Word Count: 2005 A Paradigm of Fundamentals for Just Power Introduction This paper intentionally forgoes a comprehensive discussion

on justice as a metaphysical concept to be the foundation of just power. The author submits that such a discussion is myopic to pluralistic society, and hence, politically unsustainable. That is not to say that such metaphysical discussions are not beneficial. Such questions are forgone, not on the basis of irrelevance, but rather because more pressing issues must be settled first. The thrust of this paper is to establish a political philosophy necessary to promote just exercises of power. It draws from key ideas of Rawlsian theory to provide the ideal sociological structure of society, then melded with the salient points of recent human dignity ideology as the underlying anthropological rationalization for just power. An Affirmation of Rawlsian Sociology Throughout his life and career, the great British political philosopher John Rawls dealt with the question of whether we can envision a kind of realistic utopia, an ideal society that was both reachable and sustainable in our real life context. In doing so, he postulates the following theory on societys political conception of justice, expressed in three points1: It limits itself to addressing the design of societys basic structure. It is freestanding, that is, does not presuppose, hence can be presented as independent of, any comprehensive moral, religious, or philosophical worldview. It is constructed around certain fundamental ideas available in the societys public political culture.

Rawls, John. Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press, second edition 2005, pp. 11-14.

These three features, in the words of commentator Thomas Pogge2, leave the substantive content of the conception of justice wide open. Government should not dictate how society should conceive of justice; rather it merely provides the freedom and means through which society can struggle for it. A wide variety of very different political conceptions of justice are conceivable, but it is then incumbent upon society to settle amongst themselves as to which among those rival conceptions of justice might win, lose, or be compromised. This is necessary to establish at the outset. The author submits that apart from this general benchmark, any exercise of governmental power cannot be said to be truly just. There are at least two reasons for this. First, a lack of any of the three requisites necessarily implies illegitimate power. Rawls says it this way: [P]olitical power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational 3. Note that while citizens disagree in their fundamental worldviews, they can nonetheless agree on their political conception of justice, as is usually the case in virtually every existing society, albeit some conceptions are not as democratically arrived at as others. Second, a political conception is definable. A comprehensive one (purely moral, religious or philosophical) is non-definable. The former is capable of being translated into law, and results in demandable rights. The same cannot be said with the latter. Without clear and defined standards enshrined in law, a society is devoid of moral and legal security. Societal behavior remains inchoate, confused, and stunted in development. Crime and punishment under this regime of uncertainty would unequivocally be deemed as unjust exercises of power. Why Human Dignity as Anthropology

2 3

Pogge, Thomas. John Rawls: His Life and Theory of Justice, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 139. Supra note 1, p. 217.

Justice concerns what people are due. This much is uncontested.4 This quote, from Professor David Schmidtz of the University of Arizona, speaks of the difficulty in determining by conceptual analysis exactly what justice is. But whatever else justice is, the author submits that it is axiomatic to say that justice upholds human dignity. The entire enterprise of pursuing theories of justice is necessarily the by-product of some innate, inalienable, inviolable dignity that all humans possess (or, more accurately, the result of attacks thereto). Without human dignity, justice would seem an exercise in futility. For purposes of just power, I would add the protection and promotion of human dignity as a fourth requisite to Rawls theory of the political conception of justice. I see this as needed if we are to ensure that the exercise of power be more efficiently regulated, so as to be maintained within reasonable and just limits. The goal of Rawls was a well-ordered society. Our goal is just power. For that, we must innovate. It is conceivable that even well-ordered societies can be oppressive ones. Majorities can take advantage of minorities; notwithstanding how well-ordered their society may appear. The added element of human dignity is to challenge and push societies beyond simply being well-ordered. True justice needs to be recognized as actually revolving around how this question of human dignity is addressed by the society. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights opens with the phrase: Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, followed by Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people. Here human dignity is intimately associated with human rights, as it naturally is. Even the United Charter itself echoes the same sentiment in its own preambular statement that it reaffirms faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person.

Schmidtz, David. Elements of Justice, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 7.

Human Dignity as a concept is fortunate to be enjoying near-universal acceptance and reception, albeit both religious and irreligious spheres of humanity may give differing justifications thereto. Even a person who denies human dignity will easily be converted out of his or her position when he or she becomes a victim of some particular assault. Justice is thereafter sought, in vindication of violated human dignity. A Restatement for the New Paradigm Premises considered, the political conception of justice (or the standard of just power) now looks this wise: It limits itself to addressing the design of societys basic structure. It is freestanding, that is, does not presuppose, hence can be presented as independent of, any comprehensive moral, religious, or philosophical worldview. It is constructed around certain fundamental ideas available in the societys public political culture. It espouses, as a minimum standard of justice, the celebration of human dignity. Some Objections A fair question at this point would then be, is not human dignity itself a comprehensive standard of justice, and hence, non-definable and unsuitable for the political conception of justice that we seek? The answer I would submit is that human dignity as a concept is not a comprehensive system of ethical thought. Rather, it is simply the bare minimum, the bedrock, so to speak, for any political conception of justice. It is the basic premise upon which other premises and conclusions may be constructed upon. And human dignity has the unique advantage of being concrete enough not to require any presumption of philosophical, religious, or cultural norms, while at the same time abstract enough to be transcendent, and unlimited in its application for whichever political and social context it finds itself in.

The Face of Human Dignity Just to show how basic human dignity is to the concept of justice, the author presents the following summary of human dignity: It opposes objectification. It is its own goal. It allows for reasonable use of force. Human Dignity Opposes Objectification Objectification is when human beings are used by an individual or group of individuals for the advancement and/or gratification of solely that individual or group, respectively. Simply put, people are treated as objects or tools for others ends. The more malicious and treacherous examples of this are crimes with intent to unlawfully gain (such as theft, corruption, piracy, spying), crimes with intent to exploit (such as domestic violence, rape, slavery, human trafficking, kidnapping), and crimes with intent to injure or kill (such as physical injuries and murder). These must all be effectively penalized. Ills of society may even be expressed in the language of human dignity. Where one politician resorts to bribery, graft and corruption, he or she inevitably casts an affront on the dignity of the taxpaying individual, using and objectifying them as means to material and political gain. Terrorism and religious fanaticism are equally guilty of the same, albeit for more religious ends. However, there are likewise more subtle ways through which a society may unwittingly objectify its citizens. One example is the criminal justice system. A convicted criminal may be reduced to being merely a number among other inmates, somewhat dehumanized in that he or she loses a sense of identity and worth, exacerbated by prison systems which are by and large at a huge loss at deliberately attempting to restore dignity and value in these convicts.

Another more subtle example is hospitals. When persons lose their individuality into simply becoming just another patient to take care of, the patients dignity as a human being is compromised. Medical practitioners often neglect more intimate, interpersonal relations with their patients, thus subtracting a measure of the patients identity and dignity. These more benign examples need to be addressed as well. And what can be said of private individuals may also be said of States. Acts of aggression by one State against another are likewise examples of this objectification, though not just on one or a few individual human beings, but on entire peoples and populations. Human Dignity is its Own Goal For purposes of the political conception of just power that we are seeking, the dignity of the human being must be seen as subservient to no other consideration. Otherwise, human dignity is betrayed. Human dignity must not be used to give political, economic, or even social advantage to one individual over another, nor to one political or religious ideology over another. The beauty of human dignity in this paradigm is that it merely serves as a platform or foundation. Justice is intimately intertwined with human dignity, as has already been discussed. Hence, as long as human dignity as a foundational premise (along with the first three requisites of Rawlsian society) is neither bypassed nor contradicted, any exercise of power would be just. Human Dignity allows for Reasonable Use of Force The survival of a well-ordered society grounded on human dignity, however, is impossible without some element of force. It would be prudent to be aware of the recurrent presence of those with ambitions inimical to both human dignity and a well-ordered society. Left unchecked, these people would soon cause the degeneration of society for their own benefit. In whatever way human dignity is threatened, it justifies the use of reasonable and proportional force to neutralize such a threat. Human dignity permits, nay, necessitates the exertion of protective and restorative force by the constituted authority in accordance with the will of the community

according their political conception of justice, so as to mitigate further attacks on the dignity of the human person. In Sum Much more might still be said on these matters. However, it might be more beneficial to end by posing three important questions on the new paradigm. First: Is the paradigm just? Yes, on the grounds that human dignity serves as the foundation and the prime consideration for every act of power defined and allowed within that societys political conception of justice. Second: Is it productive? Yes, since human dignity requires that critical freedoms and liberties for the pursuit of personal development be secured, as well as protections to safeguard and promote community and social interests. Lastly: Is it sustainable? Yes, because of the paradigms responsive nature to changing trends. The paradigm does not preempt nor curtail creativity necessary to adapt to future unforeseeable circumstances, which would eventually render less flexible systems obsolete and even adverse to the society. In this paradigm, then, it is clear that power is indeed distributed and exercised justly, productively, and on a sustainable basis.