RESPONSE OF SGT.

AARON SKOLFIELD
TO
THE INITIAL INTERIM REPORT DATED MARCH 15, 2024
OF
THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE FACTS OF THE TRAGEDY IN LEWISTON
MARCH 7, 2024

This statement is submitted in response to the Initial Interim Report of the

Independent Commission to Investigate the Facts of the Tragedy in Lewiston (hereinafter the
Commission). “The purpose of the Independent Commission is to determine the facts
surrounding the tragedy in Lewiston on October 25th, including relevant facts and
circumstances leading up to it and the police response to it.”1 On March 15, 2024, the
Commission released its Initial Interim Report (hereinafter the Report) to the public via its
website. In the Report, the Commission makes factual findings and conclusions “based on
the evidence presented to it through various police reports, videos and testimony of
witnesses.”2
The Commission failed to achieve its primary stated purpose of determining the facts
leading up to the October tragedy. The Factual Findings outlined in the Report state facts that
are simply wrong. Most importantly, the Commission relied on an inaccurate timeline of
events not supported by the evidence. The Commission then reached conclusions based on
the inaccurate factual findings, including the inaccurate timeline stated in the Report. The
Commission ignored or failed to understand extremely important specific facts, provided in
the evidence that was before them, when it concluded that Sgt. Aaron Skolfield had probable
cause to initiate the Yellow Flag process in September 2023. By relying on inaccurate facts,
the Commission reached conclusions that are not supported by the facts or information
known to Sgt. Skolfield in September 2023.
The Executive Summary of the Initial Interim Report the Commission states Sgt.
Skolfield “should have realized that he had probable cause to start the Yellow Flag process.”3
This statement is simply not accurate. What the Commission failed to state is that Maine
State law does not allow the Yellow Flag process to start unless a subject is in protective
custody, which requires a face-to-face interaction with the subject. There is NO mechanism
whatsoever in place that allows law enforcement to begin the Yellow Flag process unless a
subject is taken into protective custody first. This was clearly illustrated by an incident in
Raymond in December of 2023 (after the Lewiston tragedy).4 The Cumberland County

1
Executive Order to Establish the Commission, No. 4 FY 23/24, dated November 9, 2023.
2
See page 8 of the Initial Interim Report
3
See page 2, paragraph 5 of the Initial Interim Report. The legal name for the Yellow Flag order is a Weapons
Restriction order. For consistency and ease of reading this document will refer to it as the Yellow Flag law or
Yellow Flag order.
4
See attached Cumberland County Sheriff’s Office Law Report for Incident 23-036733 attached as Exhibit A
and Statement of Sheriff Joyce to the Judiciary Committee in support of LD 2224 attached as Exhibit B.

1
Sheriff’s Office responded to a remarkably similar call for a welfare check and numerous
officers staked out the subject’s residence for 72 hours (about 3 days). Ultimately officers
requested a search warrant which was denied by the Judge who advised the CCSO that he
had no legal authority to authorize a search warrant for a Yellow Flag case, even though the
subject had recently severely assaulted a coworker without provocation.5 The Commission
disregards these limitations when concluding Sgt. Skolfield “should have realized he had
probable cause.” Sgt. Skolfield did not have any tools available to force the face-to-face
interaction with Mr. Card and therefore could not make a determination as to whether
protective custody was appropriate.
The Commission also failed to appreciate that some of the witness testimony before
the Commission is inconsistent with the facts as they were portrayed to the SCSO and Sgt
Skolfield at the time the relevant events were occurring in September. Army Reserve
witnesses testified before the Commission to a vastly different level of concern and urgency
regarding Mr. Card’s mental health status than was communicated to Sgt. Skolfield in
September 2023. The mischaracterization of those events to the Commission, after the
tragedy occurred, attempts to change the tenor of the communications received by Sgt.
Skolfield from the Army Reserve in September. Based on its conclusions, it is clear the
Commission failed to recognize that communication and action (or lack of action), at the
time the relevant events were occurring, carries far more weight and is far more credible than
words spoken months after an event such as the tragedy in Lewiston.
The Commission also issued the Interim Report based on incomplete testimony. On
the eve of the March 7th testimony of the Army Reserve witnesses6, the Commission received
a large number of documents and materials. By their own admission, the Commission
members stated several times that they had not reviewed those documents prior to hearing
the March 7th testimony and would likely request follow up testimony from those witnesses.7
In addition to not having an adequate opportunity to review the documents prior to the March
7th testimony, the Commission did not have enough time in that session to hear complete
testimony from all of the Army Reserve witnesses. When the March 7th session concluded,
and before the Report was released on March 15th, the Commission knew it would be
bringing back witnesses from the Army Reserve that would certainly give testimony relevant

5
On April 25, 2024, Governor Mills signed LD 2224 into law, which includes an amendment to the Yellow Flag
Law that allows law enforcement officers to go directly to a judge to request a “protective custody warrant” for
purposes of conducting an assessment of an individual when law enforcement is otherwise unable to take
them into protective custody. This amendment to the Yellow Flag law addresses the very problem Sgt. Skolfield
faced when Mr. Card refused to come to the door. A copy of LD 2224 Is attached hereto as Exhibit C.
6
All witnesses from the Army Reserve appeared under subpoena and gave sworn testimony.
7
See video recording (at 9 min 28 sec) of March 7, 2024 hearing. Several members of the Commission
commented during the March 7th hearing that they had not reviewed the documents provided by the Army prior
to the hearing.

2
to the factual finding and conclusions it published in the Report.8 Reaching conclusions and
issuing the Report on March 15, 2024, was premature and based on incomplete testimony.
In what appears to be eagerness to assign blame to someone, other than Mr. Card,
for this horrific tragedy the Commission overlooked or misinterpreted key details and
disregarded the limitations on Sgt. Skolfield when it reached its conclusion that the
Sagadahoc County Sheriff’s Office (hereinafter SCSO) “had sufficient probable cause to take
Robert Card Jr. into protective custody under Maine’s Yellow Flag law and to remove his
firearms and that SCSO had probable cause to believe that Mr. Card posed a likelihood of
serious harm.”9 In fact, based upon the accurate facts, known to Sgt. Skolfield at the time,
the SCSO did not have probable cause to take Mr. Card into protective custody.10 In
evaluating the decisions and actions of the SCSO, the Commission should have viewed
those events through a lens that was focused on the facts and circumstances as they were
known to personnel of the SCSO at the time that relevant events were occurring,11 not
through a lens using the benefit of hindsight and additional information unknown to the
SCSO in September 2023.

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED
The following items are being resubmitted to the Commission.
- Det. Bagley’s email, and the attachments, sent to Sgt. Skolfield. (Attached hereto as
Exhibit D). This email was sent to Sgt. Skolfield on September 15th at 1451 hours (2:51pm) by
Det. Bagley and reviewed by Sgt. Skolfield at 3:47pm.
-Sgt. Mote’s statement (which he now claims he drafted as a “probable cause
statement for yellow flag”) sent to Sgt. Skolfield by Bagley (attached hereto as Exhibit E).
Parts of this statement have been highlighted to point out what the Commission has failed
to recognize as significant for timeline purposes. This statement was sent to Sgt. Skolfield

8
The Commission heard additional testimony from Army Reserve witnesses on April 11, 2024 and April 25,
2024.
9
See page 2 of the Initial Interim Report
10
Pursuant to Title 34-B § 3862(1), Sgt. Skolfield could have relied on a 3rd party informant if he can confirm that
the informant has reason to believe, based upon the informant's recent personal observations of or
conversations with a person, that the person may be mentally ill and that due to that condition the person poses
a likelihood of serious harm.” Sgt. Skolfield’s 3rd party informants, Mote and Reamer, convinced him that Mr.
Card did NOT pose a likelihood of serious harm.
11
An Independent, Third-Party Review of the Sagadahoc County Sheriff’s Office’s Response to Concerns About
the Mental Health of Robert Card (hereinafter the “Cunniff Report”) did focus exclusively on the facts and
circumstances as they were known to SCSO personnel at the time the relevant events were occurring. The
Commission seems to have largely ignored the 93-page Cunniff Report, the facts it established and its
determination that the actions of the SCSO were reasonable under the totality of the circumstances known at
the time the relevant events were occurring. We urge the Commission to review the Cunniff Report again.

3
on September 15th at 1451 hours (2:51pm) as part of the email from Det. Bagley and reviewed
by Sgt. Skolfield at 3:47pm.
-Electronically time stamped audio recordings of radio calls and phone calls to the
Sagadahoc County Communications Center to and from Sgt. Skolfield. (Attached hereto as
Exhibit F). Also included is the initial call from Det. Bagley of the Ellsworth Police
Department, when he first reported concerns to the Sagadahoc County Sheriff’s Office for
Sgt. Mote regarding Card on September 15, 2023 at 1428 hours (16 seconds) or 2:28 pm,
NOT 10:22AM AS NOTED ON PAGE 11 OF THE INTERIM REPORT. Please take note of the
tone and pauses of Sgt. Bagley’s voice when he first called the SCCC. He hesitates about the
urgency of the report he is making on behalf of Sgt. Mote.
-Sgt. Skolfield’s Deputy Report for Incident 23-015694, initially generated on
September 15th at 1447 hours (2:47 pm). (Attached hereto as Exhibit G). Parts of this report
have been highlighted to point out what the Commission has failed to recognize for
significant timeline purposes and testimonial conflicts made by Sgt. Mote.
THE TIMELINE
The most significant error in the Initial Interim Report is the incorrect explanation of
the timeline of events leading up to the September 2023 involvement of the SCSO. To follow
is the accurate timeline of events, with abbreviated explanations12, leading to and
throughout Sgt. Skolfield’s involvement in mid-September 202313
September 12 going into September 13 (after midnight) – Mr. Card had an
altercation with Staff Sergeant Sean Hodgson (hereinafter “Hodgson”) on the way
home from a visit to the casino. Mr. Card reportedly punched Hodgson in the face
during this incident. Hodgson gets out of the car on Lisbon Street.
September 13, 2023
2:30 AM approximately14: Hodgson calls Army Reserve Captain Jeremy Reamer
(hereinafter “Reamer”) and explains that he (Hodgson) and Mr. Card were
returning from a trip to a casino when Mr. Card complained that he could hear
people calling him a pedophile again. Hodgson reportedly told Mr. Card to “knock
it off” because he (Mr. Card) “was going to get into trouble talking about shooting
up places and people,” at which point Mr. Card reportedly punched Hodgson. The
SCSO did not learn about this event until September 15, 2023
September 14, 2023 – No events of significance take place on this date.

12
For more detailed descriptions of each timeline event please see the Cunniff Report, pages 14-36.
13
Attached as Exhibit H is a calendar form of the timeline to provide a visual explanation of relevant events.
14
Per Mote’s statement in the email Sgt. Skolfield received from Det. Bagley. (Attached Exhibit E).

4
 September 15, 2023
2:04 AM Hodgson sends a text to Mote and Reamer as a follow up to his telephone
conversation with Reamer the night before. He testified that he wanted to be clear
with them about his concerns regarding Mr. Card15
7:00 AM approximately Mote and/or Reamer see the text message from Hodgson
that was sent at 2:04 AM. This text message made the hairs on the back of Mote’s
neck stand up according to his March 7th 2024 testimony. (footnote)
2:28 PM Detective Corey Bagley (hereinafter “Bagley”), a detective at the
Ellsworth Police Department, called the Sagadahoc County Communications
Center and asked to speak to SCSO Deputy Carleton. The dispatcher informed
Bagley that Deputy Carleton was off duty, at which point Bagley asked to speak
with a supervisor regarding a situation in the Bowdoin area that was “kind of time
sensitive.”
2:29 PM The dispatcher informed Sgt. Skolfield by radio that Bagley wanted to
speak to him about a time-sensitive matter.
2:37 PM Sgt. Skolfield conferred by telephone with the dispatcher regarding
Bagley’s request for a return telephone call.
2:38 PM Sgt. Skolfield called Bagley, who gave him a synopsis of the Army
Reserve’s concerns about Mr. Card’s mental health, with the more recent
concerns having emerged during the early morning hours of September 13, 2023.
Sgt. Skolfield provided his email address to Bagley so that he could send him a
statement prepared by Mote, along with attachments of messages from Hodgson.
According to Bagley, [Army Reserve] personnel requested that the SCSO perform
a “welfare check” on Mr. Card.
2:46 PM: After speaking with Bagley, Sgt. Skolfield notified a dispatcher at the
Communications Center that the situation was not as “pressing” as it first
appeared, referring to the request for a wellbeing check as opposed to other
urgent action.
3:04 PM Sgt. Skolfield informed the dispatcher by radio that he had arrived at the
1007 West Road address. Less than a minute later, Sgt. Skolfield reported by radio
that the address was incorrect, and that Mr. Card was possibly living at a location
directly north of the 1007 West Road home. Sgt. Skolfield arrived a short time later
at the correct location and determined that Mr. Card was not home.

15
See video recording (at Part 2, 1hr 41 min 50 sec) of April 25, 2024 testimony of Staff Sergeant Hodgson.

5
 3:09 PM Sgt. Skolfield advised the dispatcher by radio that Mr. Card was not at
home. Sgt. Skolfield also determined that Mr. Card was not at his father’s
residence in Bowdoin.
3:24 PM Sgt. Skolfield reported to the dispatcher via radio that he had returned to
Mr. Card’s residence.
3:47 PM Sgt. Skolfield received an email message from Bagley forwarding a
memorandum from Mote and a text message from Hodgson. 16
5:11 PM Sgt. Skolfield directed a Sagadahoc County Communications Center
dispatcher to issue a statewide “attempt to locate” message (with special
attention to the Saco Police Department) In addition to providing identifying
information about Mr. Card and his vehicles. The broadcast was classified as a
File 6.
September 15, 2023 (SCSO Second Shift) Sgt. Skolfield briefed SCSO Corporal
Michael Fitzpatrick, the second shift patrol supervisor, who in turn briefed SCSO
Deputy Zach Kindelan, who was covering the Bowdoin area for the SCSO during
the second shift, about the concerns about Mr. Card’s mental health. Deputy
Kindelan made several attempts to locate Mr. Card during his shift. His efforts
were unsuccessful.
September 16, 2023
8:45 AM Sgt. Skolfield returned to Mr. Card’s home where he observed Mr. Card’s
white Subaru Outback parked in the dooryard.
9:01 AM Sgt. Skolfield requested a backup unit, which prompted a request for
mutual aid to the Kennebec County Sheriff’s Office (“KCSO”). About forty-five
minutes later, KCSO Deputy Ivano Stefanizzi arrived to assist him. Sgt. Skolfield
approached Mr. Card’s trailer and knocked on the door. He believed he saw the
curtains in a window that faced the road move and thought he could hear Mr. Card
moving around inside the trailer, but Mr. Card did not answer the door. Sgt.
Skolfield decided that standing at the trailer’s door was a disadvantageous
position under the circumstances, so he and Deputy Stefanizzi left Mr. Card’s
property. Deputy Stefanizzi returned to his patrol area in Kennebec County and
Sgt. Skolfield parked his police cruiser at a location near Mr. Card’s property with
a view toward his driveway, which positioned him so that he could attempt a
consensual contact with Mr. Card for a welfare check if he came out of his trailer
or drove away from his property.

16
See email with attachments from Bagley to Sgt. Skolfield attached as Exhibit D.

6
 10:01 AM Sgt. Skolfield located a telephone number for Mr. Card and made
attempts to reach him by phone to arrange a meeting with him. Mr. Card did not
answer the phone calls.
10:08 AM Sgt. Skolfield telephoned Lieutenant Brian Quinn, the SCSO Patrol
Division Commander, and advised him about the ongoing situation with Mr. Card,
as well as his plan to continue his efforts to locate Mr. Card for a wellbeing check.
As a result, SCSO Deputy Anderson was called in from his day off to cover what
would otherwise have been Sergeant Skolfield’s patrol assignment.
10:22 AM Sgt. Skolfield attempted to reach Bagley on his cellular telephone
number to determine whether he had any update on Mr. Card’s situation from his
sources, but he was unsuccessful.
10:26 AM Sgt. Skolfield attempted to reach Mote and Bagley by telephone at the
Ellsworth Police Department, but he was unsuccessful.
10:31 AM Sgt. Skolfield telephoned a dispatcher at the Saco Police Department
to confirm that SPD had received the File 6 broadcast sent on September 15,
2023.
10:35 AM and 10:37 AM At 10:35 AM Mote called Sgt. Skolfield, and they had a
very brief conversation. At 10:37 AM, Sgt. Skolfield called Mote back, and they had
a longer conversation. Among other things, Mote informed him that the Army
command staff was in the process of encouraging Mr. Card to retire from the
military on the condition that he obtain mental health treatment. Referring to
Hodgson’s text message about his concerns about Mr. Card, Mote also indicated
to Sgt. Skolfield that he believed that Hodgson’s message was “over the top” or
that he was being an “alarmist,” or something along those lines. Sgt. Skolfield
advised Mote he wanted to go up the chain of command who (he learned was
Capt. Reamer) to get a second opinion regarding what Mote was communicating
to him. Mote called Reamer advising him that Sgt. Skolfield wanted to speak with
him.
10:46 AM Capt. Reamer called Sgt. Skolfield while he was still parked up the road
from Card’s trailer in his cruiser. Sgt. Skolfield recorded his conversation with
Capt. Reamer using the audio feature of his cruiser’s Watchguard camera system,
which simultaneously videorecorded his view of Mr. Card’s driveway through the
windshield of his cruiser.17 It was during this conversation that Capt. Reamer told
Sgt. Skolfield that he had spoken to Mr. Card and that he was angry, but did not
make any specific threats, Capt. Reamer reported that Mr. Cards family was

17
A verbatim transcription of Sgt. Skolfield’s telephone conference with Capt. Reamer is included as Exhibit 2
of the Cunniff Report.

7
supposed to remove and secure Mr. Cards firearms, he shared that Mr. Card’s
behavior in not answering the door was typical and he was not surprised, and he
emphasized that the Amy Reserve was only looking for a well-being check (“if you
can kinda tell he’s there and alive just kind of document it “) and there was “no
sense in you guys (the SCSO) pushing in” and escalating the situation. It was also
during this call the Capt. Reamer questioned the credibility and reliability of
Hodgson’s text message and suggested it should be taken with a grain of salt.
September 16, 2023 (Morning) At some point during the morning, Maine State
Police Sergeant Thomas Pappas stopped to speak with Sergeant Skolfield while
he (Sergeant Skolfield) was parked near Mr. Card’s house. Sergeant Skolfield
explained the situation with Mr. Card to Sergeant Pappas, who informed Sergeant
Skolfield that he (Sgt. Pappas) believed that Sergeant Skolfield’s response to the
mental health concerns was sufficient under the circumstances.
Notwithstanding Sgt. Pappas’ assessment, Sgt. Skolfield decided to take
additional steps in response to those concerns.
10:59 AM Beginning at 10:59 AM, Sgt. Skolfield attempted to contact Ryan Card,
Mr. Card’s brother, by telephone (calling three telephone numbers that he
believed were utilized by Ryan Card) with the intention of speaking to him about
Robert’s mental health. He was unsuccessful in reaching Ryan Card.
11:09 AM Sgt. Skolfield telephoned his supervisor, Lt. Brian Quinn, and discussed
the status of his response to the Army Reserve’s concerns about the mental
health of Mr. Card. During the conference, Sgt. Skolfield informed Lt. Quinn that,
based on the information provided by Reamer and Mote as to the Army Reserve’s
assessment of Mr. Card’s situation and the unsuccessful attempts to conduct a
wellbeing check (other than determining that Mr. Card appeared to be inside his
home), they believed that the best approach would be to leave Mr. Card alone.
Sgt. Skolfield also advised Lt. Quinn that he intended to speak with Ryan Card, Mr.
Card’s brother, and request that Ryan Card assist by removing any firearms that
Mr. Card may possess. In addition, Sgt. Skolfield told Lt. Quinn that he intended
to ask Ryan Card to contact the Sagadahoc County Sheriff’s Office if he (Ryan
Card) had or developed any reason to believe that Mr. Card needed a psychiatric
evaluation.
11:34 AM Sgt. Skolfield attempted to contact Ryan Card again by going to the
home of Mr. Card’s father, Robert Card, Sr., in Bowdoin. Ryan Card was not there,
but Sgt. Skolfield spoke with Robert Card, Sr. and was told to speak with Ryan
Card about securing Mr. Card’s firearms. (This conversation was recorded by Sgt.
Skolfield on his Watchguard cruiser camera system). Sgt. Skolfield believes that
he then went to Ryan Card’s home, but Ryan Card was not there.

8
 12:04 PM The Sagadahoc County Communications Center assigned Sgt. Skolfield
to a call for service to investigate a domestic violence incident in Bowdoinham,
which required his full attention during the remainder of the shift and beyond.
September 17, 2023
2:42 PM Sgt. Skolfield had a telephone conference with Ryan Card, who assured
him that he (Ryan Card) and his father (Mr. Card, Sr.) would work together to
secure Mr. Card’s firearms and that they would contact the Sheriff’s Office if they
needed assistance or if Mr. Card’s mental health deteriorated further and he
believed that a psychiatric evaluation was necessary.
The Commission falsely states in its Report that Sgt. Skolfield received the initial
complaint from the Army Reserve at “10:22 am on 9/15 2023.”18 This is wrong. The Report
goes on to say, “Sgt. Skolfield called Det. Bagley, Det. Bagley relayed his concerns, and
provided the Mote probable cause statement, the Hodgson text, and other information to
Sgt. Skolfield.”19 This sentence leaves the impression that Sgt. Skolfield received all this
information from Bagley at 10:22am, which is false. The first call alerting the SCSO to the
concerns about Mr. Card came into dispatch at 2:28pm, over four hours later in the day. Sgt.
Skolfield did not speak with Bagley until he called him back at 2:38pm. During the call Bagley
communicated that they were just requesting a welfare check, which caused Sgt. Skolfield
to adjust his initial understanding of the urgency of the concern.
Sgt. Skolfield still set out to attempt the welfare check as requested by Bagley. He was
able to view the email from Bagley forwarding Mote’s statement at 3:47pm, over an hour after
his call with Bagley and after he had already made his first attempt to locate Mr. Card at his
residence. Upon reading Mote’s statement (that was forwarded from Bagley), Sgt. Skolfield
realized Hodgson’s initial report of Card’s behavior had actually come in around 2:30am,
making Hodgson’s report of his concerns a great many hours older than Sgt. Skolfield
originally thought.20 This new understanding of the longer amount of time between
Hodgson’s text message and the communication from Bagley requesting the welfare check
further diminished the severity and urgency of the request for the welfare check in Sgt.
Skolfield’s analysis. It actually took the Army Reserve over 60 hours (about 2 and a half

18
See page 11 of the Initial Interim Report.
19
It is surprising that the Commission did not ask Mote about the nexus between Ellsworth PD and the threats
Mr. Card made. Why was Ellsworth PD involved in any way, thus slowing down the reporting process
significantly? There is no evidence that any of the threats, assault or any matter relating to a welfare check
occurred within the City of Ellsworth.
20
See Mote’s statement from September 15th, where he states “night before last” which Sgt. Skolfield
understood to be September 14th. (Attached Exhibit E).

9
days) to relay their concerns and the information that was finally provided to Sgt. Skolfield
the afternoon of September 15th.21
The Commission did not accurately represent the amount of time Sgt. Skolfield spent
at or within sight of Mr. Card’s residence on September 16th attempting to make contact with
him. The Commission states, that on September 16th, Sgt. Skolfield spent “approximately 16
minutes from start to finish” attempting to contact Mr. Card.22 In reality, it was over 2 hours
as evidenced by a previously provided law enforcement report and time stamped cruiser
video of the conversation with Capt. Reamer. All the Commission had to do was look at the
upper right-hand corner of the cruiser video to see the date and time stamp, along with Sgt.
Skolfield’s law enforcement report. The Commission’s portrayal of how much time Sgt.
Skolfield spent at Mr. Cards residence is inaccurate and extremely misleading.
On January 25th, Commission member Dilworth asked Sgt. Skolfield,” ……so tell us
about this phone call you receive around 2:30 you received around the afternoon of
September 15th, who did you talk to?”23 Attorney Dilworth then asked at about what time Sgt.
Skolfield arrived at Robert Card’s house on September 15. Sgt. Skolfield, after referring to his
notes, responded that it was between 2:38 and 2:46.24 This testimony and line of questioning
from Commission member Attorney Dilworth is unmistakable evidence that the
Commission knew Sgt. Skolfield did not get the initial call from Bagley at 10:22 am on
September 15, 2023 as stated in the Interim Report.25 Why the Commission chose to use this
inaccurate time as the initial contact to Sagadahoc County cannot be reasonably explained.
The Commission’s deletion of over four (4) hours of time is incredibly significant.
On January 25th, Commission member Attorney Dilworth asked, “You have any
recollection of the conversation with the dispatcher on your. . . while you’re on your way over
to Robert Card’s house?” Sgt. Skolfield responds by saying, “ I remember telling dispatch
that it was not as urgent as it originally sounded when it was given to us, uh when dispatch
uh received the information it was reported that it was time sensitive, but once I found out
that information was, in my mind’s eye, over 12 hours old it didn’t meet the same urgency
standard as someone in crisis right here and now that needs to be dealt with who’s who’s uh
…..half a day had gone by in my mind’s eye at that point so I did communicate that to
dispatch…..”26 Sgt. Skolfield would later learn the assault on Hodgson and threats made by
Mr. Card to the Saco Army Reserve unit were actually more than two and a half days old when

21
In fact, Hodgson’s initial reporting of his concerns about Mr. Card came via telephone call to Reamer around
2:30AM on September 13th, so his initial report was even older than Sgt. Skolfield understood from Mote’s
statement.
22
See page 11 of the Initial Interim Report
23
See video recording (at 1hr 58 min) of January 25, 2024 testimony of Sgt. Aaron Skolfield.
24
See video recording (at 2hrs 12 min, 30 secs) of January 25, 2024 testimony of Sgt. Aaron Skolfield.
25
See page 11 of the Initial Interim Report.
26
See video recording (at 2hrs 9min, 20 secs) of January 25, 2024 testimony of Sgt. Aaron Skolfield.

10
they were finally communicated to him. The Commission failed to recognize this in their
Initial Interim Report or during public hearings completed prior to issuing the Report.27
INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES
When the accurate facts surrounding the involvement of the SCSO in September
2023 are closely examined it is abundantly clear that Mote’s testimony on March 7, 2024
was, at the very least, disingenuous. After reviewing the documents provided to and
prepared by Sgt. Skolfield in September 2023 (before the Lewiston tragedy) it is easy to see
that Mote’s testimony before the Commission on March 7, 2024, was describing an elevated,
retroactive concern through the lens of hindsight after the Lewiston tragedy had occurred.
Had Mote been as concerned in September of 2023 as he purported to have been when he
testified on March 7th, he would have made his concerns known to the SCSO without delay.
He would not have waited more than seven (7) hours after receiving Hodgson’s text
message and follow up communication in the early morning hours of September 15th. The
Commission failed to ask Mote why he did not act quickly on the text message and follow up
communication from Hodgson if he had a genuine concern and deemed the reported threat
to be credible at that time. Mote, not through his actions before the tragedy, but instead, in
meaningless words, after the Lewiston tragedy expresses his dire concern to the
Commission. He never expressed his dire concern to Sgt. Skolfield in September of 2023. In
fact, he did the opposite.
Mote testified that he got a text on Friday September 15th at 2:04AM28 from Hodgson.
Mote testified he did not see that text until 07:17 am. Mote testified, “….as soon as I saw it, I
contacted Capt. Reamer and um we discussed it and I said we need to get Sagadahoc
County to go down and do a well-being check to gauge his mental status.” Mote went on to
testify that he contacted Hodgson after viewing the text sent at 2:04AM. Mote testified that
Hodgson sent the text after he was assaulted in the car coming back from the casino. 29 This
is simply not accurate. Mote’s own testimony does not align with the stated details from his
own purported, “yellow flag probable cause statement” which in the 3rd paragraph down
states, “Night before last, at approximately 0230, another soldier that is friends with Card
called to tell me that Card assaulted him. They were driving home from the casino when Card
started talking about people calling him a pedophile again. When Hodgson told him to knock
it off because he was going to get into trouble talking about shooting up places and people,
Card punched him…….”

27
See attached audio recording (Exhibit F) for true context.
28
Hodgson’s text came in on September 15th at 2:04am. In Mote’s statement dated September 15th (attached
as Exhibit E) he says, “Night before last, at approximately 230, another soldier that is friends with Card called
to tell me that Card had assaulted him.” The “night before last” would be September 14th. The assault occurred
on September 13th.
29
See video recording (at 3hrs 57 min 18secs) of March 7, 2024 testimony of Sgt. Kelvin Mote.

11
 When asked if he was concerned, Mote responded by saying “absolutely.”30 The
question remains, why did Mote wait for over 7 hours (according to his testimony) to
eventually communicate his reported concern if the hairs on the back of his neck were
standing up? Would an experienced police officer, such as Mote, who is genuinely
concerned about an individual he knows well, wait all morning and into the afternoon to
report his concerns to authorities if he thought a mass shooting might actually happen?
When asked, Mote stated he found Hodgson’s accounting of Mr. Cards actions and stated
intent credible at that time. Mote responded by saying, “based on the information I had and
everything that had come before, yes.”31 So why did he wait so long to make a report to
SCSO? Mote testified upon questioning, that he was, “erring on the side of caution, basically
is urging them to get there as quickly as they can and get this evaluation or get this face to
face....”32 So why did he express to Sgt. Skolfield his doubts about the credibility of Hodgson?
The Commission did not ask Mote why he did not report the concern regarding Mr.
Card himself on in the early morning hours of September 15th if those concerns were so
alarming that they “caused the hairs on the back of his neck to stand up”. Despite Mote being
“absolutely” concerned, the Commission did not ask Mote, in any meaningful way, why he
did not report Hodgson’s concerns himself, rather than vicariously through Bagley at the
Ellsworth Police Department. The Commission also failed to recognize that Mote had a direct
cell phone number to Dep. Carleton with whom he had spoken to in May of 2023 about Mr.
Card. Why didn’t Mote simply contact Deputy Carleton directly?
Mote was not as concerned in September of 2023 as he portrayed to the Commission
on March 7th. This is demonstrated by his lack of immediate action in September and by his
conversation with Sgt. Skolfield. He waited over 7 hours to communicate his concerns
vicariously through Bagley. Further, Mote failed to express any grave concern after he learned
on September 16th that Sgt. Skolfield was not able to get Mr. Card to answer his door so the
welfare check he requested could be performed. Had Mote been as concerned in September
2023 as he claimed to be before the Commission on March 7th, he should have reached out
to the Saco Police Department to have charges initiated against Mr. Card for Terrorizing thus
triggering an arrest and bail conditions prohibiting possession of firearms. The reality is,
Mote was not as concerned as he asserted during his testimony before the
Commission. His lack of serious concern was what he communicated to Sgt. Skolfield
on September 16th at 1037 hours in their 3 minute 18 second phone call in which he
advises Sgt. Skolfield that Hodgson is not particularly credible and agreeing that Sgt.
Skolfield should let Card cool off. The only credible part of Mote’s testimony is that Sgt.
Skolfield advised him that he (Sgt. Skolfield) wanted to go up the chain of command as a
result of Mote informing Sgt. Skolfield that Hodgson tends to exaggerate, and the situation

30
See video recording (at 3hrs 57 min 18secs) of March 7, 2024 testimony of Sgt. Kelvin Mote.
31
See video recording (at 4hrs 2 min 5 secs) of March 7, 2024 testimony of Sgt. Kelvin Mote.
32
See video recording (at 4hrs 15 min 00secs) of March 7, 2024 testimony of Sgt. Kelvin Mote.

12
was not that dire. Mote did not express any belief that Mr. Card was going to follow through
with his threats. Sgt. Skolfield wanted a second opinion at the next level of command. Mote’s
opinion was then echoed by Capt. Reamer as evidenced in the cruiser video the Commission
has viewed.
It should be noted that prior to speaking to both Mote and Reamer, Sgt. Skolfield
contacted Lt. Brian Quinn advising him that he was going to be tied up for an unforeseen
amount of time due to the request for a welfare check on Mr. Card. As a result, Dep. Mark
Anderson was called out from home on his day off to cover the road. Dep. Anderson signed
on duty at 1054 hours on September 16th. Sgt. Skolfield was prepared to spend a significant
amount of time with this welfare check until he spoke to BOTH Mote and Reamer, both law
enforcement officers, who CONVINCED Sgt. Skolfield that the welfare check on Card was
NOT needed, and he could let him be. The Commission failed to recognize these facts.
Sgt. Skolfield testified before the Commission that he had initially forgotten he had
spoken to Mote for roughly 3 minutes at around 1037 hours on September 16th. After the
tragedy in Lewiston and upon reviewing his report and listening to the cruiser video, it
became clear to Sgt. Skolfield that Reamer did not make the statement below, but rather
Mote. Sgt. Skolfield also testified that he made an error in part of his report. On September
16th. Sgt. Skolfield had back-to-back phone calls from Mote and Reamer. Sgt. Skolfield
advised the Commission that he gave Reamer credit for some of things Mote had stated in
his report, specifically, “… the Guard is in the process of trying to get Card to retire from the
Guard with conditions that he get some mental health treatment.” Sgt. Skolfield heard Mote
make this statement in September, before the horrific shootings. Mote, however, could not
recall talking about working on Mr. Card getting a retirement with conditions of mental health
treatment when he testified on March 7th.
Sgt. Skolfield, after being asked why he did not reach out to Hodgson, responded that
“both Mote and Reamer indicated the unreliability of Hodgson’s report…. He “had a had a
reputation of being a bit of an alarmist, exaggerating the truth, so I relied on his (Hodgson’s)
commanding officers to make a judgement there.” 33 Sgt. Skolfield relied on the judgement
of Hodgson’s superiors, both of whom Sgt. Skolfield knew to be experienced law
enforcement officers. Both of Hodgson’s superiors expressed concern about Hodgson’s
credibility.
Mote also acknowledged that he and Reamer discussed Hodgson’s credibility,
“maybe a little bit” when asked by the Commission. Mote would elaborate in saying that the
text Hodgson sent came in at 2:04 in the morning, that Hodgson drives a truck overnight, he
sleeps during the day, calls at random times during the night 3 o’clock in the morning 4
o'clock in the morning………..so you never really know what he’s going to call you to talk
about………….sometimes he calls to talk about off the wall stuff. After being asked by the

33
See video recording (at 4hrs 6min, 16 secs) of January 25, 2024 testimony of Sgt. Aaron Skolfield.

13
Commission about a conversation he had with Reamer regarding Hodgson, Mote advised
that Hodgson “drinks a lot when he is not working and sometimes, he calls when he’s
intoxicated and coupled with the fact that it comes in at 2, 3, 4 o’clock in the morning…. You
know, you have to…. what is that old saying and take it with a grain of salt sometimes…. but
my belief was not my belief was that this was a credible threat.” 34 On September 16th, Mote
emphasized the “grain of salt” issues regarding Hodgson and very much minimized the threat
Mr. Card posed when he spoke to Sgt. Skolfield on the phone. Again, this is illustrated by the
fact that Mote took a substantial amount of time to vicariously report the threat
communicated to him by Hodgson about Mr. Card. It is also illustrated by Reamer’s advice
on September 16th to back off and not to force the welfare check with Mr. Card. It is incredible
the Commission failed to recognize these facts, even if it was only a 3-to-7-hour time delay,
as errantly portrayed by the Commission, and much more so when the delay is over 36 hours
(about 1 and a half days) if Mote’s “yellow flag probable cause statement” is utilized for
timeline purposes. The actual timeline is over 60 hours (about 2 and a half days) from Card’s
concerning behavior after leaving the Oxford Casino to actual time reported to SCSO on
September 15th around 2:30 PM.
Mote testified before the Commission that he was contacted by Dep. Carleton of
SCSO in May of 2023 and Dep. Carleton explained the concerns about Card. 35 In his March
7th testimony Mote stated that he has “no authority over him when it’s not during drill or on
orders”, they were going to have to get him to Togus or a hospital. This testimony is contrary
to what Dep. Carleton wrote in his report (23-006566) before the Lewiston tragedy. Mote told
Dep. Carleton “he was going to call Captain Reamer immediately and start to figure out
options to get Robert help.”
Mote acknowledged that he talked to Reamer about Mr. Card, but he had no
recollection of discussing the Yellow Flag law. However, he is now claiming that he thought
there was probable cause to implement the Yellow Flag law and that his email statement
(sent by Bagley) was intended to be a probable cause statement. Mote never discussed
utilizing the Yellow Flag law in his discussions with Sgt. Skolfield.
Mote testified he was on duty with the Ellsworth Police Department when he spoke to
his Deputy Chief about Hodgson’s concerns over Mr. Card. Mote testified that it was
suggested that a detective make the referral to Sagadahoc County because it involved the
military. Why, at this point, was it not appropriate for Mote to make the referral himself and
avoid the complaint being made through third party hearsay? The Commission failed to ask
this question in any meaningful way. A seasoned law enforcement officer such as Mote must
know that hearsay is a less than desirable way to communicate information to other law

34
See video recording (at 4hrs 5 min 40 secs) of March 7, 2024 testimony of Sgt. Kelvin Mote.
35
See video recording (at 3hrs 7 min) of March 7, 2024 testimony of Sgt. Kelvin Mote.

14
enforcement officers. Mote should have made the initial complaint and encouraged
Hodgson to directly contact Sagadahoc County.
Reamer’s testimony was largely consistent with the relevant events as they were
happening, though his characterization of his intentions at that time differed. Reamer
testified at numerous points regarding all the actions he failed to take with respect to Mr.
Card following his hospitalization in July, including ensuring that Mr. Card follow his
treatment recommendation and that his personal firearms were secured. In addition,
Reamer failed to notify any other agency, including the SCSO, of the situation with Mr. Card
upon his discharge from Four Winds Hospital and his recommended weapons restrictions.
He never communicated that information to the SCSO. The Commission acknowledged in
its Report that Reamer did not communicate any of this information and “appeared to
minimize the risk”36 when speaking to Sgt. Skolfield, but then completely disregarded the
effect this lack of information and minimizing had on Sgt. Skolfield’s analysis of the situation.
Reamer was more forthright in his testimony than Mote regarding Hodgson’s
credibility. He confirmed that he did communicate his concerns about Hodgson’s credibility
to Sgt. Skolfield in their recorded telephone call, but he stopped short of agreeing that he
was minimizing the threat. Reamer testified that it was not his intention to minimize the
threat, but his inaction between Hodgson’s initial report on September 13th and finally taking
some action on September 15th, his statements to Sgt. Skolfield to let Mr. Card be and not to
“push in”, and his statements about Hodgson’s credibility, clearly demonstrate otherwise.
In addition, neither Reamer nor Mote followed up with SCSO, or any other agency, in
any way, between September 17, 2023 and October 25, 2023. If these two Army Reserve
supervisors of Mr. Card (who are also law enforcement officers) had such serious concerns
about Mr. Card’s behavior and threats, why did neither of them do anything at all to follow
up, with anyone, on the well-being check?
INCOMPLETE TESTIMONY
The Commission failed to appreciate or point out in the Report that Hodgson reached
out to Reamer almost immediately after being assaulted by Card in the early morning hours
of Wednesday September 13th. Hodgson followed up with his 2:04AM text on September
15th. Mote testified he saw Hodgson’s text at 7:17 AM on September 15th. Hodgson did not
call local law enforcement himself; he texted his superiors in the middle of the night,
knowing they likely would not see the message until the morning. The Commission may have
missed this detail because they had yet to hear complete testimony from Reamer or any
testimony from Hodgson before issuing the Interim Report.
March 7, 2024 was the first Commission hearing session where witnesses from the
Army Reserve were scheduled to be questioned about their role in the events leading up to

36
See pages 11-12 of the Initial Interim Report.

15
October 25, 2023. At the outset of the March 7th hearing session Chair Daniel Wathen stated
that the Commission received voluminous documents from the Army Reserve late the
previous evening and they did not have a chance to review the documents prior to the
testimony on March 7th.37 The Commission knew before they published the Interim Report on
March 15th that they were very likely inviting the Army Reserve witnesses back for additional
testimony. On March 7th, only three Army Reserve witnesses testified, with most of that
session being Mote's testimony. Reamer also testified on March 7th, but it was clear at the
end of the session that he would likely be brought back.
On April 11, 2024, Capt. Reamer appeared before the Commission for a second time
and testified for approximately an additional three hours. During his testimony he spoke in
more detail regarding his role in all the relevant events leading up to October 25, 2023. The
Commission was able to ask more pointed questions, having now reviewed the voluminous
documents provided by the Army. Reamer’s testimony directly impacts the view of the
situation communicated to the SCSO in September of 2023 and it most certainly would have
been informative for the Commission to have all the relevant facts before reaching the
conclusions it published in the March 15th Report.
On April 25, 2024, the Commission took testimony from three more Army Reserve
members, including Staff Sergeant Daryl Read (hereinafter “Read”), Master Sergeant
Edward Yurek and Staff Sgt. Sean Hodgson. Arguably, Read and Hodgson were two of the
Army Reserve unit members that knew Mr. Card the best. Hodgson was the one that reported
the altercation with Mr. Card in September that led to the request to the SCSO for a welfare
check. It is incredible that the Commission would have issued its Interim Report prior to
hearing anything at all from these two witnesses.
The Commission issued the interim Report on March 15, 2024 based on incomplete
testimony.38 The Commission acknowledged at the March 7th hearing that they did not have
time to review the documents provided by the Army prior to hearing testimony that day. It
was communicated several times during the March 7th hearing that they would likely need to
bring back some of the Army Reserve witnesses, which they did on April 11, 2024 and April
25, 2024.39 The Commission knew the interim Report, and the conclusions they reached
regarding Sgt. Skolfield’s involvement in September, were based on incomplete testimony
and information. The Commission issued the Initial Interim Report anyway.

37
See video recording (at 9 min 28 sec) of March 7, 2024 hearing. Several members of the Commission
commented during the March 7th hearing that they had not reviewed the documents provided prior to the
hearing.
38
To date the Commission also has not heard testimony from Kennebec County Sheriff’s Office Deputy Ivano
Stefanizzi, the only other person present when Sgt. Skolfield attempted to make contact with Mr. Card at his
residence on September 16, 2023.

16
PROBABLE CAUSE
The Commission noted that it has long been established in Maine that a police officer
may determine probable cause through the collective knowledge of all law enforcement
officers involved in an investigation.40 This is exactly what Sgt. Skolfield did when he listened
to both Mote and Reamer who told him to back down and not to force the welfare check with
Card. Sgt. Skolfield examined the totality of the facts and circumstances known to him and
the collective knowledge of all law enforcement officers involved, and agreed, in conjunction
with Mote and Reamer, that it was best to let Mr. Card be and not force the welfare check. It
should also be noted that the Commission failed to acknowledge that probable cause can,
and does, in fact, go stale when multiple days go by after a reported concern, crime, or
mental health crisis. The passing of many hours and multiple days decreases the severity of
the original threats made and the level of urgency of the request for a welfare check.
During his March 7th testimony Mote acknowledged that he knew Mr. Card was
restricted from having access to military firearms after his mental health stay at Four Winds
Hospital at the end of July of 2023. He was advised of that by Reamer about a week after
Card’s release. Mote never advises Sgt. Skolfield of this in information in his now purported
“probable cause statement for yellow flag” or during their phone call on September 16th.41
As the Commission has pointed out, law enforcement officers can determine whether they
have probable cause based on the totality of the circumstances. Knowing that Mr. Card’s
doctors had recommended that he be restricted from access to firearms would have played
a crucial role in the totality of the probable cause analysis. Unfortunately, that piece of
information, among others, was not shared with Sgt. Skolfield.
The Commission made its findings that Sgt. Skolfield had probable cause through the
lens of hindsight rather than based solely on what was known to Sgt. Skolfield and what was
communicated to him by Bagley, who was told by Mote who was told by Hodgson of the
issues around Mr. Card. Much of what the Army Reserve unit knew about Mr. Card and his
psychiatric hospitalization in July, including treatment recommendations and weapons
restrictions, was not communicated to Sgt. Skolfield by either Mote or Reamer. 42 This is
significant and would have supported the initial tone of the complaint on Card. Instead,
both Mote and Reamer downplayed those concerns during their phone calls with Sgt.
Skolfield.

40
See page 13 of the Initial Interim Report.
41
See video recording (at 3hrs 53 min 40secs) of March 7, 2024 testimony of Sgt. Kelvin Mote.
42
Capt. Reamer had a lot more information about Mr. Card’s hospitalization in July, including his diagnosis, his
treatment plans and recommended restrictions following his discharge from Four Winds Hospital on August
3rd. As the Commission heard from Capt. Reamer in his testimony on April 11, 2024, he did not follow through
on any of his responsibilities with respect to Mr. Card’s discharge (i.e. ensuring Mr. Card attended his outpatient
treatment, ensure his firearms were secured, and more), nor did he communicate any of the information,
concerns or recommendations to the SCSO, even when he spoke with Sgt. Skolfield in September of 2023.

17
AT NO POINT DID MOTE OR REAMER COMMUNICATE ANY URGENCY TO HAVE A
WELFARE CHECK DONE ON MR. CARD. IN FACT, IT WAS QUITE THE OPPOSITE. NEITHER
MOTE NOR REAMER INDICATED IN ANY WAY THAT CARD WAS THE “REAL DEAL” AND
THAT HE NEEDED TO BE CHECKED ON. THE CONTRARY WAS COMMUNICATED TO SGT.
SKOLFIELD BY BOTH OF THESE MEN DURING THE PHONE CALLS THEY HAD WITH HIM.
IT WAS COMMUNICATED TO SGT. SKOLFIELD BY BOTH MEN THAT HODGSON LACKED
CREDIBILITY.
Mote NEVER communicated to Sgt. Skolfield during the phone call they had on
September 16th that he intended his statement (sent to Bagley which was eventually sent by
email to Sgt. Skolfield), was to be used as a probable cause statement to enact a yellow flag
process on Mr. Card. This statement has NO verbiage at all to indicate that it was intended
to be used as a probable cause statement and Mote never said that verbally to Sgt. Skolfield.
Mote testified before the Commission that he had experience with the Yellow Flag
process and that he himself had done one. Mote testified how familiar he was with Mr. Card’s
behavior in New York in July that led to Mr. Card’s forced mental health evaluation. Mote
testified that he was very involved with that process. Mote testified about how Card was
attempting to shut himself in his room and would not engage, however the door was forced
to remain open which ultimately ended in a command order by superiors to seek mental
health treatment while in New York. Mote, an experienced law enforcement officer, should
have known that Mr. Card would likely fail to open his door to law enforcement when they
knocked on his door in September for a welfare check. Mote was, in fact, told by Sgt. Skolfield
on September 16th at 1037 hours that Card refused to open the door when an attempt at a
welfare check was conducted. It should have been most obvious to Mote, who testified
before the Commission that a law enforcement officer must have contact in person with a
subject, such as Mr. Card, to begin the Yellow Flag process by taking them into protective
custody.
It was communicated to Mote by Sgt. Skolfield that Mr. Card refused to open the door
for the welfare check. If Mote was as concerned as he purported himself to be before the
Commission, he should have realized that he needed to press criminal charges for terrorizing
through Saco PD to get through the legal barrier of needing a face-to-face contact with Mr.
Card in order to take him into custody. The reality is, in September, Sgt. Mote did not
genuinely believe Card to be as real or serious a threat as he testified to the Commission.
Mote communicated his underwhelming concern to Sgt. Skolfield during their phone call on
September 16th prompting Sgt. Skolfield, after also talking to Reamer, to leave the Card
residence. Again, Mote’s words and actions in September do not match his testimony before
the Commission in March. Sgt. Skolfield responded to what both Mote and Reamer told him.
The Commission’s failure to recognize the 7 plus hours it took Mote to vicariously
report Hodgson’s concerns about Mr. Card is extremely significant! This considerable time
delay calls into question Mote’s credibility regarding what he testified to before the
18
Commission on March 7th, (i.e., his elevated level of concern and his belief that probable
cause existed). The failure of the Commission to recognize these inconsistencies seems to
have greatly informed the determination that Sgt. Skolfield had probable cause to take Card
into protective custody. If the accurate timeline and facts that Sgt. Skolfield knew in
September are examined, it is clear that he did not have probable cause at that time.
RELIANCE ON MR. CARD’S FAMILY
A lot of attention has been paid by the Commission to the role of Mr. Card’s family in
attempting to secure Mr. Card’s firearms. The Army Reserve relied on Mr. Card’s family to
secure his firearms in early August. Sgt. Skolfield, lacking any other options and unable to
make contact with Mr. Card, also reached out to Mr. Card’s family about his mental health
status and asked for their assistance in securing Mr. Card’s personal firearms. On both
occasions, it has been reported by several witnesses, that Mr. Card’s family was cooperative
and willing to assist in securing the firearms.43
The Commission alleges Sgt. Skolfield abdicated his law enforcement
responsibilities when he reached out to Mr. Card’s family to assist in securing Mr. Card’s
firearms and to do their own assessment of his mental health. Involving Mr. Card’s family
was not an abdication, but rather an above and beyond approach as a result of what he had
been told by Mote, which was then supported by Reamer. Both Mote and Reamer had already
convinced Sgt. Skolfield that there was not a need to continue with, or force, the welfare
check. Sgt. Skolfield took it upon himself to go further and to get the family involved. It is
common practice for law enforcement, along with medical practitioners, to utilize family
members as resources to keep individuals with mental health issues safe within a family
unit. The Commission’s failure to understand that this is common practice is concerning. 44
The Commission criticizes Sgt. Skolfield for reaching out to Mr. Card’s family45 and then later
criticizes Sgt. Skolfield for not speaking to Mr. Card’s family.46 The contradictory criticism
speaks for itself.

43
To date, it is unclear to this author if the Commission has heard testimony from any of the members of Mr.
Card’s family. While it is understandable why that has not happened, if it has not, but it also makes it difficult
to fully “determine the facts surrounding the tragedy in Lewiston on October 25 th, including relevant facts and
circumstances leading up to it and the police response to it”, which is the stated purpose of the Commission.
44
Commission Member Dilworth’s repeated statement that “people can’t police their own” is inflammatory,
insulting to families and does not reflect the common law enforcement practice of involving families and others
close to a person to ensure their safety and that of the community. For example, Court ordered bail conditions,
including the securing of restricted weapons, are routinely enforced with the involvement of family members.
45
See page 2 of the Initial Interim Report
46
See page 3 of the Initial Interim Report

19
CONCLUSION
The Commission, comprised primarily of judges and attorneys47, is very misleading in
stating that law enforcement had more than sufficient information to pursue criminal assault
charges against Card. The Commission creates an illusion in their Initial Interim Report that
law enforcement regularly obtains warrants for misdemeanor crimes where there is no
willing or cooperative complainant or victim, except domestic violence assault as mandated
by law. The Commission is, in essence, dictating that law enforcement should charge for
EVERY crime in all instances because of what may occur after the fact regardless of a
victim’s wishes. This is a notable change in law enforcement practice that the Commission
insists should have been done. This practice, if implemented, would have far reaching
implications in Maine law enforcement and the judicial process.48
The Commission seemed to be in a rush to find fault and clearly failed to carefully
examine and appreciate the facts and testimony as presented to them through March 7th.
The timeline alone speaks volumes. The lack of action and downplaying of the threat by the
Army Reserve members involved speaks volumes. Arguably, in an effort to find someone to
blame for this horrible tragedy, the Commission has distorted and ignored the evidence
provided to them. In distorting and ignoring the accurate facts and evidence, and
prematurely drawing conclusions, the Commission has unfairly put the blame squarely on
Sgt. Skolfield and the SCSO. When viewing the facts and information known to Sgt. Skolfield
at the time the relevant events were occurring it is clear that Sgt. Skolfield’s actions were
reasonable under the circumstances. By focusing on finding someone to blame, the
Commission has failed in its primary purpose of determining the facts. The accurate facts
must be determined if there is any hope of improving how similar situations are handled in
the future. We urge the Commission to review the accurate facts, hear additional testimony
if necessary, and revise the conclusions published in its Initial Interim Report.

Respectfully submitted by,

____________________________
Jessica L. Maher, Esq.
Attorney for Sgt. Aaron Skolfield and the Maine Fraternal Order of Police
May 7, 2024

47
It is noteworthy that the Commission does not include even one member of the law enforcement community.
48
It should be noted that judges and prosecutors have total immunity from civil lawsuits in the performance of
their duties. There have been instances where judges have let violent individuals out of jail or prison early that
have promptly reoffended, sometimes violently.

20