This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
relief from the appellate court other than what he has obtained from the lower tribunal, if any, whose decision is brought up on appeal. Due process prevents the grant of additional awards to parties who did not appeal. As an exception, he may assign an error where the purpose is to maintain the judgment on other grounds, but he cannot seek modification or reversal of the judgment or affirmative relief unless he has also appealed or filed a separate petition. (AKLAN COLLEGE, INC. vs. PERPETUO ENERO, ARLYN CASTIGADOR, NUENA SERMON and JOCELYN ZOLINA, G.R. No. 178309, January 27, 2009) Likewise, by availing of a wrong or inappropriate mode of appeal, the petition merits an outright dismissal pursuant to Circular No. 290 which provides that, “an appeal taken to either Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.”( HANJIN HEAVY INDUSTRIES AND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LTD. (FORMERLY HANJIN ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION CO. LTD.) v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 167938, February 19, 2009) At the outset, it must be stated that petitioners adopted the wrong mode of remedy in bringing the case before this Court. It is well-settled that the proper recourse of an aggrieved party to assail the decision of the Court of Appeals is to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Rules precludes recourse to the special civil action of certiorari if appeal, by way of a petition for review is available, as the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. (TACLOBAN FAR EAST MARKETING CORPORATION and FRANCISCO Y. ROMUALDEZ v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. No. 182320, September 11, 2009) Time and again, it has been held that the right to appeal is not a constitutional right, but a mere statutory privilege. Hence, parties who seek to avail themselves of it must comply with the statutes or rules allowing it. To reiterate, perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is mandatory and jurisdictional. The requirements for perfecting an appeal must, as a rule, be strictly followed. Such requirements are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and are necessary for the orderly discharge of the judicial business. Failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment of the court final and executory. Just as a losing 1
party has the privilege to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so does the winner also have the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision. Thus, the propriety of the monetary awards of the Labor Arbiter is already binding upon this Court, much more with the Court of Appeals. (ANDREW JAMES MCBURNIE v. EULALIO GANZON, EGIMANAGERS,INC. and E. GANZON, INC. G.R. Nos. 178034 & 178117, G.R. Nos. 186984-85, September 18, 2009) From the immediately quoted pronouncement of the Court in Sy, petitioner’s mere filing of the Motion for Reduction of Bond did not suffice to perfect his appeal. As correctly found by the appellate court, petitioner filed a Motion for Reduction of Bond dated June 24, 1999 (which was received by the appellate court on June 28, 1999) alleging financial constraints without showing “substantial compliance with the Rules” or demonstrating a willingness to abide by the [R]ules by posting a partial bond.” That petitioner questioned the computation of the monetary award ─ basis of the computation of the amount of appeal bond did not excuse it from posting a bond in a reasonable amount or what it believed to be the correct amount. (THE HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, RUFINO C. RAÑON II, AND ISMAEL C. VILLA, G.R. Nos. 180478-79, September 3, 2009) • Certiorari
Respondent may have a point in asserting that in this case a Rule 65 petition is a wrong mode of appeal, as indeed the writ of certiorari is an extraordinary remedy, and certiorari jurisdiction is not to be equated with appellate jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it is settled, as a general proposition, that the availability of an appeal does not foreclose recourse to the extraordinary remedies, such as certiorari and prohibition, where appeal is not adequate or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient, as where the orders of the trial court were issued in excess of or without jurisdiction, or there is need to promptly relieve the aggrieved party from the injurious effects of the acts of an inferior court or tribunal, e.g., the court has authorized execution of the judgment. This Court has even recognized that a recourse to certiorari is proper not only where there is a clear deprivation of petitioner’s fundamental right to due process, but so also where other special circumstances warrant immediate and more direct action. (PEOPLE’S BROADCASTING(BOMBO RADYO PHILS., INC.) vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DOLE REGION VII, and JANDELEON JUEZAN, G.R. No. 179652, May 8, 2009) • Strict Application of the Rules 2
As to the other ground cited by private respondents’ counsel, suffice it to say that it was a bare allegation unsubstantiated by any proof or affidavit of merit. Besides, they could have filed the petition on time with a motion to be allowed to litigate in forma pauperis. While social justice requires that the law look tenderly on the disadvantaged sectors of society, neither the rich nor the poor has a license to disregard rules of procedure. The fundamental rule of human relations enjoins everyone, regardless of standing in life, to duly observe procedural rules as an aspect of acting with justice, giving everyone his due and observing honesty and good faith. For indeed, while technicalities should not unduly hamper our quest for justice, orderly procedure is essential to the success of that quest to which all courts are devoted. (LAGUNA METTS CORPORATION v. ARIES C. CAALAM and GERALDINE ESGUERRA, G.R. No. 185220, July 27, 2009) • Date of Filing
In this case, petitioner availed of the services of LBC, a private carrier, to deliver its notice of appeal to the NLRC. Had petitioner sent its notice of appeal by registered mail, the date of mailing would have been deemed the date of filing with the NLRC. But petitioner, for reasons of its own, chose to send its notice of appeal through a private letter-forwarding agency. Therefore, the date of actual receipt by the NLRC of the notice of appeal, and not the date of delivery to LBC, is deemed to be the date of the filing of the notice of appeal. Since the NLRC received petitioner’s notice of appeal on 26 February 2001, the appeal was clearly filed out of time. Petitioner had thus lost its right to appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC should have dismissed its notice of appeal. (CHARTER CHEMICAL AND COATING CORPORATION vs. HERBERT TAN and AMALIA SONSING, G.R. No. 163891, May 21, 2009) • Delayed Filing
We agree with the Court of Appeals that since no intent to delay the administration of justice could be attributed to Guinmapang, a one day delay does not justify the appeal’s denial. More importantly, the Court of Appeals declared that Guinmapang’s appeal, on its face, appears to be impressed with merit. The constitutional mandate to accord full protection to labor and to safeguard the employee’s means of livelihood should be given proper attention and sanction. A greater injustice may occur if said appeal is not given due course than if the reglementary period to appeal were strictly followed. In this case, we are inclined to excuse the one day delay in order to fully settle the merits of the case. This is in line with our policy to encourage full 3
adjudication of the merits of an appeal. (REPUBLIC CEMENT CORPORATION v. PETER I. GUINMAPANG, G.R. No. 168910, August 24, 2009) • Appeal Bond
At the time of the filing of the surety bond by PJI on January 2, 2003, PPAC was still an accredited bonding company. Thus, it was but proper to honor the appeal bond issued by a bonding company duly accredited by this Court at the time of its issuance. The subsequent revocation of the authority of a bonding company should not prejudice parties who relied on its authority. The revocation of authority of a bonding company is prospective in application. (CESARIO L. DEL ROSARIO v. PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC., G.R. No. 181516, August 19, 2009) While the bond may be reduced upon motion by the employer, this is subject to the conditions that (1) the motion to reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award is posted by the appellant, otherwise the filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal. The qualification effectively requires that unless the NLRC grants the reduction of the cash bond within the 10 day reglementary period, the employer is still expected to post the cash or surety bond securing the full amount within the said 10-day period. If the NLRC does eventually grant the motion for reduction after the reglementary period has elapsed, the correct relief would be to reduce the cash or surety bond already posted by the employer within the 10-day period. (ANDREW JAMES MCBURNIE v. EULALIO GANZON, EGI-MANAGERS,INC. and E. GANZON, INC. G.R. Nos. 178034 & 178117, G.R. Nos. 18698485, September 18, 2009) In addition, while the bond requirement on appeals involving a monetary award has been relaxed in certain cases, this can only be done where there was substantial compliance with the Rules; or where the appellants, at the very least, exhibited willingness to pay by posting a partial bond. ( LOLITA A. LOPEZ, ET. al., vs. QUEZON CITY SPORTS CLUB, INC.,G.R. No. 164032, January 19, 2009) The decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the NLRC by any parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof, with proof of payment of the required appeal fee accompanied by a memorandum of appeal. And where, as here, the judgment involves monetary award, an appeal
the fact that a lawyer plays a vital role in the administration of justice emphasizes the need to secure to him his honorarium lawfully earned as a means to preserve the decorum and respectability of the legal profession. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT.R. INC.R. the Deed of Assignment constitutes not just a partial amount. and is in fact payable to the DOLE Regional Office.. Petitioner is evidently entitled to attorney’s fees. like a cash or surety bond. during the period of appeal. First. against any occurrence that would defeat or diminish recovery by the aggrieved employees under the judgment if subsequently affirmed. The Deed of Assignment in the instant case. October 2. No. and JANDELEON JUEZAN. the Court finds that the execution of the Deed of Assignment. REYES v. it is clear from the Deed of Assignment that the entire amount is under the full control of the bank. For all intents and purposes. the Deed of Assignment in tandem with the Letter Agreement and Cash Voucher is as good as cash. G. it is only proper that he should receive adequate compensation for his efforts. May 8. BULTRON. 185261. INC. and not of petitioner. but rather the entire award in the appealed Order. the Letter Agreement and the Cash Voucher were made in good faith. 179652. Third. A lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice or imposition of fraud on the part of 5 . (ERWIN H. 2009) The purpose of an appeal bond is to ensure. No. and constituted clear manifestation of petitioner’s willingness to pay the judgment amount. 2009) Attorney’s Fees Finally. Even as we agree with the reduction of the award of attorney's fees by the CA. 2009) Considering that Atty. February 10.therefrom by the employer may be “perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond. (PEOPLE’S BROADCASTING(BOMBO RADYO PHILS. Second.R. since h3e was compelled to litigate to protect his interest by reason of unjustified and unlawful termination of his employment by respondents CCBP and Taguibao. G.) vs. serves the same purpose. 180551. (WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES. DOLE REGION VII. No. THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR. Go successfully represented his client. the Court overrules the deletion by the NLRC of the Labor Arbiter’s award for attorney’s fees to petitioner. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. and SCANDIC SHIPMANAGEMENT LIMITED v.” A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites mentioned does not stop the running of the period for perfecting an appeal as in fact no motion for extension of said period is allowed. G. to be withdrawn by the same office after it had issued a writ of execution. ERIBERTO S.
.00 is reasonable as attorney’s fees. 2009) Moreover. seeing as it spanned the whole litigation from the Labor Arbiter stage all the way to this Court. With his capital consisting of his brains and with his skill acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in expenditure of time and energy. The flight attendants had a common cause of action.R.R. NORMITA P. 183385. in cases for recovery of wages. No. MASMUD) v. 178083. it may not be reasonable to award said counsel an amount equivalent to 10% of all monetary awards to be received by each individual flight attendant. This amount should include all expenses of litigation that were incurred by respondent union. he himself would not get his due. theories and arguments advanced were common for all the affected crew members. October 2. the award of attorney's fees is proper and there need not be any showing that the employer acted maliciously or in bad faith when it withheld the wages. engaged the services of its own counsel.000. G. 2009) The claim for attorney’s fees is granted following Article 2208 of the New Civil Code which allows its recovery in actions for recovery of wages of laborers and actions for indemnity under the employer's liability laws. Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.PATRIA CHIONG and COURT OF APPEALS. February 13. The same fees are also recoverable when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest as in the present case following the refusal by respondent to settle his claims.000. v. nevertheless. (BARON REPUBLIC THEATRICAL V. Hence. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES. The duty of the court is not alone to ensure that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner.his client as the client is against abuse on the part of his counsel. we find that the flight attendants were represented by respondent union which. (FLIGHT ATTENDANTS AND STEWARDS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (FASAP). While the work performed by respondent’s counsel was by no means simple. he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client to escape payment of his just compensation. 170525. 2009) In the case at bar. G. in turn. There need only be a showing that the lawful wages were not paid accordingly. No. It would be ironic if after putting forth the best in him to secure justice for his client. October 2. the issues involved in this case are simple. however. (EVANGELINA MASMUD (as substitute complainant for ALEXANDER J. PERALTA et al. INC. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. but also to see that a lawyer is paid his just fees. No. we find that the amount of P2. Based on the length of time that this case has been litigated.R. petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees of ten percent 6 . and the legal strategies.G.
KJGS FLEET MANAGEMENT MANILA G. lest we defeat the very reason of the law in granting the same. It would be unfair to allow petitioner to recover something he has not earned and could not have earned. Logically. it must be computed from the date of petitioner’s illegal dismissal up to the time of actual reinstatement. and that the employee is entitled to reinstatement. the burden of economic loss suffered by the employees should not be shifted to the employer. February 10. Respondent should be exempted from the burden of paying backwages. No.should he be found to have been illegally dismissed -. FRIEND. the employer bears the burden of proving that the dismissal of the employee is for a just or an authorized cause.R. May 26. for it is a right clearly granted to him by law -.R. 180551. Thus.V.. P. That petitioner did not immediately file his Complaint should not affect or diminish his right to backwages. No. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND WILLIAM L. G. (ERWIN H. NAVARRO v. 182430. 2009) 7 . The Court has held that where the failure of employees to work was not due to the employer's fault.R. (LEOPOLDO ABANTE v. back wages and accruing benefits. Failure to dispose of the burden would imply that the dismissal is not lawful.R. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. The statutory intent of this matter is clearly discernible. (BERNARDINO V.. Moreover. Each party must bear his own loss. 2009) Burden of Proof In termination cases. 2009) Backwages One of the natural consequences of a finding that an employee has been illegally dismissed is the payment of backwages corresponding to the period from his dismissal up to actual reinstatement. 2009) He never bothered to redeem his license at the soonest possible time when there was no showing that he was unlawfully prevented by respondent from doing so. dismissed employees are not required to prove their innocence of the employer’s accusations against them. petitioner should not be paid for the time he was not working. JR. REYES v. No. G. 164681. (SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION vs. INC. The payment of backwages allows the employee to recover from the employer that which he has lost by way of wages as a result of his dismissal. April 24. PAJARILLO LINER. since he could not discharge his work as a driver without his driver's license. December 4. There can be no gap or interruption.(10%) of the monetary award. 153983. G.and for as long as his cause of action has not been barred by prescription. No.
payrolls. service incentive leave and other claims of workers have been paid — are not in the possession of the employee but in the custody and absolute control of the employer. The reason for the rule is that the pertinent personnel files. MADRIAGA. While in cases of illegal dismissal. Evidence does not sufficiently establish that petitioner had incurred losses that would justify retrenchment to prevent further losses. 2009) The burden of proving the validity of retrenchment is on the petitioner. G. records. we affirm the award of Madriaga’s monetary claims. based on his belief that Guillermo and Bergonia had spread rumors that his transactions on behalf of BAYER would no longer be honored as of April 30. No. the employer bears the burden of proving that the dismissal is for a valid or authorized cause. SIENES.July 28. BAYER PHILIPPINES. differentials. (EMCOR INCORPORATED v. the general rule is that the burden rests on the employer to prove payment. Since in the case at bar petitioner company has not shown any proof of payment of the correct amount of salary.As a general rule. rather than on the employee to prove nonpayment. (RAMY GALLEGO v. 152101. INC. holiday pay and 13th month pay.. The Comparative Income Statement for the year 1996 and for the months of February to June 1997 which petitioner submitted did not conclusively show that petitioner had suffered financial losses. DANPIN GUILLERMO. records show that from January to July 1997. PRODUCT IMAGE MARKETING. 2002. in arguing that Sabulao abandoned his work. the Court appreciates no evidence that petitioner was dismissed. and EDGARDO BERGONIA.R. No. Hence. the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal was for a just and valid cause and failure to discharge the same would mean that the dismissal is not justified and therefore illegal. it is incumbent upon the petitioners to prove: (1) that the employee failed to report for work or had been 8 .G. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PABLO S. In fact. LOURDES D. September 8. 2009) It is well-settled that in termination cases..R. 166705. petitioner hired a total of 114 new employees assigned in the petitioner's stores located in the different places of the country. No. Even where the employee must allege nonpayment. G. This belief remains just that – it is unsubstantiated.R. July 31.2009) Respecting the issue of illegal dismissal. What it finds is that petitioner unilaterally stopped reporting for work before filing a complaint for illegal dismissal. INCORPORATED AND/OR BOBBY DEL ROSARIO v. INC. the employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of dismissal. one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. (MANTLE TRADING SERVICES. remittances and other similar documents — which will show that overtime. MA. 179807.
however. the daily-paid employees must be paid their regular salaries on 9 . SHERYL OABEL AND MANILA RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT CORP. No. 1995. No. and (2) that there must have been a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship as manifested by some overt acts. There is thus much credence in the private respondent’s claim that the service agreement executed between the petitioner and MANRED is a mere ploy to circumvent the law on employment. Otherwise stated. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. As such. TOMAS and CHRIS GARMENTS WORKERS UNION-PTGWO LOCAL CHAPTER No. a cause of action already exists for the union as they are now legally allowed to challenge the status of SMCGCSUPER as exclusive bargaining representative. THE COURT OF APPEALS. G. G. STO. 149660. Clearly. G. there is no identity of causes of action to speak of since in the first petition. 2009) Cause of Action The Secretary of Labor and Employment dismissed the first petition as it was filed outside the 60-day freedom period..absent without valid or justifiable reason.R.R. the literal meaning thereof shall prevail. Such dismissal. PATRICIA A. 832.R. (TACLOBAN FAR EAST MARKETING CORPORATION and FRANCISCO Y. private respondent’s purported employment with MANRED commenced only in 1996. January 20. At that time therefore. has no bearing in the instant case since the third petition for certification election was filed well within the 60day freedom period. the union has no cause of action since they are not yet legally allowed to challenge openly and formally the status of SMCGCSUPER as the exclusive bargaining representative of the bargaining unit. 182320. way after she was hired by the petitioner as extra beverage attendant on April 24. the union has no cause of action while in the third. No. (MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP vs COURT OF APPEALS. September 11. 167426. January 12. ROMUALDEZ v. as in the herein questioned provision. 2009) Circumvention of the Law Notably. jurisprudence dictates that the burden of proof to show that there was unjustified refusal to go back to work rests on the employer. 2009) Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) If the terms of a CBA are clear and have no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties. (CHRIS GARMENTS CORPORATION vs HON. That is settled. in particular that which pertains on regularization.
In other words. his holiday pay.the holidays which are so declared by the national government. 162324. the decision of the Labor Arbiter specified that for purposes of putting up a bond should petitioner appeal. Respondents claimed that travel time from the Bacolod City Branch to the Iloilo City Branch will only take about an hour by boat and that they were even willing to defray petitioner’s transportation and lodging expenses. No. Holiday pay is a legislated benefit enacted as part of the Constitutional imperative that the State shall afford protection to labor. 2009) Computation of Award Finally. No. although the worker is forced to take a rest. on the increase in the computation of the monetary award to respondents. April 16. because petitioner continues to refuse and accord regular status to respondents and to pay them their corresponding wages even after the lapse of two 10 . and as admitted by petitioner herself. G. or prejudicial to her. JR. KASAPIAN NG MANGGA-GAWANG PINAGKAISA-RFM (KAMPI-NAFLUKMU) and SANDIGAN AT UGNAYAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PINAGKAISASFI (SUMAPI-NAFLU-KMU).. Just because an employee gets married does not mean she can already renege on a commitment she willingly made at the time of her employment particularly if such commitment does not appear to be unreasonable. February 4. F & C PAWNSHOP and JEWELRY STORE/MARCELINO FLORETE.” (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) (RFM CORPORATION-FLOUR DIVISION and SFI FEEDS DIVISION v.R. There is no showing either that petitioner’s transfer was only being used by respondents to camouflage a sinister scheme of management to rid itself of an undesirable worker in the person of petitioner. G. Otherwise. that is. Petitioner never disputed these matters. the backwages were computed only for a certain period. 2009) Company Policy As respondents creditably explained. In addition. he earns what he should earn. regardless of whether they fall on rest days. 172601. inconvenient. HERIDA v. the actual backwages to be paid to respondents are computed from the date of dismissal until the finality of the decision. (AILEEN G.R. respondents have standing policies that an employee must be single at the time of employment and must be willing to be assigned to any of its branches in the country. she no longer bound herself to be assigned to any of respondents’ branches in the country is preposterous. Petitioner’s contention that upon getting married. Its purpose is not merely “to prevent diminution of the monthly income of the workers on account of work interruptions.
2009) Conclusiveness of Judgment Third. 167426. The computation of the award for backwages and other benefits from the time the compensation was withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement is a mere legal consequence of the finding that respondent was illegally dismissed by petitioners. RIZALINA RAUT.R. 2007 only. TOMAS and CHRIS GARMENTS WORKERS UNIONPTGWO LOCAL CHAPTER No. 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay resulting from illegal dismissal must not be prejudiced by a rigid and technical application of the rules. These should be computed from the date of her illegal dismissal until this decision attains finality.R. To reiterate. we are not barred from ordering its modification. 13 th month pay. LEILA EMNACE and GINA CAPISTRANO. October 23. PATRICIA A. (HENLIN PANAY COMPANY v. Since petitioner did not appeal this factual finding. The amount of contingent fees agreed upon by the parties is subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid for his 11 . This Court is imbued with sufficient authority and discretion to review matters. No. 2009) This Court notes that the NLRC awarded backwages. It is evident that these should not be limited to said period. 832. Besides. 2009) Contingent Fee Contingent fee contracts are subject to the supervision and close scrutiny of the court in order that clients may be protected from unjust charges. August 25. G. The matter of employer-employee relationship has been resolved with finality by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the Resolution dated December 27. it may be considered as the final resolution of such issue. G. 2005 to January 23. substantive rights like the award of backwages. Thus. January 12. STO. (PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY v. No. 174209. (CHRIS GARMENTS CORPORATION vs HON. if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a complete and just resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice. “conclusiveness of judgment” has the effect of preclusion of issues. Though Bolanos did not appeal the computation of the NLRC’s award as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. the Labor Arbiter correctly included that in its order of execution. No. not otherwise assigned as errors on appeal. G. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION . 2002.(2) years from the finality of the Labor Arbiter’s decision. then. the Labor Arbiter’s order of execution simply covered the correct computation of wages and other payments enjoyed by petitioner’s regular employees.R. and service incentive leave pay from July 10. 180718.
the employment agreement may be likened into a contract of adhesion considering that it is petitioner who insists that there existed an express period of one year from April 1. 2009) Contract of Adhesion In addition. The CA committed no error of law when it awarded the attorney’s fees of Atty. TEODOSIO. G.R. 2003. the contract shall be construed against the party who drafted the same. and the parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other. (EVANGELINA MASMUD (as substitute complainant for ALEXANDER J. (SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION v. 2009) Contract of Employment Since respondent was already a regular employee months before the execution of the Employment with a Fixed Period contract. Hence. (MAGIS YOUNG ACHIEVERS’ LEARNING CENTER and MRS. No. Equally important to consider is that a contract of employment is impressed with public interest such that labor contracts must yield to the common good. G.legal services only if the suit or litigation prospers. Hence. CARIÑO v.R. October 2. G. 2002 to March 31. in cases of doubt which will cause a great imbalance of rights against one of the parties. 2009) Corporate Rehabilitation Given these premises. 12 . VIOLETA T. where the very employment of respondent is at stake. MASMUD) v. EDUARDO L. Go and Evangelina’s husband. 178835. Go and allowed him to receive an equivalent of 39% of the monetary award. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. Provisions of applicable statutes are deemed written into the contract. ADELAIDA . 183385.R. While contracts of adhesion are valid and binding. No. The employment status of a person is defined and prescribed by law and not by what the parties say it should be. in this case. The Court finds nothing illegal in the contingent fee contract between Atty. the doubt as to the period of employment must be construed in her favor. MANALO. no valid fixed-term contract was executed. No. A much higher compensation is allowed as contingent fees because of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails. it is not difficult to understand why actions for claims against the ailing enterprise have to be suspended. February 13. its execution was merely a ploy on SMC’s part to deprive respondent of his tenurial security. February 13. using as proof its own copy of the agreement. 163033.
Court of Appeals.R. In addition.for money or otherwise --must yield to the greater imperative of corporate rehabilitation. G. claims for payment of obligations incurred by the corporation in the ordinary course of business. is of no moment. be suspended. the dismissal was valid. Enforcement of writs of execution issued by judicial or quasijudicial tribunals. Viernes is an illegal dismissal case. likewise.R. 2009) Disability Benefits Under paragraph 20. G. (CELEBES JAPAN FOODS CORPORATION V. but without the observance of procedural due process.It then becomes easy to accept the hypothesis that the date when the claim arose. 167768. since such writs emanate from “actions for claims. such as in the case of Balayan Colleges v. and without warning or a formal notice. all actions for claims against it --. or when the action is filed.590. April 17.5 of the parties’ CBA. June 5. the manner of termination was done in a humiliating and insulting manner. as it was due to an authorized cause. and ROLF WILTSCHEK v. No. the nominal damages awarded was only P2. National Labor Relations Commission to support its claim for the reduction of the award of nominal damages is misplaced. told that she was dismissed. TRINIDAD M. this Court awarded moral damages to a teacher who was flatly. As long as the corporation is under a management committee or a rehabilitation receiver. SUSAN YERMO G. INC. National Labor Relations Commission where the employer posted copies of its letters of termination to the teachers inside the school campus and it also furnished copies to the town mayor and Parish Priest of their community for the purpose of maligning the teachers’ reputation.” must. No. and the only award given was nominal damages. INC. it is stipulated that “[a] seafarer whose disability is assessed at 50% or more under the 13 . In this case. (MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY. INC.00 equivalent to one-month salary of the employee. as already mentioned. The factual circumstances are different. So also in the case of Chiang Kai Shek School v. 169173. computed from the time the compensation was withheld up to the actual reinstatement.1. ENRIQUEZ. VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY. v.R. excepting only. No. and the employer was ordered to pay backwages inclusive of allowances and other benefits. 2009) In previous cases where moral damages and attorney’s fees were awarded. (M+W ZANDER PHILIPPINES. 175855 October 2. 2009) Damages Petitioner's reliance on Viernes v. since there was no authorized cause for the dismissal of the employees. since the dismissal was done without due process..
we find that Suganob is entitled to Grade 1 disability benefits which corresponds to total and permanent disability. when preparing meals for the crew members./Marlow Navigation Co. 2002. does not mean absolute helplessness. or totally paralyzed. Permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days. Total disability. water. if in fact Suganob is clear and fit to work on October 29. What is necessary is that the injury must be such that the employee cannot pursue his usual work and earn therefrom. Hence.. Moreover. but he was not. on the other hand. fish. Inc. 2001. he would have been taken back by petitioners to continue his work as a Chief Cook. Suganob’s disability is permanent since he was unable to work from the time he was medically repatriated on September 17. or more than 7 months.000. . Suganob’s disability is also total. x x x To be entitled to Grade 1 disability benefits. In disability compensation. 2001 up to the time the complaint was filed on April 25. enlightens. Due to his illness. the employee’s disability must not only be total but also permanent. So Philimare. Both the companydesignated physician and Suganob’s physician found that Suganob is unfit to continue his duties as a Chief Cook since his illness prevented him from continuing his duties as such..POEA Employment Contract shall x x x be regarded as permanently unfit for further sea service in any capacity and entitled to 100% compensation. etc. v. Clearly. as correctly found by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. .000. it is not the injury which is compensated.66%.00 for ratings. he is entitled to a 100% disability compensation of US$60. he can no longer perform work which is part of his daily routine as Chief Cook like lifting heavy loads of frozen meat. x x x US$60.e. Ltd. regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any of his body. thus: Apropos the appropriate disability benefits that respondent is entitled to. His disability is undoubtedly permanent. Suganob. i. but rather the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one’s earning capacity.” Petitioner’s disability rating being 68. Total disability does not require that the employee be absolutely disabled. (Emphasis supplied) 14 .
(LEOPOLDO ABANTE v. When petitioner Nisda was employed on 7 August 2001. 1997 . which she also told her husband who got mad. never asked for any clarificatory hearing during the plant-level proceedings. ILORETA v. 182430. SEA SERVE MARITIME AGENCY and KHALIFA A. INC. it was the 2000 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels (hereinafter referred to simply as Amended Standard Terms and Conditions for brevity) that applied and were deemed written in or appended to his POEA-SEC. 2009) As with all other kinds of worker. in Filipino. 183908. But unlike that of others. Taken together with the testimonies of other witnesses who gave their statements on how 15 . No. No. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS. as she submitted it on the very same day that the memo was served on her. NO. December 4. Thus. G. December 4. The explanation.R. which incorporated the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels. the failure of the company-designated physician to pronounce petitioner fit to work within the 120-day period entitles him to permanent total disability benefit in the amount of US$60. which are considered to be the minimum requirements acceptable to the government for the employment of Filipino seafarers on board foreign ocean-going vessels. R. KJGS FLEET MANAGEMENT MANILA G. after filing her explanation in response to the employer’s July 1. the terms and conditions of a seafarer’s employment is governed by the provisions of the contract he signs at the time he is hired. deemed written in the seafarer’s contract is a set of standard provisions set and implemented by the POEA.00.. She also had ample opportunity to explain her side vis-àvis the principal charge against her — her involvement in the incident of June 30. ALGOSAIBI DIVING AND MARINE SERVICES. It is a matter of record that the petitioner lost no time in submitting the required explanation. July 23. we significantly note that petitioner. NISDA v. 179177. 1997 memo. 2009) Dismissal In the present case. narrated among others the indifferent and discriminatory treatment she had been receiving from the group of Nilo Echavez. the issue of whether petitioner Nisda can legally demand and claim disability benefits from respondents Sea Serve and ADAMS for an illness suffered is best addressed by the provisions of his POEA-SEC.R.(JOELSON O.000. 2009) Given a seafarer’s entitlement to permanent disability benefits when he is unable to work for more than 120 days. (CARLOS N. G. called the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels.
2009) These discriminatory acts were calculated to make petitioner feel that he is no longer welcome nor needed in respondent company − short of sending him an actual notice of termination..the petitioner encouraged her husband to attack Echavez (all of which were duly and seasonably disclosed). (ROSARIO A. the petitioner cannot claim that the respondent company did not give her ample opportunity to be heard. unreasonable or unlikely. 2009) 16 . therefore.R. G. 179985. If the employer fails to overcome this burden of proof. or when a clear discrimination.. inconvenient. 2009) • Constructive Dismissal Case law holds that constructive dismissal occurs when there is cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible. or prejudicial to the employee and that the transfer does not involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of salary and other benefits. 176506. 156766.R. September 18. December 4. JONAR P. INC. B&B FISH BROKER/NORBERTO M. FORMANTES v. No. MARTINEZ v. No.R.. (FE LA ROSA et. November 25. when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay or both. v. 170661. 177059. the employer has the burden of proving that the transfer of an employee is for just and valid grounds. but there was constructive dismissal.R. G.G. insensibility. We. 2009) What thus surfaces is that petitioner was constructively dismissed. Respondent’s sudden. March 13. (ODILON L. (RAMON B. the employee’s transfer is tantamount to unlawful constructive dismissal. such as genuine business necessity..R. DUNCAN PHARMACEUTICALS. 2009) Time and again we have ruled that in constructive dismissal cases. INC. No. All told. G. GATUS v. PHILS. (MERCK SHARP AND DOHME (PHILIPPINES) v. al. et al. petitioner having been placed in a position where continued employment was rendered impossible and unreasonable by the circumstances indicated above. No actual dismissal might have occurred in the sense that petitioner was not served with a notice of termination. we are convinced that the respondent company acted based on a valid cause for dismissal and observed the required procedures in so acting. The employer must demonstrate that the transfer is not unreasonable. No. No. QUALITY HOUSE. or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. arbitrary and unfounded adoption of the two-day work scheme which greatly reduced petitioners’ salaries renders it liable for constructive dismissal. and CHRISTOPHER CHUA. LUCINARIO. ROBLES. G. hold that respondent constructively dismissed petitioner from the service. AMBASSADOR HOTEL. April 16.
Inc. who was a managerial employee. 2009) • Dismissal due to Union Security Clauses Nonetheless. 2009) • Dismissal of Managerial Employees In view of the lack of proper investigation into the charges against respondent. subject only to the requirement of due process. and always with due process. No. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION.In the present case. are entitled to security of tenure. the respondent’s act of leaving the petitioners’ premises was in reality not his choice but a situation the petitioners created. petitioners failed to show that they have a just cause for terminating his employment. Thus. (CRC AGRICULTURAL TRADING and ROLANDO B. 165407. G. Managerial employees. 2009) • Dismissal of Union Officer 17 . Manager. For to allow its untrammeled enforcement would encourage arbitrary dismissal and abuse by the employer. the petitioners ceased verbally communicating with the respondent and giving him work assignment after suspecting that he had forged purchase receipts. the same is not without a condition or restriction. No. 177664. We have said time and again that dismissals pursuant to union security clauses are valid and legal. First Philippine Scales. no less than rank-and-file laborers are entitled to due process. the respondent was forced to leave the petitioners’ compound with his family and to transfer to a nearby place. it is nonetheless settled that confidential and managerial employees cannot be arbitrarily dismissed at any time. (CASA CEBUANA INCORPORADA and ANGELA FIGUEROA PAULIN v. We emphasized that the enforcement of union security clauses is authorized by law. December 23. Thus. too. while We uphold dismissal pursuant to a union security clause. LEUTERIO.R. June 5. and/or Amparo Policarpio. G. Respondents’ alleged infractions amount to nothing more than bare accusations and unilateral conclusions that do not provide legal justification for his termination from employment. (Herminigildo Inguillo and Zenaida Bergante v. CATINDIG v. No. Under this situation. IRENEO P.R. Although petitioners have wider latitude of discretion in terminating respondent. provided such enforcement is not characterized by arbitrariness. 176040. G. to the detriment of the employees. to safeguard the rights of the employees. and without cause as reasonably established in an appropriate investigation. fair standards of employment and the protection of labor laws. Such employees. notice and hearing prior to dismissal.R. In like manner. September 4. that is.
R. ROBERTO F. G. AGITO. et. notice and hearing. the only defense of petitioner against the charge of illegal dismissal being that respondents were not its employees. As regular employees of petitioner. 2009) As the employer. none of which were alleged or proven to exist in this case.” This reflects the intent of the legislature to require “knowledge” as a condition sine qua non before a union officer can be dismissed from employment for participating in an illegal strike. Respondents were not served notices informing them of the particular acts for which their dismissal was sought. Nor were they required to give their side regarding the charges made against them.. February 13. No. al. No. et al.R. it failed to show any valid or authorized cause under the Labor Code which allowed it to terminate the services of individual respondents. G. The provision is worded in such a way as to make it very difficult for employers to circumvent the law by arbitrarily dismissing employees in the guise of exercising management prerogative. DE LEON v. Certainly. i. 158956. petitioner shall be deemed the true employer of respondents. July 13.. Individual respondents were definitely denied due process. Indeed. AND ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS.R. Petitioner failed to discharge this burden. 2009) • Illegal Dismissal With the finding that Interserve was engaged in prohibited laboronly contracting. 168406. ILIASCOR EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS UNION – SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES FEDERATION OF LABOR (IEWU-SPFL). benjamin bautista. (ILIGAN CEMENT CORPORATION v. the respondents’ dismissal was not carried out in accordance with law and.. 2009) 18 . al.Note that the verb “participates” is preceded by the adverb “knowingly. Having failed to establish compliance with the requirements on termination of employment under the Labor Code. Records also failed to show that petitioner afforded respondents the twin requirements of procedural due process. and ATTY. No. petitioner has the burden of proving that the dismissal of petitioner was for a cause allowed under the law and that petitioner was afforded procedural due process. prior to their dismissal. ALAN M. (CLUB FILIPINO. Neither did petitioner show that individual respondents were given ample opportunity to contest the legality of their dismissal.e. G. April 24. This is but one aspect of the State’s constitutional and statutory mandate to protect the rights of employees to self-organization. INC. the dismissal of individual respondents was tainted with illegality. et. INC v.. respondents cannot be dismissed except for just or authorized causes. (COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS. 179546. illegal. No notice of such impending termination was ever given to them. therefore.
2009) Therefore. October 23. we find no overt act on the part of petitioner that he was ready to sever his employment ties. Undeniably.R. which include backwages and reinstatement or separation pay. the requisite proof therefor was not presented before the NLRC which was the proper forum. 175345.. this Court finds no reason to disturb its finding that the retrenchment of the flight attendants was illegally executed. G. No. It would have been illogical for petitioner to resign and then file a complaint for illegal dismissal later on. / ORATA TRADING and FLORDELIZA LEGASPI. October 2. A day after the incident. she was verbally dismissed from her employment without being given the chance to be heard and defend herself. No. (HENLIN PANAY COMPANY v. Consequently. the flight attendants affected are entitled to the reliefs provided by law. As held in the Decision sought to be reconsidered. 2009) Clearly. In fact. PAL failed to observe the procedure and requirements for a valid retrenchment. First. If petitioner was determined to resign. 180718. petitioner was unceremoniously dismissed in this case. there is no just or authorized cause for petitioners to terminate her employment. 178083. (BALTAZAR L. as the case may be. August 19. Second. More importantly. Her alleged act of dishonesty of “passing out” food for free was not proven. Neither was there incompetence on her part when some food items were not punched in the cash register as she was not the cashier manning it when the food items were ordered. Hence.In this case. he would not have commenced the action for illegal dismissal. Bolanos’s case is one of illegal dismissal.R.PATRIA CHIONG and COURT OF APPEALS. The alleged resignation was actually premised by respondents only on the filing of the complaint for separation pay. 2000. Bolanos was not afforded due process by petitioners before she was dismissed. PAYNO v. What strongly negates the claim of resignation is the fact that petitioner filed the amended complaint for illegal dismissal immediately after he was not allowed to report for work on June 3. v. 2009) 19 .R. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION . INC. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES. G. Assuming that PAL was indeed suffering financial losses. (FLIGHT ATTENDANTS AND STEWARDS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (FASAP). the other cashier even owned up to said mistake. ORIZON TRADING CORP. the manner of the retrenchment was not in accordance with the procedure required by law. but this alone is not sufficient proof that petitioner intended to resign from the company. No.G. Resignation is inconsistent with the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal. the retrenchment of the flight attendants amounted to illegal dismissal. as respondents posited.
but due to inadvertence.R.00. the appeal was reinstated on February 22. 2000. considered the appeal abandoned pursuant to Section 1(c). December 4. the CA issued a minute resolution dated June 7. otherwise. In fact. the Court has emphasized that the doctrine of “strained relations” should be strictly applied so as not to deprive an illegally dismissed employee of his right to reinstatement. Upon respondent's motion for reconsideration. No. the amount remitted lacked the amount of P10. ROMEL S. DUBRICO. Neither can we sustain the NLRC’s conclusion that petitioner’s position is confidential in nature. 1999. without any antagonism having been reported thus far by any of the parties. 182216. thus.. the CA in a Resolution dated November 22. an unjustly dismissed employee can never be reinstated. Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Court. Petitioner was copy-furnished all the resolutions issued by the CA. (EMCOR INCORPORATED v. G. because such issue had never been raised in any of the pleadings filed before the CA. MA. Notably. Every labor dispute almost always results in “strained relations. such issue was only raised for the first time in its Reply filed with us.” and the phrase cannot be given an overarching interpretation. The assumption of strained relations was already debunked by the fact that as early as March 2006 petitioner returned to work for respondent CCBP.In fine. (PLANTATION BAY RESORT and SPA v. G.00 to complete the docket and other fees.R. September 8. No. Respondent complied. we find that it is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CA on this ground. et al. 1999 requiring respondent to remit the amount of P510. Receipt of proceeds from sales of respondent CCBP’s products does not make petitioner a confidential employee. in regard to (2) 20 . 2009) Docket Fees Anent petitioner's claim regarding respondent's failure to pay the full amount of docket fees at the time of the filing of the petition with the CA. SIENES. but petitioner never raised the issue of incomplete payment of docket fees. 2009) Doctrine of Strained Relationship To protect the employee’s security of tenure. LOURDES D. A confidential employee is one who (1) assists or acts in a confidential capacity. respondents are deemed to have been illegally dismissed. as petitioners failed to indubitably prove that respondents were guilty of drug use in contravention of its drug-free workplace policy amounting to serious misconduct. 152101.
R. SAN MIGUEL FOODS. Time and again. No. G. if we shall compel reinstatement.R. (CRC AGRICULTURAL TRADING and ROLANDO B. and will only worsen with possible adverse effects on the parties. November 5. Verily. thus. CATINDIG v. 180551. We said: Labor Relations In any event. (REYNALDO G. this Court has recognized that strained relations between the employer and employee is an exception to the rule requiring actual reinstatement for illegally dismissed employees for the practical reason that the already existing antagonism will only fester and deteriorate.persons who formulate. in turn. G. we answered in the negative. reinstatement is no longer feasible because of the strained relations between the petitioners and the respondent. REYES v. gives rise to another question: Does the implementation of the downsizing scheme preclude petitioner from availing the services of contractual and agency-hired employees? In Asian Alcohol Corporation v. we have held that an employer’s good faith in implementing a redundancy program is not necessarily destroyed by availment of the services of an independent contractor to replace the services of the terminated employees. (ERWIN H. the use of a viable substitute that protects the interests of both parties while ensuring that the law is respected. 2009) In conclusion. 177664. and effectuate management policies specifically in the field of labor relations. determine. private respondent failed to proffer any proof that the management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner in engaging the services of an independent contractor to operate the Laura wells. petitioner’s job as a salesman does not fall under this qualification. it bears to stress that it is human nature that some hostility will inevitably arise between parties as a result of litigation. No. but the same does not always constitute strained relations in the absence of proof or explanation that such indeed exists. 21 . 2009) In the present case. G. CABIGTING v. No. In the case at bar. We have previously ruled that the reduction of the number of workers in a company made necessary by the introduction of the services of an independent contractor is justified when the latter is undertaken in order to effectuate more economic and efficient methods of production. Absent such proof. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. National Commission. INC.R. 167706. 2009) Downsizing Scheme This. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. February 10. December 23.
This does not. Rule XXIII. G. and (2) a written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances. SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATTNATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN THE HOTEL AND RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES (SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN).the Court has no basis to interfere with the bona fide decision of management to effect more economic and efficient methods of production. In all of these instances. (HEPI).R. and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side. the strike staged by officers and members of respondent Union is. 182570.. G. the employer plays an active role by providing the employee with the opportunity to present his side and answer the charges in substantial compliance with due process. VENTURA. serves to apprise the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought. INC. With regard to the requirement of a hearing. June 5. memorandum or oral argument. INC. (HOTEL ENTERPRISES OF THE PHILIPPINES. owner of Hyatt Regency Manila. GENUINO ICE CO. and the availment of contractual and agency-hired employees legal. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION.. illegal. position papers. The parties may be heard through pleadings. it has been consistently held that the twin requirements of notice and hearing are essential elements of due process.R. No. January 27. vs. v. The second notice on the other hand seeks to inform the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. written explanations. mean a full adversarial proceeding. With petitioner’s downsizing scheme being valid. Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code and Section 2. COURT OF APPEALS. 2009) Due Process It is well settled that the basic requirement of notice and hearing in termination cases is for the employer to inform the employee of the specific charges against him and to hear his side and defenses. 2009) In the dismissal of employees.( ROMEO N. 165756. perforce. to wit: (1) a written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination. The first notice which may be considered as the proper charge. grounds have been established to justify his termination. and HECTOR GENUINO. No. it should be stressed 22 . however. Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code require the employer to furnish the employee with two written notices.
R. Based on the foregoing. But it also found that the employer did not follow the notice requirement demanded by due process. Its disregard is a matter of serious concern since it constitutes a safeguard of the highest order in response to man’s innate sense of justice. al. CONSUNJI. The test for the fair procedure guaranteed under Article 277(b) cannot be whether there has been a formal pretermination confrontation between the employer and the employee. 2009) The case of Agabon v. we ruled that this requirement is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with at will. or ineffectual. EDPAN v. or render it illegal. It ruled that this violation of due process on the part of the employer did not nullify the dismissal. Section 2(d). Eleonor did not abandon her work. (PHILIPPINE PASAY CHUNG HUA ACADEMY and EMILIO CHING v. Petitioner was not able to send the necessary notice requirement to Eleonor. Nonetheless.that the essence of due process lies simply in an opportunity to be heard. v. SERVANDO L. April 7. Certainly. such an exclusivist and absolutist interpretation is overly restrictive. Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code should not be taken to mean that holding an actual hearing or conference is a condition sine qua non for compliance with the due process requirement in termination of employment. the employer must comply with the due process requirement of sending notices to the employee. 171814. No. SERGIO L. v. the employer was ordered to indemnify the 23 . and not that an actual hearing should always and indispensably be held. et. (NOW SODACO AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION) AND/OR MALONE PACQUIAO AND VICTOR A. The “very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation. In Brahm Industries.. EDPAN. PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY and JOSE LUIS SANTIAGO. G. the dismissal was found by the Court to be based on a just cause because the employee abandoned his work. G.R. applies to the case at bar. The “ample opportunity to be heard” standard is neither synonymous nor similar to a formal hearing. DORIA vs. NLRC. May 8. No. GAMO. PEREZ and AMANTE G. INC. It deprives him of other equally effective forms of adducing evidence in his defense. NLRC. No. 152048. to effectively dismiss an employee for abandonment. In Agabon. et al. G. SERVANDO L. Inc. PHILIPPINE PASAY CHUNG HUA ACADEMY and EMILIO CHING) Nonetheless. 168876. (SOUTH DAVAO DEVELOPMENT COMPANY.R.” (FELIX B. 2009) Also. To confine the employee’s right to be heard to a solitary form narrows down that right. Petitioner’s belated claim that it was not able to send the notice of infraction prior to the filing of the illegal dismissal case cannot simply unacceptable.
No. G. notice shall be served at the worker’s last known address.000 as indemnity in the form of nominal damages. the Court ordered the employer to pay the employee nominal damages in the amount of P30. such is not the case here. taking into special consideration the gravity of the due process violation of the employer. It further held that the penalty should be in the nature of indemnification. 169606.July 28. November 27.R. JR.. October 2. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. 2009) In the present case. and other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time the compensation was not paid up to the time of actual reinstatement.employee for the violation of his right to due process. 2009) The petitioners clearly failed to comply with the two-notice requirement. 166705. ROGELIO AMAN. October 12. No. Jose. We hold that Aman’s dismissal not only failed to observe procedural requirements.000. MICHAELMAR PHILS. Article 279 of the Labor Code mandates that the employee who is illegally dismissed and not given due process is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and full backwages. No. no such notice was served to petitioner. MADRIAGA. 182499.00.JAYME GO and MERLITA GO. it also lacked an authorized cause. the propriety of Jose. No. the lack of due process does not render the dismissal ineffectual but merely gives rise to the payment of P30. Thus. (MANTLE TRADING SERVICES. v. respondents shall also be liable in the amount of P30. (CONCEPCION FAELDONIA v. was not given any written notice about his dismissal.. in the form of nominal damages and should depend on the facts of each case. However. (METRO CONSTRUCTION. considering the relevant circumstances. V. G. INC. (BERNARDO B.000 in nominal damages. JOSE.R. the ground alleged by respondents. When the dismissal is for just cause. Here. Nothing in the records shows that the petitioners ever sent the respondent a written notice informing him of the ground for which his dismissal was sought. 2009) In cases of abandonment of work. Jr. However. for breach of the due process requirements. It does not also appear that the petitioners held a hearing where the respondent was given the 24 .G. INC.2009) Had Metro’s cause for terminating Aman rested on a just or authorized cause yet failed to observe procedural requirements.000. in Agabon. TONG YAK GROCERIES. Hence.G. inclusive of allowances.R. INCORPORATED AND/OR BOBBY DEL ROSARIO v. then Metro will only be liable for nominal damages worth P30.’s dismissal is not affected by the lack of written notices. 168324. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PABLO S. Jr.R.
171814. it is clear that an employer-employee relationship has existed between petitioner corporation and respondents since the beginning and such relationship did not cease despite their reassignments and the change of payment scheme. Thus. G. CATINDIG v. It was also in the exercise of the same power that petitioner corporation put Gamo in charge of the copra workers although under a different payment scheme. the Court has frequently applied the four-fold test: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee. CONSUNJI. It even issued certifications dated October 10. the respondent’s dismissal was illegal. In this case. 2009) What is more. May 8. 2008.” which is considered the most important element. 2009) Employer-Employee Relationship In order to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship. or the so called “control test. the Medicare. it does not require the actual exercise of such power. their status as petitioner corporation’s employees did not cease.opportunity to answer the charges of abandonment. G. purchased stocks through the employee stock option plan. Likewise. (SOUTH DAVAO DEVELOPMENT COMPANY. From the time they were hired by petitioner corporation up to the time that they were reassigned to work under Gamo’s supervision. GAMO. and was entitled to vacation and 25 . Neither did the petitioners send a written notice to the respondent informing the latter that his service had been terminated and the reasons for the termination of employment. No. The company also made her a member of the PDMC’s savings and provident plan and its retirement plan. Under these facts. December 23. (3) the power of dismissal. et. It grouped her with the managers covered by the company’s group hospitalization insurance. and the Pag-Ibig Fund. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. No. al.. v. she underwent regular employee performance appraisals. (CRC AGRICULTURAL TRADING and ROLANDO B. respondent PDMC enrolled petitioner Gomez with the Social Security System. it was in the exercise of its power of control when petitioner corporation transferred the copra workers from their previous assignments to work as copraceros. it is sufficient that the power to control the manner of doing the work exists.R. SERGIO L. INC. 177664. payment of their wages was merely coursed through Gamo. (2) the payment of wages. stating that Gomez was a permanent employee and that the company had remitted combined contributions during her tenure.R. (NOW SODACO AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION) AND/OR MALONE PACQUIAO AND VICTOR A. and (4) the power to control the employee’s conduct. Likewise. As to the most determinative test―the power of control.
the need for sufficient manpower to carry them out does not. (2) the payment of wages.R. PNOC DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION. as borne out by the findings of the NLRC. (GLORIA V. January 20. while the letter dated May 17. and not necessarily the exercise thereof. forbidding the clinic from receiving cash payments from the resort’s guests is a matter of financial policy in 26 . These are all indicia of an employer-employee relationship which respondent PDMC failed to refute. 2009) Contrary to petitioners’ contention. SHERYL OABEL AND MANILA RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT CORP. administrative in nature. 149660. GOMEZ v. vs. In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties. in the process exercising control. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (5th DIVISION). More importantly. but employees of petitioner. The letter addressed to respondent doctor dated February 7. the power of control is the most important element. G. (DEALCO FARMS. 2009) In this regard. the various office directives issued by Shangri-la’s officers do not imply that it is Shangri-la’s management and not respondent doctor who exercises control over them or that Shangri-la has control over how the doctor and the nurses perform their work. 174044.. or the so-called “control test. although the tasks themselves may vary. PDMC even withheld taxes on her salary and declared her as an employee in the official Bureau of Internal Revenue forms. at most.” Of the four. No. both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC examined and weighed the circumstances against the four-fold test which has the following elements: (1) the power to hire. November 27.. the petitioner determines the nature of the tasks to be performed by the private respondent. 2009) • Control Test In the case at bench. Lotlot Dagat. Thus. 153192 January 30. No. Reyes giving instructions regarding the replenishment of emergency kits is. INC. In any event.R. 2004 from Shangri-la’s Assistant Financial Controller. and (4) the power to control the employees’ conduct. (3) the power to dismiss. (MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP vs COURT OF APPEALS. G. it has not escaped the notice of the Court that the operations of the hotel itself do not cease with the end of each event or function and that there is an ever present need for individuals to perform certain tasks necessary in the petitioner’s business. No. G. both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC were one in their conclusion that respondents were not independent contractors.emergency leaves. 2003 from a certain Tata L.R. the control test merely calls for the existence of the right to control. related as it is to safety matters.
169712.R. the indolent or the wrongdoer. such a situation makes no sense. equity is available only in the absence of law and not as its replacement. the Court cannot grant her plea for the award of financial benefits based solely on this unfortunate circumstance. This principle of law applies to corporations as well. SHANGRI-LA’S MACTAN ISLAND RESORT and DR. presumably. 2009) To reiterate. prevents a person from rejecting his previous acts and representations to the prejudice of others who have relied on them. In fine.) AND/OR KEN KUBOTA.R. (GLORIA V. The PDMC in this case is estopped from claiming that despite all the appearances of regular employment that it weaved around petitioner Gomez’s position it must have technically hired her only as a corporate officer. G. it is not petitioners’ employer. (MA. MAMORU ONO and JUNICHI HIROSE.SERVICE INC. G. TIRAZONA. JESSICA J. directive of respondent. The board and its officers made her stay on and work with the company for years under the belief that she held a regular managerial position. 2009) Estoppel Estoppel. PHILIPPINE EDS TECHNO. October 2. (PET INC. No. and the denials proffered by respondent do not shed any light to the situation. ESCASINAS and EVAN RIGOR SINGCO v.R. WENELITA S. such are indicia of control that respondent exercised over petitioners. No. 27 . allegedly from SSCP. No. (JEROMIE D. TOMAQUIN v. 185251. as Shangri-la does not control how the work should be performed by petitioners. G. For all its conceded merit. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY. in the guise of equity. Equity as an exceptional extenuating circumstance does not favor. PEPITO. 178827. January 20.R. It is but reasonable to conclude that. to benefit from its own fault. nor may it be used to reward. LOCSIN and EDDIE B. This Court will not allow a party. with the behest and. 2009) Equity While the Court commiserates with the plight of Tirazona. while respondent and SSCP no longer had any legal relationship with the termination of the Agreement. petitioners remained at their post securing the premises of respondent while receiving their salaries. for that matter. an equitable principle rooted on natural justice. March 4. who has recently manifested that she has since been suffering from her poor health condition.order to ensure proper sharing of the proceeds. Clearly. petitioners continued with their services. Evidently. considering that Shangri-la and respondent doctor share in the guests’ payments for medical services rendered. (RAUL G. vs.
constituted substantial evidence to prove petitioners’ culpability. but more importantly to identify the bearers thereof as bona fide employees of the firm or institution that issued them.R. G. Petitioners’ infractions were willful and serious. et al. indubitably constitutes substantial evidence sufficient to support only one conclusion: that respondents were indeed employees of MCI. G.R. dates and time of their (petitioners’) participation. 2009) Evidence It may be true that the NBI agents’ affidavit did not directly implicate petitioners in the scheme.. thus their dismissal was proper under the circumstances. However. narrated in their affidavits the nature. Welsh and Derupe. July 3. MAKATI CINEMA SQUARE CORPORATION. In other words. G. PNOC DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION. No. 1999 as the date of receipt. who had personal knowledge of petitioners’ activities. 174044. These pieces of evidence. when taken together. 170014. v. No. the Postmaster’s certification is offered to overcome the presumption that the Malate Post Office regularly performed its official duties when the registry return card was filled up by the recipient of the labor arbiter’s decision with November 21. their co-employees Gimena. Neither did they explain why their former colleagues would unjustly and falsely testify against them even if they had the opportunity to defend themselves during the administrative investigations conducted by respondent. its evidentiary value must be differentiated from the situation presently before us where the postmaster’s certification is intended to prove that the post office had committed a mistake in placing the date of receipt on the registry return card. We find it significant that both the petitioner and 28 .R. November 27. 2009) It is common practice for companies to provide identification cards to individuals not only as a security measure. No. INC. while a postmaster’s certification is usually sufficient proof of mailing. (RENITA DEL ROSARIO. aside from their inclusion in MCI’s summary payroll.. It is of no moment that they were acquitted in the criminal case. et al. MAGDALENA MADJOS .GOMEZ v. The provision of companyissued identification cards and uniforms to respondents. Petitioners did not refute these sworn statements. 185094. (MASONIC CONTRACTOR. November 25. v. 2009) • Proof of Mailing In this case and in like manner.
170689. 170705) Finality of Factual Findings The well-entrenched rule is that factual findings of administrative or quasi-judicial bodies. if supported by substantial evidence. July 15. G. 182570. VENTURA. To be sure. 2009) Execution We would like to stress the settled rule that the power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. 2009) Lastly.. and bind the Court when supported by substantial evidence. 2009) 29 . v.” (DEALCO FARMS. even finality. G. When passed upon and upheld by the CA. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (5th DIVISION).R.R. Longestablished is the doctrine that findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are accorded respect. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC). which are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions. the Court finds that none are applicable to the present case. we are compelled to deny it of any evidentiary value for the purpose it was submitted. they are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court and will not normally be disturbed. are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. No. GENUINO ICE CO. Rule 133 defines substantial evidence as “that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. INC. and even incurs liability if he wrongfully levies upon the property of a third person. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. vs. INC. in its assailed decision.. No. 153192 January 30. Though this doctrine is not without exceptions.the postmaster’s certification failed to show that the Malate Post Office committed an inadvertence in handling the registry return card so that a corrective certification from the Postmaster was necessary..R. A sheriff is not authorized to attach or levy on property not belonging to the judgment debtor. (PANTRANCO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEA-PTGWO) and PANTRANCO RETRENCHED EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PANREA) v. No. G. No. EDUARDO VALENCIA. one man’s goods shall not be sold for another man’s debts. INC. the CA affirmed the ruling of the NLRC and adopted as its own the latter's factual findings. Section 5. 159358. No. vs. G. G. In the absence of such justification for the certification. and HECTOR GENUINO. (EUREKA PERSONNEL & MANAGEMENT SERVICES.R. ROMEO N. COURT OF APPEALS. January 27.R.
to resolve factual issues. made a factual finding not supported by substantial evidence. v.(EMCOR 30 .R. as amended by Republic Act 7902. al. we have definitively ruled that the proper remedy to ask for the review of a decision of the NLRC is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. No. they may be examined by the courts. 183385. It is within the jurisdiction of the CA. AMBASSADOR HOTEL. (FE LA ROSA et. in its assailed decision or resolution.R. it has already been explained that under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa (BP) 129. 177059. G. Inc. When there is a showing that the factual findings of administrative bodies were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record. is devoid of merit.. Moreover. are almost beyond the power of review by the Supreme Court. 2009) The issue of the reasonableness of attorney's fees is a question of fact. The findings of the CA. the CA – pursuant to the exercise of its original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari – was specifically given the power to pass upon the evidence. and that such petition should be filed with the CA in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts. March 13. The CA can grant the petition for certiorari if it finds that the NLRC. However. Well-settled is the rule that conclusions and findings of fact of the CA are entitled to great weight on appeal and will not be disturbed except for strong and cogent reasons which are absent in the case at bench. if and when necessary.G. 2009) Petitioner's argument that the CA erred and abused its discretion in reversing the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. We agree with petitioner that factual findings of quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are accorded great respect and even finality by the courts. February 13. Martin Funeral Homes v. As early as St. we held: The power of the CA to review NLRC decisions via a Rule 65 petition is now a settled issue. and justified the work rotation/reduction scheme adopted by respondent as a valid exercise of management prerogative in light of respondent’s business losses. this rule is not absolute.• Exception The appellate court predicated its reversal of the NLRC decision that petitioners were illegally dismissed on petitioners’ supposed abandonment of their jobs. (EVANGELINA MASMUD (as substitute complainant for ALEXANDER J. In R & E Transport. No. NLRC. as it is the court's policy of non-interference in the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the administrative bodies. MASMUD) v. Latag. which are supported by substantial evidence. v. whose jurisdiction over labor cases has been expanded to review the findings of the NLRC.
if there are several petitioners. No. 2009) Forum Shopping On the part of Mr. he flagrantly violated the rule on the filing of a certificate of non-forum shopping. the requirement on the filing of the certificate against forum shopping has not been complied with. knowing fully well that he was no longer the representative of the NCTEA. 152923. As explained above. 152923. INC. G. Gumarang cannot represent the NCTEA. not once but twice. (NORTHEASTERN COLLEGE TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs. 2009) Without the required authority from the NCTEA. G. he should have had the authority to do so. G. Gumarang – both of them should sign the certificate against forum shopping. January 19. January 19. the one signing on his behalf must have been duly authorized. 152101. His omission and misrepresentation are clear indications of bad faith of which this Court does not approve.INCORPORATED v. September 8. He should have known that by including NCTEA as petitioner and signing as its representative. requirement of a certification against forum shopping. If. No.R. When he alone signed on his behalf and that of the NCTEA. Gumarang. there being two petitioners – NCTEA and Mr. In the case before us. Mr. INC.. MA. LOURDES D. he did not possess. (NORTHEASTERN COLLEGE TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs. he claimed to be the duly authorized representative of the NCTEA which he was not. As in the Court of Appeals. Since there was only one signatory. explains: The reason for this is that the principal party has actual knowledge whether a petition has previously been filed involving the same case or substantially the same issues. and to convince this Court that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of justice..R. Castro. Gumarang failed to show why the duly authorized representative of the NCTEA was unable to sign the certification. 2009) Fuentebella and Rolling Hills Memorial Park v. Mr. SIENES. NORTHEASTERN COLLEGE. why did he not inform both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of such fact when he filed the petitions? Instead. the failure of one to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping is a deficiency which is a ground for the dismissal of the petition. This.R. the principal party cannot sign the petition. for any reason. on the 31 . NORTHEASTERN COLLEGE. No.
July 30. an officer of the corporation can sign the certification against forum shopping as long as he is authorized by a resolution of its board of directors. without any discussion on the merits of the case. that the Court of Appeals did not even review the assailed orders and focused instead on a general discussion of due process and the jurisdiction of the Regional Director. DOLE denied petitioner’s appeal based solely on petitioner’s alleged failure to file a cash or surety bond. xxxx A certification without the proper authorization is defective and constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the petition. It appears. this Court has previously ruled that the extraordinary writ of certiorari will lie if it is satisfactorily 32 . No. Since the petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals sought the reversal of the two aforesaid orders. v. . there is no such circumstance or reason in the present case which warrants the liberal application of technical rules. . it would have seen that there existed valid and sufficient grounds for finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOLE Secretary as well the Regional Director. Had the appellate court truly reviewed the records of the case. BONIFACIO L. italics and underscoring supplied) Petitioner’s discourse on relaxation of technical rules of procedure in the interest of substantial justice does not impress. In ruling and acting as it did. the certification against forum shopping should be signed by its duly authorized director or representative …[I]f the real party-in-interest is a corporate body. the appellate court necessarily had to examine the evidence anew to determine whether the conclusions of the DOLE were supported by the evidence presented. 2009) Grave Abuse of Discretion The Regional Director fully relied on the self-serving allegations of respondent and misinterpreted the documents presented as evidence by respondent. the Court finds that the Court of Appeals may be properly subjected to its certiorari jurisdiction. After all. however.. To make matters worse. emphasis. MIRANDO. While there have been instances when the Court dispensed with technicalities on the basis of special circumstances or compelling reasons. (Citations omitted. G. Where the petitioner is a corporation. (EAGLE STAR SECURITY SERVICES. INC. 179512.R.
. while the phrase “ample opportunity to be heard” may in fact include an actual hearing.R. 2009) • Dialogue not Tantamount to Hearing Policarpio's allegations are self-serving. she was able to ascertain the validity of the charges mentioned in the “Petisyon. INC. PEREZ and AMANTE G. Therefore. DOLE REGION VII. Policarpio relied heavily on the “Petisyon” of FPSILU. 152048. No. is not absolutely necessary to satisfy the employee’s right to be heard. although preferred. it is not limited to a formal hearing only. Except for her claim as stated in the respondent's Position Paper. G. To be heard” does not mean verbal argumentation alone inasmuch as one may be heard just as effectively through written explanations. No. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT. 2009) Hearing A hearing means that a party should be given a chance to adduce his evidence to support his side of the case and that the evidence should be taken into account in the adjudication of the controversy. nowhere from the records can We find that Bergante and Inguillo were accorded the opportunity to present evidence in support of their defenses. In fine. THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR. May 8. submissions or pleadings. the existence of an actual. Such non-compliance is also corroborated by Bergante and Inguillo in their pleadings denouncing their unjustified dismissal.” We are not convinced. she reiterated that the objective of the dialogue was to provide the employees “the opportunity to receive the act of grace of FPSI by giving them an amount equivalent to one-half (½) month of their salary for every year of service. PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY and JOSE LUIS SANTIAGO. (FELIX B. We cannot even consider the demand and counter-offer for the payment of the employees as an amicable settlement between the parties because what took place was merely a discussion only of the amount which the employees are willing to accept and the amount which the respondents are willing to give. (Herminigildo Inguillo and Zenaida 33 . She failed to convince Us that during the dialogue.R. and JANDELEON JUEZAN. formal “trial-type” hearing. April 7.established that the tribunal had acted capriciously and whimsically in total disregard of evidence material to or even decisive of the controversy.) vs.” In her futile attempt to prove compliance with the procedural requirement. 179652. In other words. DORIA vs. G. We hold that the dialogue is not tantamount to the hearing or conference prescribed by law. (PEOPLE’S BROADCASTING(BOMBO RADYO PHILS.
G. This is especially true in the instant case. and ultimately to DA on the CECAP project. SHANGRI-LA’S In sum. De Raedt’s services could be terminated on the ground of end of contract between the DA and TMI.R. G. and/or Amparo Policarpio. (PANTRANCO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEA-PTGWO) and PANTRANCO RETRENCHED EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PANREA) v. and not on grounds under labor laws. the control of the premises. the control and supervision of the work to another. (JEROMIE D. the contention is bereft of merit. No. its interest remains inchoate and has not yet ripened into a present substantial interest. 170705) Independent Contractor The existence of an independent and permissible contractor relationship is generally established by considering the following determinants: whether the contractor is carrying on an independent business. the term and duration of the relationship. ESCASINAS and EVAN RIGOR SINGCO v. the duty to supply the premises. as the debt being claimed by PNB is secured by the accessory contract of pledge of the entire stockholdings of Mega Prime to PNB-Madecor. the right to assign the performance of a specified piece of work. Though the end of the contract between the DA and TMI was not the 34 . the skill required. Manager. firing and payment of the contractor's workers. As aptly observed by the Labor Arbiter. No. 2009 Inchoate Right Again. manner and terms of payment. which would give it the standing to maintain an action involving the subject properties. 165407. De Raedt is an independent contractor. 170689. who was engaged by SGV to render services to SGV’s client TMI. appliances. PNB only has an inchoate right to the properties of Mega Prime in case the latter would not be able to pay its indebtedness. Inc. the employer's power with respect to the hiring. De Raedt received retainer fees and benefits such as housing and subsistence allowances and medical insurance. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC).Bergante v. tools. Unlike an ordinary employee. No. and the mode.R. June 5. G.R. materials and labor. While PNB has an apparent interest in Mega Prime’s assets being the creditor of the latter for a substantial amount. the nature and extent of the work. there existed no employer-employee relationship between the parties. First Philippine Scales. regarding matters in the field of her special knowledge and training for a specific period of time.
v. 2009) The relations between capital and labor are so impressed with public interest. (RAMON B. No. No. 153192 January 30.. he was still. Most important of all.. GORRES. December 4. (SYCIP. De Raedt was disengaged from the project upon the instruction of SGV’s client. strictly speaking. 2009) Insubordination Aside from the findings of sexual abuse.ground for the withdrawal of De Raedt from the CECAP. G. respondent's employee when he received the written notices. G. No. June 16. vs.a of the Operational Instruction OI-A-AP25. we stick to the settled rule in controversies between a laborer and his master that doubts reasonably arising from the evidence should be resolved in the former’s favor. The policy is reflected in no less than the Constitution.. PHILS. As an employee. which is provided under Rule IV. Labor Code and Civil Code. 170661. 2009) Interpretation of Doubt We reject petitioner’s self-serving contention. but these were necessary to ensure SGV’s faithful compliance with the terms and conditions of the SubConsultancy Agreement it entered into with TMI. or impair the interest or convenience of the public. petitioner is also guilty of insubordination. SGV did not exercise control over the means and methods by which De Raedt performed her duties as Sociologist. DUNCAN PHARMACEUTICALS. INC.R. In case of doubt.R. VELAYO & COMPANY.R. His continued failure to carry out the reasonable oral or written instructions of his supervisor is punishable by insubordination. G. he should have at least responded thereto. 1994. (DEALCO FARMS. despite receipt of the various notices sent by respondent to him to report to the office and to submit written explanations relative to his failure to follow instructions. and neither shall act oppressively against the other. Records show that after filing a case for constructive dismissal on April 13. Having failed to substantiate its allegation on the relationship between the parties.5. petitioner continued working and performing his functions with the respondent company until his termination on May 19. SGV did impose rules on De Raedt. While petitioner cannot be faulted in believing that respondent constructively dismissed him from work. Work Rules. TMI. as instructed. FORMANTES v. all 35 . CAROL DE RAEDT. 1994 against the respondent. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (5th DIVISION). However. 161366. INC. the records of the case are bereft of showing that he filed any written explanation to any of these notices.
184298-99. or service within a definite or predetermined period. and social welfare benefits. TRAVEÑO. 2009) Joint Venture To the Court. July 31. SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA CUARESMA (for and in behalf oftheir daughter. PRODUCT IMAGE MARKETING. INC. free exercise of the right to self-organization. 2009) Job contracting or Subcontracting Permissible job contracting or subcontracting refers to an arrangement whereby a principal agrees to farm out with a contractor or subcontractor the performance of a specific job. No.White Falcon Services. regardless of whether such job. far from being a job contracting arrangement. et al v. DANPIN GUILLERMO. security of tenure.G. Nos.labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer. G. The rules on job contracting are. (OLDARICO S. BOBONGON BANANA GROWERS 36 . and EDGARDO BERGONIA. (b) the contractor has substantial capital or investment. BAYER PHILIPPINES. INC. work or. good custom.. and JAIME ORTIZ (President.R. morals. inapposite.) AND PROMOTION. April 7. public order or public policy. Under this arrangement. 179807.R. (BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER v. WHITE FALCON SERVICES. terms and conditions as they may deem convenient.. clauses. Inc. INC. Cuaresma). and (c) the agreement between the principal and contractor or subcontractor assures the contractual employees’ entitlement to all labor and occupational safety and health standards. The Court may not alter the intention of the contracting parties as gleaned from their stipulations without violating the autonomy of contracts principle under Article 1306 of the Civil Code which gives the contracting parties the utmost liberality and freedom to establish such stipulations. free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of his work except as to the results thereof. Jasmin G.R. Nos. work. therefore. is in essence a business partnership that partakes of the nature of a joint venture.. the Contract between the Cooperative and DFI. INC. service is to be performed or completed within or outside the premises of the principal. G. provided they are not contrary to law. 182978-79. (RAMY GALLEGO v. the following conditions must be met: (a) the contractor carries on a distinct and independent business and undertakes the contract work on his account under his own responsibility according to his own manner and method.
G. 180188. BEHAVIOR MODIFICATIONS. INC. G. TIANGCO. Garcia tries to deny he is an officer of ETPI. v. Not being a corporate officer. March 25.MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE. 168697. et al. 2009) Judgment We disfavor delay in the enforcement of the labor arbiter’s decision. The determination of the rights of a director and corporate officer dismissed from his employment as well as the corresponding liability of a corporation. December 14. Thus. and DOLE ASIA PHILIPPINES. No. No. if any.. It can be gathered from Atty. 2004 order.R. Once a judgment becomes final and executory. Final and executory judgments can neither be amended nor altered except for correction of clerical errors. December 11. (C-E CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. the appellate court correctly ruled that it is not the NLRC but the regular courts which have jurisdiction over the present case. Garcia’s complaint-affidavit that he was Vice President for Business Support Services and Human Resource Departments of ETPI when his 37 . he argues that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the case. 2009) Jurisdiction It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. G. 2009) In sum. 2009) Intra-Corporate Dispute Atty. the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party.R. when the labor arbiter proceeded with the consolidated cases despite the SEC suspension order. G. SLIMMERS WORLD INTERNATIONAL.R. 160146. (GINA M. he exceeded his jurisdiction to hear and decide illegal dismissal cases and the CA correctly reversed his June 16. is an intra-corporate dispute subject to the jurisdiction of the regular courts. September 3. No. One of the corporate officers provided for in the by-laws of ETPI is the Vice-President. INC.R.. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS. UNIWIDE SALES WAREHOUSE CLUB. even if the purpose is to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or of law. DIAMOND FARMS.. 164205. TIMOG AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION. (LESLIE OKOL v. INC. No. Trial and execution proceedings constitute one whole action or suit such that a case in which execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all proceedings in the execution are proceedings in the suit.
however. 179652.. It is therefore clear from the by-laws and from Atty. HIZON. One who is included in the by-laws of a corporation in its roster of corporate officers is an officer of said corporation and not a mere employee. 2009) Labor-only Contractor 38 . 128(b). No. however. G. respondent contested the findings of the labor inspector during and after the inspection and raised issues the resolution of which necessitated the examination of evidentiary matters not verifiable in the normal course of inspection. DOLE REGION VII.) vs. his removal is deemed to be an intra-corporate dispute cognizable by the SEC and not by the Labor Arbiter. (PEOPLE’S BROADCASTING(BOMBO RADYO PHILS. CREATIVE CREATURES.employment was terminated effective 16 April 2000 . EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES. (ATTY. G. the CA correctly ruled that such endorsement was no longer necessary.. 173163-64. INC. THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR. 2009) • Demarcation line Between DOLE’s Prerogative and NLRC’s Jurisdiction It can be assumed that the DOLE in the exercise of its visitorial and enforcement power somehow has to make a determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship. This is the meaning of the clause “in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists” in Art. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT. 173115. G.R. the Regional Director was divested of jurisdiction and should have endorsed the case to the appropriate Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. incidental and collateral to the DOLE’s primary function of enforcing labor standards provisions. VIRGILIO R. INC. and ATTY. VIRGILIO R. Garcia himself that he is a corporate officer. INC. such determination is merely preliminary.R. GARCIA. Considering. EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES. et al v. Hence. 2009) In sum. G. cannot be coextensive with the visitorial and enforcement power itself. Such prerogatival determination.R. The determination of the existence of employer-employee relationship is still primarily lodged with the NLRC.R. SALVADOR C. July 13. No. HIZON v. that an illegal dismissal case had been filed by petitioners wherein the existence or absence of an employer-employee relationship was also raised. and JANDELEON JUEZAN. Nos. INC. No. SALVADOR C. May 8. and ATTY. April 16. Being a corporate officer. ATTY. 171275. (VICTOR METEORO. Indeed. GARCIA v.
and work premises. No. (COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS. Under this scheme. does make a corporate officer personally liable for the debts of corporation because Section 31 of the Corporation Code is still governing law on personal liability of officers for the debts of corporation. RFM CORPORATION-BAKERY FLOUR DIVISION and JOSE MARIA CONCEPCION III. v. its supposed employees. evident that Interserve falls under the definition of a “labor-only” contractor. G. ALAN M. ILIASCOR EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS UNION – SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES FEDERATION OF LABOR (IEWU-SPFL). et al. (ILIGAN CEMENT CORPORATION v.. G. performed work which was directly related to the principal business of petitioner. September 11. equipment. It is.In sum. Here. as amended. by itself.. distorting in the process the meaning of social justice and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of undesirables. No. April 24.R. as well as Section 5(i) of the Rules Implementing Articles 106-109 of the Labor Code. INC v. thus. 158956. et. TOMADA. February 13. al. Vedali is the “laboronly” contractor. (2) the employee who is ostensibly under the employ of the “labor-only” contractor. Interserve did not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools. 2009) In a labor-only contract. AGITO. Section 31 of the Corporation Code provides: not the the the 39 . AND ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS. machineries. Article 212(e) of the Labor Code. No. The law makes the principal responsible to the employees of the “labor-only contractor” as if the principal itself directly hired or employed the employees. (EDUARDO M. If length of service justifies the mitigation of the penalty of dismissal.R. there are three parties involved: (1) the “labor-only” contractor. Tomada’s acts reflect a regrettable lack of concern for his employer. and (3) the principal who is deemed the real employer. and respondents. under Article 106 of the Labor Code. 179546. 2009) Length of Service Although his nearly two decades of service might generally be considered for some form of financial assistance to shield him from the effects of his termination. G. individual respondents are the employees and petitioner is the principal. then this Court would be awarding disloyalty. 163270. SR. 2009) Liability of Corporate Officers However. the “labor-only” contractor is the agent of the principal.R.
(M+W ZANDER PHILIPPINES. its stockholders or members and other persons.R. INC. This joint and solidary liability imposed by law against recruitment agencies and foreign employers is meant to assure the aggrieved worker of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due him. trustees or officers. or that David was guilty of gross negligence or bad faith. — Directors or trustees who willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors. 40 . 169173. No. (BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER v. Jasmin G. Nos.Liability of directors. G. We agree with petitioners that he should not be made personally liable. ENRIQUEZ. G. TRINIDAD M. The general manager of a corporation should not be made personally answerable for the payment of an illegally dismissed employee's monetary claims arising from the dismissal unless he had acted maliciously or in bad faith in terminating the services of the employee. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being. April 21. x x x There was no showing of David willingly and knowingly voting for or assenting to patently unlawful acts of the corporation. 2009) Liability of Recruitment Agencies and Foreign-Based Employer Private employment agencies are held jointly and severally liable with the foreign-based employer for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment. shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. as the General Manager. (ARMANDO DAVID v. June 5. the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be. The employer corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its officers who merely act as its agents. we come to the issue of whether Wiltschek. and ROLF WILTSCHEK v. should be personally liable together with M+W Zander. 148263 and 148271-72.R. or trustees shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNION and MARIVELES APPAREL CORPORATION. Cuaresma). 2009) Liability of General Manager Lastly. SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA CUARESMA (for and in behalf oftheir daughter.
The decision of Quantum Foods to transfer Endico pending investigation was a valid exercise of management prerogative to discipline its employees. was not meant as a penalty. 2009) Management Prerogative As aptly cited by the CA: The general rule is that the characterization by an employer of an employee’s services as no longer necessary or sustainable is an exercise of business judgment on the part of the employer. however. April 7. and JAIME ORTIZ (President. as a general rule. nor was the respondent arbitrary or influenced by malice in terminating the petitioner’s employment for redundancy.. September 17. 182978-79. we find no reason to disturb the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that there was no constructive dismissal. Nos. INC. 2009) • Transfer In this case. DE LECCIONES v. subject to discretionary review on the part of the Labor Arbiter. (MIRIAM B. but rather as a preventive measure to avoid further loss of sales and the destruction of Quantum Foods’ image and goodwill. This ground for termination is a legitimate exercise of management prerogative unless attended to by arbitrariness or by the failure to follow statutory requirements. be rejected if the same is found to be in violation of the law or is arbitrary or malicious. NNA PHILIPPINES CO. ELLECCION VDA. We find no violations of law in the respondent’s actions against the petitioner.. 161615. INC. The transfer. The wisdom or soundness of such a characterization or decision is not. INC.R.R.White Falcon Services. KIMI KIMUR A. 184298-99. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. the NLRC and the CA. Inc. No arbitrariness or any violations took place in the present case. ENDICO vs. and MS. It was not designed to be the culmination of the then on-going administrative investigation against Endico. No. No. (ARNULFO O. Such characterization may. QUANTUM FOODS DISTRIBUTION CENTER.R. January 30. contrary to Aguanza’s assertions. G. Reassignments made by management pending investigation of violations of company policies and procedures allegedly committed by an employee fall within the ambit of management prerogative.G. a valid exercise of management 41 . G.) AND PROMOTION. 2009) ATI’s transfer of Bismark IV’s base from Manila to Bataan was.WHITE FALCON SERVICES. G.R. 184735. Nos. while incidental to the charges against Endico.
No. As regards the 13th month pay. No. 2005. (MANTLE TRADING SERVICES.2009) Motion for Reconsideration In this case. petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals on even date. which took effect on January 7. The transfer of employees has been traditionally among the acts identified as a management prerogative subject only to limitations found in law. G. January 12. 2005.R. August 14. RICHARD BARCLAY. INCORPORATED AND/OR BOBBY DEL ROSARIO v. (GUALBERTO AGUANZA v. TOMAS and CHRIS GARMENTS WORKERS UNIONPTGWO LOCAL CHAPTER No. the tenth day from petitioner’s receipt of the decision.R. The free will of management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve its purpose cannot be denied. 2005 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment was received by petitioner on January 25. and ATTY. However. MADRIAGA.July 28. PATRICIA A. INC. the Decision dated January 18.. STO. 832. 167426. No. ASIAN TERMINAL. now require the employer to submit a report of compliance 42 . an employee who was terminated at any time before the time for payment of the 13th month pay is entitled to this monetary benefit in proportion to the length of time he worked during the year. petitioner availed of the proper remedy since Department Order No. 2009) Money Claims An employee should be compensated for the work he has rendered in accordance with the minimum wage. Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of employees. (CHRIS GARMENTS CORPORATION vs HON.R. It would have become final and executory on February 4. 40-03 explicitly prohibits the filing of a motion for reconsideration. 166705. reckoned from the time he started working during the calendar year up to the time of his termination from the service. Such motion becomes dispensable and not at all necessary. it must also protect the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. G.prerogative. and general principles of fair play and justice. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PABLO S. and must be appropriately remunerated when he was suffered to work on a regular holiday during the time he was employed by the petitioner company.G. KEITH JAMES. Clearly. 2009) NLRC Rules of Procedure • Reinstatement Compliance Report The new NLRC Rules of Procedure. 2006. collective bargaining agreement. RODOLFO CORVITE. 163505.
DUMAGO vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK. To our mind. because they must be decided according to justice and equity and the substantial merits of the controversy.R.. To rule in favor of PAL considering the circumstances in the instant case would negate the 43 . Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank. Since moving out from its office at Allied Bank Center. August 24. the Court held: The seriousness of petitioner’s infraction demanded the setting aside of strict rules of procedure as to allow the determination on the merits of whether he was lawfully dismissed. Petitioner was a bank accountant. where the NLRC decision was sent. disobedience to which clearly denotes a refusal to reinstate. The amount involved is significant.R. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES. 163788. GARCIA and ALBERTO J. and the substantial merits of the controversy. which is a position of trust and confidence. PAL merely moved from one floor to another. Yet these office addresses could be found in the same building. particularly in labor cases.5 million. there is hardly any difficulty in determining the employer’s intransigence in immediately complying with the order. MARALIT v. Labor cases must be decided according to justice. January 20. G.within 10 calendar days from receipt of the Labor Arbiter’s decision. almost P4. the application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice. it would have been more prudent had PAL informed the NLRC that it has moved from one floor to another rather than allowed its old address at Allied Bank Center to remain as its official address. G. As held by the Court. No. INC. 2009) • Liberal Application of the Rules of Procedure The Court is unimpressed. The employee need not file a motion for the issuance of the writ of execution since the Labor Arbiter shall thereafter motu proprio issue the writ. Strict rules of procedure may be set aside to serve the demands of substantial justice. 2009) Notice of Change of Address PAL’s argument that its chaotic situation due to its rehabilitation rendered the filing of a notice of change of address impractical does not merit consideration. The gravity of Maralit’s infraction demands the relaxation of strict rules of procedure. the PAL Center Building in Makati City. 164856. (JUANITO A. There is substantial evidence showing that there was valid cause for the bank to dismiss petitioner’s employment for loss of trust and confidence. equity. (ESTER B. PAL occupied four different office addresses. With the new rules in place. No. In Azul v.
No. it shall be considered renewed for an unspecified period.R. DUPO. (LWV CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. Each year he departed from work and successively new contracts were executed before he reported for work anew. G. v. A contract of employment for a definite period terminates by its own terms at the end of such period. Article 72 of the Saudi Labor Law is also of similar import. of employment contracts already approved and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) from the time of the actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of the expiration of the same. MARCELO B. Inc. to the prejudice of the worker. INC. If both parties continue to enforce the contract. G. commonly known as the Migrant Workers Act of 1995. in Brent School. we said that “a fixed term is an essential and natural appurtenance” of overseas employment contracts. Respondent’s employment contracts expressly stated that his employment ended upon his departure from work. morals and public policy.R. The subsequent agreement cannot supersede the terms of the standard employment contract approved by the POEA. (PHILIPPINE AIRLINES. which is to place the date of receipt of pleadings. Republic Act No. July 13. then petitioner Nisda’s employment with respondent ADAMS was still 44 . Since the second employment contract petitioner Nisda signed with respondent ADAMS was void for not having been sanctioned by the POEA. as in this case.R. Zamora.” As it is. without the approval of DOLE. HEIRS OF BERNARDIN J. 164267. 8042. No.purpose of the rules on completeness of service and the notice of change of address. No. expressly prohibits the substitution or alteration. thereafter. we held that the subsequently executed side agreement of an overseas contract worker with the foreign employer is void. ZAMORA. 166996) Overseas Employment Contracts Respondent’s service award for the sixth contract is equivalent only to half-month’s pay plus the proportionate amount for the additional nine days of service he rendered after one year. “[w]here a contract specifies the period of its duration. G. it terminates on the expiration of such period. judgments and processes beyond the power of the party being served to determine at his pleasure. His service was not cumulative. We also said in that case that under American law. 172342. v. Pertinently. It reads: A labor contract concluded for a specified period shall terminate upon the expiry of its term. 2009 In Placewell International Services Corporation v. Camote. simply because it is against our existing laws.
NISDA v. As the CA correctly computed. 1996 . DUMAGO vs. which is immediately executory. GARCIA and ALBERTO J. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. petitioner was dismissed from service on 15 September 2001.R. the running of the prescription period re-started on the date of this denial. 2009) Prescriptive Period for Illegal Dismissal The law fixes the period of time within which petitioner could seek remedy for his illegal dismissal and for as long as he filed his Complaint within the prescriptive period. February 10. and was interrupted on January 7. No. then. UNILAB only answered the petitioner’s January 7. REYES v.. 1993 . R. No. 1995 . Here. G. 180551. He filed his complaint for illegal dismissal on 14 June 2004.R. 2009) Prescriptive Period for Money Claims In the present case. In illegal dismissal cases. G. 2009) Payment of Wages Pending Appeal In other words. the earliest incident covered by Article 1155 is the extrajudicial demand which came on January 7. it is ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the order of reinstatement and it is mandatory on the employer to comply therewith. 1995 . The four-year prescriptive period shall commence to run only upon the accrual of a cause of action of the worker. with a categorical denial of the petitioner’s demand. INC. he shall be entitled to the full protection of his right to backwages. January 20. the employee concerned is given a period of four years from the time of his illegal dismissal within which to institute the complaint. (ERWIN H. 179177. 1996 . SEA SERVE MARITIME AGENCY and KHALIFA A. ALGOSAIBI DIVING AND MARINE SERVICES. a dismissed employee whose case was favorably decided by the Labor Arbiter is entitled to receive wages pending appeal upon reinstatement. (CARLOS N. July 23. No. the period for prescription started to run on January 15. (JUANITO A. Unless there is a restraining order. This is based on Article 1146 of the New Civil Code which states that actions based upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff must be brought within four years. 164856. 1995 letter on February 26. Adding all the running periods yields a total of less 45 . G. but again stopped again on August 9. the instant case was filed within the prescriptive period. when the complaint before the NLRC was filed. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES. Clearly.governed by his POEA-SEC until his repatriation to the Philippines on 17 July 2002.
than three (3) years. 2009) • Money Claims . Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. the petitioner seasonably filed her monetary claim when she filed her complaint before the NLRC. but applies also to claims of overseas contract workers. joinder of actions. Private International Law.G.OFWs In Cadalin v. POEA’s Administrator. 23 of 1976 provides: “A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not be actionable after the lapse of one year from the date of the expiry of the contract” x x x. such as service of process. RIVERA v. POEA’s Administrator is instructive: First to be determined is whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action based on the Amiri Decree No. Salonga. depending on the characterization given such a law.” Said statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign 46 . are governed by the laws of the forum. As a general rule. xxxx However. No. UNITED LABORATORIES. (JANUARIA A. the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum has a “borrowing statute. we held that Article 291 covers all money claims from employer-employee relationship and is broader in scope than claims arising from a specific law. a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. 131 ). Sec. A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or substantive. It is not limited to money claims recoverable under the Labor Code. hence. 685. Procedural matters. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on prescription that shall be the governing law. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law (Restatement of the Conflict of Laws. period and requisites for appeal. The following ruling in Cadalin v. INC. and so forth.. 155639 April 22.R.
152-153 ). 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor. This point. Conflicts. In the light of the 1987 Constitution. respondent’s complaint was filed well within the three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of our Labor Code. The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy x x x. 183 ). Conflict of Laws.]). however. 23 of 1976.” one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where it accrued. July 13. will not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute has not run against it (Goodrich and Scoles. the action is barred. 172342.statute of limitation as one of substance (Goodrich. There is no provision in the Civil Code of the Philippines. Section 48 [of the Code of Civil Procedure] cannot be enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of [Article] 156 of the Amiri Decree No. it is also barred in the Philippine Islands. A “borrowing statute” directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law (Siegel. No. has already been mooted by our finding that respondent’s service award had been paid. To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. Conflict of Laws. (LWV CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. DUPO. xxxx Thus. albeit the payroll termed such payment as severance pay.” Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the Philippines. in our considered view. which is inconsistent with or contradictory to Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Paras.R. 104 [7th ed. however. Said Section provides: “If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose. Philippine Conflict of Laws. Article 2270 of said Code repealed only those provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as to which were inconsistent with it. Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. While there are several kinds of “borrowing statutes. 152-153 ). 2009) Probationary Employee 47 . MARCELO B. G.
six (6) consecutive regular semesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level. No. during which the latter determines whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment. 2009 ) • Probationary Employment for Academic Personnel For “academic personnel” in private schools. propriety and efficiency of a probationer to ascertain whether he is qualified for permanent employment. the probationary period for academic personnel shall not be more than three (3) consecutive years of satisfactory service for those in the elementary and secondary levels. Probationary Period. the word probationary. – Subject in all instances to compliance with the Department and school requirements. seeks to prove to the employer that he has the qualifications to meet the reasonable standards for permanent employment. Thus. G. the employee failed to meet the 48 . probationary employees enjoy security of tenure during the term of their probationary employment such that they may only be terminated for cause as provided for by law. 178835. colleges and universities.R. 2009 ) • Security of Tenure of Probationary Employees As above discussed. on the other hand. probationary employment is governed by Section 92 of the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (Manual). not its length. as used to describe the period of employment. The probationary employment is intended to afford the employer an opportunity to observe the fitness of a probationary employee while at work. (MAGIS YOUNG ACHIEVERS’ LEARNING CENTER and MRS. or if at the end of the probationary period.A probationary employee or probationer is one who is on trial for an employer. ADELAIDA . (MAGIS YOUNG ACHIEVERS’ LEARNING CENTER and MRS. the probationer. which reads: Section 92. VIOLETA T. CARIÑO v. While the employer observes the fitness. and nine (9) consecutive trimesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level where collegiate courses are offered on a trimester basis. MANALO. 178835. MANALO. CARIÑO v. and to ascertain whether he will become an efficient and productive employee. implies the purpose of the term or period. February 13. No. February 13. ADELAIDA .R. G. VIOLETA T.
necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of Alcatel. February 13. In termination cases. or after a lapse of 33 months. Alcatel did not rehire respondent until 1 February 1991. the burden of proving just or valid cause for dismissing an employee rests on the employer. there must be no unlawful discrimination in the dismissal.R. Nonetheless. First.July 9. Nowhere in that letter was respondent informed that her performance as a school teacher was less than satisfactory. Second. MANALO. No. it was incumbent upon petitioner to show by competent evidence that she did not meet the standards set by the school. 172174. a probationary employee can be legally dismissed either: (1) for a just cause. (DAVAO CONTRACTORS DEVELOPMENT COOPERATIVE (DACODECO) v. Undeniably. CARIÑO v.reasonable standards set by the employer at the time of the employee’s engagement.G. ADELAIDA . Records show that respondent was hired by Alcatel from 1988 to 1995 for three projects. Alcatel’s continuous rehiring of respondent in various capacities from February 1991 to December 1995 was done entirely within the framework of one and the same project ― the PLDT 1342 project. VIOLETA T. 2009 ) • Termination of Probationary Employee Under Article 281 of the Labor Code. MARILYN A. To note. that the position of “Principal” was to be abolished. as a cost-cutting measure. petitioner failed to discharge. the termination of respondent was effected by that letter stating that she was being relieved from employment because the school authorities allegedly decided. 2009) Project Employee While respondent performed tasks that were clearly vital. This did not make respondent a regular employee of Alcatel as respondent was not 49 . or (2) when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the reasonable standards made known to him by the employer at the start of the employment.R. 178835. (MAGIS YOUNG ACHIEVERS’ LEARNING CENTER and MRS. the power of the employer to terminate the services of an employee on probation is not without limitations. G. On 30 April 1988. as such. respondent was not continuously rehired by Alcatel after the cessation of every project. the dissatisfaction on the part of the employer must be real and in good faith. not feigned so as to circumvent the contract or the law. No. for the PLDT 1342 project. the PLDT X-4 IOT project and the PLDT 1342 project. namely the PLDT X-5 project. upon the expiration of respondent’s contract for the PLDT X-4 IOT project. respondent was hired as a probationary teacher and. this power must be exercised in accordance with the specific requirements of the contract. This requirement. PASAWA. Third.
2009) Protection to Labor Whether employed locally or overseas." (HERMINIGILDO INGUILLO AND ZENAIDA BERGANTE V. Respondent remained a project employee of Alcatel working on the PLDT 1342 project. April 7. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented. and regulate the relations between workers and employers.R. public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated. promote full employment. and/or AMPARO POLICARPIO. INC. all Filipino workers enjoy the protective mantle of Philippine labor and social legislation. Inc. 2009) Thus. WHITE FALCON SERVICES. Nos. G. v. If the query requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses. 164315. G.continuously rehired after the cessation of a project. as held in that case. the issue in that query is factual. INC. 50 . INC. MANAGER. 184298-99. Jasmin G. and JAIME ORTIZ (President. 165407. the question posed is one of fact.White Falcon Services. (BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER v. "the right of an employee to be informed of the charges against him and to reasonable opportunity to present his side in a controversy with either the company or his own Union is not wiped away by a Union Security Clause or a Union Shop Clause in a collective bargaining agreement. Cuaresma). RELOS. or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to one another. contract stipulations to the contrary notwithstanding. 182978-79. ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex. the leadership of which could yield to the temptation of swift and arbitrary expulsion from membership and mere dismissal from his job. RENE R.G.R. race or creed.) AND PROMOTION. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on a given set of circumstances.. June 5. Nos. (ALCATEL PHILIPPINES. July 3. 2009) Question of Law / Fact There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence. SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA CUARESMA (for and in behalf oftheir daughter. This ruling is likewise rendered imperative by Article 17 of the Civil Code which states that laws which have for their object public order. FIRST PHILIPPINE SCALES. INC. No. An employee is entitled to be protected not only from a company which disregards his rights but also from his own Union. G. This pronouncement is in keeping with the basic public policy of the State to afford protection to labor..R. No.R.
QUEVEDO. No. When it is shown that the person executing the waiver did so voluntarily. 168927.. with full understanding of what he was doing. 2009) To excuse petitioners from complying with the terms of their waivers. with respect to the second batch of quitclaims signed by 85 of the remaining 160 employees who were terminated following Hyatt’s permanent closure. with clear and unambiguous contents and executed for a valid consideration received in full by the employee who signed the same.. are barred from filing this suit. they must locate their case within any of three narrow grounds: (1) the employer used fraud or deceit in obtaining the waivers. Accordingly. THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. 2009) • Invalid Quitclaims Significantly.(GENERAL SANTOS COCA-COLA PLANT FREE WORKERS UNION-TUPAS vs. BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE.R.R. et al. cannot be later invalidated because its signatory claims that he was pressured into signing it on account of his dire financial need. we hold that these are valid and binding undertakings. 178647) Quitclaim However. public order. INC. September 11. A quitclaim. the Manifestations filed by petitioner with respect to the quitclaims executed by members of respondent Union state that 34 of the 48 employees terminated on account of the downsizing program 51 . owner of Hyatt Regency Manila. or (3) the terms of the waiver are contrary to law. v. morals or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. The said documents indicate that the amount received by each of the employees represents a reasonable settlement of their monetary claims against petitioner and were even signed in the presence of a DOLE representative. G. the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. petitioners. (HOTEL ENTERPRISES OF THE PHILIPPINES. 165756. (GENERAL SANTOS CITY). INC. The preceding discussion on the voluntariness of petitioners’ retirement from service effectively removes these grounds beyond petitioners’ argumentative reach. and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable. No. VERZOSA. (HEPI). (ARSENIO F. No. public policy. v. G. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS. SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT-NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN THE HOTEL AND RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES (SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN). G. June 5. by the terms of their waivers. (2) the consideration the employer paid is incredible and unreasonable.R.INCORPORATED (BENECO) and GERARDO P.
have already executed quitclaims on various dates. We, however, take judicial notice that 33 of these quitclaims failed to indicate the amounts received by the terminated employees. Because of this, petitioner leaves us no choice but to invalidate and set aside these quitclaims. However, the actual amount received by the employees upon signing the said documents shall be deducted from whatever remaining amount is due them to avoid double recovery of separation pay and other monetary benefits. We hereby order the Labor Arbiter to effect the necessary computation on this matter. (HOTEL ENTERPRISES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (HEPI), owner of Hyatt Regency Manila, v. SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT-NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN THE HOTEL AND RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES (SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN), G.R. No. 165756, June 5, 2009) Also, SMC cannot take refuge in the Receipt and Release document signed by the respondent. Generally, deeds of release, waivers, or quitclaims cannot bar employees from demanding benefits to which they are legally entitled or from contesting the legality of their dismissal, since quitclaims are looked upon with disfavor and are frowned upon as contrary to public policy. Where, however, the person making the waiver has done so voluntarily, with a full understanding thereof, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. The burden of proving that the quitclaim or waiver was voluntarily entered into rests on the employer. (SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION v. EDUARDO L. TEODOSIO, G.R. No. 163033, October 2, 2009) Real Party in Interest To qualify a person to be a real party in interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real holder of the right sought to be enforced. “Interest” within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in essence to be affected by the judgment as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expentancy or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. (NORTHEASTERN COLLEGE TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs. NORTHEASTERN COLLEGE, INC., G.R. No. 152923, January 19, 2009) It has been repeatedly stated that the Pantranco properties which were the subject of execution sale were owned by Macris and later, the PNB-Madecor. They were never owned by PNEI or PNB. Following our earlier discussion on the separate personalities of the 52
different corporations involved in the instant case, the only entity which has the right and interest to question the execution sale and the eventual right to annul the same, if any, is PNB-Madecor or its successor-in-interest. Settled is the rule that proceedings in court must be instituted by the real party in interest. (PANTRANCO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEA-PTGWO) and PANTRANCO RETRENCHED EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PANREA) v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), G.R. No. 170689, G.R. No. 170705) Re-computation of Awards Furthermore, the CA sufficiently explained the need to increase the award of 13th month pay and SIL pay. It modified the award after finding that the computation of the amount given by the NLRC in its Decision dated March 25, 2002 does not conform to the dismissed employees’ employment history. The CA aptly explained, viz.: A cursory reading of the assailed Decision of the NLRC dated March 25, 2002 readily reveals that the labor tribunal awarded private respondents their unpaid 13th Month Pay and Service Incentive Leave (SIL) Pay without regard to their employment history with the petitioner. There was even no explanation or adequate showing on the face of the questioned judgment why the award of the unpaid 13th Month and SIL Pay differs from one private respondent to another. This Court, therefore, after determining that indeed the petitioner had not paid the private respondents these special benefits for the whole period of their employment therewith, modified the award by painstakingly basing it to each of the dismissed employee’s employment history with petitioner. xxxx The procedural lapse on the part of the NLRC in this case in failing to take into account the number of years when the private respondents did not receive their 13 th Month and SIL Pay cannot defeat their right to receive these benefits as granted under substantive law. This Court simply could not uphold an erroneous computation of the said unpaid benefits. Hence, it had to re-compute, and as a consequence, increased it.
(AKLAN COLLEGE, INC. vs. PERPETUO ENERO, ARLYN CASTIGADOR, NUENA SERMON and JOCELYN ZOLINA, G.R. No. 178309, January 27, 2009) Recruitment Agency As the Court previously observed, the Contract of Services between Interserve and petitioner did not identify the work needed to be performed and the final result required to be accomplished. Instead, the Contract specified the type of workers Interserve must provide petitioner (“Route Helpers, Salesmen, Drivers, Clericals, Encoders & PD”) and their qualifications (technical/vocational course graduates, physically fit, of good moral character, and have not been convicted of any crime). The Contract also states that, “to carry out the undertakings specified in the immediately preceding paragraph, the CONTRACTOR shall employ the necessary personnel,” thus, acknowledging that Interserve did not yet have in its employ the personnel needed by petitioner and would still pick out such personnel based on the criteria provided by petitioner. In other words, Interserve did not obligate itself to perform an identifiable job, work, or service for petitioner, but merely bound itself to provide the latter with specific types of employees. These contractual provisions strongly indicated that Interserve was merely a recruiting and manpower agency providing petitioner with workers performing tasks directly related to the latter’s principal business. (COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC v. ALAN M. AGITO, et al., G.R. No. 179546, February 13, 2009)
Refusal to Return to Work Therefore, the complaint for illegal dismissal filed by respondents was premature, since even after the expiration of their suspension period, they refused, despite due notice, to report to work. In fact, in their Memorandum of Appeal, respondents admitted having received petitioners’ return-to-work memorandum which, however, became futile because they hastily filed the complaint for illegal dismissal. (INDUSTRIAL & TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT, INC. RAYMOND JARINA, vs. TOMAS TUGADE and CRESENCIO TUGADE, G.R. No. 158539, January 15, 2009) Regular Employment Undoubtedly, respondents were regular employees of petitioner with respect to the escort or “comboy” activity for which they had 54
been engaged since 1993 and 1994, respectively, without regard to continuity or brokenness of the service. (DEALCO FARMS, INC., vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (5th DIVISION), G.R. No. 153192 January 30, 2009) Thus, there are two kinds of regular employees, namely: (1) those who are engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer; and (2) those who have rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which they are employed. Simply stated, regular employees are classified into (1) regular employees - by nature of work and (2) regular employees - by years of service. The former refers to those employees who perform a particular activity which is necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, regardless of their length of service; while the latter refers to those employees who have been performing the job, regardless of the nature thereof, for at least a year. If the employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous or merely intermittent, the law deems the repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not indispensability, of that activity to the business. (SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION v. EDUARDO L. TEODOSIO, G.R. No. 163033, October 2, 2009) Reinstatement The spirit of the rule on reinstatement pending appeal animates the proceedings once the Labor Arbiter issues the decision containing an order of reinstatement. The immediacy of its execution needs no further elaboration. Reinstatement pending appeal necessitates its immediate execution during the pendency of the appeal, if the law is to serve its noble purpose. At the same time, any attempt on the part of the employer to evade or delay its execution, as observed in Panuncillo and as what actually transpired in Kimberly, Composite, Air Philippines, and Roquero, should not be countenanced. After the labor arbiter’s decision is reversed by a higher tribunal, the employee may be barred from collecting the accrued wages, if it is shown that the delay in enforcing the reinstatement pending appeal was without fault on the part of the employer. (JUANITO A. GARCIA and ALBERTO J. DUMAGO vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., G.R. No. 164856, January 20, 2009) • Reinstatement during Corporate Rehabilitation
No.. As earlier discussed. 2009) Republic Act No. and it is for that precise reason that the clause violates not just petitioner's right to equal protection. This is plain speculation. Unconstitutional The argument of the Solicitor General. (ANTONIO M. G.Case law recognizes that unless there is a restraining order. The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose. 164856.INC. or even just a pretext of one. (JUANITO A. there is nothing in the text of the law or the records of the deliberations leading to its enactment or the pleadings of respondent that would indicate that there is an existing governmental purpose for the subject clause. No. 2009) Retirement Coverage A twist in Rivera’s case is that she continued working beyond the compulsory separation from service that resulted from her retirement. limited only by company policies and the applicable terms of the retirement 56 . Whether she could or could not resume working with the company is. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES. GARCIA and ALBERTO J. 167614. DUMAGO vs. Respondent’s failure to exercise the alternative options of actual reinstatement and payroll reinstatement was thus justified. but also her right to substantivedue process under Section 1. SERRANO v.R. a consensual matter for the parties to agree upon. 8042 • Fifth Paragraph of Section 10. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES. January 20. as the normal effect of the non-exercise of the options. is to give them a better chance of getting hired by foreign employers. Such being the case. as a rule. Article III of the Constitution. March 24. that the actual purpose of the subject clause of limiting the entitlement of OFWs to their threemonth salary in case of illegal dismissal..R. INC. respondent’s obligation to pay the salaries pending appeal.. and MARLOW NAVIGATION CO. This injunction or suspension of claims by legislative fiat partakes of the nature of a restraining order that constitutes a legal justification for respondent’s non-compliance with the reinstatement order. G. did not attach. the implementation of the order of reinstatement is ministerial and mandatory. INC.
we conclude that her renewed service did not have the benefit of any retirement plan coverage. (JANUARIA A. (GREAT SOUTHERN MARITIME SERVICES CORP. tell us that no such coverage took place. 2009) 57 . the employer may be exempted from liability if he can successfully prove that the seafarer’s death was caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act.. Her employment terms under this renewed employment are based on what she and the company agreed upon. LEONILA SURIGAO for Herself and In Behalf of Her Minor Children. G. the plan could not have covered her. To be sure.G. LTD. PTE. or of any demand for. The first is that the terms of the retirement plan. before and after its 1992 amendment.R. the burden of proof rests on his employer. he failed to submit himself to the company-designated doctor in accordance with the post-employment medical examination requirement under the above-quoted paragraph 3 of Section 20(B) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract. No. Therefore. there is no limitation by law that barred her from continuing her work with UNILAB. MUSNIT v. No.Both Surnamed SURIGAO G. (DIONISIO M. SEA STAR SHIPPING CORPORATION . RIVERA v. any reimbursement of what Rivera would have paid as contributions to the plan had her coverage and deductions continued after 1988. respondents’ entitlement to any death benefits depends on whether the evidence of the petitioners suffices to prove that the deceased committed suicide. 183646) • Post-Employment Medical Examination But even assuming that petitioner was repatriated for medical reasons. 182623. Thus. deferred to the parties’ agreement. 2009) Seafarer • Death Benefits The general rule is that the employer is liable to pay the heirs of the deceased seafarer for death benefits once it is established that he died during the effectivity of his employment contract. however. UNITED LABORATORIES. However. The second is the absence of evidence of. and IMC SHIPPING CO. No.plan. v. even the above-quoted Implementing Rules. In sum.R..Namely KAYE ANGELI and MIRIAM. in setting the retirement age at 60. December 4. Failure to comply with this requirement which is a sine qua non bars the filing of claim for disability benefits. INC. continued to exclude those who have rendered 30 years of service or have reached 60 years of age.R. Whether these terms included renewed coverage in the retirement plan is an evidentiary gap that could have been conclusively shown by evidence of deductions of contributions to the plan after 1988. Two indicators. 155639 April 22.
In security services. the temporary “off-detail” of guards takes place when the security agency’s clients decide not to renew their contracts with the security agency. When employment not deemed terminated. or the fulfillment by the employee of a military or civic duty shall not terminate employment.Security Guard “Temporary off–detail” Petitioner’s citation of Article 286 of the Labor Code reading: ART. albeit the displacement should not exceed six (6) months. ─ The bona fide suspension of the operation of a business or undertaking for a period not exceeding six (6) months. (Emphasis in the original. teaches: We stress that Article 286 applies only when there is a bonafide suspension of the employer’s operation of a business or undertaking for a period not exceeding six (6) months. underscoring supplied) is misplaced. where respondent was last posted and which Philippine Industrial Security Agency v. Dapiton 58 . 286. In such a case. resulting in a situation where the available posts under its existing contracts are less than the number of guards in its roster. there is no termination of employment but only a temporary displacement of employees. In all such cases. there is no showing that there was lack of available posts at petitioner’s clients or that there was a request from the client-bank. (Underscoring supplied) In the present case. the employer shall reinstate the employee to his former position without loss of seniority rights if he indicates his desire to resume his work not later than one (1) month from the resumption of operations of his employer or from his relief from the military or civic duty. The paramount consideration should be the dire exigency of the business of the employer that compels it to put some of its employees temporarily out of work.
February 27. to replace respondent with another. Consequently.R. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC). is not sufficient to justify their being treated as one entity. INC. we hold that the award of separation pay only. and to full backwages.R.R. If used to perform legitimate functions. No. No. (PANTRANCO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEA-PTGWO) and PANTRANCO RETRENCHED EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PANREA) v. 170689. and ROLF WILTSCHEK v. No. ENRIQUEZ. taken alone. is proper. (ELIZABETH D. 169173.R. the same being owned by PNB-Madecor. June 5. that PNB may be held liable for the debts of PNEI. without backwages. a subsidiary’s separate existence shall be respected. computed from the time of the withholding of the employee's compensation up to the time of actual reinstatement.continued to hire petitioner’s services. for the sake of argument. petitioners still cannot proceed against the Pantranco properties. G. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK. No. (M+W ZANDER PHILIPPINES. Petitioner suddenly prevented him from reporting on his tour of duty at the bank on December 15. July 30. G. notwithstanding the fact that PNB-Madecor was a subsidiary of PNB. 2009) We thus find the dismissal to be illegal. 2009) Separate Corporate Personality Assuming. The mere fact that a corporation owns all of the stocks of another corporation. MIRANDO. 179512. G. TRINIDAD M. No. If reinstatement is not possible due to the strained relations between the employer and the employee. BONIFACIO L. and other benefits or their monetary equivalent. 2001 and had not thereafter asked him to report for duty. 2009) 59 . 172199. The general rule remains that PNB-Madecor has a personality separate and distinct from PNB. 170705) Separation Pay Since petitioner was not faultless in regard to the offenses imputed against her. INC. G. PALTENG v. computed from the time of engagement up to the finality of this decision. G. (EAGLE STAR SECURITY SERVICES. and the liability of the parent corporation as well as the subsidiary will be confined to those arising in their respective businesses. separation pay should instead be paid the employee equivalent to one month salary for every year of service. respondent is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges.R. inclusive of allowances.
Though the grant of reinstatement commonly carries with it an award of backwages. The statutory intent on this matter is clearly discernible. to his status quo ante dismissal. that is. The two forms of relief are distinct and separate. Reinstatement restores the employee who was unjustly dismissed to the position from which he was removed. separation pay. Put a little differently. These twin remedies —reinstatement and payment of backwages — make the dismissed employee whole who can then look forward to continued employment. x x x As the term suggests. firstly. separation pay may be awarded in lieu of reinstatement. the loss of earnings that would have accrued to the dismissed employee during the period between dismissal and reinstatement. The grant of separation pay did not redress the injury that is intended to be relieved by the second remedy of backwages. one from the other. is oriented towards the immediate future. Thus do these two remedies give meaning and substance to the constitutional right of labor to security of tenure. payment of backwages is a form of relief that restores the income that was lost by reason of unlawful dismissal. separation pay is the amount that an employee receives at the time of his severance from the service and x x x is designed to provide the employee with “the wherewithal during the period that he is looking for another employment. the payment of backwages corresponding to the period from his illegal dismissal up to actual reinstatement. that is. The normal consequences of a finding that an employee has been illegally dismissed are. in the present case. x x x The grant of separation pay was a proper substitute only for reinstatement. reinstatement is no longer practicable or feasible. secondly. it could not be an adequate substitute both for reinstatement and for 60 . that the employee becomes entitled to reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights and. Moreover. the transitional period the dismissed employee must undergo before locating a replacement job.” In the instant case. inclusive of allowances. while the grant of backwages allows the same employee to recover from the employer that which he had lost by way of wages as a result of his dismissal.” Since. the awards of separation pay and backwages are not mutually exclusive and both may be given to Tagulao and Serrano. the inappropriateness or non-availability of one does not carry with it the inappropriateness or non-availability of the other. the grant of separation pay was a substitute for immediate and continued re-employment with the private respondent Bank. in contrast. and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.Article 279 of the Labor Code provides that “[a]n employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages.
Certainly. ANGELITO SERRANO. however. No. RESTAURANT. petitioner cannot demand for separation benefits on the ground of illness while at the same time presenting a certification that she is fit to work. his family to consider. The law regards the workers with compassion. The prior submission of a medical certificate that petitioner is fit to resume work negates the claim of respondents that the former demanded for separation pay on account of her failing health. The particular circumstances attendant in this case. (Emphasis added) (NISSAN NORTH EDSA BALINTAWAK. in addition. 182499. 181972. Even where a worker has committed an infraction of company rules and regulations. (CONCEPCION FAELDONIA v. Hence. INC.R.backwages. 2009) Social Justice The Court is not unmindful of the equally important right of respondent as employer under the Constitution to be protected in its property and interest. convince the Court that the supreme penalty of dismissal upon petitioner is not justified. and EDWIN TAGULAO. Undoubtedly. a penalty less punitive than dismissal may suffice. DUSIT HOTEL NIKKO-MANILA v. Unemployment brings untold hardships and sorrows on those 61 . 162538. G. Respondents could have denied petitioner’s demand at that instance and ordered her to return to work had it not been their intention to sever petitioner from their employ. G. AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES (NUWHRAIN-APL-IUF). No. the hotel cannot claim that payment thereof to its 82 employees constitute substantial compliance with the payment of ECOLA under WO No. gratification by the hotel of one does not result in the satisfaction of the other.JAYME GO and MERLITA GO. June 4.G..DUSIT HOTEL NIKKO CHAPTER. October 2. 2009) Above all.R. There is. 9. TONG YAK GROCERIES. the hotel employees’ right to their shares in the service charges collected by Dusit Hotel is distinct and separate from their right to ECOLA.R. NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTEL. QUEZON CITY v. we find the allegation that petitioner presented herself for work but was refused by respondents more credible. 2009) Since Dusit Hotel is explicitly mandated by the afore-quoted statutory provision to pay its employees and management their respective shares in the service charges collected. This is not only because of the law's concern for the workingman. the intention to sever the employer-employee relationship was not duly established by respondents. August 25. (PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS. No. JR.
Consequently. G. 164205.R. INC. the award of P100.000. When he was repatriated to Manila and examined by a company doctor.00 to respondent as financial assistance is deemed equitable under the circumstances. ANTONIO G.. respondent opted to apply for optional retirement. respondent had been employed with the petitioner for almost twelve (12) years. (ABELARDO P.” and “recommended for hire.” Only under exceptionally meritorious cases may a relaxation from an otherwise stringent rule be allowed “to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed”– the existence of which petitioners failed to demonstrate.( EASTERN SHIPPING LINES. he was required to rest for a month. 2009) In the present case. (WALLEM 62 . July 31. September 3. INC V. Considering all of the foregoing and in line with Eastern. respondent had no derogatory record on file over his long years of service with the petitioner. The social justice policy of labor laws and the Constitution is not meant to be oppressive of capital. he suffered from a “fractured left transverse process of fourth lumbar vertebra. et al v. 178976. When he reported for work. hold the Cooperative’s corespondents liable for their claims without any factual and legal justification therefor. records show that respondent's seaman's book. After consulting a doctor. ABEL v. Thus. (OLDARICO S. BOBONGON BANANA GROWERS MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE.R. and DOLE ASIA PHILIPPINES. the ends of social and compassionate justice would be served best if respondent will be given some equitable relief. G. it cannot simply. No. FERRER D. by default. TIMOG AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION. especially now that the Cooperative is no longer a going concern. 171587. he was declared fit to continue his work. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION. No. No.” Moreover. as duly noted and signed by the captain of the vessel was marked “Very Good. 2009) Petitioners’ bare invocation of “the interest of substantial justice” does not lie. DIAMOND FARMS.R. 2009) While the Court commiserates with petitioners on their loss of employment. for having been deprived of continued employment with petitioner's vessel. but the position was not given to him. TRAVEÑO. In addition. as it was occupied by another person known to one of the stockholders.dependent upon the wage-earner. 1996. On February 13. petitioner refused to employ him despite the assurance of its personnel manager.” while their vessel was at the port of Yokohama. Japan. Respondent patiently waited for more than one year to embark on the vessel as 2rd Engineer. October 13.
there is a distinction between the remedies sought by the parties in these two cases. 2009) Strike • Illegal Strike The use of unlawful means in the course of a strike renders such strike illegal. Corollarily. The grant of backwages and separation pay however was not premised on the declaration of the illegality of the strike but on the finding that these affected employees were constructively dismissed from work. the NLRC erred in declaring the employment status of all employees as having been lost or forfeited by virtue of the Dinopol decision. In said case.R. it was QCSC which filed a petition to declare the illegality of the 12 August 1997 strike by the union. the affected employees were granted backwages and separation pay. On the other hand. G. As explained in the Lustria decision: Considering that the temporary lay-off of listed employees effected by the respondents on 16 August 1997 was without documentary evidence to determine its validity. it is our considered view and we so hold that said employees were constructively dismissed without just or 63 . as evidenced by the layoffs effected by the company. However. The consequence of the declaration of an illegal strike is termination from employment. In the Dinopol decision. ERIBERTO S.MARITIME SERVICES. not all union members were terminated. No. JACKBILT EMPLOYEESWORKERS UNION-NAFLUKMU. 2009) • Dinopol and Lustria Decision There is no conflict between the Dinopol and the Lustria decisions. pursuant to the principle of conclusiveness of judgment. only a few union officers were validly dismissed in accordance with Article 264 of the Labor Code. 185261. The filing of a petition to declare the strike illegal was thus unnecessary.v. 1998 strike was ipso facto illegal. While both rulings involve the same parties and same issues.R. INC. Labor Arbiter Lustria sided with the Union and found QCSC guilty of such practices. (JACKBILT INDUSTRIES. As a consequence. Nos. 171618-19. BULTRON. Therefore. In fact.G. Hence. INC. and SCANDIC SHIPMANAGEMENT LIMITED v. October 2. March 20. the other union members who had merely participated in the strike but had not committed any illegal acts were not dismissed from employment. the March 9. which the Labor Arbiter did so rule in said case. the Lustria decision involved the unfair labor practices alleged by the union with particularity.
the extreme penalty of dismissal imposed on him by petitioners was grossly disproportionate. The period of his suspension is to be deducted from the period for which he is entitled to backwages as awarded by the NLRC and affirmed by the CA. Taking into account the managerial position he held and the prior warning issued to him for failing to communicate with his superiors. report with the regional office of the Department of Labor and Employment having jurisdiction over the area and they remain under lay-off status of employment. Considering that the remedies sought by the parties in each case differ. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROBERTO J. we would be allowing them to become parties to the instant petition when they are not. Gumarang to allow the latter to be substituted by his wife. but not as to the other co-employees. January 19. (NORTHEASTERN COLLEGE TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs. Gumarang to file the petition on their behalf before this Court and even before the Court of Appeals.. NORTHEASTERN COLLEGE. For that. G. if we do. LOPEZ. This. (LOLITA A.. 2009) 64 . 164032.R. No. al. Clearly. INC.G. No. they had not done. as to the prayer of the counsel of Mr. JASSIM HINDRI ABDULLAH and RESTY AREVALO v. these two rulings may co-exist. the CA and the NLRC correctly observed that the worst that respondent committed was an inadvertent infraction. April 24. INC. ET. they are entitled to backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement as prayed.. there are two separate decisions issued by two different labor arbiters involving the same parties and interests. and by his former co-employees whom he had allegedly represented before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. (GULF AIR. We cannot allow petitioner Gumarang’s co-employees to take his place because.authorized cause and observance of due process. REYES. 2009) Substitution of Parties Finally. No. G. we grant the same insofar as the wife is concerned. 159687.C. 152923. In conclusion. This opinion finds support from the hard and cold fact of absence of prior notice.R. the penalty commensurate to the violation he committed should be suspension for three months. It would have been different if they presented evidence showing that they had authorized Mr. vs. QUEZON CITY SPORTS CLUB.R. 2009) Suspension Thus. she being his heir. January 19.
At the end of the school year. In other words. 2002 up to March 31. at the end of that period. usually for another school year. 2009 ) Termination of Employment 65 . in the absence of an express period of probation for private school teachers. No. (MAGIS YOUNG ACHIEVERS’ LEARNING CENTER and MRS. ADELAIDA MANALO. the employment relationship terminates. If the contract is renewed. (MAGIS YOUNG ACHIEVERS’ LEARNING CENTER and MRS. and the teacher then is entitled to regular or permanent employment status. absent any concrete and competent proof that her performance as a teacher was unsatisfactory from her hiring on April 18. the parties may opt to renew or not to renew the contract. NLRC that. CARIÑO v. 2003. particularly considering the teacher’s performance. the three-year probationary period provided by the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools must apply likewise to the case of respondent. If renewed. If the contract is not renewed. VIOLETA T. 178835. her probationary employment is deemed renewed for the following two school years. 2009 ) • Probationary Period for Teachers Thus. the employer may now decide whether to extend a permanent appointment to the employee. VIOLETA T. ADELAIDA . the employer has the option not to renew the contract. It is when the yearly contract is renewed for the third time that Section 93 of the Manual becomes operative. being simply on probation. G. 178835. At the end of this third year. in light of our ruling of Espiritu Santo Parochial School v. 2003. he cannot automatically claim security of tenure and compel the employer to renew his employment contract. primarily on the basis of the employee having met the reasonable standards of competence and efficiency set by the employer.Teachers • Employment Status The common practice is for the employer and the teacher to enter into a contract. the probationary employment continues.R. MANALO. the teacher remains under probation. For the entire duration of this three-year period. effective for one school year. G. No. Upon the expiration of his contract of employment. Again. CARIÑO v. respondent is entitled to continue her three-year period of probationary period. such that from March 31.R. February 13. this second renewal of the contract for another school year would then be the last year – since it would be the third school year – of probationary employment. February 13.
Inc. the charge of abandonment is belied by the following circumstances: First.R. we find it hard to believe that he will just abandon his job after petitioners gave him a chance to continue working for them. We uphold the following findings of the Court of Appeals that respondent did not abandon his job: In the case at bar. the notice shall be served at the worker’s last known address (Icawat vs. 172670. (BC CABLE MASTER SYSTEM AND/OR EVELYN CINENSE vs. And lastly. an employee would just not report for work for no apparent reason. if indeed it is true that he really failed to go back to work. It is incongruent to human nature. For this reason. the high improbability of private respondent to intentionally abandon his work considering that he had already served a penalty of suspension for his infractions and violations as well as the petitioner’s tacit condonation of the infractions he committed. by permitting him to go back to work and by asking him to execute a promissory note. a charge of abandonment is totally inconsistent with the immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal. 81 ). Rule XVI. No. In cases of abandonment of work. Secondly. Section 2. vs Florendo-Flores. G. that after having ironed things out with his employer. 2002[sic]-203 ). We are constrained to give credence to private respondent’s assertion that he attempted to report back to work but he was just asked to leave as he was considered terminated. there was no proof that petitioner sent private respondent a notice of termination on the ground of abandonment.Just Causes • Neglect of Duty/Abandonment Hence. more so when it includes a prayer for reinstatement (Globe Telecom. 390 SCRA 201. National Labor Relations Commission. Book V. Rules and regulations implementing the Labor Code provides that any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular act or omission constituting the ground for his dismissal. MARCIAL BALUYOT. 334 SCRA 75. private respondent’s filing of a case for illegal dismissal with the labor arbiter negates abandonment. As held by the Supreme Court. 2009) 66 .January 20.
R. despite the directive cum caveat of CASI for them to report back for work within two days from receipt thereof. No. it totally negated petitioner’s theory of abandonment. G. they failed to comply therewith. No. REYNALDO LABRO. October 2. Clearly.. et. PILAPIL. as reflected above. there must be clear proof of deliberate and unjustified intent to sever the employer-employee relationship. After three years. however.G. No. 2009) 67 .R. by the length of time they refused to return to work. (SOUTH DAVAO DEVELOPMENT COMPANY. the operative act is still the employee’s ultimate act of putting an end to his employment. 2009) Respondents failed to discharge this burden. (HARBORVIEW RESTAURANT v. as previously discussed. v. (NOW SODACO AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION) AND/OR MALONE PACQUIAO AND VICTOR A. et al. they offered to return to work. However. 168273. more so when it includes a prayer for reinstatement. Their intention to sever the employeremployee relationship with CASI is manifested. (MIGUEL A. for they had. Moreover. Petitioner also presented herself for work on the date stated in the medical certificate which stated that she is fit to resume work. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION G.R. April 30. been looking for other jobs. like the appellate court again. G. No. the charge of abandonment does not square with the fact that a week after respondent’s alleged dismissal. an employee who takes steps to protest her layoff cannot be said to have abandoned her work because a charge of abandonment is totally inconsistent with the immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal. 171814. 178229 October 23. GAMO. respondent was informed by no less than his immediate superior. SERGIO L. (CONCEPCION FAELDONIA v. When Eleonor filed the illegal dismissal complaint.JAYME GO and MERLITA GO. or they at least had prior knowledge of the termination. 182499.R. 2009) To constitute abandonment. 2009) In petitioners’ case. and in turn. v. al. May 8. CONSUNJI. he filed a complaint with the NLRC.In the instant case. TONG YAK GROCERIES. Like the Court of Appeals. in the interim. the Court finds no reason why these two would give respondent the false impression that he was being dismissed. is inclined to believe that they were given prior instruction. the chief cook and by his brother that he was being terminated. the Court. Mere absence of petitioner is not sufficient to establish the allegation of abandonment. INC. The prolonged absence of petitioner was not without justifiable reason because it was established that her failure to report for work was due to the injury she suffered in the course of her employment and with sufficient notice to respondents.
The single or isolated act of negligence does not constitute a just cause for the dismissal of the employee. No.R. PERALTA et al. a transgression of some established and definite rule of action. Under the given facts. What happened was not a simple case of oversight and could not be attributed to a simple lapse of judgment. 2009) • Gross Negligence An employer cannot legally be compelled to continue with the employment of a person admittedly guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his duties.R. 68 . a forbidden act. Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise even slight care or diligence. G. No amount of good intent. INC. especially for simple laborers such as respondent Aguilar. or previous conscientious performance of duty. June 9. depending upon the circumstances.R. July 31. 178976. or a dereliction of duty. G. the negligence should not merely be gross but also habitual. Serious misconduct is improper conduct. including serious misconduct. No. JAMES MATEO. 170525. Maralit is not entitled to her retirement benefits. Considering the difficult times in which our country is in it is illogical and even suicidal for an employee like Aguilar to abandon his work. (ABELARDO P. and LORENZO A. 2009) To warrant removal from service. NIÑO v. the Court agrees with respondents when they argued in their petition filed with the CA that if an employee's aim is to secure the benefits due him from his employer. 2009) • Serious Misconduct PNB may rightfully terminate Maralit’s services for a just cause. Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform one's duties for a period of time. no basis in reason exists for the petitioners' theory that Aguilar abandoned his job. abandonment would surely be an illogical and impractical recourse. October 2. No.Furthermore.( LBC EXPRESS – METRO MANILA. (ESTER B. knowing fully well of the widespread unemployment and underemployment problems as well as the difficulty of looking for a means of livelihood. 168215. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION. can assuage the damage Mateo caused LBC when he failed to exercise the requisite degree of diligence required of him under the circumstances. Having been dismissed for a just cause. simply because his employer rejected his demand for salary increase. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. G. This holds true specially if the employee’s continued tenure is patently inimical to the employer’s interest. ABEL v. (BARON REPUBLIC THEATRICAL V. NORMITA P. or the entire absence of care.
must be of such a grave character and not merely trivial or unimportant. the peculiar nature of Espadero’s position aggravates her misconduct. (EATS-CETERA FOOD SERVICES OUTLET and/or SERAFIN RAMIREZ v. willful in character. G. it must be in connection with the employee’s work. has so plainly and completely been bared. v. considering the presence of trainees in the building and Tomada’s acts. respect and loyalty to his employer. To constitute just cause for termination. August 24. No employer may rationally be expected to continue in employment a person whose lack of morals.” or have not resulted in prejudice to the company in any way. G. Petitioner therefore validly dismissed respondent. No. and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. Indeed. in effect. With the degree of trust expected of Espadero. Tomada’s offenses cannot be excused upon a plea of being a “first offense. as an 69 .R. G. EDUARDO PINERA G. Tomada. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK. SR. October 2. we consider respondent’s offense to be a simple misconduct which does not merit termination of his employment. The misconduct. such infraction can hardly be classified as one that is trivial or unimportant. TOMADA. a forbidden act.( SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION COMPANY. a dereliction of duty. RFM CORPORATION-BAKERY FLOUR DIVISION and JOSE MARIA CONCEPCION III. 2009) Moreover. No. the transgression of some established or definite rule of action. 163270.R. Misconduct has been defined as improper or wrong conduct. No.R. and appreciation of the dignity and responsibility of his office. LETRAN and MARY GRACE ESPADERO. September 11. MYRNA B. issued an open invitation for others to violate those same company rules. 2009) o Simple Misconduct Based on the foregoing. (EDUARDO M.MARALIT v. 2009) By sleeping on the job and leaving his work area without prior authorization. 179507. regard for his employer’s rules. v. Although petitioner.R. No. October 13. 188742. Tomada did not merely disregard company rules. 163788. 2009) An employee who fails to account for and deliver the funds entrusted to him is liable for misappropriating the same and is consequently guilty of serious misconduct. INC. Her failure to promptly report the incident reflects a cavalier regard for the responsibility required of her in the discharge of the duties of her position. The penalty of dismissal from service is not commensurate to respondent’s offense. to be serious. Tomada failed to live up to his company’s reasonable expectations.
The employer should bear in mind that in termination cases. petitioner made it appear therein that it was upon the initiative of Lejos that he discovered the illegal activities only on October 28. it is petitioner Manliclic’s very act of misappropriation that is offensive to respondent PELCO I. INOCENCIO B. G. 2009) The amount misappropriated by petitioner Manliclic is irrelevant. No. November 27. 2009) • Loss of Trust and Confidence Petitioner. averred that sometime in August 2004. GENUINO ICE CO. by analogy. More than the resulting material damage or prejudice.R. instead. 2009 Indeed.( ROMEO N. In sum. January 27. and his pleadings before the lower tribunals and before this Court. Alido informed him of the illegal activities in the company premises. INC. 180465. But this fact was not reflected in his Partial Audit Report. 182570. In so doing. in his Position Paper filed before the LA and in his Sagot na Sinumpaang Salaysay. has the right to discipline its erring employees. G. (PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY v. If taxes are the lifeblood of the state. The basis for terminating the employment of petitioner actually came from petitioner himself due to the substantial and irreconcilable inconsistencies in the narration of facts in his Audit Report and his Sagot na Sinumpaang Salaysay filed before the company. G. (ERIC DELA CRUZ and RAUL M..employer. INC. then. JR. VENTURA. They thus committed a work-related willfull breach of the trust and confidence reposed in them. petitioners deliberately attempted to cover up the fact that Sales was under the influence of liquor at the time the accident took place.R. No. COURT OF APPEALS. LACUATA v. what is at stake is not simply the employee’s job or position but his very livelihood. vs.. 2004. The magnitude of the infraction committed by an employee must be weighed and equated with the penalty prescribed and must be commensurate thereto. after Lejos already resigned from the company. BERBANO. exercise of such right should be tempered with compassion and understanding. they committed acts inimical to respondent’s interests. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. by obtaining an altered police report and medical certificate. No. and HECTOR GENUINO. 165199. the 70 . in view of the gravity of the penalty of dismissal or termination from the service. July 31.R.. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS. it cannot be denied that he withheld this information from his immediate supervisor and from the company – a clear breach of the trust and confidence the company had reposed in him as one of its Auditors..
the actions of Tirazona reflected an obdurate character that is arrogant. which must be established by substantial evidence. However. 71 . This constitutes valid cause for his dismissal from service. 2009) Verily. on a willful breach.000. Respondent PELCO I cannot afford to continue in its employ dishonest bill collectors. heedlessly. 185933. It should be genuine and not simulated. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally. or inadvertently. No.000. otherwise. In this case. FADRIGO. August 19. G. ALLAS. petitioner Manliclic committed a breach of the trust reposed in him by his employer. nor should it appear as a mere afterthought to justify an earlier action taken in bad faith or as a subterfuge for causes that are improper. fully justified in terminating Tirazona’s employment for loss of trust and confidence. (ST. PET was. SLMC utterly failed to establish the requirements prescribed by law and jurisprudence for a valid dismissal on the ground of breach of trust and confidence. and LOLIANO E. (CHONA ESTACIO and LEOPOLDO MANLICLIC v. caprices or suspicion. It must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer’s arbitrariness.. uncompromising. Her attitude towards her employer was clearly inconsistent with her position of trust and confidence. By immediately and unreasonably adopting an adverse stance against PET. JENNIFER LYNNE C.00 payable within five days from demand. in the language of Article 282(c) of the Labor Code. PAMPANGA I ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE. It has never been intended to afford an occasion for abuse because of its subjective nature. whims.R. INCORPORATED v. the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer. Her motive for her actions was rendered even more questionable by her exorbitant and arbitrary demand for P2. LUKE’S MEDICAL CENTER. therefore.R. Her poor character became even more evident when she read what was supposed to be a confidential letter of the legal counsel of PET to PET officers/directors expressing his legal opinion on Tirazona’s administrative case. as distinguished from an act done carelessly. illegal or unjustified. respondent PELCO I. knowingly and purposely. but.payment collection is the lifeblood of the cooperative. INC. There must. and hostile. G. be an actual breach of duty committed by the employee. without justifiable excuse. November 25. By his own admission. 183196. she sought to impose her will on the company and placed her own interests above those of her employer. No. 2009) We are not unmindful of the employer’s right to dismiss an employee based on fraud or willful breach of trust. The collection provides respondent PELCO I with the financial resources to continue its operations. the loss of confidence must be based not on an ordinary breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by the employer. therefore. thoughtlessly.
To countenance an arbitrary exercise of that prerogative is to negate the employee’s constitutional right to security of tenure. 2009) Considering the foregoing. Loss of confidence as a just cause for termination of employment is premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds a position of responsibility or trust and confidence. 172854. (PET INC. January 20. INC. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND WILLIAM L.) AND/OR KEN KUBOTA. No. 2009) As Airport Manager. necessarily involves trust and confidence. the right of an employer to dismiss an employee on account of loss of trust and confidence must not be exercised whimsically. TIRAZONA. In other words. June 16.. JR. ROMEO F. MERCADO and GUS ZULUAGA G. the employer must clearly and convincingly prove by substantial evidence the facts and incidents upon which loss of confidence in the employee may be fairly made to rest. Where the rules laid down by the employer to protect its property are violated by the very employee who is entrusted and expected to follow and implement the rules. PHILIPPINE EDS TECHNO. in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal.R. G. it is settled that for breach of trust to constitute a valid cause for dismissal. However. No. And.). 164423. specially where the employee has access to the employer’s property. the latter’s dismissal will be rendered illegal. vs. 2009) Loss of confidence must not be indiscriminately used as a shield by the employer against a claim that the dismissal of an employee was arbitrary. April 16. LEGAZPI OIL COMPANY. we find that respondents Apostol and Opulencia were dismissed by TIPI for a valid and just cause. INC. MAMORU ONO and JUNICHI HIROSE.R. No. (ADAM B. RAMON L. the same must be willful. OPULENCIA. No. otherwise. Ordinary breach of trust will not 72 . 153983. May 26. The relationship of employer and employee. 169712. the employee may be validly dismissed from service. (TRIUMPH INTERNATIONAL(PHILS. WENELITA S. He must be invested with confidence on delicate matters.FIRST DIVISION v. the act complained of must be work-related and shows that the employee concerned is unfit to continue to work for the employer.. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (SECOND DIVISION). FRIEND.SERVICE INC. G. GARCIA v. respondent occupies a position of such extreme sensitivity that the existence of some basis or reasonable ground for his involvement in any irregularity is enough to destroy the trust and confidence which petitioner Gulf Air had reposed in him.R. such as custody handling or care and protection of the property and assets of the employer. 2009) To recapitulate. (SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION vs. G. APOSTOL and BEN M.(MA.R.
whims. ABEL v. insofar as the application of the doctrine of loss of trust and confidence is concerned. No other employee working at respondent’s mine site attested to the truth of any of his statements. in the case of managerial employees. JASSIM HINDRI ABDULLAH and RESTY AREVALO v. 178976. Loss of trust and confidence. And while there is no concrete showing of any ill motive on the part of Lupega to falsely accuse petitioner. No.suffice. April 24. the evidence must be substantial and must establish clearly and convincingly the facts on which the loss of confidence rests and not on the employer’s arbitrariness. proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. and that mere uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the employer will not be sufficient. (GULF AIR. 159687. 73 . Lupega. with respect to rank-and-file personnel. REYES. and the nature of his participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of his position.R. G. to be a valid cause for dismissal. as ground for valid dismissal. such as when the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee concerned is responsible for the purported misconduct. the mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has breached the trust of his employer would suffice for his dismissal. requires proof of involvement in the alleged events in question. Respondent’s evidence against petitioner fails to meet this standard. and caprices or suspicion. The basis for the dismissal must be clearly and convincingly established but proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary. Its lone witness.R. must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts. Thus.FIRST DIVISION v. July 31. (ABELARDO P. that Lupega himself was under investigation when he implicated petitioner in the subsidence area anomaly makes his uncorroborated version suspect. did not support his affidavit and testimony during the company investigation with any piece of evidence at all. 2009) o Application of the Doctrine of Loss of Trust and Confidence Recent decisions of this Court have distinguished the treatment of managerial employees from that of the rank-and-file personnel.C. (TRIUMPH INTERNATIONAL(PHILS.). 2009) The second requisite is that there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence. But as regards a managerial employee. Hence. No. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION. Standing alone. INC. It is sufficient that there is some basis for the employer’s loss of trust and confidence. Lupega’s account of the subsidence area anomaly could hardly be considered substantial evidence. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROBERTO J. G. Nonetheless. loss of trust and confidence.
in the normal and routine exercise of their functions. Stated a bit differently. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION. July 31. shorn of the contention that the merit rating is against the CBA.RAMON L. CORPORATION (MMPC). Accordingly. therefore. provides seniority. In fact. and retrenchment of employees. recall. Retrenchment scheme without taking seniority into account rendered the retrenchment invalid. They are defined as those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies and to hire. 2009) Authorized Causes • Retrenchment The proper view. G. well within the contemplation of the parties’ CBA. and. 1 is fair and reasonable. G. 1 criteria qualify the factors of “seniority and needs of the company” in Sec. 169780. 5(c) should be understood in the light of Sec. auditors. (ALFREDO A. No. The second class consists of cashiers. While respondent was the third most senior employee among the 7 employees in petitioner's personnel department.R. 2009) Records do not show any criterion adopted or used by petitioner in dismissing respondent. The first class consists of managerial employees. OPULENCIA. has not shown any arbitrariness on the part of MMPC in the evaluation. MENDROS. is that the Sec. and attendance as among the factors that should guide the company in choosing the employees to be laid-off or kept. (ABELARDO P. February 16. 1 which. Sec. efficiency and attitude. G. Any other measure would be senseless in the business viewpoint.R. 164423. selection. No. ABEL v. property custodians. All other things being equal. she was retrenched 74 . 2009) o Positions of Trust There are two classes of positions of trust. Alfredo. lay-off. suspend.R. to be sure. regularly handle significant amounts of money or property. Respondent was terminated without considering her seniority. June 16. 5(c). job knowledge and potential. 5 in conjunction with and as qualified by the factors provided under Sec. a company would necessarily need to retain those who had rendered dedicated and highly efficient service and whose knowledge. the merit rating used by MMPC based on Sec. 178976. etc. to stress. JR v. They are defined as those who. transfer. No. APOSTOL and BEN M. attendance. discharge. and potential hew with company standards. MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILS. assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such managerial actions.
G. For retrenchment should only be resorted to when other less drastic means have been tried and found to be inadequate. v. There was no showing that respondent was offered to be transferred to other positions.R. . We cannot agree. the law also requires that written notices of the intended retrenchment be served by the employer on the worker and on the DOLE at least one month before the actual date of the retrenchment. EDMUND REY.September 18. MA. have been tried and found wanting. the employer must still prove that retrenchment was resorted to only after less drastic measures such as the reduction of both management and rank-and-file bonuses and salaries. (Emphasis supplied) In the case at bar.while her other co-employees junior than her were either retained in the Personnel Department or were transferred to other positions in the company. NLRC instructs: . going on reduced time. In this case. September 8. reduction of marketing and advertising costs. SIENES. and/or JOSE L.(EMCOR INCORPORATED v. as well as to give DOLE the opportunity to ascertain the veracity of the alleged cause of termination. CO v. petitioner did not adduce evidence to prove that retrenchment was resorted to because other measures were undertaken to abate actual or future business losses but thus failed. 2009) • Requirement for Retrenchment For a valid termination due to retrenchment. Nothing in the law gives petitioner the option to substitute the required prior written notice with payment of 30 days 75 . 2009) At all events. No. the Court is not persuaded on the necessity of resorting to retrenchment to prevent or minimize actual or imminent business losses on the part of petitioner. petitioner insists that the payment of 30 days salary to respondents in place of notice was sufficient compliance with the 30-day notice rule. . The purpose of this requirement is to give employees time to prepare for the eventual loss of their jobs. 152101. G. 181503. even if the comparative report were to be considered. faster collection of customer accounts.R. So Polymart Paper Industries. Inc. reduction of raw materials investment and others. (BIO QUEST MARKETING INC. [E]ven if business losses were indeed sufficiently proven. improving manufacturing efficiency. LOURDES D. No.
MENDROS. JR v. let it be clarified that our ruling in International Hardware. a job is more than the salary it carries. or expected losses. G. 2009) • Losses Third. For this. 170669. To our mind. ALAN G. impending. especially when.. MMPC was already financially hemorrhaging before finally resorting to retrenchment. (ALFREDO A. DEMECILLO. February 4. INC. it bears to state that the aforequoted Art. But. v. DEMECILLO. It cannot be a fully effective substitute for the 30 days’ written notice requirement by law. NLRC did not dispense with the responsibility of the employer to substantiate losses. as in this case. Any less exacting standard of proof would render too easy the abuse of this ground for termination of services of employees. 283 of the Code uses the phrase “retrenchment to prevent losses. 1998. 2009) 76 . petitioner deprived respondents of their right to statutory due process. (MOBILIA PRODUCTS. G. CORPORATION (MMPC). Inc. Further.R. 169780. consistent with our ruling in Agabon v. the amount of nominal damages should be P30. We have constantly ruled that financial statements audited by independent external auditors constitute the normal method of proof of the profit and loss performance of a company. et al. respondents had already been dismissed before they signed the letters of voluntary acceptance.000. No. Indeed. these were insufficient to show that petitioner indeed suffered business losses so serious as to necessitate the reduction of personnel. It merely exempts the latter from giving notice of retrenchment to its employees and DOLE. No. 1998 were effective the following day. February 16. v. We also sustain the award of attorney’s fees as it is sanctioned by law. No. et al. we affirm the appellate court’s award of nominal damages to respondents. The employer need not wait for substantial losses to materialize before exercising ultimate and drastic option to prevent such losses. Even as the letters of voluntary acceptance were dated July 25. the only evidence it presented were the letters of voluntary acceptance of retrenchment. National Labor Relations Commission. v.” The phrase necessarily implies that retrenchment may be effected even in the event only of imminent. 170669.R. 2009) However. apart from petitioner’s bare assertion of reduced orders from Japan. MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILS. Clearly. no notice was given to the DOLE. and waivers and quitclaims signed by respondents. In the case at bench. the notices of termination given on July 23. Payment of 30 days salary cannot compensate for the psychological effect or the stigma of immediately finding one’s self laid off from work.salary. (MOBILIA PRODUCTS. Petitioner submitted none. February 4. In essence. INC. G.. ALAN G.R.
Transferring union members to another job description.. and 8. INC.Requiring the union members to submit another information sheet. Applying the totality of the conduct doctrine. 7. 2. 5.G. resulting to her being taken to the hospital for nervous breakdown. January 19.Bribing union member and promising promotion if he will not join the strike as evidenced by the Salaysay of Bernard Delta. al. ET. 1997 salary.Unfair Labor Practice • Totality of the Conduct Doctrine Then came the Lustria decision.Cuddling and treating the minority union with favor. such as paying their salaries/wages fully and ahead of the incumbent union and as if it were the incumbent bargaining agents. QUEZON CITY SPORTS CLUB. (LOLITA A. The Lustria decision emanated from a complaint for unfair labor practice against QCSC. No. such as: 1. 4.Discouraging the members of the incumbent union from continuing their membership with the incumbent union as evidenced by the Pinagsamang Salaysay of Ramiro Espinosa and Ronaldo Q. Lim. 3. 2009) Unfair labor practice refers to “acts that violate the workers’ right to organize. LOPEZ.R.” The prohibited acts are related to the workers’ right 77 . finding that QCSC had committed unfair labor practices against the union and accordingly granting backwages and separation pay in favor of 112 employees.Subjecting one union member to a very tense confrontation in the General Manager’s Office after she commented during the NCMB conference that the 201 file of the employees are intact. Labor Arbiter Lustria held that QCSC had committed unfair labor practices. vs.Replacing them with members of minority union evidenced by Leslie Tamayo’s Salaysay. Cecilia Pangan. 164032. 6.Insulting of the Union President as evidenced by the Salaysay of Ma. issued two (2) months later. Culled from the union’s pleadings were the specific acts committed by QCSC. and failure to do so would mean no payment of their June 16-30..
2009) Petitioners never substantiated their allegations. therefore. 165756. owner of Hyatt Regency Manila. No. We said: Petitioners' accusation of union busting is bereft of any proof. June 5. are not unfair labor practices. G. No. v. (GENERAL SANTOS COCA-COLA PLANT FREE WORKERS UNION-TUPAS vs. petitioner Sereneo. v. (HOTEL ENTERPRISES OF THE PHILIPPINES. those circumstances showed prima facie that the hotel committed ULP. Thus. 178647) Here. the strike. The belief was bolstered when the management hired 100 contractual workers to replace the 48 terminated regular rank-and-file employees who were all Union members. (GENERAL SANTOS CITY). COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS.R. may be considered legal. . since the attendant circumstances support the belief in good faith that petitioner’s retrenchment scheme was structured to weaken the bargaining power of the Union. NLRC. xxx xxx xxx. who had the burden of proof to present substantial evidence to support its allegations (of unfair labor practices committed by management). INC. even if unfair. We scanned the records very carefully and failed to discern any evidence to sustain such charge. In Tiu vs. charged respondent with ULP and illegal dismissal because she was in the process of renegotiating the CBA with respondent when she was dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. (HEPI). even if technically there was no legal ground to stage a strike based on ULP. Without that element. INC. Indeed. THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. 78 .. G. Schering Employees Labor Union (SELU) et al. . Schering Plough Corporation. SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT-NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN THE HOTEL AND RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES (SAMASAHNUWHRAIN). by exception.to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA. respondent Union went on strike in the honest belief that petitioner was committing ULP after the latter decided to downsize its workforce contrary to the staffing/manning standards adopted by both parties under a CBA forged only four (4) short months earlier. In a similar case. the acts. the president of SELU.R. It is the union. . we held: .
respondent claims that in light of the opinion of the physician in Korea that he had “suspected ischemic heart. respondent’s actions show that he voluntarily resigned. Thus. April 16. in the case at bar. et al.” petitioners affirmed his medical repatriation. a position involving more strain and pressure? A Tug (boat) Master is primarily tasked to operate tug boats. 178127. a Tug Master requires not just a thorough knowledge of the port environment in which he is operating. In fact... according the latter a month of paid vacation every three months of straight service. 2009) Work-related Disease If we found in Seagull Shipmanagement that the different climates and unpredictable weather. . ischemic heart disease cannot develop in a short span of time that respondent served as chief cook for petitioners. (RENITA DEL ROSARIO. In operating such a powerful vessel. but in the case at bar the facts and the evidence did not establish even at least a rational basis why the union would wield a strike based on alleged unfair labor practices it did not even bother to substantiate during the conciliation proceedings. respondent ADAMS recognized how grueling petitioner Nisda’s job was. G. but a high level of skill as well. then what more in the heart disease of a seafarer serving as a ship master. MAKATI CINEMA SQUARE CORPORATION. RENATO MORENTE & ODYSSEY MARITIME PTE. As reflected in the immediately preceding paragraph. July 3. No..R. as well as the stress of the job. IN FINE. as indicated above. CAPT. the Gleneagles Maritime Medical Centre doctor who treated respondent in May 2000 for abscess in his left hand had noted respondent’s “[h]istory of hypertension for 3 years.. It is not enough that the union believed that the employer committed acts of unfair labor practice when the circumstances clearly negate even a prima facie showing to warrant such a belief. No. the Korean physician did not make any recommendation as to respondent’s bill of health for petitioners to assume that he was fit for repatriation. a powerful marine vessel that meets large ships out at sea and attach a line to guide/steer the same into and out of berths. . however. more than a reasonable connection between the nature of petitioner Nisda’s job and his Coronary Artery Disease has been 79 . 2009) Voluntary Resignation Finally. JESUS B. G.” Moreover. BARRAQUIO. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION v. had a correlation with the heart disease of a seafarer working as a radioman on a vessel. v. In fact.R. (VIRGEN SHIPPING CORPORATION. 170014. LTD.
179177. July 23. Petitioner Nisda was able to sufficiently prove. aggravated any pre-existing condition he might have had. utterly failed to refute the said connection. ALGOSAIBI DIVING AND MARINE SERVICES. (CARLOS N. Respondents Sea Serve and ADAMS. NISDA v. that his Coronary Artery Disease was workrelated.established. by substantial evidence. on the other hand. at least. G. 2009) 80 . R. given the arduous nature of his job that caused his disease or. SEA SERVE MARITIME AGENCY and KHALIFA A. No.
This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
We've moved you to where you read on your other device.
Get the full title to continue reading from where you left off, or restart the preview.