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relief from the appellate court other than what he has obtained from the lower tribunal, if any, whose decision is brought up on appeal. Due process prevents the grant of additional awards to parties who did not appeal. As an exception, he may assign an error where the purpose is to maintain the judgment on other grounds, but he cannot seek modification or reversal of the judgment or affirmative relief unless he has also appealed or filed a separate petition. (AKLAN COLLEGE, INC. vs. PERPETUO ENERO, ARLYN CASTIGADOR, NUENA SERMON and JOCELYN ZOLINA, G.R. No. 178309, January 27, 2009) Likewise, by availing of a wrong or inappropriate mode of appeal, the petition merits an outright dismissal pursuant to Circular No. 290 which provides that, “an appeal taken to either Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.”( HANJIN HEAVY INDUSTRIES AND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LTD. (FORMERLY HANJIN ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION CO. LTD.) v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 167938, February 19, 2009) At the outset, it must be stated that petitioners adopted the wrong mode of remedy in bringing the case before this Court. It is well-settled that the proper recourse of an aggrieved party to assail the decision of the Court of Appeals is to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Rules precludes recourse to the special civil action of certiorari if appeal, by way of a petition for review is available, as the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. (TACLOBAN FAR EAST MARKETING CORPORATION and FRANCISCO Y. ROMUALDEZ v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. No. 182320, September 11, 2009) Time and again, it has been held that the right to appeal is not a constitutional right, but a mere statutory privilege. Hence, parties who seek to avail themselves of it must comply with the statutes or rules allowing it. To reiterate, perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is mandatory and jurisdictional. The requirements for perfecting an appeal must, as a rule, be strictly followed. Such requirements are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and are necessary for the orderly discharge of the judicial business. Failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment of the court final and executory. Just as a losing 1
party has the privilege to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so does the winner also have the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision. Thus, the propriety of the monetary awards of the Labor Arbiter is already binding upon this Court, much more with the Court of Appeals. (ANDREW JAMES MCBURNIE v. EULALIO GANZON, EGIMANAGERS,INC. and E. GANZON, INC. G.R. Nos. 178034 & 178117, G.R. Nos. 186984-85, September 18, 2009) From the immediately quoted pronouncement of the Court in Sy, petitioner’s mere filing of the Motion for Reduction of Bond did not suffice to perfect his appeal. As correctly found by the appellate court, petitioner filed a Motion for Reduction of Bond dated June 24, 1999 (which was received by the appellate court on June 28, 1999) alleging financial constraints without showing “substantial compliance with the Rules” or demonstrating a willingness to abide by the [R]ules by posting a partial bond.” That petitioner questioned the computation of the monetary award ─ basis of the computation of the amount of appeal bond did not excuse it from posting a bond in a reasonable amount or what it believed to be the correct amount. (THE HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, RUFINO C. RAÑON II, AND ISMAEL C. VILLA, G.R. Nos. 180478-79, September 3, 2009) • Certiorari
Respondent may have a point in asserting that in this case a Rule 65 petition is a wrong mode of appeal, as indeed the writ of certiorari is an extraordinary remedy, and certiorari jurisdiction is not to be equated with appellate jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it is settled, as a general proposition, that the availability of an appeal does not foreclose recourse to the extraordinary remedies, such as certiorari and prohibition, where appeal is not adequate or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient, as where the orders of the trial court were issued in excess of or without jurisdiction, or there is need to promptly relieve the aggrieved party from the injurious effects of the acts of an inferior court or tribunal, e.g., the court has authorized execution of the judgment. This Court has even recognized that a recourse to certiorari is proper not only where there is a clear deprivation of petitioner’s fundamental right to due process, but so also where other special circumstances warrant immediate and more direct action. (PEOPLE’S BROADCASTING(BOMBO RADYO PHILS., INC.) vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DOLE REGION VII, and JANDELEON JUEZAN, G.R. No. 179652, May 8, 2009) • Strict Application of the Rules 2
As to the other ground cited by private respondents’ counsel, suffice it to say that it was a bare allegation unsubstantiated by any proof or affidavit of merit. Besides, they could have filed the petition on time with a motion to be allowed to litigate in forma pauperis. While social justice requires that the law look tenderly on the disadvantaged sectors of society, neither the rich nor the poor has a license to disregard rules of procedure. The fundamental rule of human relations enjoins everyone, regardless of standing in life, to duly observe procedural rules as an aspect of acting with justice, giving everyone his due and observing honesty and good faith. For indeed, while technicalities should not unduly hamper our quest for justice, orderly procedure is essential to the success of that quest to which all courts are devoted. (LAGUNA METTS CORPORATION v. ARIES C. CAALAM and GERALDINE ESGUERRA, G.R. No. 185220, July 27, 2009) • Date of Filing
In this case, petitioner availed of the services of LBC, a private carrier, to deliver its notice of appeal to the NLRC. Had petitioner sent its notice of appeal by registered mail, the date of mailing would have been deemed the date of filing with the NLRC. But petitioner, for reasons of its own, chose to send its notice of appeal through a private letter-forwarding agency. Therefore, the date of actual receipt by the NLRC of the notice of appeal, and not the date of delivery to LBC, is deemed to be the date of the filing of the notice of appeal. Since the NLRC received petitioner’s notice of appeal on 26 February 2001, the appeal was clearly filed out of time. Petitioner had thus lost its right to appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC should have dismissed its notice of appeal. (CHARTER CHEMICAL AND COATING CORPORATION vs. HERBERT TAN and AMALIA SONSING, G.R. No. 163891, May 21, 2009) • Delayed Filing
We agree with the Court of Appeals that since no intent to delay the administration of justice could be attributed to Guinmapang, a one day delay does not justify the appeal’s denial. More importantly, the Court of Appeals declared that Guinmapang’s appeal, on its face, appears to be impressed with merit. The constitutional mandate to accord full protection to labor and to safeguard the employee’s means of livelihood should be given proper attention and sanction. A greater injustice may occur if said appeal is not given due course than if the reglementary period to appeal were strictly followed. In this case, we are inclined to excuse the one day delay in order to fully settle the merits of the case. This is in line with our policy to encourage full 3
adjudication of the merits of an appeal. (REPUBLIC CEMENT CORPORATION v. PETER I. GUINMAPANG, G.R. No. 168910, August 24, 2009) • Appeal Bond
At the time of the filing of the surety bond by PJI on January 2, 2003, PPAC was still an accredited bonding company. Thus, it was but proper to honor the appeal bond issued by a bonding company duly accredited by this Court at the time of its issuance. The subsequent revocation of the authority of a bonding company should not prejudice parties who relied on its authority. The revocation of authority of a bonding company is prospective in application. (CESARIO L. DEL ROSARIO v. PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC., G.R. No. 181516, August 19, 2009) While the bond may be reduced upon motion by the employer, this is subject to the conditions that (1) the motion to reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award is posted by the appellant, otherwise the filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal. The qualification effectively requires that unless the NLRC grants the reduction of the cash bond within the 10 day reglementary period, the employer is still expected to post the cash or surety bond securing the full amount within the said 10-day period. If the NLRC does eventually grant the motion for reduction after the reglementary period has elapsed, the correct relief would be to reduce the cash or surety bond already posted by the employer within the 10-day period. (ANDREW JAMES MCBURNIE v. EULALIO GANZON, EGI-MANAGERS,INC. and E. GANZON, INC. G.R. Nos. 178034 & 178117, G.R. Nos. 18698485, September 18, 2009) In addition, while the bond requirement on appeals involving a monetary award has been relaxed in certain cases, this can only be done where there was substantial compliance with the Rules; or where the appellants, at the very least, exhibited willingness to pay by posting a partial bond. ( LOLITA A. LOPEZ, ET. al., vs. QUEZON CITY SPORTS CLUB, INC.,G.R. No. 164032, January 19, 2009) The decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the NLRC by any parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof, with proof of payment of the required appeal fee accompanied by a memorandum of appeal. And where, as here, the judgment involves monetary award, an appeal
179652. Second. Third. INC. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT. The Deed of Assignment in the instant case. it is only proper that he should receive adequate compensation for his efforts.therefrom by the employer may be “perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond. (WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES. during the period of appeal. (ERWIN H. and not of petitioner. like a cash or surety bond. and JANDELEON JUEZAN. the fact that a lawyer plays a vital role in the administration of justice emphasizes the need to secure to him his honorarium lawfully earned as a means to preserve the decorum and respectability of the legal profession. October 2. INC. No. but rather the entire award in the appealed Order. Petitioner is evidently entitled to attorney’s fees. and constituted clear manifestation of petitioner’s willingness to pay the judgment amount. to be withdrawn by the same office after it had issued a writ of execution. Go successfully represented his client. against any occurrence that would defeat or diminish recovery by the aggrieved employees under the judgment if subsequently affirmed. A lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice or imposition of fraud on the part of 5 . the Court finds that the execution of the Deed of Assignment. the Deed of Assignment constitutes not just a partial amount. G. BULTRON. REYES v. serves the same purpose. THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR. No. and SCANDIC SHIPMANAGEMENT LIMITED v. For all intents and purposes. 2009) Considering that Atty. 185261. 2009) Attorney’s Fees Finally. and is in fact payable to the DOLE Regional Office. the Deed of Assignment in tandem with the Letter Agreement and Cash Voucher is as good as cash. ERIBERTO S. the Court overrules the deletion by the NLRC of the Labor Arbiter’s award for attorney’s fees to petitioner. No. (PEOPLE’S BROADCASTING(BOMBO RADYO PHILS.” A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites mentioned does not stop the running of the period for perfecting an appeal as in fact no motion for extension of said period is allowed. G. 2009) The purpose of an appeal bond is to ensure.R. G. May 8.. February 10. 180551. the Letter Agreement and the Cash Voucher were made in good faith.R. First.) vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION.R. since h3e was compelled to litigate to protect his interest by reason of unjustified and unlawful termination of his employment by respondents CCBP and Taguibao. Even as we agree with the reduction of the award of attorney's fees by the CA. DOLE REGION VII. it is clear from the Deed of Assignment that the entire amount is under the full control of the bank.
we find that the amount of P2. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION.. October 2. but also to see that a lawyer is paid his just fees. The duty of the court is not alone to ensure that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner. (EVANGELINA MASMUD (as substitute complainant for ALEXANDER J. The same fees are also recoverable when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest as in the present case following the refusal by respondent to settle his claims. in cases for recovery of wages. he himself would not get his due. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES. 170525. in turn. G. however. 2009) In the case at bar. Hence. 183385. 178083. the issues involved in this case are simple. v. Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. This amount should include all expenses of litigation that were incurred by respondent union. 2009) Moreover. PERALTA et al. the award of attorney's fees is proper and there need not be any showing that the employer acted maliciously or in bad faith when it withheld the wages. he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client to escape payment of his just compensation. (BARON REPUBLIC THEATRICAL V. we find that the flight attendants were represented by respondent union which. The flight attendants had a common cause of action. It would be ironic if after putting forth the best in him to secure justice for his client. MASMUD) v. INC. it may not be reasonable to award said counsel an amount equivalent to 10% of all monetary awards to be received by each individual flight attendant. No.R. engaged the services of its own counsel. NORMITA P. With his capital consisting of his brains and with his skill acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in expenditure of time and energy. G.000. While the work performed by respondent’s counsel was by no means simple. petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees of ten percent 6 . No. nevertheless. Based on the length of time that this case has been litigated. October 2.his client as the client is against abuse on the part of his counsel. No.00 is reasonable as attorney’s fees.PATRIA CHIONG and COURT OF APPEALS. There need only be a showing that the lawful wages were not paid accordingly. and the legal strategies.G. 2009) The claim for attorney’s fees is granted following Article 2208 of the New Civil Code which allows its recovery in actions for recovery of wages of laborers and actions for indemnity under the employer's liability laws. seeing as it spanned the whole litigation from the Labor Arbiter stage all the way to this Court.000.R. February 13. theories and arguments advanced were common for all the affected crew members.R. (FLIGHT ATTENDANTS AND STEWARDS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (FASAP).
should he be found to have been illegally dismissed -. No. 180551. dismissed employees are not required to prove their innocence of the employer’s accusations against them. P. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. The payment of backwages allows the employee to recover from the employer that which he has lost by way of wages as a result of his dismissal. back wages and accruing benefits. it must be computed from the date of petitioner’s illegal dismissal up to the time of actual reinstatement. Failure to dispose of the burden would imply that the dismissal is not lawful. Each party must bear his own loss.V. (LEOPOLDO ABANTE v. NAVARRO v. 182430. 2009) Burden of Proof In termination cases. 164681. (BERNARDINO V.(10%) of the monetary award.. Respondent should be exempted from the burden of paying backwages. FRIEND. Moreover. 2009) Backwages One of the natural consequences of a finding that an employee has been illegally dismissed is the payment of backwages corresponding to the period from his dismissal up to actual reinstatement. May 26. December 4. and that the employee is entitled to reinstatement. the employer bears the burden of proving that the dismissal of the employee is for a just or an authorized cause. petitioner should not be paid for the time he was not working. KJGS FLEET MANAGEMENT MANILA G.and for as long as his cause of action has not been barred by prescription. No.R.. That petitioner did not immediately file his Complaint should not affect or diminish his right to backwages. April 24. The statutory intent of this matter is clearly discernible. JR. G. G. PAJARILLO LINER.R. REYES v.R. 2009) He never bothered to redeem his license at the soonest possible time when there was no showing that he was unlawfully prevented by respondent from doing so.R. No. for it is a right clearly granted to him by law -. There can be no gap or interruption. G. The Court has held that where the failure of employees to work was not due to the employer's fault. lest we defeat the very reason of the law in granting the same. (ERWIN H. the burden of economic loss suffered by the employees should not be shifted to the employer. (SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION vs. 153983. February 10. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND WILLIAM L. No. It would be unfair to allow petitioner to recover something he has not earned and could not have earned. Logically. Thus. INC. since he could not discharge his work as a driver without his driver's license. 2009) 7 .
152101. SIENES. the employer bears the burden of proving that the dismissal is for a valid or authorized cause. remittances and other similar documents — which will show that overtime.July 28. This belief remains just that – it is unsubstantiated. the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal was for a just and valid cause and failure to discharge the same would mean that the dismissal is not justified and therefore illegal. INC.R. 166705. LOURDES D. 2002. holiday pay and 13th month pay. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PABLO S.As a general rule.R. and EDGARDO BERGONIA.. based on his belief that Guillermo and Bergonia had spread rumors that his transactions on behalf of BAYER would no longer be honored as of April 30. What it finds is that petitioner unilaterally stopped reporting for work before filing a complaint for illegal dismissal. G. 2009) It is well-settled that in termination cases. BAYER PHILIPPINES. MADRIAGA. service incentive leave and other claims of workers have been paid — are not in the possession of the employee but in the custody and absolute control of the employer. the general rule is that the burden rests on the employer to prove payment. Evidence does not sufficiently establish that petitioner had incurred losses that would justify retrenchment to prevent further losses. petitioner hired a total of 114 new employees assigned in the petitioner's stores located in the different places of the country.G. No. G. Since in the case at bar petitioner company has not shown any proof of payment of the correct amount of salary. (MANTLE TRADING SERVICES. payrolls. records. No.. records show that from January to July 1997. July 31. MA. The Comparative Income Statement for the year 1996 and for the months of February to June 1997 which petitioner submitted did not conclusively show that petitioner had suffered financial losses. Even where the employee must allege nonpayment. we affirm the award of Madriaga’s monetary claims. DANPIN GUILLERMO. in arguing that Sabulao abandoned his work. one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. it is incumbent upon the petitioners to prove: (1) that the employee failed to report for work or had been 8 . While in cases of illegal dismissal. Hence. INCORPORATED AND/OR BOBBY DEL ROSARIO v. the Court appreciates no evidence that petitioner was dismissed. September 8. PRODUCT IMAGE MARKETING. differentials. 179807. 2009) The burden of proving the validity of retrenchment is on the petitioner. The reason for the rule is that the pertinent personnel files.2009) Respecting the issue of illegal dismissal. In fact.R. rather than on the employee to prove nonpayment. No. (RAMY GALLEGO v. INC. (EMCOR INCORPORATED v. the employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of dismissal.
2009) Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) If the terms of a CBA are clear and have no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties. in particular that which pertains on regularization.R. At that time therefore. 182320. 1995. No. 2009) Cause of Action The Secretary of Labor and Employment dismissed the first petition as it was filed outside the 60-day freedom period. Clearly. way after she was hired by the petitioner as extra beverage attendant on April 24. the union has no cause of action while in the third. there is no identity of causes of action to speak of since in the first petition. 149660. a cause of action already exists for the union as they are now legally allowed to challenge the status of SMCGCSUPER as exclusive bargaining representative. No. January 20. There is thus much credence in the private respondent’s claim that the service agreement executed between the petitioner and MANRED is a mere ploy to circumvent the law on employment. and (2) that there must have been a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship as manifested by some overt acts.absent without valid or justifiable reason. the daily-paid employees must be paid their regular salaries on 9 . however. TOMAS and CHRIS GARMENTS WORKERS UNION-PTGWO LOCAL CHAPTER No.R. September 11. THE COURT OF APPEALS. As such. ROMUALDEZ v. jurisprudence dictates that the burden of proof to show that there was unjustified refusal to go back to work rests on the employer.R.. PATRICIA A. the union has no cause of action since they are not yet legally allowed to challenge openly and formally the status of SMCGCSUPER as the exclusive bargaining representative of the bargaining unit. (MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP vs COURT OF APPEALS. (TACLOBAN FAR EAST MARKETING CORPORATION and FRANCISCO Y. Otherwise stated. G. Such dismissal. (CHRIS GARMENTS CORPORATION vs HON. January 12. 167426. 832. as in the herein questioned provision. G. G. That is settled. SHERYL OABEL AND MANILA RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT CORP. private respondent’s purported employment with MANRED commenced only in 1996. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. the literal meaning thereof shall prevail. STO. No. 2009) Circumvention of the Law Notably. has no bearing in the instant case since the third petition for certification election was filed well within the 60day freedom period.
Holiday pay is a legislated benefit enacted as part of the Constitutional imperative that the State shall afford protection to labor. HERIDA v.. Petitioner’s contention that upon getting married. Otherwise. he earns what he should earn. the backwages were computed only for a certain period. regardless of whether they fall on rest days. respondents have standing policies that an employee must be single at the time of employment and must be willing to be assigned to any of its branches in the country. No.” (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) (RFM CORPORATION-FLOUR DIVISION and SFI FEEDS DIVISION v. that is. Respondents claimed that travel time from the Bacolod City Branch to the Iloilo City Branch will only take about an hour by boat and that they were even willing to defray petitioner’s transportation and lodging expenses. Just because an employee gets married does not mean she can already renege on a commitment she willingly made at the time of her employment particularly if such commitment does not appear to be unreasonable. 172601. No. (AILEEN G. There is no showing either that petitioner’s transfer was only being used by respondents to camouflage a sinister scheme of management to rid itself of an undesirable worker in the person of petitioner. 162324.the holidays which are so declared by the national government. KASAPIAN NG MANGGA-GAWANG PINAGKAISA-RFM (KAMPI-NAFLUKMU) and SANDIGAN AT UGNAYAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PINAGKAISASFI (SUMAPI-NAFLU-KMU). February 4. 2009) Company Policy As respondents creditably explained. on the increase in the computation of the monetary award to respondents. Its purpose is not merely “to prevent diminution of the monthly income of the workers on account of work interruptions. she no longer bound herself to be assigned to any of respondents’ branches in the country is preposterous. In other words. G. his holiday pay. the actual backwages to be paid to respondents are computed from the date of dismissal until the finality of the decision. 2009) Computation of Award Finally. F & C PAWNSHOP and JEWELRY STORE/MARCELINO FLORETE. G. the decision of the Labor Arbiter specified that for purposes of putting up a bond should petitioner appeal. JR. because petitioner continues to refuse and accord regular status to respondents and to pay them their corresponding wages even after the lapse of two 10 . inconvenient.R.R. In addition. although the worker is forced to take a rest. Petitioner never disputed these matters. April 16. or prejudicial to her. and as admitted by petitioner herself.
(CHRIS GARMENTS CORPORATION vs HON. 13 th month pay. 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay resulting from illegal dismissal must not be prejudiced by a rigid and technical application of the rules. substantive rights like the award of backwages. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION . STO. 832. 167426. 180718. Besides.R. G. No. No. It is evident that these should not be limited to said period. (PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY v. To reiterate. These should be computed from the date of her illegal dismissal until this decision attains finality. “conclusiveness of judgment” has the effect of preclusion of issues. 174209. 2009) Contingent Fee Contingent fee contracts are subject to the supervision and close scrutiny of the court in order that clients may be protected from unjust charges. LEILA EMNACE and GINA CAPISTRANO. 2002. the Labor Arbiter correctly included that in its order of execution. it may be considered as the final resolution of such issue. The computation of the award for backwages and other benefits from the time the compensation was withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement is a mere legal consequence of the finding that respondent was illegally dismissed by petitioners. and service incentive leave pay from July 10. we are not barred from ordering its modification. the Labor Arbiter’s order of execution simply covered the correct computation of wages and other payments enjoyed by petitioner’s regular employees. Since petitioner did not appeal this factual finding. not otherwise assigned as errors on appeal. PATRICIA A. G. 2005 to January 23. if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a complete and just resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice. 2007 only. G. 2009) Conclusiveness of Judgment Third.(2) years from the finality of the Labor Arbiter’s decision. January 12. TOMAS and CHRIS GARMENTS WORKERS UNIONPTGWO LOCAL CHAPTER No. Thus. August 25.R.R. (HENLIN PANAY COMPANY v. Though Bolanos did not appeal the computation of the NLRC’s award as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. October 23. No. The matter of employer-employee relationship has been resolved with finality by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the Resolution dated December 27. 2009) This Court notes that the NLRC awarded backwages. This Court is imbued with sufficient authority and discretion to review matters. then. The amount of contingent fees agreed upon by the parties is subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid for his 11 . RIZALINA RAUT.
MANALO. (SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION v. the doubt as to the period of employment must be construed in her favor.R. The CA committed no error of law when it awarded the attorney’s fees of Atty. 2002 to March 31. its execution was merely a ploy on SMC’s part to deprive respondent of his tenurial security. Go and allowed him to receive an equivalent of 39% of the monetary award. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. Go and Evangelina’s husband. the employment agreement may be likened into a contract of adhesion considering that it is petitioner who insists that there existed an express period of one year from April 1. and the parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other. the contract shall be construed against the party who drafted the same. (EVANGELINA MASMUD (as substitute complainant for ALEXANDER J. 163033. 2009) Corporate Rehabilitation Given these premises. 2009) Contract of Employment Since respondent was already a regular employee months before the execution of the Employment with a Fixed Period contract. The employment status of a person is defined and prescribed by law and not by what the parties say it should be. The Court finds nothing illegal in the contingent fee contract between Atty. ADELAIDA . No. in this case. G. Hence. February 13.R. 178835. it is not difficult to understand why actions for claims against the ailing enterprise have to be suspended. G. Hence. No. G. 2009) Contract of Adhesion In addition. October 2. MASMUD) v. using as proof its own copy of the agreement. where the very employment of respondent is at stake. 183385. While contracts of adhesion are valid and binding. VIOLETA T. CARIÑO v. in cases of doubt which will cause a great imbalance of rights against one of the parties. No. 12 .R. EDUARDO L. (MAGIS YOUNG ACHIEVERS’ LEARNING CENTER and MRS. Equally important to consider is that a contract of employment is impressed with public interest such that labor contracts must yield to the common good.legal services only if the suit or litigation prospers. no valid fixed-term contract was executed. 2003. February 13. A much higher compensation is allowed as contingent fees because of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails. Provisions of applicable statutes are deemed written into the contract. TEODOSIO.
590. National Labor Relations Commission where the employer posted copies of its letters of termination to the teachers inside the school campus and it also furnished copies to the town mayor and Parish Priest of their community for the purpose of maligning the teachers’ reputation. INC. The factual circumstances are different. TRINIDAD M. No.1. as already mentioned. Viernes is an illegal dismissal case. National Labor Relations Commission to support its claim for the reduction of the award of nominal damages is misplaced. 2009) Damages Petitioner's reliance on Viernes v. INC. v. 167768. and ROLF WILTSCHEK v. since such writs emanate from “actions for claims. such as in the case of Balayan Colleges v. is of no moment. since the dismissal was done without due process. it is stipulated that “[a] seafarer whose disability is assessed at 50% or more under the 13 .It then becomes easy to accept the hypothesis that the date when the claim arose.00 equivalent to one-month salary of the employee. and the only award given was nominal damages. 175855 October 2.R. 2009) Disability Benefits Under paragraph 20. No. likewise. June 5. (CELEBES JAPAN FOODS CORPORATION V. ENRIQUEZ. G.5 of the parties’ CBA. Court of Appeals. 169173. excepting only. since there was no authorized cause for the dismissal of the employees. INC. In this case.. all actions for claims against it --. As long as the corporation is under a management committee or a rehabilitation receiver.” must. this Court awarded moral damages to a teacher who was flatly. claims for payment of obligations incurred by the corporation in the ordinary course of business. but without the observance of procedural due process. the dismissal was valid. April 17. SUSAN YERMO G. as it was due to an authorized cause. the nominal damages awarded was only P2.R. or when the action is filed. G. be suspended. So also in the case of Chiang Kai Shek School v. (M+W ZANDER PHILIPPINES. VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY.R. and the employer was ordered to pay backwages inclusive of allowances and other benefits. (MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY. 2009) In previous cases where moral damages and attorney’s fees were awarded. computed from the time the compensation was withheld up to the actual reinstatement. Enforcement of writs of execution issued by judicial or quasijudicial tribunals. In addition. and without warning or a formal notice. told that she was dismissed. No.for money or otherwise --must yield to the greater imperative of corporate rehabilitation. the manner of termination was done in a humiliating and insulting manner.
2002. he can no longer perform work which is part of his daily routine as Chief Cook like lifting heavy loads of frozen meat. So Philimare. (Emphasis supplied) 14 . Suganob’s disability is permanent since he was unable to work from the time he was medically repatriated on September 17. i. Due to his illness.000. What is necessary is that the injury must be such that the employee cannot pursue his usual work and earn therefrom. he would have been taken back by petitioners to continue his work as a Chief Cook. Moreover. thus: Apropos the appropriate disability benefits that respondent is entitled to.66%. if in fact Suganob is clear and fit to work on October 29.000. does not mean absolute helplessness. 2001.. 2001 up to the time the complaint was filed on April 25. but rather the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one’s earning capacity. Hence. Both the companydesignated physician and Suganob’s physician found that Suganob is unfit to continue his duties as a Chief Cook since his illness prevented him from continuing his duties as such. v. he is entitled to a 100% disability compensation of US$60. or totally paralyzed. regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any of his body. etc. Ltd.e./Marlow Navigation Co. Suganob’s disability is also total. Permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days. it is not the injury which is compensated.00 for ratings. x x x US$60. or more than 7 months. Clearly. when preparing meals for the crew members. but he was not. Total disability does not require that the employee be absolutely disabled. as correctly found by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. . enlightens.. Total disability. water. Suganob.POEA Employment Contract shall x x x be regarded as permanently unfit for further sea service in any capacity and entitled to 100% compensation.” Petitioner’s disability rating being 68. we find that Suganob is entitled to Grade 1 disability benefits which corresponds to total and permanent disability. x x x To be entitled to Grade 1 disability benefits. the employee’s disability must not only be total but also permanent. His disability is undoubtedly permanent. fish. . Inc. on the other hand. In disability compensation.
we significantly note that petitioner. INC. 1997 . deemed written in the seafarer’s contract is a set of standard provisions set and implemented by the POEA. KJGS FLEET MANAGEMENT MANILA G. 183908. (CARLOS N. Taken together with the testimonies of other witnesses who gave their statements on how 15 . 2009) As with all other kinds of worker. 1997 memo. G.00. The explanation. December 4. 182430. after filing her explanation in response to the employer’s July 1. No.(JOELSON O. NO. R. But unlike that of others. 2009) Given a seafarer’s entitlement to permanent disability benefits when he is unable to work for more than 120 days. in Filipino.R. ILORETA v. the issue of whether petitioner Nisda can legally demand and claim disability benefits from respondents Sea Serve and ADAMS for an illness suffered is best addressed by the provisions of his POEA-SEC. the failure of the company-designated physician to pronounce petitioner fit to work within the 120-day period entitles him to permanent total disability benefit in the amount of US$60. It is a matter of record that the petitioner lost no time in submitting the required explanation.000. December 4. which are considered to be the minimum requirements acceptable to the government for the employment of Filipino seafarers on board foreign ocean-going vessels. as she submitted it on the very same day that the memo was served on her. (LEOPOLDO ABANTE v. Thus. July 23.. SEA SERVE MARITIME AGENCY and KHALIFA A. G. No. narrated among others the indifferent and discriminatory treatment she had been receiving from the group of Nilo Echavez.R. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS. called the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels. never asked for any clarificatory hearing during the plant-level proceedings. She also had ample opportunity to explain her side vis-àvis the principal charge against her — her involvement in the incident of June 30. the terms and conditions of a seafarer’s employment is governed by the provisions of the contract he signs at the time he is hired. which she also told her husband who got mad. When petitioner Nisda was employed on 7 August 2001. which incorporated the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels. ALGOSAIBI DIVING AND MARINE SERVICES. NISDA v. it was the 2000 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels (hereinafter referred to simply as Amended Standard Terms and Conditions for brevity) that applied and were deemed written in or appended to his POEA-SEC. 2009) Dismissal In the present case. 179177.
et al. DUNCAN PHARMACEUTICALS. insensibility. (ROSARIO A.R. v. when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay or both. The employer must demonstrate that the transfer is not unreasonable. arbitrary and unfounded adoption of the two-day work scheme which greatly reduced petitioners’ salaries renders it liable for constructive dismissal. 2009) Time and again we have ruled that in constructive dismissal cases. PHILS. 179985. petitioner having been placed in a position where continued employment was rendered impossible and unreasonable by the circumstances indicated above. We.R. inconvenient. QUALITY HOUSE. INC. FORMANTES v. G.R. No. 177059. 176506. such as genuine business necessity. unreasonable or unlikely. December 4. (RAMON B. B&B FISH BROKER/NORBERTO M. 2009) These discriminatory acts were calculated to make petitioner feel that he is no longer welcome nor needed in respondent company − short of sending him an actual notice of termination. September 18. al. therefore. (MERCK SHARP AND DOHME (PHILIPPINES) v. (ODILON L. the petitioner cannot claim that the respondent company did not give her ample opportunity to be heard. G. 2009) 16 . the employee’s transfer is tantamount to unlawful constructive dismissal. GATUS v.G. LUCINARIO. hold that respondent constructively dismissed petitioner from the service. and CHRISTOPHER CHUA.R..R. JONAR P. INC. March 13. the employer has the burden of proving that the transfer of an employee is for just and valid grounds. No actual dismissal might have occurred in the sense that petitioner was not served with a notice of termination. April 16. MARTINEZ v. or prejudicial to the employee and that the transfer does not involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of salary and other benefits. (FE LA ROSA et. November 25. 170661. Respondent’s sudden. No. No. or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee.. 2009) • Constructive Dismissal Case law holds that constructive dismissal occurs when there is cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible.. we are convinced that the respondent company acted based on a valid cause for dismissal and observed the required procedures in so acting. AMBASSADOR HOTEL. All told. G. but there was constructive dismissal. If the employer fails to overcome this burden of proof. ROBLES. or when a clear discrimination. No. 2009) What thus surfaces is that petitioner was constructively dismissed.the petitioner encouraged her husband to attack Echavez (all of which were duly and seasonably disclosed). G. No.. 156766.
Although petitioners have wider latitude of discretion in terminating respondent. Managerial employees. 177664. and always with due process. No. Such employees. September 4. 2009) • Dismissal of Managerial Employees In view of the lack of proper investigation into the charges against respondent. and without cause as reasonably established in an appropriate investigation. it is nonetheless settled that confidential and managerial employees cannot be arbitrarily dismissed at any time.In the present case. are entitled to security of tenure. 2009) • Dismissal due to Union Security Clauses Nonetheless. IRENEO P. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. June 5. no less than rank-and-file laborers are entitled to due process. G. notice and hearing prior to dismissal. In like manner. No. the respondent was forced to leave the petitioners’ compound with his family and to transfer to a nearby place. the respondent’s act of leaving the petitioners’ premises was in reality not his choice but a situation the petitioners created.R. G. 2009) • Dismissal of Union Officer 17 . We emphasized that the enforcement of union security clauses is authorized by law. 165407.R. petitioners failed to show that they have a just cause for terminating his employment.R. to the detriment of the employees. (Herminigildo Inguillo and Zenaida Bergante v. the same is not without a condition or restriction. and/or Amparo Policarpio. subject only to the requirement of due process. (CASA CEBUANA INCORPORADA and ANGELA FIGUEROA PAULIN v. LEUTERIO. 176040. Manager. First Philippine Scales. No. We have said time and again that dismissals pursuant to union security clauses are valid and legal. while We uphold dismissal pursuant to a union security clause. December 23. For to allow its untrammeled enforcement would encourage arbitrary dismissal and abuse by the employer. Respondents’ alleged infractions amount to nothing more than bare accusations and unilateral conclusions that do not provide legal justification for his termination from employment. Thus. provided such enforcement is not characterized by arbitrariness. the petitioners ceased verbally communicating with the respondent and giving him work assignment after suspecting that he had forged purchase receipts. Under this situation. too. G. fair standards of employment and the protection of labor laws. CATINDIG v. (CRC AGRICULTURAL TRADING and ROLANDO B. Thus. Inc. that is. who was a managerial employee. to safeguard the rights of the employees.
the only defense of petitioner against the charge of illegal dismissal being that respondents were not its employees. ILIASCOR EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS UNION – SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES FEDERATION OF LABOR (IEWU-SPFL). 158956. DE LEON v.Note that the verb “participates” is preceded by the adverb “knowingly. therefore. prior to their dismissal. Indeed. 2009) 18 . July 13. (CLUB FILIPINO.. INC. et.. al.” This reflects the intent of the legislature to require “knowledge” as a condition sine qua non before a union officer can be dismissed from employment for participating in an illegal strike. No notice of such impending termination was ever given to them. (COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS. As regular employees of petitioner. the respondents’ dismissal was not carried out in accordance with law and. AND ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS. ROBERTO F. Having failed to establish compliance with the requirements on termination of employment under the Labor Code. Certainly. Individual respondents were definitely denied due process. petitioner has the burden of proving that the dismissal of petitioner was for a cause allowed under the law and that petitioner was afforded procedural due process. No. (ILIGAN CEMENT CORPORATION v. No.R. none of which were alleged or proven to exist in this case. al.. No. 168406. AGITO. benjamin bautista. The provision is worded in such a way as to make it very difficult for employers to circumvent the law by arbitrarily dismissing employees in the guise of exercising management prerogative. April 24. G.. Records also failed to show that petitioner afforded respondents the twin requirements of procedural due process. and ATTY.R. Neither did petitioner show that individual respondents were given ample opportunity to contest the legality of their dismissal. G. G. the dismissal of individual respondents was tainted with illegality. Respondents were not served notices informing them of the particular acts for which their dismissal was sought. i. ALAN M. 2009) • Illegal Dismissal With the finding that Interserve was engaged in prohibited laboronly contracting. INC v. et al. respondents cannot be dismissed except for just or authorized causes. 2009) As the employer.e.R. et. it failed to show any valid or authorized cause under the Labor Code which allowed it to terminate the services of individual respondents. petitioner shall be deemed the true employer of respondents. notice and hearing. Petitioner failed to discharge this burden. This is but one aspect of the State’s constitutional and statutory mandate to protect the rights of employees to self-organization. 179546. Nor were they required to give their side regarding the charges made against them. illegal. February 13.
As held in the Decision sought to be reconsidered. 180718. the flight attendants affected are entitled to the reliefs provided by law. 2009) Clearly. A day after the incident. October 23. PAL failed to observe the procedure and requirements for a valid retrenchment. October 2. Resignation is inconsistent with the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal. No.R.R. Bolanos’s case is one of illegal dismissal. as respondents posited. First. If petitioner was determined to resign. (BALTAZAR L. August 19. Second. Neither was there incompetence on her part when some food items were not punched in the cash register as she was not the cashier manning it when the food items were ordered. petitioner was unceremoniously dismissed in this case. G. 178083. which include backwages and reinstatement or separation pay. No. Consequently. the requisite proof therefor was not presented before the NLRC which was the proper forum. as the case may be. we find no overt act on the part of petitioner that he was ready to sever his employment ties. 2009) Therefore. What strongly negates the claim of resignation is the fact that petitioner filed the amended complaint for illegal dismissal immediately after he was not allowed to report for work on June 3. (HENLIN PANAY COMPANY v. 175345. Undeniably. The alleged resignation was actually premised by respondents only on the filing of the complaint for separation pay. More importantly. the retrenchment of the flight attendants amounted to illegal dismissal. 2009) 19 . PHILIPPINE AIRLINES. It would have been illogical for petitioner to resign and then file a complaint for illegal dismissal later on. he would not have commenced the action for illegal dismissal. Hence. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION . the other cashier even owned up to said mistake. No. Bolanos was not afforded due process by petitioners before she was dismissed.In this case. Assuming that PAL was indeed suffering financial losses. G. ORIZON TRADING CORP. 2000.. v. but this alone is not sufficient proof that petitioner intended to resign from the company. this Court finds no reason to disturb its finding that the retrenchment of the flight attendants was illegally executed. there is no just or authorized cause for petitioners to terminate her employment. PAYNO v. INC. / ORATA TRADING and FLORDELIZA LEGASPI.PATRIA CHIONG and COURT OF APPEALS. (FLIGHT ATTENDANTS AND STEWARDS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (FASAP).R. In fact. Her alleged act of dishonesty of “passing out” food for free was not proven.G. she was verbally dismissed from her employment without being given the chance to be heard and defend herself. the manner of the retrenchment was not in accordance with the procedure required by law.
LOURDES D. we find that it is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CA on this ground. A confidential employee is one who (1) assists or acts in a confidential capacity. 2009) Doctrine of Strained Relationship To protect the employee’s security of tenure. MA. 1999 requiring respondent to remit the amount of P510. December 4. G. Notably. considered the appeal abandoned pursuant to Section 1(c). the appeal was reinstated on February 22. DUBRICO. otherwise. Respondent complied. because such issue had never been raised in any of the pleadings filed before the CA.00 to complete the docket and other fees. (EMCOR INCORPORATED v. in regard to (2) 20 . Upon respondent's motion for reconsideration. 182216. No. such issue was only raised for the first time in its Reply filed with us. Receipt of proceeds from sales of respondent CCBP’s products does not make petitioner a confidential employee. SIENES. G. 152101. In fact. 2009) Docket Fees Anent petitioner's claim regarding respondent's failure to pay the full amount of docket fees at the time of the filing of the petition with the CA. 1999. The assumption of strained relations was already debunked by the fact that as early as March 2006 petitioner returned to work for respondent CCBP. Neither can we sustain the NLRC’s conclusion that petitioner’s position is confidential in nature. 2000. an unjustly dismissed employee can never be reinstated. the CA issued a minute resolution dated June 7. respondents are deemed to have been illegally dismissed. the amount remitted lacked the amount of P10. the Court has emphasized that the doctrine of “strained relations” should be strictly applied so as not to deprive an illegally dismissed employee of his right to reinstatement. No. but due to inadvertence. Every labor dispute almost always results in “strained relations. without any antagonism having been reported thus far by any of the parties.R.. as petitioners failed to indubitably prove that respondents were guilty of drug use in contravention of its drug-free workplace policy amounting to serious misconduct.00.R. (PLANTATION BAY RESORT and SPA v. thus. Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Court. ROMEL S. the CA in a Resolution dated November 22. but petitioner never raised the issue of incomplete payment of docket fees. et al. Petitioner was copy-furnished all the resolutions issued by the CA. September 8.In fine.” and the phrase cannot be given an overarching interpretation.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. Time and again. reinstatement is no longer feasible because of the strained relations between the petitioners and the respondent. petitioner’s job as a salesman does not fall under this qualification.R. in turn. (REYNALDO G. we answered in the negative. thus. Verily. (ERWIN H. (CRC AGRICULTURAL TRADING and ROLANDO B. the use of a viable substitute that protects the interests of both parties while ensuring that the law is respected. No. 2009) Downsizing Scheme This. Absent such proof. private respondent failed to proffer any proof that the management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner in engaging the services of an independent contractor to operate the Laura wells. and will only worsen with possible adverse effects on the parties. and effectuate management policies specifically in the field of labor relations. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. it bears to stress that it is human nature that some hostility will inevitably arise between parties as a result of litigation. this Court has recognized that strained relations between the employer and employee is an exception to the rule requiring actual reinstatement for illegally dismissed employees for the practical reason that the already existing antagonism will only fester and deteriorate. February 10. We have previously ruled that the reduction of the number of workers in a company made necessary by the introduction of the services of an independent contractor is justified when the latter is undertaken in order to effectuate more economic and efficient methods of production. G. 2009) In the present case. CATINDIG v. G.R. No. determine. but the same does not always constitute strained relations in the absence of proof or explanation that such indeed exists. No. SAN MIGUEL FOODS.persons who formulate. December 23. 167706. 180551. REYES v. CABIGTING v. 21 . if we shall compel reinstatement. INC. National Commission. We said: Labor Relations In any event. gives rise to another question: Does the implementation of the downsizing scheme preclude petitioner from availing the services of contractual and agency-hired employees? In Asian Alcohol Corporation v. In the case at bar. G. we have held that an employer’s good faith in implementing a redundancy program is not necessarily destroyed by availment of the services of an independent contractor to replace the services of the terminated employees.R. 177664. 2009) In conclusion. November 5.
(HEPI). INC. 165756. INC. Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code require the employer to furnish the employee with two written notices. mean a full adversarial proceeding. and (2) a written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances. it should be stressed 22 .the Court has no basis to interfere with the bona fide decision of management to effect more economic and efficient methods of production.R. G. The first notice which may be considered as the proper charge. No. G. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. COURT OF APPEALS. No. grounds have been established to justify his termination. (HOTEL ENTERPRISES OF THE PHILIPPINES. perforce. 182570.R. serves to apprise the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought.( ROMEO N. January 27. illegal. and HECTOR GENUINO. The second notice on the other hand seeks to inform the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. 2009) In the dismissal of employees. the strike staged by officers and members of respondent Union is. and the availment of contractual and agency-hired employees legal. In all of these instances. With petitioner’s downsizing scheme being valid. 2009) Due Process It is well settled that the basic requirement of notice and hearing in termination cases is for the employer to inform the employee of the specific charges against him and to hear his side and defenses. it has been consistently held that the twin requirements of notice and hearing are essential elements of due process.. however. SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATTNATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN THE HOTEL AND RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES (SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN). Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code and Section 2.. June 5. and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side. This does not. written explanations. With regard to the requirement of a hearing. owner of Hyatt Regency Manila. to wit: (1) a written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination. position papers. GENUINO ICE CO. Rule XXIII. the employer plays an active role by providing the employee with the opportunity to present his side and answer the charges in substantial compliance with due process. VENTURA. v. The parties may be heard through pleadings. memorandum or oral argument. vs.
May 8. (PHILIPPINE PASAY CHUNG HUA ACADEMY and EMILIO CHING v.. PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY and JOSE LUIS SANTIAGO. v.” (FELIX B. Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code should not be taken to mean that holding an actual hearing or conference is a condition sine qua non for compliance with the due process requirement in termination of employment. G. et. the employer must comply with the due process requirement of sending notices to the employee. or ineffectual. Section 2(d). the dismissal was found by the Court to be based on a just cause because the employee abandoned his work. In Agabon. SERGIO L.R. and not that an actual hearing should always and indispensably be held. NLRC. al. The “ample opportunity to be heard” standard is neither synonymous nor similar to a formal hearing. 168876. Its disregard is a matter of serious concern since it constitutes a safeguard of the highest order in response to man’s innate sense of justice. To confine the employee’s right to be heard to a solitary form narrows down that right. Based on the foregoing. G. EDPAN v. 2009) The case of Agabon v. 171814. or render it illegal. such an exclusivist and absolutist interpretation is overly restrictive. Eleonor did not abandon her work.R. v. Inc. 2009) Also. No. CONSUNJI. G. DORIA vs. 152048. NLRC. (SOUTH DAVAO DEVELOPMENT COMPANY. PEREZ and AMANTE G. It deprives him of other equally effective forms of adducing evidence in his defense. Petitioner’s belated claim that it was not able to send the notice of infraction prior to the filing of the illegal dismissal case cannot simply unacceptable. It ruled that this violation of due process on the part of the employer did not nullify the dismissal. No. The test for the fair procedure guaranteed under Article 277(b) cannot be whether there has been a formal pretermination confrontation between the employer and the employee. SERVANDO L. EDPAN. (NOW SODACO AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION) AND/OR MALONE PACQUIAO AND VICTOR A. Nonetheless. the employer was ordered to indemnify the 23 . GAMO. No. applies to the case at bar. et al. Petitioner was not able to send the necessary notice requirement to Eleonor.that the essence of due process lies simply in an opportunity to be heard. PHILIPPINE PASAY CHUNG HUA ACADEMY and EMILIO CHING) Nonetheless. to effectively dismiss an employee for abandonment. SERVANDO L. Certainly. INC. we ruled that this requirement is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with at will. April 7. The “very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.R. In Brahm Industries. But it also found that the employer did not follow the notice requirement demanded by due process.
was not given any written notice about his dismissal. No.000. and other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time the compensation was not paid up to the time of actual reinstatement.. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PABLO S. JOSE. 2009) In the present case.R. We hold that Aman’s dismissal not only failed to observe procedural requirements. When the dismissal is for just cause. 168324. It further held that the penalty should be in the nature of indemnification.R. 2009) In cases of abandonment of work. Article 279 of the Labor Code mandates that the employee who is illegally dismissed and not given due process is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and full backwages. (METRO CONSTRUCTION. INC.’s dismissal is not affected by the lack of written notices. No.employee for the violation of his right to due process. Here. Jr. 2009) The petitioners clearly failed to comply with the two-notice requirement.00. (BERNARDO B. G. such is not the case here. then Metro will only be liable for nominal damages worth P30. November 27. No. the Court ordered the employer to pay the employee nominal damages in the amount of P30. 166705.July 28. Hence. No. October 2. It does not also appear that the petitioners held a hearing where the respondent was given the 24 .G. the lack of due process does not render the dismissal ineffectual but merely gives rise to the payment of P30. G.000 in nominal damages.000 as indemnity in the form of nominal damages. considering the relevant circumstances. However. JR. for breach of the due process requirements.. taking into special consideration the gravity of the due process violation of the employer. (CONCEPCION FAELDONIA v. v. INCORPORATED AND/OR BOBBY DEL ROSARIO v. However. MICHAELMAR PHILS. in the form of nominal damages and should depend on the facts of each case. 169606. in Agabon. (MANTLE TRADING SERVICES.G. no such notice was served to petitioner.JAYME GO and MERLITA GO. Nothing in the records shows that the petitioners ever sent the respondent a written notice informing him of the ground for which his dismissal was sought. V. October 12. the ground alleged by respondents. 182499. Thus.R. ROGELIO AMAN. the propriety of Jose.000. respondents shall also be liable in the amount of P30. Jr. notice shall be served at the worker’s last known address. TONG YAK GROCERIES.R. Jose. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. it also lacked an authorized cause. INC.2009) Had Metro’s cause for terminating Aman rested on a just or authorized cause yet failed to observe procedural requirements. inclusive of allowances. MADRIAGA.
Thus.” which is considered the most important element. and was entitled to vacation and 25 . and the Pag-Ibig Fund. 2009) What is more. (2) the payment of wages. In this case. As to the most determinative test―the power of control. (SOUTH DAVAO DEVELOPMENT COMPANY. 171814. It grouped her with the managers covered by the company’s group hospitalization insurance. she underwent regular employee performance appraisals. Neither did the petitioners send a written notice to the respondent informing the latter that his service had been terminated and the reasons for the termination of employment. No. their status as petitioner corporation’s employees did not cease. CATINDIG v. 2009) Employer-Employee Relationship In order to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship. (CRC AGRICULTURAL TRADING and ROLANDO B. The company also made her a member of the PDMC’s savings and provident plan and its retirement plan. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. May 8. or the so called “control test. v. respondent PDMC enrolled petitioner Gomez with the Social Security System. it does not require the actual exercise of such power. (3) the power of dismissal. payment of their wages was merely coursed through Gamo.. al. CONSUNJI. the Court has frequently applied the four-fold test: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee. SERGIO L. the respondent’s dismissal was illegal.R. and (4) the power to control the employee’s conduct. Likewise. December 23. From the time they were hired by petitioner corporation up to the time that they were reassigned to work under Gamo’s supervision. G. Under these facts. INC. No. Likewise. it is clear that an employer-employee relationship has existed between petitioner corporation and respondents since the beginning and such relationship did not cease despite their reassignments and the change of payment scheme. it was in the exercise of its power of control when petitioner corporation transferred the copra workers from their previous assignments to work as copraceros. et. stating that Gomez was a permanent employee and that the company had remitted combined contributions during her tenure.opportunity to answer the charges of abandonment. it is sufficient that the power to control the manner of doing the work exists. the Medicare. 2008. (NOW SODACO AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION) AND/OR MALONE PACQUIAO AND VICTOR A. 177664. G. purchased stocks through the employee stock option plan. It even issued certifications dated October 10. GAMO.R. It was also in the exercise of the same power that petitioner corporation put Gamo in charge of the copra workers although under a different payment scheme.
the power of control is the most important element. administrative in nature. The letter addressed to respondent doctor dated February 7. 174044.. the control test merely calls for the existence of the right to control. at most. G. In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties. 153192 January 30. These are all indicia of an employer-employee relationship which respondent PDMC failed to refute. but employees of petitioner. INC. G.R. (MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP vs COURT OF APPEALS. related as it is to safety matters. both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC were one in their conclusion that respondents were not independent contractors. Lotlot Dagat. (DEALCO FARMS. SHERYL OABEL AND MANILA RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT CORP.emergency leaves. forbidding the clinic from receiving cash payments from the resort’s guests is a matter of financial policy in 26 . 2009) In this regard. 2009) • Control Test In the case at bench. both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC examined and weighed the circumstances against the four-fold test which has the following elements: (1) the power to hire. the various office directives issued by Shangri-la’s officers do not imply that it is Shangri-la’s management and not respondent doctor who exercises control over them or that Shangri-la has control over how the doctor and the nurses perform their work. Reyes giving instructions regarding the replenishment of emergency kits is.. as borne out by the findings of the NLRC. PDMC even withheld taxes on her salary and declared her as an employee in the official Bureau of Internal Revenue forms. January 20. November 27. More importantly. or the so-called “control test. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (5th DIVISION). In any event. and not necessarily the exercise thereof. although the tasks themselves may vary. No.” Of the four. the petitioner determines the nature of the tasks to be performed by the private respondent. 149660. G. (GLORIA V. the need for sufficient manpower to carry them out does not.R. vs. while the letter dated May 17. GOMEZ v. 2004 from Shangri-la’s Assistant Financial Controller. (2) the payment of wages. it has not escaped the notice of the Court that the operations of the hotel itself do not cease with the end of each event or function and that there is an ever present need for individuals to perform certain tasks necessary in the petitioner’s business. 2003 from a certain Tata L. No. No. Thus. and (4) the power to control the employees’ conduct. (3) the power to dismiss. PNOC DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION. in the process exercising control.R. 2009) Contrary to petitioners’ contention.
to benefit from its own fault. LOCSIN and EDDIE B. such are indicia of control that respondent exercised over petitioners. Clearly. March 4. petitioners continued with their services. (JEROMIE D. presumably. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY. an equitable principle rooted on natural justice. No. allegedly from SSCP. who has recently manifested that she has since been suffering from her poor health condition. equity is available only in the absence of law and not as its replacement.R. Evidently.R. (RAUL G. Equity as an exceptional extenuating circumstance does not favor. TIRAZONA.) AND/OR KEN KUBOTA. for that matter. January 20. nor may it be used to reward. PHILIPPINE EDS TECHNO. as Shangri-la does not control how the work should be performed by petitioners. directive of respondent. 27 . such a situation makes no sense. TOMAQUIN v. The board and its officers made her stay on and work with the company for years under the belief that she held a regular managerial position. G. G. 185251. (GLORIA V. 2009) To reiterate. For all its conceded merit. 2009) Estoppel Estoppel. (MA. This principle of law applies to corporations as well. with the behest and. 169712.order to ensure proper sharing of the proceeds. and the denials proffered by respondent do not shed any light to the situation. considering that Shangri-la and respondent doctor share in the guests’ payments for medical services rendered. petitioners remained at their post securing the premises of respondent while receiving their salaries. MAMORU ONO and JUNICHI HIROSE. the indolent or the wrongdoer. PEPITO. 2009) Equity While the Court commiserates with the plight of Tirazona. prevents a person from rejecting his previous acts and representations to the prejudice of others who have relied on them. vs. The PDMC in this case is estopped from claiming that despite all the appearances of regular employment that it weaved around petitioner Gomez’s position it must have technically hired her only as a corporate officer. while respondent and SSCP no longer had any legal relationship with the termination of the Agreement. it is not petitioners’ employer.R. SHANGRI-LA’S MACTAN ISLAND RESORT and DR. the Court cannot grant her plea for the award of financial benefits based solely on this unfortunate circumstance. JESSICA J. WENELITA S. 178827. This Court will not allow a party. ESCASINAS and EVAN RIGOR SINGCO v. It is but reasonable to conclude that. No.R. G. (PET INC. October 2. in the guise of equity. No.SERVICE INC. In fine.
In other words. No. indubitably constitutes substantial evidence sufficient to support only one conclusion: that respondents were indeed employees of MCI. G. 1999 as the date of receipt. v. 174044. 185094. Welsh and Derupe. 170014. et al. 2009) • Proof of Mailing In this case and in like manner. narrated in their affidavits the nature. 2009) It is common practice for companies to provide identification cards to individuals not only as a security measure. However. November 27. G. November 25. et al. Petitioners’ infractions were willful and serious. We find it significant that both the petitioner and 28 . July 3. but more importantly to identify the bearers thereof as bona fide employees of the firm or institution that issued them. The provision of companyissued identification cards and uniforms to respondents. the Postmaster’s certification is offered to overcome the presumption that the Malate Post Office regularly performed its official duties when the registry return card was filled up by the recipient of the labor arbiter’s decision with November 21. (MASONIC CONTRACTOR. These pieces of evidence. No. thus their dismissal was proper under the circumstances. v..R. their co-employees Gimena. constituted substantial evidence to prove petitioners’ culpability. Petitioners did not refute these sworn statements. INC. MAKATI CINEMA SQUARE CORPORATION.R. G. who had personal knowledge of petitioners’ activities. (RENITA DEL ROSARIO.. 2009) Evidence It may be true that the NBI agents’ affidavit did not directly implicate petitioners in the scheme. aside from their inclusion in MCI’s summary payroll. No. when taken together. dates and time of their (petitioners’) participation. It is of no moment that they were acquitted in the criminal case.GOMEZ v. PNOC DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION.R. Neither did they explain why their former colleagues would unjustly and falsely testify against them even if they had the opportunity to defend themselves during the administrative investigations conducted by respondent. while a postmaster’s certification is usually sufficient proof of mailing. its evidentiary value must be differentiated from the situation presently before us where the postmaster’s certification is intended to prove that the post office had committed a mistake in placing the date of receipt on the registry return card. MAGDALENA MADJOS .
170705) Finality of Factual Findings The well-entrenched rule is that factual findings of administrative or quasi-judicial bodies. Section 5. the Court finds that none are applicable to the present case. Longestablished is the doctrine that findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are accorded respect.R. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. even finality. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (5th DIVISION). VENTURA. G. A sheriff is not authorized to attach or levy on property not belonging to the judgment debtor. July 15. No. To be sure. the CA affirmed the ruling of the NLRC and adopted as its own the latter's factual findings. Though this doctrine is not without exceptions.the postmaster’s certification failed to show that the Malate Post Office committed an inadvertence in handling the registry return card so that a corrective certification from the Postmaster was necessary.. INC. No. 2009) Execution We would like to stress the settled rule that the power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. G. v.. No. GENUINO ICE CO. 170689.R.. No. and HECTOR GENUINO. When passed upon and upheld by the CA. (PANTRANCO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEA-PTGWO) and PANTRANCO RETRENCHED EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PANREA) v.R. and even incurs liability if he wrongfully levies upon the property of a third person. INC. EDUARDO VALENCIA. in its assailed decision. 159358. vs. January 27. ROMEO N. In the absence of such justification for the certification. vs. (EUREKA PERSONNEL & MANAGEMENT SERVICES. 2009) 29 . if supported by substantial evidence. INC. 153192 January 30. 2009) Lastly. No. and bind the Court when supported by substantial evidence. Rule 133 defines substantial evidence as “that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. which are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions. one man’s goods shall not be sold for another man’s debts. 182570.R. we are compelled to deny it of any evidentiary value for the purpose it was submitted. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC). G. are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. G. G. they are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court and will not normally be disturbed. COURT OF APPEALS.R.” (DEALCO FARMS.
February 13. 2009) Petitioner's argument that the CA erred and abused its discretion in reversing the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.G. it has already been explained that under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa (BP) 129. (EVANGELINA MASMUD (as substitute complainant for ALEXANDER J. The findings of the CA. No. whose jurisdiction over labor cases has been expanded to review the findings of the NLRC. which are supported by substantial evidence. However. Martin Funeral Homes v. as it is the court's policy of non-interference in the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the administrative bodies. in its assailed decision or resolution. MASMUD) v. G. In R & E Transport. and that such petition should be filed with the CA in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts. al. 2009) The issue of the reasonableness of attorney's fees is a question of fact. (FE LA ROSA et.R. Well-settled is the rule that conclusions and findings of fact of the CA are entitled to great weight on appeal and will not be disturbed except for strong and cogent reasons which are absent in the case at bench.. this rule is not absolute. we have definitively ruled that the proper remedy to ask for the review of a decision of the NLRC is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.R. the CA – pursuant to the exercise of its original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari – was specifically given the power to pass upon the evidence. if and when necessary. 183385. NLRC.(EMCOR 30 . are almost beyond the power of review by the Supreme Court. It is within the jurisdiction of the CA. v. Inc. No. we held: The power of the CA to review NLRC decisions via a Rule 65 petition is now a settled issue. As early as St. We agree with petitioner that factual findings of quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are accorded great respect and even finality by the courts. they may be examined by the courts. When there is a showing that the factual findings of administrative bodies were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record. is devoid of merit. AMBASSADOR HOTEL. v. Latag. to resolve factual issues. 177059. and justified the work rotation/reduction scheme adopted by respondent as a valid exercise of management prerogative in light of respondent’s business losses. March 13.• Exception The appellate court predicated its reversal of the NLRC decision that petitioners were illegally dismissed on petitioners’ supposed abandonment of their jobs. Moreover. made a factual finding not supported by substantial evidence. as amended by Republic Act 7902. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. The CA can grant the petition for certiorari if it finds that the NLRC.
INCORPORATED v. No. the failure of one to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping is a deficiency which is a ground for the dismissal of the petition. INC. and to convince this Court that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of justice. If. 152923. 2009) Forum Shopping On the part of Mr. As explained above. INC. In the case before us. the principal party cannot sign the petition. He should have known that by including NCTEA as petitioner and signing as its representative. January 19. explains: The reason for this is that the principal party has actual knowledge whether a petition has previously been filed involving the same case or substantially the same issues. January 19. on the 31 . MA. Gumarang failed to show why the duly authorized representative of the NCTEA was unable to sign the certification. if there are several petitioners.. 2009) Without the required authority from the NCTEA. Gumarang – both of them should sign the certificate against forum shopping. not once but twice.R. 152101. G. NORTHEASTERN COLLEGE. he did not possess. His omission and misrepresentation are clear indications of bad faith of which this Court does not approve. (NORTHEASTERN COLLEGE TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs. As in the Court of Appeals. This. the requirement on the filing of the certificate against forum shopping has not been complied with. Mr. why did he not inform both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of such fact when he filed the petitions? Instead. G. he should have had the authority to do so. Gumarang. Gumarang cannot represent the NCTEA. LOURDES D.R. SIENES. G. requirement of a certification against forum shopping. he claimed to be the duly authorized representative of the NCTEA which he was not. Mr. NORTHEASTERN COLLEGE..R. No. there being two petitioners – NCTEA and Mr. 152923. Castro. the one signing on his behalf must have been duly authorized. he flagrantly violated the rule on the filing of a certificate of non-forum shopping. September 8. knowing fully well that he was no longer the representative of the NCTEA. Since there was only one signatory. (NORTHEASTERN COLLEGE TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs. When he alone signed on his behalf and that of the NCTEA. for any reason. 2009) Fuentebella and Rolling Hills Memorial Park v. No.
Had the appellate court truly reviewed the records of the case. the certification against forum shopping should be signed by its duly authorized director or representative …[I]f the real party-in-interest is a corporate body. BONIFACIO L. (EAGLE STAR SECURITY SERVICES.R. INC. v. Since the petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals sought the reversal of the two aforesaid orders. To make matters worse. MIRANDO.. While there have been instances when the Court dispensed with technicalities on the basis of special circumstances or compelling reasons. July 30. without any discussion on the merits of the case. After all. In ruling and acting as it did. . . emphasis. that the Court of Appeals did not even review the assailed orders and focused instead on a general discussion of due process and the jurisdiction of the Regional Director. 179512. xxxx A certification without the proper authorization is defective and constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the petition. however. an officer of the corporation can sign the certification against forum shopping as long as he is authorized by a resolution of its board of directors. DOLE denied petitioner’s appeal based solely on petitioner’s alleged failure to file a cash or surety bond. Where the petitioner is a corporation. it would have seen that there existed valid and sufficient grounds for finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOLE Secretary as well the Regional Director. italics and underscoring supplied) Petitioner’s discourse on relaxation of technical rules of procedure in the interest of substantial justice does not impress. the Court finds that the Court of Appeals may be properly subjected to its certiorari jurisdiction. No. (Citations omitted. 2009) Grave Abuse of Discretion The Regional Director fully relied on the self-serving allegations of respondent and misinterpreted the documents presented as evidence by respondent. G. It appears. there is no such circumstance or reason in the present case which warrants the liberal application of technical rules. the appellate court necessarily had to examine the evidence anew to determine whether the conclusions of the DOLE were supported by the evidence presented. this Court has previously ruled that the extraordinary writ of certiorari will lie if it is satisfactorily 32 .
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY and JOSE LUIS SANTIAGO.R. THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR. In fine. April 7.R. DOLE REGION VII. (FELIX B. 179652. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT. 2009) • Dialogue not Tantamount to Hearing Policarpio's allegations are self-serving. and JANDELEON JUEZAN. she was able to ascertain the validity of the charges mentioned in the “Petisyon. Except for her claim as stated in the respondent's Position Paper.” In her futile attempt to prove compliance with the procedural requirement. 152048. Therefore. although preferred. is not absolutely necessary to satisfy the employee’s right to be heard. the existence of an actual. she reiterated that the objective of the dialogue was to provide the employees “the opportunity to receive the act of grace of FPSI by giving them an amount equivalent to one-half (½) month of their salary for every year of service. No. Policarpio relied heavily on the “Petisyon” of FPSILU. We hold that the dialogue is not tantamount to the hearing or conference prescribed by law.) vs. She failed to convince Us that during the dialogue.established that the tribunal had acted capriciously and whimsically in total disregard of evidence material to or even decisive of the controversy. formal “trial-type” hearing. INC. In other words. DORIA vs. submissions or pleadings. No. (Herminigildo Inguillo and Zenaida 33 . 2009) Hearing A hearing means that a party should be given a chance to adduce his evidence to support his side of the case and that the evidence should be taken into account in the adjudication of the controversy. G. Such non-compliance is also corroborated by Bergante and Inguillo in their pleadings denouncing their unjustified dismissal. it is not limited to a formal hearing only.. PEREZ and AMANTE G. nowhere from the records can We find that Bergante and Inguillo were accorded the opportunity to present evidence in support of their defenses. May 8. while the phrase “ample opportunity to be heard” may in fact include an actual hearing. G. (PEOPLE’S BROADCASTING(BOMBO RADYO PHILS. To be heard” does not mean verbal argumentation alone inasmuch as one may be heard just as effectively through written explanations. We cannot even consider the demand and counter-offer for the payment of the employees as an amicable settlement between the parties because what took place was merely a discussion only of the amount which the employees are willing to accept and the amount which the respondents are willing to give.” We are not convinced.
G. No. G. appliances. ESCASINAS and EVAN RIGOR SINGCO v. tools. 2009 Inchoate Right Again. PNB only has an inchoate right to the properties of Mega Prime in case the latter would not be able to pay its indebtedness. which would give it the standing to maintain an action involving the subject properties. No. as the debt being claimed by PNB is secured by the accessory contract of pledge of the entire stockholdings of Mega Prime to PNB-Madecor. firing and payment of the contractor's workers. (PANTRANCO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEA-PTGWO) and PANTRANCO RETRENCHED EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PANREA) v. and not on grounds under labor laws. the right to assign the performance of a specified piece of work. the term and duration of the relationship. and/or Amparo Policarpio. 170689. De Raedt’s services could be terminated on the ground of end of contract between the DA and TMI. 165407. (JEROMIE D. First Philippine Scales. there existed no employer-employee relationship between the parties. De Raedt is an independent contractor. June 5. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC). its interest remains inchoate and has not yet ripened into a present substantial interest. Manager. and the mode.Bergante v. 170705) Independent Contractor The existence of an independent and permissible contractor relationship is generally established by considering the following determinants: whether the contractor is carrying on an independent business.R. the contention is bereft of merit.R. the duty to supply the premises. Unlike an ordinary employee. De Raedt received retainer fees and benefits such as housing and subsistence allowances and medical insurance.R. the control of the premises. manner and terms of payment. who was engaged by SGV to render services to SGV’s client TMI. the skill required. Though the end of the contract between the DA and TMI was not the 34 . and ultimately to DA on the CECAP project. Inc. As aptly observed by the Labor Arbiter. No. While PNB has an apparent interest in Mega Prime’s assets being the creditor of the latter for a substantial amount. G. the control and supervision of the work to another. the nature and extent of the work. regarding matters in the field of her special knowledge and training for a specific period of time. materials and labor. This is especially true in the instant case. SHANGRI-LA’S In sum. the employer's power with respect to the hiring.
Having failed to substantiate its allegation on the relationship between the parties. No. 153192 January 30. despite receipt of the various notices sent by respondent to him to report to the office and to submit written explanations relative to his failure to follow instructions. INC. respondent's employee when he received the written notices.. petitioner is also guilty of insubordination. G. he was still. SGV did not exercise control over the means and methods by which De Raedt performed her duties as Sociologist. GORRES. vs. or impair the interest or convenience of the public.R. TMI. G. While petitioner cannot be faulted in believing that respondent constructively dismissed him from work. the records of the case are bereft of showing that he filed any written explanation to any of these notices. (DEALCO FARMS.ground for the withdrawal of De Raedt from the CECAP. 161366. De Raedt was disengaged from the project upon the instruction of SGV’s client. Most important of all. 2009) Interpretation of Doubt We reject petitioner’s self-serving contention. His continued failure to carry out the reasonable oral or written instructions of his supervisor is punishable by insubordination. PHILS. FORMANTES v. petitioner continued working and performing his functions with the respondent company until his termination on May 19. strictly speaking. (RAMON B. G. he should have at least responded thereto. In case of doubt. No. 1994. v. Records show that after filing a case for constructive dismissal on April 13..R.a of the Operational Instruction OI-A-AP25. However. DUNCAN PHARMACEUTICALS. VELAYO & COMPANY. June 16. As an employee. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (5th DIVISION). CAROL DE RAEDT. 2009) Insubordination Aside from the findings of sexual abuse. SGV did impose rules on De Raedt. No. (SYCIP.R. which is provided under Rule IV. 170661. all 35 . we stick to the settled rule in controversies between a laborer and his master that doubts reasonably arising from the evidence should be resolved in the former’s favor. 2009) The relations between capital and labor are so impressed with public interest. INC. December 4. but these were necessary to ensure SGV’s faithful compliance with the terms and conditions of the SubConsultancy Agreement it entered into with TMI. Labor Code and Civil Code. 1994 against the respondent. The policy is reflected in no less than the Constitution.5.. and neither shall act oppressively against the other. as instructed. Work Rules.
G. inapposite. April 7.) AND PROMOTION. (BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER v. and (c) the agreement between the principal and contractor or subcontractor assures the contractual employees’ entitlement to all labor and occupational safety and health standards. (RAMY GALLEGO v. service is to be performed or completed within or outside the premises of the principal.labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer. BOBONGON BANANA GROWERS 36 . No. Jasmin G. DANPIN GUILLERMO.. (OLDARICO S. Inc. public order or public policy. The rules on job contracting are. 2009) Job contracting or Subcontracting Permissible job contracting or subcontracting refers to an arrangement whereby a principal agrees to farm out with a contractor or subcontractor the performance of a specific job. regardless of whether such job. 179807. free exercise of the right to self-organization.R. is in essence a business partnership that partakes of the nature of a joint venture. far from being a job contracting arrangement. (b) the contractor has substantial capital or investment. et al v. BAYER PHILIPPINES. 2009) Joint Venture To the Court. free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of his work except as to the results thereof. the following conditions must be met: (a) the contractor carries on a distinct and independent business and undertakes the contract work on his account under his own responsibility according to his own manner and method. INC. or service within a definite or predetermined period. SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA CUARESMA (for and in behalf oftheir daughter. security of tenure. July 31. WHITE FALCON SERVICES. provided they are not contrary to law.. and EDGARDO BERGONIA. TRAVEÑO. and JAIME ORTIZ (President. clauses.. Cuaresma). INC. morals. Nos. and social welfare benefits. G. Under this arrangement.White Falcon Services. INC.R. terms and conditions as they may deem convenient. Nos. PRODUCT IMAGE MARKETING.R. work. good custom.G. INC. 184298-99. therefore. the Contract between the Cooperative and DFI. work or. The Court may not alter the intention of the contracting parties as gleaned from their stipulations without violating the autonomy of contracts principle under Article 1306 of the Civil Code which gives the contracting parties the utmost liberality and freedom to establish such stipulations. 182978-79.
TIANGCO. G. (GINA M.. is an intra-corporate dispute subject to the jurisdiction of the regular courts. BEHAVIOR MODIFICATIONS. March 25. and DOLE ASIA PHILIPPINES.R. Once a judgment becomes final and executory. INC. 2004 order. No. 2009) Judgment We disfavor delay in the enforcement of the labor arbiter’s decision. SLIMMERS WORLD INTERNATIONAL. 160146. Thus. No. G. UNIWIDE SALES WAREHOUSE CLUB.. It can be gathered from Atty. September 3.R. 164205. if any.R. v. Garcia’s complaint-affidavit that he was Vice President for Business Support Services and Human Resource Departments of ETPI when his 37 . G. Garcia tries to deny he is an officer of ETPI.. (C-E CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. DIAMOND FARMS.MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE. No. G. he argues that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the case. The determination of the rights of a director and corporate officer dismissed from his employment as well as the corresponding liability of a corporation. December 14. he exceeded his jurisdiction to hear and decide illegal dismissal cases and the CA correctly reversed his June 16. 2009) Intra-Corporate Dispute Atty. December 11. One of the corporate officers provided for in the by-laws of ETPI is the Vice-President. 168697. Final and executory judgments can neither be amended nor altered except for correction of clerical errors. INC. when the labor arbiter proceeded with the consolidated cases despite the SEC suspension order. (LESLIE OKOL v. et al. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS. 2009) Jurisdiction It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. even if the purpose is to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or of law. TIMOG AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION. INC. 180188. the appellate court correctly ruled that it is not the NLRC but the regular courts which have jurisdiction over the present case. No. 2009) In sum. Not being a corporate officer. the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party. Trial and execution proceedings constitute one whole action or suit such that a case in which execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all proceedings in the execution are proceedings in the suit.R.
) vs. the Regional Director was divested of jurisdiction and should have endorsed the case to the appropriate Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. 2009) In sum. INC. G. No..R. INC.. GARCIA. Hence.employment was terminated effective 16 April 2000 . It is therefore clear from the by-laws and from Atty. that an illegal dismissal case had been filed by petitioners wherein the existence or absence of an employer-employee relationship was also raised. GARCIA v. HIZON v. SALVADOR C. May 8. INC. (VICTOR METEORO. EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES. G. 2009) • Demarcation line Between DOLE’s Prerogative and NLRC’s Jurisdiction It can be assumed that the DOLE in the exercise of its visitorial and enforcement power somehow has to make a determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship. and ATTY. (PEOPLE’S BROADCASTING(BOMBO RADYO PHILS. This is the meaning of the clause “in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists” in Art. HIZON. VIRGILIO R. G.R. Such prerogatival determination. 173163-64. Considering. The determination of the existence of employer-employee relationship is still primarily lodged with the NLRC. G. 173115. No. ATTY. April 16. 179652. Nos. however. VIRGILIO R. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT. Garcia himself that he is a corporate officer.R. his removal is deemed to be an intra-corporate dispute cognizable by the SEC and not by the Labor Arbiter. and ATTY. Being a corporate officer. incidental and collateral to the DOLE’s primary function of enforcing labor standards provisions. and JANDELEON JUEZAN. 2009) Labor-only Contractor 38 . CREATIVE CREATURES. July 13. cannot be coextensive with the visitorial and enforcement power itself. et al v. EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES.R. INC. Indeed. 128(b). No. DOLE REGION VII. however. respondent contested the findings of the labor inspector during and after the inspection and raised issues the resolution of which necessitated the examination of evidentiary matters not verifiable in the normal course of inspection. SALVADOR C. THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR. One who is included in the by-laws of a corporation in its roster of corporate officers is an officer of said corporation and not a mere employee. (ATTY. the CA correctly ruled that such endorsement was no longer necessary. such determination is merely preliminary. 171275.
G. distorting in the process the meaning of social justice and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of undesirables. It is. AND ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS. 179546. and respondents. thus.. The law makes the principal responsible to the employees of the “labor-only contractor” as if the principal itself directly hired or employed the employees.. there are three parties involved: (1) the “labor-only” contractor. machineries.R. No. under Article 106 of the Labor Code. September 11. Under this scheme. v. (ILIGAN CEMENT CORPORATION v. as amended. RFM CORPORATION-BAKERY FLOUR DIVISION and JOSE MARIA CONCEPCION III. Article 212(e) of the Labor Code. (EDUARDO M. G. then this Court would be awarding disloyalty. TOMADA. Tomada’s acts reflect a regrettable lack of concern for his employer. individual respondents are the employees and petitioner is the principal. et. 2009) Length of Service Although his nearly two decades of service might generally be considered for some form of financial assistance to shield him from the effects of his termination. ALAN M. Section 31 of the Corporation Code provides: not the the the 39 . by itself. No. Interserve did not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools.R. evident that Interserve falls under the definition of a “labor-only” contractor. If length of service justifies the mitigation of the penalty of dismissal. INC v. et al. does make a corporate officer personally liable for the debts of corporation because Section 31 of the Corporation Code is still governing law on personal liability of officers for the debts of corporation. Here. equipment. 2009) In a labor-only contract. 163270. April 24. its supposed employees. 2009) Liability of Corporate Officers However. al. ILIASCOR EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS UNION – SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES FEDERATION OF LABOR (IEWU-SPFL). AGITO. G. No. as well as Section 5(i) of the Rules Implementing Articles 106-109 of the Labor Code.In sum. Vedali is the “laboronly” contractor.R. SR. (2) the employee who is ostensibly under the employ of the “labor-only” contractor. and (3) the principal who is deemed the real employer. and work premises. 158956. performed work which was directly related to the principal business of petitioner. (COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS. the “labor-only” contractor is the agent of the principal. February 13.
2009) Liability of Recruitment Agencies and Foreign-Based Employer Private employment agencies are held jointly and severally liable with the foreign-based employer for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment. or trustees shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation. (BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER v. G.Liability of directors. the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be. and ROLF WILTSCHEK v. The employer corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its officers who merely act as its agents. should be personally liable together with M+W Zander. — Directors or trustees who willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors. The general manager of a corporation should not be made personally answerable for the payment of an illegally dismissed employee's monetary claims arising from the dismissal unless he had acted maliciously or in bad faith in terminating the services of the employee. (ARMANDO DAVID v. No. June 5.R. 40 . we come to the issue of whether Wiltschek. This joint and solidary liability imposed by law against recruitment agencies and foreign employers is meant to assure the aggrieved worker of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due him. (M+W ZANDER PHILIPPINES. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNION and MARIVELES APPAREL CORPORATION. TRINIDAD M.R. ENRIQUEZ. as the General Manager. trustees or officers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being. SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA CUARESMA (for and in behalf oftheir daughter. Nos. Cuaresma). x x x There was no showing of David willingly and knowingly voting for or assenting to patently unlawful acts of the corporation. We agree with petitioners that he should not be made personally liable. 148263 and 148271-72. INC. April 21. 2009) Liability of General Manager Lastly. or that David was guilty of gross negligence or bad faith. shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. its stockholders or members and other persons. G. 169173. Jasmin G.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. NNA PHILIPPINES CO. January 30. QUANTUM FOODS DISTRIBUTION CENTER.R. Nos. and MS. No. as a general rule. INC. No. 182978-79. Such characterization may.R.. the NLRC and the CA. It was not designed to be the culmination of the then on-going administrative investigation against Endico..) AND PROMOTION. KIMI KIMUR A. (MIRIAM B. however. G. The transfer.G. 2009) • Transfer In this case. INC. (ARNULFO O. September 17. The wisdom or soundness of such a characterization or decision is not. be rejected if the same is found to be in violation of the law or is arbitrary or malicious. We find no violations of law in the respondent’s actions against the petitioner. G.White Falcon Services.R. we find no reason to disturb the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that there was no constructive dismissal. but rather as a preventive measure to avoid further loss of sales and the destruction of Quantum Foods’ image and goodwill. This ground for termination is a legitimate exercise of management prerogative unless attended to by arbitrariness or by the failure to follow statutory requirements. a valid exercise of management 41 . contrary to Aguanza’s assertions. subject to discretionary review on the part of the Labor Arbiter. No arbitrariness or any violations took place in the present case.R. DE LECCIONES v. 184735. April 7. ENDICO vs. 2009) Management Prerogative As aptly cited by the CA: The general rule is that the characterization by an employer of an employee’s services as no longer necessary or sustainable is an exercise of business judgment on the part of the employer. while incidental to the charges against Endico. nor was the respondent arbitrary or influenced by malice in terminating the petitioner’s employment for redundancy. G. ELLECCION VDA. 2009) ATI’s transfer of Bismark IV’s base from Manila to Bataan was. was not meant as a penalty. Nos. and JAIME ORTIZ (President. 184298-99.WHITE FALCON SERVICES. 161615. Reassignments made by management pending investigation of violations of company policies and procedures allegedly committed by an employee fall within the ambit of management prerogative. Inc. INC. The decision of Quantum Foods to transfer Endico pending investigation was a valid exercise of management prerogative to discipline its employees.
INCORPORATED AND/OR BOBBY DEL ROSARIO v. As regards the 13th month pay. an employee who was terminated at any time before the time for payment of the 13th month pay is entitled to this monetary benefit in proportion to the length of time he worked during the year. RICHARD BARCLAY. RODOLFO CORVITE. TOMAS and CHRIS GARMENTS WORKERS UNIONPTGWO LOCAL CHAPTER No. (MANTLE TRADING SERVICES.prerogative. 2005 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment was received by petitioner on January 25. the Decision dated January 18. 2005. INC.R. and general principles of fair play and justice. Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of employees. 166705. and ATTY. The free will of management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve its purpose cannot be denied. petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals on even date. 832.2009) Motion for Reconsideration In this case. it must also protect the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. August 14. It would have become final and executory on February 4. 2005. January 12. No. 2009) NLRC Rules of Procedure • Reinstatement Compliance Report The new NLRC Rules of Procedure. No. 2006. G.R. STO. (CHRIS GARMENTS CORPORATION vs HON. Such motion becomes dispensable and not at all necessary.July 28.G. However. (GUALBERTO AGUANZA v. now require the employer to submit a report of compliance 42 . 40-03 explicitly prohibits the filing of a motion for reconsideration. collective bargaining agreement. and must be appropriately remunerated when he was suffered to work on a regular holiday during the time he was employed by the petitioner company.. 163505. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PABLO S. No. petitioner availed of the proper remedy since Department Order No. MADRIAGA. the tenth day from petitioner’s receipt of the decision. PATRICIA A. G. ASIAN TERMINAL. 2009) Money Claims An employee should be compensated for the work he has rendered in accordance with the minimum wage. reckoned from the time he started working during the calendar year up to the time of his termination from the service. 167426. KEITH JAMES. The transfer of employees has been traditionally among the acts identified as a management prerogative subject only to limitations found in law. Clearly.R. which took effect on January 7.
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank.R. January 20. (JUANITO A. Yet these office addresses could be found in the same building. In Azul v.within 10 calendar days from receipt of the Labor Arbiter’s decision. 2009) Notice of Change of Address PAL’s argument that its chaotic situation due to its rehabilitation rendered the filing of a notice of change of address impractical does not merit consideration. there is hardly any difficulty in determining the employer’s intransigence in immediately complying with the order. MARALIT v.. The amount involved is significant. particularly in labor cases. The employee need not file a motion for the issuance of the writ of execution since the Labor Arbiter shall thereafter motu proprio issue the writ. because they must be decided according to justice and equity and the substantial merits of the controversy. GARCIA and ALBERTO J. almost P4. To our mind. DUMAGO vs. 163788. Strict rules of procedure may be set aside to serve the demands of substantial justice. There is substantial evidence showing that there was valid cause for the bank to dismiss petitioner’s employment for loss of trust and confidence. As held by the Court. 164856. G. Labor cases must be decided according to justice. 2009) • Liberal Application of the Rules of Procedure The Court is unimpressed.5 million. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK. INC. PAL occupied four different office addresses. Since moving out from its office at Allied Bank Center. With the new rules in place. which is a position of trust and confidence. equity. where the NLRC decision was sent. and the substantial merits of the controversy. No. (ESTER B. PAL merely moved from one floor to another. The gravity of Maralit’s infraction demands the relaxation of strict rules of procedure. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES. the PAL Center Building in Makati City. To rule in favor of PAL considering the circumstances in the instant case would negate the 43 . Petitioner was a bank accountant. G. disobedience to which clearly denotes a refusal to reinstate. it would have been more prudent had PAL informed the NLRC that it has moved from one floor to another rather than allowed its old address at Allied Bank Center to remain as its official address. the Court held: The seriousness of petitioner’s infraction demanded the setting aside of strict rules of procedure as to allow the determination on the merits of whether he was lawfully dismissed. the application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice. No.R. August 24.
Republic Act No. thereafter. Each year he departed from work and successively new contracts were executed before he reported for work anew. as in this case. which is to place the date of receipt of pleadings. If both parties continue to enforce the contract. (PHILIPPINE AIRLINES. Respondent’s employment contracts expressly stated that his employment ended upon his departure from work. MARCELO B. we held that the subsequently executed side agreement of an overseas contract worker with the foreign employer is void. G. Camote. 172342. to the prejudice of the worker. 8042.R. (LWV CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. then petitioner Nisda’s employment with respondent ADAMS was still 44 . v. “[w]here a contract specifies the period of its duration. it shall be considered renewed for an unspecified period.R. morals and public policy. simply because it is against our existing laws. 164267. His service was not cumulative. Since the second employment contract petitioner Nisda signed with respondent ADAMS was void for not having been sanctioned by the POEA. The subsequent agreement cannot supersede the terms of the standard employment contract approved by the POEA.purpose of the rules on completeness of service and the notice of change of address. Article 72 of the Saudi Labor Law is also of similar import. July 13. A contract of employment for a definite period terminates by its own terms at the end of such period. ZAMORA. judgments and processes beyond the power of the party being served to determine at his pleasure. 166996) Overseas Employment Contracts Respondent’s service award for the sixth contract is equivalent only to half-month’s pay plus the proportionate amount for the additional nine days of service he rendered after one year.R. No. HEIRS OF BERNARDIN J. Zamora. No. G. 2009 In Placewell International Services Corporation v. G. in Brent School. It reads: A labor contract concluded for a specified period shall terminate upon the expiry of its term. We also said in that case that under American law. Inc. we said that “a fixed term is an essential and natural appurtenance” of overseas employment contracts. expressly prohibits the substitution or alteration. v. No. INC. it terminates on the expiration of such period. Pertinently. commonly known as the Migrant Workers Act of 1995. DUPO. of employment contracts already approved and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) from the time of the actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of the expiration of the same.” As it is. without the approval of DOLE.
Adding all the running periods yields a total of less 45 . 1996 . with a categorical denial of the petitioner’s demand. No. GARCIA and ALBERTO J. The four-year prescriptive period shall commence to run only upon the accrual of a cause of action of the worker. 2009) Payment of Wages Pending Appeal In other words. 180551. 1995 . and was interrupted on January 7. 1995 . NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. R. then. ALGOSAIBI DIVING AND MARINE SERVICES. He filed his complaint for illegal dismissal on 14 June 2004. UNILAB only answered the petitioner’s January 7. G. In illegal dismissal cases. No. 1995 letter on February 26. Clearly.R. the running of the prescription period re-started on the date of this denial. Here. the earliest incident covered by Article 1155 is the extrajudicial demand which came on January 7. which is immediately executory. 2009) Prescriptive Period for Illegal Dismissal The law fixes the period of time within which petitioner could seek remedy for his illegal dismissal and for as long as he filed his Complaint within the prescriptive period. petitioner was dismissed from service on 15 September 2001.R. January 20. 2009) Prescriptive Period for Money Claims In the present case. No. SEA SERVE MARITIME AGENCY and KHALIFA A. February 10. (ERWIN H. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES. NISDA v. it is ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the order of reinstatement and it is mandatory on the employer to comply therewith. G. (CARLOS N. (JUANITO A. As the CA correctly computed. when the complaint before the NLRC was filed. REYES v. DUMAGO vs. 164856. the period for prescription started to run on January 15. This is based on Article 1146 of the New Civil Code which states that actions based upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff must be brought within four years. the employee concerned is given a period of four years from the time of his illegal dismissal within which to institute the complaint. a dismissed employee whose case was favorably decided by the Labor Arbiter is entitled to receive wages pending appeal upon reinstatement. July 23. but again stopped again on August 9. G. 1996 . the instant case was filed within the prescriptive period. 1993 . he shall be entitled to the full protection of his right to backwages. Unless there is a restraining order. 179177.governed by his POEA-SEC until his repatriation to the Philippines on 17 July 2002. INC..
POEA’s Administrator is instructive: First to be determined is whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action based on the Amiri Decree No. the petitioner seasonably filed her monetary claim when she filed her complaint before the NLRC.” Said statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign 46 . This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law (Restatement of the Conflict of Laws. xxxx However. RIVERA v. 155639 April 22.than three (3) years. (JANUARIA A. UNITED LABORATORIES. INC. Sec.G.R.OFWs In Cadalin v. the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum has a “borrowing statute. The following ruling in Cadalin v. we held that Article 291 covers all money claims from employer-employee relationship and is broader in scope than claims arising from a specific law. 131 ). Procedural matters.. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on prescription that shall be the governing law. period and requisites for appeal. It is not limited to money claims recoverable under the Labor Code. Salonga. 685. a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. but applies also to claims of overseas contract workers. such as service of process. POEA’s Administrator. are governed by the laws of the forum. hence. and so forth. Private International Law. 2009) • Money Claims . joinder of actions. No. A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or substantive. 23 of 1976 provides: “A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not be actionable after the lapse of one year from the date of the expiry of the contract” x x x. As a general rule. Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. depending on the characterization given such a law.
in our considered view. respondent’s complaint was filed well within the three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of our Labor Code. The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy x x x. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor. Conflict of Laws. While there are several kinds of “borrowing statutes.statute of limitation as one of substance (Goodrich.]). There is no provision in the Civil Code of the Philippines. albeit the payroll termed such payment as severance pay. Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. Section 48 [of the Code of Civil Procedure] cannot be enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of [Article] 156 of the Amiri Decree No.” Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the Philippines. xxxx Thus. 183 ). 104 [7th ed.R. Conflicts. it is also barred in the Philippine Islands. 2009) Probationary Employee 47 . however. will not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute has not run against it (Goodrich and Scoles. (LWV CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. MARCELO B. 152-153 ). 23 of 1976. July 13. Article 2270 of said Code repealed only those provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as to which were inconsistent with it. 172342.” one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where it accrued. Conflict of Laws. G. A “borrowing statute” directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law (Siegel. which is inconsistent with or contradictory to Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Paras. the action is barred. DUPO. 152-153 ). This point. however. Said Section provides: “If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose. To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. has already been mooted by our finding that respondent’s service award had been paid. Philippine Conflict of Laws. No. In the light of the 1987 Constitution.
the probationer. VIOLETA T. February 13. not its length. and to ascertain whether he will become an efficient and productive employee. ADELAIDA . seeks to prove to the employer that he has the qualifications to meet the reasonable standards for permanent employment.R. probationary employees enjoy security of tenure during the term of their probationary employment such that they may only be terminated for cause as provided for by law. colleges and universities. (MAGIS YOUNG ACHIEVERS’ LEARNING CENTER and MRS. 178835. CARIÑO v. No. CARIÑO v. six (6) consecutive regular semesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level. the probationary period for academic personnel shall not be more than three (3) consecutive years of satisfactory service for those in the elementary and secondary levels. No.A probationary employee or probationer is one who is on trial for an employer. (MAGIS YOUNG ACHIEVERS’ LEARNING CENTER and MRS. propriety and efficiency of a probationer to ascertain whether he is qualified for permanent employment. on the other hand. 2009 ) • Probationary Employment for Academic Personnel For “academic personnel” in private schools. G. VIOLETA T. 2009 ) • Security of Tenure of Probationary Employees As above discussed. MANALO. Probationary Period. which reads: Section 92. 178835. the word probationary. implies the purpose of the term or period. and nine (9) consecutive trimesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level where collegiate courses are offered on a trimester basis. during which the latter determines whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment. the employee failed to meet the 48 . or if at the end of the probationary period. G. MANALO. ADELAIDA .R. The probationary employment is intended to afford the employer an opportunity to observe the fitness of a probationary employee while at work. probationary employment is governed by Section 92 of the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (Manual). as used to describe the period of employment. February 13. – Subject in all instances to compliance with the Department and school requirements. Thus. While the employer observes the fitness.
as such.R. or after a lapse of 33 months. ADELAIDA .July 9. Second. 172174. respondent was hired as a probationary teacher and. the power of the employer to terminate the services of an employee on probation is not without limitations. as a cost-cutting measure. (DAVAO CONTRACTORS DEVELOPMENT COOPERATIVE (DACODECO) v. that the position of “Principal” was to be abolished. MANALO. respondent was not continuously rehired by Alcatel after the cessation of every project. CARIÑO v. Alcatel did not rehire respondent until 1 February 1991. No. petitioner failed to discharge. namely the PLDT X-5 project. On 30 April 1988. there must be no unlawful discrimination in the dismissal. upon the expiration of respondent’s contract for the PLDT X-4 IOT project. MARILYN A. not feigned so as to circumvent the contract or the law. it was incumbent upon petitioner to show by competent evidence that she did not meet the standards set by the school. 2009 ) • Termination of Probationary Employee Under Article 281 of the Labor Code. 178835. this power must be exercised in accordance with the specific requirements of the contract. Records show that respondent was hired by Alcatel from 1988 to 1995 for three projects. necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of Alcatel. First. Alcatel’s continuous rehiring of respondent in various capacities from February 1991 to December 1995 was done entirely within the framework of one and the same project ― the PLDT 1342 project. 2009) Project Employee While respondent performed tasks that were clearly vital. No. This did not make respondent a regular employee of Alcatel as respondent was not 49 . for the PLDT 1342 project. the termination of respondent was effected by that letter stating that she was being relieved from employment because the school authorities allegedly decided. Nowhere in that letter was respondent informed that her performance as a school teacher was less than satisfactory. Undeniably.reasonable standards set by the employer at the time of the employee’s engagement. VIOLETA T. a probationary employee can be legally dismissed either: (1) for a just cause.G. This requirement. February 13. PASAWA. Third. or (2) when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the reasonable standards made known to him by the employer at the start of the employment. the burden of proving just or valid cause for dismissing an employee rests on the employer. the PLDT X-4 IOT project and the PLDT 1342 project. To note. the dissatisfaction on the part of the employer must be real and in good faith. In termination cases.R. (MAGIS YOUNG ACHIEVERS’ LEARNING CENTER and MRS. G. Nonetheless.
all Filipino workers enjoy the protective mantle of Philippine labor and social legislation. Jasmin G. the leadership of which could yield to the temptation of swift and arbitrary expulsion from membership and mere dismissal from his job. 2009) Protection to Labor Whether employed locally or overseas. April 7. INC.R. No. "the right of an employee to be informed of the charges against him and to reasonable opportunity to present his side in a controversy with either the company or his own Union is not wiped away by a Union Security Clause or a Union Shop Clause in a collective bargaining agreement. If the query requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses. Nos. An employee is entitled to be protected not only from a company which disregards his rights but also from his own Union. Cuaresma). This pronouncement is in keeping with the basic public policy of the State to afford protection to labor. RELOS. ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex. July 3. promote full employment.White Falcon Services. INC.G. G. race or creed..continuously rehired after the cessation of a project. RENE R. or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to one another. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented. 165407. Respondent remained a project employee of Alcatel working on the PLDT 1342 project. as held in that case. 182978-79. or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. 2009) Thus. G. FIRST PHILIPPINE SCALES." (HERMINIGILDO INGUILLO AND ZENAIDA BERGANTE V. (ALCATEL PHILIPPINES. 50 . 2009) Question of Law / Fact There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence. v. MANAGER. public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated. 184298-99. WHITE FALCON SERVICES. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on a given set of circumstances. G. and JAIME ORTIZ (President.R. the question posed is one of fact. Inc. SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA CUARESMA (for and in behalf oftheir daughter. INC. June 5. INC. 164315. and/or AMPARO POLICARPIO. Nos. No. and regulate the relations between workers and employers.. This ruling is likewise rendered imperative by Article 17 of the Civil Code which states that laws which have for their object public order.) AND PROMOTION. (BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER v.R. the issue in that query is factual.R. contract stipulations to the contrary notwithstanding.
When it is shown that the person executing the waiver did so voluntarily. or (3) the terms of the waiver are contrary to law. owner of Hyatt Regency Manila.R. (2) the consideration the employer paid is incredible and unreasonable. with respect to the second batch of quitclaims signed by 85 of the remaining 160 employees who were terminated following Hyatt’s permanent closure.. 168927. petitioners.R.(GENERAL SANTOS COCA-COLA PLANT FREE WORKERS UNION-TUPAS vs. by the terms of their waivers. the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking.INCORPORATED (BENECO) and GERARDO P. 165756. INC. BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE. The said documents indicate that the amount received by each of the employees represents a reasonable settlement of their monetary claims against petitioner and were even signed in the presence of a DOLE representative. September 11. (HEPI). (HOTEL ENTERPRISES OF THE PHILIPPINES. (ARSENIO F. SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT-NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN THE HOTEL AND RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES (SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN). v. G. are barred from filing this suit. Accordingly. and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable. et al. VERZOSA. INC. G. 2009) • Invalid Quitclaims Significantly. A quitclaim. No. June 5. we hold that these are valid and binding undertakings. No. cannot be later invalidated because its signatory claims that he was pressured into signing it on account of his dire financial need.. v. The preceding discussion on the voluntariness of petitioners’ retirement from service effectively removes these grounds beyond petitioners’ argumentative reach. morals or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. G. 2009) To excuse petitioners from complying with the terms of their waivers. the Manifestations filed by petitioner with respect to the quitclaims executed by members of respondent Union state that 34 of the 48 employees terminated on account of the downsizing program 51 . they must locate their case within any of three narrow grounds: (1) the employer used fraud or deceit in obtaining the waivers. with full understanding of what he was doing. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS. THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. (GENERAL SANTOS CITY). 178647) Quitclaim However. with clear and unambiguous contents and executed for a valid consideration received in full by the employee who signed the same. QUEVEDO. public order. No. public policy.R.
have already executed quitclaims on various dates. We, however, take judicial notice that 33 of these quitclaims failed to indicate the amounts received by the terminated employees. Because of this, petitioner leaves us no choice but to invalidate and set aside these quitclaims. However, the actual amount received by the employees upon signing the said documents shall be deducted from whatever remaining amount is due them to avoid double recovery of separation pay and other monetary benefits. We hereby order the Labor Arbiter to effect the necessary computation on this matter. (HOTEL ENTERPRISES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (HEPI), owner of Hyatt Regency Manila, v. SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT-NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN THE HOTEL AND RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES (SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN), G.R. No. 165756, June 5, 2009) Also, SMC cannot take refuge in the Receipt and Release document signed by the respondent. Generally, deeds of release, waivers, or quitclaims cannot bar employees from demanding benefits to which they are legally entitled or from contesting the legality of their dismissal, since quitclaims are looked upon with disfavor and are frowned upon as contrary to public policy. Where, however, the person making the waiver has done so voluntarily, with a full understanding thereof, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. The burden of proving that the quitclaim or waiver was voluntarily entered into rests on the employer. (SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION v. EDUARDO L. TEODOSIO, G.R. No. 163033, October 2, 2009) Real Party in Interest To qualify a person to be a real party in interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real holder of the right sought to be enforced. “Interest” within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in essence to be affected by the judgment as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expentancy or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. (NORTHEASTERN COLLEGE TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs. NORTHEASTERN COLLEGE, INC., G.R. No. 152923, January 19, 2009) It has been repeatedly stated that the Pantranco properties which were the subject of execution sale were owned by Macris and later, the PNB-Madecor. They were never owned by PNEI or PNB. Following our earlier discussion on the separate personalities of the 52
different corporations involved in the instant case, the only entity which has the right and interest to question the execution sale and the eventual right to annul the same, if any, is PNB-Madecor or its successor-in-interest. Settled is the rule that proceedings in court must be instituted by the real party in interest. (PANTRANCO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEA-PTGWO) and PANTRANCO RETRENCHED EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PANREA) v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), G.R. No. 170689, G.R. No. 170705) Re-computation of Awards Furthermore, the CA sufficiently explained the need to increase the award of 13th month pay and SIL pay. It modified the award after finding that the computation of the amount given by the NLRC in its Decision dated March 25, 2002 does not conform to the dismissed employees’ employment history. The CA aptly explained, viz.: A cursory reading of the assailed Decision of the NLRC dated March 25, 2002 readily reveals that the labor tribunal awarded private respondents their unpaid 13th Month Pay and Service Incentive Leave (SIL) Pay without regard to their employment history with the petitioner. There was even no explanation or adequate showing on the face of the questioned judgment why the award of the unpaid 13th Month and SIL Pay differs from one private respondent to another. This Court, therefore, after determining that indeed the petitioner had not paid the private respondents these special benefits for the whole period of their employment therewith, modified the award by painstakingly basing it to each of the dismissed employee’s employment history with petitioner. xxxx The procedural lapse on the part of the NLRC in this case in failing to take into account the number of years when the private respondents did not receive their 13 th Month and SIL Pay cannot defeat their right to receive these benefits as granted under substantive law. This Court simply could not uphold an erroneous computation of the said unpaid benefits. Hence, it had to re-compute, and as a consequence, increased it.
(AKLAN COLLEGE, INC. vs. PERPETUO ENERO, ARLYN CASTIGADOR, NUENA SERMON and JOCELYN ZOLINA, G.R. No. 178309, January 27, 2009) Recruitment Agency As the Court previously observed, the Contract of Services between Interserve and petitioner did not identify the work needed to be performed and the final result required to be accomplished. Instead, the Contract specified the type of workers Interserve must provide petitioner (“Route Helpers, Salesmen, Drivers, Clericals, Encoders & PD”) and their qualifications (technical/vocational course graduates, physically fit, of good moral character, and have not been convicted of any crime). The Contract also states that, “to carry out the undertakings specified in the immediately preceding paragraph, the CONTRACTOR shall employ the necessary personnel,” thus, acknowledging that Interserve did not yet have in its employ the personnel needed by petitioner and would still pick out such personnel based on the criteria provided by petitioner. In other words, Interserve did not obligate itself to perform an identifiable job, work, or service for petitioner, but merely bound itself to provide the latter with specific types of employees. These contractual provisions strongly indicated that Interserve was merely a recruiting and manpower agency providing petitioner with workers performing tasks directly related to the latter’s principal business. (COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC v. ALAN M. AGITO, et al., G.R. No. 179546, February 13, 2009)
Refusal to Return to Work Therefore, the complaint for illegal dismissal filed by respondents was premature, since even after the expiration of their suspension period, they refused, despite due notice, to report to work. In fact, in their Memorandum of Appeal, respondents admitted having received petitioners’ return-to-work memorandum which, however, became futile because they hastily filed the complaint for illegal dismissal. (INDUSTRIAL & TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT, INC. RAYMOND JARINA, vs. TOMAS TUGADE and CRESENCIO TUGADE, G.R. No. 158539, January 15, 2009) Regular Employment Undoubtedly, respondents were regular employees of petitioner with respect to the escort or “comboy” activity for which they had 54
been engaged since 1993 and 1994, respectively, without regard to continuity or brokenness of the service. (DEALCO FARMS, INC., vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (5th DIVISION), G.R. No. 153192 January 30, 2009) Thus, there are two kinds of regular employees, namely: (1) those who are engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer; and (2) those who have rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which they are employed. Simply stated, regular employees are classified into (1) regular employees - by nature of work and (2) regular employees - by years of service. The former refers to those employees who perform a particular activity which is necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, regardless of their length of service; while the latter refers to those employees who have been performing the job, regardless of the nature thereof, for at least a year. If the employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous or merely intermittent, the law deems the repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not indispensability, of that activity to the business. (SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION v. EDUARDO L. TEODOSIO, G.R. No. 163033, October 2, 2009) Reinstatement The spirit of the rule on reinstatement pending appeal animates the proceedings once the Labor Arbiter issues the decision containing an order of reinstatement. The immediacy of its execution needs no further elaboration. Reinstatement pending appeal necessitates its immediate execution during the pendency of the appeal, if the law is to serve its noble purpose. At the same time, any attempt on the part of the employer to evade or delay its execution, as observed in Panuncillo and as what actually transpired in Kimberly, Composite, Air Philippines, and Roquero, should not be countenanced. After the labor arbiter’s decision is reversed by a higher tribunal, the employee may be barred from collecting the accrued wages, if it is shown that the delay in enforcing the reinstatement pending appeal was without fault on the part of the employer. (JUANITO A. GARCIA and ALBERTO J. DUMAGO vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., G.R. No. 164856, January 20, 2009) • Reinstatement during Corporate Rehabilitation
as the normal effect of the non-exercise of the options.Case law recognizes that unless there is a restraining order. respondent’s obligation to pay the salaries pending appeal. (ANTONIO M. Unconstitutional The argument of the Solicitor General. As earlier discussed. G. SERRANO v. Article III of the Constitution. and MARLOW NAVIGATION CO. 2009) Retirement Coverage A twist in Rivera’s case is that she continued working beyond the compulsory separation from service that resulted from her retirement. The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose. 8042 • Fifth Paragraph of Section 10. limited only by company policies and the applicable terms of the retirement 56 . that the actual purpose of the subject clause of limiting the entitlement of OFWs to their threemonth salary in case of illegal dismissal. there is nothing in the text of the law or the records of the deliberations leading to its enactment or the pleadings of respondent that would indicate that there is an existing governmental purpose for the subject clause.R. G. March 24. is to give them a better chance of getting hired by foreign employers.. GARCIA and ALBERTO J. the implementation of the order of reinstatement is ministerial and mandatory. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES.. This injunction or suspension of claims by legislative fiat partakes of the nature of a restraining order that constitutes a legal justification for respondent’s non-compliance with the reinstatement order. INC. No. as a rule. January 20. or even just a pretext of one. 2009) Republic Act No.INC. (JUANITO A. INC. did not attach. 164856.R. This is plain speculation.. No. 167614. but also her right to substantivedue process under Section 1. Respondent’s failure to exercise the alternative options of actual reinstatement and payroll reinstatement was thus justified. DUMAGO vs. and it is for that precise reason that the clause violates not just petitioner's right to equal protection. a consensual matter for the parties to agree upon. Such being the case. Whether she could or could not resume working with the company is. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES.
R. (JANUARIA A. Failure to comply with this requirement which is a sine qua non bars the filing of claim for disability benefits. No. Therefore. PTE. in setting the retirement age at 60. continued to exclude those who have rendered 30 years of service or have reached 60 years of age. LTD. No. 182623.Namely KAYE ANGELI and MIRIAM. we conclude that her renewed service did not have the benefit of any retirement plan coverage. 2009) Seafarer • Death Benefits The general rule is that the employer is liable to pay the heirs of the deceased seafarer for death benefits once it is established that he died during the effectivity of his employment contract. However. the plan could not have covered her. No. 155639 April 22. any reimbursement of what Rivera would have paid as contributions to the plan had her coverage and deductions continued after 1988. tell us that no such coverage took place. 183646) • Post-Employment Medical Examination But even assuming that petitioner was repatriated for medical reasons. 2009) 57 . Two indicators. RIVERA v. The first is that the terms of the retirement plan. however. SEA STAR SHIPPING CORPORATION . and IMC SHIPPING CO. v. there is no limitation by law that barred her from continuing her work with UNILAB. MUSNIT v.. Whether these terms included renewed coverage in the retirement plan is an evidentiary gap that could have been conclusively shown by evidence of deductions of contributions to the plan after 1988.R. INC.Both Surnamed SURIGAO G. deferred to the parties’ agreement. before and after its 1992 amendment. even the above-quoted Implementing Rules.plan. he failed to submit himself to the company-designated doctor in accordance with the post-employment medical examination requirement under the above-quoted paragraph 3 of Section 20(B) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract. respondents’ entitlement to any death benefits depends on whether the evidence of the petitioners suffices to prove that the deceased committed suicide.R. the employer may be exempted from liability if he can successfully prove that the seafarer’s death was caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act. UNITED LABORATORIES. Her employment terms under this renewed employment are based on what she and the company agreed upon. LEONILA SURIGAO for Herself and In Behalf of Her Minor Children.. The second is the absence of evidence of. Thus. In sum. December 4. the burden of proof rests on his employer. or of any demand for.G. (DIONISIO M. G. To be sure. (GREAT SOUTHERN MARITIME SERVICES CORP.
Dapiton 58 . or the fulfillment by the employee of a military or civic duty shall not terminate employment. In such a case. teaches: We stress that Article 286 applies only when there is a bonafide suspension of the employer’s operation of a business or undertaking for a period not exceeding six (6) months. resulting in a situation where the available posts under its existing contracts are less than the number of guards in its roster.Security Guard “Temporary off–detail” Petitioner’s citation of Article 286 of the Labor Code reading: ART. 286. (Underscoring supplied) In the present case. underscoring supplied) is misplaced. (Emphasis in the original. the employer shall reinstate the employee to his former position without loss of seniority rights if he indicates his desire to resume his work not later than one (1) month from the resumption of operations of his employer or from his relief from the military or civic duty. The paramount consideration should be the dire exigency of the business of the employer that compels it to put some of its employees temporarily out of work. In security services. there is no termination of employment but only a temporary displacement of employees. the temporary “off-detail” of guards takes place when the security agency’s clients decide not to renew their contracts with the security agency. In all such cases. albeit the displacement should not exceed six (6) months. where respondent was last posted and which Philippine Industrial Security Agency v. ─ The bona fide suspension of the operation of a business or undertaking for a period not exceeding six (6) months. there is no showing that there was lack of available posts at petitioner’s clients or that there was a request from the client-bank. When employment not deemed terminated.
G. a subsidiary’s separate existence shall be respected. 179512. 2009) 59 . separation pay should instead be paid the employee equivalent to one month salary for every year of service. without backwages. and the liability of the parent corporation as well as the subsidiary will be confined to those arising in their respective businesses. No. 170705) Separation Pay Since petitioner was not faultless in regard to the offenses imputed against her. G. 2009) Separate Corporate Personality Assuming. INC. 170689. notwithstanding the fact that PNB-Madecor was a subsidiary of PNB. for the sake of argument. and to full backwages. July 30. and ROLF WILTSCHEK v.R. the same being owned by PNB-Madecor. ENRIQUEZ. respondent is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges. BONIFACIO L. G. Consequently. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC). (PANTRANCO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEA-PTGWO) and PANTRANCO RETRENCHED EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PANREA) v. (M+W ZANDER PHILIPPINES. 2001 and had not thereafter asked him to report for duty. The general rule remains that PNB-Madecor has a personality separate and distinct from PNB. that PNB may be held liable for the debts of PNEI. No. 172199. Petitioner suddenly prevented him from reporting on his tour of duty at the bank on December 15. v. No. computed from the time of the withholding of the employee's compensation up to the time of actual reinstatement.R. June 5. we hold that the award of separation pay only. No. If used to perform legitimate functions. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK. G. MIRANDO. is not sufficient to justify their being treated as one entity. TRINIDAD M. and other benefits or their monetary equivalent. The mere fact that a corporation owns all of the stocks of another corporation. to replace respondent with another. February 27. 2009) We thus find the dismissal to be illegal. PALTENG v. G. petitioners still cannot proceed against the Pantranco properties.continued to hire petitioner’s services.R. (ELIZABETH D. inclusive of allowances.R. INC. 169173. (EAGLE STAR SECURITY SERVICES. No. is proper. computed from the time of engagement up to the finality of this decision.R. If reinstatement is not possible due to the strained relations between the employer and the employee. taken alone.
” In the instant case. and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. the awards of separation pay and backwages are not mutually exclusive and both may be given to Tagulao and Serrano. Thus do these two remedies give meaning and substance to the constitutional right of labor to security of tenure. secondly. that the employee becomes entitled to reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights and. that is. Though the grant of reinstatement commonly carries with it an award of backwages.” Since. firstly. The two forms of relief are distinct and separate. in the present case. Moreover. Reinstatement restores the employee who was unjustly dismissed to the position from which he was removed. while the grant of backwages allows the same employee to recover from the employer that which he had lost by way of wages as a result of his dismissal. These twin remedies —reinstatement and payment of backwages — make the dismissed employee whole who can then look forward to continued employment. to his status quo ante dismissal. is oriented towards the immediate future. it could not be an adequate substitute both for reinstatement and for 60 . the grant of separation pay was a substitute for immediate and continued re-employment with the private respondent Bank. the transitional period the dismissed employee must undergo before locating a replacement job. x x x The grant of separation pay was a proper substitute only for reinstatement. in contrast. separation pay is the amount that an employee receives at the time of his severance from the service and x x x is designed to provide the employee with “the wherewithal during the period that he is looking for another employment. separation pay. x x x As the term suggests. the loss of earnings that would have accrued to the dismissed employee during the period between dismissal and reinstatement.Article 279 of the Labor Code provides that “[a]n employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages. the payment of backwages corresponding to the period from his illegal dismissal up to actual reinstatement. The normal consequences of a finding that an employee has been illegally dismissed are. Put a little differently. one from the other. reinstatement is no longer practicable or feasible. inclusive of allowances. that is. payment of backwages is a form of relief that restores the income that was lost by reason of unlawful dismissal. The statutory intent on this matter is clearly discernible. the inappropriateness or non-availability of one does not carry with it the inappropriateness or non-availability of the other. separation pay may be awarded in lieu of reinstatement. The grant of separation pay did not redress the injury that is intended to be relieved by the second remedy of backwages.
the hotel cannot claim that payment thereof to its 82 employees constitute substantial compliance with the payment of ECOLA under WO No. This is not only because of the law's concern for the workingman. QUEZON CITY v.R. 162538. 182499. There is. (PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS. Certainly. No. (CONCEPCION FAELDONIA v. G. 2009) Since Dusit Hotel is explicitly mandated by the afore-quoted statutory provision to pay its employees and management their respective shares in the service charges collected. a penalty less punitive than dismissal may suffice. JR. 2009) Social Justice The Court is not unmindful of the equally important right of respondent as employer under the Constitution to be protected in its property and interest. No. petitioner cannot demand for separation benefits on the ground of illness while at the same time presenting a certification that she is fit to work. October 2.R. AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES (NUWHRAIN-APL-IUF)..JAYME GO and MERLITA GO. NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTEL. however. Hence. June 4. 181972. Even where a worker has committed an infraction of company rules and regulations. August 25. Unemployment brings untold hardships and sorrows on those 61 . TONG YAK GROCERIES. and EDWIN TAGULAO. Undoubtedly. DUSIT HOTEL NIKKO-MANILA v. the intention to sever the employer-employee relationship was not duly established by respondents. we find the allegation that petitioner presented herself for work but was refused by respondents more credible.backwages. The prior submission of a medical certificate that petitioner is fit to resume work negates the claim of respondents that the former demanded for separation pay on account of her failing health. 2009) Above all. gratification by the hotel of one does not result in the satisfaction of the other. The law regards the workers with compassion. 9. G. The particular circumstances attendant in this case. ANGELITO SERRANO.G. RESTAURANT. in addition. No. convince the Court that the supreme penalty of dismissal upon petitioner is not justified. INC. (Emphasis added) (NISSAN NORTH EDSA BALINTAWAK. the hotel employees’ right to their shares in the service charges collected by Dusit Hotel is distinct and separate from their right to ECOLA. his family to consider. Respondents could have denied petitioner’s demand at that instance and ordered her to return to work had it not been their intention to sever petitioner from their employ.R.DUSIT HOTEL NIKKO CHAPTER.
July 31. G. October 13. ABEL v. for having been deprived of continued employment with petitioner's vessel. Consequently. INC. 178976. especially now that the Cooperative is no longer a going concern. DIAMOND FARMS. September 3. the award of P100. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION. hold the Cooperative’s corespondents liable for their claims without any factual and legal justification therefor. he was required to rest for a month. Japan. (WALLEM 62 . respondent had been employed with the petitioner for almost twelve (12) years. BOBONGON BANANA GROWERS MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE. No.” and “recommended for hire. he suffered from a “fractured left transverse process of fourth lumbar vertebra.R. (OLDARICO S. In addition.000. When he reported for work. The social justice policy of labor laws and the Constitution is not meant to be oppressive of capital. INC V. No. TIMOG AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION. FERRER D.00 to respondent as financial assistance is deemed equitable under the circumstances. and DOLE ASIA PHILIPPINES. petitioner refused to employ him despite the assurance of its personnel manager. When he was repatriated to Manila and examined by a company doctor. as it was occupied by another person known to one of the stockholders.R. Thus. 164205. as duly noted and signed by the captain of the vessel was marked “Very Good. respondent opted to apply for optional retirement. (ABELARDO P.” Only under exceptionally meritorious cases may a relaxation from an otherwise stringent rule be allowed “to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed”– the existence of which petitioners failed to demonstrate. respondent had no derogatory record on file over his long years of service with the petitioner. No.( EASTERN SHIPPING LINES.. After consulting a doctor. 2009) While the Court commiserates with petitioners on their loss of employment. records show that respondent's seaman's book. the ends of social and compassionate justice would be served best if respondent will be given some equitable relief.R. TRAVEÑO.” while their vessel was at the port of Yokohama. 2009) Petitioners’ bare invocation of “the interest of substantial justice” does not lie. by default.” Moreover.dependent upon the wage-earner. Respondent patiently waited for more than one year to embark on the vessel as 2rd Engineer. it cannot simply. et al v. G. Considering all of the foregoing and in line with Eastern. 2009) In the present case. On February 13. 1996. but the position was not given to him. ANTONIO G. he was declared fit to continue his work. 171587.
which the Labor Arbiter did so rule in said case.MARITIME SERVICES. and SCANDIC SHIPMANAGEMENT LIMITED v. the other union members who had merely participated in the strike but had not committed any illegal acts were not dismissed from employment. as evidenced by the layoffs effected by the company. As a consequence. The filing of a petition to declare the strike illegal was thus unnecessary. Therefore. Hence. Corollarily. not all union members were terminated. In fact. INC. 2009) Strike • Illegal Strike The use of unlawful means in the course of a strike renders such strike illegal. it is our considered view and we so hold that said employees were constructively dismissed without just or 63 . BULTRON. On the other hand. March 20.v. 185261. 2009) • Dinopol and Lustria Decision There is no conflict between the Dinopol and the Lustria decisions. However. it was QCSC which filed a petition to declare the illegality of the 12 August 1997 strike by the union. In said case. 171618-19. Nos. the affected employees were granted backwages and separation pay. As explained in the Lustria decision: Considering that the temporary lay-off of listed employees effected by the respondents on 16 August 1997 was without documentary evidence to determine its validity.G. G. October 2. (JACKBILT INDUSTRIES. JACKBILT EMPLOYEESWORKERS UNION-NAFLUKMU. there is a distinction between the remedies sought by the parties in these two cases. pursuant to the principle of conclusiveness of judgment. the Lustria decision involved the unfair labor practices alleged by the union with particularity. ERIBERTO S. The consequence of the declaration of an illegal strike is termination from employment.R. Labor Arbiter Lustria sided with the Union and found QCSC guilty of such practices. While both rulings involve the same parties and same issues. In the Dinopol decision.R. only a few union officers were validly dismissed in accordance with Article 264 of the Labor Code. the NLRC erred in declaring the employment status of all employees as having been lost or forfeited by virtue of the Dinopol decision. The grant of backwages and separation pay however was not premised on the declaration of the illegality of the strike but on the finding that these affected employees were constructively dismissed from work. No. the March 9. 1998 strike was ipso facto illegal. INC.
they had not done. (GULF AIR. It would have been different if they presented evidence showing that they had authorized Mr...authorized cause and observance of due process. Gumarang to allow the latter to be substituted by his wife. This opinion finds support from the hard and cold fact of absence of prior notice. and by his former co-employees whom he had allegedly represented before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. In conclusion. the CA and the NLRC correctly observed that the worst that respondent committed was an inadvertent infraction. We cannot allow petitioner Gumarang’s co-employees to take his place because. REYES.. 164032. we grant the same insofar as the wife is concerned. ET. al. (NORTHEASTERN COLLEGE TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs. January 19. she being his heir. there are two separate decisions issued by two different labor arbiters involving the same parties and interests. G. these two rulings may co-exist.R. No. 2009) 64 . This. INC. they are entitled to backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement as prayed.C. 152923. No.R.G. Clearly. (LOLITA A. we would be allowing them to become parties to the instant petition when they are not. the penalty commensurate to the violation he committed should be suspension for three months. NORTHEASTERN COLLEGE. G. April 24. report with the regional office of the Department of Labor and Employment having jurisdiction over the area and they remain under lay-off status of employment. if we do. INC. LOPEZ. Considering that the remedies sought by the parties in each case differ. JASSIM HINDRI ABDULLAH and RESTY AREVALO v. as to the prayer of the counsel of Mr. The period of his suspension is to be deducted from the period for which he is entitled to backwages as awarded by the NLRC and affirmed by the CA. vs. 2009) Substitution of Parties Finally. Gumarang to file the petition on their behalf before this Court and even before the Court of Appeals. 159687. but not as to the other co-employees. No. QUEZON CITY SPORTS CLUB. 2009) Suspension Thus. January 19. For that. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROBERTO J.R. the extreme penalty of dismissal imposed on him by petitioners was grossly disproportionate. Taking into account the managerial position he held and the prior warning issued to him for failing to communicate with his superiors.
Again. MANALO. No. February 13. 2002 up to March 31. G. If renewed. CARIÑO v. VIOLETA T. respondent is entitled to continue her three-year period of probationary period.Teachers • Employment Status The common practice is for the employer and the teacher to enter into a contract. 2003. G. he cannot automatically claim security of tenure and compel the employer to renew his employment contract. At the end of this third year. February 13. ADELAIDA . NLRC that. 178835. the employment relationship terminates. primarily on the basis of the employee having met the reasonable standards of competence and efficiency set by the employer. In other words. If the contract is renewed. effective for one school year. Upon the expiration of his contract of employment. in light of our ruling of Espiritu Santo Parochial School v. CARIÑO v. this second renewal of the contract for another school year would then be the last year – since it would be the third school year – of probationary employment. If the contract is not renewed.R. being simply on probation. particularly considering the teacher’s performance. at the end of that period. absent any concrete and competent proof that her performance as a teacher was unsatisfactory from her hiring on April 18. the three-year probationary period provided by the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools must apply likewise to the case of respondent. At the end of the school year. the employer may now decide whether to extend a permanent appointment to the employee. the employer has the option not to renew the contract. the parties may opt to renew or not to renew the contract. No. It is when the yearly contract is renewed for the third time that Section 93 of the Manual becomes operative. VIOLETA T. 2003. 2009 ) • Probationary Period for Teachers Thus. in the absence of an express period of probation for private school teachers. 178835. her probationary employment is deemed renewed for the following two school years. the probationary employment continues. the teacher remains under probation. 2009 ) Termination of Employment 65 . ADELAIDA MANALO. For the entire duration of this three-year period.R. and the teacher then is entitled to regular or permanent employment status. (MAGIS YOUNG ACHIEVERS’ LEARNING CENTER and MRS. usually for another school year. (MAGIS YOUNG ACHIEVERS’ LEARNING CENTER and MRS. such that from March 31.
Rule XVI. National Labor Relations Commission. (BC CABLE MASTER SYSTEM AND/OR EVELYN CINENSE vs. We uphold the following findings of the Court of Appeals that respondent did not abandon his job: In the case at bar. No. 81 ). that after having ironed things out with his employer.January 20. there was no proof that petitioner sent private respondent a notice of termination on the ground of abandonment. more so when it includes a prayer for reinstatement (Globe Telecom. 334 SCRA 75. if indeed it is true that he really failed to go back to work. 172670. In cases of abandonment of work. And lastly. vs Florendo-Flores. by permitting him to go back to work and by asking him to execute a promissory note. the charge of abandonment is belied by the following circumstances: First. Section 2. the high improbability of private respondent to intentionally abandon his work considering that he had already served a penalty of suspension for his infractions and violations as well as the petitioner’s tacit condonation of the infractions he committed. an employee would just not report for work for no apparent reason. Inc. G. 390 SCRA 201. MARCIAL BALUYOT. we find it hard to believe that he will just abandon his job after petitioners gave him a chance to continue working for them. 2002[sic]-203 ). a charge of abandonment is totally inconsistent with the immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal. 2009) 66 . private respondent’s filing of a case for illegal dismissal with the labor arbiter negates abandonment. For this reason. It is incongruent to human nature. Book V. We are constrained to give credence to private respondent’s assertion that he attempted to report back to work but he was just asked to leave as he was considered terminated. Secondly.Just Causes • Neglect of Duty/Abandonment Hence. Rules and regulations implementing the Labor Code provides that any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular act or omission constituting the ground for his dismissal. the notice shall be served at the worker’s last known address (Icawat vs.R. As held by the Supreme Court.
May 8. REYNALDO LABRO. No. as reflected above. TONG YAK GROCERIES. Petitioner also presented herself for work on the date stated in the medical certificate which stated that she is fit to resume work. CONSUNJI. However. (HARBORVIEW RESTAURANT v. they failed to comply therewith.In the instant case. it totally negated petitioner’s theory of abandonment. INC. an employee who takes steps to protest her layoff cannot be said to have abandoned her work because a charge of abandonment is totally inconsistent with the immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal. (NOW SODACO AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION) AND/OR MALONE PACQUIAO AND VICTOR A. 182499. April 30. respondent was informed by no less than his immediate superior. G. the Court. and in turn. Clearly. No. et al. 2009) To constitute abandonment. et. (CONCEPCION FAELDONIA v. 168273. Moreover.R. Mere absence of petitioner is not sufficient to establish the allegation of abandonment. he filed a complaint with the NLRC. v. the Court finds no reason why these two would give respondent the false impression that he was being dismissed. there must be clear proof of deliberate and unjustified intent to sever the employer-employee relationship. they offered to return to work. or they at least had prior knowledge of the termination. 171814.R.R. al. been looking for other jobs. for they had. The prolonged absence of petitioner was not without justifiable reason because it was established that her failure to report for work was due to the injury she suffered in the course of her employment and with sufficient notice to respondents.G. despite the directive cum caveat of CASI for them to report back for work within two days from receipt thereof.. PILAPIL. is inclined to believe that they were given prior instruction. 2009) In petitioners’ case. more so when it includes a prayer for reinstatement. as previously discussed. G. 178229 October 23.JAYME GO and MERLITA GO. by the length of time they refused to return to work. No. (MIGUEL A. in the interim. 2009) 67 . After three years. 2009) Respondents failed to discharge this burden. (SOUTH DAVAO DEVELOPMENT COMPANY. When Eleonor filed the illegal dismissal complaint. the charge of abandonment does not square with the fact that a week after respondent’s alleged dismissal. like the appellate court again. v. the operative act is still the employee’s ultimate act of putting an end to his employment. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION G. October 2.R. Like the Court of Appeals. GAMO. Their intention to sever the employeremployee relationship with CASI is manifested. the chief cook and by his brother that he was being terminated. SERGIO L. No. however.
Maralit is not entitled to her retirement benefits. or a dereliction of duty. Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform one's duties for a period of time.R. and LORENZO A. 178976. abandonment would surely be an illogical and impractical recourse. INC. Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise even slight care or diligence. PERALTA et al. 168215. (ABELARDO P. (ESTER B. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION. no basis in reason exists for the petitioners' theory that Aguilar abandoned his job. No. JAMES MATEO. Under the given facts. 2009) • Gross Negligence An employer cannot legally be compelled to continue with the employment of a person admittedly guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his duties. 2009) To warrant removal from service. a forbidden act. G. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. depending upon the circumstances.( LBC EXPRESS – METRO MANILA. No amount of good intent. NIÑO v. especially for simple laborers such as respondent Aguilar. Considering the difficult times in which our country is in it is illogical and even suicidal for an employee like Aguilar to abandon his work. The single or isolated act of negligence does not constitute a just cause for the dismissal of the employee. (BARON REPUBLIC THEATRICAL V. This holds true specially if the employee’s continued tenure is patently inimical to the employer’s interest.R. No. 170525. NORMITA P. Having been dismissed for a just cause. can assuage the damage Mateo caused LBC when he failed to exercise the requisite degree of diligence required of him under the circumstances. G. the Court agrees with respondents when they argued in their petition filed with the CA that if an employee's aim is to secure the benefits due him from his employer.R. or the entire absence of care. the negligence should not merely be gross but also habitual. 68 . ABEL v. Serious misconduct is improper conduct. G. What happened was not a simple case of oversight and could not be attributed to a simple lapse of judgment. a transgression of some established and definite rule of action. simply because his employer rejected his demand for salary increase. 2009) • Serious Misconduct PNB may rightfully terminate Maralit’s services for a just cause.Furthermore. including serious misconduct. June 9. or previous conscientious performance of duty. July 31. October 2. knowing fully well of the widespread unemployment and underemployment problems as well as the difficulty of looking for a means of livelihood. No.
as an 69 . 188742.R. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK.R. October 13. 2009) An employee who fails to account for and deliver the funds entrusted to him is liable for misappropriating the same and is consequently guilty of serious misconduct.MARALIT v. a dereliction of duty. 2009) By sleeping on the job and leaving his work area without prior authorization. we consider respondent’s offense to be a simple misconduct which does not merit termination of his employment. regard for his employer’s rules. 163788. it must be in connection with the employee’s work. RFM CORPORATION-BAKERY FLOUR DIVISION and JOSE MARIA CONCEPCION III. respect and loyalty to his employer. and appreciation of the dignity and responsibility of his office. (EATS-CETERA FOOD SERVICES OUTLET and/or SERAFIN RAMIREZ v. No employer may rationally be expected to continue in employment a person whose lack of morals.R. 179507. Tomada did not merely disregard company rules. The misconduct. 2009) Moreover. the peculiar nature of Espadero’s position aggravates her misconduct. Tomada. Her failure to promptly report the incident reflects a cavalier regard for the responsibility required of her in the discharge of the duties of her position. 163270.R. willful in character. to be serious. EDUARDO PINERA G. SR. (EDUARDO M. MYRNA B. LETRAN and MARY GRACE ESPADERO. v. Tomada’s offenses cannot be excused upon a plea of being a “first offense. August 24. Although petitioner. in effect. has so plainly and completely been bared.” or have not resulted in prejudice to the company in any way. Tomada failed to live up to his company’s reasonable expectations. a forbidden act. Indeed. G. and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. must be of such a grave character and not merely trivial or unimportant. 2009) o Simple Misconduct Based on the foregoing. Petitioner therefore validly dismissed respondent. issued an open invitation for others to violate those same company rules. To constitute just cause for termination. No. considering the presence of trainees in the building and Tomada’s acts. No. INC.( SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION COMPANY. the transgression of some established or definite rule of action. TOMADA. No. v. September 11. With the degree of trust expected of Espadero. October 2. Misconduct has been defined as improper or wrong conduct. such infraction can hardly be classified as one that is trivial or unimportant. G. The penalty of dismissal from service is not commensurate to respondent’s offense. G. No.
averred that sometime in August 2004. No. instead. G. 2004. G. COURT OF APPEALS. No. and his pleadings before the lower tribunals and before this Court. INC.( ROMEO N. GENUINO ICE CO. JR. January 27. The employer should bear in mind that in termination cases. then. it is petitioner Manliclic’s very act of misappropriation that is offensive to respondent PELCO I. INOCENCIO B. In so doing. But this fact was not reflected in his Partial Audit Report.... 182570. by obtaining an altered police report and medical certificate. by analogy. exercise of such right should be tempered with compassion and understanding. November 27. they committed acts inimical to respondent’s interests. VENTURA. Alido informed him of the illegal activities in the company premises.R. vs. 165199. the 70 . July 31. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS. (PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY v. petitioners deliberately attempted to cover up the fact that Sales was under the influence of liquor at the time the accident took place. In sum. 180465. in view of the gravity of the penalty of dismissal or termination from the service.R. More than the resulting material damage or prejudice. (ERIC DELA CRUZ and RAUL M. They thus committed a work-related willfull breach of the trust and confidence reposed in them. after Lejos already resigned from the company. in his Position Paper filed before the LA and in his Sagot na Sinumpaang Salaysay. LACUATA v. The magnitude of the infraction committed by an employee must be weighed and equated with the penalty prescribed and must be commensurate thereto. petitioner made it appear therein that it was upon the initiative of Lejos that he discovered the illegal activities only on October 28. G. what is at stake is not simply the employee’s job or position but his very livelihood. 2009) The amount misappropriated by petitioner Manliclic is irrelevant. and HECTOR GENUINO. has the right to discipline its erring employees. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. If taxes are the lifeblood of the state. 2009) • Loss of Trust and Confidence Petitioner. INC. The basis for terminating the employment of petitioner actually came from petitioner himself due to the substantial and irreconcilable inconsistencies in the narration of facts in his Audit Report and his Sagot na Sinumpaang Salaysay filed before the company. 2009 Indeed. it cannot be denied that he withheld this information from his immediate supervisor and from the company – a clear breach of the trust and confidence the company had reposed in him as one of its Auditors.. No.R. BERBANO.employer.
INCORPORATED v. but. Her poor character became even more evident when she read what was supposed to be a confidential letter of the legal counsel of PET to PET officers/directors expressing his legal opinion on Tirazona’s administrative case. No. the loss of confidence must be based not on an ordinary breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by the employer. Her attitude towards her employer was clearly inconsistent with her position of trust and confidence. which must be established by substantial evidence.00 payable within five days from demand. in the language of Article 282(c) of the Labor Code. caprices or suspicion. However. whims. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally. It has never been intended to afford an occasion for abuse because of its subjective nature. 2009) We are not unmindful of the employer’s right to dismiss an employee based on fraud or willful breach of trust. heedlessly. JENNIFER LYNNE C. PET was.payment collection is the lifeblood of the cooperative. LUKE’S MEDICAL CENTER. or inadvertently. without justifiable excuse. as distinguished from an act done carelessly. thoughtlessly. respondent PELCO I. 185933. INC. It should be genuine and not simulated. No. 183196. fully justified in terminating Tirazona’s employment for loss of trust and confidence. G. the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer. FADRIGO. be an actual breach of duty committed by the employee. knowingly and purposely. PAMPANGA I ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE. petitioner Manliclic committed a breach of the trust reposed in him by his employer. Respondent PELCO I cannot afford to continue in its employ dishonest bill collectors. November 25. therefore. illegal or unjustified. she sought to impose her will on the company and placed her own interests above those of her employer. There must. 71 .000. This constitutes valid cause for his dismissal from service. (ST. By immediately and unreasonably adopting an adverse stance against PET. The collection provides respondent PELCO I with the financial resources to continue its operations. Her motive for her actions was rendered even more questionable by her exorbitant and arbitrary demand for P2. It must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer’s arbitrariness.. ALLAS. SLMC utterly failed to establish the requirements prescribed by law and jurisprudence for a valid dismissal on the ground of breach of trust and confidence. (CHONA ESTACIO and LEOPOLDO MANLICLIC v.R. and hostile.000. August 19. otherwise. uncompromising. In this case. By his own admission. G. nor should it appear as a mere afterthought to justify an earlier action taken in bad faith or as a subterfuge for causes that are improper.R. the actions of Tirazona reflected an obdurate character that is arrogant. 2009) Verily. on a willful breach. therefore. and LOLIANO E.
However.(MA. RAMON L. MERCADO and GUS ZULUAGA G. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (SECOND DIVISION). the latter’s dismissal will be rendered illegal. it is settled that for breach of trust to constitute a valid cause for dismissal. The relationship of employer and employee. GARCIA v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND WILLIAM L. such as custody handling or care and protection of the property and assets of the employer. Loss of confidence as a just cause for termination of employment is premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds a position of responsibility or trust and confidence. June 16. 2009) Loss of confidence must not be indiscriminately used as a shield by the employer against a claim that the dismissal of an employee was arbitrary. No. in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal. otherwise. No. (ADAM B.. No. the same must be willful. vs. (SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION vs. LEGAZPI OIL COMPANY.R. He must be invested with confidence on delicate matters. TIRAZONA. 172854. Ordinary breach of trust will not 72 . G.. specially where the employee has access to the employer’s property. 2009) Considering the foregoing. OPULENCIA. 169712. the employee may be validly dismissed from service.R. FRIEND. 2009) To recapitulate. the act complained of must be work-related and shows that the employee concerned is unfit to continue to work for the employer.SERVICE INC. 2009) As Airport Manager. January 20. No. 164423. (PET INC. MAMORU ONO and JUNICHI HIROSE. APOSTOL and BEN M. To countenance an arbitrary exercise of that prerogative is to negate the employee’s constitutional right to security of tenure. ROMEO F. Where the rules laid down by the employer to protect its property are violated by the very employee who is entrusted and expected to follow and implement the rules. PHILIPPINE EDS TECHNO. JR.FIRST DIVISION v. INC. we find that respondents Apostol and Opulencia were dismissed by TIPI for a valid and just cause.R. the right of an employer to dismiss an employee on account of loss of trust and confidence must not be exercised whimsically. INC. G. April 16. (TRIUMPH INTERNATIONAL(PHILS.).) AND/OR KEN KUBOTA. necessarily involves trust and confidence. WENELITA S. 153983.R. respondent occupies a position of such extreme sensitivity that the existence of some basis or reasonable ground for his involvement in any irregularity is enough to destroy the trust and confidence which petitioner Gulf Air had reposed in him. And. the employer must clearly and convincingly prove by substantial evidence the facts and incidents upon which loss of confidence in the employee may be fairly made to rest. G. In other words. May 26.
FIRST DIVISION v. such as when the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee concerned is responsible for the purported misconduct. Lupega. Thus. (ABELARDO P. REYES. that Lupega himself was under investigation when he implicated petitioner in the subsidence area anomaly makes his uncorroborated version suspect. 159687. insofar as the application of the doctrine of loss of trust and confidence is concerned. It is sufficient that there is some basis for the employer’s loss of trust and confidence. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION. No. 73 .R. G. ABEL v. must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts. But as regards a managerial employee. And while there is no concrete showing of any ill motive on the part of Lupega to falsely accuse petitioner. loss of trust and confidence. Its lone witness. (TRIUMPH INTERNATIONAL(PHILS.C.R. 178976.suffice. the mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has breached the trust of his employer would suffice for his dismissal. proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. and caprices or suspicion. July 31. Hence. INC. No other employee working at respondent’s mine site attested to the truth of any of his statements. whims. Respondent’s evidence against petitioner fails to meet this standard. April 24. to be a valid cause for dismissal. The basis for the dismissal must be clearly and convincingly established but proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary. in the case of managerial employees. Lupega’s account of the subsidence area anomaly could hardly be considered substantial evidence. No. and the nature of his participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of his position.). the evidence must be substantial and must establish clearly and convincingly the facts on which the loss of confidence rests and not on the employer’s arbitrariness. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROBERTO J. Nonetheless. (GULF AIR. Loss of trust and confidence. Standing alone. 2009) The second requisite is that there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence. with respect to rank-and-file personnel. as ground for valid dismissal. did not support his affidavit and testimony during the company investigation with any piece of evidence at all. G. and that mere uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the employer will not be sufficient. JASSIM HINDRI ABDULLAH and RESTY AREVALO v. requires proof of involvement in the alleged events in question. 2009) o Application of the Doctrine of Loss of Trust and Confidence Recent decisions of this Court have distinguished the treatment of managerial employees from that of the rank-and-file personnel.
No.RAMON L. property custodians. 2009) o Positions of Trust There are two classes of positions of trust. Any other measure would be senseless in the business viewpoint. etc. job knowledge and potential. discharge. has not shown any arbitrariness on the part of MMPC in the evaluation. They are defined as those who. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION. While respondent was the third most senior employee among the 7 employees in petitioner's personnel department. All other things being equal. The first class consists of managerial employees. ABEL v. OPULENCIA.R. The second class consists of cashiers. 5 in conjunction with and as qualified by the factors provided under Sec. 164423. regularly handle significant amounts of money or property. Alfredo. in the normal and routine exercise of their functions. G. and retrenchment of employees. (ALFREDO A. 5(c). Retrenchment scheme without taking seniority into account rendered the retrenchment invalid. recall. well within the contemplation of the parties’ CBA. February 16. selection. the merit rating used by MMPC based on Sec. and potential hew with company standards. and.R. transfer. MENDROS. Accordingly. MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILS. 1 is fair and reasonable. 169780. They are defined as those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies and to hire. to stress. efficiency and attitude. she was retrenched 74 . assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such managerial actions. 2009) Records do not show any criterion adopted or used by petitioner in dismissing respondent. 5(c) should be understood in the light of Sec. suspend. lay-off. attendance. APOSTOL and BEN M. JR v. 1 criteria qualify the factors of “seniority and needs of the company” in Sec. provides seniority. June 16. No. Stated a bit differently. therefore. CORPORATION (MMPC). shorn of the contention that the merit rating is against the CBA. 178976. In fact. auditors. is that the Sec. 1 which.R. a company would necessarily need to retain those who had rendered dedicated and highly efficient service and whose knowledge. (ABELARDO P. No. and attendance as among the factors that should guide the company in choosing the employees to be laid-off or kept. Respondent was terminated without considering her seniority. July 31. G. Sec. to be sure. 2009) Authorized Causes • Retrenchment The proper view. G.
NLRC instructs: .September 18. as well as to give DOLE the opportunity to ascertain the veracity of the alleged cause of termination. petitioner did not adduce evidence to prove that retrenchment was resorted to because other measures were undertaken to abate actual or future business losses but thus failed. the Court is not persuaded on the necessity of resorting to retrenchment to prevent or minimize actual or imminent business losses on the part of petitioner. improving manufacturing efficiency. 2009) • Requirement for Retrenchment For a valid termination due to retrenchment. No. the employer must still prove that retrenchment was resorted to only after less drastic measures such as the reduction of both management and rank-and-file bonuses and salaries.R. even if the comparative report were to be considered. LOURDES D. The purpose of this requirement is to give employees time to prepare for the eventual loss of their jobs. 2009) At all events. reduction of marketing and advertising costs. . faster collection of customer accounts. G. EDMUND REY. reduction of raw materials investment and others. So Polymart Paper Industries. have been tried and found wanting. There was no showing that respondent was offered to be transferred to other positions.while her other co-employees junior than her were either retained in the Personnel Department or were transferred to other positions in the company. (BIO QUEST MARKETING INC. v. No.R. going on reduced time. Nothing in the law gives petitioner the option to substitute the required prior written notice with payment of 30 days 75 . G. In this case. September 8. and/or JOSE L. 152101. For retrenchment should only be resorted to when other less drastic means have been tried and found to be inadequate. We cannot agree. 181503. petitioner insists that the payment of 30 days salary to respondents in place of notice was sufficient compliance with the 30-day notice rule. (Emphasis supplied) In the case at bar. . the law also requires that written notices of the intended retrenchment be served by the employer on the worker and on the DOLE at least one month before the actual date of the retrenchment. [E]ven if business losses were indeed sufficiently proven. SIENES.(EMCOR INCORPORATED v. MA. Inc. CO v.
To our mind. 1998. G. 170669. let it be clarified that our ruling in International Hardware. For this. Indeed. 170669. Payment of 30 days salary cannot compensate for the psychological effect or the stigma of immediately finding one’s self laid off from work. the only evidence it presented were the letters of voluntary acceptance of retrenchment.salary. February 4. G. INC. It cannot be a fully effective substitute for the 30 days’ written notice requirement by law. as in this case. impending. CORPORATION (MMPC). Petitioner submitted none. In the case at bench. In essence. Further. a job is more than the salary it carries. G. Clearly. respondents had already been dismissed before they signed the letters of voluntary acceptance. and waivers and quitclaims signed by respondents. It merely exempts the latter from giving notice of retrenchment to its employees and DOLE. 2009) 76 . Inc. The employer need not wait for substantial losses to materialize before exercising ultimate and drastic option to prevent such losses.. ALAN G. et al. We have constantly ruled that financial statements audited by independent external auditors constitute the normal method of proof of the profit and loss performance of a company. MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILS.R. INC. But. v. MMPC was already financially hemorrhaging before finally resorting to retrenchment. (MOBILIA PRODUCTS. DEMECILLO. v.” The phrase necessarily implies that retrenchment may be effected even in the event only of imminent. or expected losses. consistent with our ruling in Agabon v. (ALFREDO A. especially when. No. v. it bears to state that the aforequoted Art. 1998 were effective the following day. (MOBILIA PRODUCTS. apart from petitioner’s bare assertion of reduced orders from Japan. JR v. National Labor Relations Commission. Any less exacting standard of proof would render too easy the abuse of this ground for termination of services of employees. DEMECILLO. the amount of nominal damages should be P30.R.000. 2009) However. et al. 283 of the Code uses the phrase “retrenchment to prevent losses.. Even as the letters of voluntary acceptance were dated July 25. ALAN G. February 4. February 16. the notices of termination given on July 23. petitioner deprived respondents of their right to statutory due process. We also sustain the award of attorney’s fees as it is sanctioned by law. NLRC did not dispense with the responsibility of the employer to substantiate losses. these were insufficient to show that petitioner indeed suffered business losses so serious as to necessitate the reduction of personnel. we affirm the appellate court’s award of nominal damages to respondents. 2009) • Losses Third. 169780. No. No. no notice was given to the DOLE.R. MENDROS.
Bribing union member and promising promotion if he will not join the strike as evidenced by the Salaysay of Bernard Delta. such as: 1. al.Transferring union members to another job description.G.” The prohibited acts are related to the workers’ right 77 . resulting to her being taken to the hospital for nervous breakdown. LOPEZ. 4. such as paying their salaries/wages fully and ahead of the incumbent union and as if it were the incumbent bargaining agents. Cecilia Pangan. QUEZON CITY SPORTS CLUB. 2..Cuddling and treating the minority union with favor. 7. and failure to do so would mean no payment of their June 16-30. 2009) Unfair labor practice refers to “acts that violate the workers’ right to organize. Culled from the union’s pleadings were the specific acts committed by QCSC. vs.R. 5. finding that QCSC had committed unfair labor practices against the union and accordingly granting backwages and separation pay in favor of 112 employees. January 19. INC. issued two (2) months later.Discouraging the members of the incumbent union from continuing their membership with the incumbent union as evidenced by the Pinagsamang Salaysay of Ramiro Espinosa and Ronaldo Q. Applying the totality of the conduct doctrine. 164032. Labor Arbiter Lustria held that QCSC had committed unfair labor practices. 6.Requiring the union members to submit another information sheet. and 8.Unfair Labor Practice • Totality of the Conduct Doctrine Then came the Lustria decision.. (LOLITA A. 3. The Lustria decision emanated from a complaint for unfair labor practice against QCSC. ET. 1997 salary. Lim. No.Insulting of the Union President as evidenced by the Salaysay of Ma.Replacing them with members of minority union evidenced by Leslie Tamayo’s Salaysay.Subjecting one union member to a very tense confrontation in the General Manager’s Office after she commented during the NCMB conference that the 201 file of the employees are intact.
165756. even if unfair. (GENERAL SANTOS CITY). 178647) Here. June 5. the strike. are not unfair labor practices. INC. the acts. No. It is the union. . since the attendant circumstances support the belief in good faith that petitioner’s retrenchment scheme was structured to weaken the bargaining power of the Union. the president of SELU. NLRC.R. charged respondent with ULP and illegal dismissal because she was in the process of renegotiating the CBA with respondent when she was dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. We scanned the records very carefully and failed to discern any evidence to sustain such charge. Indeed. we held: . SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT-NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN THE HOTEL AND RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES (SAMASAHNUWHRAIN). owner of Hyatt Regency Manila. by exception. xxx xxx xxx. . therefore.R. No. may be considered legal. (HOTEL ENTERPRISES OF THE PHILIPPINES. Schering Plough Corporation. (GENERAL SANTOS COCA-COLA PLANT FREE WORKERS UNION-TUPAS vs. 2009) Petitioners never substantiated their allegations. (HEPI).. respondent Union went on strike in the honest belief that petitioner was committing ULP after the latter decided to downsize its workforce contrary to the staffing/manning standards adopted by both parties under a CBA forged only four (4) short months earlier. even if technically there was no legal ground to stage a strike based on ULP. G. who had the burden of proof to present substantial evidence to support its allegations (of unfair labor practices committed by management). The belief was bolstered when the management hired 100 contractual workers to replace the 48 terminated regular rank-and-file employees who were all Union members. We said: Petitioners' accusation of union busting is bereft of any proof. Without that element. In a similar case. v. INC. G. 78 . . petitioner Sereneo. Thus. In Tiu vs.to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA. Schering Employees Labor Union (SELU) et al. those circumstances showed prima facie that the hotel committed ULP. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS. THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. v.
G. JESUS B. the Korean physician did not make any recommendation as to respondent’s bill of health for petitioners to assume that he was fit for repatriation. respondent’s actions show that he voluntarily resigned. 170014. In operating such a powerful vessel. As reflected in the immediately preceding paragraph. RENATO MORENTE & ODYSSEY MARITIME PTE. In fact. (RENITA DEL ROSARIO.R. the Gleneagles Maritime Medical Centre doctor who treated respondent in May 2000 for abscess in his left hand had noted respondent’s “[h]istory of hypertension for 3 years.. Thus. a Tug Master requires not just a thorough knowledge of the port environment in which he is operating. in the case at bar. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION v.” Moreover. as indicated above. G.” petitioners affirmed his medical repatriation. 2009) Voluntary Resignation Finally. LTD. but in the case at bar the facts and the evidence did not establish even at least a rational basis why the union would wield a strike based on alleged unfair labor practices it did not even bother to substantiate during the conciliation proceedings. according the latter a month of paid vacation every three months of straight service. 2009) Work-related Disease If we found in Seagull Shipmanagement that the different climates and unpredictable weather.R. respondent claims that in light of the opinion of the physician in Korea that he had “suspected ischemic heart.. v. It is not enough that the union believed that the employer committed acts of unfair labor practice when the circumstances clearly negate even a prima facie showing to warrant such a belief. et al. however. a position involving more strain and pressure? A Tug (boat) Master is primarily tasked to operate tug boats. had a correlation with the heart disease of a seafarer working as a radioman on a vessel. (VIRGEN SHIPPING CORPORATION. No. IN FINE. BARRAQUIO.. as well as the stress of the job. then what more in the heart disease of a seafarer serving as a ship master. respondent ADAMS recognized how grueling petitioner Nisda’s job was.. 178127. . No. July 3. In fact. CAPT. MAKATI CINEMA SQUARE CORPORATION. April 16. but a high level of skill as well. ischemic heart disease cannot develop in a short span of time that respondent served as chief cook for petitioners. . more than a reasonable connection between the nature of petitioner Nisda’s job and his Coronary Artery Disease has been 79 . a powerful marine vessel that meets large ships out at sea and attach a line to guide/steer the same into and out of berths.
Petitioner Nisda was able to sufficiently prove. Respondents Sea Serve and ADAMS. No.established. that his Coronary Artery Disease was workrelated. utterly failed to refute the said connection. 2009) 80 . G. July 23. R. by substantial evidence. aggravated any pre-existing condition he might have had. at least. given the arduous nature of his job that caused his disease or. on the other hand. (CARLOS N. SEA SERVE MARITIME AGENCY and KHALIFA A. ALGOSAIBI DIVING AND MARINE SERVICES. NISDA v. 179177.
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