O N H I S T O R Y

ONHISTORYbyEricHobsbawm
CopyrightEricHobsbawm1997 Weidenfeld&Nicholson1997

CHAPTER3 WhatCanHistoryTellUsabout ContemporarySociety?

This chapter was originally given as a lecture to the University of California,Davis,ontheoccasionofitsseventyfifthanniversaryin1984.It had not previously been published. I have, where necessary, changed tenses from present to past, and eliminated some duplication with other chapters.

Whatcanhistorytellusaboutcontemporarysociety?Inaskingthisquestion Iamnotsimplyindulgingintheusualselfdefenceofacademicswhooccupy themselveswithinterestingbutapparentlyquiteuselesssubjectssuchasancient LatinandGreek,literarycriticismorphilosophy,especiallywhentheyaretrying toraisefundsforthemfrompeoplewhocanonlyseethemselvespayingout good money for things which have an obvious practical payoff, such as improvingnuclearweaponsormakingafewmilliondollars.Iamformulatinga questionwhicheverybodyisasking,andhasalwaysaskedforaslongaswe havehumanrecords. Forwherewestandinregardtothepast,whattherelationsarebetween past,presentandfuturearenotonlymattersofvitalinteresttoall:theyarequite indispensable.Wecannothelpsituatingourselvesinthecontinuumofourown life,ofthefamilyandgrouptowhichwebelong.Wecannothelpcomparingpast andpresent:thatiswhatfamilyphotoalbumsorhomemoviesaretherefor.We cannothelplearningfromit,forthatiswhatexperiencemeans.Wemaylearnthe wrongthingsandplainlyweoftendobutifwedon'tlearn,orhavehadno chance of learning, or refuse to learn from whatever past is relevant for our purpose,weare,intheextremecase,mentallyabnormal.`Thechildwhoburns WHATCANHISTORYTELLUSABOUTCONTEMPORARYSOCIETY? 1

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itsfingerskeepsawayfromfire'saystheoldproverbwerelyonitslearning fromexperience.Historiansarethememorybankofexperience.Intheorythe past all the past, anything and everything that has happened to date constituteshistory.Alotofitisnottheprovinceofhistorians,butagooddealofit is.And,insofarastheycompileandconstitutethecollectivememoryofthepast, peopleincontemporarysocietyhavetorelyonthem. Theproblemisnotwhethertheydo.Itiswhatexactlytheyhopetogetoutof thepast,andifsowhetherthatiswhathistoriansshouldgivethem.Takean example,awayofusingthepastwhichisdifficulttodefine,butpatentlyfelttobe important. An institution say a university celebrates its seventyfifth anniversary.Whyexactly?Whatapartfromafeelingofpride,ortheoccasion forhavingagoodtime,orsomeotherincidentalbenefits,dowegetoutofsucha celebrationofanarbitrarychronologicallandmarkinthehistoryofaninstitution? Weneedandusehistoryevenifwedon'tknowwhy. But what can history tell us about contemporary society? For much the greater part of the human past indeed even in western Europe, until the eighteenthcenturyitwasassumedthatitcouldtellushowthatsociety,any society,shouldwork.Thepastwasthemodelforthepresentandthefuture.For normal purposes it represented the key to the genetic code by which each generationreproduceditssuccessorsandorderedtheirrelationships.Hencethe significance of the old, who represented wisdom in terms not only oflengthy experience,butofmemoryofhowthingswereandweredone,andthereforehow theyoughttobedone. The term `senate' for the senior branch of the US Congress and other parliamentsrecordsthisassumption.Incertainrespectsthisisstillso,aswitness theconceptofprecedentinlegalsystemsbasedoncommon(thatiscustomary, thatistraditional)law.Butiftoday`precedent'ismainlysomethingwhichhasto bereinterpretedorcircumventedinordertofitcircumstanceswhichareobviously notlikethepast,itusedtobe,andsometimesstillis,literallybinding.Iknowof an Indian community in the Central Andes of Peru which has, since the late sixteenthcentury,consistentlybeenindisputeaboutthepossessionofcertain landswiththeneighbouringhaciendasor(since1969)cooperatives.Generation

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aftergenerationofilliterateoldermentookilliterateboysontothedisputedhigh pasturesofthe puna andshowedthemtheboundariesofthecommunalland theyhadthenlost.Historyishereliterallytheauthorityforthepresent. Thisexampletakesustoanotherfunctionofhistory.For,ifthepresentwas insomesenseunsatisfactory,thepastprovidedthemodelforreconstructingitin asatisfactoryform.Theolddaysweredefinedoftenstillareasthegoodold days,andthatiswheresocietyshouldreturnto.Thisviewisstillverymuchalive: allovertheworldpeople,andpoliticalmovements,defineutopiaasnostalgia:a returntothegoodoldmorality,thatoldtimereligion,thevaluesofsmalltown America in 1900, the literal belief in Bible or Koran which are ancient documentsandsoon.But,ofcourse,therearetodayfewsituationswhena returntothepastis,orevenseems,literallypossible.Thereturntothepastis eitherthereturntosomethingsoremotethatithastobereconstructed,a`rebirth' or`renaissance'ofclassicalantiquity,aftermanycenturiesofoblivionasthe intellectualsofthefifteenthandsixteenthcenturysawitor,morelikely,areturn tosomethingthatneverexistedatall,buthasbeeninventedforthepurpose. Zionism,orforthatmatteranymodernnationalism,couldnotconceivablybea returntoalostpast,becausethesortofterritorialnationstateswiththesortof organizationitenvisagedsimplydidnotexistbeforethenineteenthcentury.It hadtoberevolutionaryinnovationmasqueradingasrestoration.Ithad,infact,to inventthehistoryitclaimedtobringtofruition.AsErnestRenansaidacentury ago: `Getting history wrong is an essential part of being a nation.' It is the professionalbusinessofhistorianstodismantlesuchmythologies,unlessthey arecontentandIamafraidnationalhistorianshaveoftenbeentobethe servantsofideologists.Thisisanimportant,ifnegative,contributionofhistoryto telling us about contemporary society. Historians are not usually thanked by politiciansformakingit. Nowforthemostpartthissortoflessonfromhistoryofaccumulatedand coagulated experience is no longer significant. The present is patently not, it cannot be, a carboncopy of the past; nor can it be modelled on it in any operational sense. Since industrialization began, the novelty of what every generation brings is much more striking than its similarity to what has gone before.Yetthereisstillaverylargepartoftheworldandofhumanaffairsin WHATCANHISTORYTELLUSABOUTCONTEMPORARYSOCIETY? 3

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whichthepastretainsitsauthority,andwherethereforehistoryorexperiencein the genuine oldfashioned sense still operates as it did in the days of our ancestors.And,beforegoingontomorecomplexmatters,IthinkIshouldremind youofthis. Letmegiveyouaconcreteandutterlycontemporaryexample:theLebanon. Itisn'tonlythebasicsituationofthatcollectionofarmedreligiousminoritiesin andaroundsomedifficultmountainterritorywhichhasn'tchangedfor150years, butthedetailsoftheirpolitics.AJumblattwasthechieftainoftheDruzeswhen theymassacredtheMaronitesin1860,andifyougivenamestoaphotographof theleadingpoliticiansofLebanonatanytimesincethen,youwillfindtheyare thesamenamesunderdifferentpoliticallabelsandcostumes.Afewyearsagoa bookaboutLebanonbyamidnineteenthcenturyRussianwastranslatedinto Hebrew,andanIsraelimilitarymansaid,`Ifwehadbeenabletoreadthatbook, wewouldnothavemadeallthosemistakesintheLebanon.'Whathemeant was:`WeoughttohaveknownwhattheLebanonwaslike.'Abitofelementary historywouldhavehelpedtofindout.ButIamboundtoaddthathistorywasnot the only way to find out, though one of the easier ones. We professors are inclinedtoputtoomuchdowntoignorance.Myguessisthattherewereplentyof peopleinandaroundJerusalemandWashingtonwhocouldanddidgivesound informationaboutLebanon.WhattheysaiddidnotfitintowhatBeginandSharon and President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz (or whoever took the decisions)wantedtohear.Ittakestwotolearnthelessonsofhistoryoranything else:onetogivetheinformation,theothertolisten. ThecaseofLebanonisunusual,becausethereareafterallfewcountriesfor whichbookswrittenacenturyagocanstillserveasguidestocurrentpolitics andevenpoliticalleaders.Ontheotherhand,plainhistoricalexperiencewithout muchtheorycanalwaystellusagooddealaboutcontemporarysociety.Thisis partlybecausehumanbeingsstaymuchthesameandhumansituationsrecur fromtimetotime.Justasolderpeoplecanoftensay`I'veseenthisbefore,'so canhistorians,onthebasisoftheaccumulatedrecordofmanygenerations.And thisisratherrelevant. Thisis because modern social science, policymaking and planning have

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pursuedamodelofscientismandtechnicalmanipulationwhichsystematically, and deliberately, neglects human, and above all historical, experience. The fashionablemodelofanalysisandpredictionistofeedallavailablecurrentdata intosomenotionalorrealsupercomputerandletitcomeoutwiththeanswers. Plainhumanexperience and understanding doesnotornotyet,oronlyfor highlyspecializedpurposeslenditselftothis.Andsuchahistoricalorevenanti historical calculation isoften unaware of being blind, and inferior to even the unsystematic vision of those who can use their eyes. Let me give you two examples,whichareofsomepracticalimportance. Thefirstiseconomic.Eversincethe1920sactuallysinceabout1900 someobservershavebeenimpressedbyasecularpatternoftheworldeconomy ofperiodsofabouttwentytothirtyyearsofeconomicexpansionandprosperity alternatingwithperiodsofeconomicdifficultiesofaboutthesamelength.They are best known under the name of `Kondratiev long waves'. Nobody has explainedorevenanalysedthemsatisfactorily.Theirexistencehasbeendenied bystatisticiansandothers.Andyettheyareamongthefewhistoricalperiodicities whichhaveallowedprediction.Thecrisisofthe1970swassopredictedIrisked suchapredictionmyselfin1968.Andwhenthecrisiscame,historians,once again on the basis of the Kondratiev experience, dismissed the analyses of economistsandpoliticianswhopredictedarapidupturneveryyearfrom1973. Andwewerequiteright.Moreover,andagainonthesamebasis,whenIfirst gavethislecturein1984,Iwaspreparedtostickoutmyneckandpredictthata returntothenextlongperiodofglobaleconomicboomwasextremelyunlikely beforetheendofthe1980sortheearly1990s.Ihadnotheoreticaljustification forthis:onlythehistoricalobservationthatthissortofpatternappearstohave operated,giveortakesomedistortionsbymajorwars,sinceatleastthe1780s. And,onemorething.Eachofthe'Kondratievs'ofthepastnotonlyformeda period in strictly economic terms, but also not unnaturally had political characteristicswhichdistinguisheditfairlyclearlyfromitspredecessorandits successor,intermsbothofinternationalpoliticsandofthedomesticpoliticsof variouscountriesandregionsoftheglobe.Thatisalsolikelytocontinue. Mysecondillustrationismorespecific.DuringtheColdWartherewasa momentwhenthesensitiveinstrumentsoftheUSgovernmentrecordedwhat WHATCANHISTORYTELLUSABOUTCONTEMPORARYSOCIETY? 5

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lookedlikethelaunchofRussiannuclearmissilestowardsAmerica.Nodoubt somegeneralgotreadyforimmediateaction,whilewaitingforothersensitive instrumentsautomaticallytocheckup,atlightningspeed,onthesereadingsto see whether there had been some malfunction, or whether some harmless signalshadbeenmisreadinfactwhethertheThirdWorldWarhadstartedor whetherithadn't.Theyconcludedthatitwasokay,fortheentireprocesswas, inevitably,blind.Theprogrammingitselfhadtobebasedontheassumptionthat theworstcouldhappenatanymoment,forifitdidtherewouldbevirtuallyno timeforcountermeasures.But,whatevertheinstrumentssaid,itwasascertain asanythingcanbethat,inJune1980,whenthisincidentoccurred,nobodyhad deliberatelypressedthenuclearbutton.Thesituationsimplydidn'tlooklikeit.I, andIhopeweall,wouldhavemadethisjudgment,notforanytheoreticalreason forasuddensurpriselaunchwasnottheoreticallyinconceivablebutsimply because,unlikeotherinstruments,thecomputerinourheadshas,orcanhave, historicalexperiencebuiltintoit. Somuchforwhatonemightcalltheoldfashioned,experientialuseofhistory the kind which Thucydides and Machiavelli would have recognized and practised.Nowletmesayawordaboutthemuchmoredifficultproblemofwhat historycantellusaboutcontemporarysocieties,insofarastheyarequiteunlike the past; insofar as they are without precedents. I don't mean just different. History,evenwhenitgeneralizesmosteffectivelyandinmyviewitisworth nothingmuchifitdoesn'tgeneralizeisalwaysawareofunlikeness.Thefirst lesson a professional historian learns is to watch out for anachronism, or differences in what at first sight seems to be the same, such as the British monarchyin1797and1997.Inanycasehistorywritinghastraditionallygrown outoftherecordingofspecificandunrepeatablelivesandevents.No,whatI meanishistoricaltransformationswhichplainlymakethepastafundamentally inadequate guide to the present. Though the history of Tokugawa Japan is relevanttoJapantoday,andtheYangdynastytoChinain1997,itisnouse pretending that either can be understood simply as modified prolongations of theirpast.Andsuchrapid,profound,dramaticandcontinuingtransformationsare characteristicoftheworldsincethelateeighteenthcentury,andespeciallysince themidtwentieth.

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Suchinnovationisnowsogeneralandevidentthatitisassumedtobethe basicrule,particularlyinsocietieslikethatoftheUSA,mostofwhosehistory fallsintotheeraofconstantrevolutionarytransformations,andbytheyoungin suchsocieties,forwhomatvariousmomentsoftheirdevelopmenteverything infactisanewdiscovery.InthissenseweallgrowupasColumbuses.Oneof thelesserfunctionsofhistoriansistopointoutthatinnovationisnotandcannot beabsolutelyuniversal.Nohistorianwillgiveamoment'scredencetotheclaim thatsomeonetodayhassomehowdiscoveredanabsolutelynewwayofenjoying sex,asocalled`Gspot'whichwasunknowntohumanitybefore.Giventhefinite numberofthingsthatcanbedonebetweensexualpartnersofwhateverkind,the lengthoftimeandthenumberofpeoplewhohavebeendoingitalloverthe globe,andthepersistentinterestofhumanbeingsinexploringthesubject,itcan safelybeassumedthatabsolutenoveltyisoutofthequestion.Sexualpractices andattitudestothemcertainlychange,asdothecostumesanddecorofwhatis oftenaformofprivatebedroomtheatreofsocialandbiographicalsymbolism.For obviousreasonsS/Minmotorcyclegearcouldnotbepartofitinthedaysof QueenVictoria.Probablythesexualfashioncyclechangesmorerapidlytoday than in the past, like all other fashioncycles. But history is a useful warning againstconfusingfashionwithprogress. Still,whatelsecanhistorysayabouttheunprecedented?Atbottomthisisa questionaboutthedirectionandthemechanismofhumanevolution.For,likeit ornotandthereareplentyofhistorianswhodon'tlikeitthereisonecentral questioninhistorywhichcannotbeavoided,ifonlybecauseweallwanttoknow theanswertoit.Namely:howdidhumanitygetfromcavemantospacetraveller, fromatimewhenwewerescaredbysabretoothedtigerstoatimewhenweare scaredbynuclearexplosionsthatisscarednotbythehazardsofnaturebutby those we have created ourselves? What makes this an essentially historical questionisthathumanbeings,thoughrecentlyrathertallerandheavierthanever before, are biologically much the same as at the beginning of the historical record,whichisnotactuallyverylong:perhaps12,000yearssincethefirstcity, perhapsabitlongersincetheinventionoffarming.Wearealmostcertainlynot moreintelligentthantheancientMesopotamiansorChinese.Andyettheway human societies live and operate has been utterly transformed. Hence,

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incidentally, the irrelevance of sociobiology for this particular purpose. Hence also,Iwouldaddwithalittlemorehesitation,theirrelevanceofacertaintypeof social anthropology, which concentrates on what various types of human societieshaveincommon:bothEskimosandtheJapanese.For,ifwefixour attention on what is permanent, we cannot explain what has obviously been transformed,unlesswebelievethattherecanbenohistoricalchangebutonly combinationandvariation. Let me be quite clear. The purpose of tracing the historical evolution of humanity is not to foresee what will happen in future, even though historical knowledgeandunderstandingareessentialtoanyonewhowantstobasetheir actionsandplansonsomethingbetterthanclairvoyance,astrologyorjustplain voluntarism. The only result of a horserace which historians can tell us with absoluteconfidenceisonethathasalreadybeenrun.Stilllessisittodiscoveror deviselegitimationsforourhopesorfearsforhumandestiny.Historyisnota seculareschatology,whetherweconceiveitsobjective asunendinguniversal progressoracommunistsocietyorwhatever.Thesearethingswereadintoit, but cannot derive from it. What it can do is to discover the patterns and mechanisms of historical change in general, and more particularly of the transformationsofhumansocietiesduringthepastfewcenturiesofdramatically acceleratedandwidenedchange.This,ratherthanforecastsorhopes,iswhatis directlyrelevanttocontemporarysocietyanditsprospects. Now such a project requires an analytical framework for the analysis of history. Such a framework must be based on the one element of directional changeinhumanaffairswhichisobservableandobjective,irrespectiveofour subjectiveorcontemporarywishesandvaluejudgments,namelythepersistent andincreasingcapacityofthehumanspeciestocontroltheforcesofnatureby means of manual and mental labour, technology and the organization of production.Itsrealityisdemonstratedbythegrowthofthehumanpopulationof the globe throughout history, without significant setbacks, and the growth particularly in the past few centuries of production and productive capacity. Personally, I don't mind calling this progress, both in the literal sense of a directionalprocessand because few ofuswillnotregard itasapotentialor actual improvement. But, never mind what we call it, any genuine attempt to WHATCANHISTORYTELLUSABOUTCONTEMPORARYSOCIETY? 8

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makesenseofhumanhistorymusttakethistrendasitsstartingpoint. HereliesthecrucialimportanceofKarlMarxforhistorians,forhebuilthis conceptionandanalysisofhistoryonthisbasisandsofarnooneelsehas.I don'tmeanMarxisright,oreventhatheisadequate,butthathisapproachis indispensable,asErnestGellnerputit(andnobodywaslessofaMarxistthan thisnotablescholar):
WhetherornotpeoplepositivelybelieveintheMarxistscheme,no coherent,wellarticulatedrivalpatternhasemerged,WestorEast,andas peoplemustneedthinkagainstsomekindofgrid,even(orperhapsespecially) thosewhodonotaccepttheMarxisttheoryofhistorytendtoleanuponits ideaswhentheywishtosaywhattheydopositivelybelieve.1

Inotherwords,noseriousdiscussionofhistoryispossiblewhichdoesn't referbacktoMarxor,moreexactly,whichdoesnotstartwherehestarts.And thatmeans,basicallyasGellneracceptsamaterialistconceptionofhistory. Now an analysis of the process of history raises a number of questions whicharedirectlyrelevanttous.Totakeoneobviousone.Formostofrecorded historymosthumanbeingswereengagedinbasicfoodproduction:say8090 percentofthepopulation.Today,asNorthAmericademonstrates,afarming population of the order of 3 per cent of the inhabitants of one country can produceenoughfoodtofeednotonlytheother97percentbutalargesliceof the rest of the world population. Again, for most of the industrial era the productionofmanufacturedgoodsandservices,evenwhenitwasnotlabour intensive,requiredavastandgrowinglabourforce,butatpresentthisisrapidly ceasingtobethecase.Forthefirsttimeinhistoryitisnolongernecessarythat thebulkofhumanitymust,inthebiblicalphrase,`eatthybreadinthesweatof thyface'.Thishappenstobeadevelopmentofveryrecenthistory.Thedeclineof the peasantry in the Western world, though long predicted, did not become dramaticuntilthe1950sand1960s,andthedeclineofthesociallynecessary productivelabourforceoutsidefarmingthough,interestinglyenough,envisaged by,ofallpeople,Marxisevenmorerecent,andisstillmasked,ormorethan offset,bytheriseoftertiaryemployment.And,ofcourse,botharestillregional ratherthanglobalphenomena.Nowsuchabasictransformationinthesecular

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occupationalstructureofhumanitycannotbuthavefarreachingconsequences, sincetheentirevaluesystemofmostmenandwomen,atleastsincetheendof MarshallSahlins'eraof'stoneageaffluence',hasbeengearedtotheneedto labourasaninescapablefact,thebottomlineofhumanexistence. Historyhasnosimpleformulafordiscoveringtheexactconsequencesofthis change,orsolutionsfortheproblemsitislikelytocreate,orhasalreadycreated. Butitcanpinpoint one urgentdimensionoftheproblem,namelytheneedfor social redistribution. For most of history the basic mechanism for economic growth has been the appropriation of the social surplus generated by man's capacity to produce by minorities of one kind or another for purposes of investment in further improvement, though it has not always been so used. Growthoperatedthroughinequality.Nowhithertothishasbeentosomeextent offsetbytheenormousgrowthintotalwealthwhich,asAdamSmithpointedout, madeeventhelabourerindevelopedeconomiesmateriallybetteroffthanthe RedIndianchieftain,andwhich,byandlarge,madeeachgenerationbetteroff than its predecessors. But they have shared in these benefits, in however modestaway,throughparticipationintheproductiveprocessthatisthrough havingjobs,oraspeasantsandcraftsmenbeingabletoearnincomesbyselling theiroutputonthemarket.Forpeasantselfsufficiencyhasdramaticallydeclined inthedevelopedworld. Nowsupposeamajorityofthepopulationisnolongerneededforproduction. Whatdotheyliveon?Andequallyimportantinabusinesseconomywhat happenstothemassmarketbasedontheirpurchases,onwhichthateconomy hasincreasinglycometodepend,firstintheUSA,laterinothercountries?Inone wayoranothertheyhavetolivebypublictransferpayments,suchaspensions, and other forms of social security and welfare that is by a political and administrative mechanism of social redistribution. In the past thirty years this welfare mechanism has expanded enormously and, on the strength of the greatesteconomicboominhistory,onaremarkablygenerousscaleinanumber of countries. The enormous growth of the state sector, in other words public employment,muchofwhichisalsoaformofhandoutinbothWestandEast hasalsohadanalogouseffects.Ontheonehandwelfareexpenditureforincome maintenance,healthandsocialcareandeducationnoworanywayin1977 WHATCANHISTORYTELLUSABOUTCONTEMPORARYSOCIETY? 10

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forms between half and twothirds of total public expenditure in the leading OECD countries,andontheotherinthesecountriesanythingbetween25per centandabout40percentofthetotalofhouseholdincomescomesfrompublic employmentandsocialsecurity. To this extent a mechanism of redistribution has already come into existence,and,whereithas,itissafetosaythatthechancesthatitwillbe dismantledarenegligible.SomuchfortheReaganitedreamofreturningtothe economicsofPresidentMcKinley.Butnotetwothings.First,aswecansee,this mechanism,throughthetaxburdensitimposes,createsgenuinepressureson what is in the West still the major engine of economic growth, namely entrepreneurialprofits,especiallyduringaperiodofeconomicdifficulties.Hence the current pressures to dismantle it. But, second, this mechanism was not designedforaneconomyinwhichthe majority mightbesurplustoproductive requirements.Onthecontrary,itwasconstructedfor,andsupportedby,aperiod ofunexampledfullemployment.And,third,itisdesigned,likeanypoorlaw,to provideaminimumincome,thoughthisistodaymoregenerousthanwasever thoughtconceivableeveninthe1930s. So,evenifwesupposethatitworkswellandisextended,themechanismis likely,intheconditionsIhaveenvisaged,toincreaseandintensifyeconomicand everyotherkindofinequality,asbetweenthesuperfluousmajorityandtherest. So what happens then? The traditional assumption, that economic growth, though destroying some employment, generates even more somewhere else, cannolongerbereliedon. In some ways this internal inequality is analogous to the familiar, and growing, inequality between the minority of rich and developed or developing countriesandthepoorandbackwardworld.Inbothcasesthegapisgrowing, andlookslikegrowingwider.Inbothcaseseconomicgrowththroughamarket economy,howeverimpressive,hasplainly not beenanautomaticallyeffective mechanismfordiminishinginternalorinternationalinequalities,eventhoughit hastendedtoincreasetheindustrializedsectoroftheglobe,andmaybeinthe processofredistributingwealthandpowerwithinitforexample,fromtheUSA toJapan.

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Nowleavingmoralityandethicsandsocialjusticetooneside,thissituation creates, or intensifies, serious problems economic and political. Since the inequalitiesbuiltintothesehistoricaldevelopmentsareinequalitiesofpoweras wellaswelfare,itispossibletodismissthemintheshortrun.Thisisinfactwhat mostofthepowerfulstatesandclassesaretemptedtodotoday.Poorpeople and poor countries are weak, and disorganized, and technically incompetent: relativelymoresotodaythaninthepast.Insideourcountrieswecanleavethem tostewinghettos,orasanunhappyunderclass.Wecanprotectthelivesand environmentsoftherichbehindelectrifiedfortificationsprotectedbyprivateand public security forces. We can, to use a phrase of a British minister about NorthernIreland,trytosettlefor`anacceptablelevelofviolence'.Internationally, we can bomb them and beat them. As the poet wrote of the period of early twentiethcenturyimperialism:

Wehavegot TheMaximgunandtheyhavenot.

TheonlynonWesternpowerthattheWestwasscaredofwastheonlyonethat couldhitthemathome:theUSSR,andthathasceasedtoexist. Inshort,itisassumedthattheeconomywillsomehowsortitselfoutoncethe presentcrisisgiveswaytoanotherphaseofglobalboom,becauseitalwayshas inthepast;andthatthepooranddiscontented,athomeandabroad,canbe permanentlycontained.Perhapsthefirstisareasonableassumption:butonlyif wealsorecognizethatitispracticallycertainthattheworldeconomy,andthe state structures and policies, and the international pattern of the developed world,whichwillemergefromthepresent'Kondratiev'phase,willbeprofoundly, anddramatically,differentfromthoseofthe1950s1970s,aswasthecaseafter thelastgeneralsecularcrisisperiodbetweenthetwoworldwars.Thatisone thingwhichhistorycantellus,onboththeoreticalandempiricalgrounds.The secondisnotareasonableassumptionatall,exceptintheshortterm.Itmaybe reasonable to assume that the poor will no longer be mobilized for protest,

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pressure,socialchangeandrevolutionnationallyorinternationally,intheways they were between the 1880s,and the 1950s, but not that they will remain permanentlyineffectiveaspolitical,orevenmilitary,forcesespeciallywhenthey cannotbeboughtoffbyprosperity.Thatisanotherthingthathistorycantellus. Whatitcan'ttellusiswhatwillhappen:onlywhatproblemswewillhavetosolve. Letmeconclude.Inpractice,Iwilladmit,mostofwhathistorycantellus aboutcontemporarysocietiesisbasedonacombinationofhistoricalexperience and historical perspective.It isthe businessofhistorians to know alotmore aboutthepastthanotherpeople,andtheycannotbegoodhistoriansunlessthey havelearned,withorwithouttheory,torecognizesimilaritiesanddifferences.For instance, while most politicians in the past forty years read the international dangerofwarintermsofthe1930sareplayofHitler,Munichandtherest most historians concerned with international politics, while naturally accepting thatitwassuigeneris,weregloomilyimpressedwithitssimilaritiestotheperiod before1914.Aslongagoas1965oneofthemwroteastudyofthepre1914 armamentsraceunderthetitle`Yesterday'sDeterrent'.Unfortunatelyonething historical experience hasalso taught historians is that nobodyeverseems to learnfromit.Still,wemustgoontrying. Butmoregenerally,andthisisonereasonwhythelessonsofhistoryareso seldom learned orheeded,the worldisup againsttwo forceswhich obscure vision.OneIhavealreadymentioned.Itistheahistorical,engineering,problem solving approach by means of mechanical models and devices. This has producedmarvellousresultsinanumberoffields,butithasnoperspective,and itcannottakeaccountofanythingnotfedintothemodelorthedevicefromthe start.Andonethinghistoriansknowisthatwehaven'tfedallthevariablesinto themodel,andtheotherthingsoutsideareneverequal.(Thisisonethingthe historyoftheUSSRanditsfallshouldhavetaughtusall.)TheotherIhavealso mentioned.Itisthesystematicdistortionofhistoryforirrationalpurposes.Why, toreturntoapointImadeearlier,doallregimesmaketheiryoungstudysome historyinschool?Notto understandtheirsocietyandhowitchanges,butto approveofit,tobeproudofit,tobeorbecomegoodcitizensoftheUSAor SpainorHondurasorIraq.Andthe sameistrue ofcausesandmovements. History as inspiration and ideology has a builtin tendency to become self WHATCANHISTORYTELLUSABOUTCONTEMPORARYSOCIETY? 13

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justifyingmyth.Nothingisamoredangerousblindfoldthanthis,asthehistoryof modernnationsandnationalismsdemonstrates. Itisthebusinessofhistorianstotryandremovetheseblindfolds,oratleast to lift them slightly or occasionally and, insofar as they do, they can tell contemporarysocietysomethingsitmightbenefitfrom,evenifitisreluctantto learnthem.Fortunately,universitiesaretheonepartoftheeducationalsystem where historianshave been allowed,even encouraged,to do this. Itwasnot alwaysso,fortheprofessionofhistoryhasgrownuplargelyasacollectionof people serving their regimes and justifying them. It is still by no means universallyso.Buttotheextentthatuniversitieshavebecometheplaceswhere acriticalhistorycanmosteasilybepractisedonewhichiscapableofassisting usincontemporarysocietyauniversitycelebratingitsanniversaryisagood placeinwhichtoexpresstheseopinions.

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ABOUTTHEAUTHOR: EricHobsbawmwasborninAlexandriain1917andeducatedinVienna,Berlin, LondonandCambridge.AFellowoftheBritishAcademyandtheAmericanAcademyof Arts and Sciences, with honorary degrees from universities inn several countries, he taughtuntilretirementatBirkbeckCollege,UniversityofLondon,andsincethenatthe NewSchoolforSocialResearchinNewYork.Inadditionto TheAgeofRevolution 17891848, TheAgeofCapital18481875, TheAgeofEmpire18751914 and Ageof Extremes:TheShortTwentiethCentury19141991 (allavailableinAbacus),hisbooks include PrimitiveRebels, LabouringMen, WorldsofLabour, IndustryandEmpire and Bandits.Allhavebeentranslatedintoseverallanguages.

AnAbacusBook FirstpublishedinGreatBritainbyWeidenfeld&Nichotson1997 FirstpublishedbyAbacus1998 CopyrightEricHobsbawm1997 Themoralrightoftheauthorhasbeenasserted. Allrightsreserved. Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced, storedinaretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inany formorbyanymeans,withouttheprior permissioninwritingofthepublisher,norbe otherwisecirculatedinanyformofbindingor coverotherthanthatinwhichitispublishedand withoutasimilarconditionincludingthis conditionbeingimposedonthesubsequentpurchaser. ACIPcataloguerecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary. ISBN0349110506 TypesetinPhotinaby PalimpsestBookProductionLimited, Polmont,Stirlingshire PrintedandboundinGreatBritainby ClaysLtd,StIvesplc. Abacus ADivisionof Little,BrownandCompany(UK) BrettenhamHouse LancasterPlace

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