Nationa lities Papers, Vol. 27, No.

4, 1999

ISLAM AND NATIO N BUILDING IN TATARSTAN AND DAGESTAN OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATIO N
Galina M . Yemelianova*

Historical Introduction This article is based on the preliminary results of a project on Islam, Ethnicity and Nationalism in Post-Soviet Tatarstan and Dagestan, which began in March 1997 and ended in September 1999 . 1 T hese two out of Russia s 21 autonomous republics were chosen for com parative research because, althoug h they are both Muslim, there are obviou s geographical, ethnic, cultural, and political differences between them. Each republic also represents a distinctive model of the evolution of Muslim society and its relations with Russian culture in general and with the Russian political center in particular. T atarstan is situated at the con uence of the two greatest rivers the Volga and the Kama of central Russia and is the hom eland of the Tatars, one of Russia s largest ethnic and religious minorities. The republic has a special place in Russia s past and present. Its popula tion is almost equally divided between Tatars and Russians. 2 Ancestors of the present-day Volga T atars (Bulgars) and Russians (various eastern Slavic tribes) have lived and closely interacted there. T heir long history of con ict and coexistence has had a crucial im pact on their respective evolution. From the eighth-century, proto-Tatars and proto-Russians have often coexisted within a single political formation. In the eighth and ninth centuries they came under Khazar suzerainty. From the thirteenth to the fteenth centuries the Bulgars and the Russians were integrated, althoug h on different terms, within the Chingisside empire. The Bulgar elite merged with the Chingissides and secured a privileged status for the Bulgars compared to the Russians and other peoples conquered by the Chingissides. In the late fteenth century Russian resistance to ChingissideBulgar domination facilitated the amalgamation of numerous Russian princedoms and the formation of the unitary Russian state, centered in Moscow. In 1552 , the Russian Tsar Ivan the Terrible reversed the power balance by the conquest of the Kazan Khanate, the successor to the Chingisside Golden Horde which was the rst Tatar state. From the mid-sixteenth century until the present, the T atars have lived in the Russian state. Although in the ninth and tenth centuries their ancestors, Bulgars and Kievans, opted for different religions Islam and Christianity, respectively close interaction between the Tatars and the Russians persisted. It is, perhaps, signi cant that the Bulgars opted for the most tolerant and exible Hana madhhab (Islamic legal school) of Sunni Islam, which furthered their extensive links with their

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non-Muslim neighb ours. During the Chingisside period the Volga region turned into one of the major world centers of Islamic learning and scholarship. Tatar Islamic theolog y drew on the traditions of ijtihad (critical theolog ical judgement) and tajdid (renovation), generated by such great medieval Islamic thinkers as al-Ghazzali, al-Maarri, Omar an-Nasa , Ibn Taim iya, and Saad ad-Din at-Tahtazani.3 Adherence to the ijtihad and tajdid allowed Tatar Islamic scholars (ulema) to play down the dogmatic differences between Muslims and to emphasize the moral and social values of Islam. It also succeeded in reducing religiou s and cultural con ict in the multiethnic and polyreligiou s environm ent. 4 T he Russian conquest of Kazan in 1552 was accompanied by the severe suppression of the Islamic religion and its intellectual representatives. As a result, the traditions of Tatar high Islam, characterized by dynamism and creativity, were undermined. The T atar Islamic elite was either destroyed or forced to move to Siberia, Central Asia, Afghanistan, or Hejaz. 5 M ore than two centuries of persecution of Tatar Islam resulted in its ruralization and primitivization. Under the rule of the enlightened Tsarina Catherine the Great (1729 1796) , however, Islam was legalized in Russia and the T atar elite was coopted into the Russian political and economic establishment. In 1789 the rst Russian Muslim administration, the M uftiyat, was formed in Ufa. It was administered by the Mufti, the of cial head of Russia s Muslims. The M uftiyat consisted of the Volga Tatars, who since then have dom inated Russian Islamic of cialdom. Religious liberalization under Catherine the Great enhanced the economic and political activity of the Volga Tatars and contributed to the restoration of traditions of T atar high Islam. Since the late eighteenth century the Volga Tatars have played the leading economic and spiritual role among the Muslims of Eurasia and acted as intermediaries in relations between Russians and the various Islamic peoples. Another im portant consequence of the lengthy TatarRussian interaction was the Tatars dispersal all over the Russian empire, as well as the continuous increase in the Russian popula tion within the Tatar heartland in the Volga-Urals. At the end of the nineteenth century, the extent of the Volga T atars integration Russia and their subsequent cultural assimilation ensured their leadership in the national awakening of the Muslims and other non-Ru ssian peoples of the Russian empire. The Tatar Islamic and intellectual elite generated the Tatar Islamic modernism, known as jadidis m (innova tion), which sought to merge Islam and Islamic culture with modernity, associated with Europe.6 Jadidism became a distinctive form of Tatar Islamic nationalism. Its leading propon ents viewed the future national development of Tatars within the Russian political context. The political goals of the Tatar Islamic and national leaders were to a large extent congruent with those of the Russian liberal opposition. In particular, the great majority of Tatar jadids favored the evolution of the despotic Russian empire into a dem ocratic, parliamentary, multiethnic modern nation where Tatars, as well as other M uslims, would enjoy equal political and juridical rights with other citizens. 7 In the early tw entieth century

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this was re ected in the common political program of the Muslim (predominantly Tatar) faction and the Russian Constitutional Democratic Party of the Russian Dum a.8 Following the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917, the majority of Tatar leaders maintained allegiance to constitutional democracy and advocated the establishment of the nationalcultural autonomy of the Turko-Tatars of Inner Russia and Siberia within Russia. Alongsid e the liberal majority, there was a nationalist minority which pressed for full political independence and the creation of a Tatar state. After the Bolshevik revolution, Tatar nationalists attempted to revive Tatar statehood by proclaim ing an Islamo-T urkic state of Idel-Ural, covering the territory of modern-day Tatarstan and Bashkorstan, much of Orenburg region, and the territories extending south to the Caspian Sea. The Idel-Ural was shortlived, however. 9 In M ay 1920 the Bolsheviks forced the Volga Tatars into a new adm inistrative unit, the T atar Autono mous Soviet Socialist Republic, whose borders coincide with present-day Tatarstan. As a result of this territorial delimitation many Tatars found themselves outside their ethnic republic, i.e. within the borders of neighb oring Bashkir Republic (today s Bashkorstan) and elsewhere in the Volga-Urals. During the Soviet period Tatarstan, like the rest of the USSR, experienced the dramatic consequences of the enforced political delimitation, industrialization, collectivization, atheization, cadre purges, and cultural revolution (including a dual script change: rst from Arabic to L atin in 19271937 and then from Latin to Cyrillic in 1937) . Tatarstan s urbanization resulted in substantial secularization of the Tatars. In the conditions of the Gorbachevian thaw of 1986 1991 , T atarstan s government attempted to upgrade Tatarstan s status to that of a union republic. 10 In 1990 1992 during the period of intensive sovereignization of Russia and within Russia, Tatarstan s leadership, alongside the Chechen leaders, refused to sign the Federal Treaty of 1992 . Instead, Tatarstan President Mintimir Shaimiev 11 and Chechen President Djokhar Dudayev championed the dismantling of the Russian/Soviet empire and promoted a new mode of relationship between Moscow and its regions. W hile Dudayev opted for the im mediate secession of Chechnya from Russia, Shaimiev suggested a fundamental reform of the centerperiphery relations within Russia. In particular, he proposed to replace the unitarist de facto structure of the Russian Federation with a looser asymmetrical federation as a viable remedy for its survival as a politically integral and yet both ethnically and culturally diverse state. 12 Shaimiev s initiative has been termed the Tatarstan model. In order to increase his stakes in the bargaining with M oscow, Shaimiev orchestrated the T atar national movement under the leadership of the VTOTS (All-Tatar Public Center), the Party of Ittifaq (Union), Milli Mejlis (National Assembly), and Azatlyk (Freedom). In February 1994 Presidents Yeltsin and Shaimiev signed a power-sharing treaty between Moscow and Kazan which ensured Tatarstan s special status within the Russian Federation. 13 Under the terms of the bilateral treaty, Yeltsin undertook not to interfere in the internal affairs of Tatarstan, while Shaim iev

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formally recognized Moscow s supremacy and supported Yeltsin during the allRussia elections of 1996 . Dagestan ( country of mountains in Avar) is located in the North Caucasus on Russia s southern frontier. It has paramount geopolitical signi cance for Moscow. 14 It shares a 300-ki lometre eastern border with semi-independent and rapidly Islamizing Chechnya; to the west is the oil-rich Caspian Sea; to the south, newly independent Christian Georgia and Shia Azerbaijan; and to the north, the autono mous republic of Kalmykiya, under the eccentric leadership of President Illumdjinov , and the Cossack-populated areas of the Stavropol region of the Russian Federation. Dagestan is multiethnic and its society is based on a rigidly closed clan structure. Traditionally each clan, or tukhum , unites a group of families related to each other by a common mytholog ical male ancestor. Each clan has its historical area of habitation. The internal life of the clan is regulated by strict patriarchic norms, customary law (adat), and shariat. 15 It is popula ted by more than 100 different ethnic groups, each of which has its own culture and speaks a distinctive language incomprehensible to the rest. 16 The Dagestani Constitution of 1994 nominated the 14 largest ethnic groups as titular. They are: Avars (577,13 4), Dargins (332,28 1), Kum yks (267,48 9), Lezgins (250,66 6), Russians (150,05 4), Laks (102,63 6), Tabasarans (93,600), Chechens (92,217 ), Azeris (88,327), Nogays (33,408 ), Mountain Jews and Tats (18,520 ), Rutuls (17,086 ), Aguls (16,006 ), and Tsakhurs (6,295).17 They are represented in the State Council (the Parliam ent) and have the right of legislative initiative. Dagestan is one of the ancient centers of world civilization. However, it was subjected to a succession of foreign invasions. At the end of the rst millennium BC it was part of Caucasian Albania; in the third century AD Sassanid Iran conquered Dagestan; in the seventh and eighth centuries Arabs invaded it and subjected it to gradual Islamization; in the thirteenth century, together with the Russians and Tatars, Dagestanis were integrated into the Islamicized Chingissides; between the fteenth and nineteenth centuries it comprised a conglo merate of local feudal states, dependent on either T urkey or Iran. The rst Russian (Cossack) strongh olds had already emerged in northern Dagestan in the sixteenth century, and Russia has increasingly dominated Dagestan since the late eighteenth century. It was formally annexed by the Russian Empire in the Gulistan (1813 ) and Turkmanchay (1828 ) Treaties between Russia and Iran.18 Russian penetration in the region was met with a erce resistance which acquired the form of an Islamic holy war. Historically Islam has played the central role in Dagestan and in its relations with the outside world. The rst Dagestani M uslims were L aks who adopted Islam in the eighth century. By the tenth century Islam prevailed in Derbend and southern Dagestan; by the fteenth and sixteenth centuries the vast majority of Dagestanis had converted to Islam. The Dagestanis as well as the Chechens and Ingushes opted for the Sha i madhhab of Sunni Islam, while the rest of the Muslims of the North Caucasus chose the Hana madhhab . By the fteenth century the Dagestani cities of

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Derbend, T arki, Kazikumukh, and Kunzah had become centers of spiritual enlightenment for the Muslims of the North Caucasus, and Dagestani Islamic scholars were highl y respected in the Islamic world. From early times, the development of Dagestani intellectual Islam was accompanied by the advance of popula r Islam, or the Islam of mazar (burial place of a M uslim saint), associated with Su sm. The rst Su s of the tariqa (Su brotherhood ) of Abu Bakr Muhammad Derbendi appeared in Dagestan in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Between the fteenth and seventeenth centuries the Su sm of the tariqas of Naqshbandi, Kadiri, and Shazali won spiritual domination in Dagestan. Since then Su sm has become one of the key components of Dagestani identity. 19 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the Naqshbandi tariqa became the largest and most politically in uential Su brotherhood in Dagestan, provid ing a mobilizing framework for resistance to Russian expansionism in the region. Naqshbandi shaykhs headed an Islamic holy war against Russian Christian rule in Dagestan and other parts of the North Caucasus. The most active participants of the Islamic holy war were the Chechens, Avars, Dargins, and other mountain peoples of Dagestan. In the conditions of extreme polyethnicity, Su Islam served as a viable basis for political uni cation in Dagestan. From 1785 to 1790 shaykh Mansur Ushurma united various peoples of Dagestan and Chechnya in an anti-Russian politicalmilitary union . Between 1824 and 1859 Imam Shamil formed on the territory of present-day Dagestan and Chechnya an Islamic state, Imamat, based on Sharia . 20 In 1877 1878 an Islamic holy war was defeated by the Russian troops and Dagestan was nally incorporated within the Russian empire. After the Russian revolutions of 1917 , the German, Turkish, and W hite Russian armies occupied Dagestan. A group of rebellious Dagestanis and Chechens attempted to revive the Islamic state and proclaim ed a theocratic North Caucasian Emirate. It was defeated in 1921 by the Bolsheviks, and Dagestan became the Dagestan Soviet Socialist Republic of the Russian Federation of the Soviet Union. 21 During the Soviet period Dagestan underwent a radical socioeconomic and cultural transformation with some distinctive features that were not evident in Tatarstan. Among them were the 1944 deportations of Dagestan s Chechen-Akkins from the Aukhovskii (Novolak skii) district (raion). Althoug h most of the Chechen-Akkins returned to Dagestan in the 1950s, their lands were taken by neighb oring peoples, primarily Laks. This has resulted in territorial and personal disputes and turned the Akkin Chechens into a sort of fth column in Dagestan. M oscow persistent resettlement between the 1920s and 1950 s of mountain ethnic group s on the Caspian lowlands created another potential timebomb in Dagestan. T he resettlement aggravated territorial and ethnic tensions between mountain peoples and lowlanders, especially between Avars and Dargins on the one hand and Kum yks, Cossacks, and Russian peasants on the other. 22 Yet another serious ethnic problem was generated by the Soviet national policy from 1920 until the 1960 s aim ed at consolidating over 30 ethnic groups into several larger nationalities. 23

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The Avars thus formally became the largest ethnic group : 27.5% of the total populat ion. 24 They have thus dominated the political, economic, and military establishment of Dagestan. T he scale of Soviet industrialization and urbanization in Dagestan was much smaller than in Tatarstan. In fact it remained an agrarian republic, strongly dependent on Federal subsidies, which helped to preserve the clan and Su social network. Paradoxically, this network merged with the Soviet/party system and produced a distinctive synthesis of primordial and m odern structures. In spite of decades of Soviet atheism Dagestan remained overwhelmingly a Muslim republic: over 90% of its population remains Muslim. 25 During the period of relative religious liberalization in the 1940 s the Dagestan city of Buynaks witnessed the formation of a Spiritual Board of the M uslims of the North Caucasus (Muftiyat), whose leading positio ns were occupied by the Dagestani Islamic elite. T here was a very different response to perestroika in Dagestan than in Tatarstan. The general of cial and public reaction was one of desolation and frustration. The break-up of the USSR in December 1991 and subsequent de-Sovietization were widely perceived as the worst night mare in Dagestani history. The authorities hung on to the Soviet political system until 1995 , much longer than anywhere else in Russia s autonomies and regions. Unlike in other parts of Russia communists maintained their popular ity. Moreover, Dagestan was adversely affected by the RussianChechen war of 19951996 in particular and by the incompetence of Moscow s policy in the region in general. Given the differences between Tatarstan and Dagestan my research has aimed to analyze the role of Islam in the ongoin g process of national, political, and cultural self-determination among the peoples of both republics. W ithin each republic the research has focused on the biggest cities and six districts that have populations with complicated ethnic and religious compositio ns. 26 T his article addresses a num ber of key issues, including: 1. The extent to which Islam and Islamo-nationalism have in uenced the shaping of the post-Soviet political and social systems in the tw o republics. 2. The role of Islam in the ideology and political practice of various opposition national and religious political parties, popula r organizations, and movements in Tatarstan and Dagestan. 3. How the post-So viet Islamic of cial clergy, the so-called youn g Imams, has viewed the role of Islam in Tatarstan and Dagestan. 4. How the leaders of non-of cial Islam, which has historically had wider popula r appeal than of cial Islam, reacted to the conditions of religious liberalization and profou nd ideological and social crisis, the scale and forms of the foreign Islamic involve ment in Tatarstan and Dagestan, and to what extent the T atar and Dagestani Muslim communities look to unof cial Islamic authorities for guidan ce and leadership.

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5. The positio n of the leading Tatarstan and Dagestan intellectuals on the role of Islam in public and private life and how politically in uential their views are. 6. The im plications of the post-So viet Islamic revival for interethnic relations in the ethnically and culturally pluralistic societies of Tatarstan and Dagestan. Islam and Republican Leadership The Islamic factor in largely secularized and binational T atarstan has not had a direct im pact on the republican leadership and its policy. The Tatarstan political establishment had been represented by the former Obkom (regional Communist Party Committee) functionaries who made their careers under the atheistic Soviet regime and who have very little true interest and expertise in Islam and Islam-related matters. T heir major political goal has been a prolong ation of the special relations between Kazan and Moscow on the basis of the Bilateral Treaty of 1994 . This treaty secured the semi-independent status of Tatarstan and allowed President Shaimiev to form an authoritarian regime that is strongly reminiscent of the Kazan Khanate in the fteenth and sixteenth centuries. Shaimiev s regime has pursued a policy of strengthening political and economic autono my from the Federal center, with the consequent Tatarization of the administrative, economic, and cultural spheres. In this context Islam, which constitutes an integral part of Tatar national identity, has been boun d to play an indirect role in Tatar politics. On the formal level an Islam ic theme has been consistently introdu ced into Tatar national symbols, architecture, monuments, and design. Tatarstan s authorities have allowed a faster pace of buildin g of mosques, Islamic schools (medresses), and other Islam ic institut ions in comparison with Russian Orthodo x construction. 27 Despite the of cial equality of Islam and Orthodo xy in Tatarstan a special relationship has been formed between the Tatarstan political establishment and Islamic of cialdom. Since 1992 President Shaimiev has encouraged the secession of Tatarstan s Islam ic authorities from the Federal Islamic structures represented by the Central Spiritu al Board of Muslims of Russia and European states of the CIS (TSDUMR, formerly DUMES), based in Ufa, Bashkorstan. Tatarstan s leadership has regarded the independent Tatarstan Muftiyat as an im portant attribute of sovereignty. Furthermore, it has support ed the claims of the T atarstan Islamic of cialdom to represent Tatars outside Tatarstan, i.e. within the mytholog ical borders of the Idel-Ural. In February 1998 the Shaimiev administration staged a Unifyin g Islamic Congress in Kazan and organized the election of Gusman-hazret as the new Mufti of Tatarstan. 28 (The new Mufti was linked to Shaim iev s family throug h his mother Rashida Abystay, who has in uence over Sakine Shaimieva, Shaimiev s wife.) Since then the role of the T atarstan Muftiyat has increasingly resembled that of the Russian Patriarch at the M oscow court. T he strengthening of the symbolic function of Islam in Tatarstan s politics has been accompanied by attempts to revive the ideolog ical function of Islam. For

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example, the leading Tatar of cial theoretician on Islamic issues, R. Khakimov, has advocated the restoration of Tatar reformist Islam, or jadidism , as a viable basis for the Tatar national idea. He is the author of the concept of EuroIslam, which is described as a synthesis of Tatar jadidism and postmodernism. He argues that EuroIslam would permit the resolution of the apparently inevitable con ict between formally Muslim Tatarstan and allegedly Islamophobic E urope.29 The ideolog ical dimension of Islam has been present in historical studies. In some newly publshed history textboo ks, Islam has been given a preferential portrayal in comparison with Orthodo xy. 30 (There is, however, no evidence that the concept of EuroIslam has gotten beyond purely academic discussion.) Outside the of cial mainstream approach to Islam there have been a few advocates of neo-qadim ism (Islamic traditionalism).31 The latter have called for the restoration of the Islamic way of life among the T atar popula tion. The leading campaigner for the thoroug h re-Islam ization of Tatars has been the parliamentary deputy F. Shaymardanov. He has initiated parliamentary discussion of such issues as the creation of Islamic schools, hospitals, maternity wards, food stores, and cafe s, as well as special places for prayer in various places of work and recreation; the formation of Muslim units in the Russian army; the introdu ction of a ban on alcohol sales during the Islamic holiday s, and a ban on the use of Islam ic symbols in the labelling of alcohol and travel tickets, etc. 32 These initiatives have had a marginal effect on government policies. In Dagestan the im pact of Islam on the policy-making process has been much more prominent than in Tatarstan. One reason has been the much deeper economic crisis, aggravated by the lengthy economic blockade. Another is the substantially higher level of religiosity of the population 33 as well as the spontaneous popula r Islamic activities within Dagestan and an uneasy relationship with its neighbor , the rapidly Islamized Chechnya. 34 T he inability of Dagestan s leadership to curb the increase in crime 35 as well as corruption and the low standards of m orality and professionalism of the of cial Islamic clergy many of whom were former party and Kom somol chiefs has reinforced popula r Islamic protest, which has been channelled largely into the fundamentalist movement, known as W ahhabis m, Sala sm, or M uhlicism. 36 Thus far, only about 57% of Dagestani Muslims practice Wahhabi sm, but its popula rity has been increasing very quickly. 37 For exam ple, the rst W ahhabis turned up in Dagestan in 1988. T en years later, in July 1998 , three villages in Buynakskii district (Karamakhi, Chaban-Makhi, and Kadar) had already proclaim ed themselves Islamic territory, based on Sharia law. Alm ost all of the representatives of the opposition, including extremists, have appropriated Islamic slogans and symbols. In May 1998 the green banner of Islam was installed by a crowd of extremists over the Dagestani Parliament in Mahachkala. 38 In the circum stances, the Dagestan leadership has opted for ruthless political and administrative suppression of Wahhabi sm. The common hostility towards it has

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united the Dagestan secular political elite and Islamic of cialdom, represented by the Spiritual Board of the Muslims of Dagestan (SBMD). 39 In December 1997 the People s Assembly (Parliament) issued a ban on the activities of the W ahhabis on the territory of Dagestan. The government also adopted a decree On the im mediate measures against the religious extremism. 40 T his signaled the beginning of the war against the Wahhabi s. Many Wahhabi leaders were arrested, their of ces were demolished, and their periodicals were banned. 41 There has been a tightening of the border control with Azerbaijan to block the supply of W ahhabi literature and missionaries. T he Dagestani mass media intensi ed the anti-W ahhabi propaganda, presenting W ahhabis as Saudi and British mercenaries, bringing back the old theme of the Great Game and the British conspiracy in the Caucasus. 42 Behind this brutal suppression of W ahhabis m have been the corporate interests of the ruling elite. The Dagestani authorities have badly needed the phanto m of internal and external enemies in order to justify their political indispensability and to have an effective lever in their relations with M oscow given its allergy towards Islamic fundamentalism and the Chechen bandits. This propaganda has disguised the formation of a corrupt and semi-criminal ethnocratic regim e in Dagestan. Althoug h according to the Dagestani constitution 14 titular ethnic groups /nationalities have the right of legislative initiative and are equally represented in Parliament, the actual political and economic power has been monopoli zed by ve or six ethnic ma a nomenklatura groupi ngs. Avars and Dargins have occupied the top and most lucrative jobs in the republic. Until May 1998 the Laks ma a, headed by the Khachilaev clan, had been politically active. 43 Most top politicians have been closely connected with their respective ethnic/national business groupings and their armed formations. In contrast to the leadership in Tatarstan, which has pressed for asymmetrical relations with M oscow, the Dagestani leaders, largely dependent on Federal subsidies, have consistently demonstrated their loyalty to Moscow. T here have been no attempts, as in T atarstan, to introdu ce nationalist modi cations in the school programs or to switch to the L atin alphabet. 44 The Dagestani political establishment, which has been largely illiterate in Islamic matters, has opposed any suggestions from the SBM D and some Islamic politicians to introdu ce elements of Islam into publi c life.45 Among those suggestions have been the integration of Sharia law into the Dagestani legal system, as it was in the 1920s; the replacement of Sunday by Friday as a weekly holiday; the formation of an Islamic educational system and the creation of an Islamic University; and an increase in Islamic broadcasting on television and radio. 46 Surokat Asiyatilov, the parliamentary deputy and the leader of the Islamic Party of Dagestan, has been an enthusiastic propon ent of these ideas. T he alliance between the Dagestani leadership and Islamic of cialdom has provided the former with the legitimacy that is vital in the religious culture of Dagestan. Some high-ranking representatives of the Islamic clergy have been coopted into the political establishment. For example, in 1998 Ilyas-hadzhi Ilyasov, the former deputy

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Imam of the Central M osque in M ahachkala, was appointed as a religiou s advisor to Khizri Shikhsaidov, the Prime Minister. Others have been granted the even higher status of unof cial policy makers. One of them is Avar shaykh Said-afandi Chirkeevskii, who has masterminded the anti-W ahhabi campaign and strongly in uenced the Avar public in favor of particular politicians and parliamentary candidates.

Islam and Opposition The study of the T atar opposit ion and its relations with Islam has revealed the increasing Islamization of its political agenda. This has been a reaction against Shaimiev s betrayal of the nationalists in 1994 . 47 In the aftermath of the Bilateral Treaty in February 1994 the Shaimiev government turned to neutralization of the Tatar nationalists. The most intelligent and therefore dangerous representatives of the Tatar national movement have been silenced through their cooption into the political establishment. 48 The irreconcilable Tatar nationalists, on the other hand, have been removed from their premises and their periodicals have been closed. 49 In order to undermine the ideolog ical credibility of Tatar nationalists, the authorities have created parallel pro-go vernment national institutions, like an All-Tatar W orld Congress, and have incorporated some nationalist ideas into their ow n political agenda. 50 As a result, the Tatar nationalists have been politically undermined and demoralized. Their organizations have disintegrated and have lost the bulk of their former followers. Som e prominent gures in the Ittifaq and Milli Mejlis have distanced themselves from the extremist leader of the Ittifaq, Fauzia Bayramova, known as the Tatar Iron Lady. At the Ittifaq congress in December 1997 the party was split, with almost half of its members deserting Bayramova. 51 The centrists, headed by F. Sa ullin, have turned to sanctioned opposition to the regime, which has given them a licence to criticize the government for insuf cient nationalism and antidemocratism , while enjoyin g the privileged positio n of court opposition. The hardliners, thoug h they continu e to pursue their radical agenda, have been effectively marginalized. T hus, having lost their political and ideolog ical raison d e the T atar nationalists tre, have attempted alliances with the other enemies of the main enemy, the Shaim iev government. Fauzia Bayramova has joined forces, on the one hand, with the very Communists who advocated the restoration of the evil empire, the USSR, and with the Muslim clergy, on the other.52 In November 1998 a new political movement, Omet (hope), was founded by the ex-Mufti of Tatarstan, Gabdulla Galiulla, 53 which united the representatives of the Ittifaq party, the Communist party of Tatarstan, and some Islamists. The language and slogans of the T atar nationalists have been increasingly Islamized, but their in uence has persistently declined. 54 At present their popular ity among the T atar populat ion is minimal, and they have little hope of political success in the foreseeable future.

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T here has been no evidence of viable Islamic opposition in T atarstan althoug h the clergy have made several attempts to create some sort of Islamic political organization. Most notable was a popular -politi cal movement, Muslims of Tatarstan (Musul mane T atarstana), which was formed in June 1996 . Its avowed goal was the formation of an Islamic faction in Tatarstan s Parliament.55 But the activity of this movem ent was soon reduced to lobbyin g for the personal political ambition s of its leader and his entourag e. Representatives of non-of cial T atar Islam formed a number of Islamic groups, among which have been Sa Islam (Pure Islam), which later transformed into the group of Faiz Rahman and T abligh (M essage). Altogether they have united only a sm all number of followers and do not have any signi cant im pact on the political process. 56 In Dagestan the nationalist and Islamic opposition has been much more articulate and active. Still, the general trends of its developm ent have been similar to those in Tatarstan. T hus, the post-Soviet conditions of the parade of sovereignties and religious liberalization have facilitated the formation of numerous national/ethnic movem ents and Islamic parties and organizations in Dagestan. Among the most assertive national movements have been the Avar popula r movement, the Lak popula r movement Kazi-Kum ukh, the Kum yk national movement, represented by Tenglik, the Nogay society Birlik, and the Lezgin popula r movement Sadval. 57 The declared agendas of these organizations have included the federalization or autono mization of Dagestan and the promotion of the political, economic, and cultural rights of the various ethnic groups. How ever, in reality they have served the economic and political ambition s of the ethnic groupings, for which purpose most of them have created their ow n armed formations. The major rivals have been the Avar and Lak clans, headed respectively by Gadzhi Makhachev, who was in charge of the oil business, and Magomed Khachilaev, who controlled the caviar and shing business. By 1995 most of these national organizations had evolved into largely criminal ma as. They had lost their previous popula r suppor t and were torn apart by internal rivalries for leadership and lucrative business. Som e of them broke apart, while the others ceased to exist. For example, the Avar popula r movement split into the Front of Sham yl, headed by Gadzhi Makhachev, and the Union of Avar Jamaats (communities). T he Kum yk national movement was divided into the Tenglik, in ltrated by the FSB (Federal Security Service, former KGB) agents, the Vatan (motherland), and the Kum yk National Council. Birlik disappeared altogether. Only the Lezgin Sadval has remained loyal to the idea of federalization but its in uence has seriously diminished. 58 In 1996 1997 there were attempts to revive the national movement in its original form. A Coordination Council of Popular Movements was formed in January 1996 for this purpos e, but it lasted only one month. In December of that year an Organizing Com mittee of the Assembly of the People s Movements and Political Parties of Dagestan was created. In March 1997 , it convened a Conference of the Assembly, but since then there has been no evidence of any nationalist activities.

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In the last tw o years the Dagestan authorities have pressed for the self-dissolutio n of the national movements, which they claim have turned into a destabilizing political factor. 59 How ever, the of cial renunciation of the national movements has concealed some collaboration or even mergers between corrupted politicians and the leaders of these movements/ma as. Furthermore, the Dagestan government has been increasingly manipulated by the leaders of the national/ethnic ma as which have been the true masters of Dagestan s resources and nances, and has allowed them to establish direct cooperation with foreign business partners. T he relations of these national organizations with Islam have been purely instrumental. The majority of their leaders and members have an atheistic Soviet backgroun d and no real interest in Islam. How ever, all of them exploit Islamic rhetoric and symbols in their programs and propaganda. This is particularly characteristic of the L ak national movement due to its leader s relation to the All Russian Union of Muslims (RUM ). Dagestan has witnessed the widespread activity of purely Islamic organizations and parties. Among them have been the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) and the Islamic organization Al-Islamiyya, the Supreme Religious Council of the Peoples of Caucasus, and the regional association of Muslim wom en, Maslima. There have also been the Dagestani branches of the All Russian Union of Muslims and the popula rpolitical movement Nur (L ight), which in 1998 became the Party of Russia s Muslims (PRM). M ost radical of these group s were the IRP and Al-Islamiyya, which were ideolog ically close to the Islamic fundamentalist organization the Muslim Brotherhood . T he Dagestani IRP was formed in 1990 as a branch of the All-Union (i.e. Soviet Union) IRP. Both organizations advocated the gradual Islamization of society and the transformation of Dagestan into an Islamic state. T hey advocated the territorial and cultural unity of Dagestan on the basis of Islam, and its political independence from the Russian Federation. 60 They criticized the ruling nomenklatura for its complacency towards growing ethnic nationalism in Dagestan. But the ideas of the IRP and Al-Islamiyya, which were widely associated with W ahhabism, found only a limited response among the youn g Avars who had recently moved from the mountains to the plains. T he peak of their political activity was between 1990 and 1993 . Since 1994 they have been consistently isolated by the authorities. Of cial pressure has caused radical changes in the program and policy of the Islamic Democratic Party, which was formed in 1990 by democratically oriented Dagestani intellectuals under the leadership of Abdurashid Saidov. The original program of the party presented a paradoxical combination of Islamic and democratic ideals, opposing the rule of the corrupt party nomenklatura and calling for its replacement by an Islamic-democratic government. In doctrinal terms it favoured tariqatist (belong ing to a tariqa) Islam althoug h it was tolerant towards W ahhabism. In 1994 the IDP split between those who stuck to the original goals of the party and those who agreed to cooperate with the ruling regime. S. Asiyatilov got

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of cial suppor t and was elected as the new leader of the party, which dropped its democratic goals and changed its name to the Islamic Party of Dagestan (IPD). It soon evolved into a tame Avar-dominated political organization which was closely linked to Avar politicians, nationalists, and Islam ic of cialdom. Until 1998 the leader of the RUM, Nadirshah Khachilaev, played an im portant role in Dagestan s politics and was regarded as a serious candidate for the top job. Khachilaev, who had a Soviet atheistic background and has little knowledge of Islam, has chosen Islam to promote his personal political ambitions. In fact, the leadership of the RUM enabled Khachilaev, who was Lak, to raise his popular ity in Avar and Dargin dominated Dagestan politics as well as internationally. In 1996 he was elected Dagestan s deputy to the Russian State Dum a. It is widely believed that Khachilaev, one of the richest men in Dagestan, has made his money on caviar smugglin g and the nancial backing of various Islamic institutions of Saudi Arabia. Islamic Of cialdom The behavior of Islamic of cialdom and its interaction with the secular authorities and the wider M uslim community have been similar in both republics, in which the Soviet-era Islamic establishment has been challenged by the youn g Imams. The latter, who have been courted by the nationalists, have pressed for the destruction of the old Soviet Islamic Spiritual Boards, based in Ufa and Makhachkala, and their replacement by autono mous M uftiyats. In both republics Islamic of cialdom has been largely represented by corrupt and theolog ically incompetent gures who were dependent on local semi-criminal structures and on material and doctrinal assistance from foreign Islamic institutions. 61 Their policies and behaviour have often been motivated by internal rivalry, personal ambitions , and greed. The main internal tension has been over the pilgrimage (hajj) business, which has become the major source of enrichm ent. However, there have been substantial differences in the forms and intensity of the Muftiyats activities and their interaction with the authorities. In August 1992 the congress of the Im ams of Tatarstan elected Gabdulla-hazret Galiulla as Mufti of a Kazan-based Muftiyat of Tatarstan, independent from the TSDUMR, headed by Mufti T algat Tadjudd inov. 62 In terms of Islamic knowledge and publi c respect Mufti Galiulla was much inferior to T algat Tadjudd in. To justify his secession from the TSD UMR, Galiulla and his entourage unleashed a propaganda assault against T algat T adjuddin, whom they pronounced schizophrenic. 63 Mufti Talgat Tadjuddin, on the other hand, did not recognize a self-proclaimed Mufti of Tatarstan and continued to consider the Tatarstan Muslim community as his spiritual domain and to nominate his representatives there. In Novem ber 1994 the TSDUMR support ed the formation of the alternative Spiritu al Board (Muftiyat) of Tatarstan in Zelenodol sk, rst headed by Gabdulhamit Zinatulla and later by Farid Salman, who was based in Kazan.

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At the beginn ing the Muftiyat of Z inatulla/Salman, which acted on behalf of the TSDUMR, had higher status and maintained control over the vast majority of the local Muslim communities. However, the Muftiyat of Galiulla soon acquired an advantageous positio n compared to the T SD UMR due to backing from the other youn g Imams and the indirect suppor t of the Tatarstan government. In 1993 Galiulla was elected by other youn g Imams as the head of the Higher Coordination Center (HCC) of the Spiritual Board of Russia s Muslims, which was designed to replace the TSD UMR. However, the activity of the HCC was soon paralyzed as a result of internal rivalries and animosities among its members. In 1996 Galiulla support ed Ravil Gainutdinov, the self-proclaimed Mufti of Central European Russia (Moscow), in the creation of another anti-TSDUM R institution the Council of Muftis of Russia. 64 T he Shaimiev government supported the anti-TSD UMR drive of the Tatarstan Muftiyat because it regarded the latter as an im portant attribute of Tatarstan s sovereignty . The Unifyin g Islamic Congress, which was organized by the Tatarstan authorities in February 1998 , legitimized the break-up with Ufa and elected the one Mufti of Tatarstan. The new Mufti, Gusmanhazret, who received his Islamic training in L ibya, was one of Galiulla s deputies. W ith the blessing of President Shaimiev the new Mufti has begun to replace the local Islamic of cials, who were appoint ed by the Ufa Mufti, with his own nominees. In order to speed up such replacement he introdu ced new registration rules for Islamic communities. The ambition s of Gusman-hazret have even gone beyond the borders of the republic. Claiming the backing of President Shaimiev, he has tried to replace the Islamic authority in Perm, which remained under the jurisdiction of the TSDUMR. By the end of 1998 Gusman-hazret claimed to control nearly all of Tatarstan s Islamic communities (about 1,200 ) that were administratively attached to the Tatarstan Muftiyat. However, Mufti Talgat Tadjudd in insisted that he maintained control over 470 M uslim communities in Tatarstan. 65 T he confrontation between the TSDUMR and the Tatarstan Muftiyat has also had a doctrinal dimension. T he inadequate Islam ic education of the present Tatarstan Islamic establishment and its heavy nancial and ideolog ical dependence on foreign Islamic institut ions has de ned its laissez-faire attitude toward the proliferation of non-traditional and more rigid forms of Islam in T atarstan, including W ahhabism. In contrast to Gusman-hazret, who has succumbed to the W ahhabi in uence, Mufti Talgat T adjuddin has continu ed to promote the T atar Islamic traditions based on the most tolerant and exible Hana madhhab of Sunni Islam. Althoug h the W ahhabi advance in Tatarstan has been restricted by the relatively small group of believers, its continu ing dissemination could split Tatar Muslims along doctrinal lines and aggravate interethnic (interconfessional) relations in the republic. How ever, the level of awareness of the Tatarstan secular and Islamic authorities of the dissemination of W ahhabism and its im plications has remained minimal. Only a few Muslim clergy have tried to alert the attention of the

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government and the publi c about the advance of Wahhabi sm and its consequences for Tatarstan. In Dagestan the post-Soviet sovereignization of the Islamic administration acquired an ethnic dimension. In 1992 the Spiritual Board of Muslims of North Caucasus (the M uftiyat of the Muslims of six Muslim autonomous republics of the North Caucasus) disintegrated along ethnic lines. In the conditions of extreme multiethnicity this process resulted in the emergence of four ethnic Islamic Spiritual Boards. They represented Dagestan s largest ethnic communities: Avar, Kum yk, Lak, and Dargin. From 1992 to 1994 the Lezgins also pressed for the formation of their own Spiritual Board. In this early period of post-Soviet political and ideolog ical confusion, there was a short-term alliance between these national/ethnic boards and the respective national/ethnic movements. Since 1994 there has been only one of cially recognized Muftiyat in Dagestan the Spiritual Board of the Muslims of Dagestan (SBMD), represented by the Avar Islamic elite and support ed by the government. In reality the SBMD has been accepted as a Dagestan Muftiyat only by Avars. T he SBMD has been the only recipient of government and foreign Islamic fundin g and has been put in charge of the rapidly growing Islamic infrastructure: mosques, medresses (Islamic schools), and Islamic colleges and universities. 66 It is signi cant that in spite of its generally pro-go vernment positio n the Muftiyat has had a distinctive approach to the role of Islam in Dagestan. In particular, it has advocated making Friday an of cial holiday , the gradual Islamization of education, and the introdu ction of som e elements of the Sharia into the legal system, as there were in 1920 . 67 Com pared to Tatarstan s representatives of Islamic of cialdom, who have lost their historical connections with Su sm (Ishanism ), their Dagestani counterparts have preserved strong links with particular Su tariqas. The SBMD has been staffed with murids of the Avar Naqshbandi shaykh Said-afandi Chirkeevskii, who represented Dagestan s unof cial tariqat ist (belonging to tariqa, or Su order) Islam. For example, the last M ufti Abubakarov, who was assassinated in August 1998 , was the murid of this shaykh. The in uence of Said-afandi has transcended the religious sphere, his approval being crucial for many politicians: he has been courted by the in uential Russian politician Russian Ramazan Abdulatipov, who is one of the key candidates for the Dagestan leadership. T he common hatred of W ahhabis m has united the Dagestan political and religious establishment and Avar nationalists. Together they have created an extremely negative im age of W ahhabis, accusing the latter of the instigation of civil war and of a pro-Chechen and pro-British conspiracy. Still, the of cial rejection of W ahhabism has not been shared by some distingu ished representatives of the non-Avar Islamic clergy or by ordinary Muslims. They have argued that it does not matter how believers express their faith as long as they believe in Allah. 68 T hese non-Avar Islamic clergy have also pointed to the duplicity of the leaders of the SBMD, who accuse the W ahhabis of foreign Islamic connections but pro t from similar connec-

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tions themselves. In particular, they deplore the permissiveness of the SBM D towards foreign Islamic teachers in Dagestan. Many Dagestani Muslims strongly believe in the superiority of Dagestan s traditional Islamic scholarship, based on the heritage of Aligadzhi Akushinskii and other great Dagestani Islamic scholars. 69 Unof cial Islam This part of my research has been of special interest because it deals with the most volatile and politically active Islamic phenom ena such as W ahhabism and tariqatism. It is particularly relevant to the situation in Dagestan. In T atarstan, Su traditions have been strongly undermined as a result of the Stalinist purges of the 1930s. Nevertheless, my research has revealed a number of contemporary Su s who have been in uential among a small group of initiated Muslim s. 70 The larger and socially more in uential group of unof cial Islamic authorities has been represented by Muslim elders who have not had an Islamic education but have been highl y respected in their local, mainly rural communities. They have acquired their special status throug h their virtuous life and noninvolvement in corruption and criminal business. Their opinio n and advice have been sought by the locals and often preferred to that of the mullah . In Dagestan unof cial Islam has been at the forefront of political and social life. It has been represented, on the one hand, by tariqatist Islam, Naqshbandi, Shazali, and Kadiri of the Sha i madhhab of Sunni Islam, and by W ahhabism, or Sa Islam, on the other. In numerical terms tariqatists have had enormous superiority over W ahhabis . (Tariqatist Islam has been professed by 60% of Dagestan Muslims and W ahhabism by only 57% .) In contrast with T atarstan, the Su network in Dagestan has survived in spite of decades of Soviet atheism. In contemporary Dagestan there are about 4050 Su tariqas, 23 of them headed by living shaykhs. The Su orders have preserved their clandestine structure and their af liation to speci c kinship and subkins hip local formations; Su shaykhs have retained their high spiritual status among ordinary Muslims. Alongsid e them there have been a number of in uential Islamic scholars and Imams who do not identify themselves with a particular tariqa. All of them, especially Said-afandi, have exercised indirect in uence on the political process by support ing particular candidates during elections. Unlike Su sm, which has a centuries-long tradition in Dagestan, Dagestani W ahhabism has been a relatively recent developm ent. 71 Its spread has occurred in the conditions of post-Soviet religious liberalization. The annual participation of thousands of Dagestanis in the pilgramages to Mecca and Medina, as well as in the umra (small pilgramage), has been the main means of its proliferation.72 In addition, a growing num ber of Dagestanis have studied abroad, at Islam ic centers in Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, and E gypt. There has also been a ow of foreign teachers of Islam into Dagestani Islamic schools and universities as well as a ow

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of pro-W ahhabism propaganda by foreign Islamic missionaries and Islamic literature publish ed by foreign Islamic centers. T he peak of W ahhabi activity was in the rst half of the 1990s. In spite of its still relatively small number of followers, Wahhabi sm has rapidly proliferated, especially in the Kizilyurtovskii, Buynakskii, Khasavyurtovskii, Karabudakhenskii, and Tsum adinskii districts. In terms of Islamic doctrine W ahhabism allegedly represents the pure and true Islam of Prophet Muhammad and the four righteous Caliphs. T he spiritual leader of Dagestan W ahhabis (who, in fact object to this term and call themselves simply Muslims ) is Bagautdin Muhammad, who is very knowledgeable in Islamic matters. In terms of politics there has been a split between the moderate W ahhabis grouped around Bagautdin and the late Ahm ed-kadi Ahtaev, and the radicals headed by Jordan-born Hattab. In particular, the moderates and radicals have differed on the issue of Jihad. Bagautdin has interpreted Jihad as the internal spiritual process of an individ ual M uslim. Hattab, who is closely linked to the Chechen Islamists, has attached a military dimension to Jihad. W ahhabis advocate strict monothei sm (taw hid) and oppose tariqatism as a deviation from Islam. In particular, they insist on the necessity to observe all ve pillars (arkans) of Islam and oppose the authority of local shaykhs as mediators between Allah and the individ ual. In particular they reject sermons and the tariqati st burial tradition which involve s reading the Koran at the cemetery. T hey recognize the special role of Jihad. T he material and nancial resources of the Wahhabis are a controversial issue. T he authorities, the Muftiyat, and the mass media have accused the W ahhabis of being im moral mercenaries, nanced by Saudi funds. T he Wahhabis have persistently rejected such accusations and have claimed their non-involvement in criminal business which they argue is characteristic of Islamic of cialdom in Dagestan. Relations between Wahhabi s and tariqat ists have been controversial. Some villages have been divided into W ahhabis and tariqatists, each having their separate mosque as well as Imam, or amir (head of the Islamic community) . There have even been cases of armed con ict between the propon ents of Wahhabi sm and tariqatism, which have been recycled by the Dagestan and Russian mass m edia. But, there have also been cases of grassroots cooperation between the two sides which have not appeared in the press. 73 Moreover, some Dagestan Su shaykhs have expressed their tolerance towards W ahhabis. 74 Paradoxically, the negative public attitude towards W ahhabis has not been borne out by my rst-hand contacts with them. T he W ahhabis interviewed have demonstrated an im pressive knowledge of Islam and have rejected the accusations against them as a slander. T hey have stressed their peaceful character and openness to theolog ical and political dialogue with the authorit ies and tariqatists. They have counter-accused the Islamic of cialdom of corruption, involve ment in dirty politics and nancial fraud, and fear of open discussion with them. 75

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Islam and the Intellectual Elite The positio n of the intelligentsia towards Islam and its role in society as well as the im pact of these perceptions on the political process show a remarkable similarity in the tw o republics. In both, the majority of that social group has been frustrated by the non-intellectual composition of the present political leadership, by its inability to formulate a sound religious policy, and by its neglect of the intelligentsia itself, which accounts for the weakening of the intelligentsia s im pact on policy making even in comparison with Soviet times. Nevertheless, in both republics the interviewed representatives of the intelligentsia have perceived religion, Islam, and Orthodox y in particular as a viable moral and spiritual foundation in the post-Soviet crisis of values. How ever, the national/ethnic origin s of the representatives of the intelligentsia have affected their views on the optimal degree of Islamization of the society and its speci c forms. In T atarstan, the majority of Tatar-speaking Tatar intellectuals have stressed the im portance of Islam in the national self-identi cation of Tatars. They consider the Islamic faith part of Tatarness, as Orthodox y is a part of Russianness. They would therefore welcome the gradual strengthening of Islamic ethics and morality in family life and the incorporation of Islamic social norms (related to intergender and intergenerational relations, communalism, charity for the poor and care for the disadvantaged, dress code, attitudes to alcohol, drugs, theft, etc.) in public life. 76 T he dissemination of the views and ideas of the Tatar intelligentsia has been obstructed as a result of strict government control over the mass media. In March 1995 som e Tatar intellectuals attempted to raise the public pro le of Islam by joining the Council of Islamic Scholars (Golyamlar Shurasi), which was headed by the Mufti of Tatarstan. However, it was a still-born creation: Mufti Galiulla did not want any intrusion into the domestic life of of cialdom. T he intelligentsia of various Islam ic peoples of Dagestan has had even greater expectations of Islam, which has often been perceived as a crucial factor in the moral salvation of a society that has been socially degraded and criminalized. 77 Many Dagestani intellectuals have expressed their bitter dissatisfaction with the present Dagestan leadership and have linked the possibility of a solution to the current crisis to the emergence of a strong, charismatic Islamic leader. T hey have admitted that they would have welcomed the developm ent of an Islamic educational system and the introdu ction of elements of the Sharia into public life as the only viable deterrent to the process of criminalization. The attitudes of the various representatives of the Dagestan intelligentsia towards W ahhabism have varied considerably. Some have totally rejected it, while others have expressed their toleration of it or even preferred it to tariqatism. T here has been a view that W ahhabis m, which is based on the most severe Hanbali madhhab of Sunni Islam, appeals to the particular mentality and temper of Dagestanis. On the whole, the non-Russian Dagestan intellectuals have had a greater opportunity than their T atar counterparts to publicize their views.

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Tatarstan authorities. In both republics there have been no special Russian periodicals, television, or radio programs. Russian passivity could be explained by the inertia associated with a big brother complex. Because of it, they have failed to react quickly to the sudden decline in their privileged position which they used to take for granted. Many still desperately hope that the situation will return to normal. But another explanation of their passivity could be their fear of active political protest in the light of Moscow s policy of non-in terference and their dependence on the ruling elites. They do not want to be persecuted. There is no faith among most Russians that the situation could be im proved and some sort of democratic accountability established. 82 In both republics the Russians and other non-Muslims have responded to national discomfort throug h em igration. In Tatarstan this has affected predominantly Russian academics, especially in the humanities. The compositio n of emigrants from Dagestan has been more diverse and has included quali ed industrial, transport, and railway workers, military engineers, and machine builders.83 The main destination of the Russian migrants has been the neighbouring Stavropol and Krasnodar regions. The peak of Russian emigration occurred in 1994 1995 . Since then some have returned after having failed to adjust to life in the Russian republic. How ever, from 1998 the rapid deterioration of the political and security situation in Dagestan in the aftermath of the of cial crackdown on Wahhabi sm has given new im petus to Russian emigration. Conclusion Islam has had a growing in uence on publi c and private life in both republics. However, its character, intensity, and speci c form has differed substantially in each republic. In Tatarstan the role of Islam has been considerably weaker than in Dagestan. Tatarstan society has remained overwhelmingly secular. The Islamic renaissance there has been more symbolic than genuine. In its symbolic capacity it has constituted an integral part of the policy of T atarization. Islam has been regarded as a vital component of Tatarness. But the genuin e Islamic revival has been marginal. This has been due to the weaker religiosity of Tatars in general and to the inadequacy of Tatar Islamic of cialdom in particular. The moral and professional inferiority of the latter and its strong dependence on foreign Islamic institutions have determined the low esteem in which it is held by ordinary Tatar M uslims. Furthermore, it has succumbed to the in uences of non-traditional Islam, which have been opposed in the wider Tatar Islamic community . So far no viable Islamic alternative to the corrupt and incompetent political and religious establishment has been generated. In the more religious and multiethnic Dagestan, the of cial approach to Islam has been consistently negative. T here has been spontaneous re-Islamization from below, which has occurred within the framework of unof cial Islam . It has been represented by Su , tariqati st Islam, on the one hand, and by W ahhabism, on the other. In order

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to ensure their political survival the present Dagestan authorit ies have opted for an open confrontation with W ahhabism. The common anti-Wahhabi position of the atheistic Dagestan political establishment and of Avar-dominated Islamic of cialdom has de ned their alliance. Since the end of 1997 they have unleashed a com prehensive political, military, and propaganda campaign against W ahhabis. How ever, the continu ing economic and political crisis has done nothing to decrease the attractiveness of the Islamic solutio n in Dagestan.
NO TES * 1. This article is based on the preliminary results of a project funded by the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK. The research method has involved a combination of textual analysis of local periodicals and specialist literature, statistics, and interviews with members of the political and religious elite on the issues of Islam, national identity, nationhood, and relations with Moscow. The territory of Tatarstan is 68,000 square kilometers. One fth of its territory is covered by forest. The population is 3,760,000 (1996). The urban population accounts for 74% of the total. Tatars, who are Turkic people of Islamic cultural background, make up 48% of the Tatarstan population, i.e. only 26% of the total Tatar population of the Russian Federation and the CIS (7,000,000). Russians, who are Slavic people of Russian Orthodox cultural background, make up 44% of the Tatarstan population. Tatarstan is divided into 39 districts and 18 cities. Tatarstan is one of the most economically advanced autonomous republics of the Russian Federation. The major industries are oil and gas re ning, chemicals, petrochemicals, aircraft building, machine building, car m anufacturing, light industry, and food processing. Galina Yem elianova, The National Identity of the Volga Tatars at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century: Tatarism, Turkism and Islam, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 16, No. 4, 1997, p. 554. Mirfatikh Z. Zakiev, Tatari: Problemi Istorii i Yazika (Kazan: Academy of Sciences of Tatarstan, 1996), p. 102. Stephane A. Dudoignon, Djadidism, Mirasism, Islamism, Cahiers du Monde Russe, Vol. 37, Nos 12, 1996, p. 17; M. Kempler, Entre Boukhara et le Moyen-Volga: Abd an-Nasiri al-Qursawi (17761812) en con ic avec les oulem as traditionalistes, Cahiers du M onde Russe, Vol. 37, No.12, 1996, p. 42. Jadidism derives from a new a phonetic method (instead of the old syllabic m ethod) of teaching Arabic and later Tatar in the Tatar confessional primary and secondary schools. This method was rst introduced by the Crimean Tatar Ismail Gasprinskii in 1884. Later on, Jadidism evolved into Tatar national ideology. See also: D. Iskhakov, Jadidism kak natsiestroitel stvo, Iman Nuri, Vol. 4, 1996, pp. 4, 22; Edward J. Lazzerini, Ismail Bey Gasprinskii and Muslim Modernism in Russia, 18781914, PhD dissertation, University of Washington, Seattle, 1973; Azade-Ayse Rorlich, The Volga Tatars: A Pro le in National Resilience (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), p. 49. Yemelianova, National Identity of the Volga Tatars, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 16, No. 4, 1997, pp. 543572. The Muslim Duma faction consisted mainly of the members of the Party of Ittifaq (Union). It was form ed in 1905 and represented the Muslim intellectual and nancial elite, who like Russian kadets, favored the enlightened and liberal transformation of the Russian empire into a modern democratic civic nation. See Inorodcheskoe obozrenie, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1915; Musulmanskaya Pechat v Rossii v 1910 Godu (Oxford: Society for Central Asian Studies, 1987).

2.

3. 4. 5.

6.

7. 8.

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9. Zaki Validi Togan, Vospominaniya (Ufa: Kitap, 1994); Harriman Review, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1996, p. 6. 10. Pravda, 22 Septem ber 1989. 11. President Mintimir Shaim iev, a Tatar, was born in 1937 in the village Anyakovo of the Aktanyshskii district of Tatarstan. In 1959 he graduated from Kazan Agrarian Institute. Since 1962 he has been within the Soviet/party nomenklatura, rising from the position of a district party functionary to the First Secretary of Tatar Obkom. 12. Farit Mukhametshin, Tatarstan in the Outside World, International Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 4, 1997, pp. 197202; Edward W. Walker, Nationalism , Regionalism and Federalism in post-Communist Russia, in Gale Lapidus, ed., The New Russia: Troubled Transformation (Boulder: Westview, 1995), pp. 79113. 13. The power-sharing arrangements under this treaty were detailed in 12 cooperation agreements. See: Dogovor o razgranichenii polnomochii, preamble, 18 February 1994, Belaya Kniga Tatarstana. Put k Suverenitetu, 1990 1995 (Kazan: Panorama Forum , 1996, No. 5, pp. 8692; F. Mukhametshin and R. Izmailov, eds, Sovereign Tatarstan (Moscow: Insan, 1997), p. 241. 14. Dagestan s territory is 50,300 square kilom eters and its population is 1, 954, 253 (1995). The urban population makes up 43.6% of the total while the rural population is 56.4% . Dagestan is m ultiethnic; it is populated by over 100 different groups, each of which has its own culture and history and speaks a distinctive language incomprehensible to the rest. Dagestanis belong to three major linguistic families: the Nakh-Dagestani branch of the Caucasian language family, the Turkic group of the Altay language family, and the Indo-European fam ily. Over 90% of Dagestanis are Sunni Muslims of the Sha i madhhab. Over 60% of Dagestani Sunni Muslims belong to the Su orders of Naqshbandi, Shazali, and Kadiri. About 5% of Dagestani Muslims are Shiites. Dagestan is divided into 42 districts. One of the least econom ically developed autonomous republics of the Russian Federation, it is strongly dependent on Federal subsidies (8095%) and other suppliers. It is a largely agrarian republic, specialising in sheep breeding, shing, fruit growing, and the related production of wine and brandy. 15. Marie Bennigsen-Broxup, ed., The North Caucasian Barrier (London: Hurst, 1992), pp. 34. 16. Until the late 1920s Dagestan s linguae francae were Arabic and Turkic (Kum yk and Azeri) languages, based on Arabic script; afterwards it was Russian, based on Cyrillic script. 17. Statisticheskii sbornik (Makhachkala: Statizdat, 1996). 18. Istoriya Dagestana, Vol. 1, (Makhachkala: AN, 1967). 19. Amri R. Shikhsaidov, Knizhnie Kollektsii Dagestana. Rukopisnaya i Pechatnaya Kniga v Dagestane (Makhachkala: AN, 1991), pp. 89. 20. Bennigsen-Broxup, North Caucasian Barrier, p. 34. 21. Gadzhiali D.Daniyalov, Stroitelstvo Sotsializma v Dagestane, 1917 1937 gg., (Moscow: Politizdat, 1988), pp. 4964. 22. Migratsiya Naseleniya Respubliki Dagestan, 1996; Statisticheskii Sbornik (Makhachkala: Statizdat, 1997), p. 4. 23. For exam ple, as a result of such consolidation, 13 ethnic groups of the Ando-Tsez linguistic group (Andis, Didys, Godoberins, Bagulals, Chamalins, Tindins, Akhvakhs, Karatins, Botlikhs, and some others) were registered as Avars. Similarly, Kaytaks and Kubachins were registered as Dargins, while a large number of small ethnic groups of the central plateau becam e Laks; Southern Terkmens turned into Azeris and Northern Terkmens into Kum yks. See Traditsionnoe i Novoe v Sovremennoi Kulture i Bite Dagestanskikh Pereselentsev (Moscow:Yupiter, 1988), pp. 2223, 32.

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24. Osnovnie Natsionalnosti Respubliki Dagestan. Statisticheskii Sbornik (Makhachkala: Statizdat, 1995), pp. 12. 25. Narodi Rossii: Entsiklopediya (Moscow: Entsiklopediya, 1994), p. 434. 26. I investigated the cities of Kazan and Naberezhnie Chelny and the districts of Arskii/ Pestrechinskii, Drozhanovskii, Elabuzhskii, Laishevskii, Menzelinskii, and Sarmanovskii in Tartarstan. In Dagestan I investigated the cities of Makhachkala and Derbend and the districts of Buynakskii, Kaytagskii, Karabudakhkentskii, Kizilyurtovskii, Kizlyarskii, and Rutulskii. 27. By 1996, 106 mosques and only seven churches had been built, while 148 mosques and 34 churches were under construction. Religia v Sovremennom Obshestve: Istoria, Problemiu, Tendentsii, 5 6 (Kazan: Magarif, 1994), p. 265. 28. Some participants at the Congress who were interviewed admitted that over half of the people there were undercover policemen. 29. Interview with R. Khakimov. Kazan, 2 September 1997. 30. Interview with B. Terentiev, teacher of history and Russian at comprehensive school No. 87, Kazan, 13 September, 1998; G. M. Davletshin, F. Sh. Khuzin, and I. L. Izmailov, Rasskazi po Istorii Tatarstana, 5 6 (Kazan: Magarif, 1994), p. 265. 31. Yemelianova, National Identity of the Volga Tatars, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 16, No. 4, 1997, pp. 557559. 32. Deputy Fanavil Shaimardanov provided the copies of parliamentary hearings. Kazan, September 1998. 33. The religiosity of the population varies considerably in different parts of Dagestan and am ong various ethnic groups. The general perception is that the Avars and Dargins are the most religious, the Kumyks and Laks are less religious, and the Lezgins are the least religious. In many rural areas Islamic norms prevail over secular regulations. Village Imams still play a central role in the everyday life of many rural comm unities. They have the nal say in land, property, and family disputes. The function of the village administration is often limited to the rubber-stamping of the decisions reached by the local Imams. However, even within the same ethnic com munity the scale of religiosity differs greatly among local communities. 34. In 1997 the Chechen Republic of cially proclaim ed itself an Islamic state observing Sharia law. 35. Like Chechnya, Dagestan has been overwhelmed by a wave of kidnapping and political assassination. Am ong the recent victims have been the vice-premier of Dagestan, Gam id Gamidov; the leader of the Kumyk national council, Bashir Alzhanbekov; and the Dagestan Mufti Abubakarov. The mayor of Makhachkala, Said Amirov, has survived ten assassination attempts. 36. Wahhabism is a religious and political movem ent within the Hanbali madhhab of Sunni Islam . It originated in the mid eighteenth century in Arabia. Its founder was Muhamm ad ben Abd al-Wahhabi who advocated strict monotheism (tawhid ). He renounced the worshipping of saints and sacred places and called for the purging from Islam of its later accretions. Wahhabism is the state ideology of Saudi Arabia. 37. From an interview with Magomed Kurbanov, the Deputy Minister of Nationalities of Dagestan, Makhachkala, 20 June 1998. 38. On 2021 May 1998, a group of armed people, under the command of the leaders of the Lak popular movement, the All-Russian Union of Muslims, the Avar popular movement, and the chair of the Makhachkala city council, occupied the Parliament building for 12 hours. Novoe Delo, No. 22, 29 May 1998. 39. SBMD, based in Makhachkala, emerged in 1992 as a result of the disintegration of the Spiritual Board of Muslims in the North Caucasus.

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40. Proekt Kontseptsii Gosudarstvennoi Natsional noi Politiki Rossiyskoi Federatsii na Severnom Kavkaze, 12 January 1998, p. 10. 41. The W ahhabi center Kavkaz in Makhachkala was demolished and its chairman, Muhammad Dzhangishev, arrested. Interview with a W ahhabi called Rashid, Makhachkala, 17 June 1998. 42. In 1997 Dagestan s Visa and Registration Of ce stopped issuing invitations for foreign nationals to visit Dagestan. 43. The Khachilaev clan, which m onopolized the smuggling of caviar, has headed the Lak m a a. The oldest brother, Magomed, is the leader of the Lak national movement Kazi-Kumukh, while the younger brother Nadirshakh chose to play the Islamic card on an all-Russian scale. He is the leader of the All-Russian Union of Muslims and a Deputy of the Russian State Duma, representing Dagestan. 44. Interview with Nizami Kaziev, the Dagestani Minister of Education, Makhachkala, 14 July 1997. 45. Guseyn Abuev, the representative of the Russian President in Dagestan, and Magomed Tolboev, the former Security Council secretary of Dagestan, have also spoken in favor of wider incorporation of Islamic norms into Dagestani society. Novoe Delo, No. 25, 1998. 46. Interview with Magomed Kurbanov, Makhachkala, 20 June 1998. 47. The Tatar nationalists have rejected the Bilateral Treaty between Presidents Yeltsin and Shaimiev as a betrayal of the national interests of the Tatars. Altyn Urba, Nos 89, March 1997, p. 1. 48. For instance, the former leader of VTOTS , Rafael Khakimov, was elevated to the post of presidential advisor and director of the Institute of History. Another VT OTS activist, Fandas Sa ullin, was elected to the Parliament, while Farid Urazaez got a position as the head of the Federal department of the pro-government All-Tatar National World Congress. 49. Among recent victims of of cial persecution have been the newspapers Kazanskii Telegraph, Suverenitet, Kris, and Altyn Urda, which have been closed under a variety of pretexts. The closure in particular of Altyn Urda in 1998 had a devastating impact on the whole Tatar national movem ent, since it played a crucial consolidating role within it. 50. For example, the authorities appropriated nationalist policies in areas such as language and education (the creation of Tatar gymnasia, higher schools, the Academy of Sciences of Tatarstan, and of a Tatar University), religion (the restoration of old mosques and the building of new ones, the opening of an Islamic University and Islamic colleges and secondary schools, the formation of Tatar national cultural autonomy, and other goals of the VTOTS. The Program of VTOTS (Kazan, 1993), p. 3. 51. The Ittifaq branch of Naberezhnie Chelny split into two factions, headed respectively by Damir Galeev and Rafail Khaplekhamitov. Similar divisions have occurred in other Ittifaq branches. The VTOTS , which still m aintained some in uence in Naberezhnie Chelny, Nizhekam sk, Al metievsk, and Aznakay, has also fragmented into a division between centrists and hardliners. 52. Ittifaq Khalyk Partiyasi, Chally, 1993. 53. Omet intends to propose a joint candidate for the 1999 elections to the Russian State Duma and Tatarstan presidential elections in 2000. 54. Altyn Urda, Naberezhnie Chelny, 19941998. 55. Leader, 28 June 1996. 56. The attitudes of of cials and ordinary Muslims towards these organizations have differed substantially. While various representatives of Islamic of cialdom were aggressively intolerant towards them and considered its leaders and their followers as schizophrenic, some Tatar intellectuals spoke positively about Faizrahmanists and mem bers of Tabligh and stressed their spirituality and aloofness from corrupted politics. Interviews with Velliulla-hazret, deputy

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57.

58.

59. 60. 61.

62. 63. 64.

65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70.

71.

72. 73.

74. 75. 76.

Mufti of Tatarstan, and a number of Tatar intellectuals, who asked not to be nam ed, Kazan, 17 Septem ber 1998. Yemelianova, Ethnic Nationalism, Islam and Russian Politics in the North Caucasus, in Ch. Williams and Th. S kas, eds, Ethnic Nationalism in Russia, the CIS and the Baltic States (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 1999), pp. 120148. Put Islama, No. 2, 1994, p. 1; Znama Islama, No 2, 1996, p. 1. The leaders of the Dagestani Lezegin nationalists have continued to press for the formation of the Lezgin state. However, this idea has not found an enthusiastic response among the Azerbaijan Lezgins, whose living standards have been considerably higher than among the Dagestani Lezgins. Interview with Abdul Gamid Aliev, the deputy head of the Dagestan Scienti c Center of the RAS (Russian Academy of Sciences), Makhachkala, 17 June 1998. Interview with Magomed Kurbanov, Makhachkala, 20 June 1998. Put Islama, No. 2, 1994, p. 1; Znamya Islama, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1996, p. 1. Among the most active in both republics have been the University of Imam Muhammad ben Saud, the Islamic charities of Taiba and Ibraghim al-Ibraghim in Saudi Arabia, the UAE Islam ic charity organization Al-Khairia, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the World Islamic League, the World Association of Islamic Youth, and the fund of Ibraghim Hayri. About 400 Young Tatars and Dagestanis annually receive scholarships to study at various Islamic institutions in Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Libya, Kuwait, the UAE, Egypt, and Malaysia. Catherine the Great created this Muftiyat in Ufa in 1789. Interview with Galiulla-hazret, Kazan, 10 April 1997. Among other mem bers of the Council of the Muftis of Russia are the new Muftis of Dagestan, Chuvashiya, Siberia and the Far East, Penza, the Volga region, Bashkorstan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Orenbourg, and Ulyanovsk. Interview with Muftis Gusm an-hazret, Kazan, September 1998; and with Talgat Tadjuddin, London, 12 March 1999. In 1996 there were 1,670 mosques, 25 Islam ic schools, and 9 Islamic Institutes functioning in Dagestan. Interview with Magomed Kurbanov, Makhachkala, 17 July 1997. Interview with the members of the Muftiyat establishment, Makhachkala, 18 July 1997. Interview with Imam Ali Abdullaev of Karlabko village, Levashinskii district, 16 June 1998. Interview with Ali Magomedov, the head of the Religious Department of the Dagestani government. Makhachkala, 16 June 1998. It is believed that Su sm of the Naqshbandi tariqa played an important role among Tatar and Bashkir Muslims before the October revolution. Many Tatar Muftis were members of the Naqshbandi tariqa. (Interview with Tatar Ishan Abul-hakk, Kazan, 16 September 1998). According to the Muftiyat, the rst Dagestani Wahhabi was Ali Kayaev, who turned to Wahhabism during his studies in Egypt. He returned to Dagestan in 1913 and began the dissemination of W ahhabism. The W ahhabis themselves reject this version. For example, in May 1998, 12,700 Dagestanis conducted the pilgrimmage. In addition about 6,000 Dagestanis went on the small pilgrim mage. For example, in May 1998, in the village of Kirovaul in the Kizilyurtovskii region, tariqatists and W ahhabis formed joint Sharia courts to combat crime, alcohol and drug abuse, theft, and moral laxity. Interview with a W ahhabi called Gadzhi, Kizilyrt, 29 June 1998. Ispoved Wahhabita, Dialogue, No. 7, April 1998. During the only joint press conference that was organized by the authorities in 1997, Wahhabis outplayed tariqatists. Interviews with Rashid Gulyamov, Indus Tagirov, Rafail Khaplekhamitov, Rashad Saphin, Tolgat Boreev, Tufan Minullin, and Aydar Halim ; Kazan, Naberezhnie Chelny, 19971998.

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77. Interviews with Fazu Alieva, Abdurashid Saidov, Vladlen Gadzhiev, Amri Shikhsaidov, and Ali Aliev; Makhachkala, Moscow, 19971998. 78. Interviews with Alexander Salagaev, Vladimir Belyev, Andrei Maltsev, Gennadii Mukhanov, Boris Terentiev, Alexei Litvin, Liya Sagitova, and Georgii Milovanov; Kazan, Makhachkala, 19971998. 79. Guzel Sabirova and Elena Omelchenko, The Renaissance of Islam in Tatarstan and Dagestan: Popular Perceptions, BASEES Conference, Cambridge, U.K., 2729 March 1999. 80. In 1990, there was only one Tatar school in Kazan; in 1997, there were already 124 Tatar gymnasium s and 1,112 schools out of a total of 2,439 had the Tatar language as the language of instruction. They have probably produced their rst graduates in 1999. The elite schools are TurkishTatar lyce es that are based on the Turkish curriculum and use Turkish and English as languages of instruction. In 1997, there were two such lyce es in Kazan out of eight in the whole republic. Interview with Radik Zaripov, head of the Departm ent of National Education of the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Tatarstan, Kazan, 10 April, 1997. 81. Interview with Georgii Milovanov, Makhachkala, 17 July 1997. 82. Many Russian voters in Tatarstan have expressed their pessimism about any control of Izbirkoms (electoral committees) in the future. This fear has been fuelled by the negative experience of the parliamentary elections in 1995, when seven out of 21 candidates from Soglasie were badly beaten. One was killed and some others were sacked from their jobs. 83. Interview with Georgii Milovanov, Makhachkala, 17 July 1997.

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