SELECTED NEWS AND VIEWS COLLECTED BY YE KYAW SWA

No 3 - Wednesday, August 24, 2011

This is the combination or the continuation of the blog named http://mahathuriya.blogspot.com/

News,Views & Opinions

Wednesday, August 24, 2011

NO 3

Prologue
(a) Spontaneous mass-uprisings would be occurred when people wanted to blame someone and came into the streets as a result of the economic collapse of the society. Any existing government would be the victim of the crisis to be blamed even though its predecessor was a real prodigal mismanaged administrator of the regime.

The Guillotine of Louis XVI and Marie-Antoinette in France and the execution of Czar Nicholas IIs entire family in Russia were the noticeable examples of how their own people had bitterly hatred, even to take terrible revenge over, their own monarchy and called for the republic and freedom. The republic was demanded by the people, with the slogan of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, who wanted democracy and freedom also in 1848 revolution. However, eventually those revolutions ended up in coups d'tat, and instead of democracies, only the totalitarianisms were the conclusions. The abolition of the monarchies was done but the real freedom was none. Only the massacres, class vendettas, personal revenges, revolutionary tribunals, the Guillotine, the executions, the monarch and the aristocrats, the citizens, constitutional republic, national assembly and the coups d'tat were the true symbolisms and the genuine spirits of the revolution in itself. Street corner orators, pamphlet writers, street agitators, revolutionary artists, musicians and poets, protesters, marchers, demonstrators, campaigners, pacific activists, legal activists were all of those symbolisms too. But, in fact, workers, farmers, soldiers, government staffs and students of the general mass were the spirits of the revolution. But, revolution cannot be created and also it shall not be happened by the ones awakening wishes. Revolution cannot be made by a single group or political party or revolutionary front. It is just a spontaneous outburst of the people under one sovereign. It is also not an armed-insurrection or not the rebellion in any form. Revolution means spontaneous mass-uprising which occurs only because of the economic crisis. This passage is taken from the Encyclopedia Americana Vol. 18 p.386 2nd column.* It is about how Karl Marx changed his mind in understanding over revolution and devoted himself to the study of political economy.

Work In London.

On setting in London, Marx grew optimistic about the imminence of

a fresh revolutionary outbreak in Europe, and he rejoined the rejuvenated Communist League. He wrote two lengthy pamphlets on the 1848 revolution in France and its aftermath, entitled The Class Struggles in France and The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonarparte. But he soon became convinced that a new revolution is possible only in consequence of a new crisis, and devoted himself to the study of political economy to determine the causes and conditions of this crisis. * The crisis, outstanding in this modern time, was the one occurred in USA. It was the great depression of 1929-30. It echoed to all over the world. It was because of deflation. Deflation is a correlation of depression. *** However, that crisis didnt intend to topple the government, the Roosevelt administration. And there were certain major paradigms of the past about the crisis in world history. Most were because of inflation and the nearly all of them concluded in the historical result as regime change. Douglas R. Casey wrote some important examples of the crises and their results in his book named Crisis Investing in 1979. There has never been a runaway inflation that has not been followed by a change in government. The first recorded example is that of the Roman Empire. There is little doubt that debasement of its currency contributed to its fall. Government, then as now, acted in predictable patterns in response to the consequences of its inflation. A notable precedent was set with the imposition of wage and price controls by the Emperor Diocletian in the early fourth century. A more modern example is provided by the French Revolution. It was only when the currency inflation, taxation, and general extravagance of their government reached unbearable levels that French people replaced their old rulers with new ones. The new rulers proved even less desirable, which led in them to the accession of Napoleon. The German inflation of the early 1920s provided the environment for the rise of Hitler. The Inflation in China under Chiang Kai-shek contributed to the rise of Mao.**

Only one name, V.I. Lenin, should be added to join up the club of above rising dictators. There was also a recorded history of being under inflationary crisis in Russia before the revolutionary days of 1917. The Great War of 1914 to 1918 was to prove the death knell of the Tsarist regime. After initial public fervour, alliance and support collapsed due to military failures. The Tsar took personal command, but all this meant was that he became closely associated with the disasters. The Russian infrastructure proved inadequate for Total War, leading to widespread food shortages, inflation and the collapse of the transport system, exacerbated by the failure of central government to manage anything.(World War 1: The Catalyst: The Causes of the Russian Revolution in more depth)# The great historian and author, Alan Bullock also said that the real revolution in Germany ( 1920s ) was the inflation in his book named Hitler : A Study in Tyranny. It was published in 1952.##

(b) Both civil disorders and civil disobediences can also be witnessed where spontaneous mass-uprising is existed. As Douglas R. Casey said: Civil disorders are Riots, protests, and crime in the streets (all violent, convulsive nature) will occur as people try to find someone to blame for the problems besetting them. ** However, civil disobedience is mostly for civil rights movements and used as nonviolent resistance to achieve the social change under constitutional way and its basic objective is not to overthrow the existing government though it is very sometime linked as a portion of the characteristics of the revolution. Henry David Thoreau was an outstanding theorist of how to use nonviolent resistance to achieve the social change. The nonviolent civil disobedience campaign that Mahatma Gandhi used successfully against British rule in India was not civil disorder or chaos.

Dr. Martin Luther King was influenced by the ideas of Gandhi and by the theories of Thoreau. And he eventually became convinced that the same methods could be employed by blacks to obtain civil rights in America. King always stressed the importance of the ballot. He argued that once all African Americans had the vote they would become an important political force. Although they were a minority, once the vote was organized, they could determine the result of presidential and state elections. The 1964 Civil Rights Act made racial discrimination in public places, such as theaters, restaurants and hotels, illegal. King then concentrated on achieving a federal VotingRights Law that was also passed into legislation. ### After the passing of these two important pieces of legislation, King concentrated on helping those suffering from poverty. King argued that African Americans and poor whites were natural allies and if they worked together they could help change society. Kings strategy of linking poverty, civil rights and protest against the Vietnam War seemed to be mirroring the presidential campaign of Robert F. Kennedy, and later made both of them assassinated.### By learning about Martin Luther King and his civil rights movement using civil disobedience method, some historical and political lessons are obtained. They are: (1) The society or the country where King did that nonviolent civil disobedience method for civil rights movement had been grown up in democracy (2) The economic development of the nation had been strong and concrete by modern industrial capitalism (3) His movements were in legal bounds and under constitutional way (4) His movements were intended to make legislations ; not to overthrow the government (5) His movements were national politics not power politics ; he never asked for political power but the civil rights

Let us continue studying comparatively with Mahatma Gandhis nonviolent civil disobedience campaign and the other mass movements to attain more compact lessons from the history. Ladies and Gentlemen please be thinkers as thyselves!

Tuesday, August 02, 2011 - Saturday, August 20, 2011 (Prologue is written by YE KYAW SWA) References : The Encyclopedia Americana Vol. 18*( from my notes on 02/26/92) Crisis Investing by Douglas R. Casey (1979)** http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/depression/overview.htm*** http://europeanhistory.about.com/od/russiaandukraine/a/The-RussianRevolution-Of-1917.htm # Hitler : A Study in Tyranny by Alan Bullock (1952)## http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/USAkingML.htm(KING)###

Poem
O Lady! we receive but what we give, And in our life alone does Nature live:
Samuel Taylor Coleridge (17721834), British poet. Dejection; an Ode (l. 4748). . . Poems [Samuel Taylor Coleridge]. John Beer, ed. (1993) Everyman.

http://quotes.dictionary.com/O_Lady_we_receive_but_what_we_give

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Collectors Items
- Senate confirms 1st US special envoy to Myanmar FIRSTPOST.
- US Calls North-South Korea Meeting Important Step voa news - Richard M. Nixon - The china card - President Profiles - The evils of unregulated capitalism by Joseph E Stiglitz - Kerry's statement on Burma policy by CSIS Southeast Asia Program - Testimony of David I. Steinberg - September 30, 2009

QUOTATION
IF your right eye causes you to sin, pluck it out and throw it away from you. You had better lose one of your members than have your whole body cast into hell. And if your right hand causes to sin, cut it off and throw it away from you. It is better to lose one of your members than have your whole body cast into hell. MATTHEW 5:29 -30 (The New Testament P 11, 1977 Edition)

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Senate confirms 1st US special envoy to Myanmar

Aug 4, 2011 #inthespotlight/Friday, August 5th 11:19 PM IST

Washington: The Senate has confirmed the nomination of the first US special envoy to Myanmar. Derek Mitchell will lead Washingtons efforts to engage with the militarydominated Asian country and encourage democratic reform that have progressed little in two years.

Derek Mitchell will lead Obama's efforts to engage with the military-dominated Asian country and encourage democratic reform. Pablo Martinez Monsivais/Reuters

Mitchell was previously a senior defence official for Asia-Pacific affairs. His new position as special representative and policy coordinator for Myanmar has the rank of ambassador. It has been vacant since it was mandated under 2008 legislation that increased sanctions on Myanmars regime. The Senate also confirmed late Monday the nomination of David Shear as ambassador to Vietnam that had been blocked by lawmakers protesting against US handling of adoptions of Vietnamese orphans by some American families. http://www.firstpost.com/fwire/senate-confirms-1st-us-special-envoy-to-myanmar53829.html

Asia July 22, 2011 US Calls North-South Korea Meeting Important Step David Gollust | Bali, Indonesia

Photo: AP Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, left, attends a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, right, on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Ministerial Meeting in Nusa Dua, Indonesia Friday, July 22, 2011. The United States says the meeting between North and South Korean diplomats at the ASEAN conference in Bali is an important step, but that it is too soon to say if talks on Pyongyangs nuclear program can be put back on track. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton discussed North Korea and other issues in Bali with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jeichi. North and South Korean diplomats had a positive assessment of their meeting Friday on the sidelines of the annual ASEAN Regional Forum. But officials traveling with Secretary Clinton say they will withhold judgment on whether it advanced inter-Korean relations, until they can consult with the South Korean team.

A senior State Department official says the Bali meeting followed months of private back-channel conversations between the two that yielded little. He says there was some significance to the fact the two sides met publicly in a highprofile venue like the ASEAN meeting. He also says prodding by China may have figured in the North Korean decision to take part. The Korean situation figured heavily in Secretary of State Clintons meeting on the ASEAN sidelines with her Chinese counterpart. As they began the talks, Clinton welcomed the agreement reached here on a code of conduct for peacefully resolving territorial disputes between China and four ASEAN states over the South China Sea. I want to commend China and ASEAN for working so closely together to include implementation guidelines for the declaration of conduct in the South China Sea," Clinton said. "And of course we will discuss our mutual desire for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Seated across the table from Clinton, Foreign Minister Yang said Beijing, which claims the entire sea, wants to see a peaceful settlement. I do believe that the conclusion of the guidelines is of great significance," he said. "And it will go a long way to maintaining peace and stability and good-neighborliness in the region. This will provide favorable conditions for the proper handling and settlement of disputes among the claimants. Clinton will end her foreign trip Monday with a meeting with Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo in the southern Chinese city of Shenzhen. The senior State Department official says Foreign Minister Yang expressed to Clinton Chinese displeasure over President Obamas meeting earlier this week with the Dalai Lama. Clinton in turn raised Chinas human rights record.

But he says the meeting was very productive and professional. He also says the fact the two Clinton meetings were not cancelled is a pretty clear indication that both sides understand the stakes in their broader relationship. Clinton attended several multilateral meetings Friday, including two focused on environmental protection along the lower Mekong River, a vital resource for an estimated one billion people in the region. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell says that Laos has promised to extend a freeze on plans to build a hydro-electric dam across the Mekong. And thats a major achievement," he said. "And the Secretary and all the key players in the meetings commended the Laotians for taking such a forward-leaning position. Campbell says the U.S. will conduct studies with Laos on the likely consequences of the dam. At closed-door ASEAN Regional Forum plenary, Secretary Clinton called on Burmas new nominally civilian government to release political prisoners, talk with the opposition, and address growing concerns about alleged weapons proliferation activity with North Korea. She said the Burmese government has a clear choice of taking such steps and gaining the confidence of its people and the world community, or continuing down a path of political isolation. http://www.voanews.com/english/news/asia/US-Calls-North-South-Korea-MeetingImportant-Step-126018333.html

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President Profiles
Richard M. Nixon - The china card Vietnam was the great failure, and China the great success, of Nixon's diplomacy. He recognized the advantages that could accrue to the United States by exploiting the Sino-Soviet rift. Peking might put pressure on Hanoi to settle the Vietnam War, while American-Soviet relations might also be affected if Americans and Chinese achieved a dtente. During his bid for the presidency Nixon argued, in an article published in the journal Foreign Affairs (October 1967), that "we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates, and threaten its neighbors. There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation." These comments were surprising, coming from a politician who had made a career of attacking as "soft on Communism" any American political leader who dared to suggest similar ideas. Hostilities broke out in March 1969 between Soviet and Chinese troops along the Ussuri River, giving Nixon his chance to pursue a diplomatic opening. The first step, recommended by the National Security Council (NSC) and the State Department, was to lift travel and trade restrictions. Then, on visits to President Yahya Khan of Pakistan and General Secretary Nicolae Ceauescu of Romania, Nixon hinted that he would like better relations with China. By 1970, Walter Stoessel, the American ambassador to Poland, was meeting with Chinese diplomats in Warsaw. In April 1971, signs of a thaw between the two powers became public knowledge, as an American table-tennis team was invited to play in China and was received by Premier Chou En-lai. Later a Chinese team was sent to the United States as part of this "Ping-Pong diplomacy." By the end of April the Chinese indicated privately they would receive a high-ranking emissary from Washington, and Nixon decided to send Henry Kissinger in secret to make arrangements for a summit meeting. On 2 August, Secretary of State Rogers said that the United States would withdraw its opposition to the seating of Communist China in the United Nations, which occurred in October 1971; but the United States resisted the expulsion of Taiwan unsuccessfully. During the summer Nixon announced that he would visit China early in 1972, and Kissinger was then sent to Beijing for another trip.

Kissinger and Chou negotiated the outline of a statement dealing with the outstanding issues dividing the two nations. Nixon's visit to China, which began 21 February 1972, was a field day for the news media. The Chinese permitted American television crews to set up modern studio and transmitting facilities. For ten days the world press followed Nixon as he spoke with Chinese leaders and toured the country. Meanwhile, Kissinger and Deputy Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua continued work on the statement that was to be issued by the two sides at the conclusion of the visit. The final document, known as the Shanghai Communiqu, summarized points on which the two nations could agree. One point was that there was only one China and that Taiwan was part of China. Another was that the Taiwan issue must be settled peacefully by the Chinese. A third was that the United States was committed to "the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan" in the context of a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. Each of these points contained some ambiguity. The communiqu did not mention which government, the Communist one on the mainland or the Nationalist one on Taiwan, was the legitimate government of "one China." Neither did it mention American treaty commitments to the government on Taiwan. It did not specify a timetable for withdrawal of American forces from Taiwan but only committed the United States to the objective of withdrawal and linked it to a peaceful settlement. Nevertheless, the agreement was the beginning of a new era in Sino-American relations. Trade, tourism and cultural contacts increased. The new relationship did little to help American diplomacy in other matters. The Chinese were unwilling or unable to bring pressure to bear on Hanoi. The China opening may have convinced the Soviets to negotiate an arms agreement, but it is more likely that it convinced them that a plot to encircle them could be countered only by a massive military buildup. Soviet shifting of forces to the East did bring about an advantage to the allies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for a brief time until the effects of the Soviet buildup in conventional arms were felt. http://www.presidentprofiles.com/Kennedy-Bush/Richard-M-Nixon-The-china-card.html

Opinion
The evils of unregulated capitalism Remedy for the US economy: end the wars, rein in military and drug costs, and raise taxes - at least on the very rich. Joseph E Stiglitz Last Modified: 10 Jul 2011 08:27

Looking at austerity measures implemented in the past, it becomes clear that they only leave those countries poorer and more vulnerable [GALLO/GETTY] Just a few years ago, a powerful ideology - the belief in free and unfettered markets brought the world to the brink of ruin. Even in its hey-day, from the early 1980s until 2007, US-style deregulated capitalism brought greater material well-being only to the very richest in the richest country of the world.

Indeed, over the course of this ideology's 30-year ascendance, most Americans saw their incomes decline or stagnate year after year. Moreover, output growth in the United States was not economically sustainable. With so much of US national income going to so few, growth could continue only through consumption financed by a mounting pile of debt. I was among those who hoped that, somehow, the financial crisis would teach Americans (and others) a lesson about the need for greater equality, stronger regulation, and a better balance between the market and government. Alas, that has not been the case. On the contrary, a resurgence of right-wing economics, driven, as always, by ideology and special interests, once again threatens the global economy - or at least the economies of Europe and America, where these ideas continue to flourish. In the US, this right-wing resurgence, whose adherents evidently seek to repeal the basic laws of mathematics and economics, is threatening to force a default on the national debt. If Congress mandates expenditures that exceed revenues, there will be a deficit, and that deficit has to be financed. Rather than carefully balancing the benefits of each government expenditure program with the costs of raising taxes to finance those benefits, the right seeks to use a sledgehammer - not allowing the national debt to increase forces expenditures to be limited to taxes. This leaves open the question of which expenditures get priority - and if expenditures to pay interest on the national debt do not, a default is inevitable. Moreover, to cut back expenditures now, in the midst of an ongoing crisis brought on by free-market ideology, would inevitably simply prolong the downturn.

A decade ago, in the midst of an economic boom, the US faced a surplus so large that it threatened to eliminate the national debt. So what happened? Unaffordable tax cuts and wars, a major recession, and soaring health-care costs fueled in part by the commitment of George W Bush's administration to giving drug companies free rein in setting prices, even with government money at stake - quickly transformed a huge surplus into record peacetime deficits. The remedies to the US deficit follow immediately from this diagnosis: put America back to work by stimulating the economy; end the mindless wars; rein in military and drug costs; and raise taxes, at least on the very rich. But the right will have none of this, and instead is pushing for even more tax cuts for corporations and the wealthy, together with expenditure cuts in investments and social protection that put the future of the US economy in peril and that shred what remains of the social contract. Meanwhile, the US financial sector has been lobbying hard to free itself of regulations, so that it can return to its previous, disastrously carefree, ways. But matters are little better in Europe. As Greece and others face crises, the medicine

du jour is simply timeworn austerity packages and privatisation, which will merely leave
the countries that embrace them poorer and more vulnerable. This medicine failed in East Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere, and it will fail in Europe this time around, too. Indeed, it has already failed in Ireland, Latvia, and Greece. There is an alternative: an economic-growth strategy supported by the European Union and the International Monetary Fund. Growth would restore confidence that Greece could repay its debts, causing interest rates to fall and leaving more fiscal room for further growth-enhancing investments.

Growth itself increases tax revenues and reduces the need for social expenditures, such as unemployment benefits. And the confidence that this engenders leads to still further growth. Regrettably, the financial markets and right-wing economists have gotten the problem exactly backwards: they believe that austerity produces confidence, and that confidence will produce growth. But austerity undermines growth, worsening the government's fiscal position, or at least yielding less improvement than austerity's advocates promise. On both counts, confidence is undermined, and a downward spiral is set in motion. Do we really need another costly experiment with ideas that have failed repeatedly? We shouldn't, but increasingly it appears that we will have to endure another one nonetheless. A failure of either Europe or the US to return to robust growth would be bad for the global economy. A failure in both would be disastrous - even if the major emergingmarket countries have attained self-sustaining growth. Unfortunately, unless wiser heads prevail, that is the way the world is heading.

Joseph E Stiglitz is University Professor at Columbia University, a Nobel laureate in economics, and the author of Freefall: Free Markets and the Sinking of the Global Economy. The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily represent Al Jazeera's editorial policy. A version of this article was previously published on the Project Syndicate.
Ref: http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/07/20117714241429793.html

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Read Kerry's statement on Burma policy and the nomination of Derek Mitchell as Special Representative for Burma. by CSIS Southeast Asia Program on Wednesday, June 29, 2011 at 10:28am United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations WASHINGTON, DC

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: June 29, 2011 CONTACT: SFRC Press Office, 202-224-3468

Chairman Kerry On Burma Special Envoy Washington, DC This morning, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry (D-MA) submitted a hearing statement on U.S. Burma policy at the nomination hearing for Derek Mitchell to be the Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma. Chairman Kerry was an original co-sponsor of the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act of 2008 that created this special envoy position for Burma. He and the thenChairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Howard Berman (D-CA) wrote to Secretary Clinton on August 5, 2010 to inquire about the administrations efforts to fill this position. If Burmas leaders make the strategic decision to change, the appointment of a U.S. presidential envoy dedicated to Burma policy offers them an opportunity to redefine their relationship with the United States, pursue policies that can benefit their people, and begin the restoration of Burmas damaged international reputation, said Chairman Kerry. I and others will be watching to see whether Burmas government is interested in a path towards peace and democracy or whether it remains anchored to the failed policies of the past. A critical upcoming test will be Aung San Suu Kyis ability to speak

freely and move about the country. My experience working to improve relations with Vietnam taught me that clear-eyed diplomacy, combining elements of pressure and engagement, can encourage even an authoritarian regime to change course, particularly if Washington works in concert with like-minded members of the international community. This holistic approach holds the best chance of achieving real results for Burmas long-suffering people.

The full text of Chairman Kerrys hearing statement, as prepared, is below:

Today, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee convenes to consider the nominations of Derek Mitchell to be Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma, with the rank of Ambassador, and Frankie Reed to be Ambassador to the Republic of the Fiji Islands, the Republic of Nauru, the Kingdom of Tongo, Tuvalu, and the Republic of Kiribati. Both the nominees before the Committee today have distinguished records, and they are well-qualified to represent the United States overseas in these important posts. Given the moral imperative of fashioning a wise policy that benefits Burmas longsuffering people, I would like to take a moment to discuss the opportunities and challenges that await one of our nominees: Mr. Mitchell, our current Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, and the Presidents deserving choice to be his special envoy for Burma. If confirmed, I have every confidence that Mr. Mitchell will faithfully implement the Obama administrations dual-track approach towards Burma. After years of a onesided, sanctions only policy that did not produce change, the Administration is seeking to combine pressure with principled engagement to encourage the Burmese government to embrace reforms and make a genuine transition to civilian, democratic rule. Let me be clear: The special envoy position's mandate is to undertake a comprehensive international effort that includes both engagement with Burmas leaders and working with Burmas neighbors and international organizations to coordinate more effectively pressure for change. This holistic approach holds the best chance of achieving real results.

When he arrives in Naypyidaw for the first time early in his tenure, the Presidents envoy will need to assess the implications of recent developments in Burma, including the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, the controversial 2010 elections, and the formation of a government led by a former top regime general and now President, Thein Sein. Many questions linger about Burmas new parliament and its civilian government. The elections that produced them reflected a deeply flawed process with highly restrictive rules that excluded the main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD). All the while, the NLDs longstanding leader Daw Suu remained sidelined under house arrest. Members affiliated with the old regime and military appointees occupy almost 90 percent of all positions in the legislatures. While many former military officers now wear civilian clothes, Senior General Than Shwes role in daily affairs is not readily apparent. It is similarly unclear how much power various institutions such as the presidency, vice presidencies, the cabinet, the parliament, the United Solidarity and Development Party and the Tatmadaw (the military) will wield over time. If confirmed, I expect Mr. Mitchell will test and probe in principled ways to understand the new political dynamics inside Burma and see if there is a possibly changing environment that is more amenable to calls for reform. This will require him to consult broadly with various stakeholders, including the government; Daw Suu and other current and future NLD leaders; other legitimate democratic groups; civil society; ethnic groups; and, of course, the international community. While creatively exploring how best to encourage political change, our envoy will also need to search for ways to help Burmas people today, including through more effective implementation of humanitarian programs that can empower them. The Burmese government could take some tangible steps to show it is sincere about making real progress: Releasing political prisoners, easing media and speech restrictions, making good on President Thein Seins recent promises of economic reforms, devoting more resources to education and health, as well as allowing greater space for international and non-governmental organizations to help meet the critical needs of the Burmese people would be a good start. Minimal concrete steps to date in

these areas combined with deeply troubling reports of sensitive military technology transfers from North Korea and renewed violence in Kachin state and other ethnic regions make fair-minded observers wonder whether Burma is still conducting business as usual. I believe the Administration is prepared to improve ties with Burmas government if it breaks from the policies of the past. For their part, Burmese diplomats have repeatedly expressed a desire for better relations. In fact, they recently asked for a few modest U.S. measures to build confidence such as calling the country by its current name Myanmar, and removing travel restrictions on visitors to its United Nations Mission in New York, who have to adhere to a 25-mile limitation. Yet, there has been very little progress by Naypyidaw on either core human rights concerns or an inclusive dialogue that leads toward national reconciliation. In the months ahead, both sides should explore taking carefully-calibrated measures independent of each other to begin a process that encourages constructive change inside Burma and could lead to serious talk on tough issues. Burma could grant the ICRC access to prisoners, for example, while the United States could allow it observer status in a signature, new U.S. program focused on environmental, health, education, and infrastructure development in mainland Southeast Asia called the Lower Mekong Initiative. Make no mistake, U.S. efforts to encourage democratic reform and progress on human rights will get more traction if our envoy is able to forge greater multilateral cooperation on all facets of U.S. Burma policy. Other Southeast Asian countries can send a message about their own expectations by linking Burmas chairmanship of ASEAN in 2014 to tangible political progress. Burmas giant neighbors, China and India, are also indispensable partners in this equation. My experience working to improve relations with Vietnam taught me that clear-eyed diplomacy, combining elements of pressure and engagement, can encourage even an authoritarian regime to change course, particularly if Washington works in concert with like-minded members of the international community.

I and others will be watching closely to see whether Burmas government is interested in a path towards peace and democracy or whether it remains anchored to the failed policies of the past. The appointment of a U.S. presidential envoy dedicated to Burma will afford its leaders an important, new opportunity to pursue policies that benefit their people, can improve relations with the United States, and begin to repair their international reputation. http://www.facebook.com/notes/csis-southeast-asia-program/read-kerrys-statementon-burma-policy-and-the-nomination-of-derek-mitchell-as-sp/10150303395699747

U.S. SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS HEARINGS ON BURMA September 30, 2009 Testimony of David I. Steinberg Professor School of Foreign Service Georgetown University

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: It is an honor to have been asked to participate in what I feel has been a long overdue dialogue on Burma/Myanmar* problems. I believe there are no easy answers to improving relations and making progress toward our several goals in that country, but I am, and continuously have been, a firm believer in dialogue on this issue within the

United States, between the U.S. and other states, as well as with the Burmese themselves, both the government and the opposition. I thus applaud the Obama administrations decision to engage Burma/Myanmar.
(* In 1989, the military changed the name of the state from Burma to Myanmar, an old written form. The opposition, followed by the U.S., has never accepted that change as from a government they regard as illegitimate. The UN and other countries use Myanmar; thus, the name of the country has become a surrogate indicator of political inclination. Here, both are used and without political implications. Burmese is used for the citizens of that country and as an adjective. )

I am supportive of this new look, including Senator Webbs trip to Burma/Myanmar. I believe this also reflects the views of a growing number of Burmese country specialists. It is, as I have written, only a first step. Secretary of State Clintons statement that sanctions and engagement have both been tried and neither has worked is accurate, but for different actors. The U.S. continuously tried sanctions, gradually strengthening them in response to deteriorating conditions within that country. ASEANs position has also evolved; it first tried constructive engagement that seemed mere economic exploitation. But worked for the U.S. meant regime change, and for ASEAN it later meant regime modification. This strategic divergence has perhaps both hindered achieving the changes in that country we seek and made more difficult an effective relationship with ASEAN. Of course, trying to force a government to leave power in the hope that one would then engage them is a non-sequitur. The new position, articulated by the Secretary of State, that sanctions and dialogue are not necessarily contradictory is accurate as far as it goes; it is a relatively temporary state, however, that should be resolved over some reasonable period, but it does not preclude other actions that might mitigate tensions and differences. I believe most foreign observers want to see Burma/Myanmar make democratic progress and improve the well being of the diverse Burmese peoples. We are aware of and deplore the misguided economic, social, and ethnic policies that for a half-century have made what was predicted to be the richest nation in the region into the poorest. We share goals on (2) its political and economic future, but have differences in the

tactics needed to secure these objectives. But by isolating Burma/Myanmar, we have in effect played into the hands of Burmese military leaders who thus justify their position that a garrison state under their control is necessary because of perceived foreign threats and the potential break up of the Union. The U.S. in the past has not tried engagement and dialogue, although the U.S. now want them and the National League for Democracy (NLD) has called for them for some time. We now believe that the military must be part of any political solution; this is a new, evolved, and more positive position, and one now shared by the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi. Our consideration of Burma/Myanmar has concentrated on governance issues to the virtual exclusion of a broad range of problems that should be analyzed. Indeed, by concentrating essentially on politics we may have missed opportunities to affect positively other deplorable conditions in that country. We understand and sympathize with those who have suffered egregious human rights abuses. We understand the plight and frustration of those exiles who want a better Burma, and who place political change as the primary factor in this process. This approach, however, has not worked, and, in contrast, I would suggest we start by focusing on the Burmese peopletheir sorry condition and how to alleviate their plight. There is a major socio-economic crisis in that state, one that was early recognized by the UN but exacerbated by the Nargis cyclone, and one that requires pervasive reform and extensive assistance. It is also one that the government denies. In this hearing, I have been asked to testify on three basic points:

[1] Prospects for political reform and the potential role of the U.S. in promoting democracy and the upcoming elections; [2] The economic and strategic implications of unilateral U.S. sanctions; [3] Steps that can and should be taken to improve the U.S.-Burma relationship.

[1] Prospects for political reform and the potential role of the U.S. in promoting democracy and the upcoming elections. If we are to evaluate the prospects for reform, we must first understand that the present attitudes and positions of the U.S. and Burmese governments are virtually diametrically opposite with starkly divergent appraisals of the past and present reality. Both sets of perceptions reflect differing cultural backgrounds and different priorities, even how power and authority are viewed. Trying to reconcile these irreconcilable perceptions will not be productive now; it is time to concentrate on how to affect the future. We may distinguish short term potential U.S. responses to encouraging the democratic aspects of the forthcoming 2010 elections from those that could foster democracy in the longer term. These two aspects of reaction are not seamless, but could produce antithetical results if unbalanced. Concentrating on the short term period before the 2010 elections and possible disappointments therein, while ignoring the longer-term future, may obscure more distant democratic opportunities. Considering only the longer term approach (3) could vitiate chances, however tenuous, for early progress. The results of the planned 2010 elections might result in a new political dynamic, one that eventually opens some political space that could evolve into more effective governance. We should not ignore that possibility. The prospects for political changes before the 2010 elections, however, seem dim. The military will not renegotiate the new constitutional provisions approved in 2008, as the NLD has demanded. Whether the NLD would participate in the elections if allowed, is still uncertain. Various parties, both those government backed and opposition, are in the process of formation in advance of articulated state regulations. These elections from the juntas viewpoint are in part designed to wipe out the 1990 election results which the NLD swept, so the NLD has a dilemma: to participate destroys their previous claim to authority, but to abstain marginalizes them even further. The political end game is fast approaching, and the NLD needs to salvage its position or it may disintegrate or split. Whatever happens to the NLD, other opposition parties will participate and have some voice (rather sotto voce) in the new government, but one in

which the military will have veto power on critical issues. There is no question but that the government and the legislature emerging from the 2010 elections will be dominated by the military, which will have 25 percent of the seats reserved for active-duty officers and thus can prevent unwanted amendments to the constitution, which require 75 percent approval. Military control will be taut on issues it regards as vital to the country and over its own defense affairs, but may allow some avenues for debate and compromise. The U.S. should recognize that these elections will take place, and that their results, however fair or unfair, will strongly influence the future of Burma/Myanmar over the next half-decade and longer. We must deal with that reality. We should continue to call for the release of all political prisoners, the early promulgation of a liberal political party registration law and voting legislation, the ability of all parties to campaign openly and relaxation of the press censorship law so that parties may distribute campaign literature. We should encourage the UN and ASEAN to request permission to monitor the elections and vote counting. Although unlikely to be approved, the effort should be made. The U.S. might consider, through ASEAN or the UN, to supplying technical assistance and computer software for accurate ballot counting. This has been done in some other countries. These important considerations, however, even if ignored and even if the military were to engage in acts against the minorities or opposition that are reprehensible, should not terminate dialogue and a staged process of attempting to improve relations to mitigate these vital poroblems. I believe the Burmese administration sadly had no intention of allowing Aung San Suu Kyi out of house arrest before the elections, and that her trial was unnecessary for that purpose, for the junta would have found some rationale for her detention in any case. A longer term approach to encouraging democracy in Burma/Myanmar should also be instituted at the same time. Yet the role of the U.S. in affecting positive change is limited by Burmese perceptions of the U.S., the U.S. internal political process, and U.S. past actions related to Burma/Myanmar. The junta is suspicious of the U.S. There are two decades of distrust that strongly influence present and future relations. This heritage may not be insurmountable, but it

is significant. The Burmese fear a U.S. invasion, however illogical that may seem to Americans. (4) This accounts for their refusal to allow the U.S. to deliver directly relief supplies to the Burmese in Cyclone Nargis. Our cry for regime change and the outpost of tyranny characterization are not forgotten. Our support for dissident groups along the Thai border reinforces these fears, as does the potential role of Thailand as a perceived surrogate and ally of U.S. policy in the region. The U.S. has held the Burmese to a different, and more stringent, standard that we have for other authoritarian regimes with which we deal in terms of the political parties, religious freedom, and even human rights. In the region, China, Vietnam, and Laos immediately come to mind. Strong congressional and public antipathy to dialogue, let alone more productive relationships with the regime, often center on the role and fate of Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, and affect U.S. policy changes. Recent indications that she is willing to reconsider sanctions that she has in the past encouraged are welcome. Several approaches to longer-range problems should be considered. The build up of indigenous civil society through the international NGO community is one element in the attempt to encourage more pluralism over the longer term and to begin to alleviate suffering and problems through local organizations more cognizant of local needs. Even under authoritarian regimes, civil society has important functions, and ironically the government since 1988 has allowed more civil society groups, both foreign and indigenous, to function then under the 1962 military government, although it has done so with political restrictions. More basic human needs assistance (humanitarian aid) is necessary (health, education, nutrition, agriculture) to help the society out of the economic mire in which perhaps half the population is either under or at the World Bank defined poverty line. The education system may have been expanded, as the government claims, but the quality has been destroyed. Health care is dismalsaid to be the worlds second worst. Thirty percent of children are malnourished to some degree. The per capita foreign assistance in Burma/Myanmar is about twenty times less than that provided to Laos. In a country like Burma/Myanmar, where the state intervenes administratively and personally at virtually all levels, it may be necessary to work with state institutions (such as the health

system) if the people are to be helped. Depending on how this is done, it may be a small price to pay to assist the population. In essence, by improving education and health, the groundwork of a more competent and vital populace will be developed that would better contribute to any new, and eventually more representative, government. Without such improvements, when changes come, as they inevitably will, a new more open government will be saddled with even more difficult problems that might have been earlier mitigated. Third, there is one thing the U.S. does wellthat is train people. Building up human capital is a primary requirement if the state is to progress. Modern training in basic human needs fields and in economics and related disciplines is essential. The country has lost perhaps three percent of its total population through migration due to political and economic problems and lack of opportunity, as well as through warfare and the threat of violence. Although two percent may be workers and undereducated minorities, one percent is an educated group who might have been the backbone of any new liberal administration. Even should internal conditions improve, many, perhaps most, would not return because they have become rooted in other societies. Either directly or through ASEAN, modern training should be provided either in the U.S. or in the region. This is essential for future progress. The (5) international NGOs employ some10,000 Burmese and the UN some 3,000 more. They and others should be given the opportunity to acquire advanced skills so they can contribute to future development under improved governance. The U.S. should recognize that the military is and will be for a long period a cardinal socio-economic force. The military now controls all avenues of social mobility in that society. This was not true in the civilian period. Beyond the public sector, they also have important economic assets in terms of military owned and run conglomerates that influence and even control large elements of economic activity. Those families that are ambitious and may even be opposed to the military in their administrative roles now send their sons into the military as the only real avenue of mobility and advancement. Alternative avenues, such as the private sector and other autonomous institutions, must be developed if there is to be an eventual balance between civilian and military

authority. Real change will only come when these new avenues of social mobility are opened. This will take a long time, as it took in South Korea, and as it is now taking in Thailand and in Indonesia. The military will remain a vital element in that society for the foreseeable future. This should be recognized and efforts made both to help provide alternative avenues of mobility and also to broaden military attitudes and knowledge in terms of national development needs and social change. Military-to-military contacts are important, and I think it was wise of the U.S. to continue to have a military attach attached to the embassy in Rangoon, in contrast to the EU, which withdrew them in 1996 and assigned them all to Bangkok.

[2] The economic and strategic implications of unilateral U.S. sanctions [2a] Economic implications of sanctions Although some in the Congress wanted to impose Cuba-like sanctions in 1997, cooler heads prevailed. The four tranches of sanctions (1988, 1997, 2003, 2008) have had several effects. It has denied market access to the U.S. It has resulted in other states, especially China, increasing its market share. It has also resulted in a loss of jobs for the Burmese peoples, a country already wracked with high un- and under-employment. And it has not resulted in an improvement in human rights or working conditions for the Burmese. In addition, it has lost to U.S. businesses markets and some jobs that would have been important, but it has not injured the Burmese government, which has simply substituted materials and services from other states, including some from our allies. Sanctions have been, admittedly, the moral high ground, but they have accomplished none of the U.S. objectives of reform and change. The present U.S. sanctions policy toward Burma/Myanmar illustrates how easy it is to impose sanctions, and how difficult it is to eliminate them once imposed. Yet, while encouraging the private sector, we should remember that although it is an important avenue for development, it is not a panacea. Those who consider that fostering foreign investment and encouraging the indigenous private sector will early bring democracy had better be prepared for an extended waitwitness South Korea (1961-1987) and Taiwan (1949-1992).

[2b] Strategic Issues Sanctions and an absence of dialogue have resulted in a lack of public recognition, (6) until recently, of the strategic importance of Burma/Myanmar in the region. The need in a democracy to discuss publicly the multiple bases of foreign policy has been ignored we have concentrated on human rights and democracy alone. These are important, necessary elements of foreign policy, but not the complete picture. If the American public and the Congress are to support any administrations foreign policy, the full range of U.S. interests needs articulation. Burma/Myanmar is the nexus on the Bay of Bengal. It will be a major issue in future China-India relations. Both countries are rapidly rising in economic terms and are likely to be eventual rivals. Chinese extensive penetration of Myanmar prompted a complete change in Indian policy from being most vehemently against the junta to a supporter and provider of foreign aid. A secondary motive was to mitigate the rebellions in the Indian Northeast, where rebel organizations have had sanctuaries in Myanmar. India bid for Burmese off-shore natural gas, but China has basically dominated that field and will build two pipelines across Myanmar to Yunnan Provinceone for Burmese natural gas and the second for Middle-Eastern crude oil. China is supporting more than two dozen hydroelectric dams in Burma/Myanmar with important potentially negative environmental effects. One strategic Chinese concern is the bottleneck of the Straits of Malacca through which 80 percent of imported Chinese energy transits. Should the straits be blockaded, Chinese defense and industrial capacities could be negatively affected, and drops in employment could threaten political stability. Chinese activities in Myanmar mitigate this concern. In reverse, some Japanese military have said that the ability of the Chinese to import oil through Myanmar and avoid the Malacca Straits and the South China Sea is not in Japans national interests. India is also concerned with potential Chinese influence in the Bay of Bengal through Burma/Myanmar. The Burmese have used the issue of China in their analysis of U.S. attitudes toward that regime. Burmese military intelligence has specifically written that the interest of the U.S. in regime change in Myanmar was because Myanmar was the weakest link in the U.S. containment policy toward China. Although the original statement was published in

1997, it had been reprinted 28 times by 2004. The Burmese have not understood that the U.S. concern was focused on human rights, but perhaps their statements were designed to, and have reinforced, the importance to the Chinese of support to the Burmese regime and thus increased Chinese assistance both economically and militarily. It should be understood, however, that Burma/Myanmar is not a client state of China. The Burmese administration is fearful of the roles and inordinate influences of all foreign governments, including the Chinese, the Indian, and the U.S., and with considerable historical justification. The Chinese government for years supported the insurrection of the Burma Communist Party, India is said to have assisted Kachin and Karen rebels and in the colonial period controlled much of the economy, and the Thai a multitude of insurgent groups. The U.S. previously supported the Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang) remnant forces in Burma. More sustained dialogue could help us understand the strategic dynamics of Burma/Myanmar, including its obscured relationship with North Korea. Although the U.S. under three presidents(Clinton, Bush, and Obama) have invoked the phrase The actions and policies of the Government of the Union of Burma continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the (7) United States, this statement is simply an administrative mantra and gross exaggeration because this language must be used (under the Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1997) if the executive branch wishes to impose unilateral sanctions (it was used recently in the case of North Korea). That does not mean there are no problems. Non-traditional security issues abound, such illegal migration, trafficking, narcotics (now, metamphetamines), health issues, but none of them reach the status of an extraordinary threat either within the region or to the United States. Although Burma/Myanmar was once rightly castigated for its heroin production (although the U.S. has never accused the government itself as receiving funds from the trade-- it tolerated money laundering activities), the U.S. National Drug Threat Assessment of 2009 indicates that opium production dropped significantly since 2002, and that since 2006 the U.S. could not chemically identify any heroin imported into the U.S. from Burma/Myanmar. Rather than assisting in the improvement of health as a cross-national problem, the U.S. refused to support the Global Fund, which was to provide $90 million in that country over five years to counter HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. The

Europeans instead funded the Three Disease fund with $100 million of the same period to fight the same diseases. We should be concerned about the stability of the state and administration. China, India, ASEAN, the U.S. and other countries want stability. Although the Burmese state appears strong in terms of its coercive control, poor and deteriorating economic conditions, internal displacement of peoples, delicate and potentially fluid and explosive minority relations, arbitrary and repressive military actions, political frustration, and the influx of massive illegal Chinese immigrants (estimated at perhaps two million) and their increasing hold over the economy are elements that could easily result in internal violence, ethnic rioting (as in 1967), and deteriorating conditions that are against the interests of all external actors and the Burmese people themselves. We should be trying to convince the Burmese administration itself that it is the interests of their country to reform, for only then will stability be possible. [3] Steps that can and should be taken to improve the U.S.-Burma relationship. The Burmese authorities have been told by many that improvement in U.S.-Burmese relations will require significant actions by the Burmese themselves to justify changes in U.S. policy. Political attitudes in the U.S. preclude immediate or early lessening of the sanctions regimen without such reciprocal actions. In the first instance, however, increases in humanitarian assistance (basic human needs, such as health, education, nutrition, agriculture) are essential. Step-by-step negotiations are a reasonable way to proceed, perhaps the only way. Signals have been sent by both sides that some changes are desirable, but good words alone will not work. And whatever the U.S. proposes must be done with the support of both the executive and legislative branches, in contrast to an abortive executive attempt to improve relations on narcotics in 2002 that faltered in the Congress. It should be understood that such staged dialogue by both sides is not appeasement, and that both sanctions and engagement are tactics to secure objectives, not ends in themselves.

It should also be understood that as a general commentary on such negotiations, (8) expecting the Burmese to humiliate themselves before any foreign power and give in to foreign demands, whether from the Chinese or the U.S., is a recipe for a failed negotiations. Public posturing should be avoided, and quiet diplomacy take place to which the Burmese can respond to the need for progress and change within their own cultural milieu and with a means of explaining to their own people that these are indigenous solutions to indigenous problems. Unconditional surrender, which the U.S. has advocated on many occasions, is not a negotiating or dialogue position. To start the process, the U.S. should approve of a new Burmese ambassador (previously nominated) to Washington. The last one left in November 2004 after the ouster of Prime Minister Khin Nyunt in Burma/Myanmar and had nothing to do with sanctions issues. The administration should also be prepared to nominate an ambassador to Myanmar, even though there may be strong and negative congressional reactions. That person would be different from the ambassadorial position as coordinator under the Lantos 2008 sanctions legislation, and the choice of that person is important if there is to be credible dialogue with the government, since it calls for direct talks with the Burmese. There are also areas where our interests overlap, and where coordinated efforts could be productive in themselves and in trying to build the confidence required if relations in other fields are to improve. We have a mutual interest in the environment, and indeed the U.S. has been working with the Burmese on protection of wildlife. There is much we could accomplish together and an urgent need. There are cooperative relations that could prove important in disaster preparation, for Burma/Myanmar is subject to earthquakes and cyclones that annually devastate the Burmese coast, although not normally with the force of Nargis. There is still work to be done on the missing-in-action U.S. soldiers whose planes went down in Burma flying from India to China during World War II. There are the needs of the minorities who have been generally excluded from development. An especial reference should be made to the Rohingyas, the Muslim minority on the Bangladesh border who have remained stateless and who have suffered the most. Although the U.S. has concentrated its attention on political issues and human rights in general, the minority question in Burma/Myanmar is the most

important, long-range and complex issue in that multi-cultural state. There is a need to find some fair manner in the Burmese context for their development, the protection of their cultural identity, and the sharing of the assets of the state. Within the unity of Burma/Myanmar, the U.S. might be able to contribute to this process. Further, improving relations with Burma/Myanmar will help strengthen our relations with ASEAN. The U.S. has made significant and welcome progress in the recent past, and the dialogue with Burma/Myanmar would help that process. The U.S. signing the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in July 2009 was a forward step. In a variety of authoritarian states, the U.S. has supported programs that were designed to improve justice and the rule of law. Although this may seem counterintuitive, such programs could be of value in training individuals and assisting institutions to administer justice more fairly when they are in a position to do so. Although the United States objected when Australia started some human rights training in Burma/Myanmar (as it had done in Indonesia under Suharto), the exposure of key individuals with some responsibilities for dealing with such problems would be an investment for a time when they are able to use that knowledge to further goals we all share. The U.S. could join with the (9) Australian program for ASEAN designed to provide counter-terrorism training courses at the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement. Burma/Myanmar has cooperated with the U.S. on some counter-terrorism activities, including but not limited to authorizing overflights of the country after9/11. The U.S. use of the term for the name of the state, Burma, rather than the military designated term, Myanmar (an old term, but one used in the modern written language) is simply a result of following the NLD. The military regard that as an insult. Although I believe the change in name was a tactical error, especially during a year when the government was trying to encourage tourism, many states, even those of which we disapproved, have changed their names and place names and the U.S. has followed. It did, however, take a couple of decades for the U.S. to change Peking to Beijing. The Burmese need to respond to any U.S. overture. One might suggest to the junta that in light of the good performance of the international NGOs during the Nargis crisis, that the January 2006 stringent and deleterious regulations on their operation be

waived, and that new ones formulated in collaboration with the NGO community. We want greater changes, but this start would be significant and allow the international NGOs to make a greater contribution to development in that country. Increases in humanitarian assistance, required in any event, would be greatly facilitated by such action. If the Burmese were to respond to this step-by-step process, and if the 2010 elections were carried out in some manner with widespread campaigning and participation regarded as in a responsible manner (admittedly a term with strong cultural roots), then the U.S. could withdraw is opposition to multilateral assistance from the World Bank or Asian Development Bank if that government were to adhere to the banks new requirements for transparency and good governance. Burmese economic policy formulation is opaque, and such activities might not only provided needed light, but also encourage a sense of reality among the military leadership, some of whom are said to be insulated from the dire conditions in the country. The U.S. could modify its sanctions approach; some have called for more targeted sanctions that could be an indicator of gradual improvement of relations. If we want to influence the new generation in Burma/Myanmar, why do we then under the sanctions program prohibit the children and grandchildren of the military leadership from studying in the U.S.? These are just some of the people from influential families whose attitudes toward the U.S. we should hope to change. If the sanctions policy were to be modified and gradually rescinded, it would require significant reforms for that to happen. It is probable that not much will be possible before the 2010 Burmese elections, that date of which has not yet been announced. Until then, it is likely the Burmese government will be primarily focused on actions leading up to that activity and have limited interest in important changes. That does not mean we should not try to affect change in that period. Some general comments may be in order. It is important in any international negotiations that the U.S. not be wedded to the interests of any particular foreign leader or group, for although their objectives may be similar, their tactics, views, and

immediate interests may differ from U.S. national interests. U.S. policy should not be held hostage to foreign attitudes, however benign. (10) In negotiations, it is also important not to characterize the military as we have in the past with rogue, pariah, thuggish, and other such terms. The regime has to be treated with civility or any discussions will fail. We conceive grammatically and politically of the military as singular, but in fact it is plural, and there are elements who are not corrupt, who have a sense of idealism in their own terms, who want to do something for their own society, and who recognize that improved governance internally and better relations externally are part of that process. We should understand the potential diversity of the military and seek to identify and encourage positive thinking on their part. The question will be asked whether dialogue and negotiations as suggested in the paper will provide an added degree of legitimacy to the present military regime or one evolving from the 2010 elections of which the U.S. may not approve. Any relationship involves a delicate equation in which one attempts to gauge the benefits and the disadvantages involved toward reaching the goals that have been set. In the case of Burma/Myanmar, I believe the advantages to the United States and to the peoples of Burma/Myanmar outweigh any slight fillip of legitimization the regime may claim. I believe the people of that country are more astute. We should also negotiate with the Burmese on the basis that their primary national goal of the unity of the Union is a shared goal of the U.S., and that we do not want to see the balkanization of Burma, but that the actions of their own government and the attitudes of some of the military convey the impression that they are an occupying army in some minority areas, and this undercuts the willingness of some of the minorities to continue under Burman rule, and thus the ability of that government to reach its goal. It is in the interests of the region and the world not to see a break up of the country, but that unity can only be achieved through internal respect and dignity among all the peoples of the state, and through real developmental efforts to which the U.S. could contribute under conditions to be negotiated.

I am not sanguine about early progress, but what has been done in the past months and this hearing itself are important beginnings and should be continued and expanded. Thank you for giving me this opportunity to contribute to the process of dialogue. --David I. Steinberg is Distinguished Professor of Asian Studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. His most recent volume is Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone

Needs to Know (Oxford University Press).

N.B., Numbers in brackets are original pages.

Epilogue

Mao, in contrast to all other political leaders I have known, almost never engaged in soliloquies. Not for him were the prepared points most statesmen use, either seemingly extemporaneously or learned from notes. His meaning emerged from a Socratic dialogue that he guided effortlessly and with deceptive casualness. He embedded his main observations in easy banter and seeming jokes, maneuvering his interlocutor for opportunities to inject comments that were sometimes philosophical and sometimes sarcastic. The cumulative effect was that his key points were enveloped in so many tangential phrases that they communicated a meaning while evading a commitment. Maos elliptical phrases were passing shadows on a wall; they reflected a reality but they did not encompass it. They indicated a direction without defining the route of

march. Mao would deliver dicta. They would catch the listener by surprise, creating an atmosphere at once confused and slightly menacing. It was as if one were dealing with a figure from another world who occasionally lifted a corner of shroud that veils the future, permitting a glimpse but never the entire vision that he alone has seen. Yet Mao could be brutal in cutting to the heart of a problem. On one of my later trips I commented to Teng Hsiao-ping that the relations of our two countries were on a sound basis because neither asked anything of the other. The next day Mao referred to my comment and at one and the same time showed his attention to detail. He firmly rebutted my banality: If neither side had anything to ask from the other, why would you be coming to Peking? If neither side had anything to ask, then why . . . would we want to receive you and the President? At another point he indicated his displeasure with what he took to be American ineffectuality in resisting Soviet expansionism; he compare us to swallows in the face of a storm: This world is not tranquil, said the gusts painfully emitted from the shattered hulk, and a storm ------ the wind and the rain ----- are coming. And at the approach of the wind and rain the swallows are busy. . . . It is possible to postpone the arrival of the wind and rain, but it is difficulty to obstruct the coming. This was the colossus into whose presence we were now being ushered. He greeted Nixon with is characteristic sidewise glance. Our common old friend, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, doesnt approve of this, he joked, taking Nixons hand in both his own and welcoming him in front of the photographers with great cordiality ---- in itself an event of considerable symbolic significance, at least for the Chinese who were present or who would see the photograph in the Peoples Daily. Mao remarked about a statement Nixon had made on the plane ride to Chiao Kuan-hua, that he considered Mao a man with whom philosophical discourse was possible. (This was yet another example of the extraordinarily rapid Chinese internal communication, as well as of Maos careful briefing.) Mao joked that philosophy was a difficult problem; he had

nothing instructive to say on the subject; maybe Dr. Kissinger should take over the conversation. But he repeated the formula several times to avoid specifics on the international problems Nixon was raising. When Nixon put forward a list of countries requiring common attention, Maos response was courteous but firm:Those questions are not questions to be discussed in my place. They should be discussed with the Premier. I discuss the philosophical questions. Nixons memoirs give a graphic and accurate account of the meeting.*There were the jokes about my girlfriends and how I used them to set up a cover for my secret journeys. There was a mocking exchange about the epithets the leaders of Taipei and Peking were hurling at each other. There was an extraordinary indication of Maos preference for the greater calculability of conservative leaders over the sentimental oscillations of liberals:I voted for you during your election, he told the startled Nixon. People say you are rightists, that the Republican Party is to the right, that Prime Minister Heath is also to the right. . . . . I am comparatively happy when these people on the right come into power. Mao used the context of a generally teasing conversation about Nixons political prospects to mention his own political opposition. There was a reactionary group which is opposed to our contact with you, he said.The result was that they got on an airplane and fled abroad. The plane crashed in Outer Mongolia, Mao and Chou explained, in case we had missed the reference to Lin Piao. Nixon made an eloquent statement (reproduced in his memoirs) of his long journey from anti-communism to Peking, based on the proposition that the foreign policy interests of the two countries were compatible and neither threatened the other. Mao used the occasion to give us an important assurance with regard to our allies as if the thought had occurred to him only while Nixon was speaking:Neither do we threaten Japan or South Korea.

(Epilogue is the excerpts from the book named White House Years written by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger: from page 1059, 1060 & 1061 of Part Four - 1972: From War to Peace: Chapter XXIV - Nixons Trip to China ) First Edition-1979

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Collectors Items
- Senate confirms 1st US special envoy to Myanmar FIRSTPOST.
- US Calls North-South Korea Meeting Important Step voa news - Richard M. Nixon - The china card - President Profiles - The evils of unregulated capitalism by Joseph E Stiglitz - Kerry's statement on Burma policy by CSIS Southeast Asia Program - Testimony of David I. Steinberg - September 30, 2009

SELECTED NEWS AND VIEWS COLLECTED BY YE KYAW SWA

No 3 - Wednesday, August 24, 2011