An Attempted Proof and Justification for the Phenomenological Reorientation of Meillassouxs Principle of Factiality 07000408 3,994

1. Setting the Speculative realism scene

P1) That which is (exists) is experienceable P2) If that which is in-itself is (exists) then it is experienceable (and a fortiori knowable) P3) The in-itself is not experienced C1) Therefore, the in-itself does not exist Let us not get ahead of ourselves, we must break with this argument momentarily for clearly we could carry on making it valid to our hearts content but elude all soundness. As it stands both P1) and P2) need to be further expounded to provide their truthfulness, as a consequence calling into question P3). I suggest that this be done by further defining and distinguishing the way some thing could be and the way some thing could be experienceable. It should first be noted that it is quite possible that something be experienceable (that which permits of able-to-be-experienced-ness, whether this potential experiencing be by us or not) while not necessarily ever being experienced. If this is the case then as a corollary it is possible for something to be without ever necessarily being experienced, though it may well be experienceable. The ability of something to be experienceable is incommensurable with what is experienced. To put it another way that which is experienced is a priori not reducible to that which exists. Effectively experience depends on there being real beings and not the converse and, further, beings that have a purpose or telos of some kind. Why? On pain of the fact that the conditions that hold so that beings do appear to one another must depend upon the essential constitution of the objects involved. I am here alluding to something along the lines of Harmans object that lies at an absolute distance from its phenomenal appearance to some other entity (Harman, 2010:158), this entity itself being another object. This will be explained further in section 4 where it will be argued that this can provide an analogue to which Meillassouxs Principle of Factiality can be explained and compared (it will be important to note that while Meillassouxs principle leads to the possibility of the un-totalizability of the possible, from which the ontic/ontological divide is derived, this is still just a mere possibility, one which Meillassoux himself admits to have not deductively proved 1) upon which most of his ontology stands. This is the first and main aim of this essay, the second part of my argument, which I will tackle first in order, consists in reconstructing the first premise to adhere to a correlationist framework and, based upon what is derived from the exegesis of the combined principles of both philosophers, to consider a reorienting of this altered premise so as to collapse into the first. If this can be done then it becomes incumbent upon us to look into this conflation of
1 He concedes graciously that the absolutization of the Cantorian non-All requires an absolutization that is ontological, rather than ontical, because it now states something about the structure of the possible as such, rather than about this or that possible reality. It is a matter of asserting that the possible as such, rather than this or that possible entity, must necessarily be un-totalizable (Meillassoux, 2008:127)

experienced with experienceable as the potential source of the apparent inability of thought to know being when thought is not there and as a possible deduction of the un-totalizability of any thing. 2. Meillassouxs Facticity and Factiality Since this is an essay about finitude and limitedness it seems that we should try to adopt a similar approach to this argument that Meillassoux himself implements to answering the problem of access to the absolute to see if we can get a similar result; charging through the (strong) correlationist argument itself to reveal its true implications i.e. facticity. This concession being granted we must change P1) so as to adhere to a correlationist framework, which can be crudely characterized as one which prides epistemology over ontology: P1i) That which is experienced is existence What Meillassoux makes abundantly clear is that a metaphysical assertion such as this is characteristic of absolute/speculative idealism also, not just of strong correlationism proper. Here an absolute idealist absolutizes the correlation declaring There is no world without subject nor subject without world. However, against strong correlationism, Absolute Idealism has made the assumption of taking the correlation (which is in actuality the facticity of the correlation) as absolutely necessary and deducible. This would render P1i) as: P1ia) That which is experienced is existence and unconditionally so Here we have a reduction of the experienced to existence, one which does not allow for existence outside that which is experienced, whether this assertion is ontologically or epistemologically stated is besides the point. What is pertinent is that both the absolute idealist and the strong correlationist accept this premise but draw different conclusions based upon it2; ontological and epistemological respectively. The correlationist responds to the absolutist by pointing out that though indeed what is experienced is existence, this is simply another for us, and while being more fundamental than any other fact (an exposition of this point can be found in Meillassoux, 2008:38-41) it is a fundament as such for experience and not existence as such. So implicitly, if not explicitly, the correlationist is adhering to a framework which simply does not allow for necessity in their
2 Thus idealism and strong correlationism share an identical starting point - that of the unthinkability of the in itself - but then go on to draw two opposite conclusions from it - that the absolute is thinkable, or that it is unthinkable, respectively (Meillassoux, 2008:38)

ontology (for if necessary then metaphysical which would go against the grain of the post-Kantian strictures on epistemology). Accordingly, this then leads the correlationist to address the ostensible necessary conditions of experience warranting the question: does this qualification of the disqualification of the possible access to a metaphysical (necessary) absolute extend to a priori transcendental conditions? The reason the transcendental conditions cannot be grounded as necessary even though they presuppose all givenness is that they are themselves given in a very similar way as the character of (Husserlian not Kantian) phenomenal objects given in givenness itself. What becomes apparent is that in order for a strong correlationist to defend themselves against the subjectivist metaphysician it is necessary to dispute the seemingly necessary transcendental conditions, and thus the transcendental subject that embody them3, that hold for any givenness as such (the correlation itself being reducible to one such given), in order to uphold the ubiquitous classification of the limitations of knowledge. To claim, as the absolute idealists do, that the absolute is nothing but the correlation of thought to being means that we must concede that we have come to know some necessary entity viz. this or that particular correlation or set of transcendental conditions. The implications of the strong correlationists critique of the absolute idealists invalid leap from the for us to the in-itself denounces thoughts presupposition of a limited epistemological remit. This recognition is however not pursued or even noticed by the correlationists themselves. The two separate formations of the first premise differ hugely. With P1i) experience is given access to a reality reserved for itself, occupying a small seat in existence as a whole, this being further divisible into epistemological and metaphysical conclusions that either reinforces the Kantian experience-contra-thing-in-itself gulf on the one hand and sublates it on the other; where regardless of the course we so care to pursue experience, far from accessing reality, creates one of its own standing outside any possible access to the larger stage upon which supports it, though not strictly true for the absolutist (It is interesting to see that for the absolutist knowledge is completely commensurate with being since once one finds that for anything to be is to be thought and anything to be thought means for it to be. Realization of this kind is for obvious reasons absolute knowing4). P1), in contrast, inverts the strong correlationists epistemological strictures (the facticity of the correlation) by converting that which was once epistemological (human centered)
3 The pages 24-26 address this pertinent point: Objective bodies may not be a sufficient condition for the taking place of the transcendental, but they are certainly a necessary condition for it (Meillassoux, 2008: 25) 4 Whether or not this absolute is merely ideal (limited to the subject) or real (applies to all subject/objects but under the guise of both) is debatable and to an extent pertinent but cannot fall within the remit of this essay. Beiser offers an argument for the latter comparing the absolute of Hegel with that of Spinozas one substance with two attributes; mental and physical: This means that the subjective and objective must be not only ideal but also real, i.e. it must be not only one in perspective but also on in the object itself (Beiser, 2006:65)

into an ontological principle (all encompassing). At this juncture it is of utmost importance to obviate something that is overlooked here; that those who do endorse P1i) under the ilk of the strong correlationist in fact imply P1) if they wish to up hold their critique against those who absolutize the correlation, and this is what I will argue in what follows and stems from the undeducibility of the mathematical derivation of factiality. If we can demonstrate that this all too ubiquitous qualification of fundamental reality as that which is reducible to the relations it enters or qualities it exudes - the most fundamental characterization of which is expresses by Meillassoux as absolutizing the correlate (that between thought and being) - then we are left with a reality in which the thinking being is a being that is necessary; all other objects (this term will be clarified later on) become dependent upon the transcendental subject for their reality. In addition Already here we can note a Berkeleyan feeling to this assertion in that i) the reality of a thing is nothing apart from its qualities being perceived and ii) these qualities of things are not actually in the things perceived, essentially that is. But what has been shown is that the reality of a thing is necessarily something separate from its being experienced consequently we can then accept that the qualitative features of things are not ones which necessarily give themselves and necessarily so for there to be any kind of knowledge of anything at all. In other words; how is it possible that thought have access to the in-itself if it is always already circumscribed by its own qualifications? It is precisely in strong correlationisms adamant adherence to thoughts strictures on access to nature in-itself that any form of absolutism no longer has purchase because while simultaneously claiming itself to be an absolute it contradicts thoughts already established criteria that such an absolute is not deducible. At the beginning of the essay it was drawn to attention the disjunction that could be make between that which is experienceable and that which is experienced, it seems that based on the exposition we have given thus far it is possible to attribute, though tentatively, what I mean by experienced to what Meillassoux describes as givenness and what I mean by experienceable as that which is separable from the experienced, whatever that may turn out to be. What is important to notice is that some meaning can be imbued into these concepts that are readily explainable through Meillassouxs own terminology but can be refined at a later stage. This leads conveniently into a segue, that can fortify, by way of analogy, the difference outlined here between experienced and experienceable. 3. The Argument from Atomic Physics What becomes apparent from the strong correlationists discourse is that those conditions that ground experience, although necessary for experience, are not necessary in themselves.

The belief in this idea that it may be thus and so is exacerbated for two reasons 1) by the necessitarian inference (Meillassoux, 2008:94), which is based on the necessity of the nonnecessary, as no longer a legitimate ground for the absolute and 2) the up until now undisputed claim that reason may function within a framework of aleatory reason, which can no longer be up held due to Cantorian set theory, consequently leaving the possibility of the conceivable as totalizable as no longer a deducible fact. But it is exciting to bring to attention the fact that what philosophy is noticing currently physics had noticed more than sixty years prior. It is true that experience teaches us that a certain thing has such and such properties, but it does not teach us that it could not be different. Therefore, if a proposition is thought together with its necessity it must be a priori... Empirical knowledge, on the other hand, is synthetic. But are synthetic judgements a priori possible? (Heisenberg, 2000:47. Emphasis added) Here Heisenberg outlines briefly the primary theme contained within the project of Kants first Critique; how is it that we can ground the findings of the empirical sciences considering Humes assertion that causality is not deducible and whose necessity is merely inferred by custom? 5 Here Heisenberg gives his answer to the closing question in the reference as somewhat ambivalent in relation to Meillassoux, which seems to strike both accord and dissonance with Meillassouxs formulation of factiality. Although the mapping of Heisenbergs and Meillassouxs works do not map completely by any close means there is a point of equivalence and difference that should be pointed out. In Physics and Philosophy he distinguishes between three types of realism these being Metaphysical Realism, Practical realism and Dogmatic realism6, each realism being characterized by varying applications of their their ability to objectivate, We objectivate a statement if we claim that its content does not depend on the conditions under which it can be verified (Heisenberg, 2000:43), statements about the world. Under the guise of metaphysical realism (embodied by Cartesian philosophy) all statements, properly speaking, are not susceptible to explanation as we already now that thinking begets knowledge of extension, for res extensa exists on the proof of res cogitans, thus matter is free from thought. Practical realism regards that many statements can be objectivated and that these constitute much of experience. And, finally, dogmatic realism claims that any statements made regarding the material world can always be
5 Our account will focus on the principle of causality, also known as the principle of the uniformity of nature ... the principle assumes that given the same initial conditions, the same results invariably follow (Meillassoux, 2008:85). 6 (Heisenberg, 2000:43)

objectivated. It is on this last classification of metaphysics that atomic theory is able to question the dogmatic realist; because it is precisely the conditions or observer that cannot be extracted from the content of the experiment, it is on condition that there be an observer at all that the statements that quantum theory produce have any meaning at all. In relation to Kant, this calls into disrepute the rampant longevity of his arguments for the a priori nature of the conditions of possible experience. So rather than the conditions for any future science depending upon these conditions it becomes apparent that experience itself becomes a necessary condition for atomic experimentation. As Heisenberg accedes while referencing the experiments of the Copenhagen interpretation: The use of these concepts, including space, time and causality, is in fact the condition for observing atomic events and is, in this sense of the word, a priori. What Kant had not foreseen was that these a priori concepts can be the conditions for observing atomic events and at the same time can have only a limited range of applicability. (Heisenberg, 2000:50. Again, emphasis added) What Kant quite correctly pursues in his project is the justification of those conditions that are necessary for the pursuit of science but chooses to derive these features (causality, space, time, categories) that supply this justification in terms of the possibility of our experiencing as such. This, however, restricts any subsequent progression of science by forcing the adherence of the formal structure of experience without considering its possible, nay, actual remit. Since the formal structure describing nature at any one time is its own gauge against its own findings, the question of how far the formal rules of that style represent that reality of life which is meant by the art cannot be decided from the formal rules. (Heisenberg, 2000:65), here art simply alludes to any metaphysical system prevalent at the time. From this there seem to be two repercussions that provide ground for an ambivalence when having Meillassoux in mind. The similarity is that Heisenbergs proof of the inability of science to successfully establish its own limit of application can be found in Meillassouxs critique of the strong correlationists own critique against the absolute idealist and their form of absolutizing the correlate; where the recognition of the contingency of transcendental conditions through deduction as invalid, as was stated at the beginning of the section, are comparable to atomic physics reinterpretation of Newtonian physics. In this sense, experience is no longer that which needs to be grounded, transcendentally or otherwise, but is itself the ground upon which a new science derives all of its meaning, for whether a photon is in state A (wave) or in state B (particle) we can only designate these two properties to the object in question if we have a classical set of

tools with which to describe the complimentary results given to us by atomic physics. However, there is a key difference in the two systems; that where strong correlationism rejects absolute idealism atomic theory embraces experience. Given that this is the case, atomic physics claim to the necessity of the observer seems to contradict Meillassouxs claim that there need not be thinking beings for scientific discourse to have its meaning, as he states himself, the truth or falsity of a physical law is not to be established with regard to our own existence - whether we exist or do not exist has no bearing upon its truth (Meillassoux, 2008:114). Now, rather than favouring one view over another and inadvertently reducing either scientific explanation or metaphysical principle to one or the another, and thereby assuming their ability to battle one another as on a par and of the same kind, it might better aid us to ask: Is it possible to reconcile these two views, one scientific the other philosophical, in such a way as to procure the same results that would only result from a battle of experimentation and progress in the two respective fields?7 And, further more, can we make appeal to the terms we departed with at the close of the last section in order to facilitate this reconciliation? 4. In Conclusion: Harmans appearance of essence (thing-in-itself) as a necessary condition of the Factiality of Experience: A Phenomenological Reorienting of Meillassouxs Principle of Factiality Perhaps it would have been a much more exciting excursion into speculative realism if rather than exhausting both time and word count (which has already been far exceeded) on a detailed explanation of the strong correlationists argument and a seemingly fruitless exposition of atomic theory it would have been best to simply contrast Meillassoux and Harman in a depraved versus devout knockout. But if that were what was carried out an illuminating question would not have arisen: How can Meillassouxs un-totalizability of the possible, which is a result of factiality, account for the experience dependent claims of modern physics without recourse to mathematics? For to solicit mathematics (for Meillassoux) is to explain the in-itself in terms that are objectivated, remembering that we objectivate a statement if we claim that its content does not depend on the conditions under which it can be verified and therefore against the physicists, thus the two poles being directly opposed and never meeting. However, on closer inspection it seems that Meillassoux has indeed heeded Heisenbergs conditions, with one glaring omission, and in the following way:

7 We are reminded here by modern physics of the old wisdom that the one who insists on never uttering an error must remain silent (Heisenberg, 2000:46)

1.

When we objectivate we claim that a statement does not depend on the conditions under which it is verified. Atomic physics does not objectivate but instead subjectivates. When we subjectivate, on the other hand, we claim that a statement does depend on the conditions under which it is verified. The un-totalizability of the possible is a principle, which in principle, cannot be verified under any circumstances what so ever I cannot think the unthinkable, but I can think that it is not impossible for the impossible to be (Meillassoux, 2008:42)

2.

3.

4.

If we can subjectivate, however, the un-totalizability of the possible then it must at both one and the same time subjectivate and objectivate in order to cohere with both the un-totalizability of Meillassouxs mathematical ontology and atomic physics; this however seems incoherent It it statement 4 I will dispute. Firstly, one might think that 3 offers a way out of the discord by simply acknowledging that since the un-totalizable is non verifiable then this is veritable proof that it is neither 1 nor 2 and so dissolves the problem by not assenting to either. To do so would be the same as the absolute idealist who deduces without rigid deduction of the kind laid down by Kant. And as a corollary we are no longer engaging with the problem and thus have no means of solving it, to quote a foot note already used; the one who insists on never uttering an error must remain silent (Heisenberg, 2000:ibid). What is actually missing is the key deduction of the untotalizability of the possible as ontologically reaching rather than merely ontically asserted. But on pain of being inconsistent Meillassoux can only endorse one of these positions and so holds fast to mathematics as his index to things-in-themselves but there by having to answer to physics. What we want to do then (according to the points just outlined) is derive the un-totalizability of the possible from experience per se; that is from intentionally, that is from the content rather than the form. Thus avoiding Heisenbergs contention that formal rules cannot self critique but agreeing with Meillassoux that un-totalizability is indeed our conduit to which to attain the absolute. At this juncture we shall turn not to Harman but instead Husserl for a possible solution. soon one is faced with the enigmas caused by this implication of nonactive manifolds of appearances, without which no things, no world of experience, would be given to us. And soon we are also faced with the difficulties of concretely unfolding this a priori of correlation. The latter can be displayed only in relativity, in an unfolding of horizons in which one soon realizes that unnoticed limitations, horizons which have not been felt, push us on to inquire into new correlations inseparably bound up with those already displayed. (Husserl, 1970:159:46. Emphasis added)

It is in experience itself that we find our source of the derivation of the un-totalizable, not set theory or the fallaciousness of the probability of thought. If this is so then we have a number of rewards to reap from such an ontology of objects. The first being that actual empirical justification of this untotalizability of intentional objects means that we can make sense of atomic physics without having to contrive any mathematical presuppositions which directly question the fundament of atomic physics as phenomenology deals strictly with the everyday, pre-scientific phenomenon which classical physics is based on; phenomena do not change. Secondly, and more interestingly, is that we can, based upon this new application of the Principle of Factiality, give a more positive description of the terms we started with at this essays very inception; the experienced and the experienceable. To say that something is experienceable is nothing more than to insist that objects are not exhausted by their relations to other objects (Harman, 2010:164) and to say something is experienced is to say nothing more than that the experienceable is being experienced though importantly) it is never reducible to those accidents and properties being experienced; both the experienced and the experienceable have the character of non-reducibility or, borrowing from Meillassoux, un-totalizability. Though these two features work in tandem with one another; some object A cannot give itself fully to object B without ceasing to be anything experienceable at all, because by definition the experienceable is non-exhaustible, if it were it would not be experienced. So in concluding let us see if we have got anywhere close to elucidating what the initial argument could now mean in relation to what has been discussed and how we might be better equipped to deal with Meillassouxs problem of the relation of thought to being. That which is (exists) is experienceable this turns out to be merely descriptive rather than imperative; that which exists is experienceable but by no means need be experienced and so experience. If that which is in-itself is (exists) then it is experienceable (and a fortiori knowable) this can be seen as tautologous as that which exists is fundamentally connected to its ability to be experienceable or to not be experienceable depending on the constitution of the other experienceable object being encountered, it follows from this that the experienced does not equal what is experienceable. Therefore, the initself does not exist is a conclusion based upon a misunderstanding of the terms involved but through an application of the Principle of Factiality to Experience shows that a substance is simply that unknown reality of a thing that resists being exhausted by any perception of it or relations with it (Harman, 2010: 118).

Bibliography Beiser, Frederick (2006) Hegel, Routledge: London Harman, Graham (2007) On Vicarious Causation (pp.171-205), Collapse Vol. II: Speculative Realism, Urbanomic: London Harman, Graham (2010) Towards Speculative Realism: Essays and Lectures, Zero Books: Winchester Heisenberg, Werner (2000) Physics and Philosophy, Penguin: London Husserl, Edmund (1970) The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, Translated and Edited by David Carr, Northwestern University Press: Meillassoux, Quentin (2008) After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, Translated by Ray Brassier, Continuum: London

References Meillassoux, Quentin (2008) Time without Becoming, Middlesex University, May 2008 Kant, Immanuel (2007) Critique of Pure Reason, Translated by Norman Kemp Smith, Palgrave Macmillan: New York