P 290411Z MAY 06 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4726 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001778 SUBJECT: SHAWAYS' JADIRIYYA BUNKER

REPORT SUMMARY Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (C) SUMMARY: Then Deputy Prime Minister Rawsh Shaways met on May 13 with Rule of Law Coordinator Yellin and Poloff to review the findings of the Investigative Committee in the Al-Jadiriyya Shelter, which Shaways chaired. The report, translated on May 20, concluded that serious human rights violations, including torture and killings took place at the bunker. Shaways opined that former Interior Minister Bayan Jabr would be directly implicated if the violations were properly investigated. Yet the detailed translation of the Committee's report demonstrates the pains to which he went to insulate Jabr and former Prime Minister Ja'fari from any political fallout. It suggests former Ba'thists working at the bunker were responsible for the abuses, claims there is no evidence of SCIRI or Badr Corps influence in the Ministry of Interior (though Jabr is a senior Badr Corps official) and recommends that a judicial investigation into the matter limit its focus to the staff at the bunker. The Ja'fari government,

which has had this report for several weeks has taken no action to implement recommendations. We will work with the government of PM Nuri al-Maliki to publicize report and urge it to take action on its recommendations. END SUMMARY.

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2. (C) Deputy Prime Minister Rawsh Shaways met on May 13 with Rule of Law Coordinator Yellin and Poloff to review the finding of the Investigative Committee into the Al-Jadiriyya Shelter. Shaways, who chaired the Committtee, told us that no one had been prosecuted for the human rights abuses discovered at the Ministry of Interior prison, which was raided by Coalition and Iraqi forces on November 13, 2005. Shaways gave us a copy of the Committee's final report and promised to provide copies of the extensive attachments and annexes. 3. (C) Shaways told us that he recommended the matter be referred to judicial authorities for the possible prosecution of the commanding officer and investigative judge at the Jadiriyya bunker. Noting that people should be punished, he added the matter was in the hands of PM Ja'fari, who has taken no action during his term. Ambassador Yellin asked if the Minister of Interior was aware of the abuses discovered at the bunker. Shaways replied that in his personal opinion, Minister Bayan Jabr was aware but he had no evidence to support this. If the Jadiriyya incident was properly investigated, the investigation would lead to Jabr through the "engineer", said Shaways. (Note: Shaways was referring to Bashir Nasir al-Windi, Assistant Deputy Minister of Interior for

Intelligence and former head of intelligence for Badr Corps in Iran. Bashir was directly responsible for the supervision of the Jadiriyya bunker and reported directly to Jabr. End note.) 4. (C) Shaways characterized the undated report as "good" reflecting what is possible. He said there have been some changes in the Ministry of Interior and conditions for detainees held by the MOI have improved. There is now a judicial process in place. It was not enough but it was a start said Shaways. --------------------------------------------Summary of the Report - Investigative Process --------------------------------------------5. (SBU) The Commission was formed on November 15, 2005 by then PM Ja'fari to investigate the human rights violations at the Al-Jadiriyya bunker which was used as a MOI detention center until it was raided on November 13. Deputy Prime Minister Rawsh Shaways chaired the Committee which included Minister of State for Council of Representatives Affairs Safa'a al-Safi, Representative of the Council of Ministers Rashid Majeed Salih and Representative of the Ministry of Human Rights Ahmad Fazi (later replaced by Saad Sultan). In conducting its investigation, the Commission: -- visited the bunker three times; -- met and interviewed the prisoners evacuated by the Coalition and checked their bodies for

signs of torture; -- met with the Higher Judicial Council and Central Criminal Court four times; -- investigated bunker; the staff assigned to the

-- met with MG Hussein Ali Kamal, the Deputy Minister for Intelligence Affairs (whose office formally supervised the prison), and other MOI senior staff; and -- met with Interior. Bayan Jabr, the Minister of

----------------------Summary Report Findings ----------------------6. (SBU) On the basis of their interviews, investigations and reviews of documents, the Committee reported that: -- the establishment of the MOI Special Investigations Directorate, charged with fighting corruption and terrorism and which ran the Jadiriyya bunker was legitimate; -- 101 of 167 prisoners found on Nov. 13 showed signs of mistreatment from electrical shocks, beatings, and stabbings (based on MNF-I medical examination results); -- 76 percent of these prisoners claimed they

were arrested at checkpoints; -- 50 percent of the prisoners claimed the Badr Corps was in charge of the Jadiriyya bunker; -- 66 percent of the prisoners were Sunni, 33 percent Shia and 1 percent Christian; -- detentions were carried out in many cases without judicial orders; -- records indicated that 35 detainees had been murdered in the bunker during the period of its operation, though 21 cases could not be verified; officials and employees admitted that torture and killings occurred at the facility; -- there was evidence prisoners in general; of mistreatment of

-- the health, sanitation, food and ventilation facilities were unacceptable, the bunker is not suitable as a detention facility; -- the exposure of abuses at the Jadiriyya bunker has led to "distortion" of the reputation of the Iraqi security forces and the Ministry of Interior. -------------------------Summary Report Conclusions -------------------------7. (SBU) The conclusions: report reached the following

-- Employees at the MOI and at the Jadiriyyah were not properly trained. Since most of the workers are from the former Ba'th Party, it is possible that they might be using methods of the former regime. -- The al-Jadiriyya compound is not suitable as a detention center. -- Information obtained through physical examination, photos, medical examination, detainee allegations, and confessions by detainees prove the allegations of torture, though the evidence may not be sufficient for use in court. -- The GOI should form special committees to follow up on allegations of kidnapping and murder. -- The government must protect especially among detainees. witnesses,

-- Not all the arrests by the MOI and detentions in al-Jadiriyya were lawful. -- Internal MOI reports and Human Rights Ministry reports demonstrate systemic problems in MOI. -- There was no evidence of sectarian or political influence of SCIRI or Badr in the Ministry, except that officials in the Ministry are members of parties and political movements. -- Media reports have negatively affected the

reputation of the Ministry of Interior. -- The government of Iraq must improve the image of MOI by a serious follow-up of violations and punishing those who are negligent. -----------------------------Summary Report Recommendations -----------------------------8. (SBU) On Importance of Fighting terrorism: -- There is no solution to terrorism except to defeat it. Hostile media campaigns must not affect the duty of the Iraqi security apparatuses. On Measures that Need to be Taken: -- A judicial investigation should be opened to focus on al-Jadiriyya personnel concentrating on Ali Mohsin, the General who supervised the bunker and Judge Mahmoud Rashid Ridha, the investigative judge assigned to it. -- Committees should be formed to investigate abduction, assassination, and execution cases. On Preventing Human Rights Violations: -- Detention facilities should be public and in the custody of the Ministry of Justice.

-- Raid and arrest orders must be issued in accordance with the law. -- Investigations must be carried out by judicial investigators in accordance with the law. -- Juveniles must be separated from adults (in detention facilities). -- Health and living conditions (in detention facilities) should be improved. -- There should be a Human Rights Ministry representative in all prisons, holding facilities and detention facilities. -- Be open and cooperate with humanitarian organizations like the International Red Cross in areas of improving detainee conditions and human rights. -- Encourage independent and Iraqi organizations that work in defense of human rights and allow them to monitor detainee affairs. -- Conduct surprise inspection campaigns of prisons without prior notification of prison officials. On Political Administrative Necessities: -- The security ministries should be neutral and professional. They should be non-partisan and distant from political movements. Officials, including the Minister and senior deputies

should be professional and unbiased to political parties. The Council of Ministers should make important decisions and appointments in a transparent manner. ------Comment ------9. (C) COMMENT: The Jadiriyya bunker report covered all the bases. On one hand, it concluded that serious human rights violations, including torture and killings, did occur at the bunker. It implied, in its recommendations, that leadership at the Ministry of Interior was partisan. Its recommendations, if applied, could go a long way to building confidence in the security services and detention facilities. 10. (C) COMMENT CONT'D: On the other hand, the report made some incredible conclusions that provide political cover for Ja'fari's government and Bayan Jabr's leadership. It found that the special directorate responsible for the Jadiriyya bunker was under the direct leadership of Bashir Nasir Hamid al-Windi, a Jabr confidant. Yet it concluded that the human rights abuses may be the fault of former Ba'thist elements working at the bunker. Similarly, despite the well documented links of Minister Bayan Jabr to the Badr Corps, and numerous reports of Bard Corps infiltration of Interior Ministry structures, the report incredibly concluded that there is no evidence of SCIRI or Badr Corps influence in the Ministry. The report

takes pains to highlight the important work of fighting terrorism, as if to suggest that the abuses conducted by the Special Investigative Unit were in pursuit of a higher and laudable goal. 11. (C) COMMENT CONT'D: Finally, though Shaways privately admitted that the events at the Jadiriyya bunker could not have occurred without Jabr's knowledge, and that a proper investigation would come to that conclusion, the report recommended that future judicial investigations focus exclusively on staff working directly at the bunker. The undated report was submitted to former PM Ja'fari weeks ago and to our knowledge, no action has been taken by the Iraqi government to respond to its conclusions and recommendations. We will work with the new Maliki government to ensure that the report is made public and that the government addresses the recommendations in the report. END COMMENT. KHALILZAD (Edited and reading.) reformatted by Andres for ease of