ATTY. DAVID B.

CORPUZ v COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 123989 January 26, 1998

FACTS:
Atty David Corpuz was appointed as MTRCB’s legal Counsel (Attorney V) which
appointment was approved by CSC-NCR. MTRCB passed Resolution No 8-7-91 to
declare appointments of administrative and subordinate employees of the board as null
and void but was not immediately implemented. Henrietta Mendez was appointed as
MTRCB Chairman and was informed about the resolution and an ad hoc committee was
constituted to look into the appointments by the former MTRCB Chairman Morato.
Corpuz and seven others were excluded from the approved appointments stating that
the appointments by Morato were not submitted to MTRCB for approval. Corpuz filed a
complaint before the CSC which ruled in his favor. On appeal, the CA ruled otherwise
and declared that his appointment was invalid as it was not approved by MTRCB.
Having denied his motion for reconsideration, hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment is valid

RULING:
It is long settled in the law of public offices and officers that where the power of
appointment is absolute, and the appointee has been determined upon, no further
consent or approval is necessary, and the formal evidence of the appointment, the
commission, may issue at once. Where, however, the assent or confirmation of some
other officer or body is required, the commission can issue or the appointment may be
complete only when such assent or confirmation is obtained. Until the process is
completed, the appointee can claim no vested right in the office nor invoke security of
tenure. MTRCB ultimately disapproved it, his appointment ceased to have effect, if at
all, and his services were properly terminated. A public official or employee who
assumed office under an incomplete appointment is merely a de facto officer for the
duration of his occupancy of the office for the reason that he assumed office under color
of a known appointment which is void by reason of some defect or irregularity in its
exercise. 24 Undeniably, under the facts here, CORPUZ was such a de facto officer.
 BENITO CODILLA, ET AL., v JOSE L. MARTINEZ, ETC., ET AL.
G.R. No. L-14569 November 23, 1960

FACTS:
Mayor Hermenigildo Baloyo of Tagum left for Negros to attend to a sick brother and
designated the Vice Mayor to act in his place who in turn fell sick designating councilor
Bermudez as acting mayor until notice to the contrary. Bermudez was also not in good
health so he designated the third ranking councilor Jose Martinez to act as mayor.
Martinez assumed office and ordered that petitioners be separated from the service as
policemen of the municipality. Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus before the CFI
alleging that being civil service employees, their employment can only be terminated for
just causes. Respondents stated that the appointments of petitioners were made under
the Revised Administrative Code in a temporary capacity hence, their services after the
expiration of three month term is illegal. The trial court ruled in favor of respondents.
Hence, the present appeal contending that Martinez designated as acting mayor is void
and not in accordance with law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the separation from service was lawful

RULING:
While it may be gleaned from the surrounding circumstances that the hand of politics
has intervened in the separation of petitioner who apparently had been for sometime
serving the government as policemen during the previous administration, the Court
cannot escape the fact that they were merely given temporary appointments for the
reason that they do not have civil service eligibility thus making their status as employee
wholly dependent upon the grace of the ruling power. And this we say because, as we
ruled in a series of cases, "A temporary appointment is similar to one made in acting
capacity, the essence of which lies in its temporary character and its terminability at the
pleasure of the appointment power." The replacement of non-eligibles is lawful under
and pursuant to Section 682 of the Revised Administrative Code. Petitioners cannot,
therefore invoke in their favor the provisions of Republic Act No. 557 because this Act
only guarantees the tenure of office of police who are eligibles. Non-eligibles do not
come under its protection. Hence, much as we sympathize with the petitioners, our
hand is stayed by the inexorable provisions of the law.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v WINSTON T. SINGUN
G.R. No. 149356               March 14, 2008

FACTS:
Winston Singun, former Chief Trade and Industry Development Specialist of DTI, wrote
a letter to the Regional Director Jose Hipolito asking to apply for an eight month leave of
absence and signified his intention to retire from the service but which was denied by
the Director. Awaiting their action on his 2 nd application, he again filed for shorter period
and his intention to resign effective January 14, 2000. The director alleged that he
received the application and accepted it in a memorandum. DTI USec detailed
respondent to Regional Operations. Singun wrote another letter reconsideraing his
earlier resignation and that he decided to wait until he could avail of early retirement.
The Director informed the USec Singun already resigned. Singun alleged duress and no
amount of acceptance would validate it. CSC-RO2 considered his resignation effective,
while in the appeal to the CSC, it ruled otherwise absent the notice of acceptance. CA
ruled his resignation was inoperative and inefficacious. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the resignation was effective

RULING:
Resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of
the intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the office and the acceptance by
competent and lawful authority. To constitute a complete and operative resignation from
public office, there must be: (a) an intention to relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of
relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority. The final or conclusive
act of a resignation’s acceptance is the notice of acceptance. The incumbent official
would not be in a position to determine the acceptance of his resignation unless he had
been duly notified therefor. Therefore, the Court affirms the ruling of the Court of
Appeals that respondent’s resignation was incomplete and inoperative because
respondent was not notified of the acceptance of his resignation.
 LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY v AURORA A. SALVAÑA
G.R. No. 192074 June 10, 2014

FACTS:
LRTA Administrator Robles issued Office Order 119 which revoked Atty Salvaña’s
designation as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the LRTA Administrative Department. Instead
of complying Salvaña question the order with the Office of the President. She was
directed to explain in writing regarding his refusal to comply with Office Order 119 and
for submitting a falsified medical certificate in her application for sick leave. LRTA
charged her for Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Document, Grave Misconduct, Gross
insubordination and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, thus her
dismissal. Salvaña appealed with the CSC which ruled she’s guilty only of simple
dishonesty and was meted suspension. LRTA moved for reconsideration – denied. On
appeal, CA dismissed and affirmed the CSC ruling. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not CSC has the legal standing to appeal

RULING:
The LRTA had standing to appeal the modification by the Civil Service Commission of
its decision. The employer has the right "to select honest and trustworthy employees."
When the government office disciplines an employee based on causes and procedures
allowed by law, it exercises its discretion. This discretion is inherent in the constitutional
principle that "public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives." This is a principle that can be invoked by
the public as well as the government office employing the public officer. Here, petitioner
already decided to dismiss respondent for dishonesty. Dishonesty is a serious offense
that challenges the integrity of the public servant charged. To bar a government office
from appealing a decision that lowers the penalty of the disciplined employee prevents it
from ensuring its mandate that the civil service employs only those with the utmost
sense of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. Honesty and integrity are
important traits required of those in public service. If all decisions by quasi-judicial
bodies modifying the penalty of dismissal were allowed to become final and
unappealable, it would, in effect, show tolerance to conduct unbecoming of a public
servant. The quality of civil service would erode, and the citizens would end up suffering
for it.
 CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v PEDRO O. DACOYCOY
G.R. No. 135805. April 29, 1999

FACTS:
George Suan, Citizens Crime Watch Vice President filed with the CSC a complaint
against Pedro Dacoycoy for habitual drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism. After fact-
finding investigation, he was formally charged and found Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism
appointing his two sons as driver and utility worker and their assignment were under his
immediate supervision and meted him the penalty of dismissal. Dacoycoy moved for
reconsideration – denied. On appeal, the court reversed and set aside the CSC decision
ruling that the person who recommends or appoints should be the person to be
sanctioned which Dacoycoy did not. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was nepotism

RULING:
Pedro O. Dacoycoy was guilty of nepotism and correctly meted out the penalty of
dismissal from the service. The law defines nepotism as, “Sec. 59. Nepotism. (1) All
appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal governments or in any
branch or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled
corporations, made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or
of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision
over him, are hereby prohibited.” The word relative and members of the family referred
to are those related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity. One is
guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the third civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity of the appointing/ recommending authority, chief of
the bureau or office, and person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.
 REMEDIOS PASTOR, v CITY OF PASIG
G.R. No. 146873 - May 9, 2002

FACTS:
Remedios Pastor is the Budget Officer of Pasig City who was reassigned to the Office
of the Municipal Administrator pending investigation of reports against her concerning
the issuance of Advice of Allotments by her without sufficient cash collections. After
three years with no case filed against her, she asked for reinstatement to her former
position. But she was instead reassigned to another unit of the now city government.
Upon her complaint, the Civil Service Commission ordered her reinstatement as Budget
Officer of the City of Pasig. However, on appeal of the city government, the Court of
Appeals set aside the decision of the Civil Service Commission. Hence, this petition for
certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a reassignment

RULING:
Administrative Code of 1987 provides, “Reassignment. - An employee may be
reassigned from one organizational unit to another in the same agency: Provided, that
such reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status, or salary.” A
reassignment that is indefinite and results in a reduction in rank, status, and salary is in
effect a constructive removal from the service. In this case, contrary to the ruling of the
Court of Appeals, petitioner's reassignment to different offices in the local government of
Pasig City is indefinite. Petitioner has been on virtual floating assignments which cannot
but amount to a diminution of her rank, hence impermissible under the law. Petitioner
should now be returned to her original position for her indefinite detail to other positions
would amount to her removal without cause from the position to which she has been
permanently appointed.
 CITY MAYOR ROGELIO R. DEBULGADO and VICTORIA T. DEBULGADO v
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. No. 111471 September 26, 1994

FACTS:
Rogelio Debulgado was the incumbent City Mayor of San Carlos City and appointed his
wife Victoria Debulgado as General Services Officer of the City Government.
Congressman Carmona called the attention of the CSC on the promotional appointment
of Victoria issued by her husband approved by the CSC. The Commission issued
Resolution 93-1427 recalling the approval of the appointment of Victoria and
disapproved her promotion on the ground that it violated the statutory prohibition against
nepotic appointments. Mayor Debulgado and Victoria moved for reconsideration
alleging she was deprived of her right to due process – denied. Hence, this petition for
certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not promotional appointment is covered in the prohibition of nepotism

RULING:
Section 59 insures the objectivity of the appointing or recommending official by
preventing that objectivity from being in fact tested. The importance of this statutory
objective is difficult to overstress in the culture in which we live and work in the
Philippines, where family bonds remain, in general, compelling and cohesive. Section
59, Book V, E.O. No. 292 means exactly what it says in plain and ordinary language: it
refers to "all appointments" whether original or promotional in nature. The public policy
embodied in Section 59 is clearly fundamental in importance, and the Court has neither
authority nor inclination to dilute that important public policy by introducing a
qualification here or a distinction there. It follows that the promotional appointment of
petitioner Victoria by her husband, petitioner Mayor, falls within the prohibited class of
appointments, thus void. A void appointment cannot give rise to security of tenure.
 JOSE P. LAUREL V v CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. No. 71562 October 28, 1991

FACTS:
Jose Laurel, Governor of Batangas appointed his brother, Benjamin Laurel as Senior
Executive Assistant in the Office of the Governor, a non-career service position which
belongs to the personal and confidential staff of an elective official. He issued a
promotional appointment as Civil Security Officer, which is classified as primary
confidential pursuant to PD 868. Respondent Sangalang called the attention of the CSC
regarding the designation of Benjamin as Provincial Administrator in violation of the civil
service rules and in violation of RA 3019. CSC revoked the designation on the ground
that it is nepotic in violation of PD 807 on nepotism and that the function of an
administrator is not primarily confidential.

ISSUE:
Whether nor not the “designation” is not covered by the

RULING: