QUIETING TITLE, OR REMOVING CLOUD ON TITLE, OVER ACCRETION OR ALLUVION

Atty. Jessa Wong-Cantano1

The action to quiet title, or remove clouds from title, to real estate, is a well-established remedy in American law. It has for its purpose the quieting of title or removal of a cloud therefrom when there is an apparently valid or effective instrument or other claim which in reality is void, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable. The principle for this action is: equity comes to the aid of him who would suffer if the instrument were enforced. He is in good conscience entitled to a removal of the cloud or doubt upon his title. On the other hand, the respondent has no legal or moral ground to hold the instrument against the petitioners title.2 In the Philippines, Article 476 of the New Civil Code provides the substantive law on the matter, while Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides for the procedure in bringing an action to quiet title, or to remove clouds, from title to real property. Accretion, on the other hand, is the increase in the riparian land by the gradual deposit, by water, of solid material, whether mud, sand, or sediment, so as to cause that to become dry land which was before covered with water. Accretion denotes the process, while alluvion is applied to the deposit itself, although the terms are frequently used synonymously.3 The basic rule in accretion is, to the owners of land adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion (or alluvion) which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.4 Of these two (2) distinct concepts, it can be queried: is a quiet title suit the proper remedy to enforce ones claim over accretion or alluvion? And, can one, in the same quiet title suit, ask for reconveyance of title over the accretion or alluvion, or, for settlement of a boundary dispute involving such accretion or alluvion?
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The author is an associate of the Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz (Davao Branch). Before she joined the Firm, she was with the Department of Justice (Main), where, within the year that she was with that office, she was promoted from Attorney II (Technical Staff), to Associate Prosecution Attorney II, and detailed with the Malolos, Bulacan Provincial Prosecutor, the Meycauayan City (Bulacan) Prosecutor, and the Manila City Prosecutor. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II., 1999 Ed., p. 148, citing Commission Report, p. 55. 78 Am Jur 2d, page 851. Article 457, The New Civil Code.

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A. Quieting Title and Removal of Cloud: Difference of Actions. At the outset, it must be emphasized that, an action to quiet title has been distinguished from a suit to remove cloud. An action to quiet title, strictly construed, is substantially an action for the purpose of putting an end to vexatious litigation in respect to the property involved. An action to remove cloud is intended to procure the cancellation, delivery of, release of an instrument, encumbrance, or claim constituting a claim on plaintiffs title, and which may be used to injure or vex him in the future, in the enjoyment of his title. In an action to quiet title, the plaintiff asserts his own estate and declares generally that defendant claims some estate in the land, without defining it, and avers that the claim is without foundation, and calls on the defendant by decree; while in a suit to remove a cloud, plaintiff not declares his own title, but also avers the source and nature of defendants claim, point out its defects, and prays that it be declared void.5 B. Quieting Title: Its Origin and Basis. A quiet title action, or an action to remove cloud on title, is a remedy which originated in the courts of equity. Such proceedings have for their purpose an adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the claimant, is invalid, with the result that the claimant and those claiming under him may forever be free from danger of the hostile claim.6 Under American laws, jurisdiction to grant relief by way of quieting of title or removal of cloud from title is inherent in a court which exercises equity powers. Such actions originated in the chancery courts to correct abuses encouraged under the common-law system under which designing litigants harassed and annoyed the rightful owner by bringing successive actions in ejectment. Being an equity suit in nature, American jurisprudence on quite title cases provides no immutable rules, but lights its own pathway, blazes its own trail,
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Tolentino, supra, at pp. 148-149, citing 51 C.J. 134. See also 65 AmJur 29, page 142. 65 Am Jur 2d, page 141. See also Tolentino, ibid, at p. 148, citing Sanders v. Saxton, 182 N.Y. 477.

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paves its own highway; it is, in short, an appeal to the conscience of the courts of equity.7 The basis of equitable relief for removal of a cloud in title is the principle that, because of the inadequacy of the remedy at law, a deed or other instrument or proceedings constituting the cloud may not be used injuriously or vexatiously to embarrass or affect the title of a plaintiff in possession.8 Stated differently, such remedy was developed by courts of equity, to prevent multiplicity of actions, and, against repeated or continued trespasses or continuing or recurring invasion of property rights. Suits to quiet or remove a cloud from title developed from what were anciently termed bills quia timet or bills of peace, remedies which originated in and appertained to the jurisdiction of the courts of chancery.9 In jurisdictions in which distinctions between the chancery court or court of equity and the court of law has been preserved, quiet title suits are not maintainable except in chancery courts.10 In the Philippines, however, such distinction is of no moment, considering that our courts here are both courts of law and equity.11 C. The applicable Philippine laws and jurisprudential rules on Quieting Title; Basic Principles and Issues. Article 476 and 478 of the New Civil Code state: Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said

65 Am Jur 2d, page 142. Homewood Realty Corp. v. Safe Deposit & T. Co, 160 Md 457, 154 A 58, 78 ALR 8. 65 Am Jur 2d, page 143. Ibid, at page 142. F. F. Maacop Construction Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals and MIAA, G. R. No. 122196, January 15, 1997.

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title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein. There may also be an action to quiet title or remove a cloud therefrom when the contract, instrument or other obligation has been extinguished or has terminated, or has been barred by extinctive prescription. Article 477 of the same Code identifies the party who may bring an action to quiet title: The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property. Thus, for an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2) indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of action, and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. (1) Plaintiffs legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of action. Generally speaking, in order to maintain a quiet title action, the plaintiff must have legal or registered title to the property in question, or to some interest therein, and be in possession of the property at the time of the institution of the action or, as against one who comes into a pending action, at the time he becomes a party.12 It must be stressed, however, that one who has only an equitable or beneficial title to the property may maintain an action to quiet such title or

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65 Am Jur 2d, page 170.

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remove a cloud therefrom, even though he is out of possession. 13 In fact, suits to quiet title may be maintained by the holder of the equitable title against a defendant who is vested with the legal title to the property subject of the case.14 Possession therefore, is not necessary, for the plaintiff to institute a quiet title action. The plaintiff may be in possession or not in possession: the differences in effects are: (1) If the plaintiff is in possession, the period to file the action does not prescribe, and, his only right is to remove or prevent cloud. (2) If the plaintiff is out of possession, the period to file the action prescribes, but, aside, from being given the right to remove or prevent cloud, he may also bring the ordinary actions of ejectment, publiciana or reivindicatoria, within the proper prescriptive periods.15 (2) The deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. A cloud on title is an outstanding instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is actually invalid or inoperative, but which may nevertheless impair or affect injuriously the title to property. The matter complained of must have a prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. The cloud on title is a semblance of title which appears in some legal form but which is in fact unfounded. The invalidity or inoperativeness of the instrument is not apparent on the face of the instrument, and it has to be proved by extrinsic evidence.

13

Ibid, at page 172. Ibid, at page 173. Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, Vol. II, 2008 Edition, page 305, citing 44 AmJur 46-47.

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Thus, where the instrument is invalid or inefficacious on its face, or where it can be shown to be invalid or inefficacious without the need of presenting extrinsic evidence, an action to remove cloud on title does not exist.16 D. The applicable Philippine laws and jurisprudential rules on Accretion or Alluvion; Basic Principles and Issues. Article 457 of the New Civil Code states: To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to any land or alluvion deposited by a river is to compensate him for the danger of loss that he suffers because of the location of his land. If estates bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and other evils produced by the destructive force of the waters and if by virtue of lawful provisions, said estates are subject to encumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is proper that the risk or danger which may prejudice the owners thereof should be compensated by the right of accretion.17 Furthermore, it is obvious that, the riparian owner to whose land the accretion is attached is in a better position than anyone else to cultivate the accretion, and in the interests of agriculture, the law grants him such accretion. Nobody can prove the ownership over such gradual accumulation of sediment; nobody can tell from whose lands they come, and expediency dictates that they be given to the owner of the land on which they are deposited for he can best utilize them.18 Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and
16

Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-61647, October 12, 1984, citing Cortes v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567. Director of Lands V. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 48265, Janaury 7, 1987. Tolentino, supra, at p. 126, citing 3 Vera 78, 3 Manresa 231-232, 2 Navarro Amandi 93, 2 Valverde 97, Compania General de Tabacos v. Director of Lands, (C.A.) 56 Off. Gaz. 1418.

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(3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers. Notably, aside from the right of accretion itself, and in the absence of evidence that the change in the course of the river was sudden or that it occurred through avulsion,19 the riparian owner is also afforded the benefit of the legal presumption20 that, the change was gradual and was caused by accretion and erosion.21 E. Quieting Title as an action to Claim Ownership over Accretion or Alluvion. To reiterate, the ground or reason for filing a complaint for quieting of title must be an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding. Thus, under recent laws and rules, and pursuant to the maxim expresio mius est exclusio alterius, these grounds are exclusive so that other reasons outside of the purview of these reasons may not be considered valid for the same action.
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At present, the rule therefore is, a quieting title action cannot be availed of for settling boundary disputes. In Vda. De Aviles, et al. v. Court of Appeals and Aviles,23 the Supreme Court declared that a case of boundary dispute is not cognizable in a special civil action to quiet title. Citing American jurisprudential rules, it held: An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be brought for the purpose of settling a boundary dispute.
19

Avulsion is a sudden and perceptible loss or addition to land by the action of water, or a sudden change in the bed or course of a stream (78 AmJur 2d, page 852). Payatas Estate Improvement Co. vs. Mariano Tuason, et al., 53 Phil. 55 (1929), C. N. Hodges v. Garcia, 109 Phil.133, 135 (1960), and Bagaipo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116290, December 8, 2000. Erosion means the gradual washing away of land bordering on a stream or body of water by the action of the water (78 AmJur 2d, page 852). Titong v. Court of Appeals and Laurio, G.R. No. 111141, March 6, 1998. G.R. No. 95748, November 21, 1996.

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The precedent on this matter cited by the respondent Court in its Decision is herewith reproduced in full: In Ashurst v. McKenzie (1890) 92 Ala. 484, 9 So. 262, where the complainants' predecessor in title and the defendant had, during their occupancy, destroyed and obliterated the boundary line between their adjoining tracts of land, and there was now a dispute as to its location, it was held that a bill did not lie to remove a cloud on the complainants' title. The court said: "There is no allegation or evidence of any muniment of title, proceeding, written contract, or paper showing any color of title in the defendant, which could cast a shadow on the title of complainants to any part of the land; there is no overlapping of description in the muniments held by either. The land of complainants and defendant join. The line which separates them is in dispute and is to be determined by evidence aliunde. Each admits that the other has title up to his line wherever it may be, and the title papers of neither fix its precise location. So that there is no paper the existence of which clouds the title of either party, and nothing could be delivered up and canceled under the decree of the court undertaking to remove a cloud. Another similarly instructive precedent reported in the same reference is also quoted below: In Kilgannon v. Jenkinson (1883) 51 Mich. 240, 16 N.W. 390, the court, dismissing a bill to quiet title, said: "The fundamental dispute is about the correct position of the line between lots 3 and 7. The case is not one where a complainant in possession of a specific piece of land, and a defendant out of possession, but claiming some right or title, are contending as to which one has the better right to that same parcel; but it is a case where the titles are not opposed, and the basis and existence of all right and claim depend simply upon where the original line runs. When that is once settled, there can remain no semblance of claim or cloud to be passed on, and the issue on that particular question is one regularly triable at law. It further held that: From another perspective, we hold that the trial court (and likewise the respondent Court) cannot, in an action for quieting of title, order the determination of the boundaries of the claimed property, as that would be

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tantamount to awarding to one or some of the parties the disputed property in an action where the sole issue is limited to whether the instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding involved constitutes a cloud upon the petitioners' interest or title in and to said property. Such determination of boundaries is appropriate in adversarial proceedings where possession or ownership may properly be considered and where evidence aliunde, other than the "instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding" itself, may be introduced. An action for forcible entry, whenever warranted by the period prescribed in Rule 70, or for recovery of possession de facto, also within the prescribed period, may be availed of by the petitioners, in which proceeding the boundary dispute may be fully threshed out. It is important to take into consideration the foregoing pronouncements in choosing the proper remedy for enforcing ones claim of ownership over accretion or alluvion. Consider the following scenarios: (a) Landowner files an action against possessors of accretion or alluvion which, by law and by legal title, is actually owned by him. The considered view is, the proper action to be filed is not a quieting title action, but an action for ejectment. As in the Vda. De Aviles case, as well as the cited cases of Ashurst and Kilgannon, there is no instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding the existence of which clouds the title of the landowner over the accretion or alluvion. The subject matter here is merely the physical or material possession or possession de facto over the accretion or alluvion, and not possession de jure.24 But, can the landowner seek a declaration of his ownership over the accretion or alluvion in the same ejectment case? The answer, of course, is, he cannot, as, after all, in ejectment cases, the questions to be resolved simply are these: First, who had actual possession over the piece of real property? Second, was the possessor ousted therefrom within one year from the filing of the complaint by force,
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Gutierrez v. Magat, G.R. No. L-39739 October 3, 1975, citing 3 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., pp. 303-304.

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threat, strategy, or stealth? And lastly, does he ask for the restoration of his possession? Any controversy over ownership rights should be settled after the party who had the prior, peaceful and actual possession is returned to the property.25 (b) Landowner files an action against possessors and/or registered owners of accretion or alluvion which, by law, is actually owned by him. What then, should the landowner file against the possessors in order to obtain a declaration, once and for all, that the accretion or alluvion is owned by him? As previously stated, under our laws, an ejectment case will not suffice. There must be a separate action for him to be able to enforce his legal title over the accretion or alluvion. Be it noted, however, that, even with an existing ejectment case, the landowner is not precluded by law to file, simultaneously or subsequently, an action for reconveyance, the purpose of which is to seek, among others, the transfer of property, wrongfully or erroneously registered by another, to him, being the rightful and legal owner.26 Indeed, an ejectment case has an entirely different subject from that of an action for reconveyance of title. What is involved in the ejectment case is merely the issue of material possession or possession de facto; whereas in an action for reconveyance, ownership is the issue. So much so that the pendency of an action for reconveyance of title over the same property does not divest the city or municipal court of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case, nor will it preclude or bar execution of judgment in the ejectment case where the only issue involved is material possession or possession de facto. This is so because, the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no case bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building nor shall it be held conclusive of the facts therein found in case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession.27 But then again, is an action for reconveyance the proper remedy, and not a quieting title action? And, in a situation where the landowner already filed an
25

Dizon v. Concina, G.R. No. L-23756, December 27, 1969. New Regent Sources, Inc. v. Tanjuatco, Jr. and Cuevas, G.R. No. 168800, April 16, 2009. Ang Ping and Pimentel v. RTC-Manila and Ko, Dizon v. Concina, G.R. No. 75860, September 17, 1987.

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action to quiet title, is there a need for him to subsequently file a separate action for reconveyance of title? Again, an action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner. Bearing this in mind, it is clear therefore that, reconveyance is an action distinct from an action for quieting of title, which is filed whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title for purposes of removing such cloud or to quiet title.28 However, time and again, the Supreme Court has allowed the treatment or characterization of an action for reconveyance as an action to quiet title.29 Thus: In Mendizabel v. Apao,30 we treated a similar action for reconveyance as an action to quiet title, explaining, thus: The Court has ruled that the 10-year prescriptive period applies only when the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property. If a person claiming to be its owner is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. The reason is that the one who is in actual possession of the land claiming to be its owner may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. His undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession. The ruling was reiterated in Lasquite v. Victory Hills, Inc., 31 viz.: An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in 10 years. The reference point of the 10-year
28

Ney v. Quijano. G.R. No. 178609, August 4, 2010. Ibid. G.R. No. 143185, February 20, 2006, as cited in Ney v. Quijano, supra. G.R. No. 175375, June 23, 2009, as cited in Ney v. Quijano, supra.

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prescriptive period is the date of registration of the deed or the issuance of the title. The prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. However, if the plaintiff, as the real owner of the property also remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property does not run against him. In such a case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible. The same pronouncements were made in Heirs of Jose Olviga v. Court of Appeals,32 and the fairly recent cases of Brito, Sr. v. Dianala, et al33 and Spouses Carpo v. Ayala Land, Incorporated.34 The more important question, however, is this: in the same manner that an action for reconveyance may be treated as an action for quieting title, can an action to quiet title be treated or characterized as an action for reconveyance, or even an action to settle boundary disputes, so as to eliminate the need to file another action to enforce ownership or effect transfer of title over a property, such as an accretion or alluvion? It is the considered view that, the higher and nobler purpose of avoiding multiplicity of suits and prevention of litigation must be taken into account in resolving this issue. After all, such purpose is, in fact, one of the reasons for which equity interferes to remove a cloud on title.35 Thus, it was held: Equity will interfere in actions to quiet title to prevent multiplicity of suits where ample and perfect justice can be done, or, as otherwise stated, it will interpose, in a proper case, to prevent a multiplicity of suits, excessive litigation or circuitry of action.36 Verily, multiplicity of suits may be avoided when a court taking cognizance of a quieting title case will no longer be precluded from adjudicating

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G.R. No. 104813, October 21, 1993, as cited in Heirs of Valientes v. Ramas, G.R. No. 157852, December 15, 2010. G.R. No. 171717, December 15, 2010, citing Ney v. Quijano, supra. G.R. No. 166577, February 3, 2010. Tolentino, supra, citing Gardener v. Buckeye Savings, etc., 108 W. Va. 673, 152 S.E. 530. 65 Am Jur 2d, page 167.

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the issue of transferring the title of the subject property to its rightful owner, or even settling boundary disputes. As held under American jurisprudence: In the absence of any special statutory jurisdiction granted to it, a court of equity is not authorized to assume jurisdiction over a mere controversy or dispute over the location of a boundary line between adjacent landowners or a confusion of boundaries. There must be, in addition to this, some special ground of equitable interposition, such as a mutual mistake of the parties, fraud, misconduct, or unfairness on the part of the defendant, or the existence of a relationship between the parties which makes it the duty of one of them to preserve and protect the boundary, and a neglect of such duty so that the boundary has become confused, before a court of equity will assume jurisdiction and fix or determine the location of confused or obliterated boundary lines. If a multiplicity of suits is inherent in a reference of the parties to their legal remedies, a court of equity may take jurisdiction to determine confused boundaries. In other words, equitable powers with relation to boundary disputes may be exercised only where such dispute is ancillary to the main issue in the case, and then only under the rule that equitable jurisdiction taken for one purpose is taken for all purposes, and complete relief will be granted; the matter of the boundary must be truly ancillary to the main issue and not merely a pretext for the exercise of the jurisdiction of equity. In this connection, it may be noted that a number of the cases have held that a bill to quiet title or to remove cloud on a title may not be brought solely for the purpose of settling a disputed boundary, although where there are other grounds for invoking the jurisdiction of equity, the court may in its determination of the cause settle questions of disputed boundaries.37 Indeed, for as long as it can be shown that, there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes a cloud on ones title, the ancillary issue of disputed boundaries, which is necessarily produced as an
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12 Am Jur 2d, pages 628-629.

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offshoot of such existence of a cloud, the same court where the action to quiet title was instituted may likewise settle the issue of boundaries, or reconvey title to the rightful owner. Thus, in a scenario where a landowner, for example, institutes a special civil action for quieting of title, because of the existence of a certificate of title over accretion or alluvion, which on its face is valid, but which is in truth and in fact, invalid and prejudicial to his legal or equitable title as riparian owner, he may seek the declaration of nullity of such title, and in the same case, seek settlement of the boundary dispute between him and the registered owner, and even the reconveyance of the title to his name. And, the supposed registered owner of the accretion cannot even validly invoke the indefeasibility of his title, considering that, as a rule, registration does not protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream. Accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the property of the owners of the banks. Such accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams, and the provisions of the Civil Code in that respect are not affected by the Land Registration Act.38 ---=o0o=---

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Bagaipo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116290, December 8, 2000.

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