People of the Philippines vs.

Domingo Panis
GR No. L–58674–77, July 11, 1990

FACTS:

On January 9, 1981, four information were filed in the in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Zambales
and Olongapo City alleging that herein private respondent Serapio Abug, "without first securing a
license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging employment
agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate a private fee charging
employment agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and promising employment in Saudi
Arabia" to four separate individuals. Abug filed a motion to quash contending that he cannot be
charged for illegal recruitment because according to him, Article 13(b) of the Labor Code says there
would be illegal recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or
offered any employment for a fee.”

Denied at first, the motion to quash was reconsidered and granted by the Trial Court in its Orders
dated June 24, 1981, and September 17, 1981. In the instant case, the view of the private
respondents is that to constitute recruitment and placement, all the acts mentioned in this article
should involve dealings with two or more persons as an indispensable requirement. On the other
hand, the petitioner argues that the requirement of two or more persons is imposed only where the
recruitment and placement consists of an offer or promise of employment to such persons and always
in consideration of a fee.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 13(b) of the Labor Code provides for the innocence or guilt of the private
respondent of the crime of illegal recruitment

COURT RULING:
The Supreme Court reversed the CFI’s Orders and reinstated all four information filed against private
respondent.
The Article 13(b) of the Labor Code was merely intended to create a presumption, and not to impose
a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto.
Where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more
prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the
act of recruitment and placement. The words "shall be deemed" create the said presumption.

Darvin v Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 125044
July 13, 1998

Facts:

Imelda Darvin was convicted of simple illegal recruitment under the Labor Code by the RTC. It
stemmed from a complaint of one Macaria Toledo who was convinced by the petitioner that she has
the authority to recruit workers for abroad and can facilitate the necessary papers in connection
thereof. In view of this promise, Macaria gave her P150,000 supposedly intended for US Visa and air
fare.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto, hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment.

Held:

Art. 13 of the Labor Code provides the definition of recruitment and placement as:
...b.) any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers
and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not: Provided, that any reason person or entity which, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement.

Art. 38 of the Labor Code provides:

a.)Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 43 of the
Labor Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal
and punishable under Article 39 of the Labor Code.

Applied to the present case, to uphold the conviction of accused-appellant, two elements need to be
shown: (1) the person charged with the crime must have undertaken recruitment activities: and (2) the
said person does not have a license or authority to do so.

In the case, the Court found no sufficient evidence to prove that accused-appellant offered a job to
private respondent. It is not clear that accused gave the impression that she was capable of providing
the private respondent work abroad. What is established, however, is that the private respondent
gave accused-appellant P150,000.

By themselves, procuring a passport, airline tickets and foreign visa for another individual, without
more, can hardly qualify as recruitment activities. Aside from the testimony of private respondent,
there is nothing to show that appellant engaged in recruitment activities.

At best, the evidence proffered by the prosecution only goes so far as to create a suspicion that
appellant probably perpetrated the crime charged. But suspicion alone is insufficient, the required
quantum of evidence being proof beyond reasonable doubt. When the People’s evidence fail to
indubitably prove the accused’s authorship of the crime of which he stand accused, then it is the
Court’s duty, and the accused’s right, to proclaim his innocence.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby granted and the decision of the CA is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on ground of reasonably doubt. The accused is ordered
immediately released from her confinement.

G.R. Nos. 135030-33. July 20, 2001.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

plaintiff-appellee
, vs. MERCY LOGAN y CALDERON,
accused-appellant
.
Criminal Law; Labor Law; Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale; Elements.
—The essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale which is punishable with life
imprisonment and a fineof One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) under Article 39(a) of the
Labor Code, as amended,are as follows: 1) the accused engages in the recruitment
and placement of workers, as defined under Article 13(b) or in any
prohibited activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code; 2) the accused has
not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
particularly with respect to the securing of a license or an authority to recruit and deploy
workers, whether locally oroverseas; and 3) the accused commits the same against
three (3) or more persons, individually or as agroup.
Facts
: At separate instances, Rodrigo Acorda, Florante Casia, and Orlando Velasco went to Mercy
Logan’s office after learning that she can secure them jobs in Japan. Logan accommodated each of
them and asked for the payment of placement fees to facilitate the process of their employment
applications. However, Logan failed to process their applications. She issued checks in the name of
the complainants to return the payments they made but it was not honored by the bank as the Logan’s
account was already closed. They also learned that Logan’s recruitment agency was not licensed by
the POEA to recruit applicants for overseas employment. Logan was then charged in one information
with three counts of the crime of estafa, and in another information with the crime of illegal recruitment
in large scale.In her defense, Logan claims that she did not represent herself as a job recruiter to the
private complainants. According to her, the private complainants were the ones who went to her office
in and pleaded with her to help them find jobs abroad. While she admitted having received money
from the private complainants, the appellant turned the same over to a certain Gloria de Leon who
actually recruited them for overseas employment; and that Gloria de Leon reneged on her promise to
the private complainants. Hence, they implicated her in these cases inasmuch as their transactions
with Gloria de Leon took place in her office.

Issue
: Whether or not Logan committed the crime of illegal recruitment.

Ruling
: Yes.Logan was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of three (3) counts ofestafa and
one count of illegal recruitment in large scale. However, the Court modified theindeterminate penalty
imposed by the trial court on the appellant in accordance with a previousruling. Hence, the assailed
decision of the trial court was affirmed and was modified accordingly.
Ratio Decidendi
: It has been established that the three (3) private complainants met with theappellant on separate
occasions in her office to apply for overseas employment. On the saidoccasions, she promised them
employment either as construction workers or piggery helpers inJapan for a fee. Despite subsequent
payment of her required fees, she failed to secure for the three(3) private complainants any overseas
employment. Clearly, the appellant was engaged in large-scale recruitment and placement activities
that are illegal for the reason that she had no license orauthority from the Secretary of Labor and
Employment. The signatures of the appellant appearingon the written receipts presented by the
prosecution during the trial acknowledging receipt of thecorresponding amounts stated thereon
undeniably supported the testimonies of the privatecomplainants that they transacted directly with her.
Significantly, the signature of Gloria de Leon towhom appellant alleged to have turned over the money
of the complainants and who actuallyrecruited complainants for overseas employment did not appear
on any of those written receipts.These acts of the appellant certainly militate against her claim that
she did not actually receive andbenefit from the amounts that she collected from the said private
complainants.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MELISSA CHUA a.k.a. CLARITA NG CHUAG.R. No. 187052,
September 13, 2012Villama, Jr., J.

FACTS:
Private petitioners Rey Tajadao, Billy Danan, Alberto Aglanao and Roylan Ursulum filed acomplaint
for illegal recruitment before the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA)against respondent
Melissa Chua. Petitioners claim that respondent offered them a job as factoryworker to be deployed in
Taiwan. The respondent then require petitioners to secure passports,undergo medical examination
and a pay of placement fee amounting to Php. 80,000.00.Respondent Chua assured the petitioners
that whoever pays the application fee the earliest canleave sooner.Private petitioners pay the amount
of Php. 80,000.00 to Melissa Chua. Rey Tajadao, Billy Dananand Alberto Aglanao were able to
secure a voucher for their payment of placement fee fromrespondent. However, Roylan Ursulum
failed to secure the same.Billy Danan, upon follow up on the status of their deployment, respondent
Chua informed Dananthat his departure was re-scheduled as Taiwan had suspended admission of
overseas workers untilafter the festival. Hence, petitionersonly learned that respondent was not
authprized and licensedto recruit workers for overseas employment.The prosecution likewise
presented as witness Severino Maranan, Senior Labor EmploymentOfficer of the POEA. Maranan
confirmed that respondent Chua was neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas
employment. In support, he presented to the court acertification issied by the POEA to that effect.In
the defense of the respondent, she denies having recruited complainants for overseasemployment.
According to her, she was only a cashier at Golden Gate which is owned by MarilenCallueng.The
Regional Trials Courts's found that Melissa Chua is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
illegalrecruitment in large scale and four counts of estafa. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the trial court. Hence, Chua elevated the case by filing a Notice of Appeal.

ISSUE:
Wheter or not the prosecution was able to prove that Melissa Chua is guilty for the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale.

RATIO DECIDENDI:
Yes. In order to hold a person liable for illegal recruitment, the following elements must concur:1. The
offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" under
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumeratedunder Article 34 of the
Labor Code (now Section 6 of Republic Act 8042); and2. The offender has no valid license or
authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engagein recruitment and placement of workers.In
the case of illegal recruitment in large scale a third element is added: that the offender commits any of
the acts of recruitment and placement against three or more person, individually or as agroup. All
three elements are present in the case at bar.

FALLO / WHEREFORE CLAUSE:

The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed with modification in that the appellant
osordered to pay a fine of Php. 1,000,000.00 and to indemnify each of the private
complainantsAlberto Aglanao, Billy Danan and Rey Tajadal in the amount of Php. 80,000.00. With
costsagainst accused-appellant.

 
G.R. Nos. 117145-50 & 117447, March 28, 2000 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LEONIDA
MERIS y PADILLA KAPUNAN, J.:

FACTS:
Accused-appellant was charged and convicted of illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa. She
contends that her conviction was erroneous because the court never acquired jurisdiction over her
person, as her arrest was illegal, and that the prosecution failed to establish estafa.

ISSUE:
Whether the lower court erred in not dismissing this case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on its
part over the person of the accused-appellant by reason of the fact that the warrantless arrest of the
accused-appellant was illegal.

HELD:
Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired either by arrest or voluntary appearance in
court. Hence, granting arguendo that accused-appellant’s arrest was defective, such is deemed
cured upon her voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. It should be stressed that the
question of legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
accused. Consequently, if objections based on this ground are waived, the fact that the arrest was
illegal is not sufficient cause for setting aside an otherwise valid judgment. The technicality cannot
render the subsequent proceedings void and deprive the State of its right to convict the guilty when all
the facts on record point to the culpability of the accused.
Estafa is committed by any person who defrauds another by using a fictitious name, or falsely
pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission
of the fraud. The offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means of the accused-appellant and as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damages.

MILLARES vs NLRC
GR No.110524 | July 29, 2002
Petitioner:
Douglas MillaresRogelio Lagda
Respondent:
ESSO international Shipping Co.Trans-Global Maritime Agency (local manning agency)

FACTS:
In 1968, Douglas was employed by ESSO throughTrans-Global as a machinist. In 1975, he was
promotedas Chief Engineer which position he occupied until heopted to retire in 1989.On June 1989,
Douglas wrote GS Hanly (OperationsManager of ESSO) informing him of his intention to availof the
optional retirement plan under the ConsecutiveIncentive Plan (CEIP) considering that he had
alreadyrenderd more than twenty years of continuous service.
On July 1989, ESSO denied Douglas’ request for
optional retirement on the ground that he was employedon a contractual basis and his contract of
enlistment(COE) did not provide for retirement before the age of60.On June 1969, ESSO employed
Lagda as a wiper/oiler.He was promoted as Chief Engineer in 1980, a positionhe continued to occupy
until his last COE expired on April 1989.On June 26, 1989, Lagda wrote a letter to G.S.
Stanley(Operations Manager of ESSO) informing him of hisintention to avail of the optional early
retirement plan inview of his twenty (20) years continuous service in thecomplaint.On July 13, 1989,
Trans-global denied Lagda's requestfor availment of the optional early retirement scheme onthe same
grounds upon which petitioner Millares requestwas denied.
When the case reached the NLRC, the NLRC ruledthat
seamen and overseas contract workers are notcovered by the term "regular employment" as
definedunder Article 280 of the Labor Code. The POEA, whichis tasked with protecting the rights of
the Filipino workersfor overseas employment to fair and equitablerecruitment and employment
practices and to ensuretheir welfare, prescribes a standard employment contractfor seamen on board
ocean-going vessels for a fixedperiod but in no case to exceed twelve (12) months (Part1, Sec. C).
This POEA policy appears to be inconsonance with the international maritime practice.Moreover, the
Supreme Court in Brent School, Inc. vs.Zamora, 181 SCRA 702, had held that a fixed term isessential
and natural appurtenance of overseasemployment contracts to which the concept of
regularemployment with all that it implies is not applicable, Article 280 of the Labor Code
notwithstanding. There is,therefore, no reason to disturb the POEA Administrator'sfinding that Millares
and Lagda were hired on acontractual basis and for a definite period. Theiremployment is thus
governed by the contracts they signeach time they are re-hired and is terminated at theexpiration of
the contract period.
Petitioner’s contentions:


Considering that petitioners performed activitieswhich are usually necessary or desirable in theusual
business or trade of private respondents, theyshould be considered as regular employeespursuant to
Article 280, Par. 1 of the Labor Code.

Other justifications for this ruling include the fact thatpetitioners have rendered over twenty (20) years
ofservice, as admitted by the private respondents;

that they were recipients of Merit Pay which is anexpress acknowledgment by the private
respondentsthat petitioners are regular and not just contractualemployees;

that petitioners were registered under the SocialSecurity System (SSS).

Furthermore, private respondents' fear that our judicial pronouncement will spell the death of
themanning industry is far from real. Instead, with thevaluable contribution of the manning industry to
oureconomy, these seafarers are supposed to beconsidered as "Heroes of the Republic" whose
rightsmust be protected.
Respondent’s contentions:


Art. 280 is not applicable as what applies is thePOEA Rules and Regulations Governing
OverseasEmployment;

seafarers are not regular employees based oninternational maritime practice;

grave consequences would result on the future ofseafarers and manning agencies if the ruling is
notreconsidered

ISSUE:
Are petitioners regular or contractual employees whoseemployments are terminated every time their
contractsof employment expire? They are contractual employees.
RULING:
Petitioners insist that they should be considered regularemployees, since they have rendered services
which areusually necessary and desirable to the business of theiremployer, and that they have
rendered more thantwenty(20) years of service. While this may be true, theBrent case has, however,
held that there are certainforms of employment which also require theperformance of usual and
desirable functions and whichexceed one year but do not necessarily attain regularemployment status
under Article 280. Overseas workersincluding seafarers fall under this type of employmentwhich are
governed by the mutual agreements of theparties.In this jurisdiction and as clearly stated in the
Coyocacase, Filipino seamen are governed by the Rules andRegulations of the POEA. The Standard
EmploymentContract governing the employment of All Filipinoseamen on Board Ocean-Going
Vessels of the POEA,particularly in Part I, Sec. C specifically provides that thecontract of seamen
shall be for a fixed period. And in nocase should the contract of seamen be longer than
12months.Moreover, it is an accepted maritime industry practicethat employment of seafarers are for
a fixed period only.Constrained by the nature of their employment which is quite peculiar and unique
in itself, it is for the mutual interest of both the seafarer and the employer why the employment status
must be contractual only or for a certain period of time. Seafarers spend most of their time at sea and
understandably, they can not stay for a long and an indefinite period of time at sea.21 Limited access
to shore society during the employment will have an adverse impact on the seafarer. The national,
cultural and lingual diversity among the crew during the COE is a reality that necessitates the
limitation of its period. etitioners are not considered regular or permanent employees under Article 280
of the Labor Code. Petitioners' employment have automatically ceased upon the expiration of their
contracts of enlistment (COE). Since there was no dismissal to speak of, it follows that petitioners are
not entitled to reinstatement or payment of separation pay or backwages, as provided by law.

Gu-Miro vs. Adorable, G.R. No. 160952, August 20, 2004; 437 SCRA 162
Posted by Pius Morados on November 10, 2011
(Labor Law – Seafarers are not considered regular employees)

Facts: Petitioner services as radio officer on board respondent’s different vessels were terminated due
to the installation of labor saving devices which made his services redundant. Petitioner argued that
aside from the incentive bonus and additional allowances that he is entitled, he should be considered
as a regular employee of respondent company, having been employed onboard the latter’s different
vessels for the span of 10 years and thus, entitled to back wages and separation pay.

Issue: WON seafarers are considered regular employees.

Held: No. Petitioner cannot be considered as a regular employee notwithstanding that the work he
performs is necessary and desirable in the business of the respondent company. The exigencies of
the work of seafarers necessitates that they be employed on a contractual basis. Thus, even with the
continued re-hiring by respondent company of petitioner to serve as radio officer onboard the former’s
different vessels, this should be interpreted not as a basis for regularization but rather a series of
contract renewals.

OBERTO RAVAGO vs. ESSO EASTERN MARINE, LTD. and TRANS-GLOBALMARITIME AGENCY,
INC.G.R. No. 158324. March 14, 2005. CALLEJO, SR., J

FACTS

Esso Eastern Marine Ltd. (EEM), now the Petroleum Shipping Ltd., is a foreign companybased in
Singapore, represented in the Philippines by its manning agent and co-respondent TransGlobal
Maritime Agency, Inc. (Trans-Global)

Roberto Ravago was hired by Trans-Global to work as a seaman on board various Essovessels. First
as a wiper, then as oiler, then assistant engineer. He was employed under atotal of 34 separate and
unconnected contracts, each for a fixed period

After more than 22 years, Ravago was granted a vacation leave with pay.

a stray bullet hit Ravago on the left leg while he was waiting for a bus ride in Cubao. Hefractured his
left proximal tibia and was hospitalized at the Philippine Orthopedic Hospital.
 As a result of his injury, Ravago’s doc
tor opined that he would not be able to cope with the job of a seaman and suggested that he be given
a desk job.


Ravago’s wife, Lolita, informed Trans

-Global and EIS of the incident for purposes ofavailing medical benefits.


Ravago’s left leg had become a

pparently shorter, making him walk with a limp. For thisreason, the company physician, Dr. Virginia G.
Manzo, found him to have lost his dexterity,making him unfit to work once again as a seaman

Consequently, instead of rehiring Ravago, EIS paid him his Career Employment IncentivePlan (CEIP)
and his final tax refund. After deducting his SSS contributions, EIS remitted
the net amount of P162,232.65, following Ravago’s execution of a Deed of Quitclaim
and/or Release

However, Ravago filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement,
backwages, damages and attorney’s fees against TransGlobal and EIS with the POEA

o
Ravago insisted that he was fit to resume pre-injury activities
o
asserted that he was not a mere contractual employee because the respondentsregularly and
continuously rehired him for 23 years

LA rendered a decision in favor of Ravago
o
Ravago was a regular employee because he was engaged to perform activitieswhich were usually
necessary or desirable in the usual trade or business of theemployer

repeatedly contracted

given several promotions

paid a monthly service experience bonus
o

an employer cannot terminate a worker’s employment on the ground of disease

unless there is a certification by a competent public health authority that the saiddisease is of such
nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within aperiod of six months even with proper
medical treatment.

NLRC rendered a decision affirming that of the LA
o
the quitclaim executed by him could not be considered as a waiver of his right toquestion the validity
of his dismissal and seek reinstatement and other reliefs

such quitclaim is against public policy, considering the economicdisadvantage of the employee and
the inevitable pressure broughtabout by financial capacity.

Appeal to CA, plus an Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Temporary RestrainingOrder and Writ
of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin and restrain LA from enforcing hisdecision

CA issued a Resolution temporarily restraining NLRC Sheriff Manolito Manuel fromenforcing and/or
implementing the decision of the LA

CA granted the application for preliminary injunction upon filing by the respondents of abond in the
amount of P500,000.00

respondents filed the surety bond as directed by the appellate court.

Before the approval thereof, however, Ravago filed a motion to set aside the Resolutionprincipally
arguing that the instant case was a labor dispute, wherein an injunction isproscribed under Article 254

respondents professed that the case before the CA did not involve a labor dispute withinthe meaning
of Article 212(l) but a money claim against the employer as a result oftermination of employment

CA rendered a decision in favor the respondents
o
under the rules and regulations governing overseas employment promulgatedby the POEA, seafarers
are contractual employees whose terms of employmentare fixed for a certain period of time. A fixed
term is an essential and natural
appurtenance of seamen’s employment contracts to which, whatever the nature
of the engagement, the concept of regular employment under Article 280 of theLabor Code does not
find application (Millares v. NLRC)
o
the fact that Ravago was not rehired upon the completion of his contract did notresult in his illegal
dismissal; hence, he was not entitled to reinstatement orpayment of separation pay
o
affirmed the writ of preliminary injunction it earlier issued, declaring that aninjunction is a preservative
remedy issued for the protection of a substantiveright or interest, an antidote resorted to only when
there is a pressing necessityto avoid injurious consequences which cannot be rendered under any
standardcompensation.
ISSUE: WoN the CA erred and violated the labor code when it issued a restraining orderand
thereafter a writ of preliminary injunction NORATIO:


The petitioner’s reliance on Article 254 is misplaced. The law proscribes the issuance of
injunctive relief only in those cases involving or growing out of a labor dispute.
o
The case before the NLRC neither involves nor grows out of a labor dispute. Itdid not involve the
fixing of terms or conditions of employment or representation
of persons with respect thereto. In fact, the petitioner’s complaint revolves
around the issue of his alleged dismissal from service and his claim for
backwages, damages and attorney’s fees.
o
Moreover, Article 254 of the Labor Code specifically provides that the NLRC maygrant injunctive
relief under Article 218 thereof

the anti-injunction policy of the Labor Code, basically, is freedom at the workplace. It ismore
appropriate in the promotion of the primacy of free collective bargaining andnegotiations, including
voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as modes ofsettling labor and industrial disputes

an injunction is a preservative remed
y for the protection of a person’s substantive rights or
interests. It is not a cause of action in itself but a mere provisional remedy, an appendageto the main
suit. Pressing necessity requires that it should be resorted to only to avoidinjurious consequences
which cannot be remedied under any measure of consideration.

The application of an injunctive writ rests upon the presence of an exigency or of anexceptional
reason before the main case can be regularly heard. The indispensableconditions for granting such
temporary injunctive relief are:
o
that the complaint alleges facts which appear to be satisfactory to establish aproper basis for
injunction, and
o
that on the entire showing from the contending parties, the injunction isreasonably necessary to
protect the legal rights of the plaintiff pending thelitigation


ITC: the respondents’ petition contains facts sufficient to warrant the issuance of an
injunction under Article 218 (e). Further, respondents had already posted a surety bondmore than
adequate to cover the judgment award.

OSM SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

(Third Division) and FERMIN F. GUERRERO, Respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Rules of Court do not require that all supporting papers and documents accompanying a petition
for certiorari should be duplicate originals or certified true copies. Furthermore, unilateral decisions to
alter the use of a vessel from overseas service to coastwise shipping will not affect the validity of an
existing employment contract validly executed. Workers should not be prejudiced by actions done
solely by employers without the former’s consent or participation.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set
aside the February 11, 1999 and the March 26, 1999 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
GR SP No. 50667. The assailed Resolutions dismissed a Petition filed in the CA, challenging an
adverse ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The first Resolution disposed as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"We resolve to OUTRIGHTLY DISMISS the petition." 2

The second Resolution 3 denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.

On the other hand, the NLRC Decision disposed in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED in that
respondents OSM Shipping Phils. Inc. and its principal, Philippine Carrier Shipping Agency Services
Co. are jointly and severally ordered to pay complainant the sum of ELEVEN THOUSAND THREE
HUNDRED FIFTY NINE and 65/100 [US dollars] (US$11,359.65) or its peso equivalent at the time of
payment representing complainant’s unpaid salaries, accrued fixed overtime pay, allowance, vacation
leave pay and termination pay." 4

The Facts

This case originated from a Complaint filed by Fermin F. Guerrero against OSM Shipping Philippines,
Inc.; and its principal, Philippine Carrier Shipping Agency Services Co. The Complaint was for illegal
dismissal and non-payment of salaries, overtime pay and vacation pay. The facts are summarized in
the NLRC Decision as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

" [Private respondent] was hired by [Petitioner] OSM for and in behalf of its principal, Phil Carrier
Shipping Agency Services Co. (PC-SLC) to board its vessel MN ‘[Princess] Hoa’ as a Master Mariner
for a contract period of ten (10) months. Under the said contract, his basic monthly salary is
US$1,070.00, US$220.00 allowance, US$321.00 fixed overtime, US$89 vacation leave pay per month
for . . . 44 hours [of] work per week. He boarded the vessel on July 21, 1994 and complied faithfully
with the duties assigned to him.

" [Private respondent] alleged that from the start of his work with MN ‘Princess Hoa’, he was not paid
any compensation at all and was forced to disembark the vessel sometime in January 1995 because
he cannot even buy his basic personal necessities. For almost seven (7) months, i.e. from July 1994
to January 1995, despite the services he rendered, no compensation or remuneration was ever paid
to him. Hence, this case for illegal dismissal, [non-payment] of salaries, overtime pay and vacation
pay.

" [Petitioner] OSM, for its part, alleged that on July 26, 1994, Concorde Pacific, an American company
which owns MN ‘Princess Hoa’, then a foreign registered vessel, appointed . . . Philippine Carrier
Shipping Agency Services Co. (PC-SASCO) as ship manager particularly to negotiate, transact and
deal with any third persons, entities or corporations in the planning of crewing selection or
determination of qualifications of Filipino Seamen. On the same date, [Petitioner] OSM entered into a
Crew Agreement with . . . PC-SASCO for the purpose of processing the documents of crew members
of MN ‘Princess Hoa’. The initial plan of the [s]hip-owner was to use the vessel in the overseas trade,
particularly the East Asian Growth Area. Thereafter, the contract of [private respondent] was
processed before the POEA on September 20, 1994.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"OSM alleged further that the shipowner changed its plans on the use of the vessel. Instead of using it
for overseas trade, it decided to use it in the coastwise trade, thus, the crewmembers hired never left
the Philippines and were merely used by the shipowner in the coastwise trade. Considering that the
MN ‘Princess Hoa’ was a foreign registered vessel and could not be used in the coastwise trade, the
shipowner converted the vessel to Philippine registry on September 28, 1994 by way of bareboat
chartering it out to another entity named Philippine Carrier Shipping Lines Co. (PCSLC). To do this,
the shipowner through Conrado V. Tendido had to terminate its management agreement with . . . PC-
SASCO on September 28, 1994 by a letter of termination dated September 20, 1994. In the same
letter of termination, the ship owner stated that it has bareboat chartered out the vessel to said
[PCSLC] and converted it into Philippine registry. Consequently, . . . PC-SASCO terminated its crew
agreement with OSM in a letter dated December 5, 1994. Because of the bareboat charter of the
vessel to PCSLC and its subsequent conversion to Philippine registry and use in coastwise trade as
well as to the termination of the management agreement and crew agency agreement, a termination
of contract ensued whereby PCSLC, the bareboat charterer, became the disponent owner/employer
of the crew. As a disponent owner/employer, PCSLC is now responsible for the payment of
complainant’s wages. . . .. 5

Labor Arbiter (LA) Manuel R. Caday rendered a Decision 6 in favor of Private Respondent Guerrero.
Petitioner and its principal, Philippine Carrier Shipping Agency Services, Co. (PC-SASCO), were
ordered to jointly and severally pay Guerrero his unpaid salaries and allowances, accrued fixed
overtime pay, vacation leave pay and termination pay. The Decision held that there was a
constructive dismissal of private respondent, since he had not been paid his salary for seven months.
It also dismissed petitioner’s contention that there was a novation of the employment contract.

On appeal, the NLRC (Third Division) affirmed the LA’s Decision, with a modification as to the amount
of liability. On January 28, 1999, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition 7 to set aside the NLRC
judgment. The petition was dismissed, because petitioner had allegedly failed to comply with the
requirements of Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. Specifically, petitioner had attached to its
Petition, not a duplicate original or a certified true copy of the LA’s Decision, but a mere machine copy
thereof. Further, it had not indicated the actual address of Private Respondent Fermin F. Guerrero. 8

Hence, this Petition. 9

The Issues

In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Court’s
consideration:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. Did not the Court of Appeals err in interpreting and applying the 1997 Rules when it required as
attachment to the Petition for Certiorari the duplicate original of another Decision which is not the
subject of the said Petition?chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"2. Did not the Court of Appeals err in interpreting and applying the 1997 Rules when it disregarded
the subsequent compliance made by petitioner?
"3. Did not the Court of Appeals err in interpreting and applying the 1997 Rules when it did not
consider the Notice to private respondent Guerrero through his counsel as Notice to Guerrero
himself?" 10

The foregoing issues all refer to the question of whether, procedurally, petitioner has complied with
Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. Additionally and in the interest of speedy justice, this Court
will also resolve the substantive issue brought before the CA: did the NLRC commit grave abuse of
discretion in ruling in favor of private respondent?

The Court’s Ruling

While petitioner is procedurally correct, the case should nonetheless be decided on the merits in favor
of private Respondent.

Procedural Issue:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Compliance with the Rules of Court

Petitioner puts at issue the proper interpretation of Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. 11
Specifically, was petitioner required to attach a certified true copy of the LA’s Decision to its Petition
for Certiorari challenging the NLRC judgment?

Section 3 of Rule 46 does not require that all supporting papers and documents accompanying a
petition be duplicate originals or certified true copies. Even under Rule 65 on certiorari and prohibition,
petitions need to be accompanied only by duplicate originals or certified true copies of the questioned
judgment, order or resolution. Other relevant documents and pleadings attached to it may be mere
machine copies thereof. 12 Numerous decisions issued by this Court emphasize that in appeals under
Rule 45 and in original civil actions for certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Rules 46 and 56, what is
required to be certified is the copy of the questioned judgment, final order or resolution. 13 Since the
LA’s Decision was not the questioned ruling, it did not have to be certified. What had to be certified
was the NLRC Decision. And indeed it was.

As to the alleged missing address of private respondent, the indication by petitioner that Guerrero
could be served with process care of his counsel was substantial compliance with the Rules.

This Court has held that the sending of pleadings to a party is not required, provided that the party is
represented by counsel. 14 This rule is founded on considerations of fair play, inasmuch as an
attorney of record is engaged precisely because a party does not feel competent to deal with the
intricacies of law and procedure. 15 Both jurisprudence 16 and the basics of procedure 17 provide
that when a party has appeared through counsel, service is to be made upon the latter, unless the
court specifically orders that it be upon the party.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

We also note that from the inception of the case at the LA’s office, all pleadings addressed to private
respondent had always been sent to his counsel, Atty. Danilo G. Macalino. Note that private
respondent, who was employed as a seaman, was often out of his home. The service of pleadings
and other court processes upon him personally would have been futile, as he would not have been
around to receive them.

This Court has repeatedly held that while courts should meticulously observe the Rules, they should
not be overly strict about procedural lapses that do not impair the proper administration of justice. 18
Rather, procedural rules should be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding. 19

Substantive Issue:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Liability of Petitioner for Unpaid Salaries

It is worthwhile to note that what is involved in this case is the recovery of unpaid salaries and other
monetary benefits. The Court is mindful of the plight of private respondent and, indeed, of workers in
general who are seeking to recover wages that are being unlawfully withheld from them. Such
recovery should not be needlessly delayed at the expense of their survival. This case is now on its
ninth year since its inception at the LA’s office. Its remand to the CA will only unduly delay its
disposition. In the interest of substantial justice, 20 this Court will decide the case on the merits based
upon the records of the case, particularly those relating to the OSM Shipping Philippines’ Petition
before the CA.

On behalf of its principal, PC-SASCO, petitioner does not deny hiring Private Respondent Guerrero as
master mariner. However, it argues that since he was not deployed overseas, his employment
contract became ineffective, because its object was allegedly absent. Petitioner contends that using
the vessel in coastwise trade and subsequently chartering it to another principal had the effect of
novating the employment contract. We are not persuaded.

As approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), petitioner was the legitimate
manning agent of PC-SASCO. 21 As such, it was allowed to select, recruit, hire and deploy seamen
on board the vessel M/V Princess Hoa, which was managed by its principal, PC-SASCO. 22 It was in
this capacity that petitioner hired private respondent as master mariner. They then executed and
agreed upon an employment contract.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

An employment contract, like any other contract, is perfected at the moment (1) the parties come to
agree upon its terms; and (2) concur in the essential elements thereof: (a) consent of the contracting
parties, (b) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract and (c) cause of the obligation. 23
Based on the perfected contract, Private Respondent Guerrero complied with his obligations
thereunder and rendered his services on board the vessel. Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the
contract had an object, which was the rendition of service by private respondent on board the vessel.
The non-deployment of the ship overseas did not affect the validity of the perfected employment
contract. After all, the decision to use the vessel for coastwise shipping was made by petitioner only
and did not bear the written conformity of private Respondent. A contract cannot be novated by the
will of only one party. 24 The claim of petitioner that it processed the contract of private respondent
with the POEA only after he had started working is also without merit. Petitioner cannot use its own
misfeasance to defeat his claim.

Petitioner, as manning agent, is jointly and severally liable with its principal, 25 PC-SASCO, for private
respondent’s claim. This conclusion is in accordance with Section 1 of Rule II of the POEA Rules and
Regulations. 26 Joint and solidary liability is meant to assure aggrieved workers of immediate and
sufficient payment of what is due them. 27 The fact that petitioner and its principal have already
terminated their agency agreement does not relieve the former of its liability. The reason for this ruling
was given by this Court in Catan v. National Labor Relations Commission, 28 which we reproduce in
part as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"This must be so, because the obligations covenanted in the [manning] agreement between the local
agent and its foreign principal are not coterminus with the term of such agreement so that if either or
both of the parties decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of such parties towards the
contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end, but the same extends up to and until the
expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed pursuant to the said
recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will render nugatory the very purpose for which the law
governing the employment of workers for foreign jobs abroad was enacted." 29

WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions are hereby SET ASIDE, and the September 10, 1998 NLRC
Decision REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED.

TRANSACTION OVERSEAS CORPORATION v. SECRETARY OF LABOR, GR No. 109583, 1997-

09-05

Facts:
petitioner

, a private fee-charging employment agency, scoured Iloilo City for possible recruits for alleged job
vacancies in Hongkong. Private respondents sought employment as domestic helpers through...
petitioner's employees

,... Aragon, Ben Hur Domincil and his wife Cecille.

The applicants paid placement fees ranging from P1,000.00 to P14,000.00, but petitioner failed to
deploy them. Their demands for refund proved unavailing; thus, they were constrained to institute...
complaints against petitioner for violation of Articles 32 and 34(a)... of the Labor Code

Petitioner denied having received the amounts allegedly collected from respondents, and averred that
Aragon, whose only duty was to pre-screen and interview applicants, and the spouses Domincil were
not authorized to collect fees from the applicants. Accordingly, it cannot be... held liable for the money
claimed by respondents. Petitioner maintains that it even warned respondents not to give any money
to unauthorized individuals.

the license of respondent TRANS ACTION OVERSEAS CORPORATION to participate in the

overseas placement and recruitment of workers is hereby ordered CANCELLED, effective
immediately.

Petitioner contends that Secretary Confesor a... cted with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the
assailed orders... viz.: (1) it is the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) which has
the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide... illegal recruitment cases, including the
authority to cancel recruitment licenses

Issues:

whether or not the Secretary of Labor and Employment has jurisdiction to cancel or revoke the license
of a private fee-charging employment agency.

Ruling:

The power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit employees for overseas
employment is vested upon the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Article 35 of the Labor Code...
provides:

ART. 35. Suspension and/or Cancellation of License or Authority. - The Minister of Labor shall have
the power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit employees for overseas
employment for violation of rules and regulations issued by the

Ministry of Labor, the Overseas Employment Development Board, and the National Seamen Board, or
for violation of the provisions of this and other applicable laws, General Orders and Letters of
Instructions."

The penalties of suspension and cancellation of license or authority are prescribed for violations of the
above quoted provisions, among others. And the Secretary of Labor has the power under Section 35
of the law to apply these sanctions, as well as the authority,... conferred by Section 36, not only to
'restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies,' but also to 'promulgate
rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions' governing said
activities. Pursuant to this rule-making... power thus granted, the Secretary of Labor gave the
POEA,... 'on its own initiative or upon filing of a complaint or report or upon request for investigation
by any aggrieved person, x x (authority to) conduct the necessary proceedings for the suspension or...
cancellation of the license or authority of any agency or entity' for certain enumerated offenses
including -

the imposition or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of any amount of money, goods or services, or any
fee or bond in excess of what is prescribed by the Administration, and
any other violation of pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and other relevant laws, rules and
regulations.

In view of the Court's disposition on the matter, we rule that the power to suspend or cancel any
license or authority to recruit employees for overseas employment is concurrently vested with the
POEA and the Secretary of Labor.

G.R. No. 77279. April 15, 1988MANUELA S. CATAN/M.S. CATAN PLACEMENT AGENCY,
petitioners
, vs. THENATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION and FRANCISCO D. REYES,
respondents
.
Labor and Social Legislations; Labor Code; Overseas Employment; Solidary Liability of
Placementand Foreign Principal for Violation of Contract
. — A private employment agency may be sued jointlyand solidarily with its foreign principal for
violations of the recruitment agreement and the contractsof employment. (Section 10 (a) (2) Rule V,
Book I, Rules to Implement the Labor Code, AmbraqueInternational Placement & Services v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 77970, January 28, 1988)
Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.; Contract Worker Not Notified of Severance of Agency Contract with Foreign Principal
May Still Sue the Agency
. — In a case where the employment agency and the foreign principalsevered their agency agreement
at the time the worker was injured, the agency may still be sued fora violation of the employment
contract if no notice of the agency agreement's termination was givento the said worker (Article 1921,
Civil Code).
Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.; Reason
. — The obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement enteredinto by and between the local
agent and its foreign principal are not co-terminus with the term of such agreement so that if either or
both of the parties decide to end the agreement, theresponsibilities of such parties towards the
contracted employees under the agreement do not at allend, but the same extends up to and until the
expiration of the employment contracts of theemployees recruited and employed pursuant to the said
recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this willrender nugatory the very purpose for which the law
governing the employment of workers for foreign jobs abroad was enacted.
Facts
: M.S. Catan Placement Agency (Catan), a duly licensed recruitment agency, as agent of Aliand Fahd
Shabokshi Group, a Saudi Arabian firm, recruited Francisco Reyes to work in Saudi Arabia as a
steelman. The term of the contract was for one year, from May 1981 to May 1982.However, the
contract provided for its automatic renewal “if neither of the parties notifies the otherparty of his
wishes to terminate the Contract by at least
one month
prior to the expiration of thecontractual period.”The contract was automatically renewed when Reyes
was not repatriated by his Saudi employer butinstead was assigned to work as a crusher plant
operator. While he was working as a crusher plantoperator, Reyes’s right ankle was crushed under
the machine he was operating. After the expirationof the renewed term, Reyes returned to the
Philippines and had his ankle operated, for which heincurred expenses. He then returned to Saudi
Arabia to resume his work and after several months,he was repatriated. Upon his return, he had his
ankle treated for which he incurred furtherexpenses.On the basis of the provision in the employment
contract that the employer shall compensate theemployee if he is injured or permanently disabled in
the course of employment, Reyes filed a claimagainst Catan with the POEA. The decision rendered
by POEA was in favor of Reyes, which waslater on affirmed by the NLRC.Catan claims that the NLRC
gravely abused its discretion when it ruled that Catan was liable toReyes for disability benefits since at
the time he was injured his original employment contract,which Catan facilitated, had already expired.
Further, Catan disclaims liability on the ground thatits agency agreement with the Saudi principal had
already expired when the injury was sustained.
Issue
: Whether or not Catan is liable for the disability benefits of Reyes.
Ruling
: Yes.
Ratio Decidendi
: Reyes’s contract of employment cannot be said to have expired on May 1982 as itwas automatically
renewed since either or both of the parties gave no notice of its termination.Therefore, private
respondent's injury was sustained during the lifetime of the contract.The Supreme Court ruled that a
private employment agency may be sued jointly and solidarily withits foreign principal for violations of
the recruitment agreement and the contracts of employment. Arecruitment agency is also solidarily
liable for the unpaid salaries of a worker it recruited foremployment in Saudi Arabia. Even if indeed
petitioner and the Saudi principal had already severedtheir agency agreement at the time Reyes was
injured, Cata may still be sued for a violation of theemployment contract because no notice of the
agency agreement's termination was given to Reyes.Its responsibility over the proper implementation
of Reyes’s employment/service contract and thewelfare of Reyes himself in the foreign job site still
existed since the contract of employment inquestion has not expired yet.

G.R. No. 78085. October 16, 1989ROYAL CROWN INTERNATIONALE,

petitioner
, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONSCOMMISSION and VIRGILIO P. NACIONALES,
respondents
.
Labor Law; Employer-Employee Relationship; Basic Principle in Termination Cases.
— The basicprinciple in termination cases is that the burden of proof rests upon the employer to
show that thedismissal is for just and valid cause, and failure to do so would necessarily mean that
the dismissalwas not justified and, therefore, was illegal [Polymedic General Hospital v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 64190,January 31, 1985, 134 SCRA 420; and also Article 277 of the Labor Code].||| (Royal
CrownInternationale v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 78085, [October 16, 1989],
258-A PHIL 342-354)
Id.; Id.; Id.; Burden of Proof that the Dismissal was for Just and Valid Cause Rests Upon Both
Foreign-based Employer and Employment Agency which Recruited the Workers
. — Where thetermination cases involve a Filipino worker recruited and deployed for overseas
employment, theburden naturally devolves upon both the foreign-based employer and the
employment agency orrecruitment entity which recruited the worker, for the latter is not only the agent
of the former, butis also solidarily liable with its foreign principal for any claims or liabilities arising from
thedismissal of the worker.
Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.; Failure to Prove that the Termination is Just and Valid
. — The letter dated May 15,1984 allegedly written by the Actg. Project Architect and the counter-
affidavit of petitioner's GeneralManager merely stated that the grounds for the employee's dismissal
were his unsatisfactoryperformance and various acts of dishonesty, insubordination and misconduct.
But the particular actsthat would indicate private respondent's incompetence or constitute the above
infractions wereneither specified nor described therein. In the absence of any other evidence to
substantiate thegeneral charges hurled against private respondent, these documents, which comprise
petitioner'sevidence in chief, contain empty and self-serving statements insufficient to establish just
and validcause for the dismissal of private respondent [See Euro-Lines, Phils., Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No.
75782,December 1, 1987, 156 SCRA 78; Ambraque International Placement and Services v. NLRC,
supra].
Id.; Id.; Protective Mantle of Philippine Labor and Social Legislation Given Filipino Workers,Whether
Employed Locally or Overseas
. — Whether employed locally or overseas, all Filipinoworkers enjoy the protective mantle of
Philippine labor and social legislation, contract stipulations tothe contrary notwithstanding. This
pronouncement is in keeping with the basic public policy of theState to afford protection to labor,
promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunitiesregardless of sex, race or creed, and
regulate the relations between workers and employers. For theState assures the basic rights of all
workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions
of work [Article 3 of the Labor Code of the Philippines; Seealso Section 18, Article II and Section 3,
Article XIII,1987 Constitution]. This ruling is likewiserendered imperative by Article 17 of the Civil Code
which states that laws “which have for theirobject public order, public policy and good customs shall
not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determination or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.”
Facts
: Royal Crown Internationale recruited and deployed Virgilio Nacionales for employment withZAMEL
as an architectural draftsman in Saudi Arabia, thus a a service agreement was executed
byNacionales and ZAMEL.
Issue
: Whether or not petitioner as a private employment agency may be held jointly and severallyliable
with the foreign-based employer for any claim which may arise in connection with theimplementation
of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and deployed abroad.

Ratio Decidendi
: The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner conveniently overlooks the fact that ithad voluntarily
assumed solidary liability under the various contractual undertakings it submittedto the Bureau of
Employment Services. In applying for its license to operate a private employmentagency for overseas
recruitment and placement, petitioner was required to submit, among others, adocument or verified
undertaking whereby it assumed all responsibilities for the proper use of itslicense and the
implementation of the contracts of employment with the workers it recruited anddeployed for overseas
employment [Section 2(e), Rule V, Book I, Rules to Implement the Labor Code(1976)]. It was also
required to file with the Bureau a formal appointment or agency contractexecuted by the foreign-
based employer in its favor to recruit and hire personnel for the former,which contained a provision
empowering it to sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with the foreignprincipal for any of the
violations of the recruitment agreement and the contracts of employment[Section 10 (a) (2), Rule V,
Book I of the Rules to Implement the Labor Code (1976)]. Petitioner wasrequired as well to post such
cash and surety bonds as determined by the Secretary of Labor toguarantee compliance with
prescribed recruitment procedures, rules and regulations, and terms andconditions of employment as
appropriate [Section 1 of Pres. Dec. 1412 (1978) amending Article 31 of the Labor Code].These
contractual undertakings constitute the legal basis for holding petitioner, and other privateemployment
or recruitment agencies, liable jointly and severally with its principal, the foreign-basedemployer, for all
claims filed by recruited workers which may arise in connection with theimplementation of the service
agreements or employment contracts.

SALAZAR vs. ACHACOSO AND MARQUEZ

DECEMBER 20, 2016  ~ VBDIAZ
G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990
HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ, respondents.
FACTS: This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest
and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment.
On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro filed with the POEA a complaint against petitioner. Having
ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent
Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER.
The POEA brought a team to the premises of Salazar to implement the order. There it was found that
petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said
Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the
premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with
Moreman Development (Phil.). However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to
produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers — practicing a dance
number and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes which
were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.
A few days after, petitioner filed a letter with the POEA demanding the return of the confiscated
properties. They alleged lack of hearing and due process, and that since the house the POEA raided
was a private residence, it was robbery.
On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought to be barred
are already fait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we consider the petition as one
for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.
ISSUE: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly
issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code?
HELD: PETITION GRANTED. it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. Neither
may it be done by a mere prosecuting body.
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest
warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare
Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was validly
issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant. We have held that a warrant must identify clearly
the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and void
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may
issue warrants of arrest and search:
2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President
or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for
the purpose of deportation.
 
PEOPLE VS. ANGELES
Good Law
FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 132376, April 11, 2002 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE, VS. SAMINA ANGELES Y CALMA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Accused-appellant Samina Angeles y Calma was charged with four (4) counts of estafa and one (1)
count of illegal recruitment in the following informations:[1]
Criminal Case No. 94-140585 (Estafa)

That on or about September 8, 1994 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud MARIA TOLOSA DE SARDEÑA Y TABLADA in the
following manner to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representations which she made to said Maria Tolosa de Sardeña y Tablada to the effect that she had
the power and capacity to recruit and employ her as domestic helper in Paris, France, and could
facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the
requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said
Maria Tolosa de Sardeña y Tablada to give and deliver, as in fact she gave and delivered to said
accused the amount of P107,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and representations,
accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely, to obtain, as in
fact she did obtain the amount of P107,000.00 which amount once in her possession, with intent to
defraud, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to
her own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of said Maria Tolosa de Sardeña y
Tablada in the aforesaid sum of P107,000.00 Philippine Currency.

Criminal Case No. 94-140486 (Estafa)

That on or about September 8, 1994 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud MARCELIANO T. TOLOSA in the following manner,
to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which she
made to said MARCELIANO T. TOLOSA to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit
and employ him as contract worker in Paris, France and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent
papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar
deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said Marceliano T. Tolosa accused well knowing that the
same were false and fraudulent and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the amount
of P190,000.00 which amount once in their possession, with intent to defraud, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to her own personal use and benefit,
to the damage and prejudice of said Marceliano T. Tolosa in the aforesaid sum of P190,000.00,
Philippine Currency.

Criminal Case No. 94-140487 (Estafa)

That on or about September 9, 1994 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud PRECILA P. OLPINDO in the following manner to
wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which she
made to said Precila P. Olpindo to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and
employ her as contract worker in Canada and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if
given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits,
induced and succeeded in inducing said Precila P. Olpindo to give and deliver, as in fact she
delivered to said accused the amount of $2,550.00 on the strength of said manifestations and
representations, said Precila P. Olpindo accused well knowing that the same were false and
fraudulent and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the amount of $2,550.00 which
amount once in her possession, with intent to defraud, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to her own personal use and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of said Precila P. Olpindo in the aforesaid sum of $2,550.00 or its equivalent in
Philippine Currency of P61,200.00.

Criminal Case No. 94-140488 (Estafa)

That on or about the first week of September 1994 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud VILMA S. BRINA in the following
manner to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations
which she made to said Vilma S. Brina to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and
employ her as contract worker in Canada and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if
given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits,
induced and succeeded in inducing said Vilma S. Brina to give and deliver, as in fact she gave and
delivered to said accused the amount of $2,550.00 on the strength of said manifestations and
representations, accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were made
solely, to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the amount of $2,550.00 which amount once in her
possession, with intent to defraud, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied
and converted the same to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said
Vilma S. Brina in the aforesaid sum of $2,550.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency of
P61,200.00.

Criminal Case No. 94-140489 (Illegal Recruitment)

The undersigned accuses SAMINA ANGELES y CALMA of violation of Art. 38 (a) Pres. Decree No.
1412 amending certain provisions of Book 1, Pres. Decree No. 442 otherwise known as the New
Labor Code of the Philippines in relation to Article 13 (b) and (c) of said Code, as further amended in
a large scale, as follows:
That sometime during the month of September 1994 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, representing herself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for
employment abroad, did then and there willfully and unlawfully for a fee, recruit and promise
employment/job placement abroad to the following persons:

1. Marceliano T. Tolosa
2. Precila P. Olpindo
3. Vilma S. Brina
4. Maria Tolosa de Sardeña y Tablada
Without first having secured the required license or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment.
The five (5) cases were consolidated and tried jointly by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
50.

Maria Tolosa Sardeña was working in Saudi Arabia when she received a call from her sister, Priscilla
Agoncillo, who was in Paris, France. Priscilla advised Maria to return to the Philippines and await the
arrival of her friend, accused-appellant Samina Angeles, who will assist in processing her travel and
employment documents to Paris, France. Heeding her sister's advice, Maria immediately returned to
the Philippines.

Marceliano Tolosa who at that time was in the Philippines likewise received instructions from his sister
Priscilla to meet accused-appellant who will also assist in the processing of his documents for Paris,
France.
Maria and Marceliano eventually met accused-appellant in September 1994 at Expert Travel Agency
on Mabini Street, Manila. During their meeting, accused-appellant asked if they had the money
required for the processing of their documents. On September 8, 1994, Maria gave P107,000.00 to
accused-appellant at Expert Travel Agency. Subsequently, she gave another P46,000.00 and
US$1,500.00 as additional payments to accused-appellant.

Marceliano, on the other hand, initially gave P100,000.00 to accused-appellant but on September 28,
1994, he gave an additional P46,000.00 and US$1,500.00 to accused-appellant at the United
Coconut Planters Bank in Makati.

Analyn Olpindo met accused-appellant in Belgium. At that time, Analyn was working in Canada but
she went to Belgium to visit her in-laws. After meeting accused-appellant, Analyn Olpindo called up
her sister, Precila Olpindo, in the Philippines and told her to meet accused-appellant upon the latter's
arrival in the Philippines because accused-appellant can help process her documents for employment
in Canada.

Precila Olpindo eventually met accused-appellant at the Expert Travel Agency on September 7, 1994.
Accused-appellant asked for the amount of $4,500.00, but Precila was only able to give $2,500.00.

No evidence was adduced in relation to the complaint of Vilma Brina since she did not testify in court.

Accused-appellant told Precila Olpindo and Vilma Brina that it was easier to complete the processing
of their papers if they start from Jakarta, Indonesia rather than from Manila. Thus, on September 23,
1994, Precila Olpindo, Vilma Brina and accused-appellant flew to Jakarta, Indonesia. However,
accused-appellant returned to the Philippines after two days, leaving behind Precila and Vilma. They
waited for accused-appellant in Jakarta but the latter never returned. Precila and Vilma eventually
came home to the Philippines on November 25, 1994.

When she arrived in the Philippines, Precila tried to get in touch with accused-appellant at the Expert
Travel Agency, but she could not reach her. Meanwhile, Maria and Marceliano Tolosa also began
looking for accused-appellant after she disappeared with their money.

Elisa Campanianos of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency presented a certification to the
effect that accused-appellant was not duly licensed to recruit workers here and abroad.

In her defense, accused-appellant averred that, contrary to the prosecution's allegations, she never
represented to the complainants that she can provide them with work abroad. She insisted that she
was a marketing consultant and an international trade fair organizer. In June 1994, she went to Paris,
France to organize a trade fair. There she met Priscilla Agoncillo, a domestic helper, and they became
friends. Priscilla asked her to assist her siblings, Maria and Marceliano, particularly in the processing
of their travel documents for France. Accused-appellant told Priscilla that she can only help in the
processing of travel documents and nothing more. It was Priscilla who promised employment to Maria
and Marceliano. She received money from complainants not in the form of placement fees but for the
cost of tickets, hotel accommodations and other travel requirements.

According to accused-appellant, she met Analyn Olpindo in Belgium while she was organizing a trade
fair. They also became friends and it was Analyn who asked her to help Precila. Just like in the case
of Maria and Marceliano, accused-appellant explained that her assistance shall only entail the
processing of Precila's travel documents to Canada.

After trial on the merits, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty of illegal recruitment and four (4)
counts of estafa and correspondingly sentenced her as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the aforementioned premises the accused SAMINA ANGELES is hereby
declared:

In Criminal Case No. 94-140489 for the crime of Illegal Recruitment, GUILTY (Art. 38 Labor Code)
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 94-140485 for the crime of Estafa the accused is hereby declared GUILTY and
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years. In addition the accused is ordered to reimburse the amount of One hundred seven thousand
pesos (P107,000.00) to complainant Maria Tolosa de Sardeña. With costs.

In Criminal Case No. 94-140486 for the crime of Estafa the accused is hereby declared GUILTY and
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years. In addition the accused is ordered to reimburse the amount of One hundred ninety thousand
pesos (P190,000.00) to complainant Marceliano T. Tolosa. With costs.

In Criminal Case No. 94-140487 for the crime of Estafa the accused is hereby declared GUILTY and
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years. In addition the accused is ordered to reimburse the amount of Two thousand five hundred fifty
dollars (US$2,550.00) or its equivalent in Philippine currency of Sixty one thousand two hundred
pesos (P61,200.00), to complainant Precila P. Olpindo. With Costs.

In Criminal Case No. 94-140488 for the crime of Estafa the accused is hereby declared GUILTY and
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years. In addition the accused is ordered to reimburse the amount of Two thousand five hundred fifty
dollars (US$2,550.00) or its equivalent in Philippine Currency of Sixty one thousand two hundred
pesos (P61,200.00) to complainant Vilma S. Brina. With costs.[2]
Accused-appellant is now before us on appeal, arguing that the prosecution failed to prove her guilt
for estafa and illegal recruitment by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Accused-appellant points out that not one of the complainants testified on what kind of jobs were
promised to them, how much they would receive as salaries, the length of their employment and even
the names of their employers, which are basic subjects a prospective employee would first determine.

In sum, accused-appellant posits that the prosecution did not present a single evidence to prove that
she promised or offered any of the complainants jobs abroad. Illegal recruitment is committed when
two (2) elements concur: 1) that the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to
enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and 2) that the offender
undertakes either any activity within the meaning of recruitment and placement defined under Article
13(b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34.[3]

Article 13(b), of the Labor Code provides, thus:

(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising
for employment locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity which,
in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed
engaged in recruitment and placement.
To prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that the accused-appellant gave complainants the
distinct impression that he had the power or ability to send complainants abroad for work such that the
latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed.[4] To be engaged in the
practice of recruitment and placement, it is plain that there must at least be a promise or offer of an
employment from the person posing as a recruiter whether locally or abroad.

In the case at bar, accused-appellant alleges that she never promised nor offered any job to the
complainants.

We agree.

A perusal of the records reveals that not one of the complainants testified that accused-appellant
lured them to part with their hard-earned money with promises of jobs abroad. On the contrary, they
were all consistent in saying that their relatives abroad were the ones who contacted them and urged
them to meet accused-appellant who would assist them in processing their travel documents.
Accused-appellant did not have to make promises of employment abroad as these were already done
by complainants' relatives. Thus, in the cross-examination of Maria Tolosa de Cardena:
Atty. Dinglasan:
Q:
And you would likewise agree that Priscilla informed you that she can find an employment for you
once you entered Paris, is that correct?
A:
Yes, because according to her that is what Samina Angeles said to her.
Q:
In fact, even when you arrived in the Philippines, and actually met in person Samina Angeles, you did
not know who is Samina Angeles and what her business was then that time?
A:
I recognized because my sister sent me a picture of Samina Angeles.
Q:
So, it is clear that when you met Samina Angeles sometime on September 8, 1994, you were already
decided to go to Paris because you were then relying on the instruction from the advice of Priscilla?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
And that was the reason why you even terminated your employment contract in Saudi?
A:
Yes, sir.[5]
Precila Olpindo, on cross-examination, admitted thus:
Q:
You would like to confirm that before you and Samina met in the Philippines sometime in September
of 1995, you were already decided to leave for Canada as per advice of your sister?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
And you likewise agree madam witness that even before you met the accused sometime in
September of 1995, you were already directed and informed by your sister Ana as to how much and
she will pay the accused Samina for the facilitation of your travel in going to Canada, is that correct?
A:
Yes, sir.[6]
In the cross-examination of Marceliano Tolosa, thus:
Q:
Now, would you agree that your sister is working in Paris?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
And for how many years working in Paris?
A:
Almost 5 years.
Q:
And how much was she earning or receiving in Paris, France?
A:
P20,000.00 or more, sir.
Q:
And it was for this reason she advised your sister then in Saudi Arabia and you to also go to Paris
because she will be receiving more in Paris, correct?
A:
She said when we follow to her office, sir.
Q:
So what your sister told you if you're also interested to go to Paris you can avail of the help of Samina
Angeles, so you can also leave for Paris and join her, is that correct?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
And that was the reason why your sister wrote you a letter and gave instruction to go to accused
sometime on September, 1994, is that correct?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
Now you would agree with me Mr. Witness prior to that date September 8, 1994 you don't know
personally the person of Samina Angeles and do not know anything about the nature of her business
or personal circumstances, is that correct?
A:
Yes, sir.[7]
Plainly, there is no testimony that accused-appellant offered complainants jobs abroad. Hence,
accused-appellant Samina Angeles cannot be lawfully convicted of illegal recruitment.

Anent the four charges of estafa, Samina Angeles argues that the element of deceit consisting in the
false statement or fraudulent representation of the accused made prior to or simultaneously with the
delivery of the sums of money is lacking in the instant case. She claims that she never deceived
complainants into believing that she had the authority and capability to send them abroad for
employment.

We are not persuaded.

Under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of estafa are: (1) the
accused has defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit and (2) damage or
prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. Clearly,
these elements are present in this case.[8]

Although Samina Angeles did not deceive complainants into believing that she could find employment
for them abroad, nonetheless, she made them believe that she was processing their travel documents
for France and Canada. They parted with their money believing that Samina Angeles would use it to
pay for their plane tickets, hotel accommodations and other travel requirements. Upon receiving
various amounts from complainants, Samina Angeles used it for other purposes and then
conveniently disappeared.

Complainants trusted Samina Angeles because she was referred to them by their own relatives. She
abused their confidence when she led them to believe that she can process their travel documents
abroad, thus inducing them to part with their money. When they demanded from Samina their travel
documents, she failed to produce them. Likewise, she failed to return the amounts entrusted to her.

Clearly, Samina Angeles defrauded complainants by falsely pretending to possess the power and
capacity to process their travel documents.

Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but does
not exceed P22,000.00; if the amount exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty provided shall be imposed in
its maximum period, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00. However, the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years.[9]

In People v. Ordono,[10] it was held:

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be "that which, in view
of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed" under the Revised Penal Code, and the
minimum shall be "within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense." The
penalty next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first
considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination
of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within
the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be
subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term
of the indeterminate sentence.
Thus, in Criminal Case No. 94-140485, Maria Tolosa testified that she gave P107,000.00, P46,000.00
and US$1,500.00 to Samina Angeles. The Information, however, alleged that Maria gave only
P107,000.00. Samina Angeles could therefore be held accountable for only that amount.

In Criminal Case No. 94-140486, Marceliano testified that he gave P100,000.00, P46,000.00 and
US$1,500.00 to Samina Angeles. The Information however alleged that Marceliano gave only a total
of P190,000.00; hence that is the only amount that Samina Angeles could be held accountable for.
In Criminal Case No. 94-140487, Precila testified that she gave US$2,550.00 to Samina Angeles. The
Information alleged that the equivalent amount thereof in Philippine Currency is P61,200.00. Samina
Angeles is therefore criminally liable for P61,200.00.

Complainant Vilma Brina did not appear in court to testify. Thus, the damage in the amount of
$2,550.00 alleged in Criminal Case No. 94-140488 was not proved.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 94-140485, accused-appellant Samina Angeles is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa and sentenced to suffer a prison term of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and is ORDERED to indemnify Maria Sardeña the amount of P107,000.00.

(2) In Criminal Case No. 94-140486, accused-appellant Samina Angeles is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa and sentenced to suffer a prison term of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and is ORDERED to indemnify Marceliano Tolosa the amount of P190,000.00.

(3) In Criminal Case No. 94-140487, accused-appellant Samina Angeles is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa and sentenced to suffer a prision term of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eleven (11) years of prision mayor, as
maximum, and is ORDERED to indemnify Precila Olpindo the amount of P61,200.00.

(4) In Criminal Case No. 94-140488 for Estafa, accused-appellant Samina Angeles is ACQUITTED for
failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

(5) In Criminal Case No. 94-140489 for Illegal Recruitment, accused-appellant Samina Angeles is
ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.
General Milling Corporation vs. Torres
G.R No. 9366, April 22, 1991

FACTS:
Earl Timothy Cone is a US citizen, who was hired by General Milling as a sports consultant and
assistant coach. He possessed an alien employment permit which was changed to pre-arranged
employee by the Board of Special Inquiry of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. GMC
requested that Cone’s employment permit be changed to a full-fledged coach, which was contested
by The Basketball Coaches Association of the Philippines. Alleging that GMC failed to show that there
is no competent person in the Philippines to do the coaching job. Secretary of Labor cancelled Cone’s
employment permit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Labor act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking Cone’s Alien
Employment Permit?

HELD:
The Secretary of Labor did not act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking Cone’s Alien
Employment Permit. GMC’s claim that hiring of a foreign coach is an employer’s prerogative has no
legal basis. Under Section 40 of the Labor Code, an employer seeking employment of an alien must
first obtain an employment permit from the Department of labor. GMC’s right to choose whom to
employ is limited by the statutory requirement of an employment permit.

The Labor Code empowers the Labor Secretary to determine as to the availability of the
services of a “person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the time of the
application to perform the services for which an alien is desired.”

General Milling Corp vs Torres