Supreme Court of the Philippines

343 Phil. 670

EN BANC
G.R. No. 110249, August 21, 1997
ALFREDO TANO, VS. GOV. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, D E C I S I O N

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Petitioners caption their petition as one for “Certiorari, Injunction With Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction,with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order” and pray that this Court:
(1) declare as unconstitutional:
1. Ordinance No. 15-92, dated 15 December 1992, of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Puerto Princesa;
2. Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, dated 22 January 1993, issued by Acting City
Mayor Amado L. Lucero of Puerto Princesa City;
3. Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, dated 19 February 1993, of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan; (2) enjoin the enforcement thereof; and (3)
restrain respondents Provincial and City Prosecutors of Palawan and Puerto Princesa
City and Judges of Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts [1] and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Palawan from assuming jurisdiction over and hearing cases
concerning the violation of the Ordinances and of the Office Order.

Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-92

“AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER
OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998
AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
THEREOF”,

Section 4. It shall be unlawful [for] any person or any business enterprise or company to ship
out from Puerto Princesa City to any point of destination either via aircraft or seacraft of any
live fish and lobster except SEA BASS, CATFISH, MUDFISH, AND MILKFISH FRIES.

To implement said city ordinance, then Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued Office
Order No. 23, Series of 1993
‘AN ORDINANCE REQUIRING ANY PERSON ENGAGED OR INTENDING TO
ENGAGE IN ANY BUSINESS, TRADE, OCCUPATION, CALLING OR PROFESSION
OR HAVING IN HIS POSSESSION ANY OF THE ARTICLES FOR WHICH A PERMIT
IS REQUIRED TO BE HAD, TO OBTAIN FIRST A MAYOR’S PERMIT” and “City
Ordinance No. 15-92, AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH
AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO
JANUARY 1, 1998

In the pursuit of this Order, you are hereby authorized to coordinate with the PAL Manager,
the PPA Manager, the local PNP Station and other offices concerned for the needed support
and cooperation. Further, that the usual courtesy and diplomacy must be observed at all times
in the conduct of the inspection.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan enacted Resolution No. 33
“A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE CATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING,
BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINE CORAL DWELLING
AQUATIC ORGANISMS, TO WIT: FAMILY: SCARIDAE (MAMENG), EPINE PHELUS
FASCIATUS (SUNO). CROMILEPTES ALTIVELIS (PANTHER OR SENORITA),
LOBSTER BELOW 200 GRAMS AND SPAWNING, TRADACNA GIGAS (TAKLOBO),
PINCTADA MARGARITEFERA (MOTHER PEARL, OYSTERS, GIANT CLAMS AND
OTHER SPECIES), PENAEUS MONODON (TIGER PRAWN-BREEDER SIZE OR
MOTHER), EPINEPHELUS SUILLUS (LOBA OR GREEN GROUPER) AND FAMILY:
BALISTIDAE (TROPICAL AQUARIUM FISHES) FOR A PERIOD FIVE (5) YEARS IN
AND COMING FROM PALAWAN WATERS”, ORDINANCE NO. 2

4.       The respondents implemented the said ordinances, Annexes “A” and “C” hereof
thereby depriving all the fishermen of the whole province of Palawan and the City of Puerto
Princesa of their only means of livelihood and the petitioners Airline Shippers Association of
Palawan and other marine merchants from performing their lawful occupation and trade;

5.       Petitioners Alfredo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Teocenes Midello, Angel de Mesa, Eulogio
Tremocha, and Felipe Ongonion, Jr. were even charged criminally under criminal case no.
93-05-C in the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Cuyo-Agutaya-Magsaysay

6.       Petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, on the other hand, were charged by the
respondent PNP with the respondent City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City,

Without seeking redress from the concerned local government units, prosecutor’s office and
courts, petitioners directly invoked our original jurisdiction by filing this petition on 4 June
1993. In sum, petitioners contend that:

First, the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly
restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and
Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Second, Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under which the Mayor’s
permit could be granted or denied; in other words, the Mayor had the absolute authority to
determine whether or not to issue permit.

Third, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan “altogether prohibited the catching,
gathering, possession, buying, selling and shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms,
without any distinction whether it was caught or gathered through lawful fishing method,” the
Ordinance took away the right of petitioners-fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful
ways; and insofar as petitioners-members of Airline Shippers Association are concerned.

Finally, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is null and void, the criminal
cases based thereon against petitioners Tano and the others have to be dismissed.

RESPONDENTS
In their comment filed on 13 August 1993, public respondents Governor Socrates and
Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan defended the validity of Ordinance
No.2, Series of 1993, as a valid exercise of the Provincial Government’s power under the
general welfare clause (Section 16 of the Local Government Code of 1991 [hereafter, LGC]),
and its specific power to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts
which endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive
fishing under Section 447 (a) (1) (vi), Section 458 (a) (1) (vi), and Section 468 (a) (1) (vi), of
the LGC. They claimed that in the exercise of such powers, the Province of Palawan had “the
right and responsibilty… to insure that the remaining coral reefs, where fish dwells [sic],
within its territory remain healthy for the future generation.” The Ordinance, they further
asserted, covered only live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms which were enumerated
in the ordinance and excluded other kinds of live marine aquatic organisms not dwelling in
coral reefs; besides the prohibition was for only five (5) years to protect and preserve the
pristine coral and allow those damaged to regenerate.

PETITIONERS
On 25 October 1993 petitioners filed an Urgent Plea for the Immediate Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order claiming that despite the pendency of this case, Branch 50 of
the Regional Trial Court of Palawan was bent on proceeding with Criminal Case No. 11223
against petitioners Danilo Tano, Alfredo Tano, Eulogio Tremocha, Romualdo Tano,
Baldomero Tano, Andres Lemihan and Angel de Mesa for violation of Ordinance No. 2 of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan. Acting on said plea, we issued on 11 November
1993 - GRANTED

On 22 April 1997 we ordered impleaded as party respondents the Department of Agriculture

and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and required the Office of the Solicitor
General to comment on their behalf.

ISSUE:
1) WON the assailed ordinances, Office Orders are unconstitutional, thus null and void

RULING:
After due deliberation on the pleadings filed, we resolved to dismiss this petition for want of
merit, on 22 July 1997, and assigned it to the ponente for the writing of the opinion of the
Court.

There are actually two sets of petitioners in this case. The first is composed of Alfredo Tano,
Baldomero Tano, Danilo Tano, Romualdo Tano, Teocenes Midello, Angel de Mesa, Eulogio
Tremocha, Felipe Ongonion, Jr., Andres Linijan, and Felimon de Mesa, who were criminally
charged with violating Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution No. 33 and Ordinance No. 2,
Series of 1993, of the Province of Palawan, in Criminal Case No. 93-05-C of the 1st
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Palawan;[3] and Robert Lim and Virginia Lim who
were charged with violating City Ordinance No. 15-92 of Puerto Princesa City and Ordinance
No. 2, Series of 1993, of the Province of Palawan before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Puerto Princesa.[4] All of them, with the exception of Teocenes Midello, Felipe Ongonion, Jr.,
Felimon de Mesa, Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, are likewise the accused in Criminal Case
No. 11223 for the violation of Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan,
pending before Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan.[5]

The second set of petitioners is composed of the rest of the petitioners numbering seventy-
seven (77), all of whom, except the Airline Shippers Association of Palawan - FISHERMEN

The primary interest of the first set of petitioners is, of course,

1) to prevent the prosecution, trial and determination of the criminal cases until the
constitutionality or legality of the Ordinances they allegedly violated shall have been
resolved.

2) being fishermen or marine merchants, they would be adversely affected by the ordinances.

As to the first set of petitioners, this special civil for certiorari must fail on the ground of
prematurity amounting to a lack of cause of action. There is no showing that the said
petitioners, as the accused in the criminal cases, have filed motions to quash the informations
therein and that the same were denied. The ground available for such motions is that the facts
charged therein do not constitute an offense because the ordinances in question are
unconstitutional.[6] It cannot then be said that the lower courts acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion to justify recourse to the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari or prohibition. It must further be stressed that even if the petitioners did file
motions to quash, the denial thereof would not forthwith give rise to a cause of action under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The general rule is that where a motion to quash is denied, the
remedy therefrom is not certiorari, but for the party aggrieved thereby to go to trial without
prejudice to reiterating special defenses involved in said motion, and if, after trial on the
merits of adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.[7]
And , even where in an exceptional circumstance such denial may be the subject of a special
civil action for certiorari, a motion for reconsideration must have to be filed to allow the court
concerned an opportunity to correct its errors, unless such motion may be dispensed with
because of existing exceptional circumstances.[8] Finally, even if a motion for reconsideration
has been filed and denied, the remedy under Rule 65 is still unavailable absent any showing
of the grounds provided for in Section 1 thereof.[9] For obvious reasons, the petition at bar
does not, and could not have , alleged any of such grounds.

As to the second set of petitioners, the instant petition is obviously one for DECLARATORY
RELIEF, i.e., for a declaration that the Ordinances in question are a “nullity ... for being
unconstitutional.”[10] As such, their petition must likewise fail, as this Court is not possessed
of original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are
involved,[11] it being settled that the Court merely exercises appellate jurisdiction over such
petitions.[12]

II

Even granting arguendo that the first set of petitioners have a cause of action ripe for the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is here a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts, and
no special and important reason or exceptional or compelling circumstance has been adduced
why direct recourse to us should be allowed. While we have concurrent jurisdiction with
Regional Trial courts and with the Court of Appeals to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence gives petitioners
no unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum, so we held in People v. Cuaresma:[13]
This concurrence of jurisdiction is not… to be taken as according to parties seeking any of
the writs an absolute unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application
therefor will be directed. There is after all hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative
of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate
forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy
most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level
(“inferior”) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter,
with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to
issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy.

The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at this time, and to enjoin strict adherence
thereto in the light of what it perceives to be a growing tendency on the part of litigants and
lawyers to have their applications for the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes even
their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated directly and immediately by the highest tribunal of
the land….

III

Notwithstanding the foregoing procedural obstacles against the first set of petitioners, we opt
to resolve this case on its merits considering that the lifetime of the challenged Ordinances is
about to end. Ordinance No. 15-92 of the City of Puerto Princesa is effective only FROM
1993 up to 1 January 1998, while Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan, enacted on 19
February 1993, is effective for only five (5) years. Besides, these Ordinances were
undoubtedly enacted in the exercise of powers under the new LGC relative to the protection
and preservation of the environment and are thus novel and of paramount importance. No
further delay then may be allowed in the resolution of the issues raised.

It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units)
enjoy the presumption of constitutionality.[15] To overthrow this presumption, there must be a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative
contradiction. In short, the conflict with the Constitution must be shown beyond reasonable
doubt.[16] Where doubt exists, even if well founded, there can be no finding of
unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain. [17]

After a scrunity of the challenged Ordinances and the provisions of the Constitution
petitioners claim to have been violated, we find petitioners’ contentions baseless and so hold
that the former do not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable
laws.

Petitioners specifically point to Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7, Article XIII of
the Constitution as having been transgressed by the Ordinances.

The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Article XII reads:

SEC. 2.          x x x
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea,
and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino
citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino
citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and
fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.

Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII provide:

Sec. 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic
opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.

xxx

SEC. 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local
communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing resources, both
inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate
technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other
services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection
shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion.
Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing
resources
.

There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or

marginal fisherman. In their petition, petitioner Airline Shippers Association of Palawan is
described as “a private association composed of Marine Merchants”; petitioners Robert Lim
and Virginia Lim, as “merchants;” while the rest of the petitioners claim to be “fishermen,”

Since the Constitution does not specifically provide a definition of the terms “subsistence” or
“marginal” fishermen,[18] they should be construed in their general and ordinary sense. A
marginal fisherman is an individual engaged in fishing whose margin of return or reward in
his harvest of fish as measured by existing price levels is barely sufficient to yield a profit or
cover the cost of gathering the fish,[19] while a subsistence fisherman is one whose catch
yields but the irreducible minimum for his livelihood. [20] Section 131(p) of the LGC (R.A.
No. 7160) defines a marginal farmer or fisherman as “an individual engaged in subsistence
farming or fishing which shall be limited to the sale, barter or exchange of agricultural or
marine products produced by himself and his immediate family.” It bears repeating that
nothing in the record supports a finding that any petitioner falls within these definitions.

Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence
fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation’s marine wealth.
What the provision merely recognizes is that the State may allow, by law, cooperative fish
farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and
lagoons. Our survey of the statute books reveals that the only provision of law which speaks
of the preferential right of marginal fishermen is Section 149 of the LGC of 1991 which
pertinently provides:
SEC. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges. -- x x x

(b) The sangguniang bayan may:

(1) Grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or
bangus fry areas, within a definite zone of the municipal waters, as determined by it:
Provided, however, That duly registered organizations and cooperatives of marginal
fishermen shall have preferential right to such fishery privileges ....

In a Joint Administrative Order No. 3, dated 25 April 1996, the Secretary of the Department
of Agriculture and the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government
prescribed the guidelines on the preferential treatment of small fisherfolk relative to the
fishery right mentioned in Section 149. This case, however, does not involve such fishery
right.

Anent Section 7 of Article XIII, it speaks not only of the use of communal marine and fishing
resources, but of their protection, development, and conservation. As hereafter shown, the
ordinances in question are meant precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources to
the end that their enjoyment by the people may be guaranteed not only for the present
generation, but also for the generations to come.

The so-called “preferential right” of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine
resources is not at all absolute. In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources
belong to the State, and, pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution, their “exploration, development and utilization ... shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State.” Moreover, their mandated protection, development, and
conservation as necessarily recognized by the framers of the Constitution, imply certain
restrictions on whatever right of enjoyment there may be in favor of anyone.

What must likewise be borne in mind is the state policy enshrined in the Constitution
regarding the duty of the State to protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.[22]
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it a correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment ...

The LGC provisions invoked by private respondents merely seek to give flesh and blood to
the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. In fact, the General Welfare
Clause, expressly mentions this right:

SEC. 16. General Welfare.-- Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a
balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant
scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity
and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order,
and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. (underscoring supplied).

Moreover, Section 5(c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the general welfare provisions of
the LGC “shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to the local government units in
accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people of the
community.”

The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters
and to impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use
of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious
methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishery
laws.[24] Further, the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod and the sangguniang
panlalawigan are directed to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the municipality and
its inhabitants, which shall include, inter alia, ordinances that “[p]rotect the environment and
impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite
fishing and other forms of destructive fishing ... and such other activities which result in
pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance.”[25]

Finally, the centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization [26] as expressly mandated by
the Constitution.[27] Indispensable thereto is devolution and the LGC expressly provides that
“[a]ny provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its
favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of
powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the
existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit
concerned,”[28] Devolution refers to the act by which the National Government confers power
and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and
responsibilities.[29]

One of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the LGC on devolution is the
enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. [30]
This necessarily includes enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws
within the municipal waters.

The term “municipal waters,” in turn, include not only streams, lakes, and tidal waters within
the municipality, not being the subject of private ownership and not comprised within the
national parks, public forest, timber lands, forest reserves, or fishery reserves, but also marine
waters included between two lines drawn perpendicularly to the general coastline from points
where the boundary lines of the municipality or city touch the sea at low tide and a third line
parallel with the general coastline and fifteen kilometers from it. [31] Under P.D. No. 704, the
marine waters included in municipal waters is limited to three nautical miles from the general
coastline using the above perpendicular lines and a third parallel line.

These “fishery laws” which local government units may enforce under Section 17(b), (2), (i)
in municipal waters include: (1) P.D. No. 704; (2) P.D. No. 1015 which, inter alia, authorizes
the establishment of a “closed season” in any Philippine water if necessary for conservation
or ecological purposes; (3) P.D. No. 1219 which provides for the exploration, exploitation,
utilization, and conservation of coral resources; (4) R.A. No. 5474, as amended by B.P. Blg.
58, which makes it unlawful for any person, association, or corporation to catch or cause to
be caught, sell, offer to sell, purchase, or have in possession any of the fish specie called
gobiidae or “ipon” during closed season; and (5) R.A. No. 6451 which prohibits and punishes
electrofishing, as well as various issuances of the BFAR.

In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and
the powers granted to local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause),
and under Sections 149, 447 (a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which
unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned
Ordinances cannot be doubted.

Parenthetically, we wish to add that these Ordinances find full support under R.A. No. 7611,
otherwise known as the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP) for Palawan Act, approved on 19
July 1992. This statute adopts a “comprehensive framework for the sustainable development
of Palawan compatible with protecting and enhancing the natural resources and endangered
environment of the province,” which “shall serve to guide the local government of Palawan
and the government agencies concerned in the formulation and implementation of plans,
programs and projects affecting said province.”[32]

At this time then, it would be appropriate to determine the relation between the assailed
Ordinances and the aforesaid powers of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Puerto
Princesa and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Palawan to protect the
environment. To begin, we ascertain the purpose of the Ordinances as set forth in the
statement of purposes or declaration of policies quoted earlier.

It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes: (1) to
establish a “closed season” for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a
period of five years, and (2) to protect the corals of the marine waters of the City of Puerto
Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities.

The accomplishment of the first objective is well within the devolved power to enforce
fishery laws in municipal waters, such as P.D. No. 1015, which allows the establishment of
“closed seasons.” The devolution of such power has been expressly confirmed in the
Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April 1994 between the Department of Agriculture and the
Department of Interior and Local Government.

The realization of the second objective falls within both the general welfare clause of the
LGC and the express mandate thereunder to cities and provinces to protect the environment
and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment. [33]

The nexus then between the activities barred by Ordinance No. 15-92 of the City of Puerto
Princesa and the prohibited acts provided in Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993 of the Province
of Palawan, on one hand, and the use of sodium cyanide, on the other, is painfully obvious. In
sum, the public purpose and reasonableness of the Ordinances may not then be controverted.
As to Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, issued by Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of
the City of Puerto Princesa, we find nothing therein violative of any constitutional or
statutory provision. The Order refers to the implementation of the challenged ordinance and
is not the Mayor’s Permit.

The majority is unable to accommodate this view. The jurisdiction and responsibility of the
BFAR under P. D. no. 704, over the management, conservation, development, protection,
utilization and disposition of all fishery and aquatic resources of the country is not all-
encompassing. First, Section 4 thereof excludes from such jurisdiction and responsibility
municipal waters, which shall be under the municipal or city government concerned, except
insofar as fishpens and seaweed culture in municipal in municipal centers are concerned. This
section provides, however, that all municipal or city ordinances and resolutions affecting
fishing and fisheries and any disposition thereunder shall be submitted to the Secretary of the
Department of Natural Resources for appropriate action and shall have full force and effect
only upon his approval.[42]

Second, it must at once be pointed out that the BFAR is no longer under the Department of
Natural Resources (now Department of Environment and Natural Resources). Executive
Order No. 967 of 30 June 1984 transferred the BFAR from the control and supervision of the
Minister (formerly Secretary) of Natural Resources to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food
(MAF) and converted it into a mere staff agency thereof, integrating its functions with the
regional offices of the MAF.

In Executive Order No. 116 of 30 January 1987, which reorganized the MAF, the BFAR was
retained as an attached agency of the MAF. And under the Administrative Code of 1987, [43]
the BFAR is placed under the Title concerning the Department of Agriculture.[44]

Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the challenged Ordinance of the City of Puerto Princesa is
invalid or unenforceable because it was not approved by the Secretary of the DENR. If at all,
the approval that should be sought would be that of the Secretary of the Department of
Agriculture (not DENR) of municipal ordinances affecting fishing and fisheries in municipal
waters has been dispensed with in view of the following reasons:

(1)             Section 534 (Repealing Clause) of the LGC expressly repeals or amends Section
16 and 29 of P.D. No. 704[45] insofar that they are inconsistent with the provisions of the
LGC.

(2)             As discussed earlier, under the general welfare clause of the LGC, local
government units have the power, inter alia, to enact ordinances to enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology. It likewise specifically vests municipalities with the power to
grant fishery privileges in municipal waters, and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to
penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances,
electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute other
methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishing
laws.[46] Finally, it imposes upon the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and
the sangguniang panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to “[p]rotect the environment and
impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite
fishing and other forms of destructive fishing… and such other activities which result in
pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance.” [47]
In closing, we commend the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Puerto Princesa and
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Palawan for exercising the requisite political
will to enact urgently needed legislation to protect and enhance the marine environment,
thereby sharing in the herculean task of arresting the tide of ecological destruction. We hope
that other local government units shall now be roused from their lethargy and adopt a more
vigilant stand in the battle against the decimation of our legacy to future generations. At this
time, the repercussions of any further delay in their response may prove disastrous, if not,
irreversible.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the temporary
restraining order issued on 11 November 1993 is LIFTED.