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ENLARGEMENT OF DEMOCRACY AND CHANGES IN THE BOLIVIAN PARTY SYSTEM

BY FERNANDO MAYORGA UGARTEi

In 1952, a nationalist revolution started important transformations in Bolivia: agrarian reform, mine nationalization and universal voting. This last measure gave political rights to peasants, indigenous people and women. However, representative democracy was weak because the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) dominated the party system and politics was limited to disputes among the partys leaders. This dispute concluded with a coup detat held in 1964 which initiated a cycle of military governments. .After fifteen years a very conflictive period of transition to democracy began in 1978s later it was possible to install the first civilian government. Thus, in October 1982, the longest democratic period in Bolivias history began. Since then, democracy has functioned under a hybrid kind of presidential regimen, a mixed electoral system and a moderate multipartyism. However, in December 2007, the Constitutional Assembly approved a constitutional reform that, although it must still be approved or rejected by a national referendum, already announces a different political arena. The hybrid nature of this presidentialist system of government is a corollary of the constitutional norm that allows the presidents election by a parliamentary final decision, if no electoral candidate has obtained the absolute majority of votes in the general elections. Between 1982 and 2002, five general elections took place, and none had a winner with an absolute majority in the electoral boxes. Thus, the constitution and election results forced

the political parties to build up parliamentary or presidential coalitions, first, in order to elect a president, and, second, to establish links of mutual cooperation between the executive and legislative powers, and, thus, to secure political stability to the government and its future administration. This kind of political interaction between parties has been called Pact Democracy, and the resultant type of government is known as a hybrid or parliamentary presidency (Gamarra 1992, Mayorga Ren 1992). In 2005, for the first time, a candidate obtained an absolute number of votes in the general elections, and, therefore, the government was assumed directly by the leading party, which, in this case, did not need seek or establish parliamentary alliances. The electoral system supposes a model that combines representation by territory, in the High Chamber (Senators Chamber), and by population, in the Low Chamber (Deputies Chamber). In the first case, each of the nine departmentsii is represented by three senators, two for the majority and one for the first minority. As for the deputies, until 1997, they were elected by departments, in a single list for each party, by proportional representation according to each departments population. Later, since 1994, a new system was adopted. This is a mixed system that combines proportional representation by departments with simple majority rule for the uninominal districts (provinces sectors). In 2005, the electoral system was politically enlarged, eliminating the parties exclusive right to propose candidates by admitting two new possible contenders: the citizen clusters and indigenous peoples, which can also participate in the general and local elections. Also in 2005, after a political agreement and for the first time in Bolivias history, the departmental authorities (prefects) were directly elected by the citizens although, according to the Constitution, their nomination is still a presidential prerogative. Finally, the system of political parties presents itself as a moderately plural system, with an average of five relevant parties, that is, parties with enough capacity to be part of the parliamentary and governmental coalitions, or to perform as an efficient opposition. Along the years, the system of political parties has gone through some significant changes in its composition, notably, with the surge of political forces representing new social demands and identities. Likewise, the possible relationships between the parties went from a dominant since 1985 until de late nineties centripetal tendency towards a situation

marked by acute ideological polarization; a polarization that became quite problematic, especially since 2003, due to the surge of several social movements with political demands, whose active participation caused a growing weakening of the previous system of political parties. In this chapter we will evaluate the role played by the political parties in Bolivian democratization in a national context constantly subjected to critical situations and political changes. In order to analyze the mutations suffered by the system of political parties, we will consider the influence exerted by the lines of conflict or cleavages that, on one hand, divided the society, and, on the other, found institutional channels which motivated the surge, dissolution or renewal of political parties (Ramos 1995). In order to analyze the role played by the political parties, we will evaluate the institutional reforms adopted in order to solve deficiencies in the political systems functioning, especially as answers to the social demands for larger representation and participation. We must note that this social factor is very important in Bolivia. Since 1952, the countrys political history has been marked by a constant and significant presence of labor unions and social movements in the political processes, frequently questioning the supposed leading role of the political parties. Emphasizing these factors, we begin by reviewing the historical development of Bolivias political parties from 1982 to 2005 and then, in a final section, focus more directly on the relationship between the parties and democracy today. Historical Phases: Bolivian Parties and Elections from 1982 to 2008 To understand the recent history of Bolivian parties it is necessary first to recognize that during the period 1982 to 2005 several cleavages -- among which the economic, territorial, and ethno-cultural conflicts were the most salient -- shaped and partially reformed the Bolivian party system. . The cleavage state vs. market manifested itself in the contradiction between policies emphasizing the states intervention in the economy, on the one hand, and, on the other, those that promote the private investments. Since 1985, a transition from state capitalism to neoliberalism was implemented, by a series of measures destined to adjust the economic structure, but, lately (since 2005), the state has again taken a leading role. On other hand, centralism has been and still is a dominant trait in the

organization of the Bolivian state. The territorial cleavage (central vs. regional) has manifested itself in the regions struggle for political decentralization, a struggle that has been present throughout Bolivias history, so much so that a historian once affirmed that the history of Bolivia is the history of the regions struggle (Roca 1999). Finally, the ethnic cleavage is a manifestation of the cultural diversity that resulted from the Spanish conquest and colonization of the indigenous territory and people, a cleavage that began in 1825 (year of the national independence). Policies of cultural homogenization, promoted during the nineteenth century and later, did not succeed as in other parts of Latin America. As democratization began, with its consequent enlargement of the active

citizenship, ethnic demands began to acquire a growing importance.New parties, closely articulated with the peasant syndicates and the indigenous organizations, were structured, and in January 2006, Evo Morales, a peasant leader of indigenous origin, democratically assumed the presidency of the Republic. His party promotes constitutional reform that emphasizes the collective rights of the indigenous and peasant communities, disregarding regional demands for greater departmental autonomy. A new cleavage has thus emerged between the social groups and political actors promoting regional demands, on one hand, and those fighting for ethno-cultural policies, on the other. This new cleavage is clearly manifested in the intense struggle carried out regarding the reform of the state, especially in relation to the territorial distribution of power. With this summary of shifting cleavages in mind, we may now distinguish three phases in the recent history of the Bolivian political parties. In each phase we begin with an overview and then discuss the parties and specific developments in the Bolivian party system The first phase, inaugural and foundational, lasted three years, from 1982 to 1985, and, in general, it was marked by the fragility of the new democratic and political institutions. The popular expectations in the democratic transition manifested themselves by a boom in social demands coming from the labor unions and peasant syndicates, which had been the main actors during the resistance and fight against the military dictatorships. These demands were not positively solved, due to the aggravated inflationary crisis; in
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consequence, the social sectors, which previously supported the government, began to radicalize their protests. Moreover, the government an electoral alliance of national parties and leftist groups did not have a parliamentary majority, and the permanent struggle between the executive and legislative powers ended up in an unmanageable political crisis. This acute lack of governability was solved thanks to a political accord that decided to shorten the current presidential period and anticipate the next general elections. Thus, the political parties entered into a new phase with two main challenges: to solve the economic crisis and, at the same time, to establish some procedures in order to guarantee political stability. Political change began in October 1982, when the first civil government was finally installed with Hernn Siles Suazo as president, at the head of an alliance of political forces (the Unidad Democrtica y Popular, UDP), composed of the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario de Izquierda (MNRI), the Partido Comunista Boliviano (PCB), and the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario (MIR). In 1980, this same alliance had won the general elections, but it did not take control of the government because a military coup dtat interrupted the process. In 1982, the UDP won again, this time with 34.1% of the total votes. The general results showed a clear voting tendency in favor of the Left, with almost half of the total votes. Nevertheless, despite the ideological affinity, the UDP was not able to articulate this tendency and transform it into a parliamentary majority, and thus had to govern with feeble legislative support. The political parties considered Centrist obtained almost a third of the total votes, with the leader being the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) with 17% of the votes. As a tendency, the Right obtained nearly a fifth of the votes, with a leading 14.8 % obtained by the Accin Democrtica Nacionalista (ADN). (see Table 1). These voting tendencies mask the real dispersion of the political forces. Not only did 13 candidates run for office, but 11 parties obtained parliamentary representation. Obviously, the political representation was extremely fragmented. The initial consensus between the parties, about the need to end military rule and a willingness to grant tolerant support to the UDP, in order to favor the democratic process, was promptly displaced by the political polarization. Eventually, the struggle between officialism and opposition paralyzed the public administration, and the economic crisis, inherited from the military regimes, became almost unbearable.
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The outcome was a dismembering of the ruling front which found itself pressed by two extremes: the permanent mobilization of the labor unions, by means of strikes and street marches, on one hand, and, on the other, the systematic parliamentary boycott carried out by the opposition against the executive initiatives. Meanwhile, the Left divided itself into the governmental officialism and the labor unions; the main forces of Center and Right (MNR and ADN) deployed their opposition by means of a concerted control of the legislative chambers. The brand-new system of political parties was now forced to act under an antagonistic logic of friend and foe. That struggle was quite evident in Congress, where, systematically, the opposition blocked all initiatives proposed by the executive power. Furthermore, due to the UDPs legislative minority, the opposition parties found no real resistance when they exerted pressure. That legislative situation also weakened the governments capacities to negotiate with the labor movement. The economic crisis, quite acute due to the galloping hyperinflation, motivated a multiplication of labor strikes and sectoral protests, which, along with the political instability caused by the mutual blockade between the executive and legislative powers, led to a situation of democracy at drift (Mayorga Ren 1987). At the end of 1984, the political crisis was solved by an agreement among the parties to move forward the national elections, initially foreseen for 1986. The procedure was a novelty because it made possible a dialogue for democracy, mediated by the Catholic Church, in which not only the political parties took part but also several social actors, in particular the entrepreneurs. The labor unions and the peasantry did not participated in this dialogue, because such accords diminished the effect of their demands. With the labor unions relatively defeated, the parties began to play a leading role in the political representation. During this phase, the dangers of a possible regression to the previous authoritarian militarism were eliminated, as the accord between the social actors and the political parties solved the crisis by means of an electoral solution. Nevertheless, it also became quite evident that the government was extremely fragile when the ruling party lacked a parliamentary majority. If the political instability introduced into the political agenda the
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theme of governability, the growing economic crisis stimulated the debate about the states role in a market economy. Also, the low degree of democratic institutionalism became quite evident when the general elections were moved forward without respect for the existing constitutional rules, and a social actor foreign, in principle, to the political institutions the Catholic Church had to be brought in to mediate between the political and social contenders. The second phase, from 1985 through the early 2000s, was a period of adaptation and stability for the parties. The prevailing economic model was designed to reduce the states intervention in the economy. Neoliberalism was the answer to the existing cleavage between state and market, and its implementation was carried out by adopting measures of structural adjustment, aimed at stopping hyperinflation (20,000 %!) and capitalizing the public enterprises with foreign capital. The political scheme that went with this economic orientation was the formation of coalition governments, negotiated among the traditional parties, which alternated in the governments management during eighteen years. During this phase, some new political parties which expressed nationalist and ethno-cultural social demands appeared on the scene, but they did not alter the scheme, because they adapted themselves to the rules of the representative democracy. Governmental stability was guaranteed by means of political pacts which allowed a concerted majority in Congress to support the executive powers initiatives. However, popular protests against neoliberalism and Pact Democracy began to shake the existing panorama in 2000. The results of the general election in 2002 confirmed that tendency, notably due to the presence of leftist opposition forces, linked with the peasant and indigenous movements. This new presence changed the previous composition of the system of political parties. In 2003, the last governmental coalition between traditional parties was resignation. Specific changes in the parties and the party systems for this period began with the elections in 1985, which produced a re-composition of the parties spectrum. There were eighteen candidates, but, in Congress, only ten parties obtained representation; furthermore, the parliamentary representation was concentrated in three major parties: formed but the political polarization and the social protests induced crises that, eventually, lead to the presidents

ADN, MNR and MIR.iii In contrast with the previous elections, the Right and Center tendencies obtained more than half the votes (ADN 28.6% and MNR 26.4%), while the Left seemed to be losing its previous leading presence the MNRI disappeared, on one hand, and, on the other, the political forces akin to the peasant and labor movements began to disaggregate with the exception of the MIR (8.9%), transformed into the third parliamentary force (see Table 2). During this period, the logic of political pacts between the parties was inaugurated and, eventually, established; on this occasion, by means of a parliamentary accord between the MNR and the AND. They both agreed to support Vctor Paz Estenssoro, the MNRs candidate, at the head of the government, who then could count on the support of AND, the main force in the parliamentary. Despite their initial differences between 1985 and 1989 these two parties worked together, first, in order to readjust the economic structure, and, also, to secure the political stability by means of a direct collaboration between the executive and legislative powers. A new economic policy was implemented. It stopped the hyperinflation and laid the foundations for an economic model aimed to dismantle the interventionist state. The structural adjustment and its measures were following the recommendation from the Washington Consensusiv the answer to the problematic cleavage state/market. In order to implement those measures a pact was subscribed between the MNR the party that in the 1950s had led the national revolution with the ADN until then, the lonely critic to the states omnipresent economic role. Besides its economic effects, this new economic policy practically dismantled the once very powerful miners labor union, whose weakening, in a certain way, helped to consolidate the growing protagonism of the political parties. Political stability was based on a parliamentary pact between the ruling party and the main force of the opposition, and the system of political parties became the space in which the national policies were decided. Thus, a new model of governability, the so called Pact Democracy, was forged. This tendency became almost systematic in 1989, when the three traditional parties (MNR, 23.1%; ADN, 22.6%; and MIR, 19.6%) concentrated almost two thirds of the total votes. On the other hand, the opposition, aggregated in the alliance Izquierda Unida (IU)
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obtained only 7.2% of the votes. A novelty in this election were the results (11.0%) obtained by Conciencia de Patria (Condepa) (see Table 3). This new party was the first expression in Bolivia of neopopulism, a political current that appeared in several Latin American countries during the 1980s, around leaders who criticized the traditional parties and their economic programs. Besides Condepa, this current was strengthened by the creation of the Unidad Cvica Solidaridad (UCS).v Their presence was very important because they represented the impoverished sectors of the population (notably, urban migrants, feminine domestic labor force, and petty merchants); in a certain way, inside the system of political parties, they took the spaces previously occupied by the Left. Moreover, they incorporated new social identities into political representation. For example, they were the first to put an indigenous woman into the parliament. They also advanced demands for a better and fairer economic redistribution, questioning the new economic policy. They insisted on this issue because their electoral supports were the poor and the needy, and because their programs offered governmental assistance to benefit them. Nevertheless, the existence of two parties with the same characteristics limited the chances that a neo-populist candidate could successfully dispute the presidency, as happened in other countries of the region. The surge of neo-populism had already been quite manifest in the municipal

elections. Since 1987, in order to strengthen the democratization process, local governments were elected in those years, the practice was limited to the main cities and certain provincial capitals. In 1989 and 1991, Condepa and UCS, taken together, represented one third of the electorate, alternating for third place. In both elections, the traditional parties obtained more than half of the total votes, and the winner was the Acuerdo Patritico (AP), an alliance between ADN and MIR; the Left did not go beyond 10% of the votes. In 1991, neo-populism reached the zenith of its possible electoral presence. This result put into evidence two facts. First, both neo-populist parties had to face the fact that their incapacity to address effectively the medium and upper classes hindered their electoral growth; moreover, as was the case with Condepa, the high concentration of its bases in a single department (La Paz) made it almost impossible to transform itself into a national party. Second, there was no real connection between the neo-populist municipal forces and its possible weight at the national level: UCS did not possess parliamentary
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representation, and Condepa, although it supported Jaime Paz Zamoras nomination, was not a functional part of the governmental alliance that ruled Bolivia during 1989-1993. That is, the neo-populist articulation with the current political system was partial and marginal, and, thus, the fear that these parties could become real adversary forces was dissipated, especially, when, at the municipal levels, they began to subscribe to pacts of alliance with the traditional parties. Nevertheless, the neo-populist presence modified the traditional ideological spectrum usually divided between Right and Left and strengthened Pact Democracy. Thus, the political parties could converge toward an ideological center, where the representative democracy and economic neoliberalism might coexist with no real problems or frictions. This centripetal tendency became practically institutionalized in 1989, with the election of Paz Zamora as president of the Republic, by means of a parliamentary accord subscribed between the ADN and MIR, which had finished second and third, respectively, in the general elections the MNR was first- but this time it was not able to negotiate successfully the necessary parliamentary majority. The new ruling alliance implied several interesting facts. Since the MIR was a political force related to the Left and the ADN was representative of the Right, this pact diluted the ideological polarization in the system of political parties, and a new discourse which we define as democratic neoliberalism became not only dominant, but, also, gave a new shape to the political scene. Democratic neoliberalism can be represented as a horseshoe, with representative democracy on one end, and economic neoliberalism on the other; in this image, there is narrow space between the extremes, a space where the parties with parliamentary representation, although ideologically opposed, may interact.vi The MIR was akin to the pole representative democracy due to its resistance and fight against the military dictatorship but it was alien to the economic neoliberalism due its leftist perspective. On the other hand, the ADN openly subscribed to the neoliberal policies a mark of its rightist perspective but its real commitment with the democracy was still unknown since its leader had been a dictator. Thus, ruling the country, the MIR started to manage the structural adjustment, and began to privatize the

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states enterprises, that is, found itself fully compromised with the neoliberal reform. For its part, ADNs support to Paz Zamora for the presidency, despite the MIRs third place, indicated its willingness to obey the democratic rules. Thus, the risks of an authoritarian return or a change in the economic adjustment disappeared from the political scene. Moreover, the MNR, first force of the opposition, was the party that most clearly combined the poles articulated by the democratic neoliberalism. Besides this convergence between political forces from Right and Left (for the new governments management), another decisive event took place. The current surge of the neo-populist parties (Condepa and UCS) did not alter the hegemonic tendency of the forces of democratic liberalism; on the contrary, this tendency was strengthened because both parties entered into the logic of political pacts. In 1989, Condepa backed up, in Congress, the election of Paz Zamora as president, and, as part of their agreement, this party was to manage a regional office of development; moreover, between 1991 and 1995, with the support of the MIR and ADN, Condepa took control of the municipality of La Paz, seat of the national government. For its part, in 1989 and 1991, the UCS signed a post-electoral pact with the MNR in order to govern the municipalities of several important cities across the country. Later on, the neo-populist parties were to become direct partners in the national governmental coalitions, thus putting into evidence, if necessary, the strength of the centripetal tendency, which characterized the system of political parties at that time and defined the trend of the political and economic reforms. During the 1989-1993 presidential period, the ruling administration deepened the economic liberalization, when several minor national enterprises were privatizated and, in some cases, contracts of shared risks with foreign capitals were created. Efforts at political reform focused on the need to perfect the electoral system, and to answer the criticisms by those who wanted the system to give representation to political institution other than the now traditional parties. Setting up new electoral rules and procedures, decentralizing political power, and securing the independence of the judiciary power received greater attention as the problems of governability diminished and social demands focused on subjects such as social participation, representation, and the quality of the nations democratic institutions.

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During this phase, the leading parties accommodated themselves to democratic neoliberalism and its codes, especially, those related to working to overcome the cleavages state/market and other demands grew stronger, authoritarianism/democracy. At the same time, however,

the ethnic questions, with demands such as the official

recognition of the multicultural nature of the country, and the political incorporation of the indigenous peoples as such. These demands by peasant and indigenous organizations became more forceful impulse starting from 1992, when the discovery of America was being celebrated. As a sequel to the neoliberal policies, another conflict also became manifest: the tension between privatization and social redistribution. The negative impact of the states withdrawal from social policies was indirectly palliated by the assistances practiced by the neo-populist leaders. Both issues ethnic demands and social policies influenced the later electoral campaigns and their programs. In 1993, the general elections brought the MNR back into the government. Snchez de Lozadas victory was the clearest during this phase, with 33.8% of the total votes. The former governmental coalition (ADN and MIR) obtained 20%. The neo-populist vote added up to almost a third of the electorate (Condepa with 13.6% and UCS with 13.1%), a sign, by the way, of relative stagnation (see Table 4). In other words, in 1993, the system of political parties remained stable, with five relevant forces, all of which were committed to the codes of democratic liberalism. This convergence made possible several agreements between the ruling party and the opposition, in order to carry out further reforms. Nevertheless, the parties strategies and discourses did nor remain the same. The MNR, for example, invited an indigenous intellectualvii to run for the vice-presidency, in order to dispute strategically Condepas constituency, on one hand, and, on the other, perhaps more important, to address the peasant and indigenous movements, whose demands and social presence were increasing. The MNRs candidate had recognized that In Bolivia, it is not enough to use your head, you must also have a heart, talking about the need to include assistance to the needy in the electoral strategies and incorporating the ethnic and political social demands into the governments plans for further actions. The logic of political pacts continued and this time the new government was build around the MNR supported by the UCS, MBL (Movimiento Bolivia Libre, a moderate left
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wing party) and MRTKL (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Katari de Liberacin, an indigenous party). For its part, the opposition was leaded by the ADN and MIR, which, in general, concurred in the current economic and political model. During 1993-1997, the new economic policy acquired an integral dimension, notably with the capitalization of the monopolistic states enterprises in electricity, railways, telecommunications, air transportation, and hydrocarbon, that is, with investments provided by transnational capitals. However, education and health care public services were not privatized. The regional cleavage was answered with a law that privileged local developments, recognizing democratic governments in all municipal districts. The municipal governments were strengthened with fiscal resources, according to their population number. The departments, however, benefited only from administrative decentralization. These measures, together with an equity bonusviii, were answers to the redistribution demands, as well as initiatives to palliate the negative effects caused by the privatization of the national enterprises.

In 1994, a partial constitutional reform was approved. The articles related to the economic regime were not altered, as most of the changes affected the political system, and were intended to correct the existing deficiencies in quality and efficiency of the democratic institutions. In order to face the ethnic cleavage, several constitutional provisions were adopted, among which the most salient were the open recognition of the nations ethnic and cultural diversity, the formalization of the peasant and indigenous authorities and organizations, the official delivery of communal lands to the indigenous peoples, and the recognition of their traditional forms of law. Also, a new educative policy was launched, which included intercultural elements and bilinguism. Especially at the municipal level, economic neoliberalism was thus now combined with a form of participatory democracy, anchored in multicultural policies. The 1997 electoral results confirmed the stability of the political party system and strengthened its moderate multi-partyism, with five parties having significant parliamentary forces. On this occasion, the ADN won the elections with 22.3% of the votes; the MNR was second, with 18.2%; Condepa obtained 17.2%; the MIR (16.8%) was closely followed by the UCS with 16.1% of the votes (see Table 5). Overall, neopopulism
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once again gained approximately one third of the citizens support, and, together, the three already traditional parties obtained more than half of the total. The Left barely approached 6%, but the electoral and consequent, parliamentary presence of the cocaleros (peasants, producers of coca leaves) began, with four representatives in the Low Chamber, giving birth to their political instrument, the Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS). The surge of new social identities and political actors ratified the systems capacity to integrate new forces, because the opposition was still manageable, and institutional politics was still capable of dealing with the social demands and conflicts The governmental coalition reproduced a previous pact between MIR and ADN, but, this time, the elected president was Hugo Bnzer Surez, the former dictator. The coalition included a recently created party, Nueva Fuerza Republicana (NFR), and, also, Condepa and UCS. This large coalition enjoyed an absolute control in both Congress Chambers, so the parliamentary opposition became literally irrelevant, and, in order to manifest their protests and demands, the anti-governmental sectors had to use other channels, outside the institutionalized ones. During 1997-2002, despite the intention to modify some of the laws approved by the previous government, economic policy retained its original pattern. One novelty was the plan to eradicate the coca leaves plantations, a measure that, gradually, turned into a very important political issue, especially due to the pressures exerted by the United States and its need to fight the narcotraffic. To this, the peasants movement answered defending the coca leaf as a symbol of cultural resistance, thus adding new ingredients to the opposition, led by MAS, against neoliberalism as a foreign intrusion. Another novelty were the national dialogues, in which civil societys organizations participated along with the parties with parliamentary representation, in order to decide the use of the resources generated by the foreign debts reduction. Despite such participative initiatives, a cycle of social protest against neoliberal policies began in 2000, combining criticisms against Pact Democracy with demands for a more participative democracy, all under the banner of constitutional reform. The questioning of the current post-1985 model of governability had already begun to express itself in 1997, with the presence of left wing forces in Congress, such as the MAS,
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which combined their opposition in Congress with extra-parliamentary actions massive protest marches and road blockades abetted by their close relationship with the syndicated movements, especially the peasantry. Thus, an alternative protest against the neoliberal policies began to take form, proposing a larger role for the state in the economy, while questioning the representative capacity of the dominant political parties. An urban protest, against the privatization of the water services, and road blockades, carried out by peasant syndicates and indigenous communities, started a process of popular mobilizations, with serious political consequences. The mentioned political consequences became evident in the 2000 general elections. The traditional parties weakened and new ones appeared in the political arena. The MNR won the elections with 22.4% of the total votes; the MIR was fourth, with l6.3%; and, notably, the ADN had a minimum response (3.4%). After sixteen years of hegemony, the parties of Pact Democracy obtained, together, less than half of the votes nevertheless, after the parties negotiations, the MNRs candidate, Gonzalo Snchez de Lozada was elected president, with the MIRs support. As for the other parties, the MAS finished second, with 20.94%, -with Evo Morales as candidate-, and, since it did not negotiate its votes, became the head of the opposition; next came a new party, with neo-populist traits, the Nueva Fuerza Republicana (NFR), with 20.91%. In these elections, the Movimiento Indgena Pachacuti (MIP), an openly indigenist party also appeared (see Table 6). The electoral debates and campaigns foretold what was to come; they were marked by the rebuff to the capitalization project, on one hand, and by the growing demands for a constituent assembly, on the other. The new government had to rule with feeble parliamentary support and had to face a powerful opposition from the new forces (MAS and MIP), which went from criticizing the economic model to an open demand for the nationalization of all enterprises related to the countrys natural resources, in order, they proclaimed, to found the country anew. The centripetal tendency, marked by the neoliberal hegemonic capacity and Pact Democracy, came to an end. The system of political parties became more polarized, with the MAS as the head of the opposition transformed into the second electoral force. The ruling official majority, not long ago sufficient to insure a stable governability, now could
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no longer prevent political instability, nor ensure passage and implementation of the governments decisions. Agreements between officialdom and opposition were no longer possible., due to their programmatic differences. Confrontations replaced accords, and, in October 2003, the political crisis had to be resolved by the presidents resignation, after a large and violent popular revolt. Phase Three: Crisis and Polarization, 2003-2008 The third phase began in October 2003, when a popular revolt caused the fall of the government that had been elected only fifteen months previously. From then on, the path of this phase remained and remains quite uncertain, because the political crisis has transformed itself into a state crisis. It began with large social protests and was followed by a growing discrediting of representative democracy, dominated by the leading role played by the political parties. The popular protests caused two presidential resignations in a space of twenty months, and the political crisis had to be answered with the call for new national elections, which took place in December 2005. As noted, these elections resulted in the first victory by absolute majority of votes ever obtained by a single candidate, and, therefore, control of the government could be assumed without the need to form a coalition among several parties. The new government put forward a program emphasizing indigenous rights and demands, and aimed at strengthening the states role. The system of political parties suffered a profound reformulation because several traditional parties disappeared from the electoral scene and, at the same time, political organizations, strongly articulated with the peasant and indigenous movements, consolidated themselves. In order to recover the states leading role in the national economy, the new

government began to replace the previous neoliberal measures with policies aimed at nationalizing the public enterprises. Likewise, representative democracy was broadened with the use of participative democracys mechanisms, such as referenda. The states reform began with a Constituent Assembly which approved a new Constitution project, clearly favoring the peasants and indigenous demands. Some regional movements, with

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urban support, rejected this result, however, demanding larger departmental autonomy, that is, a decentralized form of State. The existing contradiction between the ethnic and the regional demands regarding the territorial distribution of the political power was the central theme of the Constituent Assembly (August 2006 December 2007) and was partially solved with the constitutional recognition, at the same level, of departmental and indigenous autonomies. The new constitution will be voted on January 2009 to conclude the state transition This phase started with the crisis unleashed by President Sanchez de Lozadas resignation in October 2003 that dismembered the governmental coalition. For the moment, the crisis was solved constitutionally, when the contenders agreed to let the vice-president, Carlos Mesa, assume the presidency. Despite the agreements, Mesa had to face the situation without real parliamentary support. His ruling period lasted only twenty months, because the crisis followed its course and, besides the parties polarization, it gave place to an open struggle between social movements, which proposed mutually exclusive projects. On one hand, the MAS, and the peasant and indigenous movements, insisted on the immediate call of a Constitutional Assembly in order to reformulate the state, and, also, on their demands to nationalize the natural resources, notably, the hydrocarbons industry. On the other hand, the traditional parties and several regional civic committees demanded departmental autonomies and direct election of prefects. These social actors deployed massive mobilizations open cabildos (town councils), marches, blockades, all of which increased the parties polarization. Finally, the crisis ended up with another presidential resignation, and the call for general elections in 2005, a resolution finally accorded by the parties, due, in large measure, to the social pressures. Previously, in February 2004, a partial constitutional reform was approved. This reform had important consequences in the further behavior inside the political system. Mechanisms of participatory democracy, such as referenda and the constituent assembly, were incorporated with the goal of transforming the existing process of making decisions, and changing the existing procedures for reforming the Constitution (usually, Congress was in charge of that kind of reform, now, an assembly elected by the popular vote would decide it) . The participatory spectrum of the political system was also changed,
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incorporating new organizations into the political arena citizens clusters and indigenous peoples thereby eliminating the parties monopoly as agencies of political representation. The inclusion of the citizens clusters was a response to strong resentment against the parties, and recognition of the indigenous peoples rights to political participation was a sign of the growing strength of the ethnic cleavage, as peasant and indigenous movements took on leading social roles and MAS was transformed into the leading political force. The new structures of participatory and representative democracy did not close the possible political reforms. In December 2005, the prefects election by citizens choice took place, thus limiting the customary presidential right to nominate departmental authorities. The demand for nationalization of the hydrocarbon industry was solved by means of a national referendum; also, an agreement was reached to consult the citizenship about departmental autonomy, and, to call elections for a constituent assembly. The final results of the 2005 general election deeply affected the system of political parties. The Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS) won the elections with almost 53% of the citizens votes, the civil organization Poder Democrtico y Social (PODEMOS) was second, with 29%, Unidad Nacional (UN) obtained about 8%, and the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, the only survivor of the traditional parties, came close to 7% of the votes (see Table 7)ix. The victory of the MAS candidate, Evo Morales, was unprecedented: for the first time in this democratic period, a candidate could assume the presidency directly, without the need of parliamentary pacts. Two decades of governments formed by means of pacts between the traditional parties committed to combining neoliberalism with representative democracy, were left behind. After twenty years, the MAS victory also meant the return of the Left into the political power. This kind of Left is, nevertheless, very different from the one that came into power during the early 80s, anchored in the labor unions and the universities. The MAS is a political movement that represents ethno-cultural and peasant demands; it is supported by a conglomerate of syndicated organizations, social movements and indigenous peoples; it proposes a nationalist and statist project, and deploys an international policy akin to Venezuela and Cuba. Finally, it is articulated around the figure of Evo

18

Morales, the first Bolivian president with an indigenous origin, leader of the peasant syndicates of coca producers, and an iconic figure in the anti-globalization movement. The system of political parties found itself now reduced to four forces with parliamentary representation. The previous polarization became more acute, with a divided government, in which the executive and the legislative powers were in permanent struggle, mainly, because the opposition found no other way but to use its majority in the Senate as a last resort to confront the executives decisions. At the same time, an unheard of vertical division of powers appeared on the political scene, when most of the prefects elected by popular vote were opposition candidates (5, then 6, out of 9), and entered into conflict with the central government. The existing distances between the ruling party and the opposition were aggravated during the Constitutional Assembly (August 2006 to September 2007). This possible place for national consensus did not fulfill its purpose when, in the middle of several legal questions, the MAS used its large majority to approve a new constitutional text with a marked indigenist tendency. Although the new Constitution must still be approved in a national referendum, its current text is frequently treated by the ruling party as if it had been ratified. As an answer, the regional and parliamentary opposition approved autonomic statutes for several departments by means of local referenda, which also were contaminated by illegality. Thus representative democracy found itself surpassed by a plebiscitary logic that reached its peak in August 2008, with the call for a national referendum to revoke (or not) the president and prefects mandates, although such a procedure is in no way provided for by the current Constitution. In short, the system of political parties functionality presents some new traits, especially due to the active presence of institutional and political scenes that run parallel to the Congress and, therefore, weaken its capacity to deal in an orderly fashion with the political process. Moreover, the system of political parties finds itself subjected to the pressures exerted by the social movements, which clearly reveal the existing territorial and ethno-cultural fractures; fractures that, for the first time, have caused confrontations between civilians who support the government and the oppositions. phase whose outcome is still uncertain. Political crisis, ideological polarization and severe social conflicts are the main characteristics of this

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Nevertheless, the transition toward a (possible) new kind of state did not happen ed Party UDP MNRA ADN PS-1 FDR PRA-A MNRU FSB AFIN MITKA-1 PUB MITKA PRIN-A Votos emitidos: 1489.484 Data Source: Corte Nacional Electoral Table 2 National Elections, 1985 Party ADN MNR MIR MNRI MNRV PS-1 Votes 493.737 456.704 153.143 82.418 72.197 38.786 Percentage 28.6 26.4 8.9 4.8 4.2 2.2
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Votes 507.173 263.706 220.309 113.959 39.401 36.443 24.542 21.372 17.150 17.023 10.308 15.852 15.724

Percentage 34.1 17.0 14.8 7.7 2.6 2.4 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1

FPU MRTKL PDC FSB MRTKL POR ACP MNRI-1 IU FNP AUR ARENA Total Votes: 1504.060

38.124 31.678 24.079 19.958 16.269 13.712 12.918 11.696 10.892 9.635 9.420 8.665

2.2 1.8 1.4 1.2 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5

Data Source: Corte Nacional Electoral. Table 3 National Elections, 1989 Party MNR ADN MIR CONDEPA IU PS-1 MRTKL FULKA Votes 363.113 357.298 309.033 173.459 113.509 39.763 22.983 16.416 Percentage 23.1 22.6 19.6 11.0 7.2 2.5 1.5 1.0

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FSB MIN

10.608 9.687

0.7 0.6

Total Votes: 1,415,870 Data Source: Corte Nacional Electoral.

Table 4 National Elections, 1993

Party MNR Acuerdo Patritico CONDEPA UCS MBL ARBOL ASD VR9 FSB EJE IU MKN Independent

Votes 585.837 346.813 235.428 226.820 88.260 30.864 30.286 21.100 20.947 18.176 16.137 12.627 8.0960

Percentage 33.8 20.0 13.6 13.1 5.1 1.8 1.7 1.2 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.5

Total Votes: 1,731,309 Data Source: Corte Nacional Electoral.

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Table 5 National Elections, 1997 Party ADN MNR CONDEPA MIR UCS IU MBL VSB EJE PDB Votes 485.209 396.216 373.516 365.113 350.742 80.599 67.152 30.214 18.32 10.378 Percentage 22.3 18.2 17.2 16.8 16.1 3.7 3.1 1.4 0.8 0.5

Total Votes: 2,177,558 Data Source: Corte Nacional Electoral Table 6 National Elections, 2002

Party MNR MAS NFR MIR MIP UCS

Votes 624.126 581.884 581.163 453.375 169.239 153.210

Percentage 22.46 20.94 20.91 16.32 6.09 5.51

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ADN MCC PS Condepa

94.386 17.405 18.162 10.336

3.40 0.63 0.65 0.37

Total Votes: 2,994,065 Data Source: Corte Nacional Electoral.

Table 7 National Elections, 2005

Party MAS PODEMOS UN MNR MIP NFR FREPAB USTB Total Votes: 3,102,417

Votes 1544.374 821.745 224.090 185.859 61.948 19.667 8.737 7.381

Percentage 53.74% 28.59% 7.79% 6.47% 2.16% 0.68% 0.30% 0.26%

Data Source: Corte Nacional Electoral.

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Translated to English by Luis H. Antezana

ii

The countrys political and administrative division establishes the territorial existence of departments, provinces, municipalities (provinces sections) and cantons. Since 1897, the municipalities are autonomous, and, in 1995, this autonomy was enlarged to all provinces sections. The departmental level is nowadays subject to debate, with possible autonomous governments as a form of political decentralization.

iii

The MNR was founded in 1941, the MIR appears in 1971, and ADN was organized in 1979. The MNR played the leading role in the 1950s nationalist revolution; the MIR surged with a socialist trend and played an important role during the transition towards democracy; and, the ADN was a conservative party, organized around the former dictator Hugo Bnzer Surez who governed between 1971-1978.
iv

A compound of macroeconomic reforms for structural adjustments designed by the international financial organisms seated in Washington D.C. These measures were meant to promote economic growth in Latin America, favoring markets forces. Its economic and ideological orientations influenced the regions governments, and became a long range program with great incidence during the 1990s (Williamson 1989).
v

Max Fernndez, another neopopulist leader, head of the UCS, was excluded from the elections in 1989 when the polls showed a good panorama for him and his party. UCS will suffer several ups and downs before it could participate in that years municipal election (see Mayorga Fernando 1991).
vi

This analogy was proposed by Jean-Pierre Faye (1972), and was used by Luis H. Antezana (1983) to study the Bolivian revolutionary nationalism, the dominant ideology during the 1950s, with its extreme poles Nation and Revolution.

vii

Vctor Hugo Crdenas, the first indigenous to become vice-president, was the leader of the MRTKL, one of the katarismos branches the katarismo was an intellectual and syndicated tendency anchored in the aymara peasants communities; this movement installed within the Bolivian political discourse the ethic cleavage, denouncing the internal colonialism.
viii

This bonus meant a yearly amount of money for senior citizens, money that came from the states shares in the capitalized enterprises.
ix

PODEMOS and UN were created by former ADN and MIR leaders, in order to participate in the 2005 elections. The MAS was founded in 1999. That is, all of them are quite recent political forces, and they surged due to the traditional parties collapse.