone, but what he wanted was lions in cages, ready to ship to
Germany, and not down in a hole in the ground that might be as
deep as a copper mine, with no elevator to bring the lions to the
surface. “Well,” said Pa, as he lit a cigar, “there’s a perfectly good
dog Numidian lion, with a black mane, on the end of that lasso, and
all you got to do is to pull him up, just as you would a muscalonge on
a line, and when he comes to the surface after I have finished my
cigar, I will hog tie him and have him ready for shipment quicker’n a
wink,” and Pa yawned, as though capturing wild lions was as easy
for him as catching mice in a trap.

“There’s Your Lions, About a Dozen Captured Down in That

Hole; Help Yourselves,” Said Pa.
So the crowd all got hold of the lasso and began to pull up, and of all
the snarling and howling you ever heard, that beat the band. The old
lion seemed to catch on to everything coming up, and all the other
lions roared until the rocks on which we stood fairly trembled like
there was an earthquake, but the old dog kept coming and I felt as
though something terrible was going to happen, and I began to get
farther away. Pa knocked the ashes off his cigar and asked the
cowboy how much more rope there was left, and was told about ten
feet, so he told them to let up a minute until the driver drove the cage
up to a point on the rock not far from where the lion would come out,
and when the cage was ready and the door open, so the lion could
see a goat tied in the cage eating hay, Pa said to the men to give a
few more jerks, and, by Gosh, pretty soon the lion’s head and neck
came out of the hole, and he was the maddest looking animal I ever
saw, and the men looked scared.
The lion was bracing with his front feet, and using all kinds of
language, but Pa was the coolest man in the bunch. “Now, let him
rest a minute,” says Pa, “but hold the line taut,” and Pa took out a
bag of tobacco and a piece of paper and rolled a cigarette, and lit it,
and we all looked at Pa in admiration for his nerve.
After puffing his cigarette a little, and looking to see if the cage was
entirely right, he ordered the men who were not pulling on the rope
to line up in two lines from the hole to the cage, like the honorary pall
bearers at a funeral, and told them not to move until the lion was in
the cage, and when they were all in place, Pa said, “Now jerk his
head plumb off,” and the crowd pulled and the lion came out of the
hole mad and frothing at the mouth. Pa stepped one side and gave
the lion a swift kick in the ham, and the king of beasts put his tail
between his legs and started for the hearse cage, and Pa said, “Get
in there, you measly cur dog,” and Pa followed him, kicking him
every jump, until the big lion rushed into the cage and laid down, so
completely conquered that he bellowed pitifully when the goat butted
him off of the hay, and Pa closed the door and locked it and turned to
Mr. Hagenbach and asked, “How many of these vermin do you
want?” and he said, “Now that we were about it we had better get the
whole bunch.” Pa said “all right, he was there after lions, and he
wanted to get the limit,” so they signalled camp for some more
cages, and Pa said we had better have lunch right there on the rock
beside the airship in the shade, while he prepared to catch the rest
of the lions.

“Get in There, You Measly Cur Dog,” Said Pa, Kicking the
Big Lion at Every Jump.

Pa was attaching a long rubber hose to the gas bag, and as he got it
fastened and reeled about fifty feet of the hose down in the hole, Mr.
Hagenbach said, “Say, old man, I don’t want to kick on any of your
new inventions, but what are you going to do now?” and Pa said, as
he turned a faucet in the gas bag and let the gas into the hose,
“Didn’t you ever drown gophers out of a hole by pouring water in,
until the gophers came to the top strangling, and you put them in a
shot bag and let them chew your fingers? Well, I am going to drown
out big gophers with gas, and in about fifteen minutes after we have
had lunch, you will see the dammest procession of sneezing lions
come up out of that hole that ever were in captivity, and I want all of
you brave ducks to hold the bags over the hole, and when you get a
lion in a bag tie the bag and roll the beast over the rock, see?”
Well, they got the gunny sacks ready, and after we had our lunch
and the gas was filling the hole good and plenty, there was a lot of
sneezing and roaring down the hole, and Pa said the medicine was
working all right, and pretty soon Pa turned off the gas and
unscrewed the hose, and loosened the ropes on the air ship so she
sailed off across the veldt for a block or so, and then the trouble
began.
First a big she lion came up with a mess of cubs, and they held the
bag all right, but she went right through it like a bullet through
cheese, and then there was an explosion away down in the bowels
of the earth, from the toe nails of some unmanicured lion striking fire
on a flint stone, and fire began to pour out of the hole, and about
nine singed lions of all sizes came up out of the hole scared to
death, and the smell of burned hair was awful.
The lions began to cuff the men and they stampeded down the
rocks, leaving Pa and two or three of us alone. Pa and I seized a
couple of the baby lions and started to run for camp, and the lions
took after us and chased us awhile, until Pa got out of wind, when
we climbed trees with the cubs, and the lions rolled in the grass to
put out the fire, and then they took to the jungle, and Pa said when
Roosevelt got to Africa and shot a few singed lions, he would think it
was a new kind of beast.
We got back to camp with the two cubs, and called the roll to see
who was missing, and we found the natives had packed up and
moved away, claiming that the old man was a devil who had
produced a burning mountain, and the whole country would be
devastated.
We sent all our animals to the coast to be shipped to Berlin and
moved our camp up to the jungle, about fifty miles, where there is a
new tribe of natives, and where it is said the country is inhabited with
gorillas.
Pa says he is going to move a cage into the gorilla country, and call
the gorillas around him, learn their language, get their confidence,
and eventually reform them and bring them to realize that they are
endowed with certain inalienable rights, and teach them white man’s
customs, and Pa will do it or die trying, but I don’t like the idea, as it
seems dangerous to Pa. Say, those gorillas are bigger than John L.
Sullivan, and they hug like bears. Gee, but I want to see gorillas
hanging by their tails on trees, and Pa says I may go with him.
 CHAPTER XVI.
The Boy’s Pa Shows Bravery in the Jungles in Africa—Four Gorillas
Chase Pa—The Boy and His Pa Don’t Sleep Much at Night—The Boy
Discovers a Marsh Full of Wild Buffaloes.

I do not know whether Pa is an expert in hypnotism or what it is, but

he certainly delivers the goods when he goes after a wild animal in
the jungles of Africa, and he shows bravery at times that astonishes
everybody, but he admits that he is a coward at heart, and would run
if anybody pulled a gun on him, and I guess he would, but you turn
him loose in a wild animal congress and he will be speaker and
make the whole bunch get on their knees.
I was scared when Pa wanted to have a cage with iron bars hauled
into the jungle where the gorillas live, and insisted that he be left
there alone for two days, with rations to last a week, as he said he
expected to have some gorilla boarders to feed, but Mr. Hagenbach
let Pa have his way, and the cage was hauled about eight miles into
the black wilderness, with great trees and vines and suckes and
gorillas all around him, but Pa insisted on having a phonograph full
of jig tunes, and when we got the cage located and Pa in it and were
ready to leave, I cried, and the whole crowd felt as though we would
never see Pa alive again, and it was a sad parting.
When we left Pa he was cooking some bacon on an oil stove in the
cage and frying some eggs for his dinner, and as we took the trail
back to camp, in silence, we could smell the bacon frying, and when
we got a mile or so away we heard music and stopped to listen and
could plainly hear the phonograph playing “There will be a hot time,”
and Mr. Hagenbach said it reminded him of a dirge.
It was a long two days before we could go back and find Pa’s
remains, but the second day we hiked out through the jungle and
into the woods. Pa had told us that when we came after him to come
quiet and not disturb the menagerie, so when we got near the place
where we left Pa we slowed down and crept up silently and peeked
through the bushes and a sight met our eyes that scared me.
There were four big gorillas and several little ones around the cage,
and some were gnawing ham bones and others were eating dog
biscuits, but it was so silent in the cage that I thought Pa had been
killed and that the gorillas were eating him, so I yelled, “Pa, are you
all right?” and he answered back, “You bet your sweet life I am all
right,” and then we prepared to go the cage, when Pa said for us to
climb trees, and just then the gorillas started for us with their teeth
gleaming, and we all shinned up the trees around the cage, and we
had front seats at the biggest show on earth. Pa told us that the
gorillas that treed us were afraid we were going to harm him, and
they proposed to protect him.
He said he had been feeding the animals for two days and had got
their confidence so he could make them understand what he wanted
them to do.
“Now watch ’em dance when I turn on the music,” and then Pa gave
them the “Merry Widow” waltz, and by gosh if a big gorilla didn’t put
his arm around his wife, or some other gorilla’s wife, and dance
barefooted right there in front of the cage, and all the rest joined in,
and the baby gorillas rolled over on the ground and laughed like
hyenas. Pa stopped the music and called one big gorilla Rastus and
told him to sit down in the cactus, and the others did the same, and
Pa repeated an old democratic speech of his, and they clapped their
hands just like a caucus. “Well, what do you know about that
already,” said Mr. Hagenbach, and then he asked Pa how he was
going to capture them.
 Pa Stopped the Music and Repeated an Old Democratic
Speech of His and They Acted Just Like a Caucus.

Pa said he had them in the cage several times and let them out, and
when we got ready to go to camp all he had to do was to let the
phonograph play “Supper is now ready in the dining car,” and they
would come in and he would slip out and lock the door and we could
haul the cage to camp.
 All He Had to Do Was to Play “Supper is Now Ready in the
Dining Car” on the Phonograph.

Well, you ought to have seen my old gentleman call the whole bunch
of gorillas into the cage and feed them and see them act like a lot of
boys in camp, reaching for potatoes and bacon and wiping their lips
on their hairy arms, but none of them asked for napkins or finger
bowls. When the food was all gone they began to kick like boarders
at a second-class boarding house, and then Pa slipped out of the
door and locked it, and we came down out of the trees and
surrounded the cage, and Pa acted as barker and told us the names
he had given to the gorillas.
Pa brought the phonograph out of the cage and set it going and the
gorillas began to dance. Mr. Hagenbach was so pleased that he
fairly hugged Pa, and we got ready to haul the cage to camp.
Pa always makes some mistake before he has a proposition well in
hand, and he did this time, of course. As we were about to start the
gorilla Rastus, who had become Pa’s chum, looked at Pa so pitiful
that Pa said he guessed he would let Rastus out and he and Rastus
would walk along ahead and get the brush out of the road, so he
opened the door of the cage and beckoned to Rastus, and the big
gorilla came out with his oldest boy, and Pa and the two of them took
hold of hands and started on ahead, and we started to haul the
wagon by drag ropes, when the worst possible thing happened.
Rastus reached in Pa’s pistol pocket, where Pa had just put a large
plug of tobacco after he had bit off a piece, and Rastus thought
because Pa ate the tobacco he could, so he bit off about half of the
plug and ate it and gave his half-grown boy the rest of it, and that
was eaten by the boy. Pa tried to take it away from them, but it was
too late, and they were both mad at Pa for trying to beat them out of
their dessert.
It was not long before Rastus turned pale around the mouth, but his
face was so covered with hair that you couldn’t tell exactly how sick
he was; though, when he put both hands on his stomach, gave a yell
and turned some somersaults, we knew he was a pretty sick gorilla,
and his boy rolled over and clawed his stomach and had a fit.
Rastus had the most pained and revengeful look on his face I ever
saw, and he looked at Pa as though he was to blame.
Pa had one of the men get the medicine chest, and Pa fixed two
seidlitz in a tin cup, but before he could put in the water Rastus had
swallowed the powder from the white and blue paper and reached
for a wash basin of water, and before Pa could prevent Rastus from
drinking it on top of those powders, he had swallowed every drop of
the water, and the commotion inside of him must have been awful,
for he frothed at the mouth and the bubbles came out of his nose,
and he rolled over and yelled like a man with gout, and he seemed to
swell up, and Pa looked on as though he had a case on his hands
that he couldn’t diagnose, while Rastus’ boy just laid on the ground
and rolled his eyes as though he were saying his “Now I lay me,” and
Mr. Hagenbach said to Pa he guessed he had broke up the show,
and Pa said, “Never you mind, I will pull them both through all right.”
Finally the siedlitz powder fiz had all got out of Rastus’ system and
he seemed to be thinking deeply for a moment, and then he got off
his haunches and looked steadily into Pa’s eyes for a minute, and
then he took Pa by one hand and his boy with the other and started
right off through the jungle, Pa pulling back and yelling to us to
rescue him from the gorilla kidnapers, but Rastus walked fast and
before he had got ought of sight he had picked his sick boy up and
carried him under his arm and both were groaning, and he held on to
Pa’s hand and went so fast that Pa’s feet only hit the high places.
The gorillas in the cage looked at them disappear and tried to get out
of the cage to go along, but they couldn’t get out.
Finally Mr. Hagenbach said me, “Hennery, I guess your Pa has got
what is coming to him this time. Rastus will probably drag your Pa up
a tree and eat him when his appetite comes back, but we can’t help
him, so we better haul the cage and the gorillas that have not had
any tobacco to camp, and in a day or two we will all come out here
and find your father’s bones and bury them.”
And then we all went to camp, and the poor gorillas just remained
listlessly in the cage, mourning as though they knew Rastus and his
boy were dead. We fed them everything we could spare, but they
would not eat, and by watching them we found there was a case of
jealousy in the cage, as two male gorillas seemed to be stuck on a
young female, and they were scrapping all the time.
Gee, but we needed Pa worse than ever to settle the gorilla dispute,
but we all felt that Pa was not of this earth any more, and the camp
took on an air of mournfulness, and they all wanted to adopt me,
’cause I was alone in the world. There was not much sleep in camp
that night, and the next day we were going out with guns to find Pa’s
remains and shoot Rastus, but a little after daylight we heard the
night watchman say to the cook, who was building a fire, “Look
who’s here, and what do you know about that,” and he called the
whole camp up, and we looked out across the veldt and there came
Pa astradle of a Zebra, with Rastus’ boy up behind him and Rastus
thoroughly subdued, leading the Zebra with a hay rope Pa had
twisted out of grass.
The whole camp came to attention and Pa scratched a match on
Rastus’ hair and lighted a cigarette, and when he got near enough
he said: “Slept in the crotch of a tree all night. Gave Rastus and his
boy a drink of whiskey out of my flask and cured them of the tobacco
sickness, had some mangoes for breakfast, sent Rastus to catch a
Zebra, and here we are ready for coffee and pancakes.”
Pa got off his zebra, opened the door of the cage and pointed to it,
and Rastus and his boy got in, and Pa kicked Rastus right where the
hair was worn off sitting down, and Rastus looked at Pa as though
that was all right and he deserved it. Then Pa closed the door,
washed his hands and sat down to breakfast, and when Mr.
Hagenbach said, “Old man, you have got Barnum and Forepaugh
skinned a mile,” Pa said, “O that is nothing; I have located a marsh
full of wild Buffaloes, and we will go out there and get a drove of
them in a few days.
“They are the ugliest and fightingest animals in the world, but I will
halter break some of them and ride them without any saddle.” Mr.
Hagenbach said he believed it, and Pa said, “Hennery, one spell I
thought you would be an orphan, but whiskey saved you. When they
got a big drink of whiskey they began to laugh, and then fell on my
neck and cried, just like a white man when he is too drunk to fight.
Well, I am going to take a nap,” and Pa laid down on a bale of hay
and slept all day, and the crowd talked about what a hero he was.
 CHAPTER XVII.
The Boy’s Experience With an African Buffalo—The Boy’s Pa Shoots
Roman Candles to Scare the Buffaloes—The Boy’s Pa Tames the
Wild Animals.

When Pa told us that he had located a place where we could get all
the wild African buffalo that we wanted, I thought of the pictures I
had seen of the killing of buffaloes in America, where all the buffalo
hunter had to do was to ride a horse after a herd of the animals, that
couldn’t run faster than a yoke of oxen, pick out a big bull and ride
alongside of him and fire bullets into his vital parts at about ten feet
range, until his liver was filled full of holes and he had the nose
bleed, and when he fell down from loss of blood, dismount and skin
him for a lap robe. The American buffalo would always run away and
the hunter could kill him if he had cartridges enough, and never be in
any more danger than a farmer milking a cow.
I thought we would have about the same kind of experience with
African buffalo, only we intended to lasso them and bring them to
camp alive for the show business, but instead of the African buffalo
running away from you, he runs at you on sight and tries to gouge
out your inside works with his horns, and paws you with his hoofs,
and when he gets you down he kneels down on you and runs horns
all through your system and rolls over on your body like a setter dog
rolling on an old dead fish.
The African buffalo certainly has a grouch, as though he had
indigestion from eating cactus thorns, and when he sees a man his
eyes blaze with fire and he gets as crazy as an anarchist and seems
to combine in his make-up the habits of the hyena, the tiger, the
man-eating shark and the Texas rattlesnake.
I wouldn’t want such an animal for a pet, but Pa said the way to get
buffaloes was to go after them and never let up until you had them
under your control. So we started out under Pa’s lead to capture
African buffalo, and while the returns are not all in of the dead and
wounded, we know that our expedition is pretty near used up.
These African buffaloes live in a marsh, where the grass and cane
grows high above them, and the only way you can tell where they
are is to watch the birds flying around and alighting on the backs of
the animals to eat wood ticks and gnats. The marsh is so thick with
weeds that a man cannot go into it, so we planned to start the airship
on the windward side of the marsh, after lining up the whole force of
helpers, negroes and white men, and building a corral of timber on
the lee side of the marsh. Pa and the cowboy and I went in the
airship, with those honk-honk horns they have on automobiles, and
those megaphones that are used at football games, and Pa had a
bunch of Roman candles to scare the buffaloes.
When the fence was done, which fifty men had worked on for a
week, it run in the shape of a triangle or a fish net, with a big corral at
the middle. Mr. Hagenbach sent up a rocket to notify Pa that he was
ready to have him scare the buffaloes out of the marsh, down the
fence into the corral.
Pa had the gas bag all full, a mile across the marsh, tied to a tree
with a slip noose, so when we all got set he could pull a string and
untie the slip noose.
Well, everything worked bully, and when Pa tied her loose we went
up into the air about fifty feet, and Pa steered the thing up and down
the marsh like a pointer dog ranging a field for chickens.
It was the greatest sight I ever witnessed, seeing more than two
hundred buffalo heads raise up out of the tall grass and watch the
airship, looking as savage as lions eating raw meat.
First they never moved at all, but we began to blow the honk horns,
and then we yelled through the megaphones to “get out of there, you
sawed off short horns,” and then they began to move away from the
airship across the marsh, and we followed until they began to get
into a herd, nearly on the other side of the marsh, but they only
walked fast, splashing through the mud.
When we got almost across the marsh Pa said now was the time to
fire the Roman candles, so we each lit our candle, and the fire and
smoke and the fire balls fairly scorched the hair of the buffaloes in
the rear of the herd, and in a jiffy the whole herd stampeded out of
the marsh right toward the fence, bellowing in African language,
scared half to death, the first instance on record that an African
buffalo was afraid of anything on earth.
We followed them until they got to the fence, but only about one
hundred got into the corral, the others going around the fence and
chasing the keepers into the jungle and hooking the negroes in the
pants, and some of the negroes are running yet, and will, no doubt,
come out at Cairo, Egypt.
 Some of Those Negroes Are Running Yet, and Will No
Doubt Come Out at Cairo, Egypt.

Mr. Hagenbach and the white men got up in trees and watched Pa
and the airship, and when we got where the fence narrowed up at
the corral Pa let the airship come down to the ground and anchored
it to a stump and yelled for the boss of the expedition and the men to
come down out of the trees and help capture some of the best
specimens; so they came down and tore out the wings of the fence
and placed them across so we had the buffaloes in a pen, and then
Mr. Hagenbach, who had been getting a little jealous of Pa, came up
to him and shook his hand and told him he was a wonder in the
capturing of wild animals, and Pa said don’t mention it, and Pa took
the makings and made himself a cigarette and smoked up, and Mr.
Hagenbach asked Pa how we were going to get the buffaloes out of
the corral, ’cause they were fighting each other in the far end of the
pen, and Pa said you just wait, and he sent for the cages, enough to
hold about ten of the buffaloes, and we let the gas out of the airship
and went into camp right there, and Pa bossed things for about two
days, until the buffaloes got good and hungry, and then we backed
the cages up to an opening in the fence and put hay in the far end of
the cages, and the herd began to take notice.
We wanted the big bulls and some cows, and nature helped us on
the bulls, ’cause they fought the weaker ones away from the cages,
and walked right up the incline into the cages, and Pa went in and
locked the doors, and when we got the cages full of bulls and started
to haul the cages to camp by the aid of some of the negroes who
had returned alive, by jingo, the cows followed the cages with the
bulls in, and you couldn’t drive them away.
We loaded the gas bag on to a sort of stone boat, and Pa rigged up
a couple of ox yokes and in some way hypnotized a few cow
buffaloes so he could drive them, and they hauled the stone boat
with the airship to camp, and we got there almost as soon as the
cages did, and Pa was smoking as contented as though he was
walking on Broadway, and with an ox gad he would larrup the oxen
and say, “Haw Buck,” like a farmer driving oxen to plow a field.
Pa got his wild oxen so tame before we got to camp that they would
eat hay out of his hand, and when we rounded up in our permanent
camp and looked over our stock and killed some of the buffaloes that
had followed the cages, for meat for the negroes, and lit some sky
rockets and fired them at the balance of the herd to drive them away
from camp, the negroes, who had always had a horror of meeting
wild buffaloes, thought Pa was a superior being to be able to tame a
whole herd of the most savage animals, and they got down on their
knees and placed their faces in the dust in front of Pa and
worshipped him, and they wouldn’t get up off the ground until Pa had
gone around and put his feet on the necks of all the negroes in token
that he acknowledged himself to be their king and protector, and the
wives of the negroes all threw their arms around Pa and hugged him
until he got tired, and he said he had rather fight buffaloes than be
hugged by half naked negro women that hadn’t had a bath since
Stanley discovered them, but Pa appreciated the honor, and Mr.
Hagenbach said Pa was the greatest man in the world.

Pa Had to Put His Foot on Their Necks and Acknowledge

Himself Their King and Protector.

The next day we shipped the buffaloes to the coast and had them
sent to Berlin, and when we got the mail from headquarters there
was an order for a lot more tigers, so I suppose we will be tigering as
soon as the open season is on.
The idea is that we must get all the animals we can this year, for it is
rumored that Roosevelt is coming to Africa next year to shoot big
game, and all of us feel that wild animals will be scarce after he has
devastated Africa.
We got short of Salt Pork, and some time ago Pa salted down some
sides of rhinoceros, and yesterday was the day to open the barrel.
Pa showed the cooks how to fry rhinoceros pork, and I tell you it
made you hungry to smell rhinoceros frying, and with boiled potatoes
and ostrich eggs and milk gravy, made from elephant milk, we lived
high, but the next day an epidemic broke out, and they laid it to Pa’s
rhinoceros pork dinner, but Pa says any man who eats eight or nine
fried ostrich eggs is liable to indigestion.
Gee, but this is a great country to enjoy an outing in.